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Monthly Forecast June 2021 Monthly Forecast 1 Overview Overview 2 Security Council Elections 2021 In June, Estonia will have the presidency. The Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) and 3 Status Update since our Council may hold meetings in the Security Coun- to receive briefings by the ICC Prosecutor and May Forecast cil chamber this month, although high-level meet- the chair of 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee. ings will most likely continue to be held by video- An adoption is also anticipated to renew 5 Mali conference (VTC). the authorisation for member states, acting 6 Libya Estonia has chosen to hold three open debates: nationally or through regional organisations, 8 Sudan children and armed conflict, cybersecurity and to inspect vessels on the high seas off the coast 9 Syria working methods. The children and armed conflict of Libya, bound to or from the country, that they 10 UNOCA open debate on the Secretary-General’s annual have reasonable grounds to believe are violating report will be at ministerial level and will be chaired the arms embargo. 11 International Criminal Tribunals by the President of Estonia, Kersti Kaljulaid. Brief- There are a number of other meetings on Afri- ings are expected from a senior Secretariat official, ca scheduled this month: 12 EU-UN Briefing UNICEF and a civil society representative. • CAR, on the UN Multidimensional Integrated 13 Somalia The cybersecurity open debate will also be at Stabilization Mission in the Central African 14 UNDOF (Golan Heights) ministerial level, with the Prime Minister of Esto- Republic (MINUSCA); 15 Yemen nia, Kaja Kallas, expected to chair the meeting. • Central Africa region, on the UN Regional A briefing is anticipated from High Representa- Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) and the 16 Security Council Working Methods tive for Disarmament Affairs Izumi Nakamitsu. implementation of the UN regional strategy to This will be the Council’s first formal meeting on combat the Lord’s Resistance Army; 17 Haiti cybersecurity. • DRC, on the renewal of the 1533 sanctions 19 South Sudan The annual open debate on working methods regime and its Group of Experts, 20 Afghanistan will feature briefings from the chair of the Infor- • Somalia, briefing by the chair of the 751 Soma- 21 Central African mal Working Group on documentation and other lia Sanctions Committee; and Republic procedural questions, Ambassador I. Rhonda King, • South Sudan, on UNMISS. 22 Children and Armed and Loraine Sievers, co-author of “The Procedure Regarding Middle East issues, there will be the Conflict of the UN Security Council (4th edition)”. regular briefings on the political, humanitarian 24 Cybersecurity The quarterly debate on Afghanistan will be and chemical weapons tracks in Syria, as well as held at ministerial level with Estonia’s Minister the monthly meeting on developments in Yemen. 25 Democratic Republic of of Foreign Affairs, Eva-Maria Liimets, expected Other Middle East issues this month include: the Congo to chair the meeting. Deborah Lyons, the Spe- • Golan Heights, quarterly briefing and renewal 26 Iran cial Representative for Afghanistan and head of UNDOF’s mandate; of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan • Iraq, on the United Nations Investigative Team (UNAMA), is the anticipated briefer. An official to Promote Accountability Against Da’esh/ from the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and a ISIL Crimes (UNITAD); civil society representative may also brief. • Iran, on non-proliferation; and There will also be the annual briefing on • Israel/Palestine, monthly briefing on recent cooperation between the UN and the EU with a developments. briefing by EU High Representative for Foreign A meeting is also expected on Haiti. Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell. In June, the Council will hold its semi-annual Regarding African issues, the regular briefing on debate on the International Residual Mechanism 29 May 2021 the UN mission in Mali (MINUSMA) is expected for Criminal Tribunals (IRMCT). This report is available online at securitycouncilreport.org. together with an adoption to renew the mission’s The General Assembly is expected in June to mandate. Council members will be paying close elect five Security Council members for the 2022- For daily insights by SCR on evolving Security Council actions please attention to the situation following the recent coup 2023 term. subscribe to our “What’s In Blue” and may hold further meetings as necessary. The Council will also be closely watching devel- series at securitycouncilreport.org or follow @SCRtweets on Twitter. On Sudan, the Council is expected to renew opments in Myanmar and Tigray and may meet on the mandate of the UN Integrated Transition the selection of the next Secretary-General. Security Council Report Monthly Forecast June 2021 securitycouncilreport.org 1 Security Council Elections 2021 The 75th session of the UN General Assembly is scheduled to hold to win a seat if all 193 UN member states are present and voting. elections for the Security Council on 11 June for five non-permanent Election to the Council, as with other principal organs of the UN, members of the Security Council for the term 2022-2023. requires formal balloting even if candidates have been endorsed by their regional group and are running unopposed. In theory, a mem- Background ber state running unopposed might not garner the requisite votes The five seats available for election in 2021, according to the regular in the General Assembly in the first round, and be challenged in distribution among regions, will be as follows: subsequent rounds by a new candidate. This is possible, but unlikely. • two seats for the African Group (currently held by Niger and There have been several instances in which extended rounds of Tunisia); voting were required to fill a contested seat, however. Such situations • one seat for the Group of Asia and the Pacific Small Island Devel- have usually been resolved when one of the contenders withdraws, or oping States (Asia-Pacific Group) (currently held by Viet Nam);1 a compromise candidate is elected. Exceptionally, countries compet- • one seat for the Latin American and Caribbean Group (GRU- ing for a seat have decided to split the term between them, but the LAC, currently held by Saint Vincent and the Grenadines); and only time this has happened since 1966 was in 2016, when Italy and • one seat for the Eastern European Group (currently held by the Netherlands agreed to split the 2017-2018 term. Estonia). The Western European and Others Group (WEOG) is not con- Potential Council Dynamics in 2022 testing any seats this year, as its two seats, held by Ireland and Nor- The ongoing tensions among the P-5 can be expected to persist and way through 2022, come up for election every other year. The five colour Council dynamics in 2022, making it difficult for the Council new members elected this year will take up their seats on 1 January to gain traction on Israel/Palestine, Myanmar, Syria, and Ukraine, 2022 and will serve until 31 December 2023. among other issues. Six member states—Albania, Brazil, the Democratic Republic of At the same time, widespread agreement is likely to continue on the the Congo (DRC), Gabon, Ghana, and the United Arab Emirates— fundamental value of UN peace operations. While there are disagree- are currently running for the five available seats. The DRC, Gabon ments about particular mandate elements and donor concerns about and Ghana are contesting the two African Group seats, while the the cost of peace operations, most mandate resolutions continue to other three candidates are running unopposed. Since 2010, 78% of be adopted unanimously. This seems unlikely to change dramatically. races for Council seats have been uncontested. As troop contributing countries, the African candidates—the Five out of the six candidates have served on the Council previ- DRC, Gabon and Ghana—can be expected to take keen interest in ously: Brazil has served ten times; Gabon and Ghana both three the ongoing discussions about the Council’s role in designing and times; the DRC twice; and the United Arab Emirates once. Albania overseeing peacekeeping mandates, including efforts to improve their has never served on the Council. effectiveness and efficiency. The need for more predictable, flexible The table below shows the number of seats available by region and sustainable funding for AU peace operations is a longstanding in the 2021 election, the declared candidates, and their prior concern—highlighted by Gabon during its campaign—that could be terms on the Council. raised by African members again in 2022. In this regard, following the adoption of resolution 2568 reauthorising the AU Mission in Somalia REGION SEATS MEMBER STATES RUNNING (AMISOM) in March 2021, the African Council members and Saint AVAILABLE AND PREVIOUS TERMS ON THE Vincent and the Grenadines (the A3 plus one) issued a joint explana- IN 2021 COUNCIL tion of vote in which they expressed their disappointment that UN Africa 2 The DRC (1982-1983, 1990-1991); assessed contributions were not included in the resolution as one of Gabon (1978-1979, 1998-1999, the possible options for more secure funding for AMISOM. 2010-2011) and Ghana (1962-1963, Tensions over the Council’s scope of discussion—and action— 1986-1987, 2006-2007) can be expected to persist in 2022. Some members regard issues Asia-Pacific 1 United Arab Emirates (1986-1987) such as food security and climate change, for example, as part and parcel of the maintenance of international peace and security. Most Latin America and 1 Brazil (1946-1947, 1951-1952, of the current Council line-up, and aspiring members such as Alba- Caribbean 1954-1955, 1963-1964, 1967-1968, 1988-1989, 1993-1994, 1998-1999, nia, Gabon, Ghana, and the UAE, espouse a role for the Council 2004-2005, 2010-2011) on climate change and security matters.
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