ý THE l3ýT'ýI,E OF Ti LARNE.

This. is most'ý. important ..: : nteresting conflict of ; the Gr,eýdt V1er, battleAt no other the time during the war andwas the the . position A3.lies> so cri. tical. '. . secmedthe.t the fate af bung on d threadof

becausa` the 10.68 of the-be. tt9. e 'pz'obý,bly-zýee. nt the: losß of the warý for tha , thetr..; 'All. ied -eauae, The: French know th. t they were fighting prdctisdl,. ly, izt last ditch' nol t° . and thts extremity. doubt contributed in no" emall `'d'egrße,° -theirvictorp"` In get : the be.ttý. it is neýesý" -order' to -aproper conception of _e ary'to have an understanding of the -events which lead up to: it This wi11 r 4"- until iöclude a brief, sketchof the aign' from txie opening of ;hostiý. itiea the'beginning of ;the long period' of trench warfar©. _ The Germä. invdsion beg= or} August 5th ý mhe general '. .: n of advance extended' froM; h; the '5wiss borc'er; to the ' border,; of: Holland* ulh4usen near . , ? The mobilization of the German Armies-was not complete at this., t:ime but wa -.t_ 15ompleted rapä.dly ýs 'the:. ddvence into Belgium: proceededo ý- ,: , The Army:.of. ixavasiari eonsistec3 of six -f ield Armies: The'-1et Army under Von Kluck direetian : Soitth,. oY:the. advatced °vurestwdxdin the ,of. Antwerp. l st"Arrny; wa,s the. Znd tirmv under Von 8ul ow. which 'advs: noed `in the *direeti On. Of South' sf. "Ird under öf Wurtemburg -- 'tha-- 2nd'vias''the': ----- . _------Army --,, ------the --- Duke -- .-ý, ad- vancing tovra.rd; . and', Thee 4th -Aryry under the, Crown Printe ridw vane ed_throughLuxembura South of this army was the under the Crown PrtncQ of =Bý.va.riý. ývhißh a,dva,nced. torýrJý.rd Verdun and. the bth_ý: rsýy under - Von Heerigen . assemblec'. arGund, ýtrý. esburg. . 4 entered , ýý. . .. The- Germans. _. -. _ Liecre --- Awrvst-"P 5th-after------ý... -- 'a '-- sviritedý. resistance--, - ... on. . af. the belgians ýdstiný;; týro ddys. ' - '--But the 1ý.sý I orts around the city vere t until . no. :reduced ten days later: and only dfier the Germrýxýs had brýugýt: üý - their: heavy artillery, ýT'he`resý. thee forts which north, _ý.:. ßtrýnc© af were -Of the'-- City delayed, -the advance several days Their guns fired on;. the rou.ds und railroad and- hindered; the, movement' of, men and 'snnlies over these raad5d ':. This time-. precious because during these war the Freneh 'an( '. 11-SJ. S_1_ was -ý "r.. first days of -the ý--ý. : ý . . ___ ýý . . ß-q6-uzsn were xkastening tne" r mobilization e to the utmost.

From the. tiiae _. of the f all' of Lie ,... _., and 2nd Arýnies assisted by three Corps under Von Hause, diverted from the advanced in the f aee Of, considerable opp osý.t i on of the B01gia. ns and oc-, Brussels eupisd a iine from Brussels to 1l6mur to Dinant. The,-Germans. - entered August 20th but the Belpians : French hel. dIvamur- Dinant+-, ' ý, and and -

ýý t.. n xuoustv° -.. -v... of ...... äý3nst the ; ý. . _. .ý...... 11th.ý'. the : fr-nch._. be fensive ... ý_ PL* ^. ; Lran - dM. movement ------S_- . t)tin uerma. ns xrrßy which vras in Al sace nd Uozýraineq- The, advance was stisoessiu a.. _ _a. _ until' -iugu ýot -19th time, Ithe 11: Frenth occupied a line including yulhaü$en and Saarburg and 'extendgdat'whichabout-half-. way between sautburg und VIet* . ;: A -glance . the- .., --- show that,. 1line:.. -.. incited its left -- rlanJ___ .. Oy at map will, this attack against - th© Germain; 5th nrmy which was near Tuletz conveniently Ioce, ted- f or such: dn =: left -ý at 'ýc]Ck: ` 'ý'hE3' Cý?ýrttýn'ý+crnir vrvýlyirýw. ýf. Y« 4 n+'vi +hcýtr)i . i" ný.,, ry VKaar.lJnýi+. v +hA French ' MS noýý. v anrý. ýM . ý+ýýº. t, lr uvý ca. ýrGt, t q. Ilu uj'xYý'iA fJi1Gr. 14T3C1 I1Zlu5 T, IlEi T-f3ý3GT1 ýa. iºG. ýinvýsýK .. + _' cý11¬'LiSTi .# . sý-- :w ý- . .. ý,. ... -. -ý. ý: ýý .... ._-,. . ,:., .... ý ...... ý ,ý..: ý- ý .. -s ...;. .... ý..:: ýý ý. , -...... -. .:..,;: . ". . zng zrom r.:uinausen-to Naney*

This de fe4t of the- French near Metz wýwavthe first, blood bdt -r4.veen - the French it on both and Germans and had a..tremendous moral influence- . coun. tries: especially- the Germs,

advanced into Belgium , By Aügust'tbth the French and British had the Gsrmýs. under_ Ruf f t Luxemburg, , o; opP ose -The 3rd x,rmy, ey was pushec:, owärd the rirmy do ' from Sedan_ l4lecieres -4th unäer --vý e r Carv -- w----"--. to: ward. the -)rthewt and. . -ý ._LanE?'1 -n _ý the 5th Ardy 'under I, a.nre-zac from, 5edaxa,to Namur, cindthe' British (twa1corps)

under, Sir: J'ohn French t oward T;ons `. The -t öok position i along the . - the Meuse arnath I 5th Ar3u the vest'bank of extending from Namur, the . - sout)l of bambre from iüdmtjr -t6'6eyoncl Charleroi and the British, extehded the line -of, the' French to the paint" north `Val.enciennes. Notethe s. ient . `west to- a" of:., ,-, sharp` al, ta 14amur ý=

' .. '_. _...... ,"_; .-...... ,. :...... , .. .r. ... ". . .. _- " The French knew that the Germans had; conqieerable superiority. of numbers but greatly "underestimdted that supor3.? rity, ---They, also 'l'overestimated the strength of ýtho. defenses Qfl' Namur "ý". ':. i ý..: ti S'ýý ,"ý: nCý-19 Q. ý'. yl, ý. ri . F"'~ý'ýrýýi'%ta., ýlý''ý_ ý urrt -w ±L-ý rý. : atýd tMe def enýes Qf ýýäiriüýý Tiýe liýtter=hýd'ý reýýy"be©n'oupJeýýeaý'ýv"r, ddvy shell fire, The main ttý, was. rnu,de Nýmura. ; ý, -ýrc 4th Army: ýinu e, ck against On , next' day the French were dr3. from thaý. povitian8 und fron Nýrnur. ven . r August 22r4 23rd the. Ist German Army the British*'-, It was not un- and attacked`. ýý_. -- -"-ý. ý... _. -ýý-...... til:; the late -afternoon oU the. '23rd that the, ý...... Britisb . leurned of tne...r rencnýý"Y. ry- ýredt They ormätiQnº hours es.rlý. etýý _ý --- should 'have o-rotten --this --_--- inf - twenty-ýf otý' t= ___1_.. _" _' ""__ The British commenced their retrßut not'untiJ. August 24th, due tine neiUy : ,t ý._ _, in''_... __.. ý.. _ .. . ý. . -. Vw 4V "vv" --W ý/ ", vý. ": ý.French r. their eettiMa ward of - +. -k a'ra+rn: a+."e%f. +hP and'the, sunerioz' stirengTn Von K].uck, The ` 1,i"üs French 'and British during this bs,ttle : of on between the ý. was very faulty it almöst had disastrous results This battý. e is crý21.e4 and ý , by `,the British-the Battle : ef,. ... .; ý..... "Charleroi.

ýý After-. --_ý -- ý . __ý-,useri ý ý. ww--ý r. -ý. Tw` vv.. w . inýýý, _.. ý. _-. -'O __-. ""_ 4th' French `xrmy . _. . ... 1Ton".Hý. drivinpº. back. the ...... zjoinedin the. attack: ýöf' the 3rd German Amy under the Duke' of 11,jurtembu3rg against the 3rä French Army to, the wouth which resulted in driving baelt T'no x'rench from the Meuse all 41 ong the lino, nea.rly, a, s far as. Verdun. 1 The gommencodfor the. French on`August'- 22nd. end for _ the British the next" day^. It. Iwas fraught with great danger and many hardships esp ecially f or, the British , as they, had farther . go, had gotten a late start to liajsan been stated) to were on the flank which -(due paar , .s as .1and had; almost been developed by ý, z;uch stronger foe. During the retreat ýf3.ýhýý-4=ý ing was continuöua,. and Many 'severe actions took` place especially at Le Ce.teau andGuise, `

On august 28th the Allied line extended from Verdun to Guise, thence ýoýLa-Fere Noyon By; me týý condition ;of the f hý.d and * this tý. ýilýiod orces ; . , greatly, improved,: The French had administered at Guise a sQver ,check, t a, the. -,, Germans and -, 'a newly organized French Army (the 6th) under Ylanoury- had, taken ' Place, an the British It be Joffre did taxe tne ,, 'mibht asked why not . of f ensive'a, t this pldce -insteý. d of givIng ground right to the ` gates of Pýris, ý It is believed` that it been the pj4n of the French commander from the ber -had ginning. to fight the.. first. great battle the line o$; the ..:;: genera.l. l$ a-'serious for alongto his during the courso.. mistake a commandez change plan , Of a campaign. It is. aespecially. so when these plans involve the. rnovement. of a million 'or. more`men. 1t woulä haviceupset the Whole scheme of things to have changed this plan' on nu"st 28th. ý-. ýnother decisive consfera on,.was that there of mobiIý. '" 1arpe` ; Frenchýý-.. -troops l in the ý 6. wereý.. ý-...... units of .. -otiý. c curse `9 it 1 . -t -,. -=, ---ý. -""_... -"I _L .... zatiuvn wnsch woujc( be availab: La on- the Marne and which, were nn avax. iuoie t%ti the line`occupied'Au. gust '26th and also"troopo alreadymbbilizerd'but not in position at--this time. :-By 'the time the 'Allied line reached the Marne the com- have. man tIme. to his. .manderwould e. niaximum number of available and also get position ` organized,, '; 'And` it will be seen 'that the battle commenced before the .trgops dx. foir, buttle were sp ossd the s

So the-, retreat continued ; until º eptember 2nd which date found most of the French and Briti. sh units in positi önlt o'o ff er their decisive resistanc e to the this line the joss"of Ps. probe. bly: uZti- 1ý enemy,,ý. f. ý. ý.,...... at ý... ý. ý.. meant -;.. ý. 'ý.. ý- `, ris and ý_ ._1_ _A. _-Defeat.ý_. .. ý.. : .:. _ý.. . .._

cl ý. .,. -. °'-ý,

ha.d been outlä, wa.s f äýi ýet3, aný intend"ý tiýha.t ned ßnly ýtý. ýeräBS ;:o; ayiný; ed to retard the advance of the invader until the French and British could- complete the movilization of their Armies soias tß offer an=effective resia- t anc ewith ä view to taking the of f ensiv$ thems elves The French at the be-1,

ginning of the German invasion did not knowvvherQ its main blow weuld_ f all, At onetime it appeared to be c oming through Luxemburg and at another through lýetx: It was 'necessary; to enemy Eaong the whole front until his _oppose.-the plan, of-s. ttack developed ! too pp ose this attack with sufficient - force to st °p : it "and to the the time pla. c6 that revel- , counter. attack with reserves at and . apments indicated would offer best chance of SüEcess. r. , ' .-. -; -- ,; ýäýýý-: e pknc: Lple of this atrategy vras'simple, but t3V;j jji%Aj3n was ex+. tremely' difficult `account' German in numbersits and heavy, guns on of . superiority . and on account of the more ra.pid'mobi, lization of, German---troops. : During the pariod gone.., of :the retreat- the mobilization of the French -and British f oraeshs.d on lage portion in the Battle, of the apace and- a -of the',, llied troops-en'g'aged . blurne had had not part in theretredt, General Gallieni had been G the troops ¬.ppointed military ommander of , and defenses of . During thß__days_-imm.odiately_ precsdingthe battle_hQ 3 or no thou ht to the possibility of defeet. This state oß mind seems to have were upset affected their actions when the bettlewent against them) and their plans Allied The retreat pr . ctictilly ended on 2nd, On Sept, 3rd the main -Sept Verdun, Armies extended from the frontier southeast of Nancy, around the notch of be» thence s Guth of the Argonne Forest, thence in a general westerly direction to yond Paris an the northwest. The Germans faced the entire line, This gave a battle line sömewhat in the shape of the figure 54 The Allied armies were left 1st 2nd, 3rd 4th, 7th 5th French Arm*es the numbered from right. to , , , , , British and the 6th French Army. The 7th French army, it's mobilization having just been completed, had had no part in the retreat and had taken -positions be- tween-the 4th and 5th Armies. In some accounts this army is designated the 9th. The German Armies were likewise numbered from right to left , letm 2nd, 3rd Prussian Gue. Corps 3rd 4th, 5th, 61nd 7th. rd- , ,

The location of the French Arries were approximately -as follows: The under Costlenau was in front of Nancy, extending to the left as. far as the defenses of Verdun. The 3Army under Sarrail extended from the dc'. , fenses of Verdun southwest to Mllaurupt 51uthwest of Belloue Woods. The 4th Arms, under Laude de Cary extended the line southwest across the Marne to a point southwest of Sommes,ous. Then came the"' under Foch extending west as far as St. Prix.. From here the 5th Army under d'Esperey and the British under Ur John French carried on the line to beaux on the Marne just outside of Paris. Northwest of Meaux was the under Manaury, The 6th Army had small part in the retreat and the 7th none at all, and the Germane apparaently - did not consider them- as a serious factor in the battle. The 'Cavalry was placed in the line between the armies and generally on the left flank of the Army to W which it belonged.

The 1st German Army under Von Kluck was northeast of Paris, 2nd _The Army under Von Beulow extended the line across the Marne to the south side of the river as far as St Prix. Beyond_ this Army und north of the Marshes ' of St Gond the Guard Corps. Marne a was From the Marshes to the at Vitry lay the 3rd Army under Von Hausen. Beyond this Army was the 4th_Army under the Rake of Nurtemburg reaching neur1y to Belloue Wood, Thence was the Crown Prince's 5th Army extending around the north and east of Verdun. Southeast of Verdun in front of the. 2nd French Army was the 6th German Army. .I

About the Ist of September the Germans under the Crown prince made a violent attack against Verdun. The rather feeblb defense of the Belgian forts lead the Germans to believe that the French fortified places would suffer the same fate as the Belgian forts and no doubt they would have if the French had not learned the lesson taught by the experience of the Belgians. They did lear this lesson promptly and moved their fortress guns from their elaborate emplaces ments and disposed them in concealed p"itions dispersed over the terrain. The attack on Ver-&un failed and the Germans turned their attention to the French line lying east of Nancy.

The French under Costlenau occupied a strong position along a ridge east of Nancy against which the Germans launched attack after attack. These

attacks lasted about a week. - up until September 9th and resulted in heavy cos- ualties in the ranks of the attackers and no advantage gained to compensate for them. It will be seen that this attack, was still in progress during the Batw tle of the Marne and being so close at hand it. should be cönsidered as a part

of that battle. If Costlenau's line had been broken the whole rench line would probably have become untenable and the Battle of the Marne lost. It is probable that the object of these attacks was in part at least, to draw off the the French reserves from the neighborhood of Paris where main German attack ; ras to be launched, and was also to turn the Verdun position, the Germans having. fei).... ed to take it by direct assault. The success of the French resistance lead the Germans. to believe that the French were stronger in this part of the line than. they were, and consequently weaker in the center and left.

battle interest During the first stages of the centers about the French it 6th and the German 1st Armies, will be remembered that the French retreat 2nd. On that the ended about September day center of the German Ist Army was it at about ompeigne facing southwest. 'Aext day was reported to the French come* mander that this Army had swung around and was facing southeast toward the inter- 5th val between the British and the French Army. Kluck's array consisted of eserve Corps-, two Cavalry the 2nd, 3rd' 4th 5th =. and divisions, He advanced 'at Compeigne igrnoring southeast from his position almost the 6th French irmy, on

his right flank between the ='ise and the "Arne and the British who extended the

-3- ýnd of lina-:,.. sout3ý oß the` iýLirne . of the existence ýrýbereýbouts` laI K1uck-- 'ýcnew ý" iý _Lyý... ý #. 0 ;stimated numbers aria i igntij-j, K va.Lý. ° " . ýý.;! ' rý .ý-) ý` +ý_their , ... ý... ,ý ,..,.. ý, ... -ý Klück' 5th the ä: ý-. -wý.. + _ý ý_. ý, _. _7.... -.. ýr ý.. ýV. noon . ý 'py . ýrmv ._ south of the Marne by of. eptember ... except. _f_ ý" ý 4th :Rese`rve GOZas.which .ýs had. been loft ac a flank guard facing the W1 rrencn3 no 1NM.. AANCý C+cý rmv: ' +. 4 '+1, A nýwý. nwu . ný i. hR m, ý--ý ! ý v ... v ý"ýr vV yýiº1V, ýV iai.; º-3` 1' j GL. MIif kilY V V1J47.14 V4 vý. 4 wsý nrý1v vsaýa, J. vw... ý ý".. " C0Y'vS.ý..... the . '-- ,.:::. ,. Ith strength 56th and 55-th''Divisiöns -and` a'Maröccan brigade,, "'-, It was- double the of :;...the 4th _.,,.., -German Reserve Corns but the ist Germ8z Hrmy_ . = -----much: - -- , weuker "- mobilizs. tiah -than 62nd The o.f.:,'the Fürmv had, not vet be4ri Com-olet$d. , Th.e,'G1st and Uilisions : verduný the , the '4th Cvr-(borrowed from* the 3rd rxmy near and _- 45th__ Division öj d been tnis 'were yet. _t oiýiýý ýýven if rý11 the units hý. present rmy_would have been 6 ensiclerOly. 'wadker than-the. German Ist ýArmy.. --,, , Finding Kluck njz'his'ri. `fl: ank' by his "advance sou'th exp as3. ý-ht and rear . . oftbe Narne it wds decided to attack with the 6th Army; even though it hacý seen'. only, aböut half the strength it. -would have '-'a later. It be that. the time of the important-, fewIt wasdays desirable to _will K1ucýt attack, wds z.- allow to, get across the Marne and to become well engaged with the British, and then strike him, in rear after driving back his flank guard. An attack made too; _, soon would allow himI to. recover- himself by'retting`back' across the Marne be- , lore becomi,ng tied dovm°by an enýaý;ement with the British and then to turn tne tr-jxt]. , would es on Manoury. And this that-almost did happen and probably have ' happened 4f "the "is another part the fiel.: . . Gomans had not been defeated in: of .

1: i About noun September 5th 'Manourv. rAttaelced the 4th' Reserve Corps ;_ ,' flank Kluck's guard which was in bs,ttle line north oorleaux extending north and south+At this Kluck had most of his traovs south of the Marne. `' After= 'time crossing the river his was extended approximately along th®-line or` the Great Morin' in the f o11owinzarmy order from richt to left `' 2nd and, 4th-,, Corps, the two Cavalry divisions und the 3rd Corpse Left of. the' 3rd Corps was the 9th Corps of the 2nd Amy., Manoüry advunced to the attack with his

""Army disposed from aright to 1 eft as follovýs. Moroccan Brigi de 55th, 56th Divisions, 7th Corps, The attach but little the '-first day gained . ground :. , nevertheless Kluck with' remarkable proznptnessdiscovered his' zýistAe undproW,

-ceeded to- correct' by. marching his. divisions back across the Marne* ' The _. successful resistance-of his flank. guard: on the first daymight have ;continue uea -to mislead him as to the 'strenath of Manourv's Arnv. ;` As a result Of Von Kluck' the mrningvof bdck s- promptness -the- 6th f ound the 2nd C4rps: -across; the Marne, -. ",This Corps which had the 'shortest distance t1 ,Q8 , cros sed ' the Marne 'the near mouth of the Ourcq. xs Kluck hdd not been engaged vlith. the British there was nothing to prevent: him from reversing the. directions ofhis march without any loss.: of time. ;. On the morning of the 6th, *iiotý only was. the 2nd Corps acros the Marne but the remainder the ist Army 'ras' on its. war' rnrth The twa Ce. of.xear- delayed. the « . valry divisions acted as a guard :and -ofthe British retreating The, advance. who'follOwed t} e Germans . see ond: 'daY; of Man4ury'sattack. was more effective than the first. ' The 45th Division. , arrived that day and took position between the 56th Ditision and. the ?th; Ctiz'p

and-ý.Manoury drove back the enemy line al ong the entire f r4nt ',' but, _. bef ore 'the the day the (which know the -.end of . 2nd Corps we. crossed the Marne. near mouth -of the Ourcq) had taken t'he place on the right= of the 4th Reserve Carps 'ar. d the: th 3d , Corps NidnourY ts f or ', c rushing- cte and . were f ,voming. __ , opportunity a feat by his attack on the Ge -men right -md rear was gone tho' he still` had

ý_.... ý. ý.. issue on ý.. arrival- the German - wa' chance- .. of victory. The nowý"ý... depended the . ... of;.I_ýýý. " .3. corps' which were crossing the Hume', and on the arrival of the remaining unite of the 6th French Army, British were f owing behind the . end -ofthe who oll enemy. During the . It was SeptemberTth and the French ý.utnurabered. , day they were- drivennow- buck. Ion their left which was-were -badly bent. back --between Bet± and Nautetxil. That, evening the 61st Division! arrived end 'at the same time

the '7th Division of-_the 4th Corps. was brought up largely by Paris Motor which . cars, -.taxicabs , private motor vehicles, etce The 61st relieved the-55th and M, in tie ` left the, oraccans " "line and the 7th Division took position on the of 7th Corps. Also the. German-Corps took-its place in _. same afternoon the 4th line- the the 2nd Corps. None newly units =t on . right of of these arrived ooh part- in the action until the next day. During the 8th and 9th the position French to hold of tte lines changed but little that is toy-say the managed - were. increasing hour by eblo their positions but the odds against the French , 8th Division, 4th Corps I&ouv. The French troops were cell in line except the , the were yet to arrive rrhieh crossed the river nn the 9th and though British .into on the (they, 41 so er oesed the Marne on the 9th), they were to go action _ into on right' of the French 6th army The 8th Division was to go position .` his left Kluck the left of the British, ' To meet this 'increased pressure on if continue his attack against would probably draw back his left necessary and It Manoury' Kluck his 3rd Corps in was s left. had not yet placed action. de' to his line further to theright and complete the envelopment and extend Bei" feat of Meinou Army. There were other troops arriving from ºs also , glum reinioreing Kluck's right flank. was the On the afternoon of the 9th the British right wing north of. Marne but th4 left (which was the important part of the British force now as Cavalry 1ºt was near the German left flank) w"as being delayed by the German

and was still south of the river. The German 3rd Corps was well north of the raver. Some of Manoury's troops had' already been withdrawn from eat�!. Circumstances 3ndi! at" hauetion and he now had no prospects of reinforcements . the !d that a withdrawal would be necessary on the 10th. But daylight of durw 10th revealed the f act that the entire German Army had left its position ing the and in' full to the This sudden change night was retreat and `north. the e German plans will be explained by what took place in other parts of fl. Wd

Kluck had c «nmenced his advance on September 4th but the attack Of`the other German Armies 'did not commence until the morning, of the 6th. On that date the attack of all the other German Armies as far as Verdun was launchdd and all the French Armies as far as the 2nd Army in front of Nancy became, en- gaged, It will be remembered the 2nd army was at that time desperately eno-. gaged repelling the German attacks on its position along the high ground east of Nancy;

The action of the 7th French Army under 'Foch will next be taken- up because. this army and the 6th Army, whose fortunes we have already fol1ow- played ed, the most important and most decisive part in the battle. '

It is rjecQSsary to give the location of the 7th A.riny in more detail. Foch. had in his line from left to right; the 42nd Division, a Moroccan Diviv- sifln, two diivisione the 9th Corps two, divisione 11th Corps of , of the and a Cavalry division. His center was at about opposite Le. Fare Chempenoise, his lit-at 'Churleville. southwest of St Prix, and his right extended beyond, Som+º mesous r ailroad junction.

In front of Foch was from his left-to right, the left of the 10th (of Corps the 2nd German Army) the Prussian Guard of two divisions 'and part of the 3rd German Army. The Petit Morin separated the hostile forces end between the Guard on the north and the Moroccan Division and the 9th Corps on the the Marsh St. Gond The Marsh soth was :of . at this time was passa- ble at a number of places but was an important obstacle to the advance of eith- er rorce. The 42nd Division was in touch with the lot Coups of the 5th_ army on its left and the Cavalry on Foeh' right was in touch the 4th . with amy lo :

It was evidently a part-of-the French strategy to allow the center. (the of the line part occupied by the lth Army) to sag to thessth in order make to the flank attack by Manoury if successful more disastrous for the Germans. And a glance at the map shows that the mored advanced the Gera man center the more awkward would-be its position in case Manoury were sue. cessfüi. For this reason Foch during the early stages of the battle was to remain on the defensive and not attempt to'-advance. But the attack of the_- _ 6th Army failed and this failure made the giving of ground by the . a dangerous operation because it weld have the' effect ::of turning the ppoitions the 5th 6th French of and Armies on their right . This Manouxy's -failure when it became known somewhat changed the role of Foch. 7th Tt will be seen that the 5th army on the left of the army advanced Kiuck when retreated back across the Marne and the 42nd Division -und the M: i'ocw cans advanced sightly so as not to become separated from right 'of the 5th Army. in.. its__ advance -but the 9th and 11th Corps remained on the defensive in accordance with the original plan.

During the 6th - the first '-day of the battle in that part of the line- gainat Germans (the 10th Corps 2nd the 42nd Division made no progress the , Army) and the 9th and 11th Corps were driven buck by the Guard Corps and the 12th Corps 3rd rmy. Thus-by evening Focht s left was holding fait While his center, and right were giving ground. ýºt this time it became known that Kluck had been able to make good his escape to the north of the lurne, The next duy the struggle was more intense and the strain on the right of: -the 7th xtmy became very severe, but there was no break. At the same time the 42nd Division ¬Andthe Moraccune aided by the ist Corps 5th Army drove back the enemy in their front. ;I r--- It seems that the Germans saw this opportunity in the weakening 11th Corps. If the line could be broken here the battle was probably won. (the It will be seen that the 10th German Corps one west of the Marshes of St, being driven back the 12th Corps on the other side of _Gond) ..was while the Marshes was advancing, The Guard Corps in trying to keep contact with these-Corps was considerable stretched. As the most decisive action was taking place on the left of the Guard most of the Corpsincltred toward that Germans their especially toward drive side. -The were now bending efforts . . in that ing in the 11th Corps and they na.turu11y diverted their troops di' . reetion ,

On the 8th the 42nd Division and the ? oraccans advanced with heavy losses and dro; -e the- Germans from St. Prix; the 9th Corps which tads prevent-, ed from advancing on account of the Marshes, held fast,, but the; Germans had brought two Corps and most of the Guard against the 11th Corps and it was driven thru La Fere Champenaise and emoine.

Now Foch's army- was in a critical. condition., His left was advancing slightly but his. right was retiring more rapidly and the. pressure he could exert with his left was much less (on-account of his inferiority of numbers) than the pressure being brought against his right. =t was somewhat in the nature of an endurance contest as to which line could hold the longer. The, odds were much in f av`or of the Germans and they evidently counted on breaking the line the 11th Corps before their line the-Marshes of own west of gave _ away. ho doubt their estimate would have proven correct if Foch had been content to allow the contest to proceed along those lines.

On the 9th the Germans threw the every available unit, -into struggle against the 11th Corps and by noon the French line was badly bent. But Foch was making hisplans for that a. ttack which was to turn the tide` of battle save and France. The 9th Corps was slightly drawn to: the rear so as to face northeast and the 42nd Division was withdrawn from its position on the left of the L oroccan. Division behind the interval between the 9th , and placed and llth- Corps. It has -been shown- that the Guard Corps '4zrasnow fighting in two directions`, the right part (the smaller p«rt) supporting- the 2nd army on the west of the Marshes and the left part joining in the aftack of the 3rd army a. ai. nst the 11th Corps on the right, of the Marshes, As these two armies became more separated the Guard line. east of the Marshes became very thin :and it was against this attenuated part of the line that Foch throw the 42nd Division and the 9th Corps. The advance'began about the / noon of 9th. Finding practically no opposition in front of -them Focht s 'me'n swept thru the German lines,

This victory of the 7th army accounts for the withdrawal of the Geri; Ist Army daring the September 9th night of which caused so -much surprise, -to the French 6th Amy, and it 4s o accounts for the withdrawal of the German Armies all the way from west of Verdun to Paris.

The general positions the. French of various and German itrmie$ at the beginning of-the battle has care%dy been given. The parts in the battle French taken by the 6th and 7th zirmies were the most interesting and decisive but the battle was fought and the outcome influenced by all the Armies from beyond Verdun to the battle ground of Manoury and Kluck.

I fro the At the beginning of the battle the 5th French Army, extended m British right south of the Groat Morin to it joined the. 7th ýrny near where in Sezanne% - It was-composed of four Corps the 18th, 10th, 3rd and Ist The order from left to right. The- Cavi lry was in the line on the lefts Corps movements of this Army conformed in general to the movements of the on the right and left. Hence the left advanced along with-the Pritish when the the latter followed the retreat of Kluck, while the right engaged by side the 42nd Division Kluck north of remained almost stationary, % When retreated the Marne right followed by .cross the of the German 2nd Army also retreated, the left of the 5th French. Army.

On the 6th the lath and 3rd Corps (the two on the left) advanced to Monceau Congeraux Corps the sane and about five miles - and the 10th about distance. The first Corps advanced but little, The next day the left was . pushed forward still more,, while the Ist Corps was held buck. But the latter ' On swung around to the east to assist the 42nd Division of the 7th Army.

the8th and 9th the 18th, 3rd and 10th Corps continued their advance) the 18th reaching Chateau Thierry and the 3rd Conde, Thus the Army had swung around

to the northeast about 45 °during those four, days the axis of the movement be- , ing the let Corps, which had not advanced but had changed front from north to This twining 5th the lot Corps threatened east, of the .rmy and especially the flank of the 10th German, Corps west of the Marshes of St. Gond and greatly assisted the advance of Foch's left. This shange of front of the Ist Corps had a tremendous influence on the battle. It is to be noted this change was caused by the attack of Manoury and consequently. the retreat of Kluck fifty

miles to the west. The let Corps was now fighting more as a part of the 7th Army than as a part of the 5th, and it is stated the command of this

Corps was turned over to Foch for the time. At any rate the liaison between these two armies was especially' effective and in marked contrast with that of the 7th Army and the 4th Army on the right. Had it not been for the assist" ance of the 10th and let Corps of the 5th any, Foch would not ' have been able -to have taken the 42nd Division out of the ]one on the morning of the 9th. So we see that at the time of the German retreat the 5th Army, extended'f rem northwest of. Chateau Thierry to St. Prix,

At the commencement of the battle the 4th French Army was on the right of the 7th Army. It was astride of the Marne extending from the right of

the 7th Army to bend Sermaize" It was faced by a part of the 3rd German Army and most of the 4th. The 4th French Army was disposed from. left to right as follows: A Cavalry division, 17th Corps, 12th Corps and 2nd Corps.

On Sunday,. September 6th, the day of the commencement of ' the battle this Army was attacked along its entire front as were the other French Armies. Its position was held and a counter attack by the' 17th Corps on the left drove` the enemy back a short distance. The next day, the flank attack of Kluck on the left German the German High Command _ extreme of -the line having failed decided, as we have seen, to make the decisive attack against the center. Probably for this reason the, attack against the 4th Army was made n much fe greater strength on this day than the day previous. It is that the 4th Army twice divisions it- The was engaged .with as many as contained. result was that the right wds driven back some distance while the 17th Corps held its ground. On the 8th the lines changed but little except that toward *osition. evening the 17th Corps again advanced its -

This Corps we know wqs next to the 11th Corps of the 7th army which on that same day was retiring, The Cavalry of the 7th--Amy was between them, This was a situation somewhat similar to what was taking place at the same time in the German lines at the Marshes of St Gond with such. tragic consequences . to the German plans. If the Germans had had a commander on the ground to

see and to seize this opportunity the outcome of the battle might have been the it Germans did in fact a reverse of . what turned out to be. The send considerable force to attack thru this opening but de Cory, the Commander of the 4th Army, discovered this movement thru the report of his Cavalry and drew two divisions. from his right and sent them across the Marne and'placed the: in-the gap in time to stop the German-advance. It would have been a sober pro- cedure to ýhave drawn back the 17th Corps earlier in the action and thus to have kept it in contact with the right of the 7th Army which was being so/everely this time, pressed at ; This , concludes ; the z,ccunt of the acticri of -the 4th Army Up, Sept ember; , ; night of 9th' when the Gorman retrest bet= ri 5 The 3rd Prench army ýt the of >eauthý ý .. ý"r-...... : ýý ýý beý:inninýv.,.. the bättXeý,,...... ,. ..;. . -. ,. _.... . 1,._extenä©d .1 wesý , or v erdun. Its -laft connectnd rrith the right of the 4th :ýrmy naar und, its right with the field defenses of Verdun. The' line faced Army'; notthwest and ý-app osije it in the Argönn© --Forest. was the 5th German `un- T This . oi14, , was : tha strongss, t German; Army, consistlng_ ` u't least five Corps,, , three of 'vlhichifý. ccd the 3rd French Amy ý.nd,.týJa in front-of Verdtzn. Army' ; During the.. ý'rench `retreat prior to the battle the 3rd; . -had moved but little ' aß the, entire movement was great wheel: -with prdun' s tinß. CLX16.

Two day s be f ore the general Geýan attack this a.rmy had beendeprived'.. , ýý the 4th Corps : and the __42nd Division.. We.havs alr'eadv seen that the 4th' -. . Corps :we.s sent,. by re. il; tö the extrema 1 eft of the7ýFrench. I ine ta, reinförce the save : 6th: Army, and no doubt, that lArm.yfrom defeat -a.lonr the' auroq* Z'he 42nd' Division t0 the 7th Army made the against -was 8ent . and, on September- 9th ,attack the Guard Corps which decided the entire battle,., The deflection of- these

troops took place before the 3rd Army went intoits position. It will be_ . noted-that this Army did not occupy the defenses of Verdun, The dsfenses held by 'especially being- a part of, were -troops not-,: French field Armies mentioned. any of-,_the. already

On September 'Oth the 3rd Army was composed of only the. 5th-Corps of two divisions ,: the 6th Corps now of dnly -one: division and one. brigade'7 and : three 5th left, right,. the reserve divisions f The was on the the 6th; an. the ýý:Lnei reserve. divisions in the socond line behind the `6th Corps. The. first. day tho; lef, t`:,ýý the., ý..drivýzýýýaack thQ itsýýoýitioný. ^ ýlineý;wa. ýbut' ýremýinaýr -hýld . . This wý the,-', end, of the Germaxi, succoss };ý 'irist this thöiýgYi ctheärsuper- _ = ýirmy , iority in as 'great , Oný'the" night the 7th the tixýny;was :reinf oxc-` numbeýrs W ý+of. . by the 15th Carps *hiGh was placed in. the leýt wing the 8th thQr _ ed - `'. ; . .- . : andon . lflst°ion the' 6th ragained, this ha.d e..diff iculty ground vas.' ýý ýý ýýýýý.4Army ý-t-ý-- ý---1 iLý. . .ý .. _ ýý . .. .ý.. _ýý'hile{... ý. iý. "slittl ý-- ý .....a. sx oppý,.".. tie_. ezýemy-- -. --.. ýý ý-z; ont_ý, the n _. ý'GLacK:,dga)nati-ý- zzýr)siý... rn° ný r :ü °ý.atter ?rnacte a. , ; . ý ang the MeusQ;: at Verdun, :the ;.9th ... _. 5. have_ the : m=_- sputhea, : af an, ceught r t_. -.. :_.. - ,. - °_ ". ------. - whic2a=- -- ,would,_-. - '1 ,. . 3rd: Arr#i°imthe ýrear haci°,zt sueceeded t Y_ This attack, hýv, e succ,eea®a a.i ýý ...... ;, . .,: miýº,ýht,ýp:,:.. ,ý. had i;bebn; inade.. earlier:; but 3.t -wasa-,broken. -_off ona. ccount=. af the uerms. n retreaz, ma f, the. 3rd rý:; lvok: e;t. the: ýhývs -howý.the salientýý. t=verdun made the, posa. tiona: ' ýrmy, p¬trtý.vUlý.r.ý.ýr:ý.vulnerdble: -:fr-om',the: rea,r.

,_, ..,. , _,., .-. We have: now followed the actions of. ©ach of the French Armies which= was engaged: int: the Bettle the ý up tha time the German retreat . : :Qf :. arne:. . of.., rsoon'_s; s : the: made-ý.by-. the. thzArmy. vraý dýýscovered he ermdn,, lg. - :ýAs --breach. _? ý. ,. :, -C cmimand knew; that<"ttý. e. ý.ine4. ý.t. the: arne-=was unteMable _ý,nd , the: general retreat line 9th., t wrýs made in f rom. thisl comenoed: the-. night4. "of ;-September' -The re#eý. ýDQdýerder: a3thöugh the French, and:. Pr,itish. lost , no time- in tdk3. ng=upthe; pur-. auitf The threq_ days the l 3th inds . the German.Armies -ý:. f retreat=: e ontiriüedý andý "f a'line from*, the {;ýrgqnne ý`oreat'fextsnding dueT'ýrtest, o COmpeigne: j toccupying: just the Here ths ýretreat endad: The : rigW of the ; German Army was, nörth of -. It the utmäst, im- and :;the {-left half *d. s:ýsouth, that river. _ was of _of bef tö. ýpýortance..;..tý. -the , AlliesAllies that theyý. ttsck,. ©re he Germans had time recover; from the of 'sudden retres. t and organize their position, If--this effects -their ttack was, to be successful it necessary that it be delivered in great, a was,, , ,. f on the entire front simuý.te. neously Ailieshad 1,been marching orce and a,, gý . <<._The ;not.. aid fighting many dayss and it -fis: probe. ble ýthat some ofthe, units vere=. 4t : .; the, Aisne t-ime'_in; c onditi onF.t o: del ive. r such 4ttack. ;And furthermore, -the.,.. ; - German. ýtihg=wwe.was,s E . obstrýc2as to ý well delivered , right . great ; Jost', ghe 5ýh ýýh Arýies had Frosýed yýeve nzný 0- t he rýttrýck of . ýrýd -f - Ahe. 4id j-1 ý ýfa. r-jy; k's'w eý ý.sý ºý_". British a... " 'ý1 ý. +lýý . eý °.. --. ý'ý-ý. -...... Mi, ý. .-$ -" ...... :a-: . ý.. ý :ý.. ý. . . . .14. '.. . ýs_ ý_ .-ý: .. _. _.:., .: _. _-...... _'ý `_It thi¬º< da. ý the that: an _4ttempt., wýs ms.ae=to utiTacz Long .... ., .__, :was _,,;. -. Y;, ., __..1_- 1ý' .---_- 1L.. (!.... L+^lei AQ1 AriC2.---a.. i-ý i i- .. -A-. -- _.iº-- --1_ . me-ý.: - _. ýAL1"_ý -1- -13thP_.! __:._ . _.-a . . ._.. ý...... _---..... ntý IF% ...t1 _ ne:: ßntiare ýronti. 'tI, o1r The lies c3eýiaý4,usy'of the . in, týe'; rear oi ýýý. were pýrticularly rýilrQdd`ri .; hý ý--.yL n.. ý.. i_ ý- ýi : ýý_. L ,.,...t. __ -: . _ .. _ ..._; r ý.,r_..; _1. . ýn %Sanrricorý... nmrnýini_. f! lýýi nný tý . ý ý: ýý _. wL 1NC9. ... r. L3ýblt., w wýý ý.... ý nwýn. _ýäkingfn . : ..; .... - .. -.. .. _ý...... _1NLiWIiIt; y. ', 5... . _. '..:iLü1via[14 }. t--' .. F ,. . 'ýrý ..,.. ._ ... .ý. .. and- l ýst_. thý French c-antinued- until ;the. $v.Qninb af, thq ~16th;, on Ttlý'is =ýýiX_ Gormý, . öirýposit rej.., ý. '. ---.idertý. ble ._ )-ground -_ the; ns .. on8. Tto. . oýt ;corýs, .I a"_ ý... '... a,dýt..-w-. 4,,t .-, "----_ t- .. . -..... ý,nd consoý. ýe, _0ý. ,, -1 _Itý __ _1.

We do not know what here the pl1.1ans of the French German High C and " ommts s and-to what extent these plans rare carried out. The French plans were necessarily tentative as the Germans heal the' `initiative'. It :I -. seems to have been Joffre's intentjon to allow his line to in the- center to : sag seas make -the German retreat mor.e difficult and to attack at a favorable tunity the Oerman oppor- T, right with the 6th' Army, The flank march of Kluck fitted tnprecisp. y tnrith the French plant

The German plan was evidently. an attack against the whole front with flank a attack against the French left. In the execution of this flank at. tack -Kluck underestimated numbers and fighting quality of- the French 6th Army -the and the British. There can be no other explanation. of his leaving so small a. flank guard to protect his right flank and rear. -on September 4th. He must have thought he was attacking the left of the main French line. The liaison between French and British was faulty at times, This al - most -caused a serious disaster at the beginning of the campaign when the , British were twenty four hours late commencing their retreat from the Mous Charleroi 'line because they did, not know that Namur had fallen and that the French had left--their positions. Poor liaison may also account for the fact that the British did not attack Kluck when-his Army was south of the Marne and an unusua], -opp ortunity was lost to inflict upon :an enemy a disastrous. defeat.

It is said that the German staff functioned poorly during the battle and that this as c punts for the fatal opening in the_ Guard Corps thru which Foch launched his attack. The ' German commanders were so intent on breaking the line of the 11th Corps that they threw all thought of their own line to the wind. This shown the necessity of keeping close liaison between adjoin- ing units and at the same time sufficient density of line 'to prevent a breach. And the lack Septem- . also of contact between the 4th and 7th French Armies on ber Bth might have resulted in disaster. This liaison is especially dif fig cult necessary in We and a tattle line extending over a, great distanee, have seen what important " results came from the cooperation between the commanders the Armies, of 5th and 7th This =kind of ooperation` between the ýcommanders ; -- _c of the 4th and 7th Armies, was equally necessary. Nevertheless the sorely pressed 11th Corps was left to fight its ovm fight and its was ig- by -existence nored the' 4th Army. With'-this kind of cooperation on the other end-of the 7th Army it is that the battle have been. losts- . probable would The lessons to be learned from the not be real battle will . apparent un- til we have more complete and 'accurate information as to. the plans of " the' commanders and as to how they were executed We know however that the Battle of the Marne marks the most critical, period of the. war and that the French won in the face a great victory of superiority of numbers , of guns and of all kinds of etuipment