DOCSLIB.ORG

A NEW GLOBAL DEFENSE POSTURE for the SECOND TRANSOCEANIC ERA Thinking Smarter About Defense

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
A NEW GLOBAL DEFENSE POSTURE for the SECOND TRANSOCEANIC ERA Thinking Smarter About Defense A NEW GLOBAL DEFENSE POSTURE FOR THE SECOND TRANSOCEANIC ERA Andrew Krepinevich Robert O. Work Thinking Center for Strategic and Budgetary Smarter Assessments About CSBA Defense csbaonline.org A New US Global Defense Posture for the Second Transoceanic Era Andrew F. Krepinevich Robert O. Work Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments 2007 . TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................................... I Global Defense Posture Defined .......................................................................... ii The American “Leasehold Empire”: A Preference for Expeditionary Postures . iii Transitioning to a New Expeditionary Posture ............................................. iii Adjusting to New Defense Challenges ............................................................... iv A Long War Against Radical Islamist Extremists ......................................... iv Nuclear-armed Rogue or Unstable States ..................................................... v The Rise of China ........................................................................................... v Supporting Preemptive and Preventive Action ............................................. vi Global Defense Posture and Strategic and Operational Concepts: a Growing Linkage .............................................................................................................. vii An Encouraging Start ......................................................................................... vii I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 1 A New Global Military Posture Review ................................................................ 1 “Global Military (Defense) Posture” Defined ....................................................... 2 Why Reorienting the US Global Military Posture is an Important Topic for Debate .................................................................................................................. 5 A Word on Organization ....................................................................................... 7 II. THINKING ABOUT GLOBAL MILITARY POSTURES ........................................................... 9 Forward-Based Forces ......................................................................................... 9 Interior or Exterior Bases ............................................................................. 11 Sovereign or Foreign Bases ......................................................................... 12 Exclusive, Shared, and Participating Bases ................................................ 14 Campaign and Expeditionary Bases ............................................................ 14 Basing Networks ................................................................................................ 15 Forward, Peripheral, Intermediate, Remote, and Sanctuary Bases ............ 16 Chokepoint Bases ......................................................................................... 17 Main Operating Bases, Forward Operating Sites, and Cooperative Security Locations ...................................................................................................... 18 Forward-Deployed Forces .................................................................................. 19 Mobile Bases ................................................................................................ 20 Global Attack Forces ......................................................................................... 22 Strategic Mobility and Logistics Forces ............................................................ 23 Forcible Entry Forces ........................................................................................ 28 Rapid Base Construction Forces .................................................................. 29 Global C3I Forces .............................................................................................. 29 Security Relationships and Legal Agreements ................................................. 32 Status-of-Forces Agreements ....................................................................... 33 Transit Right Agreements ............................................................................ 34 The Connective Tissue: Strategic and Operational Concepts .......................... 34 The American Leasehold Empire ....................................................................... 35 A History of Garrison and Expeditionary Postures ...................................... 37 III. US (GLOBAL) MILITARY POSTURE UP TO WORLD WAR II............................................. 39 The Continental Era, 1773-1889: A Naval Expeditionary Posture..................... 39 A Continental Basing Structure ................................................................... 40 Leasehold Support Bases for Naval Forward-Deployments ........................ 40 An Imperial Expansion Into the Pacific........................................................ 42 Global Attack Forces = Strategic Mobility Forces = Naval Forces ............. 43 Toward a Global Telecommunications Network ......................................... 44 The Continental/Naval Expeditionary Era: Global “Lite” ............................. 46 The Oceanic Era, 1890-1946: A Service Expeditionary Posture ....................... 46 Toward a Sovereign Exterior Basing Network ............................................. 48 Forward-Deployed Forces and Expeditionary Campaigns ........................... 51 A New Emphasis on the Transoceanic Movement of Forces, Troops and Cargo ............................................................................................................ 52 Interwar Improvements in Strategic Mobility and Forcible Entry ............... 54 Developing a Long-Range Military Command and Control System.............. 58 The Oceanic Era’s Service Expeditionary Posture: Thinking Globally, Acting Regionally ..................................................................................................... 62 IV. WORLD WAR II: GOING GLOBAL ............................................................................... 65 Expanding the Pacific and Atlantic Defensive Perimeters ............................... 65 Exploiting the British Global Basing Structure ................................................. 66 Closing the Circle: Linking the Allies’ Atlantic and Pacific Basing Networks .. 68 Mobile Sea Bases Make Their Appearance ....................................................... 69 Mobile Air Bases for Fleet and Joint Action ................................................ 70 Mobile Logistics Bases ................................................................................ 71 Mobile Assault Sea Bases ............................................................................ 72 A Global Expeditionary Movement and Maneuver System ............................... 73 The Key Component: Sealift ......................................................................... 73 Airlift Makes an Important Contribution ...................................................... 73 Combat Logistics Forces for Fleet Support ................................................. 74 Forcible Entry Forces and Rapid Construction Bases ................................. 74 A Global C3I System .......................................................................................... 77 Global Superpower, Global Military Posture ..................................................... 78 V. 1942-1947: GLOBAL DEFENSE POSTURE REVIEW, TAKE ONE ...................................... 81 An Emerging Ideology of National Preparedness .............................................. 81 JCS Plan 570/2: A Return to a Regionally-Focused Military Posture? .............. 82 Negotiating—or Dictating—Foreign Basing Rights? .......................................... 84 Finalizing JCS 570/2 ........................................................................................... 86 The Services Make Their Initial Postwar Plans ................................................ 87 JCS Plan 570/40: Inching Toward a Global Posture .......................................... 89 1945-1947: When Plans and Realities Collide ................................................... 92 A Grave and Gathering Threat ........................................................................... 94 VI. THE TRANSOCEANIC ERA, AKA THE COLD WAR, 1947-1989: ADOPTING A NEW GARRISON POSTURE ......................................................................................................................... 97 Settling In For a Long Cold War ......................................................................... 97 JCS 570/83: Going Global (On the Cheap) ......................................................... 98 1949-1953: A Remarkable Turnaround ............................................................ 100 A New Leasehold Empire: Building The Transoceanic Era’s Global Basing Network ........................................................................................................... 103 Toward Forward-Deployed “Combat Credible” Forces .................................... 105 The Emergence of Global (Nuclear) Attack Forces ........................................ 109 A New Strategic Reinforcement System ......................................................... 114 Airlift ..........................................................................................................
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Emperor Hirohito (1)” of the Ron Nessen Papers at the Gerald R
    The original documents are located in Box 27, folder “State Visits - Emperor Hirohito (1)” of the Ron Nessen Papers at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. Copyright Notice The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Ron Nessen donated to the United States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections. Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. Digitized from Box 27 of The Ron Nessen Papers at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN ~ . .,1. THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN A Profile On the Occasion of The Visit by The Emperor and Empress to the United States September 30th to October 13th, 1975 by Edwin 0. Reischauer The Emperor and Empress of japan on a quiet stroll in the gardens of the Imperial Palace in Tokyo. Few events in the long history of international relations carry the significance of the first visit to the United States of the Em­ peror and Empress of Japan. Only once before has the reigning Emperor of Japan ventured forth from his beautiful island realm to travel abroad. On that occasion, his visit to a number of Euro­ pean countries resulted in an immediate strengthening of the bonds linking Japan and Europe.
    [Show full text]
  • Post-Cold War Developments and Emergence of Other Centres of Power: Japan, EU & BRICS
    Post-Cold War Developments and Emergence of Other Centres of Power: Japan, EU & BRICS Paper: Perspectives on International Relations and World History Lesson: Post-Cold War Developments and Emergence of Other Centres of Power: Japan, EU & BRICS Lesson Developer: Ankit Tomar College: Miranda House, University of Delhi Institute of Lifelong Learning, University of Delhi Post-Cold War Developments and Emergence of Other Centres of Power: Japan, EU & BRICS Post-Cold War Developments and Emergence of Other Centres of Power: Japan, EU& BRICS TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction Defining Post-Cold War Era Major Developments in Post-Cold War Period American Hegemony and UniPolar World Emergence of Other Centres of Power: EU, BRICS and Japan Conclusion Glossary Essay Type Questions Multiple Choice Questions Suggested Readings Useful Web-Links Institute of Lifelong Learning, University of Delhi Post-Cold War Developments and Emergence of Other Centres of Power: Japan, EU & BRICS INTRODUCTION International politics is ever-changing, dynamic and comprehensive. It has never accepted any particular order as permanent and it has been proved with the dismantling of the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe (1991) and the end of Cold War which led to the massive changes in the international system. The end of Cold War gives a start of new phase in the history of international politics which is often referred as a ‘post-Cold War’ phase of world politics. In the post-Cold War era, the balance of power system and bipolar system that existed for a long period before the end of Cold War, was made away by the unipolar world order loaded with multi-polar characteristics, where more than one power may exercise its influence in world politics.
    [Show full text]
  • Assessing the Training and Operational Proficiency of China's
    C O R P O R A T I O N Assessing the Training and Operational Proficiency of China’s Aerospace Forces Selections from the Inaugural Conference of the China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI) Edmund J. Burke, Astrid Stuth Cevallos, Mark R. Cozad, Timothy R. Heath For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/CF340 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-0-8330-9549-7 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2016 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface On June 22, 2015, the China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI), in conjunction with Headquarters, Air Force, held a day-long conference in Arlington, Virginia, titled “Assessing Chinese Aerospace Training and Operational Competence.” The purpose of the conference was to share the results of nine months of research and analysis by RAND researchers and to expose their work to critical review by experts and operators knowledgeable about U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • The Early Effects of Gunpowder on Fortress Design: a Lasting Impact
    The Early Effects of Gunpowder on Fortress Design: A Lasting Impact MATTHEW BAILEY COLLEGE OF THE HOLY CROSS The introduction of gunpowder did not immediately transform the battlefields of Europe. Designers of fortifications only had to respond to the destructive threats of siege warfare, and witnessing the technical failures of early gunpowder weaponry would hardly have convinced a European magnate to bolster his defenses. This essay follows the advancement of gunpowder tactics in late medieval and early Renaissance Europe. In particular, it focuses on Edward III’s employment of primitive ordnance during the Hundred Years’ War, the role of artillery in the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople, and the organizational challenges of effectively implementing gunpowder as late as the end of the fifteenth century. This essay also seeks to illustrate the nature of the development of fortification in response to the emerging threat of gunpowder siege weaponry, including the architectural theories of the early Renaissance Italians, Henry VIII’s English artillery forts of the mid-sixteenth century, and the evolution of the angle bastion. The article concludes with a short discussion of the longevity and lasting relevance of the fortification technologies developed during the late medieval and early Renaissance eras. The castle was an inseparable component of medieval warfare. Since Duke William of Normandy’s 1066 conquest of Anglo-Saxon England, the construction of castles had become the earmark of medieval territorial expansion. These fortifications were not simply stone squares with round towers adorning the corners. Edward I’s massive castle building program in Wales, for example, resulted in fortifications so visually disparate that one might assume they were from different time periods.1 Medieval engineers had built upon castle technology for centuries by 1500, and the introduction of gunpowder weaponry to the battlefields of Europe foreshadowed a revision of the basics of fortress design.
    [Show full text]
  • The Victims at the Berlin Wall, 1961-1989 by Hans-Hermann Hertle/Maria Nooke August 2011
    Special CWIHP Research Report The Victims at the Berlin Wall, 1961-1989 By Hans-Hermann Hertle/Maria Nooke August 2011 Forty-four years after the Berlin Wall was built and 15 years after the East German archives were opened, reliable data on the number of people killed at the Wall were still lacking. Depending on the sources, purpose, and date of the studies, the figures varied between 78 (Central Registry of State Judicial Administrations in Salzgitter), 86 (Berlin Public Prosecution Service), 92 (Berlin Police President), 122 (Central Investigation Office for Government and Unification Criminality), and more than 200 deaths (Working Group 13 August). The names of many of the victims, their biographies and the circumstances in which they died were widely unknown.1 This special CWIHP report summarizes the findings of a research project by the Center for Research on Contemporary History Potsdam and the Berlin Wall Memorial Site and Documentation Center which sought to establish the number and identities of the individuals who died at the Berlin Wall between 1961 and 1989 and to document their lives and deaths through historical and biographical research.2 Definition In order to provide reliable figures, the project had to begin by developing clear criteria and a definition of what individuals are to be considered victims at the Berlin Wall. We regard the “provable causal and spatial connection of a death with an attempted escape or a direct or indirect cause or lack of action by the ‘border organs’ in the border territory” as the critical factor. In simpler terms: the criteria are either an attempted escape or a temporal and spatial link between the death and the border regime.
    [Show full text]
  • Cyber Warfare a “Nuclear Option”?
    CYBER WARFARE A “NUCLEAR OPTION”? ANDREW F. KREPINEVICH CYBER WARFARE: A “NUCLEAR OPTION”? BY ANDREW KREPINEVICH 2012 © 2012 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. All rights reserved. About the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) is an independent, nonpartisan policy research institute established to promote innovative thinking and debate about national security strategy and investment options. CSBA’s goal is to enable policymakers to make informed decisions on matters of strategy, secu- rity policy and resource allocation. CSBA provides timely, impartial, and insight- ful analyses to senior decision makers in the executive and legislative branches, as well as to the media and the broader national security community. CSBA encour- ages thoughtful participation in the development of national security strategy and policy, and in the allocation of scarce human and capital resources. CSBA’s analysis and outreach focus on key questions related to existing and emerging threats to US national security. Meeting these challenges will require transforming the national security establishment, and we are devoted to helping achieve this end. About the Author Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr. is the President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, which he joined following a 21-year career in the U.S. Army. He has served in the Department of Defense’s Office of Net Assessment, on the personal staff of three secretaries of defense, the National Defense Panel, the Defense Science Board Task Force on Joint Experimentation, and the Defense Policy Board. He is the author of 7 Deadly Scenarios: A Military Futurist Explores War in the 21st Century and The Army and Vietnam.
    [Show full text]
  • THE LOGISTICS of the FIRST CRUSADE 1095-1099 a Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Wester
    FEEDING VICTORY: THE LOGISTICS OF THE FIRST CRUSADE 1095-1099 A Thesis presented to the faculty of the Graduate School of Western Carolina University in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in History By William Donald O’Dell, Jr. Director: Dr. Vicki Szabo Associate Professor of Ancient and Medieval History History Department Committee Members: Dr. David Dorondo, History Dr. Robert Ferguson, History October, 2020 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank my committee members and director for their assistance and encouragements. In particular, Dr. Vicki Szabo, without whose guidance and feedback this thesis would not exist, Dr. David Dorondo, whose guidance on the roles of logistics in cavalry warfare have helped shaped this thesis’ handling of such considerations and Dr. Robert Ferguson whose advice and recommendations for environmental historiography helped shaped my understanding on how such considerations influence every aspect of history, especially military logistics. I also offer my warmest regards and thanks to my parents, brothers, and extended family for their continued support. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS List of Figures ................................................................................................................................ iv Abstract ............................................................................................................................................v Introduction ......................................................................................................................................1
    [Show full text]
  • The Revolution in Military Affairs: Prospects and Cautions
    THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS: PROSPECTS AND CAUTIONS Earl H. Tilford, Jr. June 23, 1995 ******* The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited. ******* Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050. Comments also may be conveyed directly to the author by calling commercial (717) 245-4086 or DSN 242-4086. LL FOREWORD The current Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is taking place against the background of a larger historical watershed involving the end of the Cold War and the advent of what Alvin and Heidi Toffler have termed "the Information Age." In this essay, Dr. Earl Tilford argues that RMAs are driven by more than breakthrough technologies, and that while the technological component is important, a true revolution in the way military institutions organize, equip and train for war, and in the way war is itself conducted, depends on the confluence of political, social, and technological factors. After an overview of the dynamics of the RMA, Dr. Tilford makes the case that interservice rivalry and a reintroduction of the managerial ethos, this time under the guise of total quality management (TQM), may be the consequences of this revolution. In the final analysis, warfare is quintessentially a human endeavor. Technology and technologically sophisticated weapons are only means to an end.
    [Show full text]
  • The Quandary of Allied Logistics from D-Day to the Rhine
    THE QUANDARY OF ALLIED LOGISTICS FROM D-DAY TO THE RHINE By Parker Andrew Roberson November, 2018 Director: Dr. Wade G. Dudley Program in American History, Department of History This thesis analyzes the Allied campaign in Europe from the D-Day landings to the crossing of the Rhine to argue that, had American and British forces given the port of Antwerp priority over Operation Market Garden, the war may have ended sooner. This study analyzes the logistical system and the strategic decisions of the Allied forces in order to explore the possibility of a shortened European campaign. Three overall ideas are covered: logistics and the broad-front strategy, the importance of ports to military campaigns, and the consequences of the decisions of the Allied commanders at Antwerp. The analysis of these points will enforce the theory that, had Antwerp been given priority, the war in Europe may have ended sooner. THE QUANDARY OF ALLIED LOGISTICS FROM D-DAY TO THE RHINE A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the Department of History East Carolina University In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts in History By Parker Andrew Roberson November, 2018 © Parker Roberson, 2018 THE QUANDARY OF ALLIED LOGISTICS FROM D-DAY TO THE RHINE By Parker Andrew Roberson APPROVED BY: DIRECTOR OF THESIS: Dr. Wade G. Dudley, Ph.D. COMMITTEE MEMBER: Dr. Gerald J. Prokopowicz, Ph.D. COMMITTEE MEMBER: Dr. Michael T. Bennett, Ph.D. CHAIR OF THE DEP ARTMENT OF HISTORY: Dr. Christopher Oakley, Ph.D. DEAN OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL: Dr. Paul J.
    [Show full text]
  • Schießbefehl and the Issues of Retroactivity Within the East German Border Guard Trials Keegan Mcmurry Western Oregon University, [email protected]
    Western Oregon University Digital Commons@WOU Student Theses, Papers and Projects (History) Department of History 2018 Schießbefehl and the Issues of Retroactivity Within the East German Border Guard Trials Keegan McMurry Western Oregon University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wou.edu/his Part of the Diplomatic History Commons, European History Commons, Legal Commons, and the Political History Commons Recommended Citation McMurry, Keegan, "Schießbefehl and the Issues of Retroactivity Within the East German Border Guard Trials" (2018). Student Theses, Papers and Projects (History). 264. https://digitalcommons.wou.edu/his/264 This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of History at Digital Commons@WOU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Student Theses, Papers and Projects (History) by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@WOU. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Schießbefehl1 and the Issues of Retroactivity Within the East German Border Guard Trials Keegan J. McMurry History 499: Senior Seminar June 5, 2018 1 On February 5th, 1989, 20-year old Chris Gueffroy and his companion, Christian Gaudin, were running for their lives. Tired of the poor conditions in the German Democratic Republic and hoping to find better in West Germany, they intended to climb the Berlin Wall that separated East and West Berlin using a ladder. A newspaper account states that despite both verbal warnings and warning shots, both young men continued to try and climb the wall until the border guards opened fire directly at them. Mr. Gaudin survived the experience after being shot, however, Mr.
    [Show full text]
  • Case 20-32299-KLP Doc 208 Filed 06/01/20 Entered 06/01/20 16
    Case 20-32299-KLP Doc 208 Filed 06/01/20 Entered 06/01/20 16:57:32 Desc Main Document Page 1 of 137 Case 20-32299-KLP Doc 208 Filed 06/01/20 Entered 06/01/20 16:57:32 Desc Main Document Page 2 of 137 Exhibit A Case 20-32299-KLP Doc 208 Filed 06/01/20 Entered 06/01/20 16:57:32 Desc Main Document Page 3 of 137 Exhibit A1 Served via Overnight Mail Name Attention Address 1 Address 2 City State Zip Country Aastha Broadcasting Network Limited Attn: Legal Unit213 MezzanineFl Morya LandMark1 Off Link Road, Andheri (West) Mumbai 400053 IN Abs Global LTD Attn: Legal O'Hara House 3 Bermudiana Road Hamilton HM08 BM Abs-Cbn Global Limited Attn: Legal Mother Ignacia Quezon City Manila PH Aditya Jain S/O Sudhir Kumar Jain Attn: Legal 12, Printing Press Area behind Punjab Kesari Wazirpur Delhi 110035 IN AdminNacinl TelecomunicacionUruguay Complejo Torre De Telecomuniciones Guatemala 1075. Nivel 22 HojaDeEntrada 1000007292 5000009660 Montevideo CP 11800 UY Advert Bereau Company Limited Attn: Legal East Legon Ars Obojo Road Asafoatse Accra GH Africa Digital Network Limited c/o Nation Media Group Nation Centre 7th Floor Kimathi St PO Box 28753-00100 Nairobi KE Africa Media Group Limited Attn: Legal Jamhuri/Zaramo Streets Dar Es Salaam TZ Africa Mobile Network Communication Attn: Legal 2 Jide Close, Idimu Council Alimosho Lagos NG Africa Mobile Networks Cameroon Attn: Legal 131Rue1221 Entree Des Hydrocarbures Derriere Star Land Hotel Bonapriso-Douala Douala CM Africa Mobile Networks Cameroon Attn: Legal BP12153 Bonapriso Douala CM Africa Mobile Networks Gb,
    [Show full text]
  • Pushing a Pull System Transforming Marine Aviation Logistics Douglas S
    LOGISTICS Pushing a Pull System Transforming Marine Aviation Logistics Douglas S. Steward by air, sea, or land. More is not always better, especially when it is the wrong stuff. Without improvements to ex- isting logistics doctrine, combatant commanders cannot leverage the full potential of their aviation weapon sys- tems. Additionally, with a greater presence of unmanned weapon systems, it makes sense that supporting logistics systems also place fewer personnel in harm’s way. The Marine Aviation Logistics Support Program is trans- forming to align with core doctrine changes and concepts such as distributed and prolonged operations, expedition- ary maneuver warfare, and sea basing. The goal of the new design, MALSP II, is to provide logistics support to deployed and non-deployed core capable units at higher levels of performance while also decreasing the infrastruc- ture and resource inventory. In January 2007, the Aviation Logistics Support Branch of Headquarters, Marine Corps, chartered the Aviation Logistics Transition Task Force and, in conjunction with Naval Air Systems Command, stood up the MALSP II Project Office to manage MALSP II improvements and program changes. Together, these activities form an architecture that identifies warfighting processes and relationships, relates systems to operational requirements, and describes standards and protocols. The architecture assists warfighters and program managers in communicating operational concepts to system develop- ers, and provides an analytic basis for discussions and decisions. The “As-Is” Design The current MALSP design is a “push” system that relies on subjective forecasts and anecdotal evidence to support its forces. This just-in-case approach has resulted in the following logistics support characteristics: • Days-of-usage depth • Fixed-allowanced resource packages • Heavy footprint • Reactive system.
    [Show full text]