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At'whichabout-Half ý THE l3ýT'ýI,E OF Ti LARNE. This. is most'ý. important ..: : nteresting conflict of ; the Gr,eýdt V1er, battleAt no other the time during the war andwas the the . position A3.lies> so cri. tical. '. secmedthe.t the fate af France bung on d threadof becausa` the 10.68 of the-be. tt9. e 'pz'obý,bly-zýee. nt the: losß of the warý for tha , thetr..; 'All. ied -eauae, The: French know th. t they were fighting prdctisdl,. ly, izt last ditch' nol t° . and thts extremity. doubt contributed in no" emall `'d'egrße,° -theirvictorp"` In get : the be.ttý. it is neýesý" -order' to -aproper conception of _e ary'to have an understanding of the -events which lead up to: it This wi11 r 4"- until iöclude a brief, sketchof the aign' from txie opening of ;hostiý. itiea the'beginning of ;the long period' of trench warfar©. _ The Germä. invdsion Belgium beg= or} August 5th ý mhe general '. .: n of advance extended' froM; h; the '5wiss borc'er; to the ' border,; of: Holland* ulh4usen near . , ? The mobilization of the German Armies-was not complete at this., t:ime but wa -.t_ 15ompleted rapä.dly ýs 'the:. ddvence into Belgium: proceededo ý- ,: , The Army:.of. ixavasiari eonsistec3 of six -f ield Armies: The'-1et Army under Von Kluck direetian : Soitth,. oY:the. advatced °vurestwdxdin the ,of. Antwerp. l st"Arrny; wa,s the. Znd tirmv under Von 8ul ow. which 'advs: noed `in the *direeti On. Of South' sf. "Ird under öf Wurtemburg -- 'tha-- 2nd'vias''the': ----- . _- ---- -- --Army --,, --------the --- Duke -- .-ý, ad- vancing tovra.rd; Namur. and'Charleroi, Thee 4th -Aryry under the, Crown Printe ridw vane ed_throughLuxembura South of this army was the 5th army under the Crown PrtncQ of =Bý.va.riý. ývhißh a,dva,nced. torýrJý.rd Verdun and. the bth_ý: rsýy under - Von Heerigen . assemblec'. arGund, ýtrý. esburg. 4 entered , ýý. .. The- Germans. _. -. _ Liecre --- Awrvst-"P 5th-after----- - ý... -- 'a'-- sviritedý. resistance--, - ... on. af. the belgians ýdstiný;; týro ddys. ' - '--But the 1ý.sý I orts around the city vere t until . no. :reduced ten days later: and only dfier the Germrýxýs had brýugýt: üý - their: heavy artillery, ýT'he`resý. thee forts which north, _ý.:. ßtrýnc© af were -Of the'-- City delayed, -the advance several days Their guns fired on;. the rou.ds und railroad and- hindered; the, movement' of, men and 'snnlies over these raad5d ':. This time-. precious because during these war the Freneh 'an( '. 11-SJ. S_1_ was -ý "r.. first days of -the ý--ý. : ý . ___ ýý . ß-q6-uzsn were xkastening tne" r mobilization e to the utmost. From the. tiiae _. of the f all' of Lie ,... _., and 2nd Arýnies assisted by three Corps under Von Hause, diverted from the 3rd Army advanced in the f aee Of, considerable opp osý.t i on of the B01gia. ns and oc-, Brussels eupisd a iine from Brussels to 1l6mur to Dinant. The,-Germans. - entered August 20th but the Belpians : French hel. dIvamur- Dinant+-, ' ý, and and - ýý t.. n xuoustv° -.. -v... of ......... äý3nst the ; ý. _. .ý. .... 11th.ý'. the : fr-nch._. be fensive ... ý_ PL* ^. ; Lran - dM. movement - -- --- -S_- . t)tin uerma. ns xrrßy which vras in Al sace nd Uozýraineq- The, advance was stisoessiu a.. _ _a. _ until' -iugu ýot -19th time, Ithe 11: Frenth occupied a line including yulhaü$en and Saarburg and 'extendgdat'whichabout-half-. way between sautburg und VIet* . ;: A -glance . the-.., --- show that,. 1line:.. -..incited its left -- rlanJ___ .. Oy at map will, this attack against - th© Germain; 5th nrmy which was near Tuletz conveniently Ioce, ted- f or such: dn =: left -ý at 'ýc]Ck: ` 'ý'hE3' Cý?ýrttýn'ý+crnir vrvýlyirýw. ýf. Y« 4 n+'vi +hcýtr)i . i" ný.,, ry VKaar.lJnýi+. v +hA French ' MS noýý. v .anrý ýM . ý+ýýº. t, lr uvý ca. ýrGt, t q. Ilu uj'xYý'iA fJi1Gr. 14T3C1 I1Zlu5 T, IlEi T-f3ý3GT1 ýa. iºG. ýinvýsýK .. + _' cý11¬'LiSTi .# . sý-- :w ý- . .. ý,. ... -. -ý. ý: ýý .... ._-,. ,:., .... ý ... .. .ý ,ý..: ý- ý .. -s ...;. .... ý..:: ýý ý. , -... ... -. .:..,;: . ". zng zrom r.:uinausen-to Naney* This de fe4t of the- French near Metz wýwavthe first, blood bdt -r4.veen - the French it on both and Germans and had a..tremendous moral influence- . coun. tries: especially- the Germs, advanced into Belgium , By Aügust'tbth the French and British had the Gsrmýs. under_ Ruf f t Luxemburg, , o; opP ose -The 3rd x,rmy, ey was pushec:, owärd the rirmy do ' from Sedan_ l4lecieres -4th unäer --vý e r Carv-- w----"--. to: ward. the -)rthewt and. -ý ._LanE?'1 -n _ý the 5th Ardy 'under I, a.nre-zac from, 5edaxa,to Namur, cindthe' British (twa1corps) under, Sir: J'ohn French t oward T;ons `. The 4th Army -t öok position i along the . - the Meuse arnath I 5th Ar3u the vest'bank of extending from Namur, the . - sout)l of bambre from iüdmtjr -t6'6eyoncl Charleroi and the British, extehded the line -of, the' French to the paint" north `Val.enciennes. Notethe s. ient . `west to- a" of:., ,-, sharp` al, ta 14amur ý= ' .. '_. _....... ,"_; .-......,. :... ......, .. .r. ... ". .. _- " The French knew that the Germans had; conqieerable superiority. of numbers but greatly "underestimdted that supor3.? rity, ---They, also 'l'overestimated the strength of ýtho. defenses Qfl' Namur "ý". ':. i ý..: ti S'ýý ,"ý: nCý-19 Q. ý'. yl, ý. ri . F"'~ý'ýrýýi'%ta., ýlý''ý_ ý urrt -w ±L-ý rý. : atýd tMe def enýes Qf ýýäiriüýý Tiýe liýtter=hýd'ý reýýy"be©n'oupJeýýeaý'ýv"r, ddvy shell fire, The main ttý, was. rnu,de Nýmura. ; ý, -ýrc 4th Army: ýinu e, ck against On , next' day the French were dr3. from thaý. povitian8 und fron Nýrnur. ven . r August 22r4 23rd the. Ist German Army the British*'-, It was not un- and attacked`. ýý_. -- -"-ý. ý... _. -ýý-.......til:; the late -afternoon oU the. '23rd that the, ý......Britisb . leurned of tne...r rencnýý"Y. ry- ýredt They ormätiQnº hours es.rlý. etýý _ý --- should 'have o-rotten --this --_--- inf - twenty-ýf otý' t= ___1_.. _" _' ""__ The British commenced their retrßut not'untiJ. August 24th, due tine neiUy : ,t ý._ _, in''_... __.. ý.. _ .. ý. -. Vw 4V "vv" --W ý/ ", vý. ": Frenchý. r. their eettiMa ward of - +. -k a'ra+rn: a+."e%f. +hP and'the, sunerioz' stirengTn Von K].uck, The ` 1,i"üs French 'and British during this bs,ttle : of on between the ý. was very faulty it almöst had disastrous results This battý. e is crý21.e4 and ý , by `,the British-the Battle : ef,.Mons ... .; ý..... "Charleroi. ýý After-. --_ý -- ý . __ý-,useri ý ý. ww--ý r. -ý. Tw` vv.. w . inýýý, _.. ý. _-. -'O __-. ""_ 4th' French `xrmy . _. ... 1Ton".Hý. drivinpº. back. the .... ..... zjoinedin the. attack: ýöf' the 3rd German Amy under the Duke' of 11,jurtembu3rg against the 3rä French Army to, the wouth which resulted in driving baelt T'no x'rench from the Meuse all 41 ong the lino, nea.rly, a,s far as. Verdun. 1 The gommencodfor the. French on`August'- 22nd. end for great retreat _ the British the next" day^. It. Iwas fraught with great danger and many hardships esp ecially f or, the British , as they, had farther . go, had gotten a late start to liajsan been stated) to were on the flank which -(due paar , .s as .1and had; almost been developed by ý, z;uch stronger foe. During the retreat ýf3.ýhýý-4=ý ing was continuöua,. and Many 'severe actions took` place especially at Le Ce.teau andGuise, ` On august 28th the Allied line extended from Verdun to Guise, thence ýoýLa-Fere Noyon By; me týý condition ;of the f hý.d and * this tý. ýilýiod orces ; . , greatly, improved,: The French had administered at Guise a sQver ,check, t a, the. -,, Germans and -, 'a newly organized French Army (the 6th) under Ylanoury- had, taken ' Place, an the British It be Joffre did taxe tne ,, 'mibht asked why not . of f ensive'a, t this pldce -insteý. d of givIng ground right to the ` gates of Pýris, ý It is believed` that it been the pj4n of the French commander from the ber -had ginning. to fight the.. first. great battle the line o$; the Marne..:;: genera.l. l$ a-'serious for alongto his during the courso.. mistake a commandez change plan , Of a campaign. It is. aespecially. so when these plans involve the. rnovement. of a million 'or. more`men. 1t woulä haviceupset the Whole scheme of things to have changed this plan' on nu"st 28th. ý-. ýnother decisive consfera on,.was that there of mobiIý. '" 1arpe` ; Frenchýý-.. -troops l in the ý 6. wereý.. ý-...... units of .. -otiý. c curse `9 it 1 . -t -,. -=, ---ý. -""_... -"I _L .... zatiuvn wnsch woujc( be availab: La on- the Marne and which, were nn avax. iuoie t%ti the line`occupied'Au. gust '26th and also"troopo alreadymbbilizerd'but not in position at--this time. :-By 'the time the 'Allied line reached the Marne the com- have. man tIme. to his. .manderwould e. niaximum number of available and also get position ` organized,, '; 'And` it will be seen 'that the battle commenced before the .trgops dx. foir, buttle were sp ossd the s So the-, retreat continued ; until º eptember 2nd which date found most of the French and Briti. sh units in positi önlt o'o ff er their decisive resistanc e to the this line the joss"of Ps.
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