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1988 Lincoln and Oregon Todd Hageman Eastern Illinois University This research is a product of the graduate program in History at Eastern Illinois University. Find out more about the program.

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m LINCOLN AND OREGON

(Tl II()

BY

Todd Hageman

THESIS

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILIJv1ENT Of THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS IN HISTORY

IN THE GRAOUATE SCHOOL, EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY CHARLESTON, ILLINOIS

1988 YtAK

I HEREBY RECOMMEND THIS THESIS BE ACCEPTED AS FULFILLING THIS PART OF THE GRADUATE DEGRl:E CITED ABOVE

--,.--- - './ DEPAR1MENT Hf AD !/ To my wife Ann, for her support. LINCOLN AND OREGON

by

Todd Hageman ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I owe a great deal to my parents who financed my undergraduate education , my sister , and my brother for the seemingly constant and invaluable use of his typewriter.

A special thank you goes to the interlibrary loan librarians in Booth Library . I also owe a great deal to the entire History Department faculty and staff at Eastern

Illinois University for their tutelage, especially Dr.

Wolfgang Schlauch , and Mr . Robert Sterling for their contributions and criticisms of this paper. I especially want to thank my thesis advisor , Dr . John Haley, for his conscientious guidance throughout this project. ABSTRACT

The Civil War is one of the most significant events in American history . President Abraham Lincoln's term in office was dominated by the war, therefore the study of

Lincoln has likewise been dominated by War developments.

The war 's battles were overwhelmingly concentrated in the eastern United States, and hence the American west has largely been ignored by Lincoln scholars. This study attempts to uncover Lincoln 's policy toward Oregon, including War developments and his domestic po licy, to partially fill the "western gap" in Lincoln scholarship.

Oregon was admitted to the federal Union in 1859, and by Lincoln 's election in 1860 that state 's population remained Lelatively small. Shortly after Lincoln's election the Civil war broke out, and Oregon 's remoteness from

Washington , D.C. made its situation difficult for Lincoln because communication was slow without a telegraph and transportation was laggard without the transcontinental railroad . A majority of Oregonians remained loyal to the

Union , however a vocal minority formed a chapter of the

Knights of the Golden Circle in Oregon to hinder the War 's success. The Knights even allied with other individuals in an effort to separate Oregon and California tram the Union and form an independent Pacific Coast Republic. Oregon consisted mainly of Democratic voters, and after the War

i began Oregon 's Democratic Governor John Whiteaker was hostile toward Lincoln 's vigorous prosecution of the war .

The attack on Fort Sumter by the Confederates had a great impact upon the Oregonians. Most Oregonians viewed the Confederate attack as the act that initiated the Wa r, and as a result Union sentiment in Oregon was strengthened.

Lincoln acted quickly to secure Oregon for the Union by forming a regiment of cavalry to remain in Oregon to guard its frontier during the Wa r. The cavalry performed its duties we ll until their term of enlistment expired a�d

Lincoln authorized a regiment of cavalry to take its place .

Although the majority of Oregonians supported Lincoln and the War , the troops were needed to suppress threatened uprisings by the Knights and Indians living in Oregon .

Lincoln 's war policy toward Oregon was just one part of his overall policy . Along with forming troop regiments , initiating the construction of forts , and supplying Oregon with an iron-clad, Lincoln also had a domestic policy toward

Oregon . Lincoln reformed the federal circuit court system in order to include Oregon and other states into the system.

Lincoln also signed the Homestead Act, the Pacific Railroad

Act, and an act to provide economic assistance for a Pacific telegraph , all of which were pieces of legislation that

Oregonians had long coveted . In return Oregon shipped large quantities of its gold eastward to help finance the war effort.

ii Lincoln 's policy toward Oregon was one of patience and

prudence. Lincoln insured Oregonian support for the Union by supporting legislation that they had perennially demanded without antagonizing the Knights. He also acted decisively

in his war policy toward Oregon that enabled that state to mobilize against both internal and external foes.

iii TAOLE OF CONTENTS

I. Introduction ...... Page 1

II. Oregon From Territorial Status Through The Secession

Crisis ...... Page 7

III. Lincoln 's Early War Policy Toward Oregon ...... Page 27

IV . Lincoln's Domestic Policy Toward Oregon ...... Page 57

V. Lincoln 's Later War Policy Toward Oregon ...... Page 69

VI. Conclusion ...... Page 85 I. INTRODUCTION

President Abraham Lincoln's term in office is the

subject of varied interpretations. The interpretations range from Lincoln's glorification as a martyr and saint,

to some revisionists ' descriptions of him as a conniving , racist tyrant. These profoundly divergent interpretations exist partially because Lincoln 's administration experienced

American history 's most tumultuous period , and that period 's bitter sectional feelings linger somewhat to the present .

The sheer number of people interested in the American Civil

War , coupled with the intense, conflicting attitudes that

Americans have concerning the War have made Lincoln's

presidency the most written about administration in American

history . Voluminous accounts, revisions, analyses , and

interpretations have been written concerning Abraham

Lincoln, and one might assume that every aspect of his

presidency has been covered. However, that is not the case .

The American West is rarely mentioned in volumes

concerning Abraham Lincoln. Many "definitive" sources

hardly mention Lincoln's policy toward the area west of the 2

Mississippi River , let alone the Pacific Coast. This is

because historians tend to concentrate solely on Civil War

developments. The purpose of this study is to partially

fill this void in the historiography of Lincoln scholarship .

This study will explore Lincoln 's policy toward Oregon

during his presidential tenure. It wi ll include: a brief

description of Oregon 's history from its exploration through

the election of 1860 in order to gain a perspective on

Oregon 's population and political environment, Linco ln 's

military and internal policy toward Oregon, and public

reaction to Lincoln's presidency will complete the study .

This study is intended to look at Oregon 's relationship to

the federal government and the Lincoln administration, and

it is not a detailed study of Oregon during the Civil War .

Surprisingly , the histories of Oregon and Lincoln

shared more than is superficially apparent . Many migrants

to Oregon were Lincoln 's close personal friends, with whom

he kept in contact during his presidency, and some received

federal appointments. Also, Oregon 's internal political

situation during the War was such that it demanded Lincoln's

attention and action although the state was far removed from

the major military battles and political controversies.

Long before Lincoln 's administration , however , Oregon was

a remote, western frontier that attracted intense inter­

national competition for settlement . 3

The famed "Northwest Passage" lured explorers into

Oregon . The British, under Captain James Cook , were the

first to "discover" Oregon in 1778. Although the British

did not find the potentially lucrative "Northwest Passage ,"

they did find wealth by cheaply obtaining sea otter pe lts

from the Indians and selling them for extremely high returns

in China . By 1785 many British private trading companies ,

along with King George 's royal company , were reaping

Oregon 's wealth. Subsequent English explorers, such as

George Vancouver and Alexander Mackenzie ''firmly established

England 's title to the Northwest," yet the Americans were

far from being out of the picture . l

In 1787 Robert Gray and Benjamin Kindrick, lured by

Cook 's published journal, eagerly sailed for Oregon to enter

the prosperous Oriental trade. Their voyage 's successful

completion hastened Gray 's second expedition , in which he

discovered the Columbia River. The United States and Great

Britain avoided war in 1818 by agreeing to jointly occupy

the Oregon Country . The emigrant exodus from the eastern

United States into Oregon was slowly initiated. John Jacob

Astor 's Pacific Fur Company in Astoria was viewed as a

profitable, permanent American settlement in Oregon . The

expectations for Astor 's permanent settlement were never

realized, because he was forced to sell his company to the

British North West Company in 1825. The British Hudson 's

Bay Company then established Fort Vancouver on the Columbia 4

River where its financial and agricultural endeavors

prospered , while American interest and prospects in Oregon

dwindled . American interest in Oregon was later rekindled

by a few visionary Congressmen. 2

Dr. John Floyd introduced a bill in Congress in 1820

urging Oregon 's annexation , but it was voted down three

years later . Hall Jackson Kelly resumed the fight for

Oregon by circulating pamphlets and letters around New

England to heighten public enthusiasm, and by 1831 he formed

the '' American Society for Encouraging the Settlement of the

Oregon 'l'erritory ." Nathaniel J. Wyeth's published journal

of his overland expedition to Oregon was also intended to

induce migrants . Throughout the 1830's , however , the

majority of Oregon 's migrants were missionaries. These

missionaries did not succeed in their goal of Christianizing

the Indians , but they did succeed in keeping Oregon alive

in the minds of eastern Americans. During the 1840's, a

decisive chain of events and circumstances allowed the

United States to reclaim Oregon from the British .

The proximity of a large number of potential American

settlers was an advantageous factor for the United States ,

even though the British had strong claims to the territory .

An adequate inducement to settle Oregon was all that

Americans needed. This inducement was provided by many

Oregon immigrant societies resulting in the "Great 5

Migration" of 1843. British interest in Oregon , on the

other hand, diminished with the decline in the fu r trade

as beaver hats fell out of style in Europe , and by 1846,

Americans were granted exclusive rights to settle in the

Oregon country . The American government responded to the

emigrants' demands for protection against I ndians , and the

government 's Manifest Destiny desire to expand the United

States' territory , and passed the bill creating the Oregon

Territory on August 14, 1848. The Act was signed by

Democratic President James K. Polk. 3 Oregon Territory

already possessed many distinctive characteristics by the

time it was created.

Following the discovery of gold in 1849, settlers

poured into the Territory mostly from the Midwest. In

addition to the Midwesterners , about 21 per cent of the

Territory 's population emigrated from Southern s lave states ,

another 21 per cent emigrated from the Old Northwest, 8 per

cent from the Mid-Atlantic states, and just over 4 per cent

from New England. The combination of an overwhelmingly

rural population that was Democratic in its po litical out­

look and the patronage of a national Democratic administra­

tion insured the entrenchment of a strong Democratic machine

in the new territory . 4 In fact, a California newspaper

correspondent to the Oregon Country was so impressed with

that area 's preoccupation with power politics in 1357 that 6

he remarked, "The Oregonians have two occupations ,

agriculture and politics."5 7

II. OREGON FROM TERRITORIAL STATUS THROUGH THE SECESSION CRISIS

The Democratic machine in Oregon was ruled by the

"Salem Clique ," which ran virtually every aspect of state

po litics. This "Clique" was led by the new Territory 's most

influential men: General Joseph Lane , and Asahel Bush .

Lane, a Brigadier General in the Mexican war, accepted his

appointment as the first territorial governor of Oregon in

1848 and his popularity grew. He eventually became Oregon 's

first territorial delegate to Congress and one of Oregon's

first senators. Asahel Bush, known as "Ass of Hell" Bush

to his enemies, was the editor of the newspaper with the

largest circulation in Oregon , the Salem Orego n Statesman .

Bush promoted Democratic positions on issues to a receptive

audience through the outspoken columns of the Statesman .

The "Clique " reflected a conservative po litical

attitude due to the sectionally heterogenous population

that migrated to Oregon . This diverse population placed

an emphasis on the middle of the political spectrum rather

than the extremes. 6 Oregon was forced to confront the issue

of slavery before it was admitted to territorial status, and

it applied this conservative approach to the issue . The

question of Oregon Territory 's admission to the Union was

raised just as the slavery issue began to heat up national-

ly . As a result, slavery was an abstract issue in Oregon , 8

although realistically slavery was not an issue with the

Oregonians .

Oregon 's economy and geographic location made slavery

economically infeasible and Oregonians made it clear that

they did not want the peculiar institution within their

borders. The provisional legislature sent a clear message

concerning this issue in 18 44 when it passed an act that

provided:

That if any such free Negro or Mulatto shall fail to quit the country as required by this act, he or she may be arrested upon a warrant issued by some justice of the peace, and if guilty upon trial before such justice, shall receive upon his or her bare back not less than twenty nor more than thirty-nine stripes , to be inflicted by the constable of the proper country. [And) that if any free Negro or Mulatto shall fail to quit the country within the term of six months after receiving such stripes, he or she shall again receive the same punishment once in every six months until he or she shall quit the country . 7

It was obvious that although Oregonians did not want

slavery , it was not due to a fundamental disagreement with

the institution. In fact, most Oregonians endorsed slavery

but, they did not want blacks within their midst. Succinct-

ly stated , Oregonians were considerably more anti-black than

anti-slavery . Oregon 's shortsighted solution for its local

position concerning slavery was typical of the independent

attitude on the western frontier . Oregon 's independent air

guided its political decisions until the eve of the Civil

War.

Polk remained president only a short time after the

Oregon Territory was created . In the election of 18 48 , 9

the Whig Zachary Taylor was elected president and given

control of federal patronage in the territories. The office

of territorial governor was directly appointed by the presi­

dent which usually meant if the party in power changed

hands, partisan appointees would soon follow suit. Oregon ,

a Democratic stronghold, was a logical place for Taylor

to exercise his patronage powers and repay some campaign

favors. It is interesting to note that Abraham Lincoln,

a young Whig upstart , was nominated for secretary of the

Oregon Territory and he was subsequently nominated

territorial governor . Lincoln seriously considered the

position, but Mary Todd Lincoln would not tolerate such an

isolated , crude home and persuaded her husband to decline

the appointment. In a letter dated September 27, 1849,

Lincoln expressed his gratitude for being offered the

appointment , but politely declined. a Fortunately, we are

only left to speculate what would have become of Abraham

Lincoln had he accepted the appointment . John Pollard

Gaines finally accepted the Oregon territorial governorship

in August, 1850 and he encountered all the problems that a

Whig Governor in a Democratic territory should have

expected .

Soon after Oregon received territorial status, the

residents complained that its independence was usurped.

This attitude was typical of a frontier that was use

to home rule. In many cases , as soon as the national 10

government exercised its power over a newly created

territory this was viewed by the frontiersmen as an

encroachment upon their independence. Oregon 's demands

during its territorial status in the 1850s were frequently

confusing and often contradictory . Oregonians protested

their loss of independence while at the same time demanding

land, money , and protection from the federal government .

They also complained of both being dictated to and neglected

by the federal government . 9 overall, Oregonians found their

territorial status unacceptable . Therefore , a revolt

against territorial government began in 1850, almost

irrunediately after the recognition of Oregon as a Territory .

This movement was fueled when the Whig Governor Gaines was

forced upon them. If Gaines' tenure was viewed as creating

a flame from a spark , further events caused a full-fledged

explosion in Oregon 's statehood movement .

The introduction of the infamous Kansas-Nebraska Act in

Congress by Stephen A. Douglas in 1854 profoundly effected

Oregon politics for over a decade . Oregonians interpreted

the Act as Congressional acquiescence in allowing states

greater independence. Oregonians , who began their statehood

movement in 185 1 for precisely that reason , complained that

territorial status was tantamount to vassalage, and after

the Kansas-Nebraska Act they equated statehood with

independence . 10 By 1854 slavery was the hottest issue in

national politics, therefore, Oregonians had to addrGss 11

the issue in their statehood movement. The Kansas-Nebraska

Act provided not only the impetus Oregon 's statehood

movement needed , but it also provided the parameters in

which the slavery issue would be discussed. Due to the

timing of the bill's introduction and the framework it

contained, the Kansas-Nebraska Act had a great impact upon

Oregon . It would be impossible to discuss Abraham Lincoln 's

policy toward Oregon without understanding the Territory 's

position concerning slavery . And , since the Kansas-Nebraska

Act precipitated an extensive debate over slavery in the

Oregon Territory , it is necessary to briefly discuss the

major viewpoints represented in that debate .

The Oregon Territorial Legislature quickly addressed

the slavery issue. Oregonians interpreted the Kansas-

Nebraska Act only as it applied to their situation. By the

1850s, as mentioned earlier, the Oregon Territory was

inhabited by many pro-s lavery Democrats. The Territory

outlawed slavery not because its citizens disliked the

institution , but because they intensely hated blacks.

Therefore, Oregonians hailed Douglas ' popular sovereignty

principle as a way to exclude slavery from their borders;

but, they cared little if the institution spread to

neighboring territories. 11 Representing this viewpoint

in the Oregon Territorial Legislature was Democrat Delazon

Smith , known as "Delusion" Smith in rival newspapers . In

December 1854, Smith introduced a series of resolutions that 12

were adopted by the Territorial Legislature endorsing

the Kansas-Nebraska Act, however, this consensus met

some opposition .

Or . Anson G. Henry , a Whig, countered Smith's resolu­

tions with a set of his own that presented an opposing

viewpoint. Henry , a former Springfield, Illinois resident,

personal physician and close friend of Abraham Lincoln ,

argued that the repeal of the Missouri Compromise would

invite the spread of slavery into every territory . He

countered Smith by reasoning that slavery would be allowed

to spread everywhere, even into Oregon , "if there were no

laws to prevent it.11 12 Surprisingly , Henry 's conservative

viewpojnt was not shared by many of his partisan colleagues

in the legislature . Oregon's Whigs' independence reflected

the national party 's split . In fact , some of the most

vociferous enemies to Henry 's resolutions were Whigs.

David Logan, son of Lincoln 's former Springfield law partner

Stephen T. Logan, and an influential Whig member of the

Oregon legislature, denounced Henry 's proposals as "too

ultra , and tinctured with abolitionism , to pledge the Whig

party of Oregon to .••13 Such was the nature of Oregon

politics. The battle over slavery in Oregon was just one

front in the two-pronged offensive it launched in order

to obtain statehood . The other battle was fought in

Washington , D.C. 13

The Washington fight for Oregon's statehood, initiated

in 1854 by Stephen A. Douglas , was slow, confusing, and

hypocritical. The Washington debate over Oregon 's admission

is also relevant to this study due to its inherent entangle­

ment in the slavery issue , and the antagonism it caused

among the different sections of the country which resulted

in a purely partisan struggle . To understand the contro­

versy over Oregon's admission , it is necessary to point out

that the Democrats opposed Oregon 's territorial organiza­

tion due to its insistence upon organizing as a free

territory. The Whigs supported statehood in 1848; but

by the mid 1850s when most Whigs had become Republicans,

they realized that Oregon , if it was allowed to enter the

Union , would be a Democratic state. 14 There fore, wher.

Oregon agitated for statehood , the national Democrats

realized they could gain an ally and the national

Repub licans realized that the territory was sympathetic

toward slavery although it remained free . 15 The Democratic

and Republican positions concerning Oregon's admission had

completely reversed and the situation was stalemated in

Congres s. This atmosphere frustrated Oregonians who decided

to take matters into their own hands.

Oregonians felt that Congress would act quicker if they

had a state constitution and government apparatus set up so

that they could present statehood as a fait accompli. 16 On

September 18, 1857 Oregon boasted a state constitution that 14

outlawed both slavery and free blacks within its borders .

These provisions supplied an issue that Republicans used

to oppose Oregon 's statehood and prevent another Democratic

state from entering the Union . On May 8, 1858, the Senate

debated Oregon 's enabling act and on May 21 passed the

measure by a strictly partisan vote of 35 to 17.17 The

House did not reciprocate until February 12, 1859.

President James Buchanan signed the bill on February 14,

1859, and the Legislative Assembly accepted it on June 3,

1859 . The battle for Oregon 's statehood was long and hard­

fought, and when the dust settled , the Oregon Democratic

party was severely damaged.

Ironically , Oregon 's admi ssion , something that

seemingly alJ Democrats agreed upon, permanently weakened

the party it was supposed to aid. Oregon 's leading Democrat

and sole representative in Washington , Joseph Lane, was

exceedingly quiet during the admission debate . Asahel Bush

did not overlook that fact in his Statesman, and soon Lane

and Bush, the two most powerful Oregon Democrats , were at

odds . Bush, along with some leading citizens, charged that

Lane did not do everything possible to gain Oregon 's speedy

admission to the Union. Lane , who up to this point had been

an extremely popular politician, fell into disfavor with

many Oregon voters . Indignation against Lane , now a United

States Senator, was initiated when he sent a letter to

Oregon 's Legislative Assembly that argued that the United 15

States ' territorial system was unconstitutiona1. l8

Accordingly , Lane deserved and received no credit for

Oregon 's admission to the Union. Furthermore, Lane 's

actions hopelessly factionalized Oregon 's Democratic Party .

The election of 1860 irreparably spl.it the Oregon

Democratic party . Most Oregon Democrats adhered to Stephen

A. Douglas ' popular sovereignty principle to settle the

slavery issue . Joseph Lane , however, agreed with President

Buchanan 's faction; and, in fact , Lane was Buchanan 's

handpicked choice to succeed him. 19 By the summer of 1859

Lane fell completely out of touch with his constituency.

He used his Senate seat to ardently support slavery and

the Southern viewpoint . Lane 's constituents felt that the

Buchanan-Lane Democrats forced slavery on Kansas and would

continue to force slavery onto other territories. That

prospect was intolerable to the independent-minded Douglas

Democrat majority in Oregon. Even though Lane 's support was

slipping , his faction controlled the state machinery , and

Lane picked the Oregon delegates to the Democratic national

convention in 1859.

Lane instructed the delegates to nominate him for the

presidency, but when it was apparent that Douglas would

receive the nomination , Lane instructed his delegates to

further his candidacy at the Baltimore convention . Lane 's

presidential hopes were futile, however , to the "bitter

disappointment'' of Je fferson Davis. 20 Lane was eventually 16

nominated as the vice-presidential candidate on John C.

Breckinridge 's Democratic ticket . However , his actions

caused a storm of indignation in Oregon that resulted in

Democrats identifying themselves as Bush-Douglas Democrats

and Lane-Buchanan Democrats .

The election of 1860 permanently ended Lane 's state and

national political career because he had misjudged his

constituency. Due to the communication difficulties between

Washington, D.C. and the Pacific Coast, Lane fell out of

touch with his constituents' sentiments . Orego:1ians were

Unionists above everything, especially after they attained

statehood, and Lane 's advocacy of the secession doctrine was

increasingly offensive to a majority of his constituency.

Lane remained in Washington during Oregon 's statehood move­

ment, and therefore he did not realize the momentum that

movement had gained since his departure . Of course this

Democratic nightmare was a Republican dream come true .

As previously mentioned , the Democratic machine was

solidly entrenched in Oregon from its territorial status

through statehood. By 1859, however , the fledgling

Republican party began to take root in Oregon , and it had

high hopes for the 1860 presidential election . Oregonians

began to identify themselves with national parties , but the

lack of adequate communication facilities prevented Oregon

Republicans from remaining in close contact with their

eastern counterparts. Also , because of the time anc expense 17

of the jollrney eastward , only five delegates from Oregon

were able to attend the Republican national convention.

Although the Oregon delegates were solidly behind Edward

Bates of Missouri, Abraham Lincoln had some supporters in

Oregon .

Simeon Francis first mentioned Lincoln as a

presidential candidate in Oregon in February , 1860. 21

Francis had moved from Connecticut to Springfield, Illinois

in 1831 where he edited two Whig newspapers , the Sangamon

Journal and the Illinois State Journal and became a personal

friend of Abraham Lincoln . In fact, Lincoln had declined

the job of secretary of the Oregon Territory in 1849

partially because he supported Francis for the position .

Francis moved to Portland , Oregon in December , 1859 where

he promoted the Union, the Republican party, and especially

Lincoln, through his editorship of the Portland Oregonian .

In a letter to the Oregon Argu s on February 11, 1860,

Francis displayed acute political tact by stating he had

a "high appreciation" for Oregon Republican favorite Bates ,

although privately admitting to "hating" his candidacy, he

proceeded to outline Lincoln 's life and career and urged

his presidential nomination . 22 Lincoln 's candidacy was not

taken seriously in Oregon at this time , however. Oregon

delegates, all but two of whom were proxies, carried their

support for Bates to the Republican national convention at

the Wigwam in Chicago on May 16, 1860. 18

The most influential Oregon delegate to the convention,

and possibly the most influential delegate at the convention

was New York T.ti..bJ.in..e_ editor and outspoken abolitionist

Horace Greeley , who served as an Oregon proxy . Greeley 's

participation as an Oregon proxy was particularly iron ic.

In 1843 Greeley remarked that migration to Oregon wore an

aspect of insanity ," yet by 1860 he used Oregon as a vehicle

to influence the Republican Party platform and block William

Henry Seward 's pres idential nomination .23 Oregon delegate

Greeley served on the Committee on Resolutions which drafted

the Republican National Platform of 1860 . 24 The Pla tform

caused another Oregon proxy, Frank Johnson , to remark that

it was "the most perfect and unequivocal statement of

Republican faith ever written, the wisest and most diplo­

matic points of which I am safe in saying Oregon had the

honor to contr ibute ."25 However, Greeley 's most signifi­

cant contribution to the convention was his influence in

the nominating process .

Greeley's actions at the convention caused one

historian to state , "Horace Greeley brought about the

nomination of Lincoln . " 20 Although this statement may

be slightly exaggerated , it cannot be denied that Greeley's

influence steered the convention away from Seward and toward

Lincoln. The Oregon delegates were instructed to support

Bates , but they were also told to use their best judgment in

the event that it was obvious that his nomination could be 19

secured .27 The delegates followed their instructions and

cast five votes for Bates on each of the first two ballots,

but changed their votes on the third ballot. Greeley

observantly pointed out to the other members of the Oregon

de legation that Bates ' candidacy had no realistic chance to

win the nomination. Greeley proceeded to persuade three

other Oregon delegates to join him in casting their votes

for Lincoln, and on the third preliminary ballot Oregon cast

four votes for Lincoln and one for Seward. These four voles

put Lincoln within one and one�half votes of the number

needed to obtain the nomination, and they encouraged the

convention's avalanche for Lincoln, whose candidacy was

eventually made unanimous. This event was romant ically

recalled by Frank Johnson who beamed:

During the third ballot there was tolerable order , until Oregon declared for Linco ln , rendering his nomination certain. At this point the enthusiasm become irrepressib le; the Wigwam was shaken with cheers from twenty-three thousand Repu blicans , which were renewed as State after State dec lared its unanimous vote for the man who could split rails and mau l Democrats . 2 0

Although Oregon did not technically "render his

nomination certain ," it did initiate the snowball effect for

Linco ln, therefore the histo rically incorrect notion that

Oregon nominated Lincoln persists . Oregonians in 1860 did

not shy away from that honor .

Lincoln's nomination was met with great enthusiasm

among Oregon Republicans , and they strongly united behind

their party's candidate.20 William L. Adams, another former 20

Illinois resident who migrated to Oregon publicly endorsed

Lincoln in the Oregon Argus which he edited . Anson G.

Henry , Lincoln's old friend from Spr ingfield, also spoke

on Linco ln's behalf. Henry pointed out that Lincoln was a

frontiersman, and therefore he was familiar with the needs

of the Pacific Coast.30 Even Lincoln, who was never accused

of being an optimist, spoke conf idently about his prospects

for the general presidential election in Oregon . In a

letter to Simeon Francis on August 4, 1860, Lincoln comment­ ' ed, "I should expect. . [that the Democratic par ty's sp lit]

would give us a fair chance in Oregon."31 Lincoln's confi­

dence concerning Oregon stemmed from more than just the

Democratic disparity in that State .

The Republican party expanded in Oregon by 1860, but

it lacked a strong charismatic leader. It needed a person

who could convince Oregonians who were comp lacent with rule

by a Democratic machine, that the new Republican party was

the right choice for the ir state . That leader came from

California to Oregon in the person of Colone l Edward

Dickinson Baker. Baker, a former Springfield, Illinois

native and an intimate friend of Lincoln's was invited to

Oregon by many leading Republicans in the state including

Dav id Logan . Bak er arrived in Oregon in December 1859,

however, Logan had no desire to let him have total control

of the Oregon Repub l ican party. This opinion was expressed

in a letter of January 22, 1860, which stated, "Col. Baker 21

has removed to Oregon. I think I can keep the whip hand of

the Col. Maybe not, but I will try. "32

The list of former Illinois residents and friends

of Linco ln who resided in Oregon was impressive . Those

individuals formed a powerfu l, if not harmonious group and

included two newspaper editors , Simeon Francis and William

L. Adams, two state politicians, David Logan and Dr. Anson

G. Henry, and Lincoln's closest Oregon fr iend, and one of

the most eloquent orators of his time , Edward Baker .

The Baker-Lincoln friendship began in 1835 and grew

through the 1840s. Despite Lincoln 's defeat at the hands

of Baker for Congressman from Sangamon County in 1844 ,

the two men had great respect for each other 's abilit ies.

One incident in 1838 in Springfield illustrated the ir

friendship. Linco ln heard Baker unintentional ly antag­

onizing a most ly Democratic audience through an open

scuttle in the floor of his law office . Realizing that

Baker was in physical danger, Lincoln dropped through the

scuttle , landed on the stage with Baker, grabbed a stone

water jug and threatened, "I 'll break this over the head of

the first man who lays a hand on Baker! "33 Baker finished

his speech unmolested. Lincoln continued to think so highly

of Baker that he named his second son Edward Baker Lincoln

in 1846 . No other man had a greater impact upon Oregon 's

po litical history from Baker's arrival in late 1859 to his

death in 1861. Baker, fresh from defeat for a Senate seat 22

from California in 1859, aspired to win a Senate seat from

Oregon after his arrival in that state .

In an August 1, 1860 letter to Lincoln, Baker wrote ,

II I have a great hope of a Republican senator in

Oregon--and of one possibly in both states [California and

Oregon] in November. II 3 4 Baker 's goal was realized after

the state legislature, following some abnormalities , elected

Baker and James Willis Nesmith , a Douglas Democrat , to the

Senate . The legislature convened in Salem on September 10,

1860, and the election process dragged on a month until

October 2, 1860. The election of Nesmith and Baker was a

"revolution" in Oregon politics.35 The Republicans and

Douglas Democrats combined to neutralize the Lane Democrats

for the first time since Oregon was organized as a terri-

tory, and the Lane faction was never a major competitor for

the new "Union" alliance . On the same day that Baker was

elected he informed his friend Lincoln that:

I know you will be pleased to hear that we have elected a Republican senator , Mr . Nesmith (Douglas) and myself are just announced to be senators. I hope to see you President, and if I do not mistake you will feel that you have a true and warm friend at your side , who will feel for you all the attachment in prosperity which was nurtured in adversity . 36

The 1860 presidential election was pivotal for state

politics in Oregon. Oregon was formerly inpenetratable for

non-Democrats, but those barriers began to crumble by late

1860. The fusion of Douglas Democrats and Republicans , and

the election of Lincoln's friend Baker to the Senate were 23

encouraging to Oregon Republicans. Yet, there remained

considerable opposition to Lincoln. Isaac Stevens, Governor

of the Washington Territory , played on popular fears in the

region and predicted Lincoln's election would precipitate

slave uprisings, and that the South, from which many Oregon

settlers had emigrated and still sympathized with ,

threatened secession if Lincoln was elected .

The political atmosphere in Oregon was restless,

however. Oregonians continued their perennial demands for

home stead legislation and a trans-continental railroad which

their Democratic representatives had failed to deliver to

them. These were included in tl1e Republican Platform of

1860 and this attracted voters to that party. Another

factor that solidified Oregon 's support for Lincoln was

Baker 's presence in the state . 37 The eloquent, persuasive

Colonel stumped Oregon in behalf of his old friend and

the Union for which he stood . Although the Union-loving

Oregonians naively thought a vote for the Breckinridge-Lane

ticket was a vote for the Union, Lincoln won Oregon 's three

electoral votes, albeit by a scant 270 vote plurality .

Oregonians ' growing disfavor with the Democratic party

caused many voters to vote for the emergent Republican

party . Lincoln 's narrow margin of victory on the Pacific

Coast caused him to remark that it was '' the closest

po litical bookkeeping'' he had ever known . 3 8 Baker 's

persuasive oratory was crucial for his fri0nd 's victory 24

in Oregon. 39 The Oregon revolution was in full stride

and Joe Lane 's career was ended.

Lane 's defeat was a tremendous turnaround. Lane was

formerly the most popular politician in the state . Even

following his divorce from the Bush Democrats, Lane

controlled the state machinery. However, Lane committed

political suicide by falling out of touch with his Oregon

constituency and endorsing the doctrine of secession . The

doctrine of secession was repugnant to an overwhelming

majority of Oregonians. Following Lincoln 's election and

the secession of the deep South, Lane used his Senate seat

to lambast the "graceless, unrelenting, and hostile

fanaticism" of the North while praising the action of the

seceded states. 40 To further illustrate Lane 's sympathies ,

twice he acted as Preston Brooks ' second in that Congress­

man's duels with New England senators . 41 However, Lane 's

support for the Southern cause went beyond rhetoric.

During the late 1850s Lane had also advocated the

forceful establishment of an independent , sovereign Pacific

Coast Republic. When this fact was revealed to an appalled

Oregon citizenry Lane 's name became synonymous with Copper­

heads and traitors. The idea of a separate Pacific Coast

Republic was nothing new, and in fact it can be traced to

Thomas Jefferson. However, the timing of Lane 's actions was

horrendous.42 He pushed for Oregon 's independence despite

the people 's intense desire for statehood . Territorial 25

Representative Lane was Oregon 's sole voice in Washington

during the statehood battle, and he worked completely

contrary to his constituency 's desires. Asahel Bush

exploited this opportunity to destroy his former ally.

Not only did correspondence between Lane and Territorial

Governor Curry intimate Lane 's support for Pacific Coast

independence, but by the sumrner of 1860 Bush 's Statesman

published documentation substantiating Lane 's involvement in

the movement. Also implicated in the secessionist movement

was Oregon 's newly elected Governor , John Whiteaker, the

Governor of California, various Pacific Coast senators, and

the Commander of the Department of the Pacific in the United

States Army. Secessionists appeared to be in control of the

Pacific Coast .

This was the situation in Oregon that President-elect

Abraham Lincoln inherited . Additionally, the lower South

had seceded, more Southern states were sure to follow, and

a secessionist movement on the Pacific Coast seemed to have

support from the region 's highest military and civil

officials . Lincoln was determined to maintain the Union.

However, he was unfami liar with the Pacific Coast 's local

authorities, and the absence of a transcontinental tele-

graph compounded the problem. Lincoln needed a devout

Union man , who was familiar with the Pacific Coast, and

who he could trust as an advisor and confidant . Nobody 26

was more qualified for this job than the newly elected

Senator from Oregon , Colonel Edward Dickinson Baker. 27

III. LINCOLN 'S EARLY WAR POLICY TOWARD OREGON

Lincoln's election radically altered Oregon 's po litical

environment by crystallizing both the Unionist and seces-

sionist movements. The vast ma jority of Oregonians were

unified behind Lincoln and they recognized that resistance

to him as a candidate was one thing, but resistance to him

as president was quite another . 43 However, there remained

·-· in Oregon a" sizable powerful minority that was not eager to

zealously support the Union. The best illustration of this

attitude is the amount of support for Joseph Lane 's Pacific

Coast Republic in Oregon .

The Oregon secessionists were a strong minority , but

they acted covertly due to their hostile reception by the

masses . The Knights of the Golden Circle was organized in

Oregon just before the Civil War broke out . Its purpose was

to secretly and systematically thwart Union efforts . The

Knights, also known as "The Old Guard ," and "Friends of

America," had specific goals: to drill members in arms

in preparation to resist the Union , to erect a Pacific

Coast Republic, and, after the War broke out, to resist

the draft . 44 The Pacific Coast Republic scheme is an

extraordinary story, although it is rarely to ld. Sur-

prisingly , very few Civil War studies relate the story

of Pacific Coast secessionists and their definite plans. 28

Joseph Lane, along with other Congressmen from

California and Washington Territory, advocated an

independent, sovereign Pacific Coast Republic that would

work contrary to the Union and support the Confederate cause

either directly or indirectly. 45 The Pacific Coast Republic

would indirectly aid the Confederacy by virtue of separation

from or non-cooperation with the Union . It would also be in

a position to directly aid the Confederacy with troops and

Llna�· nces. Wealth , in the form of gold, made Oregon and the

Pacific Coast pivota�' for both the North and South. The

Union and the Confederacy recognized the Pacific Coast 's

importance and vied for that area 's support . Therefore ,

when it was discovered that a secessionist scheme was in

motion on the Pacific Coast, the situation for the Union

was crucial.

The idea of a Pacific Coast Republic was mentioned at

least twice during the 1850s. Rumors circulated in Oregon

in 1851 concerning the formation of a separate Republic , but

the incentive was lost with the election of Franklin Pierce

as president in 1852. In 1856 another scheme was uncovered

when an anonymous letter revealed plans to form the Pacific

Coast Republic. The letter was printed in the Statesman

in September, 1856.46 But, by this time the idea lost

popularity due to the Oregon statehood movement . By 1860

Lane had revived the Pacific Coast Republic idea, and set

his plan in motion. In the Statesman 's Ju ly 17, 1860 issue 29

the "Lane and Gwin Conspiracy" was revealed . Joe Lane ,

along with Senator William M. Gwin and Senator Milton S.

Latham of California supported secession and independence

for the Pacific Coast. More details of the Pacific Coast

Republic plot were periodically revealed to a disgusted

Oregon constituency . The evidence published in the

Statesman conclusively proved that armed resistance to the

federal government in Oregon and California was planned .

The Unionists in Oregon came to grips with the fact that � their Senator was a secessionist.

In ,J ames G. Blaine 's Twenty Years of Congress he wrote :

[After the hostilities broke out] Jefferson Davis had expected, with a confidence amounting to certainty , and based, it is be lieved , on personal pledges, that the Pacific Coast, if it did not actually join the South , would be disloyal to the Union , and would, from its remoteness and its superlative importance, require a large contingent of national forces to hold it in subjection. It was expected by the South that California and Oregon would give at least as much trouble as Kentucky and Missouri, and would thus indirectly but powerfully aid the Southern cause . 47

The Pacific Coast Republic would distract the federal

government from concentrating solely on the Southern

Confederacy, thereby weakening the national war effort .

The Confederates had good reasons to believe this was a

realistic goal . California Governor John G. Downey and

Oregon Governor John Whiteaker were both opposed to coercion

of the South and were generally sympathetic toward the

Confederacy . Also , a Southern sympathizer, Albert Sidney 30

Johnston commanded the Department of the Pacific at the time

of Lincoln's election .

On January 15, 1861, the departments of California and

Oregon were merged into the Department of the Pacific with

Johnston comrnanding. 48 This vast department included all of

California, Oregon, Washington Territory, parts of western

Utah, and western New Mexico . The Department of the Pacific

was broken down into several districts, of which , one was

the District of Oregon. Rumors concerning Johnston 's

� - infide li ty toward ·the Union were widely circulated , but

General Winfield J. Scott , General-in-Chief of the United

States Army, dismissed them as false. Undoubtedly,

secessionists' entrenchment in power ful Pacific Coast

military and civil offices had the potential to work in

the Confederacy 's favor. However , Edward Baker was a keen

observer , and he was well aware of the secessionists'

scheme.

Baker left Oregon for Washington , D.C. by way of San

Francisco and Panama in early November , 1860. After

delivering the most famous address of his career before

journeying eastward, Baker took his Senate seat on December

5, 1860. Oddly enough, Baker was at one time the only Whig

Congressman from Illinois, and in 1860 he was the only

Republican Congressman from the entire Pacific Coast . 49

Lincoln summoned Baker to meet with him in Springfield soon 31

after Baker arrived in Washington, D.C. , and the Oregon

Senator met with his old friend in late December, 1860.

The meeting between the Republican Senator from Oregon

and the President-elect marked the beginning of Lincoln's

policy toward Oregon. Although there is no record of what

transpired during the meeting , it is logical to assume that

affairs in Oregon received some consideration. SO Another

pertinent fact is that Baker was in favor of the immediate

removal of Brevet Brigadier General Albert Sidney Johnston .,· from command of the Department of the Pacific. Baker had

incessantly made this point clear to Lincoln by the time he

assumed the presidency, therefore it is natural to assume

that Lincoln learned of Baker 's position on this issue

during thei� Oece�ber meeting. But, Lincoln could not act

until he had the power to do so three months later in March,

1861.

Powerless, Lincoln adopted his "watchful waiting"

policy while he remained in Springfield . Lincoln had a

strong faith in southern Union sentiment, and he believed

the secessionists would reverse themselves in a matter of

time . But , Lincoln 's patience was interpreted by Oregon 's

Douglas Democrats as indifference, and even ineptness.

These attitudes did not change following Lincoln 's

inauguration on March 4, 1861, despite the fact that he

was introduced by Senator Baker. James Wi llis Nesmith,

the Douglas Democrat elected Senator with Baker, wrote a 32

blistering critique of Lincoln on March 18, 1861, in which

he stated :

It is already demonstrated that an inherant [sic] weakness pervades our government which in the end will be its ruin. In other times of trial that weakness had in some degree been compensated by the strength of the executive head, but that quality so very much needed has not of late been sought for in presidential candidates. The people have become infactuated with the notion that some damned old fool who drank cider, skinned coons, ran a flatboat, cut cordwood or made rails was the very man to be placed in the last position where those qualifications were required. . Whilst Lincoln and his cabinet seem undetermined, the Republic is falling to pieces, and Jeff Davis, a man of great executive mind , and experience is rapidly r,jnsolidating his strength, and establishing his Southern Confederacy.51

Mr . Nesmith 's harsh critique was somewhat erroneous.

Following Lincoln 's inauguration , Baker repeated the urgency

of replacing Johnston, but Lincoln had gained conflic�ing

information from another reliable source . General Scott ,

a friend of Johnston 's and an ardent Unionist , vigorously

affirmed Johnston 's loyalty . Therefore, the issue was

deadlocked . Two highly reliable sources respectfully

differed , but neither Baker nor Scott had proof to sub-

stantiate their claims. Meanwhile, Lincoln was informed

of the situation on the Pacific Coast .

Stephen J. Field, Chief Justice of the California State

Supreme Court, and other loyal Pacific Coast citizens

monitored the situation and communicated their observations

to Lincoln . 52 The actions of Judge Field and the other

loyal communicants were secretive , therefore Nesmith was

unaware that Lincoln was taking action concerning the 33

Pacific Coast. In fact , Field 's actions were so secretive

that his work was not revealed until he mentioned it in his

unpublished book, Early Days in California . However , no

concrete proof of Johnston 's infidelity was obtained , and

Lincoln, though doing all he could about the situation ,

could not remove Johnston without substantiating his

decision. The evidence that Lincoln needed came just

eighteen days after he took the presidential oath.

James Nesmith, the man who lambasted Lincoln for his

ineptness, was due to take his Senate seat on March 4, 1861.

Nesmith departed from Oregon early and stayed in San

Francisco for three weeks before he departed for Washington ,

D.C. Nesmith's Democratic background enabled him to speak

freely with Brevet-Brigadier General Albert Sidney Johnston

at his San Francisco headquarters. Johnston revealed that

he retained command of the Department of the Pacific because

he thought he "could render the Confederate cause greater

service in the position he then held than in any other he

could assume. 11 53 Johnston elaborated on his plan and

confirmed that Southerners counted on the Pacific Coast

government's sympathy for the Confederacy's success .

Johnston was obviously unaware thac Nesmith was elected as a

direct result of his party 's coalition with the Republicans ,

and that Nesmith was a staunch Union man . Nesmith remained

mute about his discovery during his long voyage to Washing­

ton as he planned to thwart the secessionists' pJans . 34

Nesmith sought President Lincoln and Secretary of

State William H. Seward immed iately upon his arrival in the

nation 's capital . The Oregon Senator faithfu lly divu lged

his information concerning Johnston 's plans to the

President on March 22, 1861 .54 Later that day Seward

re lated to Ge neral Winfield Scott what Nesmith told hi�.

General Erasmus D. Keyes, private military secretary to

Gen eral Scott , narrated the following: .,�

Hr. Seward remarked , in strict confidence , that he had received information from a high source that Ge neral Albert Sidney Johnson [sic] command er of the department of the Pacific, was unfaithful to the Union . Senator Nesmith of Oregon , was Hr. Seward 's informant. After a long discussion it was determined to send me [Keyes] to the Pacific Coast to investigate matters there . I should carry orders in my pocket, to be used at my own discretion to send Gen eral Johnson [sic] to Washington and to devolve his command on Colonel George Wright .55

Lincoln moved quickly and decisively after hearing

Nesmith's evidence . The situation 's urgency was evident

when on Harch 22, Lincoln ordered Brigad ier Ge neral Edwin V.

Sumner , instead of Keyes , to "prepare to sail from New York

the first of next month [April] to relieve Brevet-Brigad ier

Gen eral Johnston in command of the Pac ific Department," but

the order "remained unpublished ," until he was "on the

Pacific Ocean , for conf idential reasons. " The order was

signed by Lincoln 's first military lieutenant .5e In order

to insure the mission 's secrecy, Sumner was rowed out to

the steamer after it went down the Bay of New York, to

outwit reporters .57 Lincoln wanted absolute secrecy so

that Johnston would be so surprised when Sumner arrived 35

to relieve him, that he could not organ ize a possible

rebellion. Ge neral Scott faced the fact that Johnston was

a secessionist who also consp ired for the establishment of

an independent Pacific Coast Republic and he issued an order

for his arrest .

The secessionist 's were able to alert Johnston about

his relief orders before Sumner arrived despite the

painstaking efforts to insure the secrecy of Sumner 's

mission . Johnston :., therefore, resigned and asked to be

relieved on April 9, 1861. Sumner arr ived in San Francisco

on April 24 , and the following day he handed Johnston the

president's orders and said , "I am in command of the Depart­

ment." 15B A loyal officer commanded the Department of the

Pacific and the advocates of a Pacific Coast Republic

championed a lost cause .159 Although Copperhead ism, as

expressed through the Kn ights of the Golden Circle did

not die completely in Oregon , the secession ist movemen t

was profoundly weakened as a result of Lincoln 's actions .

However, another even t, simultaneous with Johnston 's relief,

cemented union sentiment in Oregon .

The news of Fort Sumter 's fall arrived in San Franc isco

on the same day as General Sumner, April 24 , 1861 .00 The

news of Sumner and Sumter were shots of ad renaline for the

Union cause in Oregon . Ominously, the same ship that

returned Lane to Oregon , in late Apr il, 1861, also brought

the news of Sumter 's fall. Fort Sumter 's fall jelled Union 36

sentiment in Oregon and many Oregon ians feeling that the

South initiated the war, detested the doctrine of secession

and supported the Union .01 Joseph Lane 's return illustrated

the Oregon ians ' sentiment. Lane was a secessionist, and

Oregon ians felt that others like him were the cause of the

country 's problems . Previously, in a speech to the Senate ,

Lane stated , "I know long , well, and intimately" the people

of Oregon , and they wou ld refuse to fight a fratricidal war

against the South! Lane misjudged the Oregonians. As a

result, Oregon ians received Lane frigidly, and treated him

as the traitor that he was . Lane had actually brought three

boxes of arms with him to fight for the Pacific Coast

Republic, but he was dissuaded from using them by a

prominent citizen , Jesse App legate .02

Thee situation in Oregon after Fort Sumter 's fall was

summed up in a letter from Dr . Anson Henry to Lincoln on

June 21, 1861, stating:

There is a stronger secession feeling here than is generally believed . In my opinion the election of Baker and Nesm ith to the Senate , and the consequent defeat of Breckinridge and Lane in Oregon in November is all that saved this coast from going with the South. --As it was - the timely appearance of Gen . Sumner at San Francisco, saved the public property of California from falling into the hands of the Secessionists . I think all is now safe not withstanding the governors of both California and Oregon openly avow their hostility to your policy of putting down the rebellion .03

Lane 's self-destruction also strengthened the Bush-

Douglas Democrat - Republican coalition , which was later

called the "Union" party.a4 Host Oregon ians ardently 37

supported Lincoln 's vigorous prosecution of the war .

Oregon 's Governor John Whiteaker, elected in 1858, was a

glaring exception to public sentiment. In 1857, visionary

Asahel Bush prophesied, "The people of Oregon are eminently

national in their sentiments and attachments, and whether

she enters the Union slave or free, she will be a conserva-

tive National State, and in every emergency will stand by

the Union and the Constitution as they are. 11 65 Bush 's

prediction was correct, but Whiteaker failed to heed the

advice. Followinc the Oregon Union Party 's cohesion , . ...

everyone who remained outside of this coalition , including

Lane 's treasonable Democratic faction of which Whiteaker

was a part , was considered a Copperhead and a traitor .

Whiteaker's action did little to disprove this general-

ization .

Immediately after the news of Fort Sumter reached

Oregon , Whiteaker condemned the policy of "coercion" against

the South. In his "Address to the People of Oregon, " on May

28, 1861, Whiteaker argued that the South would never stop

fighting short of victory and that Oregon should not involve

itself with the eastern struggle . Whiteaker argued that

Oregon 's geographical location exempted it from participa-

ting in the war, and he also offered a more impassioned

plea . Whiteaker reasoned that Oregon 's settlers emigrated

from many different sections of the United States , and "it

would certainly be impolitic for us, however keenly we may 38

sympathize with other sections , to subj ect ourselves to

the calamities which afflict them." He accused the federal

government of pursuing a war to end slavery , and pleaded,

"Have a care that in freeing the negro you do not enslave

the white man. 11 66

After pleading with the Oregonians , Whiteaker unleased

his invective upon Lincoln's administration . Whiteaker

referred to the War as Lincoln 's "wicked and unnatural War

upon the South ." The Governor also clearly stated that

Lincoln would receive no troops from Oregon to carry o� his

"fratricidal war .11 67 Whiteaker made that remark just forty-

three days after Lincoln's iPitial call for 75,000 ... volunteers. Whiteaker 's popularity , already falling,

plummeted after he publicized his unpopular positiou.

The Jacksonville Sentinel, a newspaper in southern Oregon ,

reviewed Whiteaker 's speech by saying the governor was

"evidently in a quandary , his views are conflicting and his

mind goes wandering as he puts his pen to paper.11 68 The

Argu s simply dismissed the governor as the "biggest ass

in the state .11 69

Most regular army troops stationed in Oregon were

transferred to California or the east at the War 's outset .

By summer, 1861, only about 700 regulars and nineteen

commissioned officers were stationed in Oregon and the

Washington Territory . 7 0 However , Governor Whiteaker did

not complain to the federal government that his state was 39

inadequately guarded , although fears of Ind ian attacks and

Copperhead rebe llions were ubiquitous and well-founded .

Whiteaker 's comp lacency in this respect was almost treason-

ab le, and Bush 's Statesman quipped that Whiteaker was too

busy "fiddling" for Jefferson Davis and too afraid of

correspondence wit h a Republican ad ministration . 7 1 Finally,

Colonel George Wright , Commander of the District of Oregon ,

attempted to secure Oregon 's neglected frontier.

In June 1861, Colonel Wright requ isitioned Whiteaker

for a three year cavalry company. Whiteaker responded by

appointing fellow Copperhead A. P. Dennison as recru iting

• officer , and his inertia effectively neutralized Wright 's

plan . The Lincoln administration , informed of Governor

Whiteaker 's effective veto of Wright 's requ isition , moved

decisively to rectify Oregon 's problem .

On September 24 , 1861, an "unusual if not

unparalleled" order was issued through Adjutant General

Lorenzo Thomas . The order was addressed to three loyal

Oregon civilians : retired Colonel Thomas R. Corne lius ,

Honorable Benj amin F. Harding, and Reuben F. Haury . Li ncoln

realized he had to bypass the Copperhead controlled Oregon

state government in order to obtain Oregon troop recruits.

Lincoln appointed Colonel Thomas Cornelius as recru iting

officer and directed him to raise one cavalry regiment to

consist of ten compan ies for three years service. The order

was later mod ified to designate only six full compan ies for 40

the regiment. The regiment was known as the First Oregon

Cavalry . 72

The Oregon situation 's urgency was reflected in the

almost frantic recruiting method that the order adumbrated.

Harding was appointed regimental Quartermaster , who would be

"Mustered into the service immediately upon receipt of this

letter by an army officer in his vicinity ." But , if there

was no army officer in his vicinity , Harding would "muster

himself into the service by taking the oath of allegiance

before a civil magistrate .'' The order 's most amazing aspect

was the amount of power it granted to the three former

civilians . The order n�1ulously stated that the regiment

was formed to meet all exigencies , especially in protecting

the Oregon frontier , but :

Owing to the great distance between Washington and Oregon, these instructions must necessarily be general, but the Department , acting upon the strong recommendation of the Hon. E. D. Baker, Senator from Oregon, relies confidently upon the prudence , patriotism, and economy with which you will execute this trust . Unless otherwise ordered you will be governed by any directions sent to you by Col. E. D. Baker . ..73

The Johnston affair convinced Lincoln that Baker was

acutely aware of the loyalty and disloyalty of those on

the Pacific Coast. Therefore , when the recruitment problem

surfaced it was apparent that Lincoln followed Baker's

advice to form the First Oregon Cavalry for Oregon's state

security . Lincoln 's bold order , issued through Adjutant

General Thomas illustrated the president's intense desire 41

to retain Oregon in the Union despite the non-cooperation of

its state government . Lincoln's Oregon patronage appointees

followed a similar pattern .

The nation 's crisis magnified the importance of making

sound federal appointees. Lincoln's task for filling

vacated offices, removing secessionists, and efficiently

placing competent officials in their proper places was

acutely more difficult than any other president 's. If

secessionists were allowed to keep their governmental

positions , as Albert Sidney Johnston almost did, the

government 's effectiveness in crushing the rebellion would

have been hopelessly reduced. Therefore, Lincoln had to ·•·'' depend more than ever on trustworthy advisors to help him

make proper selections in sections with which he was

unfamiliar . For this reason, Lincoln knew he could give

Baker a virtual "free hand" in recommending the appointment

of federal officeholders in Oregon , and California, without

fear. of secessionists ' infiltration.

Lincoln asked Baker to provide him with a list of

potential appointees for offices in Oregon . Baker

faithfully responded on April 8, 1861 and suggested B. J.

Pengra as Surveyor General, and on June 13 he completed his

list of suggestions: William T. Matlock , Receiver at Oregon

City ; William A. Starkweather, Registrar of the Land Office

at Oregon City ; John Kelly , Registrar at Roseburg ; Will iam

H. Rector, Superintendent of Indian Affairs ; William 42

Barnhart, Indian Agent; William Logan , Indian Agent at Warm

Springs Reservation; and Charles Hutchins , Indian Agent at

Umatilla Reservation. Lincoln approved Baker 's suggestions

and made the appointments as listed. 74 Lincoln also

appointed Thomas J. Dryer, former editor of the Oregonian ,

as Commissioner to Hawaii on March 20, 1861. Dryer ran into

some opposition, however, and Lincoln replaced him with

James McBride , another Oregonian, on January 26, 1863.75

William H. Bennet was appointed Marshal of Oregon on April

10, 1862 at the request of Simeon Francis . 76

Dr. Elijah White was appointed Oregon 's general

supervisor of Indians . Wh ite had an unusual assignment

from Li�coln . White proposed an �ndustrial scheme for

Oregon 's Indians, and Lincoln approved the plan . He arrived

in Oregon in 1861, found his plan was impracticable due to

the amount of Indians that died in the area, and soon

afterward White returned to California. 77 A. A. Bancroft

was appoint-ed Indian Agent at the Simcoe Reservation ;

Captain A. P. Ankeny , Surveryor of the Port of Portland ; A .

R. Flint, John T. Hami lton, Charles I. Parker, and R. S.

Partlow were appointed postmasters at Roseberg, Salem ,

Astoria, and Oregon City respectively . William Tichenor and

E. P. Drum were appointed collectors at Portland and Urnpqua

respective-y; and Joel Burlingame , Postal Agent for Oregon .

Lincoln also appointed Thomas Frazar to the important post

of Collector of Internal Revenue at Portland ; Lawrence w. 43

Coe, Collector of Revenue ; and William L. Adams , editor of

the Argus, as collector at Astoria. 78 Owen Wade replaced

Starkweather on March 17, 1865 as Registrar of the Land

Office at Oregon City after Starkweather resigned . 79

Baker 's influence with Lincoln concerning federal

appointments in Oregon and California was contested in

some cases, however .

David Logan communicated his disappointment to Lincoln

concerning his rebuff from the president's federal appointee

list. In a letter to Lincoln on September 5, 1861, Logan

moaned , "Every man this [Lincoln] administration has

appointed to office in Oregon save one are favorites of Col.

Baker , and they have i�stituted against me , politically and ··! �

personally publicly and in my private affairs a system of

most annoying warfare, hoping since I have done the work

for the party to work me out and have the coast clear for

them .11 80 Lincoln , unimpressed, purposely did not appoint

Logan to an office . Lincoln reportedly inferred that he

would appoint Judge Stephen T. Logan, David 's father, to

any office he wanted; but, he would never appoint David to

an office . Lincoln 's later appointments included some of

his cronies. In 1862 he appointed Simeon Francis and Dr.

Anson G. Henry to the posts of Army Paymaster and Super-

intendent of Indian Affairs for the Washington Territory

respectively. Bl 44

It is relevant in the discussion of Lincoln 's federal

appointments to ask why Baker was not selected as a cabinet

member. It was the consensus of opinion that Baker would

receive a cabinet post during his meeting with President­

elect Lincoln in Springfiel

Indeed, David Wilmot of Pennsylvania who accompanied Baker

to the meeting was offered a cabinet position, but turned

it down. Baker 's biographers explained that the "apparent

slight" was probably due to Lincoln 's need for support in

the Senate from the Pacific Coast states . 82 In fact, Baker

turned down more than just a cabinet position in order to

give Lincoln Senate support. On May 17, 1861, Lincoln

offered Baker a Brigadier General 's commission , but Baker

declined it as he later declined Lincoln 's offer of a Major

General 's cow�ission in order to retain his Senate seat . 83

Baker 's Senate support for Lincoln came to an abrupt

end , however. Baker retained his colonel's rank, which

allowed him to keep his Senate seat , formed a volunteer

regiment, and was killed in action leading troops at the

Battle of Ba ll's Bluff on October 21, 1861. Lincoln wept

when he received the news about his longtime friend. 84

Oregon lost its first Republican Senator , and Lincoln lost

a close friend and an invaluable advisor . John Whiteaker ,

however, did not shed a tear.

Whiteaker replaced Baker with an overt secessionist,

Benjamin Stark . Mr . Stark 's appointment was accompanied 45

by a petition from some Oregon citizens asking that the

appointment not be approved. The petition, addressed to

Secretary of State William H. Seward read in part :

Mr . Stark has expressed himself publicly. . as the most prominent and bold of the advocates of secession here in this state . He has been selected by Gov . Whiteaker doubtless in consequence of his secession proclivities, thus outraging sentiment of the people of Oregon, a large majority of whom are loyal to the Union. B S

The Senate accepted Stark's nomination after some

hesitancy , but he was isolated by his Senate colleagues.

Stark 's appointment exemplified Whiteaker 's attitude . The

governor 's non-cooperation with the Lincoln administration

was most obvious in regard to troop recruitment within

Oregon .

On January 3, 1862; Adjutant General Thomas requested

some information from Governor Whiteaker concerning troop

strength in Oregon . The request asked the governor to

report to the Secretary of War the number of volunteer

regiments organized under the authority of the Oregon state

government, and their status upon being transferred to the

general government. Thomas also delicately referred to the

First Oregon Cavalry , formed without the governor 's consent,

as "independent acceptances" and desired a report concerning

"its, and any other independent regiment's strength .11 86 The

war Department 's motivations behind issuing this request are

puzzling . The Lincoln administration obviously recognized

Whiteakcr 's hostility toward furnishing troops for the Union 46

cause and it was this that forced the president to bypass

the state government and resort to "independent accep-

tances ." If the War Department's motivation was to confirm

Whiteaker 's hostility toward the Union War effort, the

Oregon governor 's retort to the War Department cleared up

any indecision concerning his position .

Whiteaker's non-cooperative attitude was apparent in

the wording of his reply . Whiteaker 's opening sentence to

the War Department read, "Your communication of January 4,

1862. is received and without delav� I make the followina�

reply: The authorities of this state have never been called

upon for any troops by the President ." Although this was an

obvious distortion of the truth, Whiteaker explained that

Wright 's requisition for troops was "countermanded" before

... the company was muster�d into service . Whiteaker understood

Thomas ' subtle inquiry concerning the '' independent accep-

tances" regiment Harding recruited without the governor 's

consent . In reference to that regiment 's situation ,

Whiteaker sarcastically noted :

. the authorities of this state [have not] furnished any volunteers upon what you call 'independent acceptances ,' unless it is meant by this to cover those cases where officers for the command of a regiment have been appointed directly from your office, and authorized to raise such troops within a State without calling upon the local authorities for them. As you must be aware , there is one such case in this State , but as to its present strength I am entirely 11 87 uninformed. . 47

On May 21, 1862, Whiteaker punctuated this statement in a

reply to a similar inquiry from Secretary of war Edwin M.

Stanton in which the governor stated , "There is not a figure

or the scratch of a pen in the (Oregon] executive office

which would enable me to answer your inquiries.11 88 In

fact , Whiteaker 's actions countermanded Lincoln 's efforts

to retain Oregon in the Union so much that the governor

indirectly encouraged foreign intervention .

Rumors frequently circulated in Oregon that the English

encouraged the separation of the Pacific Coast from the

Union. Advocates of the Pacific Coast Republic based their

philosophy partially on the argument that the Pacific

Coast's trade would be more profitable if it were indepen­

dent from the Union. 89 This argument and the outbreak of

the Civil War whetted the English appetite . On� January 11,

1862, the Jacksonville Sentinel reprinted an article from

the British Columbia British Colonist which described how a

force of British Canadians planned to sweep into the Pacific

Coast, "and combined with the 75,000 Secessionists in Oregon

and California ," they would separate the Pacific States from

the Union and possibly hold the area under English "pro­

tection ." The Sentinel ran the article under the sarcastic

title, "What the British Expect of the Secessionists in

Oregon in case of War ," and further quipped, "if the

Colonist will be kind enough to wait a little while before

taking possession of Oregon and California, we sha ll feel 48

ourselves under everlasting obligations .11 90 The Sentinel

could afford the sarcasm because despite Whiteaker 's actions

the majority of Oregonians were Unionists and Lincoln was

determined to hold on to them. Besides , the estimation of

75 ,000 secessionists in just Oregon was probably an

exaggeration .

Oregon 's unprotected coast line caused defense

problems , however. Lincoln realized this deficiency in

Oregon and other places, and he moved quickly to fortify

the coast . Lincoln 's costal fortification policy was

addressed to the governors of seaboard and likeside states

and printed in Oregon on December 7, 1861. 91 The announce­

ment was entitled "Important Circular ," which was issued

by Secretary of State Seward . The circular warned against

secessionist agents in various states who worked to gain

recognition for their state from foreign countries .

The circular pointed out that an obvious precaution

to guard against a foreign invasion of coastal states was

to put all ports and harbors in a "condition of complete

defense .'' But, the president could only grant as much money

to the project as Congress allowed him. Although "the

president fput] forth the most diligent efforts to execute

these measures," the states were asked to partially fund

the forts until the federal government could reimburse them .

Oregonians, however , were unhappy with the way the govern­

ment attempted to reimburse them for the Indian wars of the 49

mid-1850s, and they did not favor placing another economic

burden upon themselves.92 Therefore , the construction of

coastal defenses in Oregon along the Columbia River moved

slowly . By September, 1862, Oregon 's relationship with the

federal government changed dramatically.

On September 10, 1862, Addison Crandall Gibbs replaced

John Whiteaker as Oregon 's Governor. Gibbs, a Douglas

Democrat , firmly supported President Abraham Lincol1� and his

vigorous prosecution of the war . In his inaugural address

he stated that the only reason Oregon was not a "reenactment

of the scenes of Kentucky and Tennes see," was because of the

attention of Union men and the "vigilance" of the Lincoln

administration. 93 Just as Sumner 's arrival revitalized

the Pacific Coast , Whiteaker 's defeat in favor of Gibbs

stimulated Oregonians to renewed vigor . The Oregon

"Republican Revolution" was complete .

Gibbs ' election did not instantly exterminate all

secessionist sentiment, however . John Whiteaker 's relaxed

attitude toward secessionist activities during his four

year term allowed the movement to take firm hold . Seces­

sionist activities did not end with Whiteaker 's term, and

they were encouraged by every federal military setback

in the East. 94 Gibbs ' initial goal was to effectively

reorient state government and stop secessionist activities

in Oregon. Gibbs quickly and energetically launched his

plans. 50

Gibbs authorized the suppression of six ''offensively

treasonable" newspapers shortly after his election. 95

One such newspaper was the Portland Advertiser. The

Advertiser's self-admitted duty was to "invoke the Divine

interposition to stay the hand of Lincoln , paralyze his

efforts and thus put a stop to the unnatural, intestine

war that he has inaugurated and carried on ."96 But , most

significantly, Gibbs reorganized army recruiting procedures

in Oregon , although enthusiasm for enlistment was slight.

On October 16, 1862, the state legislature passed a militia

law . It empowered the governor to call three brigades of

militia into state service immediately to suppress

insurrections , rebellions , or perform any other duty in

order to insure peace on the Oregon frontier . However ,

the militia was specifically designed to check the Knights

of the Golden Circle.97

Military reorganization was overdue in Oregon , however

Lincoln's supporters did not want to embarrass him by

pointing out the army's deficiencies . Lincoln 's friends

were reluctant to expose the army 's weaknesses even though

they perceived its errant structure . This attitude was

exemplified in a letter from Dr. Henry to Simeon Francis

on March 1, 1861:

. I do not think that friends as we are of Mr . Lincoln in this crisis we ought not to embarrass him. The army , as a general fact is sound . . and if there are officers who are doubtful they will be sure , here- after to keep their mouths close [d) , or leave. 98 51

The volunteer cavalry regiment's purpose remained

constant throughout the war . The September 24, 1861 order

directing Colonel Cornelius to organize the First Oregon

Cavalry never deviated from its original intent . The order

stated the regiment 's purpose was chiefly to guard the

frontier against any insurrections including foreign and

domestic secessionist plots and Indian uprisings . The

frontier 's defense concerning Indians was a potentially

explosive situation. Oregon had suffered through three

major Indian wars between 1847 and 1858. Adequate

protection from the Indians was needed to attract settlers,

and the removal of Oregon troops to the East and California

at the War 's outbreak caused an immediate problem for Oregon

citizens . But, that was only half of their problem.

Secessionists in Oregon encouraged Indian attacks .

The situation was especially bleak around Fort Hoskins ,

near Eugene City. Thomas B. Campbell, Fort Hoskins ' Post

Adjutant relayed an almost unbelievable story in a letter

dated November 25, 1861. Campbell was informed by a citizen

that about 250 to 300 stands of arms were distributed to

traitors near the Fort, and that he needed to distribute

weapons to Union men, but he did not know who they were.

Campbell was also informed by the citizen that the Fort 's

former commander "distributed to the Indians guns ar.d

revolvers and anununition and told them to fight for Jeff

Davis and the Southern Confederacy ." The same informar,t 52

further claimed to have overheard secessionists plotting to

take over the Fort by setting "fire [to] the buildings and

shoot [ing ] the officers as they came out.11 99

In spite of the threats to their state 's security ,

Oregonians did not flock to enlist in the First Oregon

Cavalry. The regiment 's purpose did little to stimulate

enthusiasm to join . Most men preferred to fight rebels in

the East than Indians in the West. Additionally , General

Alvord commented that Oregon recruitment was hindered by

''the mining excitement and temptations on this coast, in the

depreciation of legal-tender notes, and the absence of war

stimulus. 11 100 The major difference b€ �ween Oregon soldiers

and Potomac veterans was their age; the Oregon volunteer

being about four years older on the average than the Potomac

soldier. However , except for the daily boredom that the

Oregon cavalrymen experienced and the combat that eastern

soldiers experienced, the garrison life of Oregon and

Potomac soldiers was strikingly similar. Royal A. BenselJ ,

an Oregon volunteer, related that the most common offenses

at Fort Yamhill, Oregon , were : drunkenness, absence from

camp without leave , insubordination, disrespect to superior

offjcers , absence from roll-call without leave, turbulence

after taps , sitting while on guard duty , gambling , and

leaving the beat without relief. 1 01 Many officers turned

down commissions in the state militia for the reason that

Oregon troops would not see eastern action . Volunteer 53

recruitment was briefly stimulated when Colonel Baker

promised that the regiment would see eastern action ,

but that hope died with Colonel Baker.

The Oregon cavalry did not see eastern action, but

its devotion to the Union was absolute. The troops that

composed the regiment did not forget their promise of

eastern duty , however . The Oregon soldiers implored Lincoln

to transfer them east, but the president declined . Lincoln

remembered the secessionist element in Oregon and realized

the necessity of protecting Oregonians , and emigrants, from

resentful Indians . In October, 1864 , Lincoln authorized

Governor Gibbs to form a regiment of infantry to aid the

First Oregon Cavalry. The first troops for the infantry

regiment were not officially mustered into service until

June 24, 1865, more than two months after Lee 's surrender

at Appomattox. 102 Therefore , The First Oregon Cavalry was

the only volunteer regiment Oregon produced during the war

and its services were needed at home . Lincoln stated its

primary duty was to "guard the State from foes both savage

and traitorous from without and from open treason

within.11 103

Lincoln 's policy for coastal defense moved swiftly

through Congress. On February 13, 1862, the House

authorized the construction of twenty iron-clads . 104

One week later on February 20, appropriations for Lincoln 's 54

plan to fortify ports and harbors were passed . In regard

to Oregon , the bill specified:

For defense in Oregon and Washington Territory , at or near the mouth of the Columbia River , one­ hundred thousand dollars, if in the judgement of the President, the same by, or any part thereof, shall be advisable. 105

The coastal fortification legislation passed within

two months cf Lincoln 's "Important Circular" policy

statement, but actual construction lagged behind the bill's

passage. Brigadier General Benjamin Alvord , who relieved

Colonel ,J ustus Steinberger as Commander of the District of

Oregon on July 7, 1862, deserved much of the credit for

agitating for the fort 's construction . In a letter to

United States Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas , Alvord

stated , "I respectfully recommend that the President order

the commencement of such defenses [as were specified in

the February 20, 1862 appropriations bill concerning

Oregon] .11 106 On July 11, 1863, the Sentinel reported that

the construction of the "long talked of" fort would proceed

at once , and an iron-clad would accompany the fort on the

Columbia River.107 By November 6, 1863, Alvord could report

to Thomas that the batteries being erected on the Columbia

River were "near completion. 11 108 The fort was completed on

the south bank of the Columbia River before the conclusion

of the War. The nonagon shaped fort was surrounded by

earthworks and a thirty-foot wide ditch . It was christened

Fort Stevens , after General I. J. Stevens, who died in 55

battle on September 1, 1862; and , it was one of the best

armed fortifications on the Pacific Coast.109 Oregon was

manned, fortified, and entrenched in the Union.

The First Oregon Cavalry served its purpose well.

Although the cavalry ranks appeared meager , especially

when one considers that this was the only volunteer regiment

Oregon contributed, it was effective . The regiment success­

fully deterred both foreign and domestic secessionist plots,

policed the frontier against hostile Indians , and escorted

citizens across the frontier. In short, the regiment

enforced peace in Oregon , which was its sole purpose . The

remarkably tranquil atmosphere also illustrated the triumph

of Lincoln's war policy concerning Oregon .

Oregon's situation at the time of Lincoln 's election

was dismal . Secessionists controlled the state government

and the military and southern sympathy was strong and overt .

One of Oregon 's Senators was an avid secessionist who

conspired to separate the Pacific Coast from the Union .

But, patiently , methodically, and quietly Abraham Lincoln

and his administration solved these problems and kept Oregon

in the Union.

By July 1863 Oregon was out of danger from seces�ion-

ists. The internal secessionists were under control ,

Lincoln 's bold order forming the First Oregon Cavalry

insured peace, his fortification of the Columbia River

discouraged foreign intrigue , and Indian hostilities were 56

checked . The inhabitants of Oregon recognized this

tremendous metamorphosis and subsequently Union Leagues ,

succeeded by Lincoln and Johnson clubs were formed to show

support for the Lincoln administration . However, Lincoln 's

War policy was just one aspect of his policy concerning

Oregon . 57

IV. LINCOLN 'S DOMESTIC POLICY TOWARD OREGON

Oregon was perhaps the state least effected by the

Civil war with regard to combat , and according to Oregon 's

State Adjutant General Cyrus A. Reed , Oregon was "far

removed from the thunder and shock of battle . •• 110 No

battles were fought within the state, and no Confederate

campaign came close to its borders . As late as March 22,

1862, Oregon 's contribution to the Union army was reported

as only 1,000 troops , and the soldiers to civilian ratio was

l:So. 111 As previously mentioned , some Oregon residents

thought the state 's remoteness from the conflict should

exempt it from taking part in the War. Although President

Lincoln did not agree with this reasoning , it is significant

that he exempted Oregon from fulfilling a volunteer quota

obligation in his Proclamation of October 17, 1863.112

Lincoln possibly assumed that a quota would drain many loyal

citizens from Oregon and invite a secessionist or Indian

uprising . Or, Lincoln may have reasoned that Oregon 's scant

population could not fulfill a quota and remain a viable

loyal state for an extended period of time . Whatever reason

Lincoln had for exempting Oregon, one important factor for

doing so was to concentrate on using its material resources

for the Union effort .

Lincoln understood that a war could not be fought with

only soldiers. An effective fighting machine had to he 58

properly financed, and the Civil War was extremely costly.

But Oregon 's population was small . On September 2, 1861,

the Statesman reported Oregon 's quota for the national

revenue bill was only $35, 140.113 Lincoln recognized that

Oregon 's wealth lay in its gold mines rather than its troop

and tax potential, and the President exploited these assets

for the Union benefit. Oregon 's gold donation to the Union

is often overlooked due to the emphasis on California gold

during the mid 1800s . Oregon , the Washington Territory and

Montana produced three-fourths of California 's gold

production in their combined peak gold production years

of 1861 through 1867. 114

Gold was initially discovered in Oregon in 1845,

and various small discoveries were made until the major

discoveries were made in the Thompson and Fraser rivers

in 1856 and 1857. By 1858 the Oregon gold rush was on and

Portland emerged as Oregon 's major metropolitan center.

Portland 's population doubled to 2917 inhabitants between

1857 and 1860. In 1863 Thomas Frazar, a Lincoln appointee

for collector of Revenue at Portland , reported that total

gold assays in Portland was $4 ,505,731. For one three

month's period in 1864 Frazar reported Portland 's gold

assays to be $1,376,678.82. The total shipments of gold

bullion from Portland by We lls Fargo exvress in 1864 was

$6,200,000; and in 1865 it was $5,800,000.115 . Over 40 per

cent of the United States total gold product between 1861 59

and 1867 came from Oregon and the Pacific Coast. 116 These

figures illustrate Oregon 's importance for financing the

expansion of the national economy and the Union war effort .

Oregon 's economic importance also reveals the partial

motivation behind Lincoln's intense desire to retain Oregon

in the Union. If Oregon and the other Pacific Coast states

aided the Confederacy, as Jefferson Davis was promi sed , the

course of the Civil War would have undoubtedly been altered .

In fact, the Confederate Congress passed a series of

resolutions on October 2, 1862 that recognized the practical

neutrality of Oregon and the rest of the Pacific Coast

states and territories . 117 The Confederacy faced the

problem of inadequate funding at the War 's outset .

Conversely , the Union enjoyed a greater economic advantage

over the Confederacy that was partially due to Pacific Coast

gold even though the national debt had mounted because of

the War. Bad Oregon been persuaded to initiate a Pacific

Coast Republic and fund the Confederate war effort, the

complexion of the War would have been different . Although

Oregon and the Pacific Coast would not have been enough to

tip the advantage toward the Confederates , a Pacific Coast

Republic could have forced the war to drag on longer by

providing adequate arms and ammunition to the rebels. It

would have also created an enlarged area for the Union

troops to subdue . Oregon was also an important source of 60

woolens for uniforms during the Wa r, a commodity greatly

demanded by the Southerners . 118

Oregon's gold supply and the Civil War stimulated

federal support for those internal improvements that the

state had voiced concern for since its territorial

inception. Oregonians, inhabitants of the most remote area

within the United States, perennially demanded a Pacific

railroad . This request, along with many others from Oregon

was typical of the western frontier. The Democrats hounded

for internal improvements in Oregon, but the Republicans

successfully turned the issue in their favor as part of

the "Oregon Revolution" in 1860. Republicans held a !;tate

convention in Salem on April 21, 1859, and a Pacific rail­

road was at the top of their demands . 119 Oregonians

realized that eastward transportation wou ld accelerate

wealth production, and Lincoln realized accelerated western

wealth production was a must for thee War effort . However ,

by early 1862 fourteen miles of portage railroads along the

Columbia River was the extent of Oregon 's steel rails. Also

in early 1862, the Union armies were being beaten and the

federal treasury was being drained . Oregon was still

governed by John Whiteaker until September , 1862, and that

state had heretofore been more of a problem than an asset .

The Lincoln administration kept Oregon in the Union , and it

was time for Oregon to repay its debt . 61

The federal treasury wns in the red ; but, gold was in

the Oregon mountains and rivers. With this in mind , the

federal government hastily began the internal improvements

in transportation and communication that Oregonians long

demanded. On December 10, 1861, a message from President

Lincoln was printed in Oregon . Lincoln 's statement began:

I submit a statement of the proceedings of the [Pacific Railroad] Commission , which shows the progress that has been made in the enterprise of constructing the Pacific Railroad , and this suggests the earliest completion of the road , and also the favorable action of Congress on the project now pending before them ...120

In fact , the Pacific Railroad would have been built much

earlier had the plan not been sabotaged. The Pacific Coast

Republic conspirators, including Lane , concentrated their

efforts on halting the transcontinental railroad while

informing their constituents that other federal government

officials hampered the plan. 121

In July 1862 Lincoln signed a bill to aid in the

construction of a railroad and telegraph line from the

Missouri River to the Pacific Ocean . 122 Although this act

was passed as a war measure , construction was slowed by the

wa r. Oregon 's citizens and the state legislature aided the

federal government with money , land , and even a surveyor 's

report by 1864. However, specific plans for construction

did not begin until 1866. Throughout the Civil War , gold

from Oregon relied on the Wells Fargo express for its

journey eastward . Lincoln initiated the railroad era in 62

Oregon with regard to the federal government, but it was not

until after the War that the Transcontinental Railroad with

branches to Oregon was completed . Lincoln had a more pro-

found effect upon Oregon in other aspects .

The federal court system in Oregon was reorgan ized at

Lincoln 's request. In his annual message to Congress on

December 3, 1861, Lincoln pointed out some systemic

weaknesses in the federal judicial systern .123 Lincoln

stated that in order to retain uniformity in the federal

judicial system, a vast reorgan ization was needed . In

particular, not all states conformed to the same federal

circuit court system . The country was divided into

circuits, and a United States Supreme Court Justice was

picked from each circuit. The justices sat on the United

States Supreme Court when it was in session , and after

adjournment they returned home and presided over their

federal circu its. However , this system was not applied

to each state at the time of Lincoln 's election .

The federal circu it court system failed to expand to

accommodate new states that entered the Un ion . Wisconsin ,

Hinnesota, Iowa, Kansas, Florida, Texas , California, and

Oregon "never had any" circuit courts attended by Supreme

Court Justices before Lincoln 's term. Lincoln presented

three proposals to rectify the situation and they were meant

to improve the court system without creating "a court

altoge ther too numerous for a judicial body of any sort to 63

function ." Lincoln 's proposals were : expand ing the system

then used by incorporating the states that did not have

circuits, relieving Supreme Court Justices from circuit

duty, or abolishing circuit courts in favor of expand ing

the power of the district courts . Lincoln added that each

state had to be represented in the system or it should be

abolished ; and , that the adoption of any of his proposals

"would be an improvement upon our present system ."124

Congress moved sluggishly to enact legislation concern ing

Oregon 's federal judicial system .

Congress in itially appeared to purposely ignore the

federal court problem in Oregon . On July 15, 1862, Congress

created nine circuits and expanded the circuit courts ·

powers at the expense of the district courts . 12° Congress

also incorporated each state that Lincoln spec if ied , except

California and Oregon . It was not until Harch 3, 1863 that

Congress incorporated California and Oregon by creating the

Tenth Circuit. This Act also fixed the number of Supreme

Court Justices at nine . 120 Lincoln was allowed to pick a

Justice, and he spent his choice on a Pacific Coast citizen .

Ironic-ally, Lincoln chose Judge Stephen J. Field . Field

was the California Supreme Court Chief Justice , and one of

the loyal men who secretly mon itored the Pac ific Coast

secessionist situation for Lincoln prior to Albert Sidney

Johnston 's removal. 64

Homestead legislation was another perennial demand that

Oregon ians made on the federal governmen t. Lincoln touched

a responsive chord in Oregon in an add ress of December 21,

1861. He stated that the interruption of the country 's

business caused by the Civil War "obstructed settlements

in the new States and Territories of the Northwest. "12 7

Lincoln reported this obstruction cost the government $1

million in receipts to the Patent Office which forced a

large reduction of that office 's personnel to keep it self-

sustaining . Lincoln 's acknowl�dgment of this problem, one

that Oregon ians were well aware of, was music to their ears .

Oregon ians ' demands for a homestead bill were second

only to their demands for a Pacific railroad . They realized

that the Oregon Trail was a long, dangerous trek that did

not provide the lure that better transportation and '' free

land" wou ld . A law was passed that donated free land to

Oregon emigrants in 1850, but it was not a permanent

homestead law . The Civil War provided incentive for the

federal government to enact a national homestead law .

The Homestead Act passed by Congress on Hay 20, 1862

was designed to boost agr icultural production . Oregon had

an abundance of land , but the law did not produce the exodus

for which it was intended . The Homestead Law provided that

a settler cou ld obtain 160 acres of unappropriated land for

a $10 fee . The settler obtained the land title if he lived

or cultivated the land for five years. The Homestead Law 65

was not su itable for its purpose in the Northwest, however .

The 160 acre tracts were inappropriate for efficient Nor th­

west farming. The law was most effective for midwestern

farming and the law's intent was defeated when it was

app l ied to Western forested areas. 120 The act was received

with measured enthusiasm in Oregon .

Some Oregonians viewed the federal Homestead Law as an

overdue attempt to encourage set t lement . In response to the

Homestead Law, the Sentinel grumbled , "Had it not been for

the war [sic] , the Pacific coast wou ld have received a

larger accession to its population than at any previous

year ."12 0 Due to the deficiencies of the Law's application

to the Northwest, this assumption is questionable, but it

was a popular sentiment . On April 30, 1862 , before the land

embraced in the Homestead Act was su rveyed , General Wright

proclaimed that all surveyors and preemptors were required

to take an oath of allegiance to the Union.130

On Hay 28 , 1862, the specifics for Oregon land sales

under the Homestead Act were announced . J. H. Edmunds,

Commiss ioner of the General Land Office , announced that by

a recent proclamat ion," by President Lincoln, all land west

of the Cascade Mountains to the Pac ific Ocean , except

donation claims, pre-empt ions completed , and mineral lands,

would be offered for sale on October 6, 1862. 13 1 On January

21, 1863 the Surveyor General of Oregon reported that

6,219 .682 acres were sur veyed , of which 4, 442. 700 acres 66

would be sold. Oregonians were generally pleased with the

completed homestead legislation , but other federal

legislation was not so popular.

Oregon 's Indian War debt controversy raged from the mid

1850s through Lincoln's administration . The "Oregon and

Washington Territory War Debt" controversy was a drawn out ,

confusing issue concerning federal reimbursement to citizens

for loans to the government in order to fight Indian wars .

The Oregon debt was contracted between 1855 and 1856.

Oregon businessmen initially thought that government

purchases would stimulate the economy , so they eagerly and

liberally sold supplies to the federal commissary on credit.

The idea was that the government would repay the debt fully

and promptly after the wars , but thi s was not the case . 132

Congress appointed a commission to arrive at a just

compensation award for the Oregon debt after the wars were

completed. The commission, which consisted of one Oregon

citizen, Lafayette F. Grover, and two United States Army

Captains , Rufus Ingalls and Andrew J. Smith, calculated the

federal debt owed Oregon to be $6,011,457.36.133 However ,

on March 2, 1861, Third Auditor Robert J. Atkinson issued a

report that reduced Oregon 's award . Congress responded to

Atkinson 's report by appropriating $2,800,000 for repayment

of Oregon 's war debt in twenty-year United States bonds at

an annual rate of six per cent. Oregonians felt they were

cheated by Congress' appropriation and they sent a petition 67

to President Lincoln on November 1, 1861 for redress of

their grievances. The petition was signed by 701 Oregon

and Washington Territory citizens , including future Oregon

Governor Addison Crandall Gibbs. 134

President Lincoln received the respectfully worded

petition on May 1, 1862. The President obviously had no

legal power concerning an appropriation grievance, so he

forwarded the petition, along with a copy of the Third

Auditor 's report to the Senate . The petition stated that

Oregonians were wronged for three main reasons. The three

central grievances were that the reward was too small, that

more than six years elapsed since the debt was incurred, and

that the interest was not granted from the correct date .

Atkinson issued a statement to Congress defending his

original report against the petition . He claimed that

the repayment was handled as speedily as possible, and he

offered proof that if his figure was wrong , it actually

"discriminated in their [Oregonians] favor ." Congress was

swayed by Atkinson 's rebuttal, and Oregonians were repaid in

1861 in accordance with Atkinson 's original recommendation .

However, the debt was not p�id in gold , but in depreciated

greenbacks . 135 Though disappointed, Oregonians ' faith in

the Union was not shook , however.

Oregonians made many domestic gains despite their

setback in the war debt settlement . The Homestead Act

encouraged some migration into Orego11 , and gold also 68

encouraged settlement while it pumped vitality into the

economy . Gold also accelerated the long awaited Pacific

Railroad construction, and precipitated communication

advancements . The transcontinental telegraph connections

with Portland crept northward from Sacramento and Yreka,

California, between 1858 and 1861. Portland was finally

connected to the telegraph on March 5, 1864. The first

telegraph message sent east from Portland was from Governor

Gibbs to President Lincoln on March 8, 1864. Gibbs ' message

exemplified Oregon 's Union sympathie s :

Our telegraph completed. Let the great Pacific Railroad with a branch to Oregon soon follow . We want no Pacific republic, no compromise with rebels in arms , and no more slavery. 136

Lincoln's domestic policy toward their state kept

Oregonians contented , but Gibbs ' te legram also alluded that

Oregon, like other states , still depended upon the federal

government for protection . Gibbs ' mention of the Pacific

Railroad indicated that more internal improvements were

needed. The telegram also intimated that Oregon 's security

was still dependent upon the federal military. By 1863

Lincoln 's War policy generally secured Oregon from internal

threats, but complacency could not be afforded. Obviously

the Pacific Coast Republic and ''rebels in arms" remained

issues in Oregon after Gibbs ' election and his telegram

illustrated that Oregon still needed Lincoln 's attention . 69

V. LINCOLN 'S LATER WAR POLICY TOWARD OREGON

The Pacific Coast Republic scheme lingered in some

Oregonians' minds throughout the War, and at times the

fear of the plot 's success almost caused an atmosphere of

paranoia. The idea of a Pacific Coast ReFublic was also

invoked to inspire loyalty and patriotism for the Union,

especially when the federals lost eastern battles. Anson

Henry told Lincoln that the Statesman was the "most zealous

and efficient supporter of you here in Oregon ," and this

paper was especially good at exploiting the Pacific Coast

Republic scheme to the Union 's advantage . 137 An eloquent

editorial upholding the principles of the United States

Constitution was printed under the headline , "Lane Aga inst

Madison;" and after Senator Latham of California switched

his loyalty from the Pacific Coast Republic to the Union ,

the headline read, "Latham Brought to His Senses.11 138 This

attitude was also carried out in the government sector.

On September 9 and 10, 1862, the Oregon state

legislature discussed a series of resolutions offered by

John R. McBride . The resolutions were strongly pro-Union ,

pro-Lincoln, and anti-secessionist. The legislature pledged

its support for Lincoln, and stated that any attempt to

embarrass the President "should be regarded as unpatriotic

and having a direct tendency to aid the traitors now

fighting against the government ." The legislature also 70

resolved that the Pacific Coast Republic met "the emphatic

condemnation of the people of Oregon , and we denounce it as

a development of treason favored by no man who has intelli­

gence and patriotism. 11 139 The legislature was given a

chance to prove its loyalty soon after the resolutions

were passed .

By 1863 there was an open complaint from official

quarters that Oregon had not raised its share of troops. 140

Lincoln desired to expand the First Oregon Cavalry to full

strength . Colonel Thomas Cornelius initially tried to

recruit eight companies for the Fi. rst Oregon Cavalry ; but ,

on February 24, 1862, the Commander of the Department only

allowed for six companies to complete the regiment . 141

Cornelius resigned over this dispute in 1862 but by 1863

the regiment was expanded.

On January 5, 1863, Benjamin Alvord, Commander of

the Oregon District wrote Governor Gibbs concerning the

expansion of the First Oregon Cavalry . General Alvord

carried out Lincoln 's desire and "requested" that six

additional companies be raised to "complete the First

Regiment of Cavalry Oregon Volunteers.11 142 The Governor

responded immediately . In a proclamation printed on January

10, 1863, Gibbs informed the Oregonians that the "President

of the United States " requested that six volunteer companies

be recruited; and , he hoped that "the call will promptly be

responded to by the local citj zens of this State .11 143 The 71

additional troops were needed for the same assignment for

which the original regiment was formed . Not surprisingly,

enthusiasm in Oregon was slight and recruitment lagged .

The standard complaint that western service with

no hope of eastern action was just one of a multitude of

grievances. The Oregon troops were also paid in depreciated

legal tender notes instead of specie. General Wright

recognized this problem, and realized that fulfilling

Lincoln 's request for additional troops from Oregon would

be nearly impossible if they were to be paid in greenbacks .

Wright officially requested from the War Department that

Pacific Coast troops be paid in specie . Wright claimed that

the depreciated greenbacks were worth less in the West than

they were in the East. 144 However , the federal government

responded that the greenbacks were just as worthless in the

East as they were in the We st, and Wright 's request was

denied . The military organization of the First Oregon

Cavalry also discouraged recruitment .

On July 7, 1862 Brigadier General Benjamin Alvord

assumed command of the District of Oregon replacing Colonel

Justus Steinberger, who was immediately sent to Fort Wa lla

Wa lla. Steinberger 's predecessor was Reuben F. Maury, a

popular resident of Oregon . Steinberger , on the other hand ,

was a citizen of the Washington Territory and a former

infantry commander . To make matters worse, Steinberger had

been an Oregon proxy delegate to the Baltimore convention 72

that nominated Breckinridge and Lane . No doubt some

Oregonians were not excited about serving in a cavalry

regiment under a "foreign" infantry ccrnmander that helped

nominate a secessionist to run against Lincoln in 1860.145

Steinberger remained in command of the regiment until Maury

received his promotion to Colonel and ordered to relieve

General Alvord as Commander of the District of Oregon on

March 23, 186s. 146 The First Oregon Cavalry, therefore ,

was under an unpopular commander for most of the War .

It is not surprising that Lincoln 's request to expand

Oregon 's mounted regiment was not quickly fulfilled.

Another factor that worked against recruitment was that the

request for this expansion came in January, 1863, when Union

battle losses in the East had a detrimental effect on

soldier morale. By March, 1863, the Argus reported that

only one company, of the proposed six, was "nearly full. "

General Alvord expressed his impatience with the recrui tment

pace in a letter in which he stated, "Oregon had not raised

her share of troops. California has sent nearly nine

regiments, and Oregon but seven companies into the

field .11 147

In this tense, apathetic atmosphere , General Wright

issued an impassioned plea to the Oregonians for recruits .

In his proclamation of April 7, 1863, Wright pointed out

that Oregonians were relatively untouched by the War that

"drenched in blood the fairest portion of our beloved 73

country ." Wright also warned that unless the Pacific

Coast frontiers were kept well guarded , the blessing

of peace among them was in jeopardy . Wright beseeched :

Are you prepared, then to sacrifice all these blessings to prove recreant to yourselves, to the nation and to the high and holy trust transmitted to you by the founders of our republic? No . Already I hear the welkin ring with shouts of acclamation : 'The Union shall be preserved.' Although the great mass of the people on the Pacific Coast are eminently patriotic and devoted to the Union. . we have traitors in our midst who are doing all in their power to involve this country in the horrors of civil war . 148

The only ringing shouts Wright heard were entirely

within his head. Only one company of recruits was mustered

into the service in fulfillment of Lincoln's request for six

companies. Company G, First Oregon Cavalry, was Oregon 's

final contribution to its mounted regiment. 149 Wright

brought up the need to defend the Pacific Coast from

traitors in his proclamation. Once again , an intimation

concerning the Pacific Coast Republic was used to arouse

patriotism. Although it did not succeed in enlisting many

recruits, Wright 's concerns were well founded because the

Knights of the Golden Circle had gained additional members

and momentum with every Union setback in the East .

A proposed draft supplied important impetus to the

Knights' movement. The state legislature openly intimated

the draft could be employed to supply men when recruitment

proceeded slowly for the First Oregon Cavalry . The Oregon

Knights , however, would not tolerate a draft without a 74

fight , and the state legislature did not antagonize this

highly volatile group. The authority for a state draft was

bequeathed to the legislature in the 1862 militia bill, but

it was net used in Oregon during the War .

The Oregon legislature opted against conscription .

The legislature 's reasoning behind pursuing a non-coercive

recruitment policy was pragmatic rather than philosophic.

The Oregon legislature received reliable information which

predicted that instituting a draft would be counterpro­

ductive to its goal of insuring peace within Oregon.

Legislators were aware of the Knights' existence and its

probable opposition to the draft; but, before 1863 it was

not known how formidable the opposition would be . Increased

intelligence concerning the Oregon Knights was available

after Gibbs ' election to the governorship due to the

infiltration of the organization by loyal Union spies.

Union spies kept efficient tabs on the Oregon

Knights. 150 Julius M. Keeler was appointed provost Marshal

of the District of Oregon on May 22, 1863 with the respons­

ibility of foiling the Knights' activities . Captain Keeler

arrived in Oregon in 1863 with a corps of detectives who had

orders to monitor the Knights and to arrest any members who

actively planned any armed rebellion against the federal

government. The spies, who answered to Oregon 's state

Adjutant General Reed supplied intelligence concerning

the secretive group. Before Oregon ' s spy network was 75

implemented, loyal state authorities could only conjecture

about the Knights' plans, strength , and goals . The spies

confirmed that the Knights boasted approximately 2,500

members by 1864, and that at least ten separate circles

existed in Oregon. The circles were mostly in southern

Oregon, and there were two circles each in Portland and

Salem. 151 The spies also discovered that the Knights were

not only organized, but active .

The Oregon Knights planned armed rebellion against the

federal government. John o. Shelton . a Union spy, learned

that the Knights planned a rebellion in order to form the

Pacific Coast Republic, and they were waiting for an

opportune moment to set their plan in motion . Indeed,

crates of arms and ammunition were secretly stored for this

purpose . The spies also spoiled "several" attempts by the

Knights to assassinate Adjutant General Reed and capture the

federal arsena l . 152 Reed 's spies also furnished him with

a list of prominent Knights' members. The list included

Democratic newspaper editors and politicians , including

Gibbs ' opponent for the Oregon governorship in 1862, John

F. Miller. The Lincoln administration 's perspicacity in

dealing with the Oregon K�ights was admirable. An attempt

to crush the movement without just provocation could have

incited a rebellion by supplying the Knights with the

opportunity it awaited . Conversely , ignoring the highly

volatile group could have been detrimental to the Oregon 76

Union effort. Lincoln 's policy , administered through

Adjutant General Reed , effectively and covertly subverted

the subversives.

The Oregon legislature doubtlessly recognized the

possibility of the Knights mobilizing if draft legislation

were passed. The legislature realized that economic

inducements for enlistment would be an effective alternative

to coercive measures. The legislature could not afford to

delay . Union enthusiasm for recruitment was waning in

Oregon just as more troops were needed due to the Knight 's

consolidation cf their power . A memorandum sent from

Adjutant General Reed to Brigadier General Alvord on October

28, 1863 described the current atmosphere in Oregon:

This day I received a communication from Capt. Julius M. Keeler. .by which it seems there is some danger of a resistance to the laws and an organizati on of men for that purpose . . It appears to me that measures should be taken , if possible, to prevent an outbreak, for if civil strife should once commence on this coast there is no knowing where it would end . . It is evident that prudence, energy, and firmness must be the governing principle of men in authority, in order to prevent a calamity that does in a measure hang over us . 1 5 3

Further factors compounded Oregon 's military problems .

The first four companies mustered into the First Oregon

Cavalry were due to be discharged in the fall of 1 864 .

Recruitment to replenish the cavalry ranks was hampered by

Congressional bungling . When the First Oregon Cavalry was

formed in 1 861 , the men were required to supply their own

horses and equipment . On June 20, 1864, Congress passed a 77

law that illustrated its misunderstanding of Oregon cavalry

service . After June , 1864, the men were still required to

supply their own horses , but they no longer received

compensation . This act demoralized Union cavalry troops

in Oregon. The nature of the First Oregon Cavalry 's duty

required extensive excursions across the frontier which took

a heavy toll on horses. The federal government, however ,

was oblivious at best and unfeeling at worst, toward its

plight . At this juncture the federal government seemingly

added insult to the Oregonians ' injuries.

By October, 1864, the Lincoln administration had called

on Oregon to supply an infantry regiment . On July 1 , 1864

Major General Irwin McDowell relieved Brigadier General

George Wright as Commander of the Department of the Pacific .

Four months after McDowell assumed command, he received an

order from the War Department requesting that "a regiment

of infantry be raised in Oregon as soon as possible. 11 154

McDowell forwarded the president 's "request" to Governor

Gibbs. Later on October , 20, 1864, Gibbs forwarded

McDowell's message and appealed to the legislature to

emulate the example of other states and pass an economic

incentive to attract volunteers. 155 Gibbs reasoned that

this method would attract volunteers without resorting

to the draft and antagonizing the Knights. The Oregon

legislature responded to Lincoln 's call for additiona l

Oregon troops to replace the cavalry volunteers whose term 78

of enlistment were nearly expired and took a major step to

induce recruitment.

On October 24, 1864 the Oregon legislature passed a

bounty law. The law provided for $150 to be paid to each

three year volunteer. The bounties were paid in install-

ments with United States bonds at seven per cent interest

due in 1884 and payable in specie . Oregon volunteers who

served prior to this law's enactment also received five

dollars for each month of their enlistment, in bonds bearing

sev�n percent due in 1875.156 Luckily , the bounty law

provided the encouragement Oregonians needed to volunteer .

Gibbs was pleased that the legislature passed the

bounty law , although he felt the appropriations were too

low. However , the law fulfilled its goal. Recruitment

vastly accelerated in comparison to previous calls for

troops , and the infantry ranks quickly filled . Adjutant

General Reed also complimented the legislature for passing

the law, and relayed his gratitude for additional private

bounties that were donated by citizens . Company A, First

Oregon Infantry , was completed within a week of the call,

and the six companies that completed the regiment were

mustered in on June 24, 186s. 157 The officers for the

First Oregon Infantry were taken largely from the cavalry

regiment, and cavalry Captain George B. Currey was

commissioned as a Colonel and placed in the infantry 's

command . 79

The First Oregon Infantry was recruited swiftly, but

problems requiring military attention surfaced before the

regiment was filled. The call for the infantry regiment was

made in October , 1864 in anticipation of possible violence

in connection with the presidential election in 1864. By

1864, however, the Knights were more numerous and organized .

Once again, Oregon officials received threats that if

Lincoln were elected the Knights would rebel. They had

stored their arms near polling places and were prepared

to prevent Lincoln 's election with force . 158

Governor Gibbs took steps to neutralize the Knights '

plan. The governor alerted the military and directed it

to be highly visible at the polling places . Gibbs gave

the First Oregon Cavalry general instructions and Oregon 's

Acting Assistant Adjutant General Hopkins received thi s

order on November 3, 1864:

It has been reported to these headquarters that threats have been made of violence at the polls on the 8th instant, the day of the presidential election. .The general will not believe that any use of military force will be necessary . But the governor of Oregon and other officers of the civil authority having had reason to apprehend something of the kind it is proper that ou r command 5y should hold itself in readiness to act . 1 9

The governor 's policy was to send an entire unarmed regiment

to a polling place to allow the soldiers to vote. The

troops remained at the polling place after they voted in

the event the civil authorities needed help to enforce

order. Gibbs stated this intention and requested Brigadier 80

General Alvord 's compliance . 160 The governor 's policy was a

general success . The Knights never gained control of a

polling place, and the election proceeded unimpaired. The

1864 election results were a clear indication of Oregonian

sentiment in support of the new Union Party .

In 1860 Lincoln carried Oregon by a small plurality,

but by 1864 he won by a clear majority . Oregon 's official

vote total in 1864 was 9,888 for Lincoln and 8,457 for his

rival, War Democrat George Brinton McClellan . Lincoln

defeated McClellan by a convincing 1,431 vote majority . No

statement better illustrates the evolution of Oregonians '

devotion to the Union during the War. The infiltration of

secessionists into the Oregon Democratic party forced

Oregonians to prove their Union sentiment by joining the

Union party fold. The Sentinel reported in 1862 that the

Oregon Democratic party was "wholly defunct," and it had

"been shaken into separate elements by the convulsions of

civil war." 161 The 1864 Oregon election-returns bore out

this truth . Oregon 's support for Lincoln can be misleading ,

however.

Oregonians supported Lincoln because he represented a

vote for the Union , and it is incorrect to assume that they

were his avid supporters. They supported Lincoln because

they felt he was the best man to restore the Union , and they

wanted the Union restored as it existed prior to the Civil

War . But Oregonians finally realized that the Civil War 81

had ushered in permanent changes and they accepted the

possibility of a new Union over no Union . It became

increasingly apparent that the old Union was gone forever ,

and most Oregonians grudgingly accepted this fact .

Oregonians realized that a permanent Union could not be

maintained if the federal government did not suppress the

rebellion, and Lincoln was the candidate that committed to

this goal.

Oregonians fully approved of Lincoln 's vigorous

prosecution of the War , but they disproved of his policy

toward blacks. His Emancipation Proclamation was soundly

denounced in Oregon, and only the few Radical Republicans in

conservative Oregon supported the Proclamation. 162 In fact,

the Proclamation almost caused a serious schism in the

Republican-Douglas Democrat "Union" coalition in Oregon for

the 1864 election. This potential problem was evaded when

the Oregon delegates attended the "national convention ," and

omitted the word "Republican ." Oregonians retained their

hatred toward blacks throughout the War and most had never

supported abolition . Lincoln 's Proclamation even forced

Asahel Bush to switch his support from Lincoln to McClP.llan

after 1863, but this did not have a great impact upon

Oregonians . Oregonians reluctantly accepted abolition as an

undeniable fact only as a means to restore the Union . Even

the resolutions passed in the state legislature in 1862 that 82

supported Lincoln and the War asserted that Oregon fought

the war to preserve the Union and not to free the slaves.

Most Oregonians , excluding the Knights, were

conservative throughout the war . They accepted the fact

that the Emancipation Proclamation and the growing influence

of the Radical Republicans "sounded the death knell" of

the old Union , but they did not change their views on

slavery . 163 The conservative attitude was best illustrated

by the early utterances of two people who became leading

Oregon Republicans . In 1856 David Logan wrote his sister:

The Whigs are all dead out here - they call themselves the Republican party - which means negro worshipers [sic] . I can't go the Locofocos and I'll see the Republicans to the Devil before I'll vote with them. I don't know what I am exactly, but anything but an abolitionist.164

Lincoln 's friend Anson G. Henry wrote him a letter in 1859

and desired "the triumph of a conservative Republican party

who will repudiate Massachusetts foolery and adopt

intervention plank as part of their platform. 11 165

Throughout the War , the Oregon Republican party more closely

resembled the national Douglas Democrats than the national

Republican party in regard to slavery . It is important to

remember that the national Republican party was

factionalized during the War, while Oregon 's Republicans

remained relatively solidified throughout Lincoln 's

administration .

Public reaction in Oregon to Lincoln 's administration

was exemplified after the news of Lincoln 's death. 83

Lincoln 's assassination was received with acute diversity in

Oregon. Many loyal Lincoln supporters were deeply bereaved ,

but the Copperhead element was exuberant . The Copperheads'

level of enthusiasm was so high that General McDowell

labelled them "accessories after the fact ." In General

Order #27 issued on April 17, 1865 McDowell declared that

any person who exulted over Lincoln 's assassination would

be arrested by any law enforcement official that had any

knowledge of the case. He further threatened that "any

paper so offending or expressing any sympathy in any way

whatever with the act will be at once seized and

suppressed .11 166 The nature of McDowell's order illustrated

that Lincoln had strong support even in death , but the need

to issue the order also indicated that there remained some

opposition to Lincoln.

Generally, the Oregon frontier remained secure

following Lincoln's assassination . The state 's ability

to hold the Knights in check had been demonstrated during

the election of 1864. The military 's ability to thwart

Copperhead rebellions was again demonstrated following

Lincoln 's assassination . Military officials in Oregon

predicted trouble in the traditional secessionist hotbed

of Eugene City , near Fort Hoskins , Oregon . In April, just

after the news of Lincoln 's assassination arrived , two

companies of the proposed First Oregon Infantry were

stationed at Fort Hoskins and alerted that they would be 84

ordered to disperse any rebellion in Eugene City . Although

the First Oregon Infantry was not officially established

until June, 1865, companies A and B were mustered in early

and used for garrison duty. 167 The predicted rebellions

never materialized, and peace on the Oregon frontier was

enforced by intimidation . 85

VI. CONCLUSION

A few basic premises have to be considered before an

accurate analysis of Lincoln 's policy toward Oregon can be

made. The most important factor concerning his policy

toward Oregon was the rudimentary communication facilities

at the War 's outset. The amount of time required for

correspondence between Washington, D.C. and the Pacific

Coast was roughly one month in either direction . This

factor greatly strengthened the subversive sec8ssionist

movement in many ways . Secessionist plans could be

implemented before the federal government could react.

It was also difficult for the federal government to assess

the true state of Oregon 's social and political environment .

The communications that Lincoln received were mostly

encapsulated incidents that could easily be distorted or

taken out of context. The lack of adequate communication

with Oregon before the telegraph was connected at Portland

in 1863 doubtlessly contributed to a lack of timely

information concerning Oregon . This factor was an obvious

disadvantage for Lincoln.

The communication problem also affected Lincoln 's

leadership style . Lincoln preferred to run the government

and the War directly . Although he consulted with his

cabinet and advisors on po licies and orders , his ultimate

decisions were his own . Generally, Lincoln personally 86

exercised his powers . However, the communication and

distance factors required that he change his leadership

style toward Oregon to an indirect delegation of power .

Lincoln successfully turned this potential deficiency into

an asset. The key to Lincoln's daily policy toward Oregon

was the appointment of men in high positions who understood

his philosophy and who would dutifully carry out appropriate

actions . In this way Lincoln 's policy was carried out ,

although he was not in constant contact with Oregon

officials.

The effectiveness of Lincoln 's policies in Oregon was

also partially due to the wording of his orders. He issued

ambiguous orders which in most cases consisted of a broad

policy statement that supplied the loyal Oregon officials

with sufficient latitude to attain the stated goals. John

N. King, Chief Commissary for the District of Oregon

summarized this atmosphere in a letter to his sister on July

24, 1863 from Fort Vancouver :

.We have a great many secessionists out here and many more are coming, but we are not apprehensive of any outbreak , should they do so they will have a very rough time of it, and war can be carried on here without the military officers , being interfered with by politicians, and orders from Washington - I think we would carry on a war in earnest, make it short and decisive , and pay no respect to persons who have any sympathy with the rebels or ...with the Copperheads . 1 6 8

Lincoln's appointees, beginning with General Sumner ,

were unquestionably loyal Union men who understood and

diligently carried out their assignment . The initial 87

quality of Lincoln 's appointees was , of course , due largely

to Edward Baker. Baker 's knowledge and advice concerning

Oregon and its inhabitants was invaluable to Lincoln 's

policy. Fortunately , Baker advised Lincoln concerning many

appointments until his abrupt death in 1861. Baker 's

usefulness was never equalled, although by 1865 Anson G.

Henry claimed, "The whole Pacific Coast Delegation don 't

hesitate to acknowledge their obligation to me in securing

them the ear of the President when they could not obtain

it through the ordinary avenues, and thus I saved them

important interests politically and personally ."169

Lincoln's problems with Oregon secessionists were

twofold . He had to remove Southern sympathizers from

federal offices to prevent them from encouraging a

secessionist rebellion. However, Lincoln had to remove

these Copperheads without appearing too harsh so as not to

provoke a rebellion among the masses. Carrying out some

policies without of fending many Oregonians was a difficult

task before Fort Sumter's fall solidified Union sentiment.

Had Lincoln rashly removed General Johnston before he

received evidence that he was a traitor , militant secession-

ist sentiment could have been mobi lized. Lincoln 's patience

concerning the Johnston situation prevented this. Lincoln 's

success in this respect was due largely to his informants ,

mainly Baker and Senator Nesmith. Baker and Nesmith assured

Lincoln that Oregonians ' Union devotion was dominant over 88

secessionist sentiment. This assurance allowed Lincoln to

implement his effective policy. Lincoln's policy toward

Oregon was as cautious as it was effective .

The composition of Oregon 's population resembled that

of Union states bordering the Confederacy. The state 's

political atmosphere made it abundantly clear that Oregon

was neither a purely pro-s lave nor an anti-slave state and

its prewar sympathies were split between the North and

South . Lincoln realized this and ascertained that it

behooved him to treat Oregon cautiously, and not antagon­

istically . Oregonians historically detested federal

appointments granted to non-Oregonians within their state .

With this in mind, Lincoln 's political plums in Oregon went

mainly to Oregonians . It was impossible to fill all

military appointments within the state with its residents ;

but, the popular Oregon Indian war hero George Wright was

commissioned Brigadier General. Wright briefly commanded

the District of Oregon, and the Department of the Pacific

from November 19, 1861 to July 1, 1864.

Lincoln 's faith in Oregon 's Union sentiment was we ll­

founded. Before Fort sumter 's fall, most Oregonians

genuinely vacillated concerning their philosophical support

for either the North or South. But after Fort Sumter was

attacked many clearly felt the South was wrong . Lincoln's

unantagonistic policy toward Oregon also magnified the

perception of Southern rashness. The majority of Oregonians 89

clearly i

in the war. Simeon Francis relayed this thought in a letter

on June 21, 1862:

.The democrats are trying to Union dodge here [Washington Territory]. The shrewd ones are getting on platforms to read every way - to be explained just to put the different phrases and doctrines of democracy - or to keep the dear speck of that flock together. The same scheme was tried in Oregon and it didn 't work. [Oregonians] won 't be diverted from an honest and patriotic cause when they understand what that is.170

Lincoln 's successful courting of Oregon hinged on the

successful retention of the state in the Union . Southerners

realized that Oregon 's distance from Washington , D.C. and

the War 's epicenter, might aid their cause if Lincoln had

to subdue the Oregonians with eastern troops. Lincoln also

realized this and tried to avoid that scenario. Lincoln 's

patience and understanding toward Oregon insured its loyalty

and eliminated the need for eastern troops to subdue the

state . Oregon was kept in the Union by its own troops

throughout the War which enabled eastern troops to actively

fight the Wa r; and, Lincoln was freed from many distractions

that would have surfaced if the secessionists gained

control. Lincoln's po licy during the war allowed Oregonians

to take care of matters within their state while he

concentrated on the War in the East.

Oreyonians attained many of their domestic demands

during Lincoln 's admi ni stration . Lincoln incorporated

Oregon into the federal circuit court system . He also

fortified the state 's coastline and signed the long aw�itcd 90

Homestead Ac t. wartime finances and Oregon 's gold also

encouraged Lincoln to initiate transportation and

communication advancements. The zeal with which most

Oregonians supported Lincoln's prosecution of the War was

also evident by the state 's generous contributions to the

Sanitary Commission .

Oregon was one of the few states that was systematic­

ally organized and canvassed for donations to the Sanitary

fund. In almost every public gathering a collection was

taken for the fund, and often the more spontaneous the

collection, the more money was received. Am ory Holbrook ,

a Republican state legislator , was Oregon 's chief Sanitary

Commission agent. Oregon donated a total of $79,371.19 to

the fund, according to the Commission's official report .

Oregon was the fifth largest contributor , behind only

California, New York, Massachusetts , and Nevada

respectively . The Commission 's report noted Oregon 's

exceptional donation, and what made it more extraordinary

was that the armies that Oregonians ' donated to were

fighting thousands of miles from their state . The support

that Oregon and the Pacific Coast gave the Sanitary

Commission enabled the Commission to prove itself a truly

national organization. 171

Oregon 's potential importance to both the North and

South, coupled with its vacillation between each side made

that state an unpredictable swing state for the Union 91

effort. But, in the end , Oregon 's fidelity to the Union

was strong . Oregon 's generous monetary donation and its

provision of troops vastly aided Lincoln 's War effort.

Oregon 's devotion to the Union was a direct result of

Lincoln 's patience and sagaciousness. If Lincoln had

antagonized the Oregonians during the secession crisis ,

Albert Sidney Johnston and Joe Lane could have possibly

obtained increased support and formed a Pacific Coast

Republic or at least hampered the Union effort. The fact

that Oregon 's part in the War is relatively unmentioned in

Civil War stu

toward Oregon and the Pacific Coast. Lincoln effectively

but quietly insured Oregon's support for the Union. 92

ENDNOTES

CHAPTER I

l.Ray A. Billington, 5th ed. Westward Expansion (New York: MacMillan , 1982) , p. 452.

2.Ibid. , p. 453.

3. Ibid . , p. 4 7 3.

4.Robert W. Johannsen, Frontier Politics and the Sectional Conflict (Seattle: University of Washington Press , 1955) , p. 7.

5.James E. Hendrickson , Joe Lane of Oregon (New Haven : Yale University Press, 1967) , p. viii.

CHAPTER II

6.Robert W. Johannsen, "Spectators of Disunion," Pacific Northwest Quarterly 54 (July 1953) : 107.

7.D. G. Hill, "The Negro as a Political and Social Issue in the Oregon Country ." Journal of Negro History 33 (April 1948) : 140.

8.Charles H. Carey , History of Oregon (Portland: The Pioneer Historical Publishing Co ., 1922) , p. 634.

9.Dorothy 0. Johansen , "A Tentative Appraisal of Territorial Government in Oregon," Pacific Historical Review 18 (November 1949) : 492; 493.

10.Ibid. , p. 26.

11.Johannsen, Frontier , p. 24.

12.Ibid. , p. 26.

13.Ibid. , p. 22.

14.Charles H. Carey , "The Creation of Oregon as a State ," Oregon Historic�l Quarterly 27 (December 1925) : 21. 93

15.Henry H. Simms , "The Controversy Over the Admission of The State of Oregon ," Mississippi Valley Historical Review 32 (December 1945) : 364.

16.D. Johansen, "Appraisal," p. 496.

17.Sims , "Controversy," p. 363

18.Dorothy Hull, "The Movement In Oregon For The Establishment of A Pa cific Coast Republic," Oregon Historical Quarterly 17 (September 1916) : 192.

19.Phillip G. Auchampbaugh, "James Buchanan And Some Far Western Leaders, 1860-1861," Pacific Historical Review 12 (June 1943 ) : 169 .

20 . Ibid. , p. 169.

21.Walter Carleton Woodward , The Rise and Early History of Political Parties in Oregon, 1843-1868 (Portland: J. K. Gill Co., 1913) , p. 175.

22.Harvey w. Scott, History Of The Oregon Country, 6 vols. (Cambridge, MA : Riverside jress , 1924) , v. 5, p. 38.

23.Billington, p. 468.

24.Carey , Historv, p. 636.

25.0regon City Argus , July 11, 1860.

26.Leslie .M. Scott, "Oregon's Nomination of Lincoln," Oregon Historical Quarterly 17 (September 1916) : 201.

27.Ibid. , p. 202

28.0regon City Argus, July 14 , 18GO .

29.Carey , History , p. 640.

30.Johannsen, Frontier , p. 114.

31.Roy P. Basler, ed., The Collected Works Of Abraham Lincoln , 9 vols . (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press , 195 5) ' v. 4 pp. 8 9-9 0.

32.Harry Pratt, ed., "Twenty-two Letters Of David Logan , Pioneer Oregon Lawyer ," Oregon Historical Quarterly 44 (September 1943) : 280. 94

33.Harry c. Blair and Rebecca Tarshis, Colonel Edward Baker Lincoln 's Constant Allv (Portland : Oregon Historical Society , 1960) , p. 15.

34.Ibid. , p. 101.

35.Johannsen , Frontier, p. 128.

36.Letter from Baker to Lincoln, October 2, 1860, Original in the Illinois Historical Library . Springfield , Illinois.

37.Johannsen , Frontier , p. 144.

38.Milton H. Shutes, "Colonel E. D. Baker ," California Historical Society Quarterly 17 (December 1938) : 315.

39.Johannsen, Frontier, p. 148.

40.Congressional Globe , 36th Congress, 2nd Session , pp . 1342-1348.

41.Johannsen, "Spectators," p. 111 .

42.Joseph Ellison , "Designs for a Pacific Republic , 1842- 1862," OJ�egon Historical Quarterly 31 (December 1930) : 319.

CHAPTER III

43.Woodward , p. 190.

44.Hill , p. 140.

45.Hull, p. 197.

46.Ibid. I pp . 181; 186.

47.James G. Blaine , Twenty Years of Congress From Lincoln to Garfield with a Review of the Events Which Led to the Political Revolution of 1860: (Norwich CT: The Henry Bi ll Publishing Co., 1884) , p. 308.

48.U.S. War Department , War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. 50, pt . 1, p. xvi. Hereafter referred to as the Official Records.

49.Elijah R. Kennedy , The Contest For California in 1861 (Boston : Houghton Mifflin, 1912) , p . 202.

SO . Ibid . , p. 168. 95

51.Johannsen, Frontier, pp . 182; 183.

52.Kennedy , p. 202.

53.Scott, 5, p. 179 .

5 4. Ibid . , p. 186.

SS.Erasmus D. Keyes, Fifty Years of Observation of Men and Events, Civil and Military (New York: Charles Scribner 's Sons, 1884), p. 420.

56.0fficial Records, Series I, vol. 50, pt . J, p. 455.

57.Kennedy , p. 206.

58.Ibid., p. 208.

59.Ellison, p. 341.

60.Kennedy , p. 210.

61.Carey , History , p. 647.

62.Bancroft, History of Oregon, p. 455.

63.A letter from Anson G. Henry to Lincoln, Henry MSS , Illinois Historical Library.

64.The coalition was labeled Union, but candidates still identified themselves as Douglas Democrats or Republica�s . The nominating conventions divided the offices between the two parties and ran on one ballot against Lane 's faction .

65.Portland, Oregon Statesman , March 31, 1857.

66.Jacksonville , Oregon Sentinel, June 15, 1861.

67.Ibid., June 15, 1861.

68.Ibid., June 22, 1861.

69.0regon City , Argus, June 8, 1861.

70.Robert Treat Platt , "Oregon and Its Share In 'l'he Civil War," Oregon Historical Quarterly 4 (June 1903) : 99.

71.Robert W. Johannsen , "John Whiteaker, Governor of Oregon , 1858-1862," Reed College Bulletin 26 (January 1948) : 63.

72.0fficial Records, Series I, vol . 50, pt. 1, pp . 632- 633. 96

73. Ibid. , p. 633.

74.Basler, 4, p. 406.

7 5. Ibid. , 5, p. 147.

76.Ibid. , 5, p. 163.

77.Scott , 1, pp. 215-216.

78.Jacksonville Oregon Sentinel, June 22, July 20, August 3, November 23, 1861; Salem, Oregon S�atesman , Ap ril 15, 1861; March 4, August 11, 1862.

79 .Basler, 8, p. 359.

80.Pratt , p. 255.

Bl .Scott , 5, pp . 38-39 Sentinel September 7, 1861.

82.Blair , p. 117.

83 .John Hay , "Colonel Baker," Harper's Magazine 24 (December 1861) : 108.

84.Basler , 4, p. 560.

85.Carey , History, p. 649.

86.0fficial Records, series I, vol. 50, pt. 1, p. 795.

B 7. Ibid . I p. 918.

88. Ibid . I p. 1090.

89.Hull, p. 187.

90.Jacksonville Sentinel , January 11, 1862.

91.Ibid., December 7, 1861.

92.U.S. Serial Set, 37th Congress, 2nd Session , v. 5, Serial #1122, Senate Executive Document #46, 1862, p. 1-12. This document hereafter referred to as S.E.D. #46.

93.Addison C. Gibbs Inaugural Address, September 10, 1862.

94.Helen Jean Poulton , "The Attitude of Oregon Toward Slavery and Secession , 1843-1865," M.A. Thes is. University of Oregon , 1946, p. 88.

95.Woodward , p. 199. 97

96.Ibid .

97.Platt, p. 108.

98.A letter. from Simeon Francis to Anson Henry , Henry MSS, Illinois Historical Library.

99.0fficial Records, Series I, vol. 50, pt. 1, pp. 739- 740.

100.Ibid., Series I, vol. 50, pt . 2, p. 2897.

101.Royal A. Bensell, All Quiet On The Yamhill, (Eugene , OR; University of Oregon Books , 1959) , p. xiii .

102.Carey , History, p. 673.

103.Platt , p. 103.

104.Congressional Globe , 37th Cong. , 1st Sess., 426.

105.Ibid.

106.0fficial Records , Series I, vol. 50, pt. 1, p. 323.

107.Sentinel, July 11, 1863.

108.0fficial Records , Series I, vol . 50, pt. 1, p. 664.

109.Bancroft , p. 511.

CHAPTER IV

110.Bensell, p. x.

111.Sentinel, March 22, 1862.

112.0fficial Records , Series III, vol. 3, p. 1018.

113.Statesman , September 2, 1861.

114.Scott, 1, p. 339.

1 1 5.Ibid . , 1, p. 330-345.

116.Poulton, p. 124 .

117.Woodward , p . 221.

113.Gordon B. Dodds , Oregon : A Bicentennial History. (New York : W.W. Norton and Co. , 1977) , p. 76. 98

119.Woodward , pp. 153-154 .

120.Sentinel, December 10, 1861 .

121.Hull , p. 186.

122.Carey , History, p. 685.

123.Basler, 5, p. 41.

124. Ibid. I p. 41.

125.Congressional Globe , Appendix to the 37th Congress, p. 229.

126.Basler, 5, p. 42.

127.Ibid . I 5, p. 42.

128. Dorothy 0 . Johansen, Em pire On The Columbia (New York: Harper and Row, 1957) , pp . 278; 374.

129.Sentinel, August 2, 1862.

130.Ibid., August 16, 1862.

131.Ibid., January 21, 1863.

132.Dodds, p. 74.

133.S.E.D. #46.

134 .Ibid .

135.Dodds, p. 74.

136.E.D. Smith Jr ., "Communication Pioneering In Oregon," Oregon Historical Quarterly 38 (December 1939) : p. 356.

CHAPTER V

137.Henry MSS , Illinois Historical Library

138. Statesman , December 24, 1 860.

139.Sentinel, September 20, 1 862.

140.Carey, History, p. 667. 99

141.0fficial Records , Series I, vol. 50, pt . 1, pp. 885-886 ; 890.

142.Ibid. I pp. 276-277 .

143. Sentinel, January 17, 1863.

144.0fficial Records , Series I, vo l. 50, pt . 2, p. 356.

145.Carey , History , p. 664.

146.0fficial Records , Series I, vo l. 50, pt . 2, p. 1171 .

147.Argus, March 28, 1863.

148.0fficial·· Records, Series I, vol. 50, pt . 2, --·· 384 .

149 .Carey , Historv , p. 667.

150.Alexande:r E. Wy lie , "Southern Sentiment On The Northwe stern Frontier ," Speech delivered , October 7, 1966, deposited at the Illinois Historical Library.

151.Poulton, p. 136.

152.Woodward , p. 221.

153.0fficial Records, Series I, pt . 2, vol. 50, pp . 6 6 0 - 6 61 .

1�4.Ibid. I p. 1020.

155. Ibid., p. 1027.

156.Poulton , pp . 96-97.

157.Carey , His_tory, p. 673.

158.Platt, p. 108.

159. 0fficial Records, Series I, vol. 50, pt . 2, .p. 1045 .

160. Ibid . I p. 1035.

161 .Sentinel, September 27, 1862.

162.Carey , History, p. 651 .

163.Johannsen , "Spectators ," p. 114. 100

164.Pratt, p. 272; Johannsen , "Spectators ," p. 114.

165.Johannsen, "Spectators ," p. 108.

166.0fficial Records, Series I, vol . 50, pt. 2, p. 1198.

167.Carey , Histo�y, p. 673.

CHAPTER VI

i68.King Family MSS , Illinois Historical Library .

169.Henry MSS, Illinois Historical Library.

170 . Simeon Francis MSS, Illinois Heritage Library.

171.Chu.rles J. Stille, History of the United States Sani�a:i_::_y Commission, (New York : Hurd and Houghton , 1868) , 242; 480; 542-543. This source is the official report of the Sanitary Commission. The figures cited in this study concerning the Sanitary Commission were taken from this source . 101

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