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Maurer Georgetown 0076D 13 AN ERA OF NEGOTIATION: SALT IN THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION, 1969-1972 A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History By John D. Maurer, M.A. Washington, D.C. May 30, 2017 Copyright 2017 by John D. Maurer All Rights Reserved ii AN ERA OF NEGOTIATION: SALT IN THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION, 1969-1972 John D. Maurer, M.A. Thesis Advisor: David S. Painter, Ph.D. ABSTRACT The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) represented a decisive shift in the Cold War, replacing unbridled strategic competition with a process of superpower bargaining. Despite its importance, however, the Nixon Administration was divided over the purpose of arms control. The State Department and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) promoted the Cambridge Approach to arms control, which sought to bolster mutual assured destruction by limiting dangerous weapons technologies. The Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) promoted the Philadelphia Approach to arms control, which sought to gain competitive nuclear advantage over the Soviets through a combination of competition and negotiation. Newly-available archival sources allow us to examine how Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger mediated these competing viewpoints to produce SALT policy. Nixon and Kissinger redefined deeper political divisions over the purpose of arms control in terms of technical questions of verification, while delaying any final SALT decision that would alienate proponents of either arms control approach. Facing mounting pressure to conclude an arms control agreement, Nixon and Kissinger resorted to secret backchannel negotiations with the Soviets to present fait accompli bargains to the US foreign policy bureaucracy. The resulting arms control agreements, the 1972 ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement on Offensive Forces, were shaped by the internal bargaining of the Nixon Administration. Proponents of both the Cambridge and Philadelphia Approaches could agree, albeit for very iii different reasons, that limiting large intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defenses was beneficial to US security. As a result, ICBMs and ABM were both limited under the 1972 agreements. Conversely, proponents of the two arms control approaches could not agree over the desirability of MIRV. As a result, the 1972 agreements did not limit the deployment of MIRV technology. iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This dissertation was written only with the help of many wonderful people. First and foremost among these is my graduate advisor, David Painter, whose advice and encouragement were essential to the completion of this work. Kathryn Olesko and Keir Lieber also provided useful advice and timely feedback on the manuscript, helping me to sharpen the focus of my study. My work at Georgetown has also been enriched by many teachers and colleagues. Special thanks are due to Daniel Byman, Michael David-Fox, Toshihiro Higuchi, Robert Lieber, Aviel Roshwald, Adam Rothman, Gregory Brew, Anthony Eames, Chad Frazier, Oliver Horn, and Robynne Mellor, all of whom contributed to my understanding of American history and US nuclear weapons policy. Carolina Madinaveitia provided invaluable help in navigating the procedural aspects of producing a dissertation at Georgetown. I also owe a great debt to many beyond Georgetown. Jacqueline Deal, Stephen Rosen, and Nathan Picarsic of the Long-Term Strategy Group provided advice on the interaction of US foreign policy and domestic politics. William Burr, Carla Braswell, Richard Moss, and James Neel offered ready advice on navigating the relevant sources. Nicholas Myers and Eric Sand provided feedback on parts of the project. Funding for research was provided by the Cosmos Club Foundation of Washington, DC, as well as the Gerald R. Ford Foundation. Finally, this dissertation was only possible with the love and support of my family. My parents, John and Maureen Maurer; my siblings, Margaret, James, and Clara Maurer; and my in- laws, David, Vivian, and Greg Shaull, provided endless encouragement in my work. Most of all, my wife, Rebecca Maurer, endured with patience the many ups and downs of graduate school, and was always ready with good counsel. Many thanks, John Maurer v TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 1 Chapter 1 – Approaches to Arms Limitation ................................................................. 19 Chapter 2 – The Politics of Delay .................................................................................. 59 Chapter 3 – The Verification Panel ............................................................................ 125 Chapter 4 – SALT Decisions ...................................................................................... 176 Chapter 5 – SALT Stalemate ...................................................................................... 221 Chapter 6 – The 20 May Agreement ............................................................................ 279 Chapter 7 – Final Compromises .................................................................................. 332 Chapter 8 – Moscow and Back ................................................................................... 369 Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 405 Bibliography ................................................................................................................ 413 vi INTRODUCTION In the fall of 1969, representatives from the United States and the Soviet Union met in Helsinki to begin the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). The meetings in Helsinki began a process that would redefine superpower relations. Although SALT had antecedents in previous US-Soviet arms control negotiations, none had touched so directly on the international balance of power. From 1969 onwards, the unilateral pursuit of strategic nuclear advantage would be tempered by negotiation. In the years ahead, a process of bargaining in arms control talks would shape the military balance between the superpowers and become a policy topic of immense controversy. Much was a stake in these negotiations as successive US Presidents and Soviet leaders sought to reduce the risk of nuclear competition even as they aimed to prevent each other from gaining a strategic advantage. The process of strategic arms limitation was built on the precedents set between 1969 and 1972. Although a number of detailed accounts exist of the Nixon Administration’s SALT deliberations, to date none have delved fully into the arms control motives of US policymakers in the 1960s and 1970s. Arms control was a two-level negotiation, taking place simultaneously between the United States and the Soviet Union, and between various parts of the US foreign policy community. US motives for arms control were complex. Many conservatives, Nixon and Kissinger included, hoped that SALT could be used as a tool to increase the United States’ relative nuclear advantage over the Soviet Union, conserving US resources while retaining an edge over the Cold War adversary. Nixon also had to contend with many influential Americans who believed that SALT should be used to stabilize an equal deterrence based on no advantages for either side. This basic division over the proper purpose of arms limitation meant that 1 achieving a successful SALT agreement was not foreordained.1 Nixon and Kissinger worked hard to build a tenuous arms control consensus that could please key constituencies within the government and pass Congressional muster. Reconstructing the motives behind SALT can tell us a great deal about how the United States conducted arms control negotiations during the Cold War. SALT Motives US arms control policy was a response to the dramatic shift in the nuclear balance of power that occurred in the late 1960s. Since 1945, the United States had enjoyed overwhelming superiority in the number of nuclear weapons it could deliver to the Soviet Union in the event of a general war. US national security strategy was predicated on this superiority in nuclear firepower, which also provided an extended deterrent against possible Soviet aggression against US allies in Eurasia. Beginning in the mid-1960s, however, the size and capability of the Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal expanded dramatically, with the Soviets constructing hundreds of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) each year. The loss of the United States’ nuclear superiority threatened to undermine US national security strategy more generally. Although parity did not necessarily undermine direct deterrence of a Soviet attack on the United States, many analysts and policymakers feared that the United States might not be willing to deter Soviet aggression against its Eurasian allies if 1 Arms limitation is a sub-set of arms control negotiations that seeks to restrict specific weapons. Other types of arms control include “spatial restrictions” on where weapons can be deployed, and “functional measures” on how armed organizations behave; see: Paul Viotti, “A Template for Understanding Arms Control,” in Arms Control: History, Theory, and Policy, Volume 1: Foundations of Arms Control, eds. Robert Williams & Paul Viotti (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger,
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