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2003 How open is open enough?: Melding proprietary and open source platform strategies Joel West San Jose State University, [email protected]

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Recommended Citation Joel West. "How open is open enough?: Melding proprietary and open source platform strategies" Research Policy (2003): 1259-1285. doi:10.1016/S0048-7333(03)00052-0

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Management at SJSU ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of SJSU ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact [email protected]. How Open is Open Enough? Melding Proprietary and Open Source Platform Strategies

Joel West1 College of Business, San José State University, One Washington Square, San José, CA 95192-0070 USA December 31, 2002

Forthcoming in Research Policy special issue on “Open Source Software Development” (Eric von Hippel and Georg von Krogh, editors)

Abstract Computer platforms provide an integrated architecture of hardware and software standards as a basis for developing complementary assets. The most successful platforms were owned by proprietary sponsors that controlled platform evolution and appropriated associated rewards. Responding to the Internet and open source systems, three traditional vendors of proprietary platforms experimented with hybrid strategies which attempted to combine the advantages of open source software while retaining control and differentiation. Such hybrid standards strategies reflect the competing imperatives for adoption and appropriability, and suggest the conditions under which such strategies may be preferable to either the purely open or purely proprietary alternatives. Keywords: open source, standards competition, computer architecture, innovation returns

Acknowledgments I would like to thank Jason Dedrick, Tineke Egyedi, Scott Ensign and two anonymous reviewers for helpful suggestions and comments, as well as seminar participants at Case Western’s Weatherhead School of Management and the 2002 Academy of Management annual meeting. I am especially grateful to the special issue editors for advice and encouragement that were instrumental in developing the paper. My appreciation goes to the representatives of Apple, IBM and Sun who generously shared their time to both explain various complex technologies and also the institutional relationships behind those technologies. The remaining errors are of course my own.

1 Tel: +1-408-924-7069; fax: +1-408-924-3555. E-mail address: [email protected] prior research to suggest the theoretical 1. Introduction implications of such hybrid strategies. The evolution of the computer industry 2. Proprietary Platform Strategies has been driven by the emergence of standardized platforms which allow modular substitution of complementary assets such as 2.1 Dynamics of Proprietary Platform software and peripheral hardware. Competition The initial platforms were proprietary, in A proprietary platform consists of an which a computer systems manufacturer architecture of related standards, controlled controlled all hardware and software layers by one or more sponsoring firms. For a of the standards architecture. These computer system, the architectural standards platforms were later challenged by two typically encompass a processor, operating hardware-independent operating systems — system (OS), and associated peripherals. Unix and Windows — which reduced Some have also extended the concept of a differentiation between hardware vendors “platform” to include multiple layers of and shifted platform control to the operating software, such as applications that rely on a system vendors. The Unix operating system “middle ware” tool such as Java or a also inspired a more radical shift, the open database (Morris and Ferguson, 1993; source movement in which Linux allowed Bresnahan and Greenstein, 1999; West and users and competitors to control a platform’s Dedrick, 2000). direction. A platform is but a specific example of These various strategies reflect the the general class of technological essential tension of de facto standards innovations studied by Teece (1986), who creation: that between appropriability and links the ability of firms to profit from their adoption. To recoup the costs of developing technological innovations to the a platform, its sponsor must be able to appropriability regime for intellectual appropriate for itself some portion of the property rights (IPR) — either through economic benefits of that platform. But to formal de jure protection (e.g. patents) or obtain any returns at all, the sponsor must through de facto protection such as tacit get the platform adopted, which requires knowledge or trade secrets. Absent such IPR sharing the economic returns with buyers protection, firms selling a given technology and other members of the value chain. can be expected to adopt marginal cost The proprietary and open source pricing and drive profit margins to zero strategies correspond to the two extremes of (Katz and Shapiro, 1986; Beggs and this trade-off. In making a platform strategy Klemperer, 1992). Without appropriability, for the 21st century, leading computer Teece (1986) suggests that firms must use vendors face a dilemma of how much is some combination of speed, timing and luck open enough to attract enough buyers while if they hope to appropriate returns generated retaining adequate returns. by their innovation. First I review the theory and history of Teece (1986) also considers those proprietary computer platform strategies, innovations (such as computer systems) that contrasting that with the Unix-based open require the provision of complementary systems movement. I then examine the assets to commercialize the innovation. origins and motivations of Linux and other When additional investment is required to open source software projects. In three co-specialize the asset to be useful with a abbreviated case studies, I present the hybrid given innovation, the successful adoption of strategies of three platform vendors — the innovation and the related assets are Apple Computer, IBM and Sun mutually reinforcing, providing a positive Microsystems — that combine open source feedback cycle. Thus, to make a successful and proprietary platform strategies in hopes “whole product” solution, the owner of the of obtaining competitive advantage. Finally innovation seeks to attract such an analysis of these cases is combined with complementary assets, in part by sharing the overall returns of the innovation with the

West, How Open is Open Enough? Page 2 third party supplier of such assets (Katz and market platforms displaced more specialized Shapiro, 1985; Teece, 1986; Moore, 1991). products, either by providing lower cost or The positive feedback, self-reinforcing addressing a broader range of buyer needs cycle of success between a de facto standard (Morris and Ferguson, 1993). and its co-specialized asset success has been Firms that successfully establish and termed “network externalities” (Katz and maintain a proprietary platform enjoy the Shapiro, 1985) or “demand side economies right to appropriate the returns from a of scale” (Katz and Shapiro, 1986). When success of that platform (Morris and such network effects are coupled with Ferguson, 1993). But platform success is a switching costs between standards and high necessary but not sufficient condition for up front R&D costs, Arthur (1996) predicts profiting from proprietary technology that the dominant technology will enjoy innovation. When competing firms control “increasing returns to scale” that magnify an different layers of the standards architecture, early lead in a technology contest. The platform leadership is unstable because instability and self-reinforcing nature of control of the platform can shift without such a lead has often been referred to as disrupting the buyer’s value proposition. In “tipping” of the contest (e.g. Besen and particular, a firm that can take control of Farrell, 1994). Liebowitz and Margolis access to the complementary assets has an (1999) argue that actual tipping is rare, and incentive to do so to capture the returns from that lasting success is more often explained the platform (Bresnahan and Greenstein, by production economies of scale and firm 1999; West and Dedrick, 2000). execution. In explaining platform success, In the case of computing platforms, most economic research has focused on demand research has focused on one particular type and supply side economies of scale, and the of complementary asset, that of prepackaged broad strategic choices made by sponsoring application software. A computer platform is firms. However, there is also repeated not, in itself, useful without software to evidence that operational execution is solve specific problems. During the 1960s crucial to the relative success or failure of and 1970s, large organizations buying individual platforms (Morris and Ferguson, mainframe computers typically developed 1993; Liebowitz and Margolis, 1999; West, their own custom software. However, the 2003). Also, measures of platform success advent of the mass-market personal have focused on adoption or market share. computers attracted many new users unable The more managerially relevant metric to develop their own software, fueling a shift would be the sponsor’s net profit or return to prepackaged application software on investment from the proprietary packages (Mowery, 1996). As such, the technological innovation, although such data control of the platform’s complementary is much harder for researchers to obtain. assets (e.g. packaged software) is 2.2 Mainframes: Vertically Integrated determined by the ability to create and evolve application programming interfaces Proprietary Platforms (APIs), which specify how application In 1964, IBM introduced the world’s software must be co-specialized to work first successful computing platform, the with a particular platform (West and System/360. A key success factor was the Dedrick, 2000). modular architecture that enabled the use of Multiple platforms can and have the same software and peripherals simultaneously co-existed serving different throughout the product line, providing market segments (Table 1). Bresnahan and interoperability that was missing the product Greenstein (1999) argue that in the U.S. lines of IBM and other companies. IBM also computer industry, new platforms succeeded leveraged its existing domestic market share when they tapped unserved market niches, and global reach to win the largest share of avoiding competition with established the global market, vanquishing the platforms until they achieved critical mass. proprietary platforms of domestic rivals and Due to simple economies of scale, mass European national champions (Flamm, 1988; Chandler, 1997; Moschella, 1997).

West, How Open is Open Enough? Page 3 The one exception to IBM’s dominance was in Japan, where by the 1990s IBM held only 2.3 Personal Computer Brings Horizontal a 25% share as part of a stable, four firm Platform Control oligopoly, in which IBM’s rivals produced As with mainframes and minicomputers, clones of the S/360 platform (Anchordoguy, the personal computer industry attracted 1989; Ferguson and Morris, 1993). many new entrants that tried and failed to IBM was a vertically integrated establish successful platforms. However, manufacturer of processors, systems, there was one crucial difference: the 1971 peripherals and software for the S/360 invention of the microprocessor dramatically platform and its System 370 and System 390 lowered the cost of entry and also led to successors. The pattern was repeated by platform convergence as a large number of Digital Equipment Corporation, which systems makers purchased processors from a introduced a series of minicomputer shrinking number of microprocessor platforms, culminating with its most vendors. During the initial 8-bit era, the PC successful offering, the VAX 32-bit industry used two different platform minicomputer (1978) with its proprietary strategies. One group used the Intel 8080 (or VAX-11 processor and VAX/VMS compatible) processors along with CP/M, a operating system. DEC dominated U.S. proprietary operating system licensed to technical markets, although IBM led many computer makers. The other group business markets with its AS/400 bought an inexpensive processor and then minicomputer (Bresnahan and Greenstein, designed their own software to run on top of 1999). it. Application software was either designed Late entrants had trouble gaining market for CP/M APIs, or for one of the proprietary share for their innovations due to switching platforms. costs between the proprietary platforms Seeing the growth of the PC market, and (Greenstein, 1997). A major cost in worried about ceding market control to early converting from one platform to another was pioneers, in 1980 IBM launched a crash due to application software, which had to be project to build a 16-bit PC. IBM’s specialized to fit each platform’s APIs. In mainframe power and reputation assured the the 1960s and 1970s, this tended to be success of the IBM PC, which also rendered software custom-developed to meet the 8-bit PCs obsolete. The IBM PC standard firm’s particular needs, but subsequent soon dominated the world, except in Japan buyer shifts to using off-the-shelf packaged where NEC’s proprietary PC-98 dominated software shifted the conversion cost from the market from 1983-1995 (Chposky and users to third-party software suppliers. Leonsis, 1988; West and Dedrick, 2000). Chandler (1997) argues that the As with CP/M, IBM’s PC architecture concentration of the global mainframe used both a processor and operating system industry was consistent with the pattern of from outside vendors. When coupled with its other capital-intensive industries, in that the unexpected legal defeats on ROM high entry costs allow the pioneer and early copyrights, IBM lost control of its platform challengers to form a stable oligopoly. as other firms produced “clone” computers Bresnahan and Greenstein (1999) attribute that ran the same application software such oligopoly to the effect of endogenous (Langlois, 1992). For the next decade, IBM sunk costs in rewarding scale; their spent billions of dollars on proprietary mechanisms and predicted outcomes technologies in an unsuccessful attempt to correspond to Arthur’s (1996) formulation re-assert its leadership of the PC industry. of increasing returns to scale.2 Instead, the “IBM PC” platform gradually began to be termed the “Wintel” platform, an acknowledgment that the proprietary platform control rested with 2 The Bresnahan and Greenstein formulation also identifies platform-specific investments in Microsoft (Windows) and Intel. Both firms providing market stability, corresponding to enjoyed the barriers to imitation provided by Teece’s (1986) earlier analysis of specialized economies of scale for R&D and network complementary assets. effects through software supply (Arthur,

West, How Open is Open Enough? Page 4 1996). Grove (1996) argues that the resultant ubiquitous by reducing switching costs and horizontal specialization of the PC industry differentiation between hardware vendors. is more efficient (and thus more durable) Both operating systems shared APIs across than the vertically integrated structure, multiple hardware vendors. As with even the because it allows for the producer of each most proprietary computing platform, UNIX layer to achieve economies of scale by and MS-DOS were “open” to third party serving the broadest possible market. software suppliers, utilizing APIs widely disseminated to maximize software 2.4 Workstations: Unix and Open Systems availability. The horizontally specialized platform Unix and Windows were also similar in strategy predates CP/M and MS-DOS, but that the shared OS nearly eliminated the instead began with AT&T’s Unix operating antecedents of Arthur’s (1996) typology — system. Unix began in 1969 with economies of scale, network effects and minicomputers, helped create the new switching costs — that might lead to workstation platforms of the 1980s, and later positive returns to scale, and thus tip the became an important multivendor, multi- market share contest to a single winner product mainframe platform. Unix among computer manufacturers.3 The lack eventually evolved into a new form of open of such factors made it unlikely that any non-proprietary platform standard, often manufacturer would enjoy market referred to as the “open systems” movement dominance. In Unix workstations, most of (Gabel, 1987). the market was fragmented among four As with any other operating system, major firms — Sun, IBM, HP and DEC Unix was not a complete platform (later Compaq) — none of whom captured specification, because each hardware system more than a 35% market share. might have different processor and However, in the 1990s Unix and peripheral interface standards (Table 2). Windows differed dramatically in the However, Unix quickly evolved into a control of their APIs. Windows retained its portable OS that tended to “hide” the proprietary APIs under the control of a differences between hardware from software single firm which produced the only applications, and so could present a set of implementation, allowing it to enjoy common APIs across widely divergent monopoly rents. Meanwhile, de facto control hardware implementations. The task was of the Unix APIs had shifted to various aided by the C programming language industry committees and consortia in the which served as a highly efficient substitute “open systems movement,” which published for hardware-dependent assembly language. vendor-independent standards such as AT&T was restricted from selling POSIX, OSF/1 and X/OPEN. While the computer products by a 1956 anti-trust trademarked “Unix” was all derived from settlement, so in the first 15 years Unix was AT&T’s IPR, the “open systems” evolved limited to internal use, research universities, into multiple independent implementations and a comparatively small number of user companies and hardware vendors that bought source code licenses. AT&T 3 For both Unix and Windows machines, the eventually spun off Unix into a separate computer makers spent little on operating system company, which was sold to Novell and research and development, eliminating that as a later SCO. In the 1980s, Unix became the source of economies of scale. The shared APIs preferred operating system for computer also provided access to the same complementary workstations and also won significant assets and reduced switching costs between market share in minicomputers, high end computer makers. Between “Wintel” machines, computer servers and supercomputers. the complementary assets were identical and In some ways, AT&T’s Unix strategies switching costs negligible; for Unix in the 1980s paralleled those of Microsoft workstations, the processor differences and proprietary API extensions slightly increased the with MS-DOS and later Windows. By switching costs for users and suppliers of licensing their operating systems to multiple application software, but were much lower than hardware vendors, each made their platform between proprietary platforms.

West, How Open is Open Enough? Page 5 — including several “open source” competition that limited their ability to profit implementations — each compliant with the from the platform success, even for firms accepted POSIX specification. Thus, the (like IBM) that had been the platform’s open systems movement reflected an original innovator. evolution of platform strategies that reduced While these newer platform strategies the ability of any individual firm to obtain gave computer users lower switching costs control or differentiation for their platform and higher bargaining power, buyers still (Table 3). However, the subsequent “open fundamentally licensed technology that was source” movement took this to the next owned by computer vendors (or their level. alliances) — owners that could set the terms and pricing of the technology, as well as the 2.5 Assessment schedule for enhancements and error After IBM succeeded with its correction.4 This relationship fundamentally System/360 platform, rival computer makers changed with the emergence of “open sought to emulate IBM’s vertically source” computing platforms. integrated proprietary platform strategy. Positive returns to scale meant the winning 3. Emergence of Open Source proprietary platform enjoyed high barriers to Platforms imitation and thus high profits. Vertical integration allowed a firm to appropriate In developed countries, software enjoys those profits without having to share them strong intellectual property rights (IPR) with other firms. But when a single platform protections in the form of trade secrets, (like the IBM S/360) enjoyed sustained copyrights and (most recently) patents. The market share dominance, rivals had trouble ability to create and modify software competing with a vertically integrated products is governed by the access to the proprietary strategy: with a smaller share, source code, which is why for-profit they lacked minimum efficient scale to software developers have historically treated cover the fixed R&D costs. such source code as a closely guarded trade As an interim measure, firms procured secret. non-critical components (such as memory So-called “open source” software and peripherals) from common suppliers, represents the antitheses of a proprietary developing a proprietary processor and technology strategy. Rather than using operating system to provide differentiation. formal IPR protection to set boundaries However, such component sourcing did not between vendors and their competitors and address the processor and OS R&D costs, customers, open source enlists all as and still left market share laggards at a collaborators, maximizing adoption significant disadvantage due to fewer throughout the value chain but minimizing complementary assets (typically software) the options for appropriating rents from the and switching costs faced by most potential software. users. The success of the open source So over the longer term, minor computer movement reflected a confluence of three makers tried various strategies to pool R&D factors in the mid 1990s (West and Dedrick, and the supply of complementary assets 2001): across multiple producers; these strategies ¥ users seeking an inexpensive Unix also allowed firms without proprietary implementation free of AT&T platforms to enter new markets. One such licensing restrictions; strategy was to buy the crucial OS or processor from external proprietary vendors (such as AT&T, Microsoft or Intel). Another was to form a multi-vendor consortia (e.g. 4 the Open Software Foundation) to pool The open systems standards-setting consortia included representatives of major computer technology among vendors. By sharing buyers, but the deployment of new technologies some (or all) of their platform, they enjoyed implementing these standards remained under better adoption but risked intra-platform the control of the computer makers.

West, How Open is Open Enough? Page 6 ¥ a philosophical movement rejecting they gradually supplanted other Unix the idea of software ownership and distributions for Intel-based personal appropriability; computers, and also enabled such PCs to be ¥ emergence of the Internet as both an used as reliable servers by organizations. enabler and objective for Despite contrasting strategies for control and collaborative software development. IPR, both the Linux and BSD groups became forerunners of what later was named 3.1 Linux and Other Unix-like Platforms the “open source” movement. In the 1980s, the Unix platform had three main attractions for programmers: it 3.2 “Free Software” vs. “Open Source” ran on inexpensive minicomputers, was In his academic computing career, hardware independent and provided a state Stallman came to expect a computing of the art environment for software environment where users shared software development. Thus, it was a natural target and could make custom modifications for those who eventually developed “clone” (Stallman, 2001). Such sharing had also operating systems. existed between some large computer sites, In 1984, Richard Stallman left his job as through computer user groups like SHARE an MIT programmer to develop a free Unix- (for IBM users) and DECUS (for Digital like operating system. He founded Project Equipment Corp. users), and in a few GNU, which by 1990 had produced a variety publicly distributed software programs such of software development tools, but lacked as the TENEX operating system and the the essential core of a modern operating sendmail mail server. In launching Project system, a kernel (Stallman, 1999). Efforts to GNU, Stallman promoted a philosophy develop a kernel had first been delayed by diametrically opposed to the norms of work on other components, and then proprietary commercial software. Extending floundered for several years without strong by analogy the traditions of pooled scientific leadership. research and the free dissemination of ideas, Two groups used the GNU tools as the Stallman argued that all software should be basis for assembling complete and free Unix “free software,” with source code that can be “clone” operating systems. In 1991, Linus read, modified and redistributed (Zachary, Torvalds began writing a UNIX-compatible 1991; Stallman, 1999). operating system for his new PC, and Some but not all of Stallman’s goals solicited others to join in his efforts. By were shared by other developers of free early 1993, a version of Linux was freely software. By 1998, Linux and other available for downloading on the Internet technologies had become popular but (Varhol, 1994; Torvalds and Diamond, Stallman’s ideology had won only limited 2001). commercial support. To promote adoption Meanwhile, from 1990-1992 a Unix by business users and third-party developers, team at the University of California, firms that sold Linux- and GNU-related Berkeley solicited outsiders to volunteer to support and services met to promote a more rewrite components for its BSD Unix using business-friendly concept of collaborative only the published APIs (and thus not software development. They labeled their violating the copyright and trade secrets of common vision “open source” (DiBona et AT&T’s source code). This in turn spawned al., 1999: 3). a series of BSD implementations primarily Unlike for proprietary software, for both aimed at PC hardware: NetBSD (1993), “open source” and “free software” the FreeBSD (1993) and OpenBSD (1996) source code and executable component are (McKusick, 1999; West and Dedrick, 2001). freely distributed. Both can be freely By relying heavily upon the Project downloaded from the Internet, even though GNU components, both the Linux and some users decide to buy a distribution on various BSD teams delivered free Unix- tape or CD-ROM. And in both cases, compatible operating systems originally consulting, support and training services can oriented at personal computer hobbyists. and are sold without restriction. Through cost and flexibility advantages,

West, How Open is Open Enough? Page 7 The major difference is that “free software” prohibits ex post appropriation of 4. Context for the Study the technology: any derivative works must also be distributed as “free software” and all This study examines the decision by changes returned to the original author for proprietary platform vendors to release and subsequent redistribution. Stallman (1999) support open source technologies as part of argued that this is essential to prevent firms their platform strategies in the period 1995- from making minor improvements to free 2002 (Table 4). The field study and analysis software and then using it as a way to attract of secondary data were intended to explain users to their non-free commercial upgrade. this somewhat paradoxical development. The Project GNU tools and the Linux OS Was it a temporary phenomenon tied to a were distributed under the restrictions of the particular time and place, e.g. the so-called GNU Public License (GPL). importance of supporting Internet standards? Meanwhile, “open source” projects did Was it a desperation phenomenon for firms not impose any such restrictions, allowing that were eventually destined to fail — as individuals or firms to customize and happened during the early 1990s when combine open source software as they failing minicomputer makers abandoned desired; however, the profit potential of their proprietary OS to adopt open systems? minor improvements is limited by the Or was this a sustainable and ongoing availability of the free alternative. This form business model for makers of computer of source code license was developed by the hardware and integrated computing BSD Unix clones and the Apache web platforms? server, and was later emulated by other The study considers three companies — projects that used “BSD-style” or “Apache- Apple, IBM and Sun — that historically had 5 promoted vertically integrated platforms style” licenses (West and Dedrick, 2001). differentiated by proprietary software in The two licenses differ in their (respectively) the PC, mainframe and competitive implications. A developer workstation eras. As these proprietary releasing source code with a BSD-style strategies began to falter, each eventually license grants the most rights, in that others employed open source to revitalize their (including competitors) can modify and use strategies. At the beginning of the study, the software as they please. Using the GPL there were two obvious similarities between levels the playing field: all users are required the three companies: all three faced serious to share any subsequent changes, competitive pressures from Microsoft, and eliminating the ability of any party all three faced a challenge in formulating (including the original owner and any “open” strategies that nonetheless allowed competitors) to differentiate their offerings them to retain one or more sources of through software enhancements. competitive advantage. They are similar in that for both licenses, a software developer voluntarily surrenders 4.1 Responding to the Microsoft Challenge the ability to appropriate the returns from its The reality in the late 1990s was that a R&D in hopes of winning greater adoption. single company dominated the IT industry: Although they cannot directly profit from Microsoft. While it shared the “Wintel” such software, developers could use free platform control with Intel, unlike Intel software as a complementary asset to help Microsoft did not have a competitor in sell hardware (or other software), or could supplying PC manufacturers. Microsoft also use it to sell assets complementary to the played a major role in PC application free software — such as consulting, support software, server operating systems, server and training. applications and an increasing role in mobile devices. IBM, Apple and Sun sought new strategies to respond to pressure from 5 Henceforward, I use “Open Source” to subsume Microsoft. With its PC, IBM had both the BSD/Apache-style licenses and GNU- relinquished industry leadership to style “free software” licenses.

West, How Open is Open Enough? Page 8 Microsoft; Apple had traditionally been the famous typology of Raymond (1999) — Microsoft’s primary competitor in 16-bit PC provided a more identifiable authority for platforms; and Sun found its core negotiating alliances. workstation and server business threatened by Microsoft’s attempts to expand beyond 4.2 Leveraging Openness While Keeping the PC. Differentiation Many hardware vendors had benefited The open source movement was in part from Microsoft’s technical leadership. Firms framed as a reaction to Microsoft and its such as NCR, Siemens, and Unisys sold proprietary control of the computer industry, computers built on commodity components, just as the open systems movement a decade focusing on a particular geographic or earlier had been a reaction to the proprietary market niche. Other companies such as Dell control of IBM. As such, the movement and Fujitsu obtained advantages of found natural affinity with Microsoft’s three distribution or operational efficiency that major platform competitors, as well as enabled them to flourish in commodity hardware makers — particularly Intel — markets (Kraemer et al., 2000). who both benefited from Microsoft’s But such was not in the “organizational success but also wanted to increase their DNA” of these three focal companies. IBM independence from it. Thus in 2001, HP, had led the computer industry for 30 years, IBM, Intel and NEC launched a joint open supporting the huge infrastructure of world’s source research lab in Oregon and Japan; largest computer company. Similarly, as the meanwhile, Linux publisher Red Hat had only surviving PC startup of the 8-bit era, already won equity investments by Intel, Apple had from its birth pursued a go-it- followed by Compaq, Dell, HP, IBM and alone strategy. Finally, Sun, while building Novell (MacCormack and Herman, 1999; upon the success of Unix and the open West and Dedrick, 2001). systems movement, had sought to The problem for IBM, Apple and Sun differentiate itself by having the most was that by making source code freely complete and fully featured Unix-based available and modifiable, open source operating system. inherently reduced barriers to entry by rivals Until the rise of the IBM PC “clones,” and switching costs by customers. So despite IBM had largely controlled its own destiny the appealing logic of mutual adversaries through proprietary architectures. However, (“the enemy of my enemy is my friend”), a to win allies for their de facto standards, pure open source strategy would eliminate IBM — and to a lesser, degree Sun and each company’s historic source of Apple — had tried to lead formal and de differentiation, their proprietary software. facto standards organizations to support their Each of the firms faced a dilemma of how to respective technology initiatives, as with adapt an open source strategy suitable for IBM’s DOS/V PC standard in Japan (West their respective core competencies and and Dedrick, 2000). resources. Such alliances were more problematic for open source technologies. In the 5. Apple: Re-use and Leverage decentralized “bazaar” model epitomized by Apple Computer’s heyday had come Linux, there was no central administrative with its creation of proprietary computer authority with which to negotiate; to some platforms, but — like IBM — its onetime degree, publishers such as Red Hat and supplier Microsoft had become a formidable SuSE ended up filling this role.6 The more rival that threatened this traditional source of centralized cooperative efforts such as advantage. This forced Apple to consider FreeBSD or Apache — the “cathedral” in (and embrace) something previously unthinkable: sharing technology through the use of open source. 6 In analyzing the “bazaar” archetype for the Linux Apple’s adoption of open source came project, one must recognize the ongoing de facto after several failed attempts to develop a leadership and control exerted by founder Linus new PC operating system, and seemed to Torvalds.

West, How Open is Open Enough? Page 9 offer Apple a way out of its technological multi-processing and memory protection dead-end. In 1995, Apple was the first major features without rendering its software computer maker to sponsor a Linux library obsolete. While Microsoft had implementation for its own hardware. The released Windows NT as an eventual experimental Linux project was eventually replacement for Windows 95, Apple was dropped, but it was replaced by a new OS still using improved versions of its 1984 that combined a unique mix of proprietary architecture, designed for a machine with and open source components. 128K RAM and two floppy drives. More seriously, the company’s decline in both 5.1 Strategic Position in mid-1990s profits and R&D staff made it even tougher Although the most successful U.S. to respond to the Microsoft challenge than it maker of 8-bit personal computers, Apple had been in 1990. had several false starts before releasing a As a quick fix, in 1996 Apple evaluated popular 16-bit PC with the Macintosh. The various alternatives to jump-start its future Macintosh differentiated itself with ease of operating system design, including licensing use provided by a proprietary graphical user Windows NT and Sun’s Solaris variant of interface (GUI), but for various reasons Unix. In the end, it bypassed the purchase of lagged MS-DOS and its Windows in the promising but incomplete BeOS to adoption.7 Finally cutting prices to respond acquire NeXT, a company that Jobs had to its MS-DOS rivals, Apple grew market founded in 1985 after leaving Apple. The share in major markets in the early 1990s acquisition brought not only NeXT’s and enjoyed record market share and operating system to Apple, but Jobs and his revenues through its fiscal year ending R&D team, which quickly assumed key September 1995. However, the August 1995 positions within the company. release of Windows 95 effectively eliminated its ease of use differentiation. 5.2 Shifting to Unix Both the actual and predicted shift in The search for a modern operating demand helped fuel a downward spiral that system would eventually bring both the in the next two years brought nearly $2 Unix operating system and open source to billion in losses and forced resignation of the core of Apple’s long term platform two Apple CEOs.8 strategy. In buying NeXT, Apple cast its Ongoing improvements in operational future with the NextStep operating system efficiency from 1996-1998, the return of that was the acquiree’s primary asset. Steve Jobs as CEO in August 1997 and the NextStep was a Unix variant that combined introduction of the popular iMac one year the Mach operating system “kernel” with later at least temporarily quelled predictions other components from BSD Unix. To this of the company’s immediate demise. But the NeXT had added various extensions, company faced the same dilemma as at the including a graphical user interface, beginning of the decade — upgrading its software development and system core operating system to incorporate modern administration tools. Prior to the NeXT acquisition, Apple already had experience with Unix, offering 7 The discussion of Apple’s proprietary platform the AT&T-based A/UX operating system strategies is adapted from West (2000). from 1988 to 1995. But by the time it was 8 The conventional analysis attributes Apple’s abandoned after a shift to IBM’s RISC- problems in the late 1980s and 1990s to its based processors, A/UX had attracted only failure to license its operating system to rivals 15,000 users — at a time when Apple was prior to the rise of Windows in 1991. Assessing selling 4 million units a year (Hess, 1995; such post hoc advice is complicated by the Dataquest, 1996).9 variety of other strategic and execution errors during this period, including nearly $2 billion spent on unsuccessful efforts both to upgrade its core technology and diversify into new market 9 From 1996-7 Apple sold IBM’s AIX version of segments such as handheld computers and set- Unix, in between canceling A/UX and buying top boxes (West, 2003). NeXT.

West, How Open is Open Enough? Page 10 Apple had experimented with both the had lacked. At the time, Apple proclaimed it Mach OS and open source prior to the NeXT was “leading the industry by becoming the purchase. In 1995, to help its operating first major OS provider to make it’s [sic] systems design efforts it funded a research core operating system available to open project to adapt the Mach kernel for Apple source developers,” (Apple Computer, hardware. Because of the rising popularity 1999). of Linux, Apple selected a Mach/Linux Project manager Ernest Prabhakar noted combination instead of the standard that a catalyst for the Darwin strategy was Mach/BSD combination. This operating pressure from large university customers system, named MkLinux, was released in a with specialized networking needs: series of developer releases from May 1996 We realized that the pieces until the summer of 1998, when the project they’re most interested in are the was destaffed by Apple and handled over to most commoditized. There wasn’t its base of user-programmers. The Mach and any proprietary technology added Linux source code were released under that we had to worry about them BSD-style and GNU-style open source copying. … We started making the licenses. case [that] we should just open the Instead of continuing with Linux, the source code and release it as a 1997 merger with NeXT committed Apple complete BSD-style operating to adapting its existing Mac OS to use the system (Wayner, 2000: 175). BSD-based NextStep technology. In 1997 it announced “Rhapsody” — a Macintosh Prabhakar later said that Apple sought to version of the existing NeXT OS — which “embrace and enhance” existing open source shipped as “Mac OS X Server” in 1999. technologies, but in some cases would However, the company’s main focus was a “embrace and layer” by building Apple’s comprehensive upgrade of the NeXT proprietary code on top of the publicly technology, incorporating a new GUI and an shared open source code. emulator for older Mac OS programs. This The move was proclaimed by optimists “Mac OS X” was originally promised for as legitimizing open source development, in late 1999, was released in beta form in that a once proprietary platform firm was September 2000 and eventually shipped to willing to share a portion of its core users in March 2001. During 2000 and 2001, operating system with outside developers. the Mac OS X user and Server code bases However, other open source advocates were merged so that both used the same core attacked some of the exclusions in Apple’s technology and user interface. license, and the controversy divided previously allied leaders of the open source 5.3 Building a New OS on Open Source movement. While the major license Parts concerns were resolved within a month, the The original NextStep was based on both dispute hurt open source advocates within AT&T and BSD licensed Unix code, but by Apple by demonstrating the lack of a single 1999 Apple replaced that code with spokesperson within the open source FreeBSD, one of the three open source Intel- community who could speak on behalf of based versions of Unix. More significantly, the entire community (Shankland, 1999; Apple announced that it was releasing the Wayner, 2000: 162-163). Mach, FreeBSD and some NeXT Some also complained about Apple’s components as a new open source operating choice of the BSD rather than GPL style system, “Darwin,” which outside experts license, which allows a commercial firm to described as a new member of the BSD take the public source, make proprietary family tree. modifications, and to release that part Darwin, in effect, was the central core of public, part private product as a proprietary Apple’s Mac OS X Server and subsequent solution (e.g., Leibovitch, 2001). Such is Mac OS X (Figure 1). It provided proven both the inherent advantage (for commercial multi-user memory management and process firms) and disadvantage (for open source control services which the original Mac OS purists) of the BSD-style license.

West, How Open is Open Enough? Page 11 But the most enduring controversy continued over Apple’s decision to hold 6. IBM: From Platforms to some layers of its operating system entirely Applications proprietary. Most of the public Darwin source was a derivative work of the public Despite its well publicized travails of the FreeBSD and Mach, and so as a practical 1980s and 1990s, IBM remains the world’s matter Darwin offered the same largest computer company, as measured functionality than its FreeBSD cousin. both by total sales and employees. It was Apple had held out the largest (roughly also the most aggressive of any incumbent 75%) and most valuable parts of Mac OS X computer maker in embracing Linux and — its graphical user interface, the NeXT and open source. Mac OS application support — meaning that As he announced IBM’s 2001 plans to Darwin was not a complete GUI operating invest $1 billion in Linux, then-CEO Louis system and thus of little interest to average Gerstner predicted an end to the era of users. Other Apple-controlled technologies proprietary platforms that his company had — such as its TrueType fonts and spawned: QuickTime multimedia software — were The movement to standards- similarly excluded, preventing Darwin (and based computing is so inexorable, I Linux) users from using these technologies believe Sun—and EMC and without Apple hardware. Microsoft for that matter—is In March 2002, Apple helped launch a running the last big proprietary new organization, OpenDarwin.org. play we’ll see in this industry for a OpenDarwin maintained a stand-alone good long while (Wilcox, 2000). version of Darwin outside Apple’s direct control, with its own discussion groups and While Gerstner might secretly prefer a bug lists, but sharing source code with return to IBM-controlled proprietary Apple. By December 2002 it had 48 industry, the reality was that he found that identifiable user-contributors. an open source world — where hardware On paper, Apple enjoyed the best of all vendors and customers all had full control possible worlds. The open source Darwin over crucial system software — was allowed it to leverage off the larger BSD preferable a proprietary industry controlled communities to incorporate enhancements in by Microsoft. networking and other technologies, and to 6.1 Strategic Position in mid-1990s port Unix-based applications such as web IBM was best known for creating the and mail servers. Darwin also provided low- first computer platform with its S/360 level documentation to third party hardware proprietary mainframes, and its subsequent vendors, freeing Apple to concentrate its AS/400 minicomputer platform. Many support efforts on application software. argued, however, that its most successful Apple also retained differentiation in the architecture was the one that got away: the traditional areas where it had mattered most IBM PC. The shift of leadership was — in graphics and ease of use for its core traumatic for IBM. In the early 1990s, IBM markets in graphical design and education. spent billions of dollars on OS/2 and joint However, by opening only part of its ventures with various industry rivals — all technology — largely corresponding to the in an unsuccessful attempt to re-assert its existing FreeBSD — Apple made it less proprietary leadership of the computer valuable to user-contributors. The fewer industry, or at least break free of dependence users that contributed to the Darwin sources, on Microsoft. By 1996, the hatred of the the less benefit Apple realized from its open “Evil Empire” within IBM bordered on the source strategy. profane (Garr, 1999: 187-188). After losing the PC OS war, IBM’s leadership was confined to those segments (large computer systems) that were enduring a systemic decline. In more rapidly growing

West, How Open is Open Enough? Page 12 PC and workstation markets, it was an also- The WebSphere product indirectly led to ran. In response, the company sought to IBM’s November 2001 formation of reposition the demand for mainframe Eclipse, an independent open source computers, first by promoting client/server consortium to develop common software architecture and later by developing tools. IBM donated source code it valued at software to enable them to serve as massive $40 million to launch the consortium, which web servers. Meanwhile, it placed increasing eventually grew to include Fujitsu, HP, emphasis on the sale of software and Oracle, Red Hat and SAP. Sun (with its services, winning business based on its competing JavaBeans) was notably absent. unmatched ability to offer a complete end- While IBM’s initial focus was on to-end “turnkey” solution. developing web-enabled applications in Java and HTML, the Eclipse project bragged that 6.2 Phase I: Applications it was a “universal tool platform … for IBM’s first major open source initiative anything and nothing in particular” came in its efforts to integrate corporate (Eclipse.org 2002). The IBM-developed mainframes (with their vast legacy architecture allowed third party developers databases) to directly support e-commerce to write plug-in modules to support various and intranet initiatives. In June 1998, it programming languages (C, C++, Cobol), unveiled its WebSphere product family, file formats and external software products which built upon the Apache open source (like IBM’s WebSphere Application Server). web page server. IBM had begun with its The code was licensed under the own internally-developed web server, but Common Public License, an open source adopted the Internet’s most popular web license which like BSD — and unlike GPL server after failure of negotiations with — allowed commercial distribution of Netscape over licensing its proprietary web derivative works. As Eclipse evolved, IBM server (McKay, 1998). merged updates from it into its commercial IBM’s efforts to adapt Apache to meet product, WebSphere Studio Workbench. In its specific needs set a pattern for December 2002, IBM announced a $2.1 collaboration in its sponsorship of billion purchase of Rational Software, an subsequent open source efforts. IBM helped Eclipse consortium member that sold fund Apache’s adaptation for use on application development tools. Windows NT, because it was central to its Overall, IBM’s development of WebSphere strategy (Moltzen and Burke, applications using open source software had 1998). Meanwhile, IBM engineers three common threads. First, IBM accepted contributed code back for use by all Apache commodization of certain layers of its implementations, and IBM hired one of the application architecture and was thus was key open source developers to act as a willing to collaborate with open source permanent liaison (Wayner, 2000: 181-183). software programmers to make a shared IBM found that working with (largely user- technology available to all; these layers driven) open source group provided more typically implemented open Internet flexibility than using someone else’s standards which offered less opportunities proprietary solution, a lesson it would later for differentiation. Second, in many cases apply to Linux. the shared software competed with WebSphere was also the first IBM proprietary solutions developed by application to be made available on various Microsoft using its $4 billion annual R&D Linux platforms. IBM added a Linux version budget, such as its Internet Information of its DB2 database, which in December Services web server. Finally, the shared 1998 was released in beta form on IBM’s software was released under a non-GPL web site; IBM later ported a third major license allowing IBM to retain technology or product, its Lotus Domino groupware. As make proprietary enhancements. with other Unix application vendors, IBM found that offering a Linux version required 6.3 Phase II: System Software a comparatively small investment. Unlike with applications, IBM’s direct support for Linux as a replacement operating

West, How Open is Open Enough? Page 13 system was long in coming. Throughout Finally, the open source operating system 1998, IBM’s corporate strategists had no allowed IBM to make changes to improve its intention of providing or supporting Linux, hardware differentiation for enterprise as it would reduce differentiation and also customers. As chief technology officer for threaten its high-margin proprietary PC servers noted, Linux “has given IBM an operating system sales. So instead of being opportunity we didn’t have before to play to officially sponsored by developers of IBM’s our strengths, which is availability and S/390 mainframe, Linux was successfully reliability” (Shankland 2002). “ported” in late 1998 through unsanctioned Wladawsky-Berger also said that the effort of programmers at IBM Germany open source model was a logical extension (Hall, 2001). This internal version of S/390 of the long-standing IBM research culture. Linux was eventually released for customer Towards that end, in August 2000 IBM’s downloads in February 2000. Subsequently, special developerWorks open source web the changes to standard Linux to support the site released the source code from two large S/390 were made available both on IBM’s IBM research projects, the Andrew file web site and through commercial system (later called OpenAFS) and its Jibes distributors Red Hat, SuSE and TurboLinux. Java compiler. Both were released under the IBM also endorsed existing Linux IBM Public License, an antecedent of the distributions for its PC servers. Common Public License. In early 2000, IBM announced it would support Linux across its entire range of 7. Sun: Opening New Platforms servers, from PCs up to the largest mainframe (Table 5). At the same time, a Sun was founded in 1982 to make reorganization eliminated its Internet engineering workstations, and by the late business unit, and reassigned its head, Irving 1980s had outlasted its rival Apollo to lead Wladawsky-Berger, to head a combined the market. While its Sun OS (later Solaris) Unix-Linux unit. That group was located platform was based on the same UNIX within IBM’s Enterprise Systems division operating system adopted by most of its — clearly targeting IBM’s traditional large workstation rivals, Sun successfully corporate customers rather than the PC- differentiated itself from other rivals through based Internet service providers that up to ongoing enhancements in its operating that point had been the largest market for system, particularly with its support for data Linux. networking (Garud and Kumaraswamy, Beyond the level of customer demand 1993). (or “market pull”), endorsing Linux gave As the 1990s ended, Sun faced threats to IBM key strategic advantages. First, Linux its core business, by open source Linux on provided a common set of APIs across its the one hand and Microsoft’s Windows NT entire product line, providing a unified on the other. At the same time, it sought to architecture for software developers. retain its traditional control of the operating Second, the comparatively immature (yet system and other technology that had fueled complex) operating system required support its success in the workstation and server services, a traditional IBM strength, as market. Wladawsky-Berger later explained: 7.1 Strategic Position in mid-1990s We’ve wedded ourselves to the In the mid-1990s, Sun held a strong integration of the solution, the position in workstations. Meanwhile, it was notion being that the Internet and well positioned to capitalize on rapidly e-business solutions are more growing industry demand for midrange important than any particular servers and those that required networking component. And as a result, we’ve and Internet support. While Sun’s marketing changed all our business models so had historically emphasized support for that the integration of the pieces “open architecture,” it used proprietary has become more important than extensions to Unix software to differentiate any one piece (Cooper, 2001).

West, How Open is Open Enough? Page 14 itself from workstation rivals such as HP, Microsoft’s harshest and most vocal critics, IBM and DEC (later Compaq).10 both because of the two company’s To improve adoption, it licensed its conflicting goals and because of the lack of workstation and OS technology to customers dependence on Microsoft for any key and complementors; this included a small technology. number of makers of “clone” products, most Both Windows NT (later Windows 2000 notably in Japan (Garud and Kumaraswamy, and XP) and Linux posed a low-cost threat 1993). At the same time, Sun retained full to Sun’s lucrative server business: both were control of the architecture, allowing it to based on high volume Intel processors, rapidly evolve the technology rather than whose performance was increasing more negotiate with standards committees. As rapidly than that of Sun’s proprietary RISC such, Sun’s strategy more closely fit the processors. In another dimension, Windows “proprietary but open” model of Morris and and Linux were attacking Sun from opposite Ferguson (1993) than did Microsoft. sides: the former represented a more By concentrating on Unix-based systems proprietary approach under control of a and ignoring PCs, in the mid-1990s Sun held strong, centralized rival, while the latter a unique position in the computer industry offered greater openness that was supported with respect to Microsoft. Most computer (initially) by a diffuse group of hobbyists. companies licensed one of Microsoft’s 7.2 Strategy 1: New Platforms Windows operating systems for servers, PCs, laptops or handheld computers; while Sun’s primary strategy during the late Apple notably did not, it bundled 1990s was to establish new platforms Microsoft’s web browser and actively independent of Microsoft that would limit (if courted its Office application suite. As such, not reduce) Microsoft’s control of industry no matter how much some initiatives of IBM standards. or Apple (or HP or Compaq) might conflict Most of Sun’s efforts went towards with Microsoft, at other times they were establishing Java as a new platform with a Microsoft allies. Even bitter rivals America common set of APIs available on a wide Online and Netscape made Windows range of computer systems, under the slogan support their top applications priority. “write once, run anywhere.” An early By contrast, Sun lacked such a “co- prototype of Java was made available for opetition” relationship with Microsoft. A user downloads in May 1995, and licensed decade earlier, the two firms had little by most major computer companies over the overlap with completely different next year (Garud, Jain, Kumaraswamy, technologies and customers. However, 2002). Sun mounted a four year lawsuit industry trends — particularly the shift of accusing Microsoft of trying to hinder Java’s the Internet from a research network to a success, a lawsuit settled out of court in consumer one — had led them to become January 2001. direct competitors (Goff, 1999). The After distributing previews of its Windows NT server operating system was technology and generating great interest, directly aimed at the Unix server business Sun spent three years (1997-2000) trying to led by Sun, while any success of Microsoft get Java established as a de jure standard in establishing proprietary Internet protocols albeit under Sun’s control, first at the would come at Sun’s expense. Meanwhile, ISO/IEC Joint Technical Committee 1 Sun did not ship Microsoft’s operating (JTC1) and then later at ECMA.11 Both system or applications. Thus, it was not efforts were withdrawn after vigorous and surprising that Sun’s co-founder and long- well-financed opposition from competing time CEO Scott McNealy was one of computer makers, particularly Microsoft and HP (Egyedi, 2001). Sun also objected to the 10 However, the differences in Unix APIs increased costs for user and software developers, 11 ECMA was founded in 1961 as the European eventually forcing vendors to agree on a Computer Manufacturers Association, but in common GUI and system specifications in the 1994 switched to its acronym in hopes of mid-1990s, ending the “Unix wars”. increasing its global influence.

West, How Open is Open Enough? Page 15 provisions that would have required it to surrender IPR to the standardization 7.3 Strategy 2: Partly-Open Source committee. Instead of responding to Linux, Sun’s In a second major initiative, in August first open source strategies focused on its 1999 Sun spent $73.5 million to acquire the competition with Microsoft in getting core German maker of StarOffice, a clone of technologies adopted by users and software Microsoft Office. As Sun later noted “It is developers. The evolution of these strategies critical for all of Sun’s customers that there began with Java, extended to StarOffice and be open, viable, cutting-edge office eventually reached its core Solaris operating productivity software available to run in the system. In addition to its pro-active heterogeneous network and across all strategies, Sun also reacted to pressure to platforms” (Sun Microsystems, 2001). The increase the access to its Java code exerted company also stated a desire to shift the by licensees and standardization committees. industry from the purchase of software The effort to define Sun’s open source products to the rental of network-intensive strategy was led by chief scientist Bill Joy, application services (which would require who had been one of the leading engineers more Sun systems to implement). in the Berkeley Unix group before leaving to To a large degree, Sun’s preoccupation co-found Sun (Kim, 1999). The most radical with its offensive strategy against Microsoft option — which would please the largest contributed to its failure to defend against number of open source advocates — would Linux. For example, in a 3,000+ word 1996 have been to use the GNU Public License, in interview, Sun’s CEO did not mention Linux which all changes made by Sun, its or open source code at all. Instead, he customers or competitors must be shared reiterated Sun’s historic push for Unix-based with everyone. While this would fuel open systems over proprietary platforms: adoption, it posed real concerns about appropriating the returns of Sun’s R&D Q: Now Microsoft’s recent investment, as Joy explained: licensing of Java seems like a solid vote of confidence in the I can’t license all of Sun’s technology, but are you worried intellectual property under the Microsoft might try to position GPL, because it just won’t work. I Java as just another language, or don’t see any reason why I should bury it under ActiveX? give somebody who’s doing commercial reuse unfettered access McNealy: We’re always to stuff that cost me millions of worried people will try and hijack dollars to do. We’re spending over the standards on the network… a billion dollars a year in research. The real beauty of the Net is all I can’t just throw it all on the interfaces are open, they’re street.… multivendor and you can publish your data or publish your If I make code available under application once and know it will the GPL, I’ll lose control of it. … run on everything. That makes it a The GPL just doesn’t solve my lot more competitive and lowers business problem at Sun. I would the price to the user. That’s not like all of our intellectual property exactly what all the technology to be available in source form, but I companies want to do. They want can’t economically do that under to get you locked in (Taylor, 1996). the GPL (Kim, 1999). Ironically, the efforts of Microsoft and Instead, in February 1999 Sun released other proprietary computer makers to derail Java source code under what it called the Sun’s platform strategies led it towards its Sun Community Source License, a hybrid first open source strategies, which improved between a traditional proprietary license and its ability both to compete and cooperate a BSD-style open source license. The license with open source software. had four basic elements: 1) right to modify

West, How Open is Open Enough? Page 16 the source code; 2) royalty free distribution software functionality to be ported in open source projects; 3) royalties for to a wider range of systems (Sun commercial redistribution; 4) testing Microsystems, 2001). requirement to maintain compatibility and prevent forking (Loukides, 1999). From In 2002, Sun released a $76 commercial Sun’s standpoint, the license: “provides version of StarOffice, sharing code with protection for intellectual property, … OpenOffice, which remained an ongoing guarantees structured innovation within a open source project. Both Sun and the open single responsible organization, [and source community retained a common goal, provides] clear control over compatibility” being able to access business documents (Gabriel and Joy, 1998). The Sun license is compatible with Microsoft Office and the innovative in its governance: the SCSL dominant Windows standard. processes in many ways resemble a formal 7.4 Strategy 3: If You Can’t Beat Them, standards consortium or de jure Join Them standardization committee more than the Compared to its other workstation rivals “bazaar” more associated with decentralized — particularly HP and IBM — Sun did little Linux development. to embrace Linux. From 1998-2000 it If Sun had concern over rivals and provided technical assistance to outside control with Java, these were even greater groups porting Linux to run on its 32-bit with Solaris, its Unix-based operating SPARC and 64-bit UltraSparc line of system that had provided its key Solaris-based systems. It did not sell systems differentiation in the workstation and server with Linux pre-installed, leaving that to market. However, in October 1999 it value-added resellers. In fact the demand for announced that it would release Solaris Linux on Sun hardware was so weak that in under the restrictions of the SCSL, and in November 2000 a leading Linux distributor, December 2000 finally did so. Red Hat, canceled future development of Sun adopted a different strategy for Linux for Sun computers.13 StarOffice; in October 2000 it released all Sun was initially ambivalent about the source code to a new organization, success of Linux. On the one hand, OpenOffice.org. The code was licensed in a increasing adoption of Unix-based systems way that guaranteed the source would reduced Microsoft’s influence and improved always remain public, but allowed its use in availability of Unix-related software, commercial products by Sun or anyone 12 training and engineers. On the other hand, else. After nearly a decade of Sun had charged a premium to its development, StarOffice badly lagged workstation rivals based on its superior Microsoft’s product in features, Solaris software, so a world where Linux compatibility and reliability. The “bazaar” was the norm would eliminate that community of open source user-developers advantage (Rosenberg, 2000). As one was ideally suited for addressing such analyst put it: “Sun is giving Linux some concerns, as Sun explained: rhetoric, but Sun does not want Linux to By engaging the energy and take off” (Scannell and Gardner, 1999). creativity of developers worldwide, Eventually, in the face of competition in we will accelerate the addition of the low-end server business, Sun adopted innovative features and improved Linux as a server operating system, albeit to integration with other products. a lesser degree than IBM. In 2000, Sun Making the source code available purchased Cobalt, a maker of low-end Linux also enables the StarOffice server appliances. Two years later, Sun

12 Technically, the Lesser GNU Public License has some characteristics in common with the GPL, 13 It should be noted, however, that Sun’s Internet but in practical terms it was more similar to an servers incorporated the same Open Source Apache-style license in that it lacked the “viral” applications (such as Apache and sendmail) as provisions of the GPL. the other Unix and Linux-based servers.

West, How Open is Open Enough? Page 17 announced plans for its own branded Intel- terms — the former to improve adoption, the based servers, running Linux or Solaris. latter in response to competition from the open source Linux. 8. Effect of Open Source on Platform All three firms sought to maintain Strategies control of their proprietary OS and other technologies, in part to assure that they The popularity of open source operating would continue to evolve and remain systems created both problems and competitive. They also had specific concerns opportunities for proprietary platform about aiding rivals and an historic aversion vendors. Disclosing software technology to sharing profits with others in their value through open source licenses would chain. naturally lead to the commodization of such Prior to embracing open source software. Not surprisingly, the response of strategies, all three companies had extended leading industry firms varied depending on the value of their platforms through whether they had used software as a source proprietary applications and “middleware”. of competitive advantage, and whether they Such software had enabled them to serve retained other sources of competitive their respective markets — large corporate advantage. servers for IBM and Sun and multimedia- 8.1 Comparing Strategies by Apple, IBM savvy consumers for Apple. By retaining and Sun this software as proprietary and unique to their respective platforms, the firms were While IBM was one of the world’s top able to retain at least some differentiation software vendors, its software was normally relative to both proprietary and open source sold as part of a combined solution with its competitors. own hardware. It continued to differentiate itself based on services such as integration, 8.2 Microsoft’s Response services that would provide switching costs Of the industry’s largest firms, Microsoft if it adopted commodity software. Also, its clearly had the most to lose by the having key revenues were in mainframe and free software supplant commercial operating midrange systems where there were few systems and application software; it lacked remaining competitors. Under such the hardware and services revenues to conditions — with either service replace software sales lost to free software. differentiation or few viable competitors — On the other hand, Microsoft’s proprietary software commoditization would be less of a platform strategies continued to be concern, and anything that reduces costs or successful and thus it faced the least increases demand is an unvarnished plus. In pressure to adopt an open strategy. fact, Linux offered IBM something it had However, the rising publicity associated never had — a common set of software APIs with open source and the potential shift of across its entire product line. server customers from Windows to Linux Linux successes would also hurt Apple forced it to respond. and Sun, which historically bundled average In the first half of 2001 key Microsoft hardware with better than average operating executives publicly attacked the movement, systems. Apple and Sun faced diminished particularly the “viral” nature of the GPL profit margins if they shared the same (West and Dedrick, 2001); the company software as its rivals (or vice versa). But later clarified its position to emphasize unlike IBM, both Apple and Sun released support for BSD-style licenses. Microsoft source code from their primary operating also unveiled its own form of licensed system. The two firms adopted two different source code disclosure called “Shared approaches: opening parts vs. partly open. In Source”. By 2002, its strategy had evolved part by building on code that was already to allow PC vendors, third-party developers open source, Apple chose to grant all rights and large end-users to view but not modify to a subset of its new OS X operating the source to Windows. To win the hearts system. Meanwhile, Sun released the entire and minds of academics, Microsoft also source of Java and Solaris under restrictive

West, How Open is Open Enough? Page 18 allowed universities to both view and their efforts, or find greater success by modify the source for internal research. returning to more proprietary strategies. The role of Microsoft was clearly paramount in the open source license 9.1 Shifting from Proprietary to Open strategies adopted by both nonprofit and Source Strategies corporate software developers. Linux The study suggests a three stage developers and other backers of the GNU evolution of proprietary platform vendors to license often cited Microsoft’s decision to the use of open source. use BSD networking technologies in Proprietary Platforms. As with other Windows, then enhance those technologies industries, computer industry pioneers began in a way that made Windows incompatible by vertically integrating to deliver a with Unix-like systems. As Sun’s Bill Joy complete proprietary platform solution. complained: Whenever possible, the firms prefer proprietary platform strategies, because they The top predator now is provide better barriers to imitation and better Microsoft. We didn’t have a top margins. But as noted earlier, this strategy predator back when I did TCP/IP. may only be available to one or two market When you have a person with leaders. unlimited funds who is clearly focused on destroying the value Open Standards. For many IT vendors, proposition of what you’re doing, the use of proprietary platform strategy you’d be a fool not to account for becomes infeasible for some combination of them in the strategy that you technical and economic reasons, and they adopted (Kim, 1999). modify their platforms to incorporate open standards that are shared with one or more competitors. Among the motivations:14 9. Discussion ¥ market share lower than the The use of multiple qualitative case minimum efficient scale necessary to studies provides a rich opportunity for support proprietary R&D; building theory in emergent areas that is ¥ not enough market power to resist grounded in empirical data. This section buyer demands for open standards; uses induction to generalize the observed ¥ “tipping” of the standards contest in open source platform strategies of favor of the open standard, making it proprietary firms into broader theoretical infeasible to establish (or maintain) a predictions about competitive strategies for proprietary standard; or IT platforms, and suggest areas for future ¥ a decision to accept commodization research. of the particular architectural layer Such theory always runs the risk of and shift competitive advantage to being idiosyncratic and not generalizable to another architectural layer. the entire population (Eisenhardt, 1989). In These criteria are consistent with von Burg’s this case, by studying firms that were (2001) analysis of the adoption of Ethernet previously successful with proprietary as the preferred networking technology by strategies, such findings may not be both proprietary and open systems vendors. applicable to firms that unsuccessfully While shifting to such shared platforms pursued proprietary strategies, or de novo may be the most cost-effective solution, it entrants that lack prior platform capabilities can be difficult when it runs contrary to the upon which they can build. There is also the corporate culture and previously valued core risk of attempting to generalize from a still- competencies. The experience of Apple, emergent process: the adoption of open IBM and Sun suggests that shifting to even a source — both by business end-users and proprietary hardware companies — is still 14 In the case of the PC industry, the shared comparatively recent phenomenon. Any or multivendor architectural layers are proprietary all of the companies studied could fail in technologies provided by Microsoft and Intel, which addresses some but not all of the pressures for open multivendor standards.

West, How Open is Open Enough? Page 19 partly-open architecture may require a major suggests that proprietary vendors are aware external shock to force firms to relinquish of the competitive risks of such an previous innovation-driven differentiation appropriability waiver and are thus strategies. experimenting to find the right compromise The shift also contains unexpected between totally proprietary platforms (which pitfalls. Firms with a successful proprietary would be rejected by the market) and totally architecture are able to simplify their open ones (which would eliminate all technical and business decisions, because competitive advantage). Thus far, the two they control their environment and don’t hybrid strategies have been (Figure 2): have to interoperate with the rest of the ¥ opening parts, waving control of world. When the proprietary strategy fails, commodity layer(s) of the platform, firms are forced to work with open standards while retaining full control of other to achieve interoperability, and such layers that presumably provide interoperability both requires additional greater opportunities for technical efforts and also reduces the lock-in differentiation; of existing customers. For example, faced ¥ partly open, disclosing technology with plummeting market share, Apple under such restrictions that it abandoned its proprietary peripheral provides value to customers while interface standards and switched to making it difficult for it to be directly industrywide standards, discontinuing most employed by competitors. of the proprietary peripherals that once The former strategy is important as an accounted for much of its revenues (West, offensive strategy to speed adoption of a 2000). new platform-related standard or a particular Having lost various platform battles with implementation of such a standard. Waiving Microsoft, both Apple and IBM have been intellectual property rights makes the forced more than ever before to shift from standard (or implementation) more attractive proprietary to open standards. Sun’s to competitors and key users, priming the business model had always required co- positive-feedback bandwagon effects that existing with open standards, but now has can accrue to early market leaders. It also relinquished control of more platform increases the number of products that are standards to “compete on implementations.” interoperable with the vendor’s products, Without innovation and proprietary lock- particularly important for networking and in to provide barriers to entry and imitation, other communications standards. invariably firms will find it difficult to Both approaches allow sophisticated achieve competitive advantage with these users (such as large business enterprises, new strategies. Among the functional universities or IT industry suppliers) to help strategies that the three firms used include improve the products they use, consistent marketing, customer service, product design, with the long-identified role of technically engineering efficiency and leveraging knowledgeable industrial users (von Hippel, previously establish brand name reputations; 1976). the long-term viability of all these strategies have yet to be proven. 9.2 Future Platform Strategies Open Sources. The transition to an open The study of standards and standards source platform strategy is a continuation of architecture competition has focused on that to open systems, driven by the many of three basic approaches: the same factors. Open source, however, ¥ vertically integrated proprietary eliminates the ability of vendors to compete systems, as represented by the IBM based on implementations since the details 360 (Chandler, 1997; Moschella, of an implementation are visible to all. 1997); A vendor’s decision to disclose ¥ platforms assembled from technology is an irrevocable waiver of its proprietary layers that are freely ability to appropriate the returns from that licensed to all, such as “Wintel” technology. The use of hybrid strategies architecture (Morris and Ferguson, 1993; Grove, 1996); and

West, How Open is Open Enough? Page 20 ¥ de jure standards not sponsored by beginning differentiated its operating system any single firm but shared by all, through its ease of use, after that advantage epitomized by “open systems” and disappeared in 2001, Apple began bundling Europe’s GSM digital telephone consumer applications to differentiate its standard (Gabel, 1987; Funk and platform among PC buyers. Microsoft began Methé, 2001).15 such bundling even earlier, when it included Open source standards differ from other its Internet Explorer application with its unsponsored open standards mainly in Windows 95 operating system. degree, to the extent that the entry and Such vertical integration into imitation barriers are dramatically lower. applications suggests at least a partial re- But the idea of a shared standard — with the examination of the assumption that associated implications for governance and platforms succeed through their ability to differentiation — is not fundamentally attract a supply of third-party applications. different between the open source Linux or Gallagher and Park (2002) have shown that FreeBSD and its open systems (Unix clone) in-house applications development was ancestors. crucial in deciding a success of platform To a lesser degree, hybrid platform contests in the videogame console industry. strategies have existed for decades, driven If this pattern is more generally applicable, by the ever-increasing need for systems then it suggests firms need to garner the interoperability between or within financial resources to supply a complete (or organizations. Even the most proprietary at least basic) supply of complementary platform incorporates open industrywide assets expected by adopters, rather than standards such as ISO character sets, ANSI building early market share perceptions to C, Ethernet or TCP/IP. Other firms (notably attract third party suppliers of such assets. IBM and Microsoft) have taken portions of In other cases, the attempt to their platforms and gotten them adopted as differentiate may continue not to higher industrywide standards. architectural layers, but with system The hybrid strategies of Sun and Apple integration or design. In November 2001, blur the lines between the proprietary and Nokia announced a plan to license its unsponsored standards. By retaining an PDA/mobile handset applications to rivals, element of control, they retain many of the either for use with their own OS, or to run competitive benefits of sponsorship. on a multivendor OS developed by the However, by reducing duplicative R&D they Symbian joint venture (Nokia, 2001). can create shared communities that in many 9.3 Implications for Open Source ways are indistinguishable in practice from Development nominally unsponsored standards — assuming that the sponsors move How open is open enough? Open source aggressively enough to build sizable provides few direct benefits to the vast communities of adopter/collaborators. number of users who lack the requisite The open source strategies studied also technical skills to do their own development, call attention to the use of platform but instead is best suited for technically extension as a strategy to deal with proficient users (such as Internet service commoditization of lower-level platform providers) with strong motivations for layers. For computer platforms, such customization (West and Dedrick, 2001).16 extension normally involves developing additional application or “middleware” as 16 the highest level standards layers of an Direct benefit from access to open source code would appear to require some combination of architecture. While Apple had from the programming skill, (personal or professional) motivation and (personal or organizational) slack 15 Note, however, that the nominally open GSM time. In their study of Apache users, Franke and standardization effort led by Nokia and Ericsson von Hippel (2002) found highly heterogeneous built upon patent portfolios that were used to requirements among users (motivating exclude Japanese vendors from the European customization), and also that professional skill market (Bekkers et al., 2002). predicted customization activities.

West, How Open is Open Enough? Page 21 The degree to which open source adds value enough to improve the quality and features beyond this niche depends on how much it of the software.17 enables other attributes more directly valued How applicable are these benefits to the by users, such as greater reliability, lower hybrid strategies? For the “opening parts” cost or expanded variety of complementary strategy, must the open part of the platform assets. have value on its own to win enough user- An example of such indirect benefits is programmers? Or is it enough that it be part the provision of complementary assets. of a larger system of crucial importance, as Normally, the provision of applications for with Apple’s release of the Darwin portion an operating system is controlled by the of its mainstream Mac OS X operating formal, published interfaces (Langlois and system? Robertson, 1995; West and Dedrick, 2000). A “partly open” strategy — such as However, in an open source system, a third Sun’s Community Source License or party software supplier can add its own Microsoft’s Shared Source — must also interfaces as needed to provide functionality attract attracting user-programmers. In this unanticipated by the original author of the case, the question is whether the strategy OS. Apple specifically opened the lowest provides a stable enough allocation of the layers of its Mac OS X architecture to returns of innovation between software enable user support of unusual third-party vendors and users. Such strategies presume hardware configurations. that there is an intermediate level of Another postulated indirect user benefit disclosure and granting of rights (between of open source systems is increased fully open and fully proprietary extremes) reliability through the concurrent debugging that will be valuable to users without efforts of a widely distributed community of compromising the IPR owners’ competitive user-programmers (Raymond, 1999). Such concerns. One such intermediate point — activity appeared to be an important goal for the GNU Public License which grants nearly all three firms studied, as the proprietary all rights except the use in competing vendors sought volunteer labor to find and proprietary products — has high value to correct some of the gaps in their systems. users because of the complete and Kogut and Metiu (2001) report that more irrevocable disclosure.18 But the other forms than 70% of the Linux and Apache used thus far seem to be discounted by most contributors had made only one change to users (particularly those with more fully the source code tree. This pattern is open options) and thus provide little if any consistent with users getting involved only adoption incentive. when there is a problem of great concern to them. Research on large, successful open 17 In the adoption typology of Rogers (1995), source projects such as Linux and Apache sponsors would want to attract innovators as the assumes away variance in what may be a user-programmers, early adopters as non- key independent variable: size of the user- programming beta testers who would be tolerant programmer community. Anecdotal of bugs and missing features, so that a complete evidence suggests that the major reason solution could be developed suitable for the early open source projects fail is a lack of user- majority. contributors to do the work. In this case, 18 I recognize that advocates of the GNU-style sponsors of open source projects (whether license would argue that their license is more organizations or individuals) vendors face a “free” than the BSD alternative, it that particularly important adoption challenge: to guarantees that all derivatives will also be free. attract enough of the right sort of users early However, such perpetual freedom is enforced by restricting the rights granted with the software, while the BSD-style licensing has few if any restrictions. An economic analog is the choice between giving a child a trust fund or cash; the former assures that the original goal will always be met, while the latter gives the recipient full right to do as (s)he sees fit.

West, How Open is Open Enough? Page 22 Other possible areas for future study of 9.4 Future Research open standards include: The hybrid open source strategies of ¥ Are there any conditions which are proprietary platform vendors suggest that sufficient for predicting whether a additional research is necessary on a crucial vendor should switch from trade-off in technological innovation: proprietary to open standards? In resolving the conflicting imperatives of particular, will the pressure for making an innovation successful and openness remain confined to less profiting from that success. successful vendors, or will it In his analysis of this trade-off, Teece eventually reach all firms? (1986) focuses on the case where firms face ¥ Are there categories of standards weak appropriability regimes and thus must (e.g., communications infrastructure) share the returns of their innovation. that will always be open? Are there Subsequent analyses largely assume that any (e.g., document internal file strong appropriability is good, to be sought, formats) that will always be closed? and that lack of appropriability is a less Research on open source strategies by desirable condition. Strategists consider how commercial firms might include: firms should share the economic surplus ¥ Under what conditions will open they have generated, but not the possibility standards lead to the widespread that firms should irrevocably abandon some adoption of open source or all of that surplus by waiving all future implementations by commercial appropriability from a given innovation. vendors? However, proprietary software enjoys ¥ How durable are various approaches one of the tightest appropriability regimes (including opening parts, partly available, at least in countries that enforce open) for creating barriers to IPR laws. Meanwhile, the three decades imitation using open source since the invention of the microprocessor software? Are some less likely to offer numerous examples where innovators create competitive advantage enjoyed tight appropriability, but the lack of because they don’t add perceived adoption of their innovation meant that there customer value, or conversely were no returns to appropriate. provide too much aid to competitors? The conversion of proprietary software ¥ Is the decision between open source to open source by IBM, Apple and Sun — and proprietary strategies a matter of forfeiting a portion of their IPR — suggests managerial discretion? Or is there a that the more general question of voluntarily normative “best practice” for similar waiving appropriability bears further study. situated firms that dictates the Among the issues that might be considered: appropriate choice for each context? ¥ Is forfeiting IPR more or less ¥ When firms select a “partly open” desirable in cases where competitors strategy, what is the appropriate (or substitutes) have weak governance for vendor sponsored appropriability? open source communities? Can the ¥ Is such a differentiation strategy conflicting goals of the two parties more effective when competing with be reconciled? an organization with tight IPR control? Or does it have general References applicability as a strategy to pre- empt adoption of competing Anchordoguy, Marie, 1989, Computers Inc. technologies? (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, ¥ Is it the effectiveness dependent on Mass.) the nature of the technology, its use, Apple Computer, 1999, Mac OS X Server or the importance of complementary Embraces Open Source With Launch of assets? Are there any other adoption Darwin, Press release, 16 March, process characteristics relevant to www.apple.com (accessed 27 Dec. deciding on such strategies? 2001).

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West, How Open is Open Enough? Page 26 Tables and Figures Category Firm Platform Released Mainframe IBM IBM 360 (370,390) 1964 Minicomputer DEC VAX/VMS (OpenVMS) 1977 IBM AS/400 1988 †AT&T->OSF Unix 1980¤ Workstation Apollo Domain¦ 1980 Sun Sun OS (Solaris) 1982 8-bit PC Apple Apple II¦ 1977 †Digital Research CP/M¦ 1976¤ 16+ bit PC IBM IBM PC 1981 †Microsoft Windows 1990¤ NEC PC-98¦ 1983 Apple Macintosh 1984 Personal Digital Palm Pilot 1996 Assistant †Microsoft Windows CE 1996 † OS vendor; otherwise, vendors are vertically integrated manufacturers ¤ Widespread commercial release ¦ Discontinued Table 1: Major 20th century computing platforms

Product Vendor IBM DEC DEC Sun Apple IBM Compaq Product S/390 VaxStation VaxStation SparcStation Macintosh PS/2 DeskPro Segment Mainframe Workstation Workstation Workstation PC PC PC

Platform Applications own own own own own own 3rd party 3rd party 3rd party 3rd party 3rd party 3rd party 3rd party OS OS/390 VMS Unix† Unix† Mac OS MS-DOS MS-DOS (own) (own) (3rd party) (3rd party) (own) (3rd party) (3rd party) CPU ES9000 CVAX CVAX Sparc 68030 386 386 (own) (own) (own) (own) (3rd party) (3rd party) (3rd party) † Licensed from a 3rd party supplier but with proprietary extensions Table 2: Ownership of achitectural layers for representative computer platforms, 1990

Multiple Multiple Published Platform hardware OS Source APIs for 3rd strategy Sponsor vendors vendors Licensing party s.w API Control Products closed Vertically Hardware no no no yes hardware IBM S/360, integrated vendors vendor DEC VAX, proprietary Macintosh Horizontal Microsoft yes no no yes software Windows 3.0 proprietary vendor Unix AT&T yes no yes yes software System V vendor open Open Systems Consortia yes yes yes yes consortium OSF, X/Open

Table 3: Representative platform IPR strategies, 1990

West, How Open is Open Enough? Page 27 Date Industry Apple IBM Sun May 1995 Pre-release Java posted for free Internet download October Starts working on MkLinux 1995 for Power Macintosh March 1996 Licenses Java to Microsoft May 1996 Releases MkLinux, gives away 20,000+ CDs to ISVs October Sues Microsoft over 1996 “polluted” Java December Buys NeXT to adapt Announces “100% Pure 1996 Mach/BSD-based OS Java” initiative June 1998 Announces use of Apache across entire server line July 1998 Torvalds on cover of Ends work on MkLinux Forbes September Microsoft lists Linux as a Announces DB2 will 1998 threat in SEC filing support Linux November Microsoft “Halloween” Abandons ISO/IEC JTC1 1998 memo stirs controversy Java standards effort December German IBM engineers Intro Sun Community 1998 port Linux to S/390 Source License, plans to mainframe release Java source code December Announces open source for Announces support for 1998 Jikes Java compiler Linux on UltraSparc CPUs February Java 2 source code posted 1999 under SCSL March 1999 IBM, Compaq, Oracle and Announces Darwin open Supports Linux on work- Novell invest in Red Hat source OS and Apple stations and PC servers Public Source License May 1999 Releases Darwin source Certifies 4 Linux versions code on Apple web server for PC servers July 1999 Releases DB2 for Linux August 1999 After IPO, Red Hat reaches Buys StarOffice, reveals $4 billion market cap plans to release source September Launches developerWorks Releases SPARC chip 1999 open source site design under SCSL October Microsoft posts "Linux Announces it will release 1999 Myths" page, attacks Linux Solaris under SCSL December Abandons ECMA 1999 standards process on Java; Resells Red Hat Linux February Posts its Linux for S/390 2000 for free download August 2000 Open Source Development Releases tools under IBM Replaces own GUI with Lab funded Public License open source GNOME September Releases public beta of Purchases Cobalt, maker of 2000 Darwin-based OS X Linux server appliances October Posts StarOffice source 2000 under Lesser GPL license November Red Hat drops Linux 2000 support for Sun systems December Announces IBM will spend Releases Solaris source 2000 $1 billion on Linux in 2001 under SCSL license January Settles Java lawsuit with 2001 Microsoft March 2001 Microsoft launches “Shared Ships Mac OS X, based on Launches “Peace, Love and Source” initiative Darwin and FreeBSD Linux” ad campaign

West, How Open is Open Enough? Page 28 June 2001 Microsoft CEO Ballmer Hires FreeBSD co-founder says “Linux is a cancer” November Launches Eclipse open 2001 source consortium April 2002 HP wins Linux-based With non-profit Internet supercomputer contract Software Consortium, co- with U.S. Dept. of Energy sponsors OpenDarwin.org May 2002 Sells StarOffice for $76 September Red Hat Linux expands Introduces LX series 2002 support to all IBM servers Linux-based PC servers Table 4: Open Source Platform Milestones, 1995-2002

Earlier Platforms Revised Platforms Category Hardware Operating System Rebranding Operating System† mainframe IBM S/390 OS/390 zSeries Linux minicomputer AS/400 OS/400 iSeries Linux workstation RS/6000 AIX pSeries Linux server PC Netfinity Windows NT xSeries Linux Windows 2000 desktop/laptop PC NetVista Windows n/a n/a ThinkPad 95/98/ME PDA WorkPad Palm OS n/a n/a † Traditional OS also available on rebranded platforms Table 5: IBM’s supported platforms before and after Linux adoption

Applications

Other Mac OS 9/X NextStep Java layers APIs APIs APIs (trade secret) Graphics, GUI, multimedia

Darwin Mach: memory, BSD: networking (Open task control files, security Source)

Source: Apple Computer (2000) Figure 1: Architectural layers for Apple’s Mac OS X platform

West, How Open is Open Enough? Page 29 100% Opening Mac OS X Apache, Parts StarOffice R Linux i g h t s

G Java, r a Solaris n t e Windows CE d Partly Open Proprietary OS 0% 0% 100% Technology disclosed

Figure 2: User rights under open and quasi-open source licenses

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