CHAPTER V

CONTENT ANALYSIS OF VIVARA ṆOPANY ĀSA

The Vivara ṇopany āsa is a summary of vivara ṇa. Therefore, it follows the structure of the text. Vivara ṇa follows the structure of

Pañcap ādika as it is an exposition of Pañcap ādika . Pañcap ādika has nine var ṇakas and so is Vivara ṇa and Vivara ṇopany āsa .

Contents of Pañcap ādik ā

The order of contents discussed in Pañcap ādika is as follows. The first var ṇakas exclusively devoted to the discussion of adhy āsabh āṣya .

It considers the following topics also. The significance of bhāṣya followed by Adhy āsa and related concepts like ajñ āna , and mithy ātva , refutation of khy ātiv ādas , pratikarmavyavastha, and jīvanmukti nirupana . Many other topics are also discussed in this var ṇaka which can be included in the broad sense of adhy āsa . In this var ṇaka

Padmapada discusses the nature of mithy ātva and the classic definition

िमयेितअिनवचनीयताउयते1 appears here.

The second var ṇaka mainly deals with the bhāṣya on first sūtra ‘ath ātobrahmajijñāsa’ . In this varanaka , the author considers the views of Bhatta and Pr ābh ākara schools of pūrvam īmāmsa as pūrvapak ṣa and rejects them. The third var ṇaka deals with the jijñ āsas ūtra . In this var ṇaka also the concepts of both schools of Pūrvam īmāmsa are discussed and refuted.

The fourth var ṇaka considers the views of Śarir ātmav ādins , indriy ātmav ādins, vijñ ānavadins, śūnyav ādins, and sāmkhyas on the nature of Ātman . It also considers and refutes the inference of Vai śeṣikas on the existence of Ātman . This var ṇaka concludes with an illustration of the benefit of learning Brahmavidy ā.

The fifth Var ṇaka deals with the commentary on Janm ādis ūtra and considers the Svar ūpa and lak ṣana of Brahman in its Kārya and

Kāra ṇa forms. Here also the ideas of Mim āmsa , and Ny āya systems were considered and refuted.

The sixth Var ṇaka deals with the third sūtra śāstrayonitv āt. It exposes the sarvajñatva of Brahman . The seventh var ṇaka also deals with the third sūtra . In this var ṇaka , the Śāstrapram āṇakatva of

Brahman is discussed.

Eighth var ṇaka deals with Samanvayas ūtra . Ninth var ṇaka also

74 deals with the contents of the bhāṣya on the fourth sūtra–Tattu samanvay āt. It establishes the prāmāṇya of ved āntav ākyas on Brahman and attempts to prove the asams āritva of Brahman .

Contents of Pañcap ādik ā Vivara ṇa

Pañcap ādikavivara ṇa also deals with the same content but elaborate on them and add new concepts. The śrava ṇavidhi , jñānani vartyatva, the bhāvar ūpatva of ajñ āna , criticism and refutation of the view of Bh āskara on ajñ āna , refutation of the view of Buddhists and establishment of śabd ārtha sambandha , the difference-less-ness of

Māyā and avidy ā, the co-existence of avidy ā and caitanya , the refutation of avachedav āda , the establishment of pratibimbav āda, and the

Pratikarma vyavasth ā are some topics that the vivara ṇa discussed in addition to the topics in pañcapdika .

The second var ṇaka summarises the topics of each chapter of

Pūrvam īmāmsa, discusses the meaning of the term ‘codan ā’. It also contains a refutation of the Pr ābhakara School of Pūrvam īmāmsa . The third var ṇaka also contains the criticism of Prābh ākaram īmāmsa . Here the ‘concepts related to the ‘ adhy āpanavidhi ’ is refuted. The sannyasa in the stage of brahmacarya itself is discussed in this var ṇaka . In the

75 fourth var ṇaka , the questions connected with the ‘Ātman’ are discussed and the views of opponents refuted. In the fifth var ṇaka , the

‘Brahmapari ṇāmav āda’ advocated by Bh āskara is discussed and refuted. It also considers and refutes the views of Sāmkhya and other schools on the cause of the universe. The sixth and seventh var ṇaka s discuss the sarvajñatva and śātrapram āṇakatva of Brahman . The eighth var ṇaka along with other topics considers the Akha ṇḍārthatva . The ninth Var ṇaka refutes the views of ‘ Bhed ābheda’ . The review of

‘Abhihit ānvaya’ and ‘ Anvit ābhidh ānav āda’ is done in this var ṇaka where the view of Pr ābh ākara is considered and refuted.

Contents of Vivara ṇopany āsa

Vivara ṇopany āsa follows the same method of vivara ṇa in the treatment of topics. The lengthy discussions were shortened considerably without losing the essence. In the second var ṇaka of vivara ṇā, Prakas ātman had summarised the subject matter of

Pūrvam īmāmsas ūtras of Jaimini in less than fifteen sentences.

Rāmānanda Sarasvati considerably elaborated the same in the second var ṇaka of Vivara ṇopany āsa . The third var ṇaka deals with the adhik āri, vi ṣaya and other related topics. The fourth var ṇaka discusses the meaning of the word ‘ Brahman ’ and derives the meaning of

76 ‘Tvampad ārtha’ . This var ṇaka is used to refute the concept of Ātman , the individual self, followed by other systems of thought. This var ṇaka also develops the concept of Īś vara as the meaning of ‘Tatpad ārtha’ . In the fifth var ṇaka , R āmānanda Sarasvati, while discussing the application of ‘ lak ṣaṇa’ to illustrate the definition of Brahman, collects the opinion of various Schools of Ved ānta on the ‘sarvajñatva’ of Brahman . This is a laudable attempt because these views were not included even in

Siddhantale śasa ṅgraha in which Appayad īkṣita collected the views of different Ved āntins . The sixth var ṇaka discusses the third sūtra and the pauru ṣeyatva of Veda s. The seventh var ṇaka explains upani ṣads as the means to know Brahman . It also discusses the ‘ Badha -Mukta– Bhāva’ of Jīvas . The eighth var ṇaka refutes the Mim āmsaka view of

‘vidhi śeṣatva ’ of Brahman and discusses the ‘six ‘ tātparyalingas ’. The ninth var ṇaka considers the ‘ upāsan āś eṣatva ’ of Brahman . The

Sabd āparok ṣatva of Brahman is also a topic discussed in this var ṇaka .

First Var ṇaka

Manga ḷavic āra

Vivara ṇopany āsa , immediately after the mangala, considers the manga ḷavic āra which was a topic of discussion in both Pañcap ādika

77 and vivara ṇa. The opponent challenges the use of manga ḷa following

śiṣṭācāra at the beginning of a text and doubt that it is useless because the conclusion cannot be considered as a natural result of manga ḷa. This is because the conclusion is found without manga ḷa. The destruction of obstacles also cannot be the result of manga ḷa nor the non-origination of obstacles be the result of manga ḷa. Therefore, it is useless.

Rāmānanda Sarasvati replies that the result of manga ḷa is not

‘successful conclusion itself, but it includes all, the destruction of obstacles, the non-occurrence of obstacles and successful completion.

The manga ḷa fetches its result through Apūrva . If there is any obstacle the Apūrva destroys it. 2

Some believe that manga ḷa is part of a text. R āmānanda Sarasvati is of opinion that invocation following the ‘ śiṣṭācāraanumita śruti ’ could not be considered as the part of a text written on worldly interests. 3

The opponent challenges the absence of manga ḷa in bhāṣya . manga ḷa is made to destroy the obstacles and helps the smooth conclusion of the text. Further, it was instructed by śruti . The absence of manga ḷa will cause many difficulties. The bṛhad āra ṇyaka śruti

‘तमादेषांतियम्’4 and the sm ṛti ‘ ेयांिसबिवािन ’ and also from

78 the worldly wisdom that the worthy bhāṣyas will indeed face obstacles as ‘ devas ’ don’t have any affection towards ‘ tatvajñ āna ’. The reason is that ‘ tatvajñ āni ’never worship ‘ devas’ . Therefore, the obstacles are certain due to the annoyance of ‘ devas’ which will cause difficulties like the delusion, sluggishness etc. Therefore, due to the possibility of defects, the bhāṣya should not be explained or expounded.5

Rāmānanda Sarasvati answers this doubt showing the astikatva of

ācārya Śankara. He says following some Sm ṛti , that in whose ear the

‘Bhagav ān Hari resides, to them there will be no amanga ḷa’ , i.e. inauspicious experiences. 6

This Sm ṛti claims that the remembrance of ‘Par ādevata’ is manga ḷa and the ācārya, who is first among the learned and wise, must have done it. Therefore, this bhāṣya is free from defects and there fore, should be expounded. 7

The Significance of ‘ Adhy āsabh āṣya’

The commencement of bhāṣya with the phrase ‘Yu ṣmad asmat pratyayagocarayoh’ is challenged on the grounds of the accepted definition of a bhāṣya. The traditional meaning of bhāṣya is that –

वपदायानेसितसूानुकारवायैःसूाथवणनम्. This definition is not

79 followed in the Advaitabh āṣya . The purport of the first sūtra

‘अथातोिजासा ’ is to initiate the Adhik āri to Ved āntav ākyavic āra to attain the mok ṣa through the knowledge of Brahman . This meaning is not exposed in the text beginning with ‘युषमदमययगोचरयोः ’. So, it cannot be considered as a bhāṣya .8

This argument is answered in this way: The knowledge of

Brahman is given as the result in sūtra . This knowledge cannot be considered as a result, as it is not a puru ṣārtha . The resulting knowledge born from the sūtra is not like ‘ svarga’ etc., because a person who has renounced all has the right to pursue the brahmavidy ā. Therefore, the knowledge becomes result through the destruction of the bondage of

Jīva .9

If the bondage is true, the knowledge cannot destroy or remove it. Therefore, bhāṣyak āra explains adhy āsa to substantiate the unreality of bondage. The bhāṣyak āra proves the existence of adhy āsa by giving its lak ṣana, sambh āvan ā and pram āṇa. This adhy āsa is referred to at the beginning of the text that is known as ‘śank āgrantha and parih āragrantha ’. The author of bhāṣya has presented Brahman and jñ āna, the object and result, as the purport of jijñ āsas ūtra . Therefore, the

80 ākṣepa and sam ādh ānabh āṣya, through its primary meaning refer to the adhy āsa , the cause of bondage and vyavah āra , and due to the

‘tātpary ānupaptti ’ through lak ṣana, it indicates the vi ṣaya and prayojana , which are considered as ‘ sādhya ’10

One may doubt, in this instance, that how the unity of Brahman and Ātman , which is considered as vi ṣaya, is expressed in the sūtra . The removal ‘ kart ṛtvadhy āsa ’ of Jīva through the Brahmajñ āna is specified in sūtra. If the Jīva and Brahman were two different entities, the

‘Jñ ānanivartyatva’ becomes impossible as the adhy āsa and knowledge of two entirely different and mutually exclusive objects do not have

‘nivartya -nivartaka bhava’ .11

Adhy āsa is the Cause of Vi ṣayatva and Prayojanatva

In Advaita Ved ānta the viṣaya is śāstra and prayojana is mukti .

The śāstra gets viṣayatva only if it deals with some thing useful and previously unknown. Advaita Ved ānta accepts adhy āsa as the cause of unrecognizing the real nature of Brahman and perceiving it as Jīva. This confusion leads to all vyavah āras and bondage. The brahmavidy ā releases the bonded Jīva from the mis-understanding caused by adhy āsa .

This knowledge that destroys adhy āsa, is the knowledge of the pure

81 nature of Ātman as Nitya, Ṥuddha, Budha , and Mukta . Thus, adhy āsa , that makes the pure impure, is the cause of viṣayatva and prayojanatva of śāstra . This means that this śāstra is useful only to those who are in unreal bondage due to adhy āsa . Therefore, it is certain that the śāstra that commences with Sūtra ‘ath ātobrahmajijñāsa’ will have results. The

śāstra leads to the destruction of bondage. R āmānanda Sarasvati here provides some inferences to prove his thesis. 12

The text beginning with ‘ Yu ṣmad asmad ’ and ending with

‘Sarvalokapratyak ṣa’ is thus connected with the meaning of Sūtra . The

śank āgrantha and parih āragrantha are directly connected with the viṣaya and prayojana . The text up to ‘Sarvalokapratyak ṣa’ which is

‘Lak ṣaṇabh āṣya’ , deals with the viṣaya, as it explains the adhy āsa .The

Bh āṣya from ‘ asy ānarthahetoh’ to ‘ārabhyanta’ describes the viṣayatva of Ved āntav ākyas. This substantiates the viṣayatva of the śastra that analyses the purport of these Ved āntav ākyas . Therefore, this text has an intimate association with the meaning and purport of sūtra , should be considered as bhāṣya and interpreted appropriately.

Another objection posed against Śā nkarabh āṣya is about the significance of this śāstra . The opponent argues that the sūtra

‘अथातोिजासा ’ has the defect of ‘असगित ’. The knowledge or

82 ignorance about the object of sūtra , the Brahman, will lead to this difficulty. If Brahman is known, the enquiry, jijñ āsa, is impossible, and if Brahman is an ‘entirely unknown object, again the jijñ āsa is impossible. 13 There fore, not having the foundational validity it is affected with the defect of ‘asangati’ . The first sūtra , as well as the first chapter, is also not free from this defect, the opponent argues.

Advaita counters this argument that the ‘ sāmānyajñāna’ of

Brahman is a result of svādhy āya of Vedas , but this knowledge is about the object that is associated with the attributes like ‘satyatva’ . This knowledge leads one to enquire about the object that is attributed, the viśeṣya . The Śruti ‘आमाोतः ’leads one to enquire the purport of

Ved āntav ākyas through yuktivic āra, which ultimately will result in

Brahmajñ āna . śruti is the foundation of Brahmavic āra . There is no difference in the meaning of Brahman and Ātman . The śruti

‘आमिनिवातेसविवदतम्’, identifies Brahman with Ātman, and the term Brahman is used in the sūtra to indicate param ātman .14

Thus the ‘Ved ānta śrava ṇa’ leads one to the Brahmavic āra and

Vivara ṇa school accepts it as ‘niyamavidhi’ . They reject arguments for ap ūrvavidhi and parisamkhy āvidhi , 15 as the niyamavidhi confirms a

83 particular option when there were other possible alternative options.

Rāmānanda Sarasvati following vivara ṇa view insists that if the mumuk ṣu is a vaidika he should learn Ved ānta from Veda itself. The acceptance of vidhi never leads to the incomplete or partial accomplishment , ‘ अिसि ’, of Brahman . The lingas like ‘upakrama ’, certainly, will lead to the mah ātātparya, which is Brahm ātman .

Śrava ṇavidhi is given as an intermediate means for Brahmajñ āna .

Therefore, being destined, Brahman is important and vidhi is only supplementary. 16

After considering the mūlapram āṇa of ‘ brahmavidy āś ravana’ and the significance of the niyamavidhi on śravana, Rāmānanda Sarasvati concludes the discussion on the significance of first Sūtra, the first adhy āya of Brahmas ūtra and its bhāṣya by Śankaracharya. 17

In this Sūtra, the Brahmajñ āna is given as the result of learning.

But this knowledge is not the svar ūpajñāna (that is the real mok ṣa is not a result of literary learning). Hence the mok ṣa in the form of bandhaniv ṛtti , cessation of bondage, is given as the result of arthajñ āna

(That is as the result of vic āra after śravana ). The bondage is the cause of pram ātṛtva and bhokt ṛtva. If bondage is real, knowledge cannot

84 destroy it. Therefore, the adhy āsa is accepted, which is indicated in the

Sūtra . Thus, the adhy āsa is established along with the vi ṣaya and prayojana of śā stra and through them, the vic āra is made possible. 18

Rāmānanda Sarasvati here discusses the pram āṇa that prove mithy ātva . He does that to establish the destruction of bandha, the bondage, by knowledge. The mithy ātva is established through arth āpattipram āṇa. This method is similar to the process of validation of ap ūrva in pūrvam īmāmsa. Therefore, by teaching the destruction of bondage by Brahmajñ āna, the s ūtra has taught the adhyastatva of bandha, the superimposed and unreal character of bondage. 19

Significance of Adhy āsabh āṣya as Ᾱmukha

Advaitins always attempted to substantiate the placement of adhy āsa at the very beginning of bhāṣya . R āmānanda Sarasvati here illustrates the method of presenting topics of interpretation in texts.

He says, “ितपामथबुौसंगृआदौतेतुवणनमुपोातः , ितपामा -

20 दौितायपाेतुवणनंितपादनिमितिवभागोऽित ” .

That is, there are two methods for presenting a topic. Upotgh āta and Pratip ādana. In upotgh āta, the illustration of the topic is done after

85 the explanation of its reason. In the second, the topic is explained at the very beginning and its reason illustrated afterwards .In this context, the primary meaning the sūtra is to meditate or think on the meaning of ved āntav ākyas . This Vic āra is an outcome of vi ṣayatva and prayojanatva , and adhy āsa is the cause of this vi ṣayatva and prayojanatva . Hence adhy āsa is discussed in the upotgh āta bh āṣya .21

Another doubt posed against this argument is that how adhy āsa becomes the cause of vi ṣayatva of Brahman, which is beginningless, self-Luminant and indistinguishable from ātman (Individual self, known as the substratum of ego).22 The sameness of Brahman and ātman is realised through the analysis and reasoning of the mah āvākya

‘tatvamasi’. The bondage of ātman is described as a result of superimposition, adhy āsa . So, it is difficult or impossible to illustrate the difference-less-ness of Ātman and Brahman as the direct meaning of

Ved āntav ākyas .23

While answering the above issue, R āmānanda Sarasvati attempts to answer another connected question, why don’t sūtrakara directly presented adhy āsa in the first Sūtra . He replies that the author of sūtra s intended to introduce Brahmavic āra, who after considering the immediate connection, samanvaya of Ved āntav ākyas on Brahm ātman,

86 doubting kart ṛtva , bhokt ṛtva , and a ṇutva of ātman, describes adhy āsa in the sūtra ‘तगुणसारवापदेशः 24 . The meaning of this Sūtra is that experiencing ātman as ‘atom’ and Karta etc., is due to the

‘dharm ādhy āsa ’. Bh āṣyak āra described this adhy āsa at the beginning.

This is the difference. Therefore, to get the viṣayatva and prayojanatva for śā stra , adhy āsa is essential. 25 Rāmānanda Sarasvati has shortened in

Vivara ṇopany āsa the long discussion on the significance of adhy āsabh āṣya in vivara ṇa for easy comprehension.

Adhy āsa

The opponents who challenge the adhy āsa of ātman and an ātman contends that the sameness, tādātmya , of ātman and an ātman, is impossible due to the absence of a cause. The cause of adhy āsa is the impression of cognition created by the similarity of the common aspects of adhi ṣṭ hāna and āropya. But, for ātman being ‘ vijñ ānaghana ’ its tādātmya with an ātma is impossible. There fore, the ātman and an ātman are free from tādātmya as light and darkness. 26

The later arguments on the dravyatva of tamas , that referred in the ‘ tamaprak āś avad ’ indicate that pūrvam īmāmsaka is the opponent.

To prove the impossibility of finding any similarity between ātman and

87 an ātman , absolute difference without any common aspects among them has to be established. The terms used in the ‘ śank āgrantha ’ of adhy āsabh āṣya to show their contradictory nature is ‘tamaprak āś avad’.

Here, the existence of darkness has to be proved. Unlike Ny āya,

Mīmāmsa considers darkness as dravya . In Ny āya philosophy darkness is the absence of light. The character of light and darkness are contradictory. The presence of one, confirms the absence of other.

Rāmānanda Sarasvati presents the argument of Mīmāmsaka on the nature of contradiction. They are two types; it is the inability to stay together at a place (सहावथानायोयता ) and the inability of union

(तादायायोयता ). The first can be found in cow-ness and horse-ness, which are contradictory and unique. This character is not found in the case of ‘light and darkness’ because both co-exist in a room where light is dull or dimmed. Therefore, the reason for adhy āsa is ‘ Tādātmy āyo gyatva ’. Further, the darkness is a substance, dravya .27 The view of

Pr ābh ākara is that darkness is the absence of perception and cannot be entertained. The closure of ear gives the perception of internal sounds, similarly, the closure of eyes gives the cognition of internal darkness 28 .

Therefore, the Tādātmya , unity, of Ātman and An ātman is improbable and impossible because they are two different substances. 29

88 Rāmānanda Sarasvati condenses the long argument of Vivara ṇa here. He says that the similarity of ātman and an ātman is possible, as it is found in the cognition ‘ aham ’. The similarity is not the cause of

‘nirup ādhikaadhy āsa ’ as in the cognition of blue sky. The blueness and sky bear no similarity. The impressions are the results of anubhava, which is not born of pram ā, valid knowledge. The kart ṛtva bhokt ṛtva adhy āsa is beginning-less, like the relation between seed and seedlings.

Similarly, the impressions from an earlier misapprehension, Bhrama , produces later adhy āsa .30

Bh āṣyak āra has explained that the adhy āsa is natural and it is due to the mixing up of real and unreal. 31 Therefore the adhy āsa in the form of ‘ aham ’ and ‘ mama ’ is beginning-less owing to its continuous flow. The beginningless continuity of cause and effect is indicated by the ‘ktva ’ used in the phrase adhyasyamidhuni īkṛtya 32 . The term

‘Saty ānṛte ’ is used to exclude the cognitions like ‘white pot. The

‘Mithun īkara ṇa’ is adhy āsa . The term ‘ Mithy ājñānanimittah ’ explains how adhy āsa affects Ātman . The beginning-less indescribable ignorance, the ajñ āna , concealing Self-Luminant Ātman creates adhy āsa . Therefore, ignorance is the cause of adhy āsa . It is considered as the creator, Kart ā, of ahank ārādhy āsa , for being a defective cause;

89 and for being the adjunct, upādhi , of Īś vara , it is also considered as efficient cause. 33

The opponent asks whether there are any causes other than ignorance for adhy āsa . The Sidhh ānta is that the ajñ āna residing in the adhi ṣṭ hānacaitanya is the cause of ‘ arth ādhy āsa’ and ‘ jñānaadhy āsa ’. 34

The Nature of Ajñ āna

The opponent doubts again on the nature of ajñ āna. He contends that ajñ āna being the absence of jñāna how can it be considered as the cause of adhy āsa . Further, this ajñ āna is not a positive entity.

The position of Advaita is that ‘ ajñ āna ’ is an object of experience.

It is an object of experience that is found against the general experience of an object. The contention is that ‘ ajñ āna ’ is not ‘the absence’ of jñāna, but a different type of jñāna . The view of Vy āsabh āṣya on

Yogas ūtra too provides a similar idea. Vy āsabh āṣya says that

‘नाानंानाभावः , ानातरमेविहतत्’. The Jñ ānas āmānya is the pure

Caitanya experienced in all inconstant cognitions as the form of existence like ‘Sangha ṭa’, and its opposite is ajñ ānas āmānya , which is an object of pratyak ṣa. 35

Another question posed against the knowability of ignorance is

90 that how sākṣi could illuminate the ignorance. R āmānanda Sarasvati illustrates the Advaita position. All things are objects of sākṣi either as being known or unknown. The state of being known is in the form of the unity of ‘ Manov ṛtti’ (Transformed internal organ in the form of an object) and the Caitanya . This process is the same in the experience of pleasure etc. since pleasure is a kind of modification of the mind. It is also found in the cognition of shell- silver, where it is found in the form of ‘ Idam ’ in ‘ Idamrajatam ’. In the case of external objects like pot, the modification of mind is formed through pram āṇa. The object as unknown does not need the help of any pram āṇa36 . There fore, ajñ āna and its objects are objects of sākṣipratyak ṣa. 37

The bhāvar ūpatva of ajñ āna can be proved by inference also. 38 arth āpatti also proves the existence of ‘ bhavar ūpaajñāna’ , the superimposition of aha ṅkāra on pure self and silver on the shell cannot be explained without ajñ āna as there is no cause other than it. 39 This ajñ āna is beginningless for not having any cause. It is unreal by itself.

The cause of unreality of the mundane world, also, is ajñ āna 40 .

The Object of Ajñ āna

The object of ajñ āna is Ātman. The ajñ āna applies its concealment only on ātman as there is no pram āṇa and ‘ phala ’ to

91 establish such a mask on an ātman.41

In the worldly experience, the cognition of the real shell that functions as the substratum of shell-silver leads to the destruction of adhy āsa , superimposition, of silver on it. Similarly, being contradicted by real knowledge, tattvajñ āna, the cessation of ajñ āna is considered as

‘dṛṣṭ aphala ’ or as a proven. 42 . This ajñ āna is one and it is mūlājñāna .

The ajñ ānas that exist in sākṣi and viṣay āvacchinna caitanya (the ajñ āna with the worldly objects) are considered as ‘ vy āsajyav ṛtti ’

(inhering in more subjects than one) and they were called ‘avasth ā’.

These avasth ās are infinite. These ajñ ānas in the form of avasth ā conceals the Caitanya, which is its abode, in the same way, mūlajñāna covers pure Caitanya. 43

The Nature of Ajñ ānavarana

The opponent forces the sidh āntin to describe the nature of

‘āvara ṇa’ cast by ‘ ajñ āna ’ and the result of this concealment. The theory of Advaita is that śruti has established that the Brahman is Self-

Luminant and it is not different from the self. But this Brahman is mis- apprehended as -‘नाित न काशत ’- ‘non-existent and unmanifested. That is, an existing object cognised as non-existent. This

92 compels to presume the existence of an ‘ āvara ṇa’ that will make existing thing non-existant. Further, there are experiences like ‘I am ignorant’, ‘I don’t know anything’ also points to the existence of

āvara ṇa. There fore, even in Self-Luminant Ātman , its concealment by ajñ āna cannot be avoided. 44 This ajñ āna, which is bhāvar ūpa , conceals all of caitanya except the part where the ajñ āna is supported. (The ajñ āna is Jada , and it needs to be illuminated by the caitanya to play its part. The idea is that this ignorance conceals the whole ajñ āna excluding the part that illuminates it.) 45

Sāmkhya doubts whether this ajñ āna that cast āvara ṇa on

Brahman is ‘ akha ṇḍ atamodravya ’. R āmānanda Sarasvati in his reply says that if this āvara ṇa is permanent there will be no mok ṣa. If it is

Jñ ānanivartya it is ajñ āna. 46

Sarvasankarav ādi (A follower of Bhed ābheda ) contends that agraha ṇa, mithyajñ āna and their impressions are called ajñ āna .

Rāmānanda Sarasvati asks him to explain what is mithyajñ āna and points out that there is rarely a place for mithyajñ āna in bhed ābheda philosophy. 47 There fore, the bh āvar ūpājñāna should be considered as the cause of adhy āsa .48

This adhy āsa is felt as natural in either form as a direct cause or

93 as in the form of a continuous flow. The bhāṣyak āra used the term

‘Mithy ājñāna nimittah ’ to indicate ‘causal and caused’ the nature of adhy āsa . In this way the ajñ ānadhy āsa in the pure caitanya is beginningless. 49 Among the ‘ ādhy ātmik ādhy āsas’ , which are the products of adhy āsa , the first one is ‘ aha ṅkāradhy āsa ’ (I am) 50 and connected to this aha ṅkārādhy āsa arise the adhy āsa in the form of

‘mama śar īra’ (my body). This is assumed as the instrument of enjoyment of the aha ṅkāra , the enjoyer.

Rāmānanda Sarasvati after concluding the discussion on the necessity of commencing the Brahma vidya says that for having vi ṣayatva and prayojanatva there are no obstacles in pursuing the

śāstra. 51

Adhy āsaLak ṣaṇa and Khy ātivic āra

The text between ‘आहकोऽयमयासो and कथंपुनःयगामिन ’

is known as lak ṣaṇabh āṣya . The text from ‘कथंपुनःयगामिन ’ is known as sambh āvanabh āṣya. Pram āṇabh āṣya is the text beginning from ‘तमेतमिवायमामानामनोः ’ and ending with ‘ सवलोकय ’.

The opponent contends that as pram āṇas help to understand

94 things completely the lak ṣaṇa and sambh āvana are not essential. The definition gives the difference from others and sambh āvana removes the possibilities of asambh āvana. As a result of pram āṇas , the results expected from lak ṣaṇa and sambh āvana also get cognised. There fore, the bhāṣya describing the lak ṣaṇa and sambh āvana of adhy āsa is useless. 52

Rāmānanda Sarasvati explains the position of Advaita . In the perceptual cognition of a pot, a definition of the pot is unnecessary. adhy āsa is sākṣi pratyak ṣa and all these worldly experiences are due to adhy āsa . There fore, it is indispensable to differentiate pram ā from adhy āsa jñ āna. Without knowing this difference, the annihilation of adhy āsa is impossible. Hence lak ṣaṇa bh āṣya is useful. 53 Some times asambh āvana is removed with the help of pram āṇas. But sometimes something known through perception is affected with asambh āvana (not considering something as possible). The pure Brahman is free from the defects caused by adhy āsa, and without adhy āsa, it is difficult to maintain the pure nature of Brahman. The adhy āsa sambh āvana and its lak ṣaṇa were given in succession.

The term ‘ āha ’, which is part of prasnabh āṣya , is used in the bhāṣya to indicate that this śastra follow ‘ vādakatha ’. vādakatha is the

95 form of debate that is free from apasiddh ānta , any ūnādhikokti, hetv ābh āsa etc. , and it presents the śā stra with pram āṇa and yukti .54

Adhy āsa is defined as ‘ Sm ṛtirupa ḥ paratra pūrvad ṛṣṭāvabh āsa ḥ’ in bhāṣya . At this point, R āmānanda Sarasvati elaborates the meaning of this definition. 55 The meaning of sm ṛti is a memory of something that was known earlier. The word sm ṛti is meaningful. The word Paratra denotes the substratum of adhy āsa . 56 The third term ‘ Pūrvad ṛṣ tāva bh āsa ḥ’ explains the nature of cognition. It is not sm ṛti nor real perception, but a cognition that has the character of sm ṛti of an object, which is different from the cognized. This cognition is liable for negation as the object being different from the form cognized. This possibility of future negation leads to the indescribable character of the cognition because the real cannot be negated and the unreal cannot be cognized.

The Bh āṣyak āra discussed the opinion of other thinkers on adhy āsa by following the definition of adhy ᾱsa . In Vivara ṇopany āsa ,

Rāmānanda Sarasvati takes up the view of Akhy ātivadin s. Pr ābh ākara mīmāmsakas uphold this theory. According to them, there is no

‘bhrama ’. It is a phenomenon due to the difficulty to separate two type of cognitions, namely remembrance and perception. In the cognition

96 ‘this is silver, only the ‘this-ness’ is perceived and the other part silver is remembered. but both these were presented to the intellect as a single cognition. Even after the realization of shell the annihilation of silver never happens as it is available elsewhere. Advaiti n rejects this on the ground that the mere knowledge of the substratum without its particular characters and the defects of sense organs lead to the erroneous cognition. At the time of cognition, the object is experienced and this cognition is liable for correction. There fore, in the locus where the silver is perceived there, its non existence can be established, at all times, through a later denial of silver in the locus. 57

Rāmānanda Sarasvati asks Akhy ātivadin the ‘definition’of

Akhy āti. It cannot be considered as the absence of knowledge of an object with its specific characteristics ( िविशानाभाव ), because such a position will lead to ‘ Bhr ānti ’ in Su ṣupti. If it is the unity of two different things the view is not different from the view of Advaita .

Therefore, it should be accepted that bhrama is mithyajñ āna .58

Śabda śakti samarthana

In the course of discussion on akhy āti Rāmānanda Sarasvati considers śabda śakti . The argument of the opponent is directed against

97 the potency of śabda to convey a meaning, a theory followed by vedantins. There is the absence of samyoga and tādātmya of śabda with their concerned artha , object, and there exists any other type of relationship between them, śabda and artha . There fore, the knowledge from śabda is invalid. This argument is rejected showing the existence of a property called śakti between śabda and artha .59

Refutation of Anyath ākhy āti

Anyath ākhy āti is the theory of error followed by Naiy āyikas .

According to them due to similarity or defects of sense organs may lead to perceive the shell as the silver that exists else where. R āmānanda

Sarasvati asks many questions to the opponents: what is the cause of the cognition of ‘this is silver? what is the cause of super imposition on the part ‘this’ is? whether it is the ‘ rajatat ādātmya ’ or the contact with silver? In the case of former, and whether it is shell or silver. It is not the first because it contradicts the experience. In the second, the activity is on an object exist else where. 60 Therefore, the shell is not the object of the cognition of silver. The object in contact with the organ presents the cognition of the characters of the object. The Naiyāyikas accept sāmānya and viśeṣa as different categories and their ‘ tādātmya ’ is impossible. So,the direct cognition is also impossible as pratyak ṣa is

98 possible only on objects which are in contact with sense organs.

Another version of Anyath ākhy āti followed by Madhva says that the shell changes as silver. The problem with this theory is that the silver thus cognized cannot be negated because nobody can negate the curd formed from the milk, that is real in all aspects. 61 Therefore this view is not Anyath ākhyati . In the view of Dvaita Ved ānta , a defective organ in association with the aroused impressions, perceives the non-existent silver on the shell. This view is known as abhinava anyath ākhy āti .

Refutation of Ātmakhy āti

This theory of error is the view of Buddhists except for

Mādhyamikas . According to them, the silver is not different from

Buddhi because it is direct and not associated with sense organs. 62 They believe that the silver in the form of intellect, which is internal, appear as an external object. 63

Rāmānanda Sarasvati asks Buddhists to prove the source of silver that has originated. No objects could be the cause of silver as Buddhists does not accept any external objects. It is also not from the knowledge left behind ( at ītajñāna ) because the past ones cannot be considered as a cause. If it is considered as a product or born from a previous cognition

99 of silver, it is impossible, because the same thing cannot be both the subject and object at the same time. If both were different then the momentary silver knowledge cannot be the object of later silver. A different cognition of silver does not exist and the silver remains unknown forever. Therefore, it is difficult to prove ātmakhy āti. 64

Māya and Avidy ā are not Different

It seems that R āmānanda Sarasvati takes up the view of some sect of Advaitaved āntins and criticize them. He says, according to some, the silver is avidy āmaya , and not Māyāmaya because Māyā and avidy ā are different. He challenges this view. He asks: how do they differ?

Whether the difference is in their definitions or their vyavah āra? It cannot be the lak ṣaṇa as the nature of indescribability, the nature of concealing the reality, and the cause of ‘ bhr ānti ’ are not indicating their difference. 65 Māyā and avidy ā are defined as ‘that which do not delude its substratum is Māyā’ and ‘the one that deludes its locus is avidy ā’, does not hold good.Because,in a person who possesses the knowledge that refutes ‘bhrama’ have avy āmohakatva, and where this anti-illusory cognition is absent, the ‘ mohakatva ’ is found. So, there is no difference in lak ṣaṇa.66 In the Śruti 67 and Sm ṛti, 68 the term Māyā is used in the sense of avidy ā, or to indicate avidya, and this avidya can be destroyed

100 by tatvajñ āna . Similarly, the bhāṣyak āra and his followers also used the term Māyā in the sense of avidy ā. 69 So Māya and avidy ā are not different from the view of vyavah āra too. Therefore, Māyā and avidy ā are not different entities. One and only avidy ā, due to its common power of ‘ bhrama’ or ‘ vik ṣepa ’ known as Māyā and due to its astonishing power of bhrama or concealment known as avidy ā.

Refutation of Satkhy āti

Satkhy āti was followed by Ramanuja and his followers. This theory is described in his Śrībh āṣya and his followers developed it further. This theory maintains that the object imposed is real because it is also created out pañcabh ūtas as other real objects in the world.

Rāmānanda Sarasvati maintains that this theory cannot be valid because this theory could not explain the bādha of imposed object satisfactorily.

Further, if the imposed silver is real, as its locus, shell, it should always be an object of cognition, but it is not so. The silver thus known on the locus, shell, undergo modification by the realization of the locus. The viṣaya of this ‘ bādha ’ is the ‘ atyant ābh āva pratiyogitva ’ of silver on the locus. Hence the perception of bādha also a pram āṇa to establish mithy ātva. This cognition of abh āvapratyak ṣa follows the view of

Naiy āyikas .70 In the view of Advaita Vedantin s, abh āva is the object of

101 ‘anupalabdhipram āṇa’. In siddh ānta, abh āva is treated as sākṣi pratyak ṣa associated with anupalabdhi. That is, aparok ṣajñāna of abh āva is sākṣipratyak ṣa while abh āva is the object of anupalabdhi pram āṇa. 71

Adhy āsalak ṣaṇa

The term ‘ Sm ṛitir ūpa ’ in the adhy āsalak ṣaṇa suggests that in jñānadhy āsa , which is born from the impressions, have some similarity with remembrance. 72

In dream also caitanya is the substratum. The adjunct – up ādhi – is ego in the form of mind. In jāgrat , brahma caitanya , which is not separate from the pratyag ātman and sākṣi is the substratum of the whole universe. 73

Paratr āvabh āsa is the lak ṣaṇa of adhy āsa . The meaning of avabh āsa is cognition, Jñ āna .74

Refutation of Śū nyav āda

At this point, the Mādhyamika Buddha challenges the significance of the term paratra in the definition of adhy āsa because in

‘Ke śondrakabhrama ’ (net-like apparitions are seen while the eyes are shut) there is no substratum. Therefore ‘ bhrama ’ is the cognition of an

102 object. R āmānanda rejects this view. He shows that if the definition given by Śū nyav ādin s is followed the knowledge of Śū nya too becomes bhrama . The substratum of ‘ Ke śondraka ’ is the rays of eyes which were squeezed together by the hand. Therefore, the lak ṣaṇa ‘Paratr āvabh āsa’ is free from defects.

The substratum of bhrama is real. The ‘ Bhrama ’ is the result of superimposition on a real substratum. The removal of Bhrama is on the realization of the substratum and this realization is always with sākṣi.

The Śū nya cannot be the substratum of appearance. The appearance also cannot be ‘ Asat ’, because the ‘Asat ’ is not Aparok ṣa.75

Therefore, Bhrama according to Advaita Ved ānta is the appearance of something indescribable on a real locus which is entirely different from the thing that appeared. 76 This phenomenon of something appearing as something else is well-known in this world. The

Bh āṣyak āra shows two examples- ‘Śuktik ā rajatavad avabh āsate ’ and

‘Eka ścandrah sa dvit īyavad’ - to illustrate his point. The suffix ‘ vat ’ shows the mithy ātva following negation in both these examples. The first one is the example of ‘ aha ṅkāradhy āsa ’ and the second one is the example of ‘ Jive śvara bhed ādhy āsa ’. 77

103 The opponent accuses that the superimposition is possible only on objects like ‘ Śukti ’, which alone is the meaning of the term ‘ Paratra ’ in the definition. The term ‘ Paratra ’ could refer to anything other than

Ātman because the Ātman is pure and self-luminant. Further, self- luminant things are free from defects and so free from the materials associated with defects. 78 The self-luminance is one’s manifestation without any external illumination. 79 This quality is inherent in Ātman .

The scripture ‘ Atraiv āyamsvayamjyoti’ 80 ‘Ātmev āsyajyoti ḥ, 81 substantiates this.

Rāmānanda Sarasvati explains the Advaita view. In pure Ātman, which is one and devoid of any components, characteristics such as cit, pūrṇānanda etc., are ascribed. This is the substratum, which is cit and self-luminant. There exists the ignorance that conceals the pure bliss nature. This ignorance concealing the substratum, the pure Ātman, creates the illusion of aha ṅkāra . This is called the defect. Hence aha ṅkāra has the nature of appearance on the substratum, pure Ātman .82

According to vivara ṇa school of Advaitaved ānta, the locus of avidy ā is pure Brahman . The opponent challenges this position how ignorance does exist in self-luminant Brahman . The existence of ignorance on pure Brahman is known from experience. The experience

104 ‘I am ignorant’ points to its existence in Ātman . The scripture also points to the same. 83 Therefore ignorance has no ultimate validity for being negated by knowledge. The pure Brahman , which is svar ūpajñāna, is not opposite to ajñ āna . The pure Brahman is the locus and object of ignorance.

Another question that the opponent asked is about the Bhr āntatva of Īś vara . Jīva is Bhr ānta due to its association with ajñ āna similarly

Īś vara also needs to be considered as Bhr ānta .

Advaitin s clarify that Jīva is asarvajña . Īś vara is sarvajña .

Therefore, ignorance never conceals the pure non-dual form for Īś vara .

But to the Jīva , which is a reflection of Brahman , ignorance conceals the nondual pure form. The upādhi always adheres to reflection than the original bimba . In other words, the limitations and defects of upādhi would affect pratibimba alone. 84

Difference of Īś vara and J īva

How the difference of Jīva ,Īś vara and their respective difference of ajñatva and sarvajñatva is ascribed to pure non-dual caitanya, asks the opponent. R āmānanda Sarasvati answers that the cause of this beginningless difference is mūlāvidy ā. When this avidy ā ceases to exist

105 the difference thus assumed also destroyed. 85

Rāmānanda Sarasvati refutes a view, that internal organ, antakara ṇa, determines the difference. Accepting internal organ as real and determiner of difference will contradict scripture that describes the unreality – mithy ātva – of ‘bheda’ – the difference – of J īva and

Brahma. The unreality, mithy ātva , of the difference of Jiva and Īś vara , is proven by śruti and inference. 86 The annihilation of the internal organ is provided in the Śruti, ‘Svamap ītoBhavati’ .87 The internal organ is different for different aha ṅkāras , the Jīva also differs. 88 The avidy ā here functions as the adjunct by concealing the caitanya .

The Pure Cit itself is the Object of Avidy ā

The pure Brahman is the locus of ignorance but it cannot be the object of avidy ā an opponent contends because this luminant one is considered as opposed to the concealment of ajñ āna . This view is negated by showing that ignorance is the cause of material knowledge.

The argument is that the experience like ‘I don’t know the pot’ is universal where the manifested thing is the object of ignorance.

Therefore, manifesting along with the pure caitanya does not affect its avidy āvisayatva .89

106 Some argue that difference is manifested and revealed. Therefore, the cognition of unity is secondary or ‘ Gau ṇa’ as the knowledge will be only on the primary sense. This view is not acceptable to Advaitins .

They say that if ‘ bheda’ is accepted as truth, it will cause defects like

‘kṛtah āni ’, the destruction of that is existing, the futility of the scripture etc. Therefore, the experience of ‘ aha ṅkāra’ is illusory. If the ‘ bheda ’ is real and uncovered, there would be no reason for the dispute on

‘deh ātmav āda ’. The dispute over ‘ deh ātmav āda ’ being a fact, this deh ātmajñāna is significant due to the illusoriness of this deh ātmajñāna , it does not rise to the level of valid knowledge. 90

Further, indirect knowledge could not remove the illusion of difference. The opponent following the view of difference argues that following scripture and reason if one realises the reality of difference, the knowledge of unity should be secondary. Advaitin s say that this argument cannot be supported because the indirect cognitions could not remove the illusion that is direct cognition. The Bhagavadp āda has pointed out with ‘ paśvādibhisc āvi śeṣāt’ in the bhāṣya. 91

Against the argument that the cognition as ‘ I’ – aham –is not adhy āsa , because the substratum and the thing that to be imposed, adhi ṣṭ hāna and āropya, are not present in it. R āmānanda Sarasvati

107 reiterates the view of Advaita that in the cognition ‘I’ there are parts -‘I’ and ‘ upalabh ’ the perception,- which is experienced by all. This is like the cognition ‘the iron is burning’ where the tādātmya of iron and fire is perceived. Similarly, in aha ṅkāra also, due to the tādāmya of the knower, and witnesses, the sākṣi.92

Refutation of Pr ābh ākara and other Opponents

The Pr ābh ākaram īmāmsakas object here. He says that in the cognition, ‘ Gha ṭamahamj ānāmi’ self is manifested as the abode of knowledge and in this cognition, there is no ‘this factor ‘ idama ṁś a’; and according to Advaita Ved ānta only the ‘this factor’ is assumed.

Therefore, it is difficult to uphold ‘ aṁś advaya ’ in aha ṅkāra . 93 The

Sāmkhya also oppose the view of Advaita . According to them, the caitanya reflected in intellect is similar to the bimbacaitanya . The

Bh āṭṭ am īmāmsaka is of the view that the Jñ āna is inferable from the evidence of being known, Jñ ātata . Sautr āntikas , who infer the existence of external objects through inference believe that the things that reflected directly in knowledge are depended on corresponding external objects. 94

The existence of an external object is inferred as untenable

108 because it is contradictory to the direct experience of objects. The knower, the object of knowledge and the knowledge are direct,

Rāmānanda says. 95 The view of Bh āṭṭ as and Naiy āyikas is that Ātman is the object of mental perception also untenable because it contradicts the subject-object rule. When the Ātman becomes the object of knowledge, that is, becomes vi ṣaya of jñāna , it will be reduced to mere An ātm ā, being the abode of knowledge, hence, should be considered as its

‘aparok ṣat ā’. 96 Rāmānanda Sarasvati rejecting the Pr ābh ākara view says that the directness of knowledge is its self-luminousness. He also rejects the view of Bh āṭṭ as that knowledge is indirect and inferred, on the ground that the result of pram āṇa is self-luminant knowledge associated with Ātman .97

The contention of Pr ābh ākaras that the manifestation of aha ṅkāra as the abode of knowledge, samvid , is the manifestation of

Ātman and there is no adhy āsa is untenable because the self- luminant perception -‘svaprak āśā nubh ūti’ itself is Ātman, not insentient aha ṅkāra .98 Further aha ṅkāra is the object of knowledge and here it is not the knower, because the same cannot function as subject and object at the same time. 99 The witness of aha ṅkāra is one and only. It is self- luminant, beginningless and non-dual. It is called Ātman and anything

109 that different from it is An ātman . Further, there is no proof of the existence of bheda .100

The Cid ātman is not aha ṅkāra . Aha ṅkāra that transforms as sorrow etc. cannot be pure Ātman . The cid ātman did not undergo any transformation as it is permanent, Kūṭastha .101

The cid ātman , which is free from viṣayajñāna, is manifested in deep sleep. Therefore, the aha ṅkāra associated with viṣayajñāna is different from cid ātman . The experience of aha ṅkāra is in the form of caitanya associated with modification of antakara ṇa loses its existence with the cessation of the modification, vṛtti. 102

Regarding the experience of bliss in deep sleep, R āmānanda explains, there is the presence of Sākṣi, whose character is bliss. The vik ṣepas are also absent. The avidya transforms into the form of

‘sukhacaitanya’ present there in deep sleep. The caitanya reflected in the sukhav ṛtti is the cause of the experience of sukha. The sākṣi remembers it as ‘ I slept well’ and due to the t ādātmya of sākṣi with who remembers the experience it is felt like the experience of aha ṅkāra.

Therefore, the experience of bliss in deep sleep belongs to sākṣi103

110 The Cause of Aha ṅkāra

The cause of aha ṅkāra is ajñ āna that is known after many names viz . M āyā, Prak ṛtih, Agraha ṇam , Avyaktam , Kāra ṇam , Layah , Śaktih ,

Mah āsu ṣuptih , Nidr ā, Ak ṣaram , and Ākāś am ; Īś vara is the creator,

Karta; the Bhr ānti, karma and samsk āra are nimitta . Its svar ūpa has two potencies viz. vijñ āna śakti and kriy āś akti . Its effects are kart ṛtva bhokt ṛtva etc. Its pram ānā is Sākṣi.

According to Sāmkhya , pradh āna evolves as intellect, buddhi, which becomes aha ṅkāra and aha ṅkāra is associated with the characters kart ṛtva and bhokt ṛtva . R āmānanda Sarasvati rejects this view suggesting that the kart ṛtva etc., having no association with Ātman must be parok ṣa, but they are aparok ṣa. Further, the view of Sāmkhya will lead to the destruction of the system of bandha and mok ṣa. The relation between self and aha ṅkāra should be accepted as a relation through avidy ā. Hence aha ṅkāra is intellect superimposed on Ātman due to avidy ā.104

According to Ny āya aha ṅkāra is Jñ āna, which is a character of

Ātman and its instrument is buddhi. The cause is mind. Apart from this, there is no entity like aha ṅkāra having the character of kart ā or bhokt ā.

111 This view is defective as the desire etc. are not the characteristics of

Ātman. Further, scripture says that the mind itself is buddhi and aha ṅkāra 105 . The buddhi , due to its character of modification, is a dravya, substance. This buddhi is aha ṅkāra .106

The kart ṛtva etc. are imposed on Brahman and these attributions are mithy ā. The apparent redness of a clear crystal is assumed as the result of some defect in the form of presence of red flower, similarly, the presence of aha ṅkāra is the cause of the appearance of kart ṛtva etc on

Brahman . The inference that establishes this is as follows- ‘आमिन

कतृवादकंिमयासोपािधकवात् फटकेलौिहयवत्’107

Brahman and Jīva :Bimba and Pratibimba

The bondage is due to the presence of Up ādhi , being attached to avidy ā, the Up ādhi , the Jīva undergoes bondage. This bondage being mithy ā, illusory, due to the attachment with illusory avidy ā, the unity of

Jīva with pure Brahman is not contradicted. R āmānanda Sarasvati gives an inference in support of his view. The inference is ‘ Jīvo Brahmaiva’ ,

‘tatpratibimbatv āt’ ‘ darpa ṇajal ādi ṣu mukhas ūry ādi pratibimbavat’ , 108

The scripture also says this. 109 The sun reflecting in different waters appear as many. Similarly, the non-dual Ātman reflecting in the clear

112 māyā becomes Jīva . This Jīva due to its association with antakara ṇa, which is also called kṣetra , becomes many. 110

Some opponents question this concept of pratibimbav āda . The reflected image is different from the original because the face reflected in the mirror is different from the original and the theory of Advaita contradicts this experience. He asks whether this reflection is a chāya of the original face or it a different face. Advaitins clarify that the pratibimba is not a chāya, a shade, as it has clear organs like teeth and eye. The recognition of the sameness of both, reflection and original, as

‘this face is above the neck’ negates the existence of a different face.

The usage of the word chāya on pratibimba is in a secondary sense. The face thus reflected in the mirror is not real as the mirror could not produce a face. 111 This pratibimba is not a direct impression of the object as there is no physical contact. 112 This reflection cannot be negated like the cognition ‘this is not the face’ or as the silver imposed on the shell was negated because such a negation will lead to

‘Svar ūpab ādh ā’. Therefore, the reflected is not an illusory face. The bimba and pratibimba are same, but the characteristics conferred on the

Pratibimba are supposed ones. 113 The opponent asks: the face is not an object of the eye, then how the Pratibimba becomes an object of eyes.

113 Ram ānanda replies that the organs like the nose are objects of eyes. The rays re-directed from the mirror pervading the face show it as separate. 114 Thus the Bimba manifested in association with the adjunct is

Pratibimba , and this Pratibimba is real. The association with the adjunct is assumed and the characteristics thus obtained is considered as illusory. This illusion of Pratibimba is an effect of mul āvidy ā. It is not vyāvah ārika , for being similar to svapna it is prātibh āsika and is a result of incidental defects -Āganthukado ṣajanyam . 115 This Jīva is the

Pratibimba of formless Īś vara (Brahman ).

Refutation of Avachedav āda

Avachedav āda is the theory followed by the school of V ācaspati or the Bh āmati school. According to this school, Jīva is not a reflection but Jīva is avidy āvachinna . This view cannot be adopted as it is not logical. This view leads to difficulty as the ākāś a unconditioned or unlimited by the pot is existing outside. Similarly, the Īś vara not conditioned or limited by avidy ā have to remain outside the Brahm āṇḍ a created by avidy ā. This will lead to a position that the Ātman is not all- pervasive or it could not pervade the entire universe. This, in turn, destroys the sarvajñatva and sarvop ādānatva of Brahman . Further, the

114 pure Brahman is devoid of attributes and attachment with any attribute is unsuitable. 116

Pr ājña

The pure caitanya reflected in avidy ā, who is the witness of suṣupti , is the Jīva called Pr ājña . It is different from pure cit and this difference is the cause of its reference during the return from a deep sleep. 117 The difference between Pr ājña and Īś vara is not caused by avidy ā. This difference is beginningless. 118

Taijasa

Taijasa also a Jīva , little different from the pure cit, and this difference is caused by avidy ā. This Jīva is reflected in the antakara ṇa is the knower in the dream stage and have well-formed characteristics like kart ṛtva , bhokt ṛtva,aha ṅkāra etc. 119 The difference between taijasa etc., are caused by avidy ā because their up ādhis are products of avidy ā.120

Vi śva

The cit then reflected in the gross body during the jāgrat state is known as viśva . Its characteristics are clear. The Jīva being attached

115 with earlier upādhis it will get the later upādhyavachedas. Therefore, even in the difference of upādhis, there will no difference of Jīva in a particular body. 121

This difference due to the difference of upādhis will not lead to any difficulty. The pure self in association with upādhis , avidy ā,citta and body, assumes sams āra , this worldly life. Hence the system of bandha and mukti is intact. The difference is assumed between jīva and

Īś vara, so there will be no mess up of the characteristics like sarvajñatva. 122

The opponents, one among them is Vaitan ḍika , argue that the pure Ātman , for being Āsa ṅga cannot be the knower. According to the first opponent, Ātman has the nature of attachment and kart ṛtva and its kart ṛtva is not an imposed one. The internal organ is not the knower, for being inert. 123 The Vaita ṇḍ ika refutes all systems of knowledge and concludes that no knowledge has ‘ viṣayavyavastha’. 124

Rāmānanda Sarasvati summarizes the theory of Advaita Ved ānta .

The Advaitins considers the caitanya reflected in avidy ā as jīva and the bimbacaitanya as Īś vara . The objects like pot are being the vivarta of

Īś vara is related to it forever but they have no such relation with jīva because Jīva has no causal relation with them. Jīva is associated with

116 anthakara ṇa as it has a causal relationship with it. When the external objects like pot have contact with sensual organs, the internal organ in which the Jīva is adhyasta transforms to acquire the object in contact.

This process of transformation is called vṛtti . This vṛtti pervades the bimbacaitanya . Thus, the difference between Jīva, (which is associated with antakara ṇa,) and the ‘ viṣay ādhi ṣṭ hānacaitanya ’, (which is not associated with antakara ṇa, ) ceases to exist due to the fusion of both in the vṛtti . Thus, even in the difference due to avidy ā’s existence in the

Jīva and Īś vara, their difference ceases to exist. This will lead to a particular relation in which the object becomes non-different from the sākṣicaitanya . In other words, the caitanya associated with Jīva and the caitanya associated with the object get fused into one. Thus, the object that connected with aparok ṣas ākṣi, which is aparok ṣa by itself, also become aparok ṣa.125

This vṛtti can remove the concealment, āvara ṇa, on viṣayacaitanya. In ‘ Ek āvidy āvaranav āda ’ (concealment by single avidy ā) only the Brahmajñ āna can remove āvara ṇa. According to the view of ‘ ajñ ānan ānātvapak ṣa’ (those who admit the existence of many ajñ ānas ), this vṛtti removes the āvara ṇa. Thus, when the obstacles that deny the ‘ viṣay āparok ṣatvavyavah āra’ are removed or destroyed the

117 uncovered caitanya destroys the ajñ āna . It is jñāna that destroys ajñ āna , not the vṛtti because only the jñāna can destroy ajñ āna . The vṛtti only removes āvarana 126 The manifestation of the viṣaya

(viṣay āvachinnacaitanya ) through the removal of concealment and ignorance, is the phala , result.

The object, sat , that is associated with caitanya (viṣayavachinna caitanya) is prameya, the object of knowledge, the revealed sat is the phala, the caitanya associated with vṛtti (vṛttyavachinncaitanya ) is prama -knowledge and, the caitanya that is associated with the transformed internal organ ( Vṛttimadantakara ṇāvachinnam ) is the

Pram āta, knower. 127

The pure caitanya in association with the upādhi of avidy ā is

‘sarvas ākṣi’ . The individual’s knower-hood should be then explained in connection with an internal organ. Therefore, this sākṣi is called

‘asa ṇkīrṇavyavah āra ṅgas ākṣi’ 128 vṛtti is the essential tool that connects external objects with Jīva and internal organ. Again, this vṛtti is the destroyer of concealment cast on by avidy ā.129

Pratikarmavyavastha

The ‘ Pratikarmavyavasth ā’ can be defined as the process through which the Jīva knows each object. It deals with the process called vṛtti

118 that reveal external things to the knower. R āmānanda Sarasvati explains this process in simple words. The ‘ abhed ābhivyakti’ of an object created by an antakra ṇa through its vṛtti in connection with a pram āta or sākṣi associated with that antakara ṇa, reveals that object only to that particular knower. This perception of ‘ aparokshajñ āna ’ is not available to others. 130

The Difference of Advaita from Mah āyāna Buddhism

The Vijñ ānavadins and Śū nyav ādins are known as Mah āyāna

Buddhists. The opponent doubts the position of Advaita is not different from that of Buddhists . The objects known are considered as identical with sākṣi and jñāna , there would not be an object different from knowledge, that is there is no object other than knowledge, hence this position is not different from the view of Buddhists .

Rāmānanda Sarasvati clarifies the position of Advaita Ved ānta .

The thesis of Advaitins and Buddhists are different. Buddhist accept only momentary Vijñ ānas . They believe that nothing except momentary

Vijñ ānas does exist. There are no real objects that have arthakriy ākārita .

Advaita accepts the existence of objects apart from Brahman and also admit ‘ satta ’ to them. Therefore, Advaita Ved ānta is different from

Mah āyāna Buddhism .131

119 Adhy āsapram āṇa Bh āṣya

‘Sākṣipratyaksa’ and anum āna are the pram āṇas that reveal

‘aham mama adhy āsa’ . It is certain that only if one has the notion of ‘I’ and ‘my’, all vyavah āras , both laukika and śāstr īya , will succeed. There is no vyavah āra in deep sleep where the ‘ abhim āna ’ does not exist. arth āpatti is also a pram āṇa on adhy āsa . The non-accomplish- ment of the conventions like knower and means of knowledge is also a pram āṇa of adhy āsa . The pure non-attached Brahman as well as the inert internal organ cannot be the substratum of knowledge. Therefore, Ātman fused with avidy ā is the abode of knowledge is considered as pram ātā- knower. Bh āṣyak āra has pointed out it in his bhāṣya as

‘अिवाविषयािणयादीिनमाणािनशाािणच ’. The Tādātmyadhy āsa is the relation between body and Ātman. The unattached Ātman will never get the character of lordship etc. without adhy āsa. 132

Āagma also a Pram āṇa to establish the existence of adhy āsa . The

śruti like ‘ brāhma ṇoyajeta’ etc. by the word ‘ brāhma ṇa’ refers to the adhik āri who had identified self with the body of Br āhmin and by addressing him the scripture is addressing adhy āsa . Therefore, it is also a pram āṇa to prove adhy āsa .133

120 The Divisions of Adhy āsa

The beginning-less ‘ ajñ ānadhy āsa ’ is located in pure caitanya .

The caitanya with ajñ ānadhy āsa is called Jīva . In Jīva the mind and its characteristics are assumed. The caitanya is associated with the mind, where the body and its peculiar dharmas are imposed. In the caitanya associated with a body, the worldly prosperities and hardships are imposed. 134

The desire etc., are the dharma, characteristics , of mind. Its fusion with caitanya brings the superimposition of desire etc., on Ātman. This mind has ‘ Madhyamaparim āṇa’. This mind is not ‘ aṇu’ as assumed by

Naiy āyikas . It is also considered as ‘ sāksipratya kṣavedya ’. 135

There are two types of adhy āsa viz. svar ūpādhy āsa and samsarg ādhy āsa . The adhy āsa due to samsarga exists on aha ṅkāradhy āsa because the anadhyasta does not manifest in bhrama- an illusion. In the experience of aha ṅkāra, the caitanya is manifested.

This proves the existence of samsarg ādhy āsa .136 The caitanya known as

‘this part’in ‘this silver’ is the common aspect of Ātman and the

‘Pūrṇānanda Brahman ’ is the particular one. 137 The Cid ātman gets imposed on internal organ and the Ātman associated with an internal organ, in turn, get imposed on the body created by it. The pure self is

121 superimposed on antakara ṇa and the self that associated with antakara ṇa will get superimposed on the gross body, which is an effect of Antakara ṇa. It is not the pure self or that one attached or attributed with ajñ āna get superimposed on the body but the upahit ātman (i.e. the

ātman in association with the antakara ṇa) is the one that superimposed on the body. Hence, the illusion of body as Ātman , according to Advaita , hold good. 138

The Benefit of Advaita Ved ānta

It was established that the mutual superimposition

(anyonyadhy āsa ) is the cause of all this worldly convention, and the cause of superimposition ( adhy āsa ) is beginning-less ignorance. The experience, direct knowledge of pure Brahman , the result of meditation on the mah āvākyas like ‘ Tattvamasi, destroys the ignorance that leads to the plight of self. This cessation of ignorance is the benefit of learning

Advaita Ved ānta as this state is mok ṣa. 139 This direct experience of

Brahman also destroys the beginning-less avidy ā along with its effects.

The scripture, ‘ Atonyad ārtam ’, 140 ‘Yadalpamtanmartyam ’ 141 also declares the destruction of all except the ‘ sat ’- the non-dual Brahman .

This is described in the bhāṣya by ’ asy ānarthahetoh ’. It means the destruction of ignorance will lead to the manifestation of non-dual

122 Brahman , the ultimate bliss. This is the ultimate benefit.142

The opponent asks that the result of the learning of Brahmavidy ā, as reiterated in the adhy āsabhasya, is the cessation of ‘ anartha’ .

Further, the scriptures like ‘ asth ūlamana ṇu’ 143 etc., describe the

Brahman, which is devoid of this universe. This is the result of meditation on Mah āvākyas , so they are the viṣayas of śāstra. The question that arises here is how this cessation of difficulties, anarthaniv ṛtti , differs from viṣaya.

Rāmānanda Sarasvati clarifies that the negation of the universe is the subject matter of śā stra and it is not different from Brahman .

Further, the cessation also is not different from Brahman .144

The existence of Brahman cannot be cognised by external sensual organs nor it is the object of inference. There exists no scripture that asserts the co-existence of Brahman and the universe. The scripture

‘Idamsarvamyadayam ātm ā’145 is to remind that Brahman is the cause of all, and this is repeated as the object of negation by Netineti .146 The

Ka ṭha śruti also asserts that only negation leads to mok ṣa. Therefore, the

śruti that ‘negates’ are powerful than that which ‘affirm’. 147 Hence,

Brahman is ‘ niṣprapañca ’. This negation never contradicts with the scripture that deals with the creation of the universe. These do not teach

123 creation as ultimate, instead, they declare Brahman as the cause of the universe and asserts their non-existence disassociated from Brahman .

They negate their independent existence and establishes the non-duality of Brahman based on this. 148

Jīva has no Worldly Life

Like Brahman , the individual self is free from the worldly experience as kart ā, bhokt ā etc. The notions of agency etc., are a mere illusion as there is the absence of a valid means of knowledge to establish the reality of the cognitions of desire, action, sorrow etc.

Buddhists and Pr ābh ākaras maintain that the sorrow etc are self- luminant. It is not so as all things that are different from Jñ āna are not self-luminant. Therefore, like the phenomenon of shell-silver cognition, the worldly experiences like agency are also caused by the sākṣi – i.e. kart ṛtva etc are sākṣivedya . Hence, in reality, the individual self is free from worldly experience and bondage. Therefore, to establish the oneness of Brahman and the individual self is the purport of this śastra , remains uninterrupted. 149

Anarthaniv ṛtti

The relief from ‘ anartha ’ not being an objective of the

124 śāstra, how, then, can it be achieved? Rāmānanda Sarasvati answers that the cognition ‘I am Brahman ’, born from the meditation of mah āvākyas , destroys the ignorance, the root of all sorrows and difficulties. This is the immediate result of Brahmajñ āna .150 The scripture, ‘Tarati śokam

ātmavit ’, reiterates cessation of anartha , that the sage, the Brahmavit , has experienced. The author of bhāṣya has mentioned it as-

‘asy ānarthahetoh prah āṇāya’ - in the adhy āsabh āṣya . 151

The Meaning of Pratipatti

The bhāṣya says that ‘िवाितपयेसववेदाताआरयते’.152 The question is about the sense of the phrase ‘ Vidy āpratipattaye’ 153 used here. The knowledge born from the Ved āntav ākyas, which are not meditated upon, have the Brahman as its object. Though this cognition is direct, due to defects like the absence of concentration of citta and

‘vipar ītabh āvana’ the cessation of the mask by the ajñ āna becomes an object of perception that give direct cognition. A person who believes that he could not be Brahman realises his true nature at once the obstacles were removed by ‘ āptopade śa’ and ‘ tarka’ when the

‘cessation of ignorance becomes the object of knowledge, and this knowledge sustains undisturbed. This state is mentioned by the word pratipatti in bhāṣya. 154

125 Tarka and Svatapr āmāṇya

It should not be imputed that the dependence on Tarka will not take away the ‘ Svatapr āmāṇya of ved āntavakya’. Advaita ved āntin s never advocate such a view that the ‘ Ved āntav ākyas ’ depends on tarka to establish their validity on their objects, but when the obstacles were removed by ‘ tarka’, the ‘ vākyas’ without depending on any other means provide their meaning and the validity of pram āṇas remain intact. This is discussed in ‘ Pūrvam īmāmsa ’. 155

The Invalidity is not by Direct

According to Sāmkhya the invalidity and validity of Pram āṇas are by themselves. This position is not tenable as the proliferation of flaws lead to wrong conclusions where the usage of extra materials than usual ones found in regular cognitions are found used. The extra material found, here, in cognitions like ‘ bhrama’, is a defect. If the defects – defects of organs, conditions etc., - were not considered as the cause of bhrama’, all ‘real’ cognitions too become erroneous or ‘ bhrama’ .

Therefore, the ‘ apr āmāṇya ’, invalidity, is extraneous and validity is inherent. Therefore, the view followed by Sugatas – the Buddhists – that the invalidity is inherent and validity is extraneous is unfounded.

126 According to the ‘ Tarkikas ’, both validity and invalidity are extraneous. This view is also untenable because the cognitions that are born free from defects are considered as pram ā or valid cognition or knowledge. 156 The knowledge thus born – ‘Janyaprama ’ – is not born from a quality – Guna – for it being pram ā or jñāna , similar to the knowledge of Īś vara . 157 Further, the quality that causes the valid cognition cannot be identified. But it is identified in ‘ bhramajñ āna’, erroneous cognition’ as defects like similarity. 158 Therefore, the valid cognition is born when it is not affected by defects and its pram ātva is inherent. 159 The absence of defects cannot be considered a quality, as such a position will lead to the defect of ‘ Anyath āsiddha ’ because there is the absence of obstacles. 160 According to Mīmāmsaka s the validity of knowledge is inherent while the invalidity is extraneous (i.e., the invalidity of cognition comes only later, as in shell –silver knowledge). 161

Direct Knowledge from Vākya

The opponent argues that the theory upheld by advaitins that in the absence of obstacles, the sentences can produce direct cognition is untenable because the ‘ śabdapram āṇa’ could only produce indirect knowledge. The reply of R āmānanda to this is that if the object of

127 perception is not different from the sākṣi, direct knowledge is possible even from śabda . This is noticed in the vākya – ‘Da śamastvamasi ’. The scripture also asserts that the cause of mok ṣa is the direct knowledge of

Brahman born of Ved āntav ākyas . 162

Those who possess the requirements like ‘ Śama ’ etc, learns the purport of ‘ śruti ’ following manana and nididhy āsana, and have control over citta and sensual organs, realises the sameness of Brahman and

Ātman. The preceptors had ascribed the status of an organ to ‘ citta’ for it is the cause of direct cognition (of internal processes and objects). 163

The followers of Vacaspatimisra contends that the knowledge of

Brahman born from śabda is indirect, for indirectness being the quality of knowledge formed from words. Later the concentration of citta leads to the direct experience of Brahman .164

An opponent contends that among ‘ śrava ṇa’, ‘manana’ , and

‘nididhy āsana ’, ‘ nididhy āsana ’ is important. All these three are not equal as there is no result is mentioned other than knowledge and knowledge is only the result of śabda . The status of ‘main and subordinate’ cannot be ascribed for all that which does not have a common result. If it is considered as providing the desired result in succession, the nididhy āsana , meditation is important as only it is

128 leading to the direct experience of Brahman . Therefore, nididhy āsana is important and the other two are subordinate to it.

Rāmānanda Sarasvati reiterates the view of vivara ṇa school against this argument. According to vivara ṇa śravana is important, hence the injunction is on śravana . śravana is directly associated with the result and is the cause of knowledge. The manana and nididhy āsana are causes of the concentration of mind and removal of difficulties like the doubt of impossibility etc. The Dhy āna is never assumed as a means of valid knowledge it cannot be treated as the cause of Brahmajñ āna .

Therefore, the vākya that was the object of meditation is the cause of knowledge and manana and Dhy āna are its auxiliaries or sub- ordinates. 165

The Adhy āsanivartakatva of Adhy āsa

If the direct cognition ‘Aham Brahm āsmi’ leads to the destruction of ignorance and its effects, it would result in the immediate separation of self from the corresponding physical body. This ultimately will lead to the difficulty of not satisfying the ‘j īvanmukti’ asserted by śāstra .

This asserts that learning this śāstra is uselessness.

129 In reply to this objection, R āmānanda Sarasvati refutes the charges. Though the vivekajñ āna could not remove the ignorance for being not opposed to it, the tattvajñ āna that born out of the

Ved āntav ākyas , which has the Brahman , the substratum, as its object, can remove the ignorance located in Brahman as the ‘ vṛttijñāna ’ can negate the ignorance and its effects. Therefore, knowledge is fruitful.

One being continuing with the physical body even after the realisation of Brahman is due to the continuation of impressions of the destroyed ignorance. 166 The impressions of the ‘elimination of ignorance’ also located in Ātman. It has to be presumed that this impression also ceases to exist as the termination of fire on the completion fuel. 167

Another view describes that the knowledge only destroys a part of ignorance that conceal the Brahman but it never removes the part of ignorance in the form of vik ṣepa . The vik ṣepa s are experiences and its objects like body etc. It will be destroyed at the end the prārabdhas by the caitanya reflected in the ‘ akhandakarav ṛtti’ that has preceded.

Therefore, the existence of partial ignorance is the cause of the continual of the physical body; on the removal of the vik ṣep āṁśa of ignorance the physical body gets destroyed and the person attains the final release. 168

130 The Appropriateness of ‘ Up āsan āvidhi’ in Ved ānta

The bhāṣya is confronted by the opponent again. The bhāṣya says that the subject matter of Ved ānta is knowledge of nondual Brahman but many sections in the upanisads deals with the worship or upāsana .

Therefore, the view of bhāṣya is wrong.

Rāmānanda Sarasvati argues that the non-duality or ‘the niṣprapañcatva ’ is established pursuing the logic of adhy āropa and apav āda. The vākyas that deal with the creation of the universe imposes the universe on Brahman and on the negation of ‘ prapañcatva ’ the non- dual Brahman alone remains. The upāsana is accepted as a means that helps to attain the ultimate knowledge through the concentration of citta or mind. 169 This upāsana is not limited to the one who seeks liberation

– mumuk ṣu but a universal means. 170

Though there are many types of vākyas like upāsanav ākyas , sagunav ākyas and nirgunav ākyas , the general implication, mah ātātparya, of these v ākyas are non-dual brahman . In this sense, referring to all the scripture,the bh āṣyak āra has used sarva śabda in the bhāṣya .171

The subject matter of Ved āntas (upani ṣads ) is the unity

131 (difference-less-ness) of Ātman and Brahman, and the result this knowledge is the removal of ‘ anarthas’ . The Ved āntas ūtra s that describe this philosophy of upanisads, which have the same subject matter and result. The bhāṣyak āra , assuming that these were indicated in the first sūtra , has discussed the adhy āsa at the beginning to establish them, and suggested them in the commentary by ‘ asy ānarthahetoh ’. As it describes the purport of sūtra s this text, ‘ Śārīrakabh āṣya’deserves the status of commentary. 172

The Commentary Strictly Follows Sūtra

An objection is raised against this position of Advaita that the

‘viṣaya and prayojana’ referred in the sūtra were explained in the commentary. The opponent rejects the argument.

In reply to this R āmānanda says that the direct meaning of sūtra is that a mumuk ṣu had to undertake ‘ vic āra’ for the Brahmajñ āna . The suffix that indicates the injunction says about the means to attain the goal, leads to the curiosity to know the result, which fetches the attribute of the ‘adhik āri’ ‘mumuk ṣa’. Thus, the knowledge of mok ṣa as the benefit of meditation becomes a meaning of sūtra . The Brahmajñ āna is considered as the destroyer of all worldly difficulties and bondage, and

132 this result cannot be achieved by any other means, both the subject- matter and its benefit are indicated in the sūtra . Therefore, the adhyayabh āṣya that discuss the subject-matter and benefit of Ved ānta is useful and worthy. 173

The Pr ābh ākaram īmāmsaka s pose an objection that the suffix that indicates the injunction could not convey the sense of its utility or benefit. This knowledge is generated from the ‘ niyoga’ which is understood from the injunction. In this process the knowledge generated by the meaning of root in association with the ‘niyojya’.That is the suffix, is not indicating the utility and benefit of the ‘ karma ’ conveyed through the injunctions but the injunction in association with the meaning of the root conveys the benefit of karma given in injunction.

Therefore, ‘ niyoga’ convey the ‘hitas ādhanat ā’, the benefit or utility, of a particular karma. 174

Rāmānanda Sarasvati refutes this argument. He says that the benefits were conveyed by the ‘ vidhi’ , not ‘ niyoga’. He indicts the opponent that the view upheld by him will lead to ad-infinitum because

‘niyoga ’ is considered as the cause of the knowledge of benefit, and yajña thus learned to be completed in a short period produce its results only later. This ‘ niyoga ’could not convey the later enjoyment of the

133 benefits. Therefore, to understand the later enjoyment of the benefits of

‘karma ’, it should be accepted as conveyed through the potency of the suffixes like ‘ling’. 175

The great bhāṣyak āra has provided a discussion on the subject matter and the benefit of learning of Vedanta sūtra s. There after he turned to describe the meaning of the constituent parts, the padas , of the sūtra . Therefore, a person desiring liberation should pursue the

‘Vedam īmāmsa ’ called ‘ Brahmajijñ āsa’,

Second Var ṇaka

It has been pointed out that the object of the injunction

‘śrotavya’ is ‘ Brahm ātmaaikya ’ and its benefit is ‘ anarthaniv ṛtti ’.

Therefore, those who have the desire for the benefit should pursue

Brahmavidy ā.

The opponent objects that the commencement of brahmam īmāmsa is useless. He asks: whether this subject has been considered in the Pūrvam īmāmsa or not .If done, it is not necessary to begin Brahmavidy ā.176 The immediate object indicated by an injunction is the object of consideration- ‘vic āravi ṣaya ’; but Ved ānta is not immediate to the injunction. It is far distanced from the injunction. The

134 purport of all the Vedas are on the effects, ( kāryapara) , the primary intension of the Ved āntav ākyas is to direct the person toward knowledge, and not to learn Brahman . 177 All the topics connected with injunctions like the origin of karma (utpatti), its performance

(viniyoga ’), its benefits ( phala ) are considered in the

Pūrvam īmāmsas ūtra s of Jaimini. Hence, for being considered in the

Pūrvam īmāmsa , thus being known, and being direct, a separate discussion on the meaning of Ved āntav ākyas is not necessary.

Here, the opponent is Pr ābh ākaram īmāmsaka. Rāmānanda

Sarasvati summarises and evaluates the subject matter of

Pūrvam īmāmsas ūtras to refute the argument that the subject matter of

Vedanta was considered by the Mīmāmsa śā stra.

At first, he refers to the objection raised against the commencement of Pūrvam īmāmsa . Dharma is the subject matter of mīmāmsa. It is dealt with in Vedas. And the pram āṇa of dharma is

Vedas. The validity of śabdapram āṇa depends on other means of knowledge. Hence it cannot be considered as an independent pram āṇa.

But there are no other valid pram āṇas other than Vedas that deal with dharma. Therefore, for not being the object of any other pram āṇas, the dharma is invalid. Therefore, it should not be pursued.

135 Mīmāmsakas reply to this objection by clarifying that the Vedas are not Pauru ṣeya . Therefore, Vedas are free from human errors and does not require external support for its validity. The dharma is known from the Vedas and the ‘codan ā’ – interest –born there after are valid.

The mantra , arthav āda,n āmadheya , are also valid as they directly involved in the execution of the karma. The ‘ Sm ṛti ’ is valid for being dependent on scriptures, Śruti. These are the subject matter of the first chapter of Pūrvam īmāms ā.178

At the summary of the second chapter, R āmānanda Sarasvati assumes a doubt that is directed against both Pr ābh ākaras and Bhattas .

Bh āvana or the ‘ niyoga ’ helps one to determine the approach to achieve the desires through performing the ‘ karma ’. The mim āmsak’s opponent challenges the significance of the second chapter of p ūrvam īmāsas ūtra.

The second chapter discusses the types of injunctions and their characteristics and differences. The difference is known from

‘śabd āntara ’, abhy āsa , samkhya , guṇa, kriy ā, and nāmadheya .179

Even in the absence of an injunction regarding the subsidiary,

śeṣata , of a karma they were done considering them helpful. Therefore, the third chapter of Jaimin īyas ūtra is useless, observes the opponent.

136 A subsidiary is that depending on the injunction that is desired 180 and Śruti is the Pram āṇa to it. Hence the chapter that deals with the topics are useful. Similarly, the opponent contends, the knowledge of use and order, the performance of ‘ Aṅga and Aṅgi ’ is possible.

Therefore, a separate chapter, the fourth one, is useless.

Rāmānanda Sarasvati gives the view of m īmāmsakas. He says that though the performance of the main and the subsidiary karmas are possible, their simultaneous-ness could not be grasped without the knowledge of the main injunction in association with the subsidiary ones forming one full unit ( mah āvākya ). This is explained in the fourth chapter. 181

The objection against the fifth chapter is that as the performance is possible in the inverted order what is the use of the fifth chapter. The opponent intends to say that the karma along with its all subsidiaries is known, it is unnecessary to start a new chapter to describe the order of the subsidiaries. The m īmāmsaka position is that when the main and subsidiaries were learned from the ‘ prayogavidhi’ it is necessary to provide the definite order of the process. There are specific rules: they are ुित , अथ, पाठ , थान , मुय and वृि . These are considered in the fifth chapter. 182

137 The sixth chapter of the pūrvam īmāmsas ūtra is devoted to the discussion of ‘ adhik āri ’. The opponent contends here that as the karmas are devoid of any fruits it is impossible to have them any adhik āri is who enjoy the results of karma.

Rāmānanda Sarasvati gives the view of bhāṭṭ as as the answer to this objection. The scrutiny of injunction associated with the desire for benefit is the meaning of the suffix in the injunction, and the suffix alone is not able to convey meaning if the knowledge of the particular benefit is unknown. Hence it associates with the term that indicates the benefit of karma , as the heaven isin the injunction ‘ svargak āmo‘yjeta’ .

Here ‘ svarga ’ is to be accomplished. Therefore, the karma has a benefit and the persons fit for them are to be decided. This is done with the sixth chapter. 183

The first part of pūrvam īmāmsas ūtras has discussed the topics associated with the injunctions regarding ‘ prak ṛti’ - the major or the important karmas. The four components – ‘utpatti’ , ‘ viniyoga’ ,

‘prayoga ’, and adhik āri , were discussed in these six chapters. A ‘ yāga ’, where all the subsidiaries are described, is called prak ṛti . The second part of pūrvam īmāms āsūtras, consisting of six chapters, known as

‘uttara ṣaṭka ’, deals with vik ṛtiy āga .

138 From the śruti ‘yajeta’ the meaning of root ‘ yaj’ conveys the meaning ‘ yāga ’ in general including the subsidiaries. These, by prescription – upade śa – can apply to the ‘ vik ṛtiy āgas ’ where all subsidiaries - aṅgas – were not prescribed. Then, the use of the seventh chapter that deals with ‘ atide śa’ are questioned. The reply to this also following the bhāṭṭ a line. The scrutiny of the meaning of injunction simulates the curiosity to achieve it, which in turn lead to the subsidiaries. In the vik ṛtiy āgas, where all the subsidiaries were not described, ‘ atide śa’ attaches ‘ aṅgas’. Therefore, the seventh chapter is useful. 184

The necessity of the eighth chapter is doubted on the application of sarva ṅgātide śa. By this, the opponent argues, the subsidiaries of all the ‘ prak ṛtis ’ could be part of ‘ vik ṛti ’ by atide śa.

Pūrvam īmāmsaka contends that the defect of sarva ṅgātide śa will not happen because the subsidiary-ness in ‘ vik ṛtis ’ is determined by some causes. This cause is not the same for all subsidiaries. The atide śa of an undetermined subsidiary is not accepted. That is, the ‘ atide śa’ of all the subsidiaries are not possible. The answer to this objection is given in a sentence. The atide śa is determined by the similarity of

‘aṅgas ’ like dravya and devata . The procedure of atide śa is discussed in

139 the eighth chapter, therefore, it is essential. 185

The mantra‘agnayeju ṣṭ amnirvapāmi’ and the purification processes like ‘ avagh āta’ are associated with the auxiliaries of ‘ agneya ’ and these subsidiaries have no applicability in a ‘yāga ’ connected with the sun. Then what is the purpose of the ninth chapter: asks the opponent.

The condition that determines the association with an ‘ aṅga’ is not the ‘svar ūpa’ of an auxiliary of a yāga, but the ability to provide the desired result, which is the bhāvya . The subsidiaries, due to their ability to provide desired results, were learned from the root. The benefits, which are the bhāvyas, were provided by Ap ūrvas . Therefore, Ap ūrvas are real bhāvyas. The subsidiary that is associated with a particular

‘phal āpūrva ’ becomes the ‘ aṅga ’ of a particular ‘ prak ṛti’ . In the same way, it becomes an ‘ aṅga ’ of a ‘ vik ṛti ’ too. These relations were determined by ‘ uha ’ which is the subject matter of the chapter concerned. 186

The subsidiaries of a ‘ prak ṛti’ that have no application in a ‘ vik ṛti ’ will get contradicted due to the non-performance. This is not appropriate. These subsidiaries should be observed for apūrva , though not directly useful, as they were brought-forth by ātide śa. Therefore, the

140 tenth chapter of dvāda ślak ṣaṇī lacks significance.

There will be no contradiction as only the subsidiaries, that felt necessary were get attached to a vik ṛti . When such an association is established, the process that integrated them with the prak ṛti may lose, and this is not considered as a defect. These are explained in the tenth chapter. 187

The significance of the eleventh chapter is also questioned where injunctions with multiple sacrifices as its objects were discussed. The opponent contends that this would bring unintended results.

The eleventh chapter clarifies the doubts regarding the multiple sacrifices instructed in a single injunction and associated procedures.

Hence it is useful. 188

Considering the performance of a subsidiary ritual instructed as part of different karma, ‘ śeṣi’, as ‘ anuddi ṣṭ aśeṣyantaropak āraka ’ is not appropriate. Therefore, the twelfth chapter is irrelevant. This objection cannot be admitted because a lamp placed for a particular person is helpful to others also. Similarly, a subsidiary instructed for particular karma will be benefitting to another karma carried out in between. For example, the karma ’s like pray āja is aimed at the ‘animal to be used in

141 the agni ṣoma’. These are also helpful to the karma called

‘paśupuro ḍāś a’, which is ‘ anuddi ṣṭ a’ that is performed in between. The chapter that deals with issues like this.Therefore, the twelfth chapter is worthy. 189

The opponent concludes his argument that the pūrvam īmāmsa

śastra deals with the vidhis and the associated topics. The assumption that Ved ānta has the character of jñānavidhi is inappropriate. The argument that the object of knowledge, Brahman , which is not an object of any sense organ, is dealt in a separate section containing four chapters has been started to remove the unsolved doubts remaining on ‘ Brahman ’ and it could not be granted because the word ‘cow’ can make the knowledge of ‘cow’. Similarly, the injunctions can make knowledge of imposed objects also. Therefore, no further doubt will arise regarding the Brahman .190

Rāmānanda Sarasvati refutes the claim of the opponent from the view of a section of advaitins . According to them, the pūrvam īmāmsas deny the validity of Ved ānta for want of an injunction. The śruti ,

‘ātm āvā are d ṛaṣṭ avya ’ cannot be treated as an injunction as it is associated with futile karma . The activity indicated by the suffix ‘ tavya’ associates it with an object which should have distinguishing characters.

142 Brahman is considered as ‘beginning-less, immutable, and free from defects. In such an object the characters ‘ utpatti, vik āra, āpti and samsk āra ’ will not take place. Therefore, the knowledge of Brahman cannot be an object of any injunction. 191

After the presentation of the objection, R āmānanda Sarasvati attempts to give the theory of siddh āntin , a sect of advaitins. But this is also from the perspective of the opponent. It seems that R āmānanda

Sarasvati himself is not advocating the view upheld by these schools.

This section is given as the presentation of the opponent to refute the view. These schools under consideration accept Ved ānta as ‘ vaidha’ and it has not been discussed in dvāda śalak ṣaṇi. Therefore, to consider and evaluate ved ānta the brahmam īmāmsa should be commenced.

A group of Ved āntins argue that this śāstra of Brahman need to be commenced as the injunction of the knowledge of Ātman directs to the purification of impressions in Ātman . The acquisition of purity is the benefit of this injunction. The nature of the result of this injunction is similar to the result of the injunction ‘ svādhy āyodhyetavya ḥ’ where the result is the Vedajñ āna, which is a samsk āra in the form of āpti. 192

The opponent after explaining the position of a sect of Advatins

143 on śāstr ārambha turns to another sect and presents their position. This school holds that the Ved ānta has ‘ vidhiparatva’. There is doubt on the absence of pram āṇas on Brahman , and to remove this doubt, the injunction should be accepted on Jñ āna . For being associated with

‘vidheyajñ āna ’ the prāmāṇya of the Ved ānta on Brahman also needs to be evaluated. Therefore, the beginning of śāstra is necessary 193 . After the presentation of the arguments of two schools of Ved ānta , the opponent initiates their refutation. He says that both these are untenable.

The view of the first school is not appropriate because when the suffix

‘tavya’ is used to indicate an activity that is to be done. Therefore, on hearing dra ṣṭ vaya , no doubt will arise whether it is an injunction or not.

The importance of jñāna helps to establish the vākya as a ‘vidhi’ following ‘ saktuny āya’. The Ātman is samsk ārya as it attains mukti .

Hence the injunction in the form of ‘the agent desiring mukti has to do jñāna ’ is proper and fits well. This being accomplished with m īmāms ā the brhmam īmāms ā śā stra should not be commenced. 194

The opponent continues his argument. He contends that this jñānavidhi is ‘ niyamavidhi ’ that confirms the jñānābhy āsa for mok ṣa.195

Therefore, being an injunction and having the absence of doubts, the

Brahmavic āra need not be started. 196

144 The opponent then proceeds to summarise the argument of the second school of Ved āntins who upheld the ‘ vidhi’ on Brahmavidy ā through jñānavidhi. He proceeds to prove ‘ utpattividhi , viniyogavidhi , prayogavidhi, and adhik āravidhi on Ved ānta. The Śruti ‘ātm āvā are dra ṣṭ avya’ helps to suppose an injunction, vidhi , ‘ jñānmkury āt’ . This is utpattividhi . Brahman being known only from upani ṣads the Ved āntas associate with it as instruments. This utpattividhi becomes the viniyogavidhi by attaching ‘ śam ādi ṣaṭka ’ as its subsidiaries. The same injunction following the – ‘अभयंभवितयएवंवेद ’ 197 , which is an arthav āda, instructing the person who has a desire for mok ṣa as adhik āri , becomes ‘ adhik āravidhi . 198 This adhik āravidhi becomes prayogavidhi by instructing to observe the six auxiliaries, śama, dama, uparati, titik ṣa, śraddha and sam ādhi , to complete the karma that has given in injunction. Therefore, having the injunction been established on jñāna , on Brahman that is related to the injunction, the Ved ānta

Pr āmāṇya of Brahman has to be evaluated and for this, the beginning of

śāstra is necessary. 199

The opponent attempts the refutation of the arguments put forth by two different schools of Ved ānta . The ‘ Brahm ātman ’ is not known from any other Pram āṇa, pursuing ‘Jñ ānavidhi’, ‘Brahm ātm ājñātavya ’,

145 will lead to the difficulty of ‘ vair ūpya ’ arising out of ‘ viruddhatrika ’. 200

Further, the Ved ānta cannot be considered as ‘ vidhi ’ due to the absence of ‘ vidheya’ .201 If Ved āntin still holds that it is possible to prove the

‘Brahm ātman ’ following the ‘ vidhi’ , it would result in the non-existence of Brahman . 202

The view of the opponent can be summarised as follows. All the

Veda is ‘Karmapara’ and were considered for exposition in

Pūrvam īmāmsa . Therefore, the meaning of Ved ānta is that the mumuk ṣu should meditate on ‘ ahambrahma ’. The sameness of Ātman and

Brahman is not the purport of these Ved āntav ākya s, as this is against the conclusion of other pram ānas and will be contradicted by other vākyas.

The intention of vidhi is on ‘ kārya ’. Therefore, ‘ Brahmavidy ā’ is

‘avidheya’ and cannot be commenced.

After the long presentation of pūrvapak ṣa, R āmānanda Sarasvati attempts its refutation. 203 Rāmānanda Sarasvati, firstly, puts forth a pūrvapak ṣa against the commencement of Pūrvam īmāmsa, against the

Pūrvam īmāmsaka, who challenged the commencement of the

Śā rīrakam īmāmsa . He asks: how the Vedas were concluded as

‘kāryapara. ’ Whether the potency of words associated with its respective objects or through the words of Jaimini etc.? If it is the

146 potency of the words it is considered in the ‘ Samanvayas ūtra’. If the second, the instruction of the wise men teach the ‘kāryaparatva ’ of

Vedas, there is no such instruction. 204 The words of Jaimini, as given in the Sūtra , ‘ Ath ātodharma jijñ āsā’ does not point at the ‘ Kāryapatva ’ of

Vedas . The question of whether the examination of dharma should be carried out or not being considered, it is found that there is no Pram āṇa that direct to the examination of dharma . Neither the perception nor the scripture advocates it. The doubt is that whether this instruction of learning ( adhyayana vidhi ) aims at direct results or indirect results. It cannot be direct in the form of knowledge corresponding to word and object ( śabda - artha) . In the second, the learning is for adṛṣṭārtha , indirect results, like the oblation ( homa ), is not intended for the knowledge of inherent meaning. Therefore, the dharma should not require an examination. 205

Rāmānanda Sarasvati refutes the argument that ‘ dharma ’ need not be examined as the Veda is the authority that directs to the learning of dharma . The ‘ niyamavidhi ’ suggests that the adhyayana is directed for results that are direct and indirect intermixed. The direct result of adhyayana is the attainment of Vedas . The ability to recite it is a

147 ‘samsk āra ’ which is the result of vidhi. The ‘ kāryav ādin’ accepts this

Ap ūrva as the result of the injunction. 206

Vidhi in Ved ānta

In Advaitaved ānata ‘svādhy āyavidhi’ points at the cause of desired result svādhy āya. The desired result here is svādhy āya associated with the acquisition ( avāpti ) and purification ( samsk āra) .207

The View of Bh āttas

Bh āttas are Bh āvan āvādins. They say that vidhi is executed through bh āvan ā. An injunction directs a person to pursue the desired benefits by carrying out the rituals (the karma, which is called bh āvya) prescribed. The relation between the ritual, benefit and the procedure is understood through bh āvan ā. In adhyayanavidhi, there is no bh āvya to be accomplished through bh āvana . But an injunction is indicated through the suffix ‘tavya’ . To overcome the difficulty, an ‘ Apurva’ is accepted as the benefit of this vidhi.The svādhy āya purified by the adhyayana (which is a result of adhyayanavidhi) is helpful to the sacrifice like the fire purified by ādh āna . 208 The application of

‘saktuny āya’ 209 is not useful here as the benefit of karma is direct and intact as dircted by the scripture. Therefore, sūtra intends to prove that

Veda is the pram āṇa of dharma. 210

148 Pūrvam īmāmsa is not an Explanation of all the Vedas

The pūrvam īmāmsa view of dharma and m īmāms āsūtra does not conclude that all the Veda should be interpreted following dharma. A statement ‘blue is the object of the eye’ never deny that red could not be an object of eye. Therefore, only a section of Veda is examined under dharma .211 The word of Bh āṣyak āra that‘ Vedas should be interpreted following dharma ’ is not directed at the whole Veda, because, it seems that both sūtrakara and Bh āṣyak āra have taken great effort to explain dharma , and not the whole corpus of Veda .212

Brahman is Different from Dharma

Like dharma , Brahman , unknown as well as unnegated, is also known from Veda s. Therefore, the words of Śabarasw āmi is certainly directed at a section of Vedas. 213 There is no doubt that

Pūrvam īmāms āsūtra s deal with dharma and not Brahman . After the study of Vedas, Jaimini insists on the study of dharma (as the meaning of

Vedas) which points at the existence of meaning other than dharma. 214

Though there is the possibility of examination of the whole Veda, the dharma is well known in the world as the means of prosperity, most of the aspirants pursue it. The liberation being difficult to attain the desire

149 for it would be unusual. Therefore, Jaimini confines to the explanation of the well-known dharma. It is certain from the review of the first Sūtra of dvāda śalak ṣaṇi that the whole of Veda is not considered in

Pūrvatantra 215 The second Sūtra ‘Codan ā lak ṣaṇo artho dharma’ defines dharma . Pr ābh ākaras say that in the case of dharma , known from the injunction is its definition, i.e., to dharma, pram āṇa is codan ā- Vidhi. The Bh āṭṭ as regards Vidhi as the pram āṇa of dharma and the definition of dharma is known from Vidhi . Veda has two forms- directional and non-directional ( codan ātmaka and acodan ātmaka ).

Jaimini considering one type of Veda , i.e., vidhir ūpa , has hinted at the other part of Veda that deals with ‘ acodan ābh āga ’. This part of Veda deals with ‘ siddhavastu’ against the s ādhya of p ūrvam īmāmsa.216 If it wasn’t the intention of sūtrak āra , the sūtra would be ‘ Veda lak ṣaṇo dharma’ .

Bh āvana

Dharma is ‘ arthabh āvana’ - the effort for accomplishing some ritual.That is, dharma is to be obtained through the performance of ritual. ‘ codan ā’ is Vākya that speaks about the karma . It leads to the cognition of the karma to be performed and it is instructed through the suffixes - ‘ling’, ‘lot’ or ‘ Tavya’ . The śabda bh āvana sprung from the

150 suffix ‘ling’ which inspires the knower to do a ritual for the desired result, and the ritual is conveyed by the root.That is śabda bh āvana is the knowledge and artha bh āvana is the actual performance of ritual by the knower. Jaimini, to define ‘ dharma ’derived the word ‘ codan ā’ from the root ‘ cud prera ṇe’. This suggests that dharma is fruitful activity and activity always presupposes some benefit. 217 The svādhy āya vidhi itself is conveying the purport of svādhy āya , which is bhāvya , as an object that is the outcome of the activity. Therefore, the term ‘ codan ā’ is used to avoid the ‘ dharmaparatva ’ of the section of Veda that is not

‘codan āpara’ . 218 Hence, the arthav āda sentences that do not carry the meaning of ‘ codan ā’ were interpreted in association with the injunctions. If all the Veda has been covered by the Sūtra the word

‘atadarth ānām’ would become useless. 219 Śabara too, while presenting the pūrvapak ṣa on ‘आायययाथवादानथयमतदथानाम्’, explaining the Vākyas having no fruits of its own, like ‘ Sorod īt’ etc,has pointed to the Ved āntav ākyas that have associated benefits, are not part ( Śeṣa) of any other ( Śeṣi). 220 (śeṣi is mukhyay āga and śeṣait 's subsidiary).

The sentences in the Śabarabh āṣya like ‘ dṛṣṭ ohi ’ etc are not contradictory to the Ved āntav ākyas and according to the Bh āṭṭ a view, the Pūrvatantra has not attempted the explanation of Ved ānta .221

151 It seems that Pr ābh ākaram īmāmsaka who follow the theory of

‘niyoga’ too believe that the Ved āntav ākyas are not considered in the

Pūrvatantra . On completion of the learning of Vedas doubt may arise on the purport of vākys like ‘ udbhid āyajeta pa śuk āma ’. This leads to the activity to remove these doubts, and one has to pursue the interpretation of Vedas to determine the validity and invalidity of Vedas . This is the pūrvapak ṣa of Pūrvam īmāmsa according to the Pr ābh ākara s. They assert that the meaning and purport of Vedas were determined by

‘‘ niyoga ’’. This ‘ niyoga ’ describes the intension of the vākyas , i.e, the intention of the injunctions. 222

The injunction that direct to the study of Veda and Ved ānta, consider Vedas in general, and a major section of learners pursue the knowledge that provides prosperity and rather less number may pursue mok ṣa or liberation and Jaimini did the exploration of dharma for those who sought prosperity. Therefore, in the view of Guru also the meaning of Pratijñ āsūtra, from the potency of the term dharma in the sūtra , is about the explanation of the section of Veda that deal with dharma .

Therefore, the Ved ānta vākyas are not considered in the

Pūrvam īmāmsa. 223

The Mīmāmsaka contends that the word dharma stands for Vedas ,

152 i.e. there is only one type of Veda that is dharma . This argument is met with the following counter by R āmānanda Sarasvati. The general meaning of dharma is not ‘ Veda’, it is found used in other meanings by

Buddhists. That which causes ‘good’ cannot be considered as dharma as it will lead to the study of pure Brahman that provide the ultimate bliss.

(that is, the definition of dharma is affected by the defect of ativy āpti )

The pure Brahman has not been explored in the dvāda śalak ṣṇī as the term dharma does not convey Brahman . Dharma is ‘ Śreyas ādhana ’ and Brahman is Śreyor ūpa ’. The dvāda śalak ṣṇī deals only with the dharma , that is the cause of prosperity, śreyas. 224

In Dv āda śalak ṣṇī, the exploration of the meaning of entire Veda is not considered but only the exploration of dharma has been declared and completed. Therefore, the examination of the section of Veda that deals with ‘ Siddhabrahma ’ should be initiated. Therefore, the commencement of the śāstra ‘ath āto brahmajijñ āsa ’ is necessary. 225

Third Var ṇaka

The third Var ṇaka explores the meaning of the word ‘ Atha ’ in the first Sūtra as ‘ Ānantarya ’. It also establishes that the person qualifies for

153 the study of Brahmavidy ā should have acquired the ‘ sādhanacatu ṣṭ aya, following scripture.

The opponent challenges the meaning of the word ‘ atha’ in the sūtra . R āmānanda Sarasvati, following the tradition, asserts that the word ‘ atha ’ is used in the sense ‘after’ and this meaning leads to the related four requirements of the person who qualify for the study of

Ved ānta . A person who possess these requisites suddenly engages in learning Ved ānta. The presence of the word ‘jijñ āsa’ , which have the meaning of ‘ vic āra’, and the ‘ vic āra ’ has to be commenced, may tempt one to consider the meaning of ‘ atha ’ as ‘begin’. The meaning of the term, ‘jijñ āsa’ is associative ( yaugika) and not conventional ( rūḍha ). In a word, if the certain meaning is associative its conventional meaning should not be considered. 226 When a word conveys its meaning as a single unit irrespective of its components and free from ‘ saṅketa ’, the vṛtti is called rūḍhi . When the components that form the word determines the meaning, the v ṛtti is yaugika . These two are important vṛttis . The relation with the primary meaning of a word is lak ṣaṇa.

Among these three, earlier ones are powerful compared to later ones. 227

The term ‘ atha ’ is included in the sūtra to remove doubts on

‘adhik āri’ . The traivar ṇikas who qualify for the learning of Vedas does

154 not qualify for the ‘ vic āra’ , because it is not directed by the

‘adhyayanavidhi ’. 228

Rāmānanda Sarasvati refutes the positions of Bh āṭṭ a and

Pr ābh ākara on adhik āra . The ‘ niyoga ’ theory of Pr ābh ākara is discussed in detail and refuted. 229

The Advaitins regards the meaning of vidhi as ‘ śreyas ādhanatva ’, where the ‘ adhik āritva is free from the determining factors like age, caste etc. 230 The adhyayanavidhi becomes accomplished by the learning of Vedas and this adhyayanavidhi functions as an auxiliary to ‘ vic āra’ in determining the purport of vākyas where doubts arise about its benefit and procedure of performance. The real vākyas that provide direct benefit is the injunctions that deal with ‘ nityakarmas ’ which are not beneficial to Brahmavic āra as it never depends on ‘ nityavidhi’ .

Therefore, the dharmavic āra is pursued by the persons who have learned Vedas following the injunctions, so the bhāṣya of Śabarasw āmi is not contradicted at all. 231

The meaning of ‘ maṅgala ’ does not suit the context of sūtra , so

ānantary ārtha should be given to fulfil the requirements of jijñ āsa. The

ānantary ārtha will help to determine the adhik āri and requirements. 232

155 The vṛttik āra follows the view that Brahmajijñ āsa should be persuaded after accomplishing dharmajijñ āsa. He thinks that all the

Veda aims at mok ṣa both dharma and Brahma Jijñ āsa were driven by the adhyayanavidhi .233

Rāmānanda Sarasvati refutes this claim. He asks that what

‘dharmajijñ āsā’ is and whether it is the thousand ‘ Ny āyās’ described in

Pūrvam īmāms āsūtra or the knowledge of sacrifices learned from it or the sacrifice ( Karma) associated with it. He concludes his arguments showing the inappropriateness of assuming dharmajñ āna as a prerequisite of Ved ānta.Brahman is ‘ svatassiddha ’ and never became a subject to the rules of ‘ utpatti , viniyoga ’, prayoga , adhik āra and atide śa’ . The rules of śruti,liṅga etc. used in both the ‘ Mīmāms ās’ do not require the study of Pūrvam īmāms āsūtras as they were well known in the world. 234 Though ‘ upāsana ’ follows Pūrvam īmāmsa rules, for being considered as a form of dharma, it does not form a necessary requisite of Brahmajiñ āsa. These rules ( Ny āya ) form part of Ved ānta , and not wholly associated with ‘ Pūrvatantra’ .These were discussed in the‘ Brahmas ūtras ’, viz.‘Śā strayonitv āt’ 235 , ‘AtaevaCaNityatvam ’, and

‘Sam ānan āmr ūpatv āt’ 236 . That is the rules are a common property of both the m īmāms āsas. 237

156 Further, there is no rule that Ved ānta should be persuaded after the exploration of karma . All the karma , according to scripture and tradition, purify a person from sin. This purification helps the ‘ Adhik āri’ while learning the Ved ānta by removing the obstacles . If the person does not pursue, Ved ānta he will attain Pit ṛloka etc. Hence, the scripture,

‘ययैतेचवारशसंकाराःसणःसायुयंसलोकतांगछित ’ will not be contradicted. 238

The opponent, who follow the Gautama sm ṛti, argue that the

‘liṅga ’ of saūjya and sālokya , tells that the adhik ārin attains only the

‘kārya Brahman ’ and never the true liberation. Therefore, how could confirm that the impressions (samsk āra) lead to liberation through the

Jñ āna ?

Rāmānanda Sarasvati reminds the opponent that the word sāyūjya is used in the sense of non-difference, which is its primary meaning. The sameness with the ‘K āryabrahman’ does not fit to the individual self.

One thing cannot be the other by giving up its original nature or without giving up its original nature. So, the Sm ṛti refers to the Mukti and

Sālokya . Bhagavad G īta by ‘वेवेकमयिभरतः ’ 239 and the Sm ṛti 240 maintains clearly that one attains Mukti through Samsk āra . The purificatory rites, which are the subsidiaries of the karma initiated by

157 injunction, become the ‘ Gu ṇakarma ’. Therefore, the rites that purify the mind can be considered as providing independent results. Only in the subordinate rituals, the ‘ phala śruti ’ is considered as arthav āda . 241

According to a section, all the Karma useful for both Jñ āna and

‘kramamukti ’. 242

A second group consider that the Karma like Agnihotra performed following the utpattiv ākyas establishes a connection with heaven through the association with the sentences like

‘Svargak āmoyajeta ’. According to this group, the karma is a means of knowledge (pram āṇa) for being instructed for the purpose. The śruti

‘Yajñenad ānena ’ instructs that those who wish the realisation of

Brahman do observe Yajña etc. as given in śruti. 243 Karma cannot be considered as the direct means of realisation as it is against the śruti

‘Nānya ḥpanth āvidyata’ . Therefore, the karma is a subordinate instrument for Mok ṣa by preparing the mind for it. 244 Therefore, the meaning of the term ‘ Atha ’ in the ‘ Ath āto brahmajijñ āsā’ is

‘Karm ānantarya’ - after the learning of Karmam īmāms ā. 245

Rāmānanda Sarasvati refutes this argument. He says that even before the thought of karma the requisites of the ‘ adhik āri’ could get associated with the term atha. It should not be accepted that the karma

158 performed in the present life is the cause of the purity of mind. The

Śruti ‘जायमानोवैाििभऋणवा ’, 246 and the Sm ṛti ‘ऋणािनीय -

पाकृयमनोमोेिनवेशयेत्’, 247 does not mean this as it contradicts the

Jābāla śruti ‘चयादेवजेत्’, which supports renunciation at the stage of ‘ brahmacarya ’ itself. Therefore, the given Śruti and Sm ṛti should be treated as ‘arthav ādśruti and Sm ṛti’ which are subordinate. 248

Since the renunciation of brahmac ārin is approved in śruti, the

‘Krama śruti, is intended for the those who are ‘ aviraktas ’, the persons who are attached to domestic obligations; and the Rṇa śruti is used to determine the eligibility. R āmananda Sarasvati in the sa ṅgraha śloka concludes that the blind etc. are not eligible for mok ṣa due to the inability for śrava ṇa.249

Rāmānanda Sarasvati at this point contests the view of

Bha ṭṭ abh āskara who never advocated the renunciation of the sacred thread, Yajñopav īta; and refute him following the scripture –

‘इदमेवाययोपवीतंयआमा , मुडोऽपरहः ’ 250 , which insists abandonment of yajñopav īta. Considering all these aspects

Bhagavatp āda clarified in his sūtrabh āṣya that the curiosity for

Brahman is possible even before dharmajij ṇāsa. 251

159 Refutation of Jñ ānakarma samuccayav āda

The karma and the karma associated with jñāna (ानसमुितकम) is also refuted by advaitins as the means of mok ṣa for lacking support of

Pram āṇas , i.e., scripture. The ‘ Vividi ṣāvāky ā252 cannot be supposed as advocating ‘Jñ ānakarmasamuccaya’ because the Śruti

‘अिवयामृयुंतीवा’253 declares that the results of dharma and jñāna are entirely different. Advaitins state that liberation is the result of jñāna

(ानादेवतुकैवयम्).254 Further renunciation is considered as an ‘ anga’ of jñāna in Advaita Ved ānta and the rituals associated with daily routine never lead directly to mukti, but in succession, through the purification of mind. Again, the Karma is not able to establish the sameness, aikya , of Brahman and Ātman . It cannot destroy ignorance, avidy ā knowledge itself destroys ignorance and the karma has no (direct) role in this process. 255

Criticism of Bh āskar ācārya

This theory of Jñ ānakarma samuccaya is considered as the theory advocated by Bh āskar ācārya. The Vi śiṣṭādvaitins and other Vai ṣnava sects follow him. Further, the Bhed ābheda theory upheld by Bh āskara influenced many philosophical systems in India. The Vivara ṇak āra ,

160 Prak āśā tmayti, attempted the refutation of the views of Bhāskara.

Rāmānanda Sarasvati also refuted the views of Bhaskara in

Vivara ṇopany āsa .

Even if one accepts that the association of Jñ āna and Karma is the cause of liberation, the succession of Jñ āna following Karma cannot be proven, because knowledge always precedes the activity. Hence, only the ‘ Karma’ observed by the person who knows Brahman will move to liberation. Thus, in the first stage of life, the ‘brahmacarya āś rama’ , itself he learns Brahman and the learning of karma follow later. The result is that the dharmajij ṇāsa comes just after Brahmajijñ āsā, which is against the presented model. 256

The succession, of dharmajijñ āsā and Brahmajijñ āsā, cannot be accepted for the difference of their respective objects. The object of

Brahmajijñ āsā is Brahman , which is an existing object but the object of dharmajijñ āsā is dharma , which is yet to be created. The difference between an existing one that has not yet come into existence is far wide.

Further, the dharma instructed in the Vedav āky ās directs a person to activity but the śrutiv ākys that deals with Brahman are nondirective-

‘Apravartaka ’. Therefore, ‘after the karma’ cannot be the meaning of

‘atha’ in the sūtra . The meaning of atha śbda , instead, is after obtaining the Śrautas ādhanas .257

161 Sādhana Catu ṣṭ aya

The opponent doubts that the sādhanas , nity ānityaviveka, vairagya , śam ādhi, and mumuk ṣā are not given in a single vākya.

Different upani ṣadv āky ās are giving different s ādhanas. They cannot be considered as teaching a unified concept. The enquiry is set forth from the Vākya ‘Sonve ṣṭ avya ḥ’. 258 ‘Tadyatheha Karmacitolokah Kṣīyante ’259 convey ‘ Viveka ’, ‘ Par īkṣyaLokan 260 speaks about vairagya ,

‘Śā nthod ānthah ’ 261 deals with Śam ādi ṣaṭka , and ‘ Brahma Veda

Brahmaiva Bhavet ‘262 presents the mumuk ṣa. The view of advaitins that all these together forms a single vidhi is not cognisable, argues the opponent. 263

Rāmānanda Sarasvati contends that the rule of the

‘Sarva śā kh āpratyayanyaya ’264 of Jaimini is followed by advaitins, and the Śrava ṇavidhi is accepted in all these vākyas . Further, the term

‘vijñ ānārtham ’ implies the result that is common to all. Therefore, all the sādhanas are worthy. 265 A section considers, only the Mumuk ṣa is the attribute of adhik ārin and all else are to infer the nature of

‘Mumuk ṣa’. 266 Rāmānanda Sarasvati summarises that the four sādhanas are mutually associated in a cause-effect relation. Viveka leads to

162 vairagya and vairagya is the cause of śam ādi ṣṭ ka which ultimately leads to Mumuk ṣa.267

Bh āskar ācārya has indicted Śree Śankara for considering sādhana catu ṣṭ ay ānantaryam as the meaning of atha śabda. He argues that śama etc., cannot be considered as the meaning of ‘ atha śabda ’ since there is no proof to establish that these were in the mind of sūtrakara . This argument is not correct because sūtrak āra has summarised the idea of

śrava ṇvidhi in the s ūtra. This is impossible if he was unaware of associated scripture. 268

The Meaning of ‘ Ata ḥś abda ’

The opponent argues that the second term of the jijñ āsāsūtra ,

‘ata ḥ’ is useless as the ‘ atha śabda’ itself has explained all requirements.

Rāmānanda Sarasvati criticises the opponent who believes that the arthav ādas are important than other sections of Veda , and oppose the invariable concomitance ‘vyapti ’,‘whatever limited is mortal’ –

‘Athayadalpam tanmartyam ’ showing a violation of the rule in the case of Param āṇus . The opponent believes that those who seek eternality will not get vair āgya from the performance of karma . He contends that it should not be supposed that a person will strive for hearing or learning

163 eternal brahman knowing its futility. Further, the sameness ( aikya) of

Brahman and Ātman is impossible. There will not be any

‘Brahmasamyoga ’ because a person seeking eternal bliss has no desire for ‘ Brahmasamyoga ’. During the Mukti the Ātman , or Jīva , experience

‘own nature’ or eternal bliss due to the non-existence of eternal bliss.

Therefore, the opponent argues, that the Mok ṣaśāstra should not be commenced as there is no seeker, adhik āri, to pursue the system. 269

Rāmānanda Sarasvati refutes the arguments. He says that the term

‘atah’ establishes that sādhanacatu ṣṭ aya like viveka etc., are causes of

Brahmajijñ āsa . The Śruti, ‘Tadyatheha karmacito lokah’ suggests the impermanence of the results of ‘ karma . This suggests that vair āgya is possible. 270 Similarly, the results of up āsana also impermanent. The

Śruti ‘ Anevamvin mahat pu ṇyam karotit addhasy āntatahk ṣīyate ’ rejects the permanence of anything other than knowledge. 271 The Śruti ‘nānyah pantha’ 272 asserts that there are no means other than knowledge to attain

Mukti . Therefore, neither Up āsana nor the ‘ Samuccaya’ can be considered as means of Mok ṣa. 273

The opponent argued that Brahma jijñ āsa is useless. This contention is wrong, because, the śruti ‘Brahmaveda Brahmaivabhavati’ asserts the existence of pure Brahman and there exists no contradiction

164 in considering the sameness of both Jīva and Brahman. The characteristics of j īvā are due to the superimposition caused by beginning-less ignorance on Brahman . The non-experience of Brahman in its pure nature is due to the cover by ignorance. Therefore, the knowledge leads to the removal of the concealment on Brahman and the experience of pure Brahman . So, the study of Brahmavidy ā is fruitful. 274

The Sam āsa (Compound) in the word‘ Brahmajijñ āsā’

Advaitins consider that the compound used in ‘ Brahmajijñ āsā’ is

ṣaṣṭ hī sam āsa with ‘ karma ṇi ṣaṣṭ hi’ , where the importance of the desire is indicated. 275 The prominence of desire is accepted here to emphasize the sameness of the object, Brahman, and the resulting knowledge. The knowledge of Brahman is the result of the desire to know Brahman , which is not different from Brahman . If the ‘ vic āra’ is considered important, the object and result become different and this is followed in the Pūrvam īmams ā 276 . The Vṛttik āra , ensuing the Pāṇin īya ‘sūtra

‘Ṣaṣṭ hīś eṣe’ 277 considers the Ṣaṣṭ hī’used in the jijñ āsāsūtra as Śeṣa, not

Karma ṇiṣaṣṭ hī’.278 The term Śeṣa denotes general or common relation or association. Anything sought in its general characters will lead to the knowledge of its particular aspects, that is, it leads to the ‘ karmatva ’

165 indirectly. This cannot be accepted that as there is the possibility for direct ‘ karmat ā’ and it is not necessary to seek an indirect method.

Further, the Śruti ‘Tadvijijñ āsasva ’ 279 shows the ‘ Karmatva ’ of

Brahman .280

The Meaning of the Term ‘ Brahma’ in Sūtra

The opponent doubts the meaning of the term ‘ Brahman’ in the

Sūtra as it is well known in the sense of ‘caste’, ‘ Jīva’ , ‘ Hira ṇyagarbha’ or ‘ Caturmukha Brahma’ , and Veda . The opponent seeks clarification about the meaning of ‘brahma śabda’ used in the sutra. Rāmānanda

Sarasvati replies that the term ‘ Brahma ’ refers to the cause of the universe as only that one could be the object of the desire of a

Mumuk ṣu. 281

The Meaning of Jijñ āsā

The Bha ṣya has described the ‘knowledge’ that is the cause of desire and the ‘knowledge’ that is the result of desire.

‘Av āptiparyantam jñ ānam’ is considered as the object of desire indicated by the suffix ‘ San’ in the word jijñ āsa . A piece of general information or knowledge generates curiosity for deeper particular knowledge or higher knowledge. Therefore, general knowledge should

166 be treated as a cause. The realisation of brahman is the result of knowledge which is direct. The direct experience that reveals pure

Brahman is the meaning of knowledge. In the view that knowledge from

Śabda is indirect, the verbal knowledge,which reveals only general aspects of an object, is considered as cause and realisation is the result.

According to the section who considers that the verbal knowledge too can create direct knowledge, the direct experience of the knower is the cause and the unobstructed direct knowledge is the result. 282 There is a difference between Jñ āna and avagati . If the activity of the knower is involved in the result it is called Jñ āna . The cumulative experience is called ‘ Samvid’ and avagati . (तयःकतृापारःतानम्, समुदाय -

फलंतुफुरणंसंिवद्अवगितरितचोयते। )283

The great commentator thus explaining the meaning of component words of the Sūtra said that therefore, the Brahman should be sought. The opponent poses a doubt whether this Sūtra commences the śāstra from outside if so, it must be explained what opens the śāstra that seeks Brahman . If the sūtra itself opens the śāstra the defect of

Ātm āś raya cannot be avoided. If by any other agent, there is the defect of ad-infinitum. The reply of Advaitins to this is that the sūtra comes midway, and not in the beginning. 284 The śāstra was initiated by the

167 injunction of śrava ṇa – śrava ṇavidhi, and the sūtra is to determine the associated elements like ‘ Anubandha ’. 285 Therefore, it is associated with

śruti. The sūtra conveying the meaning of the śruti that the

Ved āntav ākyas should be listened and meditated on to learn the

śāstra .286

Rāmānanda Sarasvati concludes the discussion on the first sūtra .

A Mumuk ṣu seeking solution to end sorrows and bondage learns from

Vedas that the knowledge of Brahman is the way to Mok ṣa. The

‘niyamavidhi ’ is accepted here, as the term ‘ śrotavya ’ insists

Brahmavidy ā for Mok ṣa. The desire to learn Brahmavidy ā for Mok ṣa he investigates and examines its logical stability of Vedanta v āky ās through

Pram āṇas following tradition. The Brahman is the object of enquiry for being unknown and it is also the benefit in the form of known, the desirous person is the eligible one to learn Brahmavidy ā, and all these are associated with śāstra .

Fourth Var ṇaka

The subject matter of this Var ṇaka also deals with the significance of the enquiry of Brahman . The problem considered is

‘whether Brahman is well-known or not’. The opponent argues that the

168 śāstra does not have an object, so it should not be pursued. The question, ‘whether Brahman is well-known or not’ is used to explain the position of the opponent. The position is that if Brahman is well known, it cannot be the object of śāstra , and the enquiry is useless because due to the absence of ignorance the removal of ignorance does not happen. If it is unknown, then the curiosity and enquiry on Brahman become impossible. In such a situation the Brahman cannot be described following the scripture and śāstra , that is, it never becomes the object of

Śā stra , and for not being the object of śāstra a relation or connection between the Brahman and śāstra cannot be established. Further, there will be no benefit to the study of this śāstra . These arguments are refuted in this var ṇka. 287

Rāmānanda Sarasvati describes the arguments of Advaitins against Purvapak ṣa. Though Brahman is revealed in Vedas and learned from there, a complete awareness cannot be warranted due to the appearance of doubts at a later time. An uncertain knowledge attained from the common means of knowledge leads to real knowledge through critical thinking and reasoning. The Ved āntav āky ās were evaluated to realise the Brahman , the object of knowledge as well as śāstra that was learned earlier along with some doubts. Therefore, the enquiry of

Brahman should be performed. 288

169 Again, the opponent contends that the author of Brahmas ūtra ,

Bādar āya ṇa, being a Sarvajña , the śā stra qualifies for the study. The subject matter of the śastra being discussed elaborately in

Samanvay ādhikara ṇa will lead to the complete knowledge of Brahman .

Then, the discussion of the vi ṣaya etc. at the beginning of Śā stra is useless. R āmānanda Sarasvati rejects this argument, that the discussion of the subject matter of Śā stra etc. is to engage the qualified desirous person. 289

Opponent puts forth another objection that only the benefit of

śāstra should be discussed at the beginning, not other components like adhik āri, Vi ṣaya, and ‘ Sambandha’ as the discussion of benefit includes the discussion of other aspects. 290

Rāmānanda Sarasvati replies that the subject matter or object of

śāstra is two types – that have a result which is inherent in the knowledge ( phala śā livi ṣaya) that is, the knowledge and result are not different at all and the subject matter just belonging to it

(ananyas ādh āra ṇa). Therefore, the auxiliaries like

‘Anubandhacatu ṣṭ aya ’ need to be discussed at the beginning. In the second type, ananyas ādh āra ṇa, the result is different from the knowledge, as in the case of systems of medicine, where the seeker can

170 achieve the knowledge from one or other optional sources. In the case of Ātmavidy ā, the only source is Ved ānta. Hence, the discussion of these

‘Anubandhas ’ is useful. 291

Opponent contends again that Brahman , the subject matter of

Ved ānta cannot be the object of Śā stra which is rational. It has any connection with the śā stra, because no valid means of knowledge,

(pram āṇa) could prove it ( brahman ) in a rational examination. 292

A section of Advaitins answers the given argument as follows.All the components of a Yāga together produce its result.Similarly, the

Ved āntavic āra results in the realisation of Brahman. Determining the significance of words is a component in examining the intended meaning. It is considered asan auxiliary of śabdapram āṇa, and the examination of the object must have a result. Similarly, examination,

Vic āra , the cause of knowledge, ‘ Avagama ’, has an object, Brahman , which is considered as ‘ Avagamya ’. 293

Opponent rejects the argument of this sect of Ved āntins that there is no proof to establish that Vic āra is part of Ved ānta, as the knowledge of Śakti and Tātparya only remove the difficulty in understanding verbal sources of knowledge. The knowledge from Śabda is also not free from human errors. 294

171 Rāmānanda Sarasvati has refuted the arguments of the opponent.

The knowledge of śakti and tātparya indeed ceases after removing the difficulty, but it is assumed that on the removal of difficulty the verbal knowledge leads to the realisation of Brahman . Therefore, vic āra is considered as the cause of the realisation of the Brahman , hence both vic āra and Ved ānta have a common object or subject matter, the

Brahman. 295

According to Tārkikas ‘tātparyjñāna’ is the cause of

‘śābdabodha ’. Ram ānanda Sarasvati challenges this view. He asks whether the unknown potency or purport is the cause of knowing the meaning of a sentence ( vākyartha samsarga jñ āna hetu) , or the knowledge of purport itself is the cause. The first cannot be considered as the cause as the examination of tātparya becomes useless. In the second case, before knowing the meaning of the sentence it is impossible to understand the tātparya or purport of that sentence. For the tātparya cannot be inferred the position of Vai śeṣika too untenable. 296

The opponent again contends that according to AdvaitaVed ānta the knowledge of Brahman is the result of reasoning where lak ṣaṇa is accepted on terms like ‘ satya ’ etc. Even if it be reasoning, it cannot be

172 considered as an imputation ( āropa ) as it never gets destroyed

(abādh āt). 297

Rāmānanda Sarasvati explains the view of Advaita Ved ānta in

Bh āgaty āga lak ṣaṇa. The cognition of a particular object conveyed through the words is considered as part of the lak ṣya . The attributes of the object are considered imaginary. Therefore, the object without attributes is considered real, which is not known earlier. Thus, the tātparya is assumed only on the lak ṣya which is the result of vic āra. Where ‘ tarka ’ is considered as something different from imputation, āropa, there the tarka is inference. Whatever is not a

‘Bhrama ’ that cannot be tarka’ because the definition of ‘ tarka ’ is

‘ani ṣṭāropa ’, that is, the imputation of undesired is tarka’ . 298 The purpose of ‘ tātparya jñ āna ’ is to refute the obstacles caused by

‘Bhrama ’ etc.

Brahman is not unknown

The object of Ved ānta vic āra is Brahman which is known superficially from Vedas . The opponent objects that superficial knowledge of Brahman is impossible from the word Brahman as it is

‘unknown’ – ‘aprasiddha ’ – and it also cannot be known from vākya as the meaning of the word is unknown. 299

173 The word Brahman has some meaning in Śruti and Sūtra. It cannot be accepted that a meaningless word is used in a ‘ pram āṇvāky ā. While considering the specific meaning of the word, the doubts like caste etc. will be negated at the first instance itself. The application of the tools

‘Vy ākara ṇa, Nirukta , and Nigama ’ and the traditional use of the root

‘Bṛmh ’ to imply ‘ Vṛddhi ’ leads to conclude the meaning of ‘ Brahman ’ as the ‘ Niravadhika mahatva sampannam vastu’. 300

Nigama , Nirukta and Vy ākara ṇa

In nigama,the meaning of the word is determined by pursuing the primary meaning of the root, without resorting to the lak ṣaṇa. For example, the well-known meaning of the word ‘ deha ’ (body) is used to denote an object that grows (upacaya ). In nirukta, the meanings of all the components of that word (prefix, suffix, etc.) other than the common meaning are considered to determine the significance or meaning. For example, the word ‘soma’ is commonly used in the sense of moon, could also refer to Śiva with Um ā. The Vy ākara ṇa teaches the parts of speech and their associated meaning as well as usage. For example, the term ‘ Vādī’ points to the person who has the habit of ‘reasoned speaking’. This peculiar meaning is tagged by the use of the suffix ‘ini’ which conveys the sense ‘its character’. 301

174 The opponent objects that the v ākya ‘b ṛmha ṇād Brahma’ points to something that had growth or development, do not refer to Brahman .

Therefore,it should be clarified how this meaning is derived. 302

Rāmānanda Sarasvati explains the Advaita position, due to the inapplicability of the words ‘ Satya’ , and ‘ jñāna ’ in association with the word Brahman one is forced to resort to the application of ‘ Nigama ’ by taking a cue from the adjacent word ‘ Ananta ’ which concludes that the term Brahman stands for the object that is infinite as well as big. This is the rule that determines the meaning of a sentence. The emphasis is that the scripture points to the existence of a thing and the tools like Nigama leads to the conclusion of the meaning of scripture as Brahman .303

The author of Vivara ṇopanyasa answers a doubt of the opponent that how Brahman could be the object of the desire of Mumuk ṣu just for being ‘ Mahat ’. The Advaita position is that the Brahman is not just

‘Mahat ’. It is always pure ( Śuddha ), enlightened ( Buddha) , liberated

(Mukta ), omniscient ( Sarvajña ), and omnipotent ( Sarva śakta ). An object that possesses all these are referred to by the word Brahman , which is the object of desire of a Mumuk ṣu. 304

Opponent again objects that the Svar ūpa and Ta ṭastha lak ṣanas have defined Brahman . Therefore, seeking a different meaning of

175 Brahman is useless. The answer is that before knowing the meaning of words it is impossible to understand the meaning of the sentence.

Therefore, the meaning the term Brahman is discussed in the sūtra as well as śruti. If it is not done in this way the ‘ Janm ādi sūtra ’ become useless.

Brahman is Well-known as Ᾱtman

The Brahman is well-known as Ātman, the Jīva of all or as the substratum of the cognition ‘ aham ’. The scripture ‘ Ayam ātm ā brahma ’ explains this. The scripture directs the attention toward the unknown

Brahman suggesting the absence of its difference with the well-known jīva. 305 Though it is well known as the ‘ Ātman ’ of all, not all seems to follow such a view because there are many theories on the nature of the self. It is due to the absence of knowledge of Brahman as the ‘self of all’. Therefore, the Brahman is only superficially known and its particular knowledge is yet to be sought. 306

The common cognisable aspects of Brahman are its characteristics found in the body that differentiates it from worldly inert objects. Though the ‘ caitanya ’ is all-pervasive, yet in beings, it is present as the witness, a unique character that makes it different from

176 other things. This made opponents assume that Ātman is attached to the body. 307 The advaita system, on the contrary, discriminates all attributes ascribed to Ātman known as Jīva and recognises it as Brahman that is pure bliss. This Brahman is the subject matter of śāstra . The abode, adhi ṣṭ hāna , is the common factor and the pure form; and the unknown part, the anti thesis of ‘ Bhrama ’, is the distinct aspect of Brahman . This assumption of parts on ‘ Brahman ’ is based on the different words used to refer to Brahman such as ‘ Pūrṇānanda etc. 308

Refutation of Rival Views on the Nature of Ᾱtman

Rāmānanda Sarasvati consolidates the various theories on the concept of Ātman prevalent among different philosophies. The cause of these differences is the difficulty in discriminating the body from self.

Lok āyata

‘Lok āyatas ’ and uncivilised people ( Pr ākṛta ) consider the sentient body as Ātman because the existence of nothing except the four constituting elements, (the four bh ūta, fire, air, water and earth) can be proved. Another sect of Cārv ākas considers organs ( Indriya ) as Ātman following the experience ‘I am blind’. Some other, speculating on experience during dreams, consider that the Ātman is mind. 309

177 Buddhists

Buddhists say that momentary Jñ āna is Ātman . The body and organs being objects of knowledge, they cannot be considered as Ātman.

Mind being immediately contiguous knowledge, it too cannot be treated as ātman. Therefore, the Vijñ āna itself should be considered as Ātman .

The Mādhyamikas believe in the absence of Vijñ āna during sleep. They claim that there is no clue on the existence of any Vijñ āna that has no form. Therefore, they assume that Ātman is Śū nya .310

Ny āya and Vai śeṣika

The followers of Ka ṇāda and Gautama insist that the self is permanent, agent, enjoyer and is different from the body. It is the abode of all experiences like pleasure, sorrow, knowledge etc. They say that

अहमुलेखिवषयोानसुखाायआमा। . It is well known from our experience, they explain. Therefore, the view of Śū nyav ādin is baseless. 311 The mind is not ātman as there is no experience as ‘I am mind’. The organs are not ātman as the experience is ‘these are mine’. 312

Similarly, the body also cannot be Ātman as the notion of ‘I’ continuous into the experience of a dream where the physical body is absent. The difficulty of separating the body from self is the cause of considering the

178 body as Ātman , which is a ‘ Bhrama ’ due to the recognition of ‘I’ apart from body etc. It isa fact that Ātman is permanent, different from the body, agent and enjoyer. 313 In this section,R āmānanda Sarasvati elaborates the concepts self that was refuted in the first verse of

‘Da śaśloki ’ of Śankaracharya. 314

The Nature of Indriya

Indiriyas are not visible objects that are normally named nor the potency of respective organs. Instead, they are material substances with inherent potency and they are not all-pervasive. 315 The ‘ Indriyas, ’ sensual organs, are ‘ Go ḷakas ’ is the view of Buddhists . Even in the absence of ‘ Go ḷaka, the snake perceives sound. The ‘potency of

Go ḷakas ’ is the view followed by Mīmāmsakas. If the potency of

Go ḷakas is Indriya , they will get destroyed along with the burned body.

This view is not tenable as it contradicts the view of scripture that the

Indriyas go out along with the Pr āṇa that pass away. 316 Therefore, they are substances with potency as declared by scripture and the ignorance of this fact has led to the faulty conclusions. 317 These indriyas, organs, are not produced from ego, aha ṅkāra , though Sāṅkhya s uphold such a view. Some of them, following‘pur āṇas’, argue that three types of aha ṅkāras were evolved out of ‘ Mahat ’ and which in turn are evolves as

179 organs. 318 This Pur āṇvākya points out that the organs are subordinate to the aha ṅkāra and do not say aha ṅkāra is the cause of organs. The scripture says that the mid is formed from Anna , food 319 . Therefore, the

Indriya s are material substances; R āmānanda Sarasvati concludes his argument. 320

These organs are not all-pervasive. Sāṇkhyas believe that indriyas are all-pervasive. This view is defective as it will result in cognising everything everywhere. Therefore, they should be accepted as having confined nature. 321

The Buddhists believe that these organs are ‘ Apr āpyak āri ’, that is, they do not go out of the body to perceive the object. This view is worthless as it will lead to the perception of far away objects as well as objects without any contact with the eye. Therefore, it should be accepted that the sensual organs are ‘ Pr āpyak āris’. 322

Naiy āyikas believe that the mind is eternal, indivisible and atomic. This is untenable as the scripture Annamayam hi

Somyamana ḥ323 and ‘the mind and Pr āṇa are born out of it’ 324 asserts that mind is a product and composed of parts. Therefore, the mind is pervasive in the body and impermanent for being composed of parts,

180 and for having the character of contraction and expansion. 325

There is a sect of Tārkikas who consider the self as inert, agent and many. This view contradicts the Śruti. 326 The scripture assures that difference or the multiplicity is created through upādhi .327

Rāmānanda Sarasvati clarifies about the character of mind and self in Advaita Vedanta . The mind is impermanent, divisible, and it has the character of contraction and expansion. On the other hand, Ātman is eternal, all-pervasive, self-luminant and the same one in all beings. 328

The all-pervasiveness of Ātman cannot be inferred as it is not being an object of sensual organs. The scripture is the only valid means of knowledge on ātman . The inference in this matter also based on scripture, not independent. 329

The Sāṇkhya considers Ātman as the mere enjoyer. A sect of

Sāṇkhyas accepts Īś vara different from Jīva.Vedav ādins admit the identity of both. 330

Ātman - Different Views

The Sāṇkhya consider ātman as enjoyer and indivisible. He is not a ‘ Kart ā’ that Kart ṛtva will lead to the defect of the impossibility of

Mok ṣa. Therefore, Ātman is Akart ā. The Kart ṛtva associated with the

181 intellect is not superimposed on Ātman . Being witness to intellect brings

‘bhokt ṛtva’ to Ātman. 331

The Vai śeṣikas and Yogins accept an Ῑśvara deferent from Jīva .

He is considered as the efficient cause of the universe because all the products existing in this world are creations of someone. Therefore,

Tārkikas accept an omniscient Īś vara as the efficient cause of the universe. The Yogins considers Īś vara as ‘ Nirati śya jñ ānai śvarya śā lī’.

The perfectness points at the omniscience of Īś vara. 332

The opponent objects that in a discussion on the concepts of

Ātman , the deliberation about Ῑś vara and its unity with Jīva is useless.

Rāmānanda Sarasvati counters this argument saying that the pure

Brahman is known partially as Ātman and the desire to know Brahman in detail is fulfilled by removal of suspicion, for which an examination of the views of various systems is essential. The review and refutation of these rival views will lead to the ultimate validation and success of the

Ved ānta theory, the unityof Ātman and Brahman which is Mukti,the result of knowledge .333

Mukti

A section of Advaitins considers the liberation as the cessation of

Pram ātṛtva and Adhy āsatva following the annihilation of ignorance

182 which results in the extermination of the notion of Kart ṛtva and

Bhokt ṛtva and the duality created by the Māyā. Another section says that the Samanyaya sūtra describes the extinction or Niv ṛtti of all duality, which is the view followed by the creators of the system ( Vṛddha ). One who realises this Brahman attains the Mok ṣa, which is ‘ Nity ānand ā vasthiti ’. There is no dispute among advaitins in this regard. Therefore, the Mumuk ṣu who possess the four necessary requisites should pursue the study of Ved ānta .334

Fifth Var ṇaka

The fifth Var ṇaka deals with the examination of the commentary on the second Sūtra of Brahmas ūtra , Janm ādyasyayat ḥ. The first Sūtra discusses the subject matter of the Śā stra and the necessary requisites of the Adhik āri and the benefit of pursuing the study of this particular

Śā stra.

After commencing the study of Brahman, the Sūtra goes on to define Brahman .

The opponent contends that for Brahman does not have any form, its study is impossible. Elaborating the cue from the śruti ‘ Yato vāim ānibh ūtānij āyanta’ the Sūtra and Bh āṣya describe the Brahman.

Advaitins explain the word janm ādi in the S ūtra as ‘Janma ādi ḥyasya ,

183 Janmsthiti bha ṅgasya Tad Janm ādi ḥ’. Advaita tradition explains the compound used in this sutra as ‘ Tad gu ṇasamvijñāna bahuvr īhi. ’335 This help advaitins to explain ‘Janmasthiti bha ṅga’ as the meaning of

Sam āsa. This is indicated by the use of neutral gender in the commentary as ‘ Janmasthiti bha ṅgam ’. 336

Kāra ṇatvatrayam

The opponent asks the reason for not using plural form

‘Janm ādaya ḥ’ if the intention was to convey the multiple nature of causality. Advaitin replies that the ‘Janma’ , ‘ Sthiti’ and ‘ Bha ṅga ’ together form the definition of Brahman , not separately. Therefore, the singular form is used. 337 The neutral gender is used in the commentary with this intension.

The opponent asks again that if the beginning, sustenance and extinction, functions in a circular form, how the ‘Janma’ could be the firstin this beginningless universe. Advaitins replies this objection sticking to scripture. The scripture says that things take birth, exists and ceases to exist. The singular form of neuter gender is used to indicate that Brahman is the single cause of the universe. 338

184 The Meaning of ‘ Asya ’ in Sūtra

The term ‘ Asya ’ refers to the entire effect produced. The genitive case is used to indicate the attachment with the effects through the

Anirvacan īya tādātmya’ . The effect, whether real or unreal, has no real attachment with the ultimate reality. 339

The scripture says that this universe is three-fold as n āma, r ūpa and karma . 340 These are śbda , Artha and their relation. The relation involves its inherent association with corresponding objects, the system builders considered only two substances viz. śabda and artha .341

Substance

The substances, that are not dealt with in the scripture and which are creations of human intellect were discussed by many teachers. The

Vārtikak āra (Kumarila) consider dravya,gu ṇa,karma and sāmānya as substance. The Pr ābh ākaras enumerate viśeṣa, śakti , samav āya, and

‘niyoga ’ and make the number of substances eight. Vai śeṣikas accept six while Naiy āyikas say that substances are sixteen. The Śaivas consider it as five. Jains accepted seven substances. Substances are only four according to Lok āyatas. The Buddhists say that the substances are only two: Citta and Caitta.S āṅkhyas say that there are ‘twenty-five Tattvas’.

185 Yogis add Īsvara to these. Advaita Ved āntins does not follow any of this division.

The Svar ūpalak ṣṇ a of Brahman

Describing the nature of brahman, the opponent argues that the bh āṣya ‘Y ata ḥ sarvajñ āt sarva śakte ḥ kāra ṇāt idambhavati tad Brahma’ should not be interpreted to conclude that the nature of Brahman is omniscience and omnipotence, because the omniscience is connected with the whole. Advaitin replies that the Brahman is not different from

ānanda . The Svar ūpalak ṣaṇa of brahman is ‘independent pure knowledge’ and it can illuminate all the objects that were superimposed through avidy ā.342

The Sarvajñatva of Brahman

The opponent objects the Sarvajñatva of Brahman . The scripture has presented Brahman as ‘ Acak ṣu,A śrotram , etc. 343 Therefore, it has no sensual organs. Hence, it cannot grasp the cognition of present objects.

Further for not having any contact with past and future objects or events the character of omniscience, Sarvajñatva dharma , is impossible.

Rāmānanda Sarasvati replies that Māyā with predominant Satva ’ transforms in the form of all that exists in the universe, and to the soul

186 manifested satva it is direct perception. When the transformation of

Māyā ceases, there remains the memory from the impression of former experience. Similarly, the knowledge of the future also due to vṛtti.

Some accept only one vṛtti comprising all the three states of time.

Others consider, the Svar ūpa caitanya itself is the cause of Sarvajñattva of all that exists. 344

Opponent doubts that the sūtra in question deals only with the

Ta ṭastha lak ṣaṇa, and not about the kart ṛtva or the agency of Brahman .

‘The cause of the universe’ cannot be considered as the definition of

Brahman. The universe being insentient, its cause could be a sentient one. Further, the ‘ śruti māyām tu prakrtim vidy āt’ says that prak ṛti is the cause of the universe. Thus, the definition goes beyond the object brahman and pervades m āyā too.That is, the lak ṣaṇa has the defect of ativy āpti. 345 The opponent extends his argument by interpreting another

śruti. The Śruti‘Indro māyābi ḥ purur ūpa īyata’ does not contradict the causality of M āya.There is a smṛti that says Māyā,Prajñā and Samvid are one and same. 346 The Śruti ‘Māyinam tu mahe śvaram ’ also says that

Māyā is not Caitanya. In this context, the word Śakti, a synonym of prak ṛti , is used to denote the subordinate or dependent character of

Māyā and not to convey the sameness of Śakti and Śaktimat ’ i.e., the

187 unity of potency and the potent. Hence the definition is affected by the defect of ativy āpti . Further, the word Māyā refers to illusory and unreal objects like dream objects; and the Māyā and avidy ā are the same because the real is absent in Māyā. Therefore, the definition of Brahman is overstretched to indescribable Māyā, which is the upādāna of the universe. 347

Rāmananda Sarasvati refutes the claim of the opponent. He says that a section of Advaitins believe that the Māyā and Brahman together form the cause of the universe, where the Brahman is distinguished from

Māyā by its pure, ‘ Cid ānanda’, form. Another section, following the

Śruti ‘it becomes real and unreal’, 348 claims that Brahman is the upādāna and this up ādānatva is conferred to Prak ṛti which is the potency of Brahman. There is no overstretching of definition because

Brahman itself is the principal cause. Another sect believes that Māyā is the cause of the universe, Brahman is its abode. Thus, it is considered as the upādāna of the universe. According to this section, the definition of kāra ṇatva is ‘being the abode of avidy ā that evolves as the universe’

(परणममानाऽिवाऽिधानवम्). 349

Refutation of Brahma Pari ṇāmav āda

Some argue that Brahman itself transforms. This view is not

188 acceptable. If an object becomes another, following some process,it is called Pari ṇāma where both, the cause and effect, are in the same state of existence ( Samasatt āka ). This transformation is like the change of milk into curd. Advaitins follow Vivartav āda . Vivarta is the transformation of an object into another without losing its original character and form, like the appearance of a phenomenal snake in a piece of rope. As the universe merges with Māyā in the deluge it is

Pari ṇāma of Māyā. These transformations do not affect the pure nature of Brahman because this universe is vivarta, an apparent transformation of Brahman . The Śrutis like ‘नामपयोनविहतातेयदत -रातत

दमृतम्’ 350 declare the immutability of Brahman . Another set of scriptures 351 that deny its transformation say that Brahman has no parts or avayavas . Therefore, the real transformation of Brahman , the Brahma

Pari ṇāma , cannot be substantiated. 352 Some argue that ‘the ‘ niravayava’ too undergoes a real transformation. They ask if the atoms of gold do not undergo a real transformation, how could its modification in the form of ornaments be explained. 353 Rāmānanda Sarasvati asks the opponent to explain pari ṇāmā. Whether it is a combination of parts? or

Is ita movement – ‘Parispanda ’? or Appearance of a different character?

None of these characters exists in Brahman which is immutable. 354 The

189 Brahman is niravayava . The things that exist in the world are products of Māyā and the real transformation of them never affect Brahman .355

In the absence of Pari ṇāma , vivarta should be accepted to explain the origin of the universe and multiplicity. The śrutis that deal with the creation of the universe says that the bhūtas are born. The śruti ‘yatov ā’ considers bhūtas as born, is a repetition of the ideas of other scriptures. 356

The second Sūtra of Brahmas ūtra , says that the cause of universe

Brahman .357 Rāmānanda Sarasvati here attempts a refutation of other systems who do not accept Brahman as the cause of the universe.

The View of Other Systems

It is known that all the things in this universe have the character of pleasure, sorrow and delusion inherited from their cause. Therefore, their cause is pradh āna composed of three guṇas . Tārkikas says that the effects are formed by the union of atoms. The heterodox philosophers say that the effects are born out of the void. The followers of

‘Hira ṇyagarbha ’ following Āgama, says that Hira ṇyagarbha created the universe. The Svabh āvav ādin says that the effects are born without any cause. 358

190 The view of Sāmkhya is untenable as an inert cannot produce any effect. The view of Tārkikas who consider Īś vara as the efficient cause is not satisfactory because the assumption of eternal knowledge is impossible due to the absence of the body. If a body is assumed for the sake of the argument it may be affected with the defects like sorrow and pleasure and make it similar to Jīva who is alpajñ ā which in turn lead to a conclusion that the Īś vara could not trigger the atoms. 359

All the effects have a particular cause, like clay for pot; therefore, the concept of Śū nyav āda cannot be accepted. Again, the

Hira ṇyagarbha being a j īva cannot be considered as a cause of all effects. 360 If svabh āvav āda is accepted as a valid theory of creation, then a person looking for sesame oil never seeks sesame.361 Therefore, the

Brahman through its unintelligible power of Māyā creates this universe, i.e. Brahman is the upādāna of the universe. 362

The Independence of Śruti

Śruti is the only independent Pram āṇa on Brahman . At this point, the opponent argues that the sūtra considers independent inference because the śruti is inherent in anum āna. Rāmānanda considering this objection, asks the opponent if the claim, this sūtra in question discusses

191 the inference, not śruti, was true, the sūtrak āra would not have written the sūtra ‘Tattusamanvay āt’ to discuss the Pram āṇtva of inference.

Therefore, Śruti is the only Pram āṇa on eternal Brahman . 363 The śruti

‘Śrotavyo mantavyo nididhy āsitavya ḥ’ asserts the use of reason supportive to śruti that can be used as a valid means of knowledge on

Brahman .364 Unlike the dharma mim āmsa, owing to the difference in the subject matter, ‘manana’ is practiced in Brahma mīmāmsa. Unlike dharma, which is not perceivable,the self, Pratyag ātman , is an object of direct experience. To exclude ‘ Bhrama ’- from direct cognition, Manana and Nididhy āsana are useful (That is, manana and nididhy āsana help one to realise the unreal or illusory character of the universe. In the case of dharma, these are not applicable because dharma is not perceivable).

The direct experience of Brahman is from śābdabodha which is a result of śrava ṇa, manana, and nididhy āsana. 365 The dharma and Brahman are entirely different. Brahman is ‘ Siddhavastu ’ and the knowledge of this object conforms with the object, and the knowledge corresponding to the object is Pram ā. Therefore, being different from dharma , the application of manana etc are appropriate. 366 Another Śruti indicates the gaze (ईण ) of the ‘ Sadvastu ’. This one and only omniscient and omnipotent Brahman is the cause of the universe. The absence of

192 difference is the character of this Brahman . The Śruti ‘Ānand ādhyeva khaluim āni bh ūtāni jāyante ’367 leads to the conclusion that Brahman is

ānanda. 368 The knowledge is not a character of Brahman because it contradicts the Śruti ‘Kevalo nirgu ṇa’. 369 Therefore, Brahman is the cause of the universe. The Sṛṣṭ i vākyas in all branches of Veda, with some changes in the text, repeat the pure nature, the Satya jñ āna rūpatva , of Brahman .

Sixth Var ṇaka

The sixth Var ṇaka summarises the Vivara ṇa view on the third

Sūtra . Ram ānanda Sarasvathi commences the Varn ṇaka suggesting that this Sūtra can be considered as a continuation of the previous Sūtra

‘Janm ādyasya yata ḥ’ that deals with the omniscience of Brahman by establishing that Brahman is the cause, upādāna of the universe. This

Sūtra also can be considered as a separate adhikara ṇa.

The Sūtra ‘Śā strayonitv āt’ discusses the Śruti, ‘asya bh ūtasya ni śvasitam etat ṛgvedo yajurveda ḥ sāmaveda ḥ’. 370 The opponent doubts the Veda krt ṛtva of Brahman and he concludes that the Veda being

‘Pauru ṣeya ’ it is not a creation of Brahman .371 If the Veda is considered eternal, the ‘ Sarvop ādānatva ’ of Brahman becomes void and the result

193 is the loss of omniscience of Brahman .

According to advaita theory, the Vedas are not independent creation of any person and therefore, cannot be treated as Pauru ṣeya .

Vedas are apauru ṣeya and originated from Brahman 372 . Therefore, Vedas can illuminate all things. This ultimately leads to prove the omniscience of Brahman . The potency of Vedas to illuminate all the objects is inherited from the power of its cause. 373 The Vedas are creations of a person who has more knowledge than the knowledge possessed by the

Vedas .374

The opponent challenges the argument of advaita that Vedas are created by Brahman . He asks the meaning of ‘ Pra ṇītatva’ . If it is similar to the Vākya of a student (who repeats the v ākya of up ādhy āya), the

Brahman is not different from the student. Then, if it is a creation by a person who knows the meaning, it became Pauru ṣeya like a poem. 375

Some say that it is not wrong to accept Vedas as Pauru ṣeya. If so, the dependence on other means of knowledge leads to its apr āmānya . The desire of the speaker determines the meaning of the sentence in Veda as well as in society, where the knowledge of Jīva being impermanent, the desire that determines the meaning of a sentence is relative. The knowledge and desire of Īś vara being eternal the Vedas created by him

194 are associated with eternal desire, which do not require the assistance of any other Pram āṇa. 376

This argument of the opponent cannot be admitted. There is no proof to substantiate the eternity of knowledge and desire through inference. The eternality is a result of Vedas , cannot be admitted as the non-availability of such Vedas . The desire never forms part of the meaning of a sentence, which will be discussed in the fourth Sūtra .377

Another sect argues that only the worldly sentences are associated with the desire for their meaning, not the Vedav ākyas. Though it was created knowing their meaning, is free from desire because the purport of them was determined from the ‘ adhyayana vidhi’. This argument is refuted on the ground that if the Veda were written knowing their meaning with some desire it will lose its status of ‘vidhi’. That is,Veda becomes similar to worldly texts. 378

Another sect puts forth an argument that the knowledge of

Brahma svar ūpa being ‘ nirvikalpaka ’ being born out of this

(nirvikalpaka Brahma ) would never lead to dependence. This view is untenable because if Brahman becomes the object of ‘ Ved ārtha ’ it will lose its ‘ nirvikalpakatva’, and if not the object of Ved ārtha , it cannot be

195 considered as the cause of Veda . Therefore, the above-said options cannot be considered as remedies to refute the imputation of

‘Pauru ṣeyatva’ .379

Refutation of the View of Tārkikas

Tārkikas consider Veda as the creation of man ( Pauru ṣeya ). They were creations of a person who knows much because they are

Pram āṇav ākyas like bhāratav ākya . In this, the creation of Veda does not require the knowledge of past and future, hence cannot be considered as

Pram āṇa. Further, nothing proves that the eternal knowledge of Īsvara is the cause of Vedas because t ārkikas believe that knowledge is the result of the union of objects with the mind which cannot be proved on eternal knowledge. Further, the validity of non-eternal knowledge is doubted. The Īsvara jñ āna being considered as anitya too does not solve the issue. because the Ved ārtha being imperceptible it cannot be considered as sensual knowledge. 380

Considering ved ārthajñāna as an out-come of immediate proximity attained through Yoga (a result of yoga dharma Praty āsatti ) too, will not resolve the issue that Īś vara has prior knowledge of Ved ās because there is nothing to prove this. Yoga dharma praty āstti is useful only to know eligible remote objects. Kum ārilabha ṭṭ a has said that the

196 organ of śrava ṇa, the śrotra , could notcognise the shape of a remote object. 381 Therefore, it cannot be accepted that Īś vara earns the knowledge of Ved ā through super natural contact. 382 Therefore, Ved ās not creations of man.

Refutation of Buddhists

Buddhists refute the validity of Vedas . They should answer whether they admit ‘ dharma’ that provide other worldly results. If they exist, it cannot be proved without Ved ās, Ram ānanda argues. 383

Refutation of Lok āyata

The Lok āyatas do not accept objects that are not perceivable.

Therefore, the Ved ās that deals with super natural objects are not valid.

These Lokayat ās should clarify a doubt whether this-worldly vāky ās are considered valid. If they do not accept the validity, then Charv ākas do not have the right to engage in a debate. The validity of this worldly sentences, if accepted, what is the fault with the Ved ās that instruct about the things not yet studied and unrefuted. That is, the function of

Vedic sentences is similar to the function of worldly sentences. If these worldly sentences are valid, the validity of Vedas also should be accepted. Therefore, Ved ās are valid. 384

197 The Relation between Śabda and Artha

The relation between śabda and artha is not created by man.

Rāmānanda Sarasvati puts forth some options to clarify the position of

Advaita . He poses some questions and tries to clear each of them. He asks: what is the meaning of ‘ Pauru ṣeyatvam ’? whether it points to the relation between śabda , word, and artha , object or meaning? Or whether the v āky ās were created by men? or these were created men who knew the meaning?

For lack of proof, it is not the first. It cannot be presumed that at the beginning of creation God has created all the words associated them with the sense and objects concerned. The main concern is that while combining each word and meaning, had he followed the pattern of relation ships that existed in previous ‘ kalpa ’ or ascribed new meanings according to his choice. If he creates new ones, the meaning of Veda becomes different in different ‘ kalpas ’ which is not an acceptable position. If the first one, Īś vara has no control over it. Therefore, it should be accepted that the relation between the word and its reference, artha, is not a creation of man. Similarly, ved ā is also not a creation of man. It is apauru ṣeya. 385

198 The second alternative Pauru ṣeyatva is Puru ṣakrtatva and is acceptable if it means repetition. Then it is proving an already proved one ( Siddhas ādhana ). The students of Ved ās produce the same sentence, similar in all respects, following the same succession of Var ṇās and

Mātr ās. In the present creation, Īś vara is not a cause at all. The

Mah ānārāya ṇopani ṣat says that the creator has done it much earlier. 386

Similar to the relation of word and its reference, the succession of

Var ṇās and mātr ās is also conceived as beginning-less. Therefore, the view Ved ā is paru ṣeya, 387 developed by interpreting the Śruti ‘ tasya ni śvasitametat iti’ must be rejected.This śruti must be interpreted as the re -appearance of Vedas, similar to the appearance of ākāś a, after the great deluge. Therefore, it should be accepted as ‘Cidvivarta ’. 388

The contention that the man knowing the meaning has created

Veda, is acceptable if this is ‘Pauru ṣeyatva’. The ‘ niśvās śruti says that

Veda has born from Īś vara and he has the knowledge. The view of

Advaitins is that Veda is Apauru ṣeya .389

The Veda is defect-less, hence not depended on āptajñāna . the

‘Var ṇa’ and ‘ Krama ’ of Veda is same in all Kalpas .390 Men have no absolute freedom of creation on Vedas. Therefore, it is considered as continuing in a beginning-less unbroken chain of succession and Vedas

199 lasts till the realisation or Brahmajñ āna. 391 Vedas have the form of

Var ṇa. Var ṇas are eternal and not associated with time and space. The knower imposes ‘ krama ’ to var ṇas as they were received by the ear.

Therefore, the knowledge of Vedas also‘ Bhrama ’ for not being different from the knowledge of rope-snake (i.e. krama is imposed on varna, the substratum). 392 Varnas are perceivable. These are not momentary. If momentary, the recognition of Var ṇas becomes impossible. Besides, the lost Var ṇas, for being non-existent, could not establish close contact with the ear. 393

Akhy ātiv ādin does not accept vi śiṣṭārtha and vi śiṣṭ aj ṇāna in bhrama. Anyath ākhy āti vādins (the bh āṭṭ as) do not accept Vi śiṣṭārtha.

The pure var ṇa or pure krama cannot be considered as Veda. In

Advaitaved ānta , during the time of ‘Bhrama’, the Vi śiṣṭārtha is accepted.

A picture of a snake or a written word ‘ Sarpa’ produces the right cognition ( Pram ā) of the snake through the causes of the cognition were unreal. Similarly, the knowledge obtained from the Vedas is real. 394

Further, Brahman being the cause, upādāna , of Vedas , it is Sarvajñ ā, omniscient. 395

200 Seventh Var ṇaka

This Var ṇaka discusses the second meaning of third Sūtra

Śā strayonitv āt. The compound used here is bahuvrihi , so there is a possibility for more than one meaning. It is the merit of Sūtra to have more than one sense. The Advaitin claims that the other meaning the

Sūtra conveys is that ‘ śā stra is the only valid means of knowledge on

Brahman’ . B ādar āya ṇa discards the doubts about the objectivity

(cognisability) of brahman through scripture and inference. Sūtra kāra coined the Sūtra Śā strayonitv āt to remove the doubts. The Śruti

‘तंवौपिनषदंपुषं’396 declares that only Pram āṇa on Brahman is Veda.

The inference could not reveal Brahman.Ved ānta (upani ṣat) itself is the only valid means of knowledge on Brahman .397

The opponent raises a doubt whether the manifold exists even after the cessation of the universe. He asks, “You had earlier stated that

Brahman is the cause of the universe through Māyā. As the Māyā cease to exist with realisation or tattvajñ āna how can you prove the existence of manifold”. 398

Rāmānanda Sararvati summarises views held by various sects in

Advaita Ved ānta . According to some, the Brahman associated with

201 Māyā is ‘ Bimbasth ānīya’ and the individual selves are distinguished and separated by ignorance which is different from Māyā. Hence, even in the disappearance of avidy ā connected with an individual self the whole world does not endure dissolution, because the world is the effect of

Māyā, and individuality is a distinction marked by the avidy ā.

Therefore, the mundane universe continues to exist in the niv ṛtti of a person’s avidy ā, as the disappearance of duality is up to him, and not to the whole world. 399

Another group of Advaitins describe this context differently. They say that Māyā is the collective form of ignorance ( avidy ā) and the consciousness, Brahman , reflected in Māyā is the cause of the universe.

The Jīva is the consciousness reflected in individual avidy ā -

Vya ṣṭ iavidy ā. They also agree with the system of bondage and release

(Baddha- Mukta -vyavasth ā) that the former school has accepted. 400

Another set of Advaitins assumes that different selves experience different universes. They appear as one due to the similarity of experience. 401

The people who know the heart of śā stra say that Māyā is avidy ā, and it resides in ‘ caitanya’ and the object of avidy ā also is Brahman .

202 Brahman through its unimaginable power appears as the universe. The system of bandha and Mok ṣa is similar to dream experience. 402

After this statement, R āmānanda Sarasvati resorts to explaining the system of bondage and release in Advaita Ved ānta . He considers the views of other philosophers for refutation. He sums up their views.

The opponent challenges the baddha-Mukta system of

Advaitaved ānta . The Śruti , Sm ṛti and Pur āṇas consider the same of

Māyā and avidy ā. The Sāṅkhy ā and Yoga systems call it Prak ṛti and it is only one and assumes the plurality of individual selves. The Sm ṛtis that declare multiplicity of selves cannot be ignored easily. 403 Then, how the explanation of the system of bondage and Mok ṣa without damaging the unity theory of Advaita Ved ānta can be carried on. 404

Rāmānanda Sarasvati replies that Advaita Ved ānta has a system of bondage and liberation.To substantiate the nonduality it should be accepted that avidya have parts. Otherwise, the transformation of one avidya into infinite forms could not be substantiated.The realisation of brahman, by a particular individual, leads to the extinction of all the effects created by that particular ignorance attached to his antahkara ṇa.

Those individual selves whose antakara ṇas remain attached to avidya

203 continue in this world.This is the system followed by Advaitins .405 This view is not essentially different from the position of Ved āntins who upheld the theory of ‘many avidy ā’, because the difference of

‘Mūlaprak ṛti’ and the multitude of the universe does not exist here.

Thus, in succession, on cessation of all the parts of avidy ā, all will attain

Mukti. 406

Eighth Var ṇaka

The subject matter of this Var ṇaka is the fourth Adhikara ṇa –

Samanvay ādhikara ṇa. In earlier three adhikara ṇas the definition, as well as the ‘ Vedapram āṇakatva’ of Brahman, has been discussed and established. This adhikara ṇa presents Brahman as ‘siddhaVastu ’ and discusses associated doubts. Pūrvam īmāmsaks believe that Veda deals with dharma which is puru ṣatantra . They treated Vedav ākyas that deals with topics other than dharma as arthav āda .407

Rāmānanda Sarasvati summarises the argument of Mīmāmsakas.

As mentioned above, to Mīmāmsakas Vedas are ‘ kāryapra ’; i.e. the

Vedas deals with dharma that has to be gained through the rituals instructed in Vedas for returns like heaven etc. Brahman , on the contrary, is a ‘ Siddha Vastu’ which is not a result of karma. Therefore,

204 Vedas are not pram āṇa on Brahman . An already existing thing could be an object of pram āṇas other than Veda . If Ved ānta is siddhavastupara it depends on other pram āṇas like the sentence ‘this is a pot’. 408

The opponent counters the contention of Ved āntin that for being apauru ṣeya the Ved ānta does not require external validation. The opponent, at this point, clarifies that the Vedas , without reference to other means of knowledge, applies only to the foundation of the validity of Vedas, not to objects that qualify for verification by other means of knowledge. Therefore, if Ved ānta is teaching about an object that already exists which qualify for examination by other Pram āṇas , then the examination and validation by other Pram āṇas cannot be avoided. It cannot be so, because if it is exposed to other Pram āṇas , the Ved ānta become a mere repetition of already known ( anuv āda ) and if not, it will become invalid. 409 Moreover, the Ved ānta pursued following

‘adhyayanavidhi’ must provide a result. This would be a result of an activity. The activity presupposes knowledge. The Brahman , as

Ved āntins has perceived, is inert and inactive. Therefore, it cannot be the meaning of Veda . So, Ved ānta is useless. They were intended for japa or svādhy āya or to praise karma or kart ā.410

205 The Advaitin is not ready to accept Ved ānta as arthav āda that praise karma and kart ā. He says that Ved ānta is not studied in the context of karma . It cannot be treated as ‘ karma śeṣastuti ’ as the karma and the context are not a subject matter in Ved ānta . Hence the

‘kartrst āvakatva ’ cannot be ascribed to Ved ānta .411

The sect of Ved āntins who follow upāsana argues that Ved āntas are ‘ upāsan āvidhi śeṣa’. Therefore, Brahman , which is ‘ asat’ , should be worshipped as omniscient by one whishing eternity. Therefore,

Ved āntas are ‘k āryapara’ .412

Advaitins rejects all these arguments. They assert that Brahman is the object of Ved āntapram ā, for it being the tātparya of Ved ānta . The object of reference of a sentence, whatever it be, is its object. Tātparya is the potency of a word to convey its unknown as well as fruitful meaning. Six indicators ( liṅga) helps to understand the tātparya of a sentence. They are ‘ upakrama and upasamh āra , abhy āsa,apūrvata , phala,arthav āda, and upapatti. The Ved āntas with the assistance of these six indicators reveals the purport, tātprya ,Brahman .413 Ram ānanda

Sarasvati exhibits how this works. He applies these rules to interpret the sixth chapter of Ch āndogyopani ṣat, as all the Ved āntins who follow tradition does, without any change. 414

206 Akha ṇḍārthatva

The uniqueness of the Vedav ākyas, Vedic sentences is their

‘Akha ṇḍārthagocaratvam ’. They lead to non-fragmentary knowledge.

Akha ṇḍārthakatvam is the ability of non-synonymous words to produce true and valid knowledge without being the object of any contact; or being the object of ‘ prātipadika ’, that is reflecting only the sense of an

‘uninflected word’. In the vidhi ‘udbhid āyjeta ’ the words ‘ udbhid ’ and

‘yāga ’ is associated with yāga . The meaning of the sentence is conveyed in association with the relations existing among the words in the sentence.The meaning thus generated is not ‘ akha ṇḍārtha.

The vāky ās like ‘ Satyam , Jñ ānam , Anantam Brahma, are not vidhis, and there exist no ‘required essential relations’ to derive their meaning. They convey the meaning of each word independently, not the meaning of combined or associated words. Therefore, akha ṇḍārtva is impeccable. 415

The meaning of vākyas thus obtained from ‘ akha ṇḍārthatva ’ cannot be treated as synonyms because the direct meaning of each constituent word is different, that is, to Mīmāmsakas the meaning of a word is its form ( ākṛti ḥ śbd ārtha ḥ iti mīmāmsak āḥ). Hence, the words

207 jñ āna and ānanda that denote ‘ Jñ ānatva’ and ‘ Ānandatva ’ with their primary potency, convey Brahman attached with vṛtti. The caitanya that associates with each cognition born from manifold materials of knowledge are called ‘ Jñ ānatvam ’ i.e. the common factor existing in all forms of j ṇāna. The vṛttis (transformation of mind or the power of a word) are associated with upādhis (concerned objects). Brahman is devoid of any character and word can convey it directly 416 because the scripture says so. 417

The Meaning of the Words ‘Eka’ etc.,

The words ‘eka’ , ‘ satya ’ and ‘ ananta ’ together referred to as

‘ekādi ’. ‘ Ekatvam ’ is the absence of difference. Satyatvam is the absence of annulment. Ānantya is the absence of extinction. These words that convey the absence have secondary potency on Brahman, which indicate Brahman through ‘ Jahallak ṣaṇa. The words like Sarvajñatva ,

Sarva śakta etc. denote Sop ādhikabrahman. The words in sentences like

‘tatvamasi’ have the distinctive meaning which through

Jahadajahllak ṣana indicate Brahman . Hence, they can indicate non-dual

Brahman . 418

208 Mah āvākya and Pad ārthav ākya

In Ved ānta there are two types of sentences, Mah āvākya and

Pad ārthav ākya . The sentences that assert the sameness of Jīva and

Brahman are called Mah āvākya . The Vākyas that convey the meaning of components of Mah āvākya are called Pad ārthav ākya or

Av āntarav ākya .419

Rāmānanda Sarasvati explains how the ‘ Tatvamasi’Mah āvākya expresses ‘ akha ṇḍārtha’ . This vākya recognizes the sameness and the

‘absence of difference’ of Prameya . It is impossible to establish the unity of objects with different attributes cannot have unity. Therefore, it has been accepted that the object that attributed with that-ness, ‘ Tatta’, and this-ness, ‘ Idanta’ , is one and same, (as in Soyamdevadtta; this is that Dev ādatta ) which is the object of tattvamasi. The negation of contradictory characteristics paves the way to realise the common factor in both experiences, which is the object or prameya of the vākya . Even though the cognitions with contradictory attributes are experienced, and known as separate cognitions, they cannot be the object of recognition,

Pratyabhjñ ā. 420 The view vāky ā is not necessary as the word itself could convey the meaning of the sentence cannot be accepted, because though the purport is known from the words, without the vākya , the

209 cognition that destroys the difference will not take place. The vākya

‘Tattvamasi ’ provides the knowledge of non-dual Brahman negating the phenomenal experience of unreal difference. 421

Refutation of Bhed ābheda

A section of Ved āntins, namely, bhed ābhedav ādins, say that these vākyas have purport on bhed ābheda because in absolute unity the difference between word meaning and sentence meaning cannot be cognised. R āmānanda Sarasvati asks them whether the difference ceases to exist in Mukti or not. If duality or bheda exists even after Mukti there is no difference between Samsara and Mukti . In the first case, nothing is found to destroy the bheda , because the bhed ābhedajñāna born from upani ṣdv ākyas cannot destroy its viṣaya . It will destroy the difference as well as nondifference. If duality is a real knowledge it could not be destroyed. The argument that the Karma will destroy the duality, is contradictory to the Śruti ‘Brahma Veda Brahmaiva Bhavati’. 422

Further, Brahman , which is devoid of all characteristics, has no attributes that create the difference. There is no duality in Brahman , i.e. in Brahman only abheda exists. Then how the conclusion that Brahman possesses two contradictory characteristics like bheda and Bbheda can be reached? Above all, the Brahman that remains in Mukti itself is

210 considered now as a Sams āri, because, considering a Brahman other than it, will lead to the difficulty that the bandha and Mukti relating to different subjects (persons). The argument that there is another attribute called ‘ atireka ’ which is vāky ārtha is refuted that it is impossible to describe anything other than bheda , and the bheda is rejected.

Therefore, the meaning of vākya is absolute non difference or absolute unity. Even in the non-difference of pad ārtha and vāky ārtha , the vāky ārtha is cognised through the negation of Bheda .423

Like Mah āvākya,Av āntarav ākya also leads to non-dual knowledge. Therefore, the ‘ Tatpada ’ is indicative of the nondual object conveyed by the sentence ‘ Satya etc., for being the definition or for being an answer to the particular question on lak ṣya like the vākya

‘Prk ṛṣṭ apraka śaścandra ’. The given sentence, which is an answer to the question ‘who is Candra’, is rooted in ignorance. It is answered in the vākya that immediately follows and this describes the true nature of the object in question. The words in the vākya ‘Prak ṛṣṭ a and Prak āś a indicate moon through lak ṣana, where the cause is the non- accomplishment of intention. It should not be argued that even though it is a lak ṣaṇvākya it cannot be ‘ akha ṇḍārthaka’ , as such an argument contradicts the Śruti ‘Ekadhaiv ānu dra ṣṭ vya ṁ nehan ānāsti kiñcana’ .424

211 This śruti negates the reality of everything except Brahman . Therefore, they cannot be objects of scripture. It should not be conceded that the vākya ‘Satyamjñ ānam ’ etc., describe unreal objects. They, instead, provide the true nature of Brahman . Therefore, it should be admitted that the purport of Vedanta is nondual Brahman .425

Further, Brahman having no form is not an object of other pram āṇas. Hence, the Veda that deals with ‘existing objects’,

Bh ūtaVastu , are independent Pram ānas . R āmānanda Sarasvati intends to prove that the Ved āntav ākyas can lead to the knowledge of Brahman by themselves. 426

Rāmānanda Sarasvati examines another imputation that all things known from Śabda are also revealed by other means of valid knowledge. Then, how can it be said that śabda is the only Pram āṇa that can reveal Brahman ? It would be difficult to find a relation between

śabda and artha if they were considered as independent entities.

It is possible, R āmānanda Sarasvati argues, the purport of words in ‘ Saty ādiv ākya ’ was known from their conventional meaning, that is the word ‘ Satya ’ denotes a state of unnegated existence. Further, the memory of the meaning of the heard word ( upasthiti) is applicable to

212 understand the purport and not its proven validity from other means of knowledge. 427

Some systems argue that the words have any permanent association with meaning. R āmānanda Sarasvati puts forth two alternatives as possible options before the opponents. He asks whether individual words are meaningless or whether the sentences do not have any meaning formed from the association of words. There is no example to prove the first alternative, therefore should be rejected. The followers of Prabh ākra, opting the second position say that the knowledge of the speaker, ‘ Vakt ā’, determines the meaning of the sentence. According to them the words of men has no association with

Pad ārtha , but the knowledge of the speaker is the object of knowledge -

Prameya . All words have their meaning as each word has some knowledge as its object. Therefore, all words are meaningful. 428

This view of Pr ābh ākara is untenable as the knowledge of the speaker is not Pad ārtha . Hence the words, Padas, do not have

Pad ārthtva , any significance. That is, if the theory of Prabhākara is followed, the signifier – significance relation between word and meaning will be lost and there will not be any Vāky ārtha. To convey the meaning relation between word and its meaning is necessary. This

213 applies to both laukika and vaidika sentences. In the absence of this word-meaning relation, samsarga, communication become impossible.

Therefore, the mutual relation determines the meaning in common sentences. 429

The opponent again contends that the nondual knowledge obtained from śrutiis invalid for contradicting the perceptual experience. 430 Rāmānanda Sarasvati replies that if organ and object of knowledge were defectless the knowledge of Brahman born from

Ved ānta is valid as the knowledge born from Vedic injunctions. 431

The Mim āmsaka has argued, following the Sūtra ‘Āmn āyasya kriy ārthatv āt’, 432 that the ‘ Siddha Vastu’ is not dealt in Vedas or not the object of Veda . It is not supposed to be so. If a Vedic sentence deals with a topic with some benefit that previously unknown, that becomes the object of that sentence. Hence it should not be accepted that the subject matter of Veda is k ārya. 433

Ninth Var ṇaka

This Var ṇaka also deals with Sūtra ‘Tattusamanvay āt’ . The earlier Var ṇaka discussed the significance of Veda on ‘ Bh ūtavastu’ and refuted the views of opponents who argued that Ved ānta could not prove

214 the nondual pure Brahman . At this point the view of some opponents who claim that the primary significance of Veda is on vidhi and Ved ānta is vidhi śeṣa. Some of them, who follow a view that the significance of words is associated with its effects, believe that the object of a sentence is Kārya in laukika and vaidika sentences . Therefore, being known from

Vedas,Brahman is Vākya śeṣa.434 This is the view of a sect of ancient

Ved āntins. The view of the opponent is that Ved ānta teaches Brahman as ‘ Kārya śeṣa’. In the world, a child grasps the significance of words through inference. Children infer the significance of words from the activities of an elderly person who follow some verbal instruction. The thing that activates the person is ‘ Kārya’ . The knowledge that this has to be done by me leads one to perform his obligations. The knowledge of something as the means to achieve desires or the knowledge of the method to achieve certain benefits is not the cause of the activity of a desirous person, but the knowledge of obligation is pushing one to activity. 435

The potency of a word is learned from the ‘ vyavah āra ’ of elders in society. The child uses its ability of reasoning to register the meaning of the word ‘ gau ’ on the object ‘ gau ’ which is associated with some function. The potency of all words is associated with the k ārya 436

215 because the word is the abode of k ārya associated with it

(Kāry ānvay āś rayatva ). This is found in ‘ Kāry ā too (that is, the abode or substratum of karma – learned from injunctions – are words). Therefore, the meaning of a sentence is associated with some function. There are no words without any associated function. Hence, in the bare existent object, one cannot find any associated function. Further, Ved ānta cannot provide knowledge of Brahman , which is a ‘ Siddha Vastu’. As the result is associated with the knowledge of ‘ Kārya’the ‘K āryaparatva’ of

Brahman must be accepted . Even after the knowledge ‘, I am Brahman ’ the worldly life continuous. Therefore, this bare knowledge of Brahman is useless. Hence, it should be admitted that the niśreyasa is depended on Kārya. 437

The Manana Vidhi suggests this dependence on k ārya. If the cause of the final release is knowledge, there would not be a separate injunction for manana and nididhy āsana . There is nidhi and therefore, after the knowledge, there should be activity. This vidhi is not supposed for realisation or direct cognition, because śabda can give only indirect knowledge. 438

Therefore, the Ved āntas are associated with kārya (Kāryapara ) due to the absence of ‘vyutpatti’ on an already existing object, and the

216 absence of ‘ Phala’- result. The intension of the opponent was to prove the k āryaparatva of Vedanta. The injection ‘ So Anve ṣṭ avya ḥ’ says that strive for Mok ṣa by knowing Ātman . This creates doubt about Ātman which is attached to the upani ṣdv ākya ‘Satyam, Jñ āna ṁ, etc. This Vākya leads to the conclusion that Ātman is Brahman . That is Brahman is vidhi śeṣa. 439

Refutation of ‘ Niyoga ’

Rāmānanda Sarasvati refutes this view of a sect of ved āntins who has concluded that Brahman and niyoga are śeṣa and ṣeśi. Ramananda contends that it is useless to accept some ‘inherent function’- niyoga - on Śā bdajñāna , as the learned could understand it from words alone without any injunction. Due to the lack of benefit injunction will lead to indirect knowledge. In this context, it should not be said that the continuity of memory is the object of the injunction. The adṛṣṭ a cannot be accepted as the direct result because it will make the Mukti impermanent like ‘ Svarga ’ attained through adṛṣṭ a. This Ad ṛṣṭ a is not a direct cause Mok ṣa nor an indirect cause, because the transcendental

Brahman is beyond senses. The words associated with functions could not produce direct cognition of its object. Further, such a view that words produce direct cognition is not accepted by the opponent. If the

217 view that the knowledge from Śabda could provide the required result is accepted the adṛṣṭ a will become useless. 440 It cannot be supposed that there is Vidhi on dhy āna , because of the absence of result. 441 There is a difference between the dhy āna and Sm ṛti.Sm ṛti is born from Prm āṇa and objective, while dhy āna is solely depended on mind not associated with any object. If knowledge is considered as born from dhy āna , it becomes an illusion, and become invalid. The Śabda cannot be considered as a means to know Brahman as it will destroy the self- manifested-ness or self-luminousness of Brahman . Therefore, due to the absence of an object ( viṣaya ) that provide some benefit, the Ved āntas do not convey an injunction. 442 The Kāryav āda cannot prove the mutual accord of śabda and jñāna since it advocates a theory that words have their function only on vidhi or kārya . If the vāky ās are concerned only with vidhi, due to the contradiction with perceptual experience etc.,the non-dual Brahman cannot be established. 443

In Advaita Ved ānta , the purport of Ved āntav āky ās were determined as pure non-dual Brahman , following the ‘ upakrama ’ etc.

These have supremacy over pratyak ṣa.The injunction of Śrava ṇa etc. is to remove the obstacles before achieving the realisation of Brahman .

Some has argued that the meditation in association with Śama etc., is the

218 cause of Mukti, which is the object of injunction is untenable; because meditation can present the realisation of non-existent objects also. These

Ved āntas cannot be considered as an injunction attributed with the realisation of Brahman (not a viśiṣṭ avidhi) . Therefore, the purport of

Ved āntav ākyas rest with Brahman . 444 Not being an injunction, vidhi, would never invalidate Ved āntav ākyas, because, it has the potency to reveal hitherto unknown objects. 445 Therefore, Ved āntav āky ās are valid.

Ved ānta is not ‘ Niyoga ’

Rāmānanda Sarasvati attempts to refute the concept of ‘niyoga ’ followed by Pr ābh ākaras . The ‘ niyoga ’ is given as ‘ vidhi’ which is marked by the liṅ (िलङ् ). The vidhi, injunction, cannot be the intention of the speaker, vakt ā, because it has no vakt ā as Ved ās are apauru ṣeya .

It is not kārya (an activity that deserving to be done after Jñ āna ) because not all knowledge is accompanied by an action like the knowledge to fell in awell, everybody knows it none seems engaging in it. The eternal, virtuous thing also cannot be conceived as ‘ niyoga’ , because things known to be done in this world cannot be considered as eternal. It cannot be said that the things that one is desirous to do are ‘ niyoga’ because it will not provide a kārya, that is different from the activity and

219 the result. 446 The employment ( viniyoga’ ) depends on ‘ niyoga ’ ( vidhi) is the idea of karyav ādin . The knowledge of vidhi leads to the knowledge of the means to attain benefit ( Śreya ). 447 The Vi śiṣṭ ajñāna activates

Puru ṣa. The power of ‘ liṅ’ (िलङ् ) is the Vi śiṣṭ a in Vi śiṣṭ ajñāna because the ‘ Kṛtisambandha ’ is known from the verb and the potency of ‘liṅ’

(िलङ्) is only on efficacy. 448 It cannot be argued that Ved āntas deals with injunctions intended for the benefit because, it is well known that the truth known, or the realised knowledge is the cause that has removed the ignorance regarding that object. 449 Therefore, it should be accepted that Brahman is the object of Vedānta .

Up āsana and Ṁok ṣa

Rāmānanda Sarasvati attempts to refute the view of another opponent who considers upāsana, worship, as the means of Mok ṣa. This is the view followed by Bhed ābhedav ādin . He argues that the Vedas , which are vidhipara is not supporting nondual Brahman but the dual

Brahman . The Śruti ‘athayadta ḥ parodivo jyotird īpyate’ 450 describes

Brahman as different from Jīva and Prapañca . The reality of the mundane universe is not negated here. The meditation of ‘I am

Brahman ’ (aham brahm āsmi) leads to Mok ṣa. Ṁoksa being the result of

220 upāsana , it will never become short-lived, as the Śruti 451 negates the return of Mukta again to this world or rebirth. 452

Advaitin refutes the argument of Bhed ābhedav ādin . The Śrutis such as ‘ Brahma Veda brahmaiva bhavati, 453 ‘ath āyam aśrīro am ṛta ḥ’,

454 ‘Vimukta śca vimuktaye ’ 455 ‘Brahmaiva San Brahma Apyeti’ 456 declare that the liberation in the form of Brahman is eternal and everlasting. This Mukti cannot be a result of upāsana . It is not a result of karma . If this Mok ṣa is a result of karma it becomes ‘ Sādi’ like

‘Svarga ’ and is liable to destruction. 457

The opponent puts forth another argument that the Karma provides numerous benefits like wealth, son etc.; similarly, through the worship of Brahman , the aspirant of Mok ṣa can attain the ‘ aśrīra brahmabh āva’ which is permanent.

This view cannot be accepted as it is contrary to the view of Śruti.

The Śruti. ,aśar īram śar īre ṣu’ 458 emphasises the absence of a body to

Ātman . The scripture repeats that Ātman has no body, for being

Niravayava . It never has components and never will have. There is no real tādātmya as it is impossible for sentient and inert. Therefore, the relation between jaḍa and aja ḍa is due to Brahman . Aśrīritva is the real

221 nature of Ātman , and it is not a ‘ phala’ of Karma .459 The things that undergo transformation ( Pari ṇāmi ) cannot be called ‘ nitya’ . Therefore,

Brahman is Kūṭstha, unchanging, and Mok ṣa is not a result of karma in the form of Pari ṇāma .460 The only way to attain Mok ṣa and realise

Brahman is knowledge. Up āsana is helpful to the concentration of mind that lead to the knowledge, hence ascribed ‘ Brahmabh āva paratva ’ to it.

Therefore, the significance of Ved ānta is on pure non-dual Brahman is undeniable. 461

The nature of the Mok ṣa of upāsaka is the ‘ Brahma sārūpya ’ on reaching ‘ Brahma loka ’. The Śruti , ‘ na sa punar āvartate ’ is not the proof on the nityatva of this position. The benefit achieved from upāsana is impermanent. 462

The Śruti-s ‘brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati, and tad hi etatpa śyan vāmadeva ḥ pratipeda ’ clarify that the result of Brahma vidy ā is immediate to knowledge. In the view of upāsan ā vādin , there is ap ūrva between upāsan ā and Mok ṣa. The word ‘ Pa śyan ’ in the Śruti rejects the existence of any such intermediary. 463

There is no proof to admit that up āsana removes ignorance.

Therefore, the Śrutis like Brahmaveda etc. aims at the destruction of

222 ignorance. So, Tattva jñ āna is the cause of Mok ṣa, and Ved āntas deals with nondual Brahman . 464 The scholars like Gautama also consider tattva jñ āna as the cause of mok ṣa.465

Though they consider tattvajñ āna as the cause of mok ṣa, their concept of mok ṣa is different from Advaita. They never admit that the unity of Jīva and Brahman is Mok ṣa. According to them, the knowledge of sixteen substances leads to the cessation of sorrows and this cessation of sorrows is called Mok ṣa.466

The followers of Ka ṇāda say that the knowledge of the similarities and differences of six substances, followed by the meditation on Īś vara , leads to the knowledge that J īvātman is different from substances. This knowledge removes the Mithy ā jñ āna and this state is called Mukti. 467

The Yogins considers Mok ṣa as the separation of dra ṣṭā and dṛś ya following the removal of avidy ā through Asamprajñ āta sam ādhi . This state of free existence (free from any attachment with three gu ṇas and its products) of puru ṣa is called kaivalya .468

The S ānkhy ā view is that the knowledge of the difference of puru ṣa from prak ṛti through the knowledge of twenty-five categories, tattva , is Mok ṣa.469

223 Buddhists accept the cessation of the illusory flow of

Jñ ānasant ānas as Mok ṣa when the illusory notion of permanence, effect, activity, and Brahma , were lost due to the pure knowledge of the final moment. 470

The Upani ṣadas say that the knowledge of nondual knowledge eradicates all the experience of duality. The Śruti ‘Indrom āyābhi ḥ purur ūpa īyata ’ 471 condemns the knowledge of duality as illusory.

Another Śruti ‘Tad ātm ānam ev āved aham brahm āsm īti’ 472 asserts that nondual knowledge is the cause of Mukti. 473

The objective (t ātparya) of ‘Tat Pada’ and ‘ Tvampada’ is to establish unity or sameness of Jīva and Brahman . This concept is not contradicted by any other means of valid knowledge, and the unity is instructed by Tattvamasi 474 . Śruti , ‘ Anena jīvevena ātman ā anupravi śa 475 confirms it. The Śruti ‘Atha ye Anyath āato viduranyar ājān astek ṣayyalok ā bhavanti ’476 blames the difference. The significance of these Śruti s is that they imply the unity of Jīva and

Brahman . Therefore, the knowledge of sameness of brahman and j īva is

Pram ā.477

224 Refutation of Bhed ābheda View of Jīva

The Bhed ābhedav ādin, a critic of nondualism, says that individual self is different from supreme self. This idea is contrary to experience and Pram āṇa. According to Advaitaved ānta , it is easy to prove the difference of Jīva and Iśvara , while sticking to the unity. The scriptures assert that the characters are just ascribed on Brahman . If Brahman , which is nondual, is accepted as composed of parts will lead to its birth and destruction. Therefore, the characters and parts, which are unreal, are just imposed on Brahman . It is impossible to concede the simultaneous reality of difference and unity. The Śruti ‘Nānyoato asti dra ṣṭ a’ rejects the reality of difference. Another Śruti , ‘ Eṣa ātm ā antary āmī’ asserts the unity of Jīva and Iśvara. 478 The Jīvas, if considered as parts of Brahman, will get attached with sorrow and the attainment of liberation become impossible. In Advaitaved ānta , the plurality of Jīvā is admitted. The Jīva attached with Samsara is different from the Mukta . The Jīvatva and its Sams āra are assumed on the abode,

Brahman , which is not attached with it. The identity of Jīva and

Brahman leads to the cessation of primordial ignorance and the duality, and this experience of sameness will clear away the duality like a dream. 479

225 The Validity of Ṥāstra

The opponent doubts the validity of Śā stra. Ram ānamda Sarasvati clarifies the doubt by saying that from the Śā stra , Tattvamasi , Mumuk ṣu attains the knowledge of non-dual Brahman as ‘ Aham brahm āsmi’ . This knowledge destroys the concealment cast on Brahman and destroys the ignorance imposed on it. The destruction of superimposition removes all notions of duality like knower-ness etc. Therefore, for being the cause of ultimate removal of ignorance and the Samsara , the Ved ānta śā stra has validity and it is Pram āṇa.480 This brahman known through the v ṛtti is an object Vṛtti, the transformation of antahkara ṇa. But this pure

Brahman is not the object of up āsana as the śruti ‘neda ṁ yadidam up āsata ’ has negated the Up āsyatva of Brahman .481 The result of this knowledge is permanent and not in the form of any prosperity or wealth, nor it conveys the Bheda and abheda (bhed ābheda) . This knowledge is

‘Akha ṇḍākāra pram ā’ and permanent. The result of this is the manifestation of pure bliss, the pure Brahman . The same is conveyed by

‘avidy ā āvara ṇ niv ṛtti ’ and Mukti .482 When an aspirant of Brahmavidy ā attains the knowledge of Brahman , he realises Brahman , and becomes

Brahman , in this world itself. 483 The Ātman cannot be purified as

Brahman is devoid of impurities and it is impossible to conceive that

Nirgu ṇa has Gu ṇas. 484

226 The Difference of Jñ āna and Kriy ā

Rāmānanda Sarasvati describes the difference between Jñ āna and

Kriya . He says that the Phala of Jñ āna is the permanent manifestation of Brahman . The result of Karma is inert and impermanent. The Karma is born from the activity of Puru ṣa following an injunction and the desire thus ignited for some result. Knowledge, on the contrary, is not a result created by the active engagement of a Puru ṣa, but a result of

Pram āṇa.485

Some maintain a view that there is no ‘ Kriy ā’ other than

‘Samyaoga and Vibh āga’. But this view cannot be accepted as it is against experiences. There exists Kriya other than Samyoga and

Vinh āga. 486

The followers of Prabh ākara makes it clear that kriya is different from Samyoga and Vibh āga and it is not an object of perception. So

Kriya could only be inferred. 487

This view is not acceptable. The result of karma is kārya . It could be obtained only through karma . It cannot be proved with inference but can be cognized from pratyak ṣa. 488

The Śruti ‘Ved ānta vijñ ānasu ni ścit ārth ā’ says that correct

227 knowledge is the cause of Mok ṣa. So, knowledge different from kriya is the cause of Mok ṣa and injunction has no role to play. ‘ Vidhi’ is indeed clear on Jñ āna in Vākyas like ‘ Ātm āvā are D ṛaṣṭ avya ’ but due to the absence of ‘ Niyoga’ (Vidhi) on Jñ āna, Ātman , which is the ‘ phala ’ of

Jñ āna , is praised in these words. The person, who has a hatred towards worldly pleasures, will get attracted to the result of Jñ āna from this praise and starts to learn Ved ānta .489 Therefore, due to the absence of mandatory kriya and its result, the knowledge of Brahman cannot be considered as ‘ Vidhi śeṣa’ .490

Siddavastu can be the Object of Vedas

Rāmānanda Sarasvati, again, considers the objection against Śruti

Ved āntins that Brahman , a Siddha Vastu , cannot be the object of Vedas .

He says that the first Var ṇaka of Smanvaya sūtra has examined the independence of Ved ānta from other means of knowledge. The second var ṇaka has cleared that the Ved āntas has no connection with vidhi . In this section, the concepts discussed in previous var ṇaka s were reconsidered. The first problem considered here is the purport of

Ved ānta.

The opponent doubts the subject matter of Ved ānta and asks

228 whether it is aha ṇkāra or something else. If the object of Ved ānta is aha ṅkāra , for it is the agent of Karma , it is ‘ vidhi śeṣa’ and associated with Vidhi . If aha ṅkāra is not the subject matter of Veda , it cannot be

Ātman . If it is Ātman Karma śeṣat ā cannot be avoided. The

Āpastamba 491 assures that the persons who know Veda say that Veda is

Pram āṇa. 492

AdvaitaVed āntin contends that aha ṅkāra is different from

Sākṣi. This Sākṣi is Brahman . He is not a part of any karma and nor is there any pram āṇa to prove it as a subordinate or part of any ritual. The

Ved āntav āky ās deals with Brahman . If these vāky ās were considered as

‘karmapra ’ and understanding Ātman as part of karma will result in contradiction of statements. The text of Āpastamba is connected with

Pūrvam īmāmsa . The Śrutis‘Tam Tu aupani ṣadam puru ṣamp ṛch āmi’ and

'Sarve ved āyat padam ām ananti ’; and the Sm ṛti ‘Vedai ś ca sarvair aham eva vedya’ asserts that the pure Siddha Brahman is the subject matter of

Vedas . Therefore, the Karma kāṇḍ a is subordinate to Jñ āna kāṇḍ a helps to attain the knowledge of Brahman through purifying the mind of the observer of Karma. The knowledge of Brahman for not being annulled, cannot be illusory. It is impossible to cognise the absolute nonexistence of Ātman for want of a knower. Therefore, the un obstructed witness of all is the subject matter of Ved ānta . 493

229 Abhihit ānvayav āda and Anvitabhidh ānav āda

According to Abhihit ānvaya , the potency of the words is assumed on the object. The meanings revealed by words establish a contact to give the meaning of the sentence. This is ‘ Abhihit ānvaya’. The words after reminding their corresponding meaning cease to exist. Therefore, the memory of the meaning is the cause of the cognition of the meaning of the sentence, that is, the memory of the meaning of words, not the words, is the cause of Vāky ārth ajñ āna . 494 In this theory, the

Ānarthakya , uselessness of words that refer to things that are not objects of action, does not convey that they are meaningless, instead indicates the absence of result, because it is universally accepted that all words are meaningful. Therefore, in a sentence where the meaning is not an enjoyable object or entity, Jaimini has treated them as ‘ Saphala vidhi śeṣa’. Kumarila bha ṭṭ a has clarified the point that the word and its meaning are logically connected. These logical relations are the potency of words. The contact of the meanings of words leads to the meaning of the sentence in Abhiht ānvaya . This theory is followed, the Vidhi śeṣatva of Vāky ās like ‘ So Arod īt’ is logical but not the Ved āntav ākyas . 495

The Pr ābh ākaras, who follow Anvit ābhidh āna theory say that the learner understands the meaning of Vākya following the knowledge

230 attained from the inference of the mutual connection of words in that sentence. In this process the unclear potency is known first and later,following logical reasoning, the meaning of each component in the sentence get cognised from the thing already known. No independent word has pure meaning. Further, it is difficult to cognise the meaning of combined words. Therefore, the potency is not on words but Kāry ānvita , sentence. 496

Rāmānanda Sarasvati reiterates the view of Purvapak ṣin , the

Pr ābh ākara, that in his view the effect is different from the activity and this effect rests with the desire of man in the world and Ap ūrva in Veda .

Rāmānanda Sarasvati challenges this position. If the potency of all words is accepted in ‘ kāry ānvita , that is Vākya , it becomes difficult to understand the relations between the words. In the sentence ‘bring the white cow’ which convey quality and other aspects through the words.If the potency of v ākya is accepted the words fail to reveal the relationship between different words in a sentence. Therefore, to overcome the difficulty, it should be accepted that the potency rests with the words that are mutually combined or associated. It should not be argued that the different contacts determine the difference in sentences because the intermediate contacts are many the main contact is one and only. It is

231 difficult to accept that potency is in Vāky ā, ‘ Kāry ānvita’ for being consistent, because this consistency is also found in the knowledge of the speaker. It should not be argued that in the knowledge of speaker the association is in the form of the cause, hence devoid of Śakyat ā due to the defect ‘ Anyath āsiddha ’.That is, the defectof cause can be found in the kāry ā too. In common sentences that deals with the objects existing in this world like ‘the handsome prince in yellow rob playing after the bath, and food’ it is impossible to show a constant ‘ kāry ā, a ‘ Phala ’ of the sentence, that is, the consistency of Kāryav āda fails here. It should not be argued that without Kāry ā, the contact of the prince, the object that exists, with its attributes will not manifest, because it contradicts with common experience, and it is difficult to assume an effect that is not attached with both speaker and listener. Therefore, even without any effect (K ārya, action followed by knowledge), contact with the siddhavastu, object, can be experienced, and for being simpler, it should be assumed that the contact of suitable or eligible words is the distinguishing mark of śakyat ā. Again, it should not be contested that the pure sense or object, ( śuddh ārtha ,) has no potency because when the direct connotation is grasped from the word, there will be no intention for secondary relations. The view that śakti being a substance, the

232 contact is inferable, hence there is the intention for meaning is untenable, because it contradicts the immediate experience of the intention. If the meaning of a sentence inferred after perceiving the sound (heard), it will destroy the validity of śabda as a valid means of knowledge, Pram āṇa. The śabda could not convey its meaning without

‘Vṛtti’ (Śakti and Lak ṣaṇā). Therefore, if not accepting potency in the contact of words, the knowledge thus attained will not be śābda , verbal knowledge. 497 Further, in the world, dictionaries etc refer to ‘siddha vastu’ . 498

At this point, the follower of Prabh ākara raises another concern.

He says that the potency of the word is connected with another and innumerable connections could become meaning. This ultimately will lead to the uncertainty of meaning.The attributes are infinite and it would be difficult to grasp the potency. Another difficulty is that all words become synonyms. Therefore, potency cannot be accepted on

‘Itr ānvita ’ and on that connected with attributes, and on Abhihit ānvita.

Therefore, he insists, the potency must be on ‘ Kāryanvita’

Rāmānanda Sarasvati refutes this argument as untenable. He explains the instances. In the sentence ‘ Gāmānaya’ , the word ‘ Gau ’ is expressed by proximity joins with the word ‘ Ānaya ’. Then the two

233 words with expressed implication together form the sentence meaning.

This position is defectless. 499

The ‘ Pada ’ being momentary, and the existence of a sentence without words being impossible, the meaning of words, Pad ārtha , should be considered as the cause of the meaning conveyed by sentence.

The expressions cannot have ‘ kāra ṇatva ’ as the expression of the last word destroy the former in the form of memory. It cannot be supposed that the expression of the last one holds the former memories together, and the memory of ‘ arth ās’ thus retained is the cause of knowledge, the same applies to words, ‘ padas ’, also. The memory of the pad ārtha being the activity, vyāpāra, is not separated from śābdabodha . It is impossible to explain śābdabodha without this intermediary. Therefore, the words cannot be considered as the cause of śābdabodha .500

The Separate Beginning of ‘ Catus ūtri’

Vy āsa has opened a new system to discuss the Veda that deals with ‘ siddha Vastu’ and Jaimini showed no disagreement with Vy āsa in it. If he had any difference, he should not have written the sūtra ‘Arthe anupalabdh e tat Pram āṇaṃ’. Vyasa, the Guru of Jaimini, has established beyond doubt in Samanvaya sūtra that the purport of

234 Ved ānta is ‘akha ṇdārtha ’. This becomes futile if admitted that all Veda is ‘ Kāryapara’ . Therefore, Vedas that deal with ‘ Siddha Vastu’ also treated as valid. It cannot be believed that Jaimini, the disciple of Vy āsa, has contradicted him. Both believed that the meaning of a sentence is a result of the mutual contact of words constituting it. The difference of the systems is due to the difference in the subject matter: Pūrva tantra deals with Sādhya, things that have to be created and uttara tantra deals with thing that is already existing 501 .

The Significance of ‘ Akha ṇḍārthata’

Opponent doubts again that how the ‘ Akha ṇdārthata ’ becomes possible for general contact of words ( Sāmānyaanvaya) is ‘ Pad ārtha ’ and the special contact is Vāky ārtha . Siting Śrutis, ‘ Saindhavagha- naeva ’502 and ‘ Atoanyad ārtam ’ 503 explains the homogenous character of

Brahman and the destruction of all other things that are supposed on

Brahman . These indicate ‘ Akha ṇḍārtha ’ through lak ṣaṇa. The meaning of Prathama does not involve ‘ Samsarga ’, as P āṇini has treated it only in the sense of ‘ Pr ātipadika ’. 504

The K āty āyana has ruled that if any verb is absent in a sentence the ‘ La ṭ’ form of the root ‘ as ’- अस् – should be supplemente there. So,

235 Mah āvāky ās too, the association with activity, Kriya, should be assumed. Rāmānanda Sarasvati does not support this view. The sentence like ‘ Vane Si ṃha ḥ’ where the declension Pratham ā is used and it is expecting a ‘ Kriy ā’. Here the rule K āty āyana fits. But not in sentences like ‘ Am īdrum āḥphalit āḥ’ this rule does not fit. Here, the sentence does not attract the supplementation of verb ‘asti’ because the intention is on ‘ Vi śeṣaṇa’. Similarly, in ‘ Akha ṇḍārthabodha ’ through

‘Saty ādiv āky ā’ due to the absence of wish, there will be no contact with

‘Kriya ’. 505

Ni ṣedhav ākya and ‘ Siddh ārthat ā’

There are Vidhiv ākyas as well as niṣedhav ākyas in Vedas. The connotation of mutually connected words on Brahman has been discussed. The ‘ niṣedhv ākyas’ also could reflect ‘siddha Vastu’ as in

‘Br āhma ṇo na hantavya’ . The primary meaning of negation ( नञ्) is the absence of the object concerned. In Niṣedhav ākya due to the absence of secondary purport, lak ṣaṇa, its meaning is Abh āva. There fore, all the

Vedas are not Kāryapara .506

The follower of Prabh ākara expresses his disagreement on this view. His argument that the नञ् in the sentence does not deny

236 Br āhma ṇa, because it is contradictory to perception nor it denies the

‘hanana’ - killing, for hanana being already Pr āpta – achieved. The meaning of the suffix ‘ tavya ’ is not Abh āva because the ‘ hanana ’ could be either Kārya or Iṣṭ as ādhana . Therefore, due to the absence of a thing in the form of abh āva , the नञ् instructs the injunction that ‘ do ahanana’ .

This is, certainly, a vidheya – an instruction to be observed by a person.

Therefore, the Vākya ‘Br āhma ṇo na hantavya’ is Kāryani ṣṭ ha .507

Rāmānanda Sarasvati rejects the argument that the meaning of

नञ् is the Pr āgabh āva , of hanana . The absence of hanana is the cause of the desired result, and the desired benefit is the absence of future sorrows. It should not be argued that in the absence of ‘ hanana ’

‘niyoga ’, injunction, is the meaning of suffix because the abh āva is not to be executed for being beginningless. 508 The negation of killing indicates that it causes strong undesirable results, hence should not be carried out. This knowledge removes the confusion that ‘hananaIsi ṣṭ a- sādhana . This leads to the removal of desire and effort which makes the person passive. So, niṣedhav ākya indicates the ‘ siddhar ūpa ’. Similarly,

Ved āntas too are dealing with ‘siddha Vastu’ . Even in vidhiv ākyas the

‘niyoga ’ of Ap ūrva is not the meaning of suffix, because it is not well- known in the world. 509

237 Again, the Pūrvapak ṣin argue that the Brahman undergoes the experience of Sams āra . Therefore, liberation from mere knowledge is impossible. The attachment of Ātman with the body is due to karma.

Only karma can remove them. Advaitins reply that the nondual

Brahman is unattached to karma and Sams āra is due to indescribable ignorance. So, due to the destruction of ignorance, the Jñ āni has no bondage there after. The Śruti ‘Tatrako Moha ḥka ḥ śoka ḥekatvam anu pa śyata ḥ’510 affirms that knowledge is the cause of liberation. 511

Though the knowledge destroys all bondages associated with

Samsara the Pr ārabdhas remain. The Pr ārabdha continues until the fall of the body. 512 It should not be asked that after the destruction of ignorance, how the effects can exist. It continues to exist due to the difference in the parts of avidy ā. Avidy ā has two powers, āvara ṇāṁś a and vik ṣep āṁś a. Knowledge removes āvara ṇāṁś a. The other part, vik ṣep āṁś a, continues to exist until the cessation of Pr ārabdha . This

Pr ārabdha is the cause of the experience of duality even after the realisation of Brahman .513

The opponent is not ready to agree to the concept of Jīvanmukti .

He contends that it is impossible to accept that a living man has the realisation of Brahman . Advaitins counters this argument. He says that

238 the blind could not realise the form is not a reason to conclude that a person who is not blind too could not realise form, because only the blind lost the ability of vision, not the other. So, the Mumuk ṣu with a pure mind, who had meditated on the Mah āvāky ās, can realise Brahman in this life itself. Further, the great men like Vy āsa, Janaka, Vasi ṣṭ ha etc, were considered as Jīvanmuktas .514

The Mukta has no right for karma. This right is a result of

Adhy āsa . Therefore, it has been said that the śāstra also similar to avidy ā. Hence, the realised person is free from the results of Karma. So, he could not lead a life of his wish as it is caused by desire. The liberated person is free from the desire due to the destruction of the cause. The opponent asks again that if the Jñ ānin has no right over karma , why the meditation is ordered after Śrava ṇa. There is no realisation only from Śrava ṇa. so, the manana and nididhy āsana are instructed. The person having the experience of the vāky ārtha ,

Brahman , there will be nothing to be done. Hence too, Ved āntas are not vidhipara.

Ved ānta is Brahmapara

The beginning of Ved ānta by B ādar āya ṇa affirms that the subject

239 matter of Ved ānta is Brahman other wise, he should have commenced it differently. 515

Another opponent named ‘ Sarvasa ṅkarav ādi ’ argues that the

Bheda is true and cannot be negated by the knowledge of Abheda . This argument cannot be granted. The Śruti, ‘Brahmaveda brahmaiva bhavati’ declares the destruction of duality by knowledge. This view of bhed āheda too needs to be neglected for it is already rejected. 516

The ‘Absolute difference theory’, Atyanta bhedav āda ’ followed by Tārkik ās is baseless. The scripture asserts that the difference experiencing in this world is imaginary or assumed. Hence cannot be conceded as real and ultimate. Further, this difference is relative. This relative difference also imaginary or creations of intellect. 517 The realisation Brahman removes the notion of the reality of duality or bheda. Further Brahmavidy ā ends all engagements in this world as well as one instructed by śāstras. 518

Resume

The text Vivara ṇopany āsa has condensed the concepts discussed in Nine Var ṇakas of Pañcap ādik ā vivara ṇa. It follows the same structure of Pañcap ādika Vivara ṇa. The first Var ṇaka is exclusively

240 devoted to the discussion of Adhy āsabh āṣya . The significance of

Bhāṣya followed by Adhy āsa and related concepts like Ajñ āna , and

Mithy ātva , refutation of Khy ādiv ādas , Pratikarmavyavastha and

Jīvanmukti nir ūpa ṇa were discussed. The Second Var ṇaka discusses the contents Pūrvam īmāms āsūtra of Jaimini and establishes the independence of Vedanta. The Third Var ṇaka deals with the adhik āri and viṣaya . The fourth var ṇaka discusses the meaning of the word

‘Brahman ’ and derives the meaning of ‘ Tvam’ Pad ārtha . It is used to refute the concept of Ātman – the individual self-followed by other systems of thought. In the fifth Var ṇaka , Ramanda Sarasvati, while discussing the definition of Brahman discusses the opinion of Ved ānta on the Sarvajñatva of Brahman . The Sixth Var ṇaka discusses the Third

Sūtra and the Pauru ṣeyatva of Vedas . The Seventh Var ṇaka explains

Upani ṣads as the means to Brahman . It also discusses the Bandhamukta bh āvas of Jīvas . The Eighth Var ṇaka refutes the Mīmāmsaka view of

Vidhi śeṣatva of Brahman and discusses the Six tātparya lingas . The

Ninth Var ṇaka considers the upāsan āś eṣatva of Brahman also a topic discussed in this Var ṇaka.

241 End Notes

1 पपादका , Ed. Subrahmanyasastri, Sri Dakshinamurti Math Prakasan, Varanasi, 200, p.46 2 Vivaraṇopanyāsa p. 1-2 3 Ibid 3 4 बृ. उ. १ । ४ । १० 5 Vivaraṇopanyāsa 24-25 6 सवदासवकायषुनािततेषाममगलम्।येषांदथोमगलायतनंहरः॥ Quoted in Vivaraṇopanyāsa , p. 25 7 Ibid 25 8 Ibid 4 9 Ibid 5 10 Ibid 5-6 11 Ibid 6 12 अथातोिजासेितसूसघातामकंशांेावतकृितिवषयःसफलवात्, कृयादवत्; सूािणसफलािनबधिनवृयनुकूलवात्; सपमिनवतकरुबोधवत्, … बधोानिनवयःअयतवात्, रुसपवद्इितयोजनसाधकोऽयासः ; जीवोािभःतानिनवयायासववात्, यदथं, तथा , यथारविभइदमंशइितिवषयसाधकोऽयासः। Vivaraṇopanyāsa, p 8 13 Vivaraṇopanyāsa p. 8.; This type of argument is common in Sastra texts. Almost all sub-commentaries on Brahmasutra Śānkarabhāṣya begins with this doubt whether Brahman is known or unknown. The contention of Advaita Vedāntin is that the known as the object of the reference ‘Aham’ is an unreal knowledge due to Adhyāsa . Adhyāsa forces one to cognise the pure Mukta Brahman as a phenomenon attached with body. This known is never revealing its true nature due to ignorance. Hence one has an

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incomplete knowledge of Brahman , and this incompleteness is the cause of further enquiry to realise the true nature of Brahman . 14 Vivaraṇopanyāsa 9 15 Ibid 14 16 Ibid 15 17 Ibid 17 18 Ibid 19 19 Ibid 21 20 Ibid 22 21 Ibid 22 Ibid 23 Ibid 24 Brahmasutra II-iii-29 25 Vivaraṇopanyāsa p 24 26 Ibid 26 27 Ibid 26-27 28 Ibid 29-30 29 Ibid 30

तथाचरागेषाददोषकतृवभोृवायासानांबीजाकुरवदनादवापूवपूव मजयसंकाराद्उरोरायासःसंभवित। Ibid p 30 31

अयोयामकतामययसयानृतेिमधुनीकृयनैसगकोऽयंलोकवहारः। Bra hmasūtra Śankarabhāṣya – Adhyāsabhāṣya. 32 Vivaraṇopanyāsa p.30; Vācaspatimiśra has explained that Śankara used the suffix िव following the rule described in in the Vyākaraṇasūtra ‘अभूततावे कृवितयोगे सपकतर िवः (V/iv/50), to indicate the unreality of superimposition, the coupling of real and unreal. तकुतिदामनो भेदाहः कुत तादायिवमः इयत आह - सयानृते

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िमथुनीकृय इित । िववेकाहादययेित योजना । सयं िचदामा , अनृतं बुीियदेहाद , ते े धमणी िमथुनीकृय युगलीकृयेयथः । न च संवृितपरमाथसतोः पारमाथकं िमथुनमतीयभूततावाथय वेः योगः । एतदुं भवित - अतीतयारोपायोगादारोयय तीितपयुयते न वतुसेित । The Nyasa commentary on this Paniniyasutra say that “... लधसाकयैव कारणय ागितपिवकारयोरकालिवकारभूमावािरभूततावः ” .Our author refers to the use of ‘Ktvā’ which is a suffix in Sanskrit, and the commentator refers to the use of root ‘kṛ’. The term ‘Ktvā’ may be an error crept into the text. The form ‘Mithunīkṛtya’ is formed from ‘mithuna+cvi+kr+lyap. 33 Vivaraṇopanyāsa p. 33 34 अहकारायासःअानोपादानकः , अयासवात्, रजतायासवत्। ibid 36 35 तमासकलािनयानानुगतंयियचैतयंतदेवानसामायं, तिरोयानसामायंयिवषयः। ibid 37 36 Ibid p 39 37 तमासिवषयमानंसाियिसम्। ibid 39 38 माणानंवागभावितर - विवषयावरण - विनवयवदेशगतववतरपूवकंअकािशताथकािशवात्अधकारेथमोप दीपभावदित। ibid 40 39 Ibid 45 40 तयचहेवदशनादनादवम्।एवंचय ानादवयंिमयािमयोपादानंतदानिमितिथतम्। ibid p.46. 41 Ibid 46 42 लोकेशुितवानािरोिधनोऽयासयिनवृेदशनाद्, अानयािपानिवरोिधवाद् िवरोिधिनवृिःदृफलम्इयुयते। ibid p. 48 43 Ibid 49

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44 Ibid 50 45 Ibid p 51 46 Ibid 47 Ibid 52-54 48 Ibid 54 49 Ibid 54 50 Ibid 55 51 Ibid 52 Ibid p 56 53 Ibid 87 54

अपिसातयूनािधििभःपहेवाभासैवजतामाणयुियांतविनणय फलावादकथा। ibid 58 55 Vps 59 56 Ibid 60 57 Ibid 62 58 Ibid 66 59 Ibid 69 60 Ibid 71 61 Ibid 73 62 रजतंबुयिभम्इियासिकृवेसितअपरोकेषवात्, बुिवत्। ibid 63 तमाबुयामकंरजतंबिहवयात्। ibid 64 Ibid 74 65 Ibid 82 66 Ibid 83 67 Śv U I-10 68 तरयिवांिवततांदयिमन् िनवेिशते।योगीमायामयेयायतमैिवामनेनमः। quoted in Vivaraṇopanyāsa .

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P 83. This smrti is quoted in Pancapadikavivarana and Vedantaprabhsha. Its source is unknown. 69 Ibid p 83 70 Ibid 84 71 Ibid 85 72 Ibid 86 73 Ibid 89-90 74 Ibid 75 Ibid 93 76 Ibid 77 Ibid 94 78 Ibid 95 79 ववहारेकाशातरानपेवम्। ibid 80 Br U. 4-3-6 81 Br U. 4-3-6 82 Ibid 99 83 Ch U.8-3-2 84 Ibid 102 85 Ibid 103 86 जीवभेदयिमयावंअैतुया , दृयवाद्, भेदवाभेदवत्इितअनुमानेनचिसम्। Ibid 104 87 Ch U. 6-8-9 88 Vivaraṇopanyāsa 104 89 Ibid 108 90 Ibid 109 91 Ibid 111 92 Ibid 112 93 Ibid 114 94 Ibid

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95 Ibid 115 96 Ibid 116 97 Ibid 118 98 Ibid 119 99 Ibid 122. 100 Ibid 123 101 Ibid 102 Ibid 125 103 Ibid 127 104 Ibid 130-131 105 Br.U 1-5-3 106 Vivaraṇopanyāsa 131 107 Ibid 133 108 Ibid 136 109 यथायंयोितरामािवववानपोिभाबधैकोऽनुगछन्।उपािधनाय तेभेदपोदेवःेेवेवमजोऽयमामा। Quoted in Vivaraṇopanyāsa p 136, सएषइहिवः (Br.U 1-4-7) 110 Ibid 136 111 Ibid 137-138 112 Ibid 139 113 Ibid 139 114 Ibid 140 115 Ibid 141 116 Ibid 144 117 Ibid 147 118 Ibid 148 119 Ibid 120 Ibid 149 121 Ibid 148

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122 Ibid 149 123 Ibid 151 124 Ibid 152 125 Ibid 154 126 Ibid 155 127 Ibid 158 128 Ibid 129 Ibid 130 Ibid 159 131 Ibid 161 132 Ibid 192 133 Ibid 200 134 Ibid 135 Ibid 202-203 136 Ibid 204 137 Ibid 138 Ibid 205 139 Ibid 140 Br.U 3-4-2 141 Ch.U 7-24-1 142 Vivaraṇopanyāsa 206. 143 Br.U 3.8.8 144 Ibid 207 145 Br.U 2.4.6 146 Ibid 2.3.6 147 Vivaraṇopanyāsa 208 148 Ibid 209-210 149 Ibid 210 150 Ibid 211

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151 Ibid 212 152 Adhyāsabhāṣya 153 Vivaraṇopanyās a 213 154 Ibid 213 155 Ibid 214 156 दोषाऽजयानमाय मावदशनेन ानसामायहेवितरहेतुगुणजयंानं मेय मानाभावात्। Vivaraṇopanyāsa, 215 157 जयमा न गुणजया , मावाद्, ानवाद् वा , ईरमावत्। ibid 158 Ibid 159 Ibid 216 160 Ibid 217 161 Ibid 218 162 Ibid 219 Ramananda Sarasvati quotes following Upanishadvakyas to substantiate his view. तवौपिनषदम्, ( बृ. 3-9-26), वेदातिवझानसुिनिताथाः (कैनय .3) 163 Ibid 220 164 Ibid 221 165 Ibid 222 166 Ibid 224 167 Ibid 168 Ibid 169 Ibid 225 170 Ibid 226 171 Ibid 227 172 Ibid 228 173 Ibid 174 Ibid 229 175 Ibid 230

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176 Vivaraṇopanyāsa 237 177 त सववेदय कायपरवात् वेदातानामिप इित ानिवधौतापयम्, न िण। ibid 238 178 Ibid 239. 179 Ibid 240 180 Ibid 241 181 Ibid 242 182 Ibid 243 183 Ibid 244-245 184 Ibid 246 185 Ibid 247 186 Ibid 248 187 Ibid 249 188 Ibid 250 189 Ibid 252 190 Ibid 191 Ibid 254 192 Ibid 256 193 Ibid 257 194 Ibid 258 195 Ibid 259 196 Ibid 260 197 Br U 4.4.25 198 Vivaraṇopanyāsa 268 199 Ibid 269 200 Ibid 270 201 Ibid 275 202 वेदाताः िविधिनाेद् ाभावः सयते। Ibid

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203 वेदराशेः कायगवं क ुपयोत सिरा। युपिभािवनीतेऽे सतांगीतु िवचायतां।। (Samgrahasloka 16) ibid 281 204 Ibid 281 205 Ibid 282-283 206 Ibid 284 207 Ibid 285 208 Ibid 285-286 209 Ramānanda Sarasvati gives a detailed discussion on ‘Saktunyaya’, in the Second Varnaka. See Vivaraṇopanyāsa pp 254-255 210 Ibid 287 211 Ibid 287 212 Ibid 288 213 Ibid 289 214 Ibid 290 215 Ibid 291 216 Ibid 292 217 Ibid 293-294 218 Ibid 295 219 Ibid 296 220 Ibid 221 Ibid 297 222 Ibid 300 223 Ibid 301 224 Ibid 302-303 225 Ibid 306 226 Ibid 310 227 Ibid 311 228 Ibid 313 229 Ibid 332

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230 Ibid 334 231 Ibid 335 232 Ibid 337 233 Ibid 338 234 Ibid 338 - 3339 235 BSSB I-i-4 236 Ibid I-iii-29-30 237 Ibid 340 238 Ibid 342 239 Bhagavad Gīta 18-47 240 काषाये कमिभः पे ततो ानं वतत (Quoted in Vivaranopanyāsa, p. 342) 241 Ibid 342-343 242 Ibid 243 Ibid 344 244 तमािशुििववेकवैरायादपरपरया ानाथािन कमािणइित िसम्। ibid 344 245 Ibid 245 246 तैरीयसंिहता ६.३.१० .५ 247 मनुः (६॥३५ ) 248 Vivaraṇopanyāsa 345 249 वटोः यासकथनादिवरे मुितः। ऋणुित सामय नाधादेयासयोयता॥ ibid 346 250 अथ हैनमिः पछ यावयं पृछािम वा यावयअयोपवीित कथं ाण इित । स होवाच यावयः ।इदमेवाय तोपवीतं य आमापः ायाचयायं िविधः पराजकानाम्। वीरावाने वा अनाशके वा अपां वेशे वा अिवेशे वा महाथाने वा । अथपरािववणवासा मुडोऽपरहः शुिचरोहीभैणो भूयाय भवतीित। यातुरः यामनसा वाचा संयसेत् ।

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एष पथाणा हानुिवतेनैित संयासी िवदयेवमेवैष भगवयावय ॥ ५॥Jābāla 5 251 Ibid 347 252 तमेतं वेदानुवचनेन ाणा िविवदषितयेन दानेन तपसाऽनाशकेन। बृहदारयकोपिनषत्IV.iv.22. 253 िवां चािवां च यतेदोभयं सह। अिवया मृयुं तीवािवयाऽमृतमुते॥ ईशावायोपिनषत् ११॥ 254 न वेदाययनामुिन शापठनादिप । ानादेव िह कैवयं नायथा िवनतामजः॥ गडपुराणम्, २,४९ .८७॥ https://sanskritdocuments.org/doc_purana/garuDapurANa.html?lang=sa 255 Vivaraṇopanyāsa 349 256 Ibid 350 257 Ibid 352 258 Ch U -VIII-vii-1 259 Ch U -VIII-i-6 260 M U –I-i-12 261 Br U IV-iv-23 262 M U–III-ii-9 263 Vivaraṇopanyāsa 352 264 जैिमनीयसूम् –II-iv-9 265 Ibid 353 266 Ibid 354 267 Ibid 355 268 Ibid 356 269 Ibid 357 270 Ibid 358 271 Ibid 272 नायः पथा िवतेऽयनाय  ( े. उ. ३ । ८)

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273 Ibid 359 274 Ibid 275 Ibid 360 276 Ibid 361 277 षी शेषे॥ अायायी २।३।५० 278 Ibid 362 279 ‘तििजासव त  (तै. उ. ३ । १ । १) 280 Vivaraṇopanyāsa 362 281 Ibid 361 282 Ibid 364 283 Ibid 365 284 Ibid 367 285 शामयगतं सूं सानुबधचतुयम्। िवचारं कायमाहतःकतः सोऽिधकारणा॥ ibid 286 Ibid 368 287 Ibid 370 288 Ibid 371 289 Ibid 290 Ibid 372 291 Ibid 372-373 292 Ibid 373 293 Ibid 374 294 Ibid 375 295 Ibid 376 296 Ibid 377 297 Ibid 378 298 Ibid 379 299 Ibid 380

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300 Ibid 381 301 Ibid 302 Ibid 382 303 Ibid 382 304 Ibid 383 305 Ibid 385 306 Ibid 386 307 Ibid 308 Ibid 387 309 Ibid 388 310 Ibid 389 311 Ibid 390 312 Ibid 391 313 Ibid 392 314 तानां वा समतानां भूतानां भोृता कुतः। इियादेरिपतथा शूयाते नामता ततः॥ ibid 393, through 402 315 न गोलकानीियािण नाऽिप तछयोऽिप तु। शिमपािणभौितकायिवभूिन च॥ Ibid 397 316 तमुामतं सव ाणा अनूामित। बृ.उIV-iv-2 317 Vivaraṇopanyāsa p 397 318 ििवधोऽयमहकारो महवादजायत। इियाणां ततः सृिगुणारामहामुने॥ Quoted in Vivaraṇopanyasa, p . 398 319 अमयं िह सोय मनः।छा .उVI-v-4 320 Vivaraṇopanyāsa p 398 321 Ibid 322 Ibid 399 323 Ch U .VI-vi-5 324 एतमाायते ाणोमनः॥ कैवयोपिनषत् 15

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325 Vivaraṇopanyāsa 399 326 अायं पुषः वयं योितः (बृ.उIV- iii-9); असगोयं पुषः , (बृ. उIV-iii-15) 327 उपािधना यते भेदपः -Quoted in Vivaraṇopanyāsa. P 400 328 Ibid 329 Ibid 401 330 Ibid 402 331 Ibid 332 Ibid 403 333 Ibid 404 334 Ibid 408 335 Vide Siddhāntakaumudī, Bālamanoramā, on Sutra सवादीिन सवनामािन (211) I-i-16 तगुणसंिवानो बीिहः। तय =अयपदाथय , गुण #आ#◌ः =िवशेषणािन वतपदाथपािण , तेषां संिवानं=यावियतयािवानं य स तगुणसंिवान इित पिः। य संयोगसमवायायतरसंबधेनायपदाथवतपदाथावयत ायेण तगुणसंिवानो बीिहः। 336 Vivaraṇopanyāsa 411 337 Ibid 338 Ibid 412 339 Ibid 413 340 यं वा इदं नाम पं कम Br.U. I.vi.1 341 Vivarṇopanyāsa p. 414 342 Ibid 416 343 Br.U III-viii-8; Kaivalyopaniṣat 21 344 Vivaraṇopanyasa p. 417 345 Ibid 418 346 मायााचसंिव - Quoted in Vivaraṇopanyāsa 411 347 Ibid

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348 स याभवत् । Taittiriyopaniṣat, II-vi-1 349 Ibid 420 350 Ch.U. VIII- xiv-1 351 िनकलं िनियं शातम् –SvetaśvataraUpaniṣat VI-19; असगम्अरसम् अगधम् –Bṛ.U III-viii-8 352 Vivaraṇopanyāsa p. 421-422. 353 Ibid 422 354 Ibid 355 Ibid 424. 356 Ibid 425 357 Ibid 426 358 Ibid 426 359 Ibid 427 360 Ibid 428 361 Ibid 429 362 Ibid 363 Ibid 431 364 Ibid 365 Ibid 432 366 Ibid 433 367 आनदायेव खिवमािन भूतािन जायते । आनदेन जातािन जीवित । आनदं ययिभसंिवशतीित ।तै.उ. III-vi-1 368 Vivaraṇopanyāsa 436 369 Sv. Up. 6.11 370 Br.U . II-iv-10 371 Vivaraṇopanyāsa p. 438 372 अरेऽय महतो भूतय िनिसतमेतदृवेदो यजुवदः सामवेदोऽथवािगरस इितहासः पुराणं िवा उपिनषदः ोकाः सूायनुायानािन ायानाययैवैतािन िनिसतािन। Br.U. II.iv-10

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373 Vivaraṇopanyāsa 439 374 Ibid 440 375 Ibid 376 Ibid 441 377 Ibid 378 Ibid 442 379 Ibid 442 380 Ibid 442-443 381 Kumārilabhaṭṭa, Ślokavārtika, II.114 382 Vivaraṇopanyāsa 443 383 Ibid 444 384 Ibid 385 Ibid 445-446 386 सूयाचमसौ धाता यथापूवमकपयत् ।दवं च पृिथव चातरमथो सुवः ॥Mahānārāyaṇopaniṣat V-7 387 The text uses the word Apauruṣeya which does not fit in the context. The editor of thetext suggested the reading ‘Pauruṣeya’ which is acceptable. 388 Vivaraṇopanyāsa p.447 389 Ibid 447 390 Ibid 448 391 Ibid 449 392 Ibid 393 Ibid 450 394 Ibid 395 Ib id 451

396 तं वौपिनषदं पुषं पृछािम Br.U . III.ix.26 397 Vivaraṇopanyāsa p. 453 398 Ibid 453 399 Ibid 454

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400 Ibid 401 Ibid 402 Ibid 455 403 Bhagavadgita 4-10 404 Vivaraṇopanyāsa 455 405 Ibid 456 406 Ibid 407 आायययाथवादानथयमतदथानाम् (जै० सू० १ -२-१) 408 Ibid 460 409 Ibid 410 Ibid 461 411 Ibid 462 412 Ibid 413 Ibid 463. 414 छादोयतापयम् तथा िह -'सदेव सौयेदम आसीद् (छां. ६.२.१), 'ऐतदायिमदं सवम्' ( ६.१६ .३) इयितीये युपमोपसंहारयोरैकयम्। 'तसयंस आमा ' ( ६.८.८-१६ ) इित नवकृवोयासः। त मानातराऽावादपूवता। 'अथ सपय ' इित (६.१४ .२) फलम्। 'येनाुतं ुतं भवित ' ( ६.१.३) इयथवादः। 'वाचारभणं िवकारः , मृिकेयेव सयम्' ( ६.४.१) इित कारणाऽयवेयुिः। इित षिवधािन िलगािन छादोये दृयते। अथ ारधयानतरं िवा के वलं सपत इित ुयथः। एवं ितवेदातं िलगािन ानीयथः। Ibid 464 415 Ibid 465 416 Ibid 466 417 यतोवाचोिनवतते।अायमनसासह। Tai.U2.9.1 418 Vivaraṇopanyāsa p. 467 419 Ibid 467 420 Ibid 468

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421 Ibid 469 422 Muṇdaka Up - III-ii-9, 9 423 Vivaraṇopanyāsa p. 469-470 424 Br.U IV-iv-20 425 Vivaraṇopanyāsa p.471 426 Ibid 472 427 Ibid 474 428 Ibid 476 429 Ibid 477 430 Ibid 478 431 Ibid 479 432 J. S I.ii.1 433 Vivaraṇopanyāsa.p. 480 434 Ibid 484 435 Ibid 485 436 The word Kārya in this context mean ‘Deserving to be done’. ‘The meaning effect’ is not considered. 437 Vivaraṇopanyāsap.486 438 Ibid 487 439 Ibid 440 Ibid 488 441 Ibid 489 442 Ibid 490 443 Ibid 491 444 Ibid 492 445 Ibid 446 Ibid 494 447 Ibid 495 448 Ibid 496

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449 Ibid 450 Ch. U III-xiii-7 451 Ibid VIII-xv-1 452 Vivaraṇopanyāsa.p 497 453 M.U III.ii.9 454 Br.U IV-iv-6 455 Kaṭha. V.1 456 Br.U IV.iv.6 457 Vivaraṇopanyāsa.p 498 458 Ka. U II-22 459 Vivaraṇopanyāsa p. 498 460 Ibid 499 461 Ibid 462 Ibid 501 463 Ibid 502 464 Ibid 465 Ibid 503 466 Ibid 467 Ibid 504 468 Ibid 504 469 Ibid 505 470 Ibid 471 Bṛ. Up. II-v-19 472 वा इदम आसीत्। तदामानमेवावेदहं ामीित तमासवमभवोयो देवानां यबुयत स सऽएव तदभवथषणां तथा मनुयाणाम् –शतपथाणम् – १४ .४.२.[ २१ ] 473 Vivaraṇopanyāsa p. 505 474 Ch.U VI-viii-7 475 Ch.U VI-iii-2

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476 Ibid VII-xxv-2 477 Vivaraṇopanyāsa p. 506 478 Ibid 505 479 Ibid 508 480 Ibid 510 481 Ibid 511 482 Ibid 514 483 Ibid 518 484 Ibid 485 Ibid 519 486 Ibid 520 487 Ibid 520-521 488 Ibid 521 489 Ibid 522 490 Ibid 523 491 ĀpastambaDharmasūtra II-ix-ix 492 Vivaraṇopanyāsa p. 524 493 Ibid 524 494 Ibid 525 495 Ibid 526 496 Ibid 497 Ibid 527-528 498 Ibid 530 499 Ibid 531 500 Ibid 501 Ibid 532 502 Br.U IV-v-13 503 Ibid III-iv-2 504 Vivaraṇopanyāsa p. 534

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505 Ibid 533-534 506 Ibid 507 Ibid 535 508 Ibid 536 509 Ibid 510 Īśāvāsyopaniṣat 7 511 Vivaraṇopanyāsa p.538 512 Ibid 539 513 Ibid 514 Ibid 540 515 Ibid 542 516 Ibid 517 Ibid 543 518 Ibid 544

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