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Reeta Ramasamy Can ASEAN work? Political and Strategic Diversity within a shifting Indo-Pacific Order. Reeta Ramasamy A thesis in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Philosophy School of Humanities and Social Sciences CANBERRA 2016 Contents Page List of Acronyms 2 List of Tables 4 Chapter One: Introduction 5 Chapter Two: Literature Review and Conceptual Framework 14 Chapter Three: Sources of Unity and Disunity 38 Chapter Four: Chapter Four: Nexus of Diversity of ASEAN Strategic 63 Orientations with Great Power to Intra-ASEAN Unity. Chapter Five: External Power Economic Nexus to Intra-ASEAN Disunity 105 Chapter Six: Ties that Bind? 155 Conclusion 181 Appendix 1 195 References 200 1 List of Acronyms ACFTA ASEAN-China Free Trade Area ADB Asian Development Bank ADMM ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting ADMM-Plus ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting-Plus AEC ASEAN Economic Community AFC ASEAN Financial Crisis AFTA ASEAN Free Trade Area AHA Centre ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management AIA ASEAN Investment Area AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank AMM ASEAN Ministerial Meeting ARF ASEAN Regional Forum ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASEAN Community Association of Southeast Asian Nations Community ASC ASEAN Security Community ASCC ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community ASEM Asia-Europe Meeting ASEAN-plus Association of Southeast Asian Nations-Plus CARAT Exercise Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training CBM Confidence Building Measures CEPT Common Effective Preferential Tariff CLMV Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam CMIM Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization EDSM Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone FDI Foreign Direct Investment FTA Free Trade Area GDP Gross Domestic Product IR International Relations MSP Malacca Straits Patrol NAM Non-Aligned Movement NTS Non-Traditional Security OROB One Road One Belt PD Preventative Diplomacy RCEP Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership RIMPAC Rim of the Pacific ROO Rules of Origin SCS South China Sea SEA South East Asia SEACATT Southeast Asia Cooperation and Training TAC Treaty of Amity and Cooperation TPP Trans-Pacific Partnership USA United States of America USA-ASEAN United States of America- Association of Southeast Asian Nations UN United Nations WTO World Trade Organisation 2 ZOPFAN Zone of Peace, Friendship and Neutrality 3 List of Tables Table Page Table 2.1 GDP per Capita by ASEAN Country (current US$) 27 Table 2.2 ASEAN Country GDP Composition 28 Table 3.1 Shifts in ASEAN GDP per capita ($) 45 Table 3.2 GDP per Capita by ASEAN Country (current US$) 58 Table 3.3 Military Expenditure by country between 1988-1999 60 Table 4.1 Major Military Exercises 71 Table 4.2 Strategic allies for individual countries by overall rank. 73 Table 4.3 Military Expenditure between 2000-2008. 75 Table 4.4 ASEAN Member States Economy Total Import partners (2014) 84 By main destination Table 4.5 ASEAN Member States Economy Total Export partners (2014) 85 By main destination Table 4.6 List of China’s strategic partners in the region 93 Table 4.7 Military Expenditure between 2008-2015. 99 Table 5.1 ASEAN Member States Economy Total Import partners (2000) 107 By main destination Table 5.2 ASEAN Member States Economy Total Import partners (2014) 108 By main destination Table 5.3 ASEAN Member States Economy Total Export partners (2000) 109 By main destination Table 5.4 ASEAN Member States Economy Total Export partners (2014) 110 By main destination Table 5.5 GDP per Capita by ASEAN Country (current US$) 116 Table 5.6 ASEAN Country GDP Composition 117 Table 5.7 Import levels 119 Table 5.8 Export levels 120 Table 5.9 Net Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment, 2008-2010 (USD 123 Million) Table 5.10 List of China’s strategic partners 132 Table 5.11 Key Features of the TPP and the RCEP agreements (as of Feb 142 2017) Table 6.1 GDP per Capita by ASEAN Country (current US$) 160 Appendix 1 Representative sample of the external strategic relations among 195 ASEAN members 4 Introduction The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) turns 50 in 2017. The Association’s journey to this milestone has been fraught with ups and downs as it has attempted to have an influential role in shaping the regional landscape. ASEAN is a forum where its smaller and weaker members have the opportunity to have their voices heard over the clamour of much louder foreign powers such as the United States of America (U.S.A.), China and Japan. ASEAN has consistently used its platform to emphasize on the importance of the pacific management of disputes and differences, especially considering the region’s conflict-ridden history that goes back to its colonial period. ASEAN’s approach to conflict management has enabled its member states to shift their focus and attention to their respective nation-building processes. ASEAN’s stated intentions and reality have been at odds during many occasions. ASEAN has been relatively successful in fostering economic cooperation among its members and there has not been an outbreak of inter-state war since its inception in 1967. However, factors such as lingering historical animosity and inter-state rivalry still run deep among its diverse members. These variables when set against the broader regional and global contexts have, at times, challenged ASEAN’s capacity to unite its member behind a shared threat perception and have their collective voices be heard. To be fair, ASEAN has managed to exercise a considerable degree of influence in the region as seen in the role that it played during the Cambodian Crisis and in the way that it has tried to keep foreign powers peacefully engaged in the region during the post-Cold War period. ASEAN’s capacity to have any plausible influence in the region has also been impaired by internal divisions, deep levels of distrust among its members and their preference for informal institutional processes. The most striking instance of ASEAN’s disunity and its ineffectiveness in playing a stabilizing role in the region was evident during the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) of 1997. 5 Recent developments in the region have yet again thrown the spotlight on ASEAN’s unity and its capacity to unite its members behind a shared threat perception in order to exercise its plausible influence in the region. The catalyst for this study is ASEAN’s failure to issue a joint communiqué during the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in 2012 over China’s behaviour in the South China Sea (SCS) dispute. For the first time in ASEAN’s 45 year history, the Association had failed to issue a joint communiqué because the Cambodian Chairperson had refused to accept the requests from the Philippines and Vietnam to include their respective grievances over China’s increasing assertiveness in the disputed region. It was later revealed that Cambodia had come under the influence of China and had been awarded with a $9.6 billion investment project for upholding Beijing’s interests in the meeting. While much has been made about this incident, more recent instances of a similar nature have drawn attention to the extent that ASEAN has become a deeply divided and dysfunctional organisation. Divisions within ASEAN are not new. However, the level of acrimony displayed between members has been particularly high during such developments and warrants an exploration on the disparity between ASEAN’s appearances of unity and its reality. This is because several instances of division within ASEAN may not imply anything much apart from what is expected among ten widely varying members. However, the role and impact that foreign powers like China appear to be increasingly having on some members and the resulting impact on ASEAN’s unity suggest that there may be deeper underlying disparities within the Association that are ripe for the picking. The research paper argues that ASEAN’s utility, relevance, and ultimately legitimacy is increasing becoming doubtful because its capacity to unify its own members behind a shared threat perception is being challenged by the diversity of its members’ strategic orientations and political values. This challenge is being exacerbated against the backdrop of growing 6 great power rivalry between China and the United States in the region. ASEAN’s limited success in generating greater strategic, economic and political cooperation among its members and its resulting inability to unify its own members behind a shared threat perception appears to be compelling some of its members to align themselves more with a diverse range of foreign powers to secure their domestic interests. The asymmetrical relations that have evolved among some of its members and external actors are posing as an added challenge to ASEAN’s unity. This is because recipient states are increasingly reluctant to show solidary with ASEAN and jeopardize the lucrative relations that they have developed with these foreign powers. Some member states have then used the Association’s own processes and norms such as the consensus-based, decision-making process and the Chairperson position to deliberately undermine ASEAN’s unity in order to protect these asymmetrical relations. The resulting acrimony and division within ASEAN appears to be adding another layer of distrust and competitiveness among its members who are then aligning even more with a diversity of external actors to secure their domestic interests. This cycle of distrust and dysfunction does not bode well for ASEAN because the legitimacy of its own forums is being eroded by this new dimension to its disunity and impacting upon its ability to exercise its influence in the region. This new aspect to ASEAN’s disunity also has implications for the autonomy of the Association and the region. This is because if this type of disruptive behaviour becomes more deeply entrenched within ASEAN, then member states are increasingly going to be compelled choose between their lucrative economic partnerships with China and their strategic partnerships with the United States.
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