Seabasing: All Ahead, Slow

Thinking About Seabasing: All Ahead, Slow By Robert Work 2006 ABOUT THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments is an independent, non-partisan policy research institute established to promote innovative thinking and debate about national security strategy and investment options. CSBA’s goal is to enable policymakers to make informed deci- sions in matters of strategy, security policy, and resource allocation. CSBA provides timely, impartial and insightful analyses to senior decision makers in the executive and legislative branches, as well as to the media and the broader national security establishment. CSBA encourages thoughtful participation in the development of national security strategy and policy, and in the allocation of scarce human and capital resources. CSBA’s analysis and outreach focuses on key ques- tions related to existing and emerging threats to US national security. Meeting these challenges will require transforming the national security establishment, and we are devoted to helping achieve this end. CSBA is directed by Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevich and funded by foundation, corporate and individual grants and contributions, and gov- ernment contracts. 1730 Rhode Island Ave., NW Suite 912 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 331-7990 http://www.csbaonline.org Contents Acknowledgements ...................................................... i Executive Summary ................................................... iii I. What’s in a Name? ................................................. 1 Defining Sea Basing .......................................................... 3 Which Way Ahead? .......................................................... 10 Purpose, Scope, and Organization .................................... 12 Seabasing: a Maritime Concept......................................... 15 II. The Rise of Seabasing and Naval Maneuver in US Strategic Thought and Operations ....................... 17 The Continental Era: Watching and Learning ..................... 20 The Expeditionary Era: Competing for and Claiming the Sea as Base ....................................................................... 25 World War II: A “Sea as Base” Joint Power-projection Fleet .. 30 Seabases for Naval Tactical Aviation ............................... 30 Fleet Logistics Seabases ............................................... 33 Amphibious Assault Seabases for Advanced Base Seizure and Theater Forcible Entry .......................................... 37 Mobile Seabased Harbors .............................................. 43 Naval Maneuver .............................................................. 45 III. The Fall of Seabasing and Naval Maneuver and the Rise of “RSOI” ............................................... 51 The Garrison Era: Power-Projection Out, Garrison Reinforce- ment In ...................................................................... 53 The Evolution of the US Strategic Military Transportation System ........................................................................ 59 The Operational Maneuver Fleet: Quo Vadis? ...................... 62 A Question of Deployment and Employment ....................... 70 A New Planning Focus: RSOI ........................................... 71 The Death of Seabasing? ................................................. 72 IV. Back to the Future: The Joint Expeditionary Era .. 75 The Return to an Expeditionary Posture ............................. 75 The Maturation of the Guided Weapons Warfare Regime ...... 82 Of Ship Counts and Command of the Seas ......................... 88 A Renewed Emphasis on Seabased Power-projection ........... 93 The Emergence of Joint Littoral Warfare ............................ 96 A Renaissance for Seabasing ........................................... 98 V. Seabasing Makes a Comeback: The Evolution of Seabasing through 2001 ................................... 101 DoN Lift II, the MRS, the BUR, and MRS BURU ..................103 Land Bases at Sea: the Mobile Offshore Base ....................108 The Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Mobility: Toward Global Expeditionary Maneuver and Movement ....110 The Army After Next: Introducing Operational Maneuver From Strategic Distances ..............................................112 The Marines Weigh In: Introducing Operational Maneuver From the Sea and Ship-to-Objective Maneuver ................116 MPF 2010 and Beyond and Seabased Logistics ...................119 Initial Navy Responses ...................................................122 In the Navy’s Defense: Extenuating Circumstances ............128 The National Defense Panel ............................................130 Task Force Hawk: a Systemic Failure in Expeditionary Move- ment .........................................................................134 The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century ......................................................................137 Speedbump: MRS 2005 ..................................................140 MPF(F): If You Can’t Beat Them, Co-opt Them ...................142 The 2001 QDR ..............................................................146 Needed: An External Stimulus .........................................150 VI. Seabasing Ascendant ........................................ 153 Reinforcing Fires: Operation Enduring Freedom .................154 The 2002 National Security Strategy ................................156 OA 2003: The Need for Speed ........................................157 Sea Power 21: The Navy Embraces Seabasing—of a Sort ...162 Enhanced Networked Seabasing and the MPF(F) AoA ..........168 MOB, the Sequel ............................................................171 The 2003 Draft Seabasing Concept of Operations ..............173 The 2003 Naval Transformational Roadmap .......................175 Reinforcing Fires: Operation Iraqi Freedom .......................180 The DSB Task Force on Seabasing: Cementing the Link Between the MPF(F) and Forcible Entry Operations (and Calling Into Question the Future of Amphibious Surface Assaults) .....................................................................182 Seabased Logistics: PA&E (and JFCOM) Weigh In ...............193 The JFEO PDM Study ......................................................195 The Advanced Mobility Concepts Study .............................199 Joint Seabasing Initiatives ..............................................202 Improving the Combat Logistics Force ..........................202 Improving the Logistics Prepositioning Force ..................204 The Joint High Speed Vessel Program ............................207 The Joint Enable Theater Access—Sea Ports of Debarka- tion (JETA-SPOD) ACTD ..............................................210 The National Research Council Weighs In ..........................212 The Global Defense Posture Review and Continued Access Problems ....................................................................213 “Sea Swap:” Extending Ships on Global Patrol and Scouting Missions ......................................................................216 Making a Run on Amphibious Surface Assaults ..................220 The Fox in the Henhouse: the Seabasing JIC .....................224 All Ahead, Flank: Pursuing the MPF(F) Solution (Or: When Concepts and Reality Collide) ........................................234 Been There, Done That: Thinking About the Pentomic Trans- formation ....................................................................242 VII. Developing a New Way Ahead .......................... 247 The 2005 National Defense Strategy and the 2006 Quadren- nial Defense Review: Establishing a New Direction for the Future of Seabasing .....................................................250 Conducting a Zero Baseline Seabasing Review ..................258 Step One: Adopting New Maritime-Focused Definitions .......260 Step Two: Questioning Old Assumptions, and Making New Ones ..........................................................................265 Old Assumption #1: Joint and DoN Seabasing Efforts Should Focus on the “Seizing the Initiative Phase” of a “Traditional” Power-projection Operation ......................265 Old Assumption #2: “Operationalized” Maritime Prepo- sitioning Ships Can Replace Amphibious Ships in the Assault Echelon of an Attack From the Sea ...................270 Old Assumption #3: The Future Amphibious Landing Force Should be Optimized for Aerial Maneuver .....................274 New Assumption #1: The Future Expeditionary Maneu- ver Fleet Must be Prepared to Operate Under Threat of Nuclear Attack ..........................................................282 Step Three: Reviewing Current Seabasing Capabilities, Diag- nosing Deficiencies, and Developing Alternative Plans .......286 Strategic/Prompt Global Conventional Strike Operations ..287 Global Patrolling and Scouting and Rapid Crisis Response Operations ...............................................................288 Unwarned Unilateral Punitive Strikes and Raids ...............292 Persistent Surveillance of Coastal Areas of Interest and Overt and Covert Special Operations Support ...............294 Rapid Global Movement of Joint Goods and Services Along Interior Lines and Naval Maneuver, Including Forcible Entry Operations, to Exploit an Exterior Advantage .......297 Sustained Combat, Combat Support, and Combat Service Support of Joint and Combined Forces Operating Afloat and Ashore ...............................................................300

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