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Schnellrecherche Der SFH-Länderanalyse Vom 22

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Schnellrecherche Der SFH-Länderanalyse Vom 22 Schnellrecherche der SFH-Länderanalyse vom 22. Januar 2016 zu Iran:Gefährdung eines Mitglieds der KDP bei der Rückkehr in den Iran Fragen an die SFH-Länderanalyse: Sind im Nordirak aktive Mitglieder der KDP bei der Rückkehr in den Iran ge- fährdet? Wie ist die Gefährdungslage eines in Nordirak in Kampfhandlungen involvier- ten Peschmerga-Kämpfers bei einer Rückkehr in den Iran zu beurteilen? Gibt es Informationen zu Jalil Gadani? Die Informationen beruhen auf einer zeitlich begrenzten Recherche (Schnellrecher- che) in öffentlich zugänglichen Dokumenten, die uns derzeit zur Verfügung stehen sowie auf den Informationen einer sachkundigen Kontaktperson. 1 Gefährdung eines Mitglieds und Peschmerga-Kämpfers der KDP-I, respektive der KDPI bei der Rückkehr in den Iran Aufspaltung der Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) in KDPI und KDP-I. Die Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran KDPI wurde im Jahr 1945 in der Stadt Mahabad im Nordwesten des Iran gegründet. Nach Angaben verschiedener Quellen (Cetti-Roberts, 2015; Bundesministerium für Inneres (BMI), 2015; Al Jazeera 2013; Gunter 2010) spaltete sich die KDPI im Jahr 2006 oder 2007 in die zwei Parteien KDPI (auch PDKI genannt) und KDP-I auf. Laut Gunter sollen die meisten Anführer der KDPI in die KDP- I gewechselt haben. Da die KDPI in Iran verboten sei, liegt ihr Hauptquartier laut BMI (2015) in Irak. Nach Angaben des Journalisten Cetti-Roberts, der am 24. September 2015 von den Aktivitäten der KDP-I in Irak berichtete, befindet sich das Hauptquartier der KDP-I in der Stadt Koya in der autonomen Region Kurdistan (KRG) in Nordirak. Laut eines Artikels von Al Jazeera (2013) sei die KDPI (PDKI) die grössere Gruppie- rung und werde von Mustafa Hejri angeführt. Sie sei in drei Lagern in Nordirak behei- matet und verfügte 2013 nach eigenen Angaben über rund 800 Peshmerga-Kämpfer. Das UK Home Office dagegen nennt in seinem Bericht vom August 2015 sowohl KDPI und KDP-I als Namen für die Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran. Mitgliedschaft in der KDP-I und Tätigkeit als Peschmerga-Kämpfer. Nach Anga- ben von Mustafa Moloudi von der KDP-I in Nordirak gegenüber dem Danish Immigra- tion Service (DIS 2013) gebe es zwei Arten von Mitgliedschaft bei der KDP-I: Ordent- liche Mitglieder und professionelle Vollzeitmitglieder. Eine Person, welche ein orden- tliches Parteimitglied werden wolle, müsse ein zweimonatiges Training in Nordirak durchlaufen. Während dieser Zeit würde die Person über das Parteiprogramm instru- iert und erhalte eine militärische Ausbildung. Die meisten hochrangigen professionel- len Mitglieder lebten im Hauptquartier im Lager nahe der Stadt Khoysanjaq (auch Koya genannt) in den kurdischen Gebieten in Irak. Ein ordentliches Mitglied könne nach einigen (zum Beispiel drei) Jahren Tätigkeit als Peschmerga und ordentliches Mitglied ein professionelles Mitglied werden. Dafür würde sie einem Training ( Basic Political-Organizational Course) mit einer Dauer von 45 Tagen bis zwei Monaten un- terzogen. Nachdem die Person das Training absolviert und ein Zertifikat erhalten habe, und wenn sie während eines Jahres Vollzeit für die Partei arbeite, könne die Person zu einem Fourth Grade Cadre befördert werden. Es bestehe die Möglichkeit, nach längerer Tätigkeit und mit weiteren Schulungen graduell weiter in der Partei auf- zusteigen. Die höchste Stufe der Parteimitgliedschaft sei First Grade Cadre. Um ein professionelles Mitglied der KDP-I zu werden, muss eine Person laut derselben Quelle zunächst Peschmerga werden. Wiederaufnahme militärischer Aktivitäten der KDP-I gegen Iran sowie Wahrneh- mung der KDP-I und anderer Gruppierungen durch iranische Behörden als Be- drohung. In einem Artikel von Al Jazeera vom 12. September 2015 wird berichtet, dass die KDP-I nach 20 Jahren den bewaffneten Kampf wieder aufgenommen habe. Nach Angaben von Khalid Wanaswasha, des Kommandanten des bewaffneten Flügels der KDP-I, stünden mehrere 1000 Männer und Frauen unter seinem Kommando und würden auch auf dem iranischen Staatsgebiet aktiv sein. Zwar würde die KDP-I nicht Krieg mit Iran suchen, jedoch hätten die iranischen Streitkräfte in den letzten drei Monaten ihre vor Ort stationierten militärischen Kräfte massiv aufgestockt. Pe- schmerga-Kämpfer der Gruppierung KDPI wiederum seien auch offensiv gegen irani- sche Truppen vorgegangen und in verschiedene Kämpfe mit iranischen Truppen ver- wickelt gewesen. Auch der Journalist Cetti-Roberts berichtet in seinem Artikel vom September 2015, dass die Mobilisierung der KDP-I und anderer Gruppierungen die iranischen Behörden provoziert habe. So habe Iran zwei Monate zuvor nur wenige Truppen an der Grenze zur KRG-Region stationiert gehabt. Vor kurzem habe laut des Artikels Ali Shamkhani, der Sekretär des iranischen Supreme National Security Coun- cil die Aktivitäten der KDP-I angeprangert und gesagt, dass ein Krieg mit Iran provo- ziert werde. Seither habe Iran eine grosse Zahl von Truppen, inklusive 100 Panzern, Raketensystemen und andere schwere Waffensysteme in der Nähe der Grenze stati- oniert. Verschiedene Quellen, die im DIS-Bericht (2013) zitiert werden, berichten ebenfalls, dass iranische Behörden Personen mit Verbindungen zur KDPI und anderen kurdischen Gruppierungen als Bedrohung wahrnehmen. Teilnahme der Kämpfer der KDP-I an Kampfhandlungen gegen die Terrormiliz Islamischer Staat. Gemäss des Artikels des kurdischen Mediennetzwerks Rudaw vom 8. Dezember 2014 haben drei iranische kurdische Parteien, darunter die KDP-I, die Peschmerga-Streitkräfte der KRG-Region mit eigenen Kämpfern bei Kampfhand- lungen in Gwer und Makhmour gegen die Terrororganisation Islamischer Staat unter- stützt. Nach Angaben der KDP-I seien rund 250 Kämpfer entsandt worden, um an der Seite der Streitkräfte der KRG zu kämpfen. Anfang Dezember 2014 habe d ie KDP-I zudem eine Gruppe von Kämpfern in die Region Khazer westlich von Erbil geschickt. Laut Rudaw seien die Kämpfer der KDP-I nur zwei Tage in Gwer und Makhmour ge- wesen und dann wieder in ihrer Stützpunkte zurückgezogen worden. Der Einsatz und der Abzug der Kämpfer seien auf Bitte eines Ministeriums der KRG-Region erfolgt und die Kämpfer seien während ihres Einsatzes unter dem Kommando der Peschmerga- Streitkräfte gestanden. Brutale Unterdrückung kurdischer Oppositionsgruppen und Verbot der KDPI in Iran. Nach Angaben des Berichts des UK Home Office vom August 2015 werden kur- dische Oppositionsgruppen, welche separatistischer Aspirationen verdächtigt werden, Iran – Gefährdung eines KDP-Mitglieds – Schnellrecherche – 22. Januar 2016 Seite 2 von 23 in Iran brutal unterdrückt. Dazu gehöre beispielsweise auch die KDPI. Nach Angaben verschiedener Quellen sind die KDPI und weitere kurdische Gruppierungen in Iran verboten und können dort nicht legal tätig sein (BMI 2015, AI 2012). Willkürliche Verhaftung und unfaire Gerichtsverfahren. Laut dem US Department of State (USDOS 2015) setzen iranische Behörden Sicherheitsgesetze und weitere Rechtsvorschriften ein, um kurdische Personen zu verhaften und zu verfolgen. Nach Angaben des Iran Human Rights Documentation Center (IHRDC 2012) werden Kurdin- nen und Kurden oft unter einem falschen Vorwand verhaftet. Dazu gehörte die Be- schuldigung der Spionage, des Waffenbesitzes oder Drogenhandels. Bei einer Ver- haftung seien kurdische Personen dem gleichen Muster von Misshandlung und unfai- ren Gerichtsverfahren ausgesetzt wie politische Häftlinge. Amnesty International (AI 2012) berichtet ebenfalls von unfairen Gerichtsverfahren und willkürlicher Verhaftung. Massive Konsequenzen für Aktivitäten im Zusammenhang mit KDP-I, KDPI oder weiteren kurdischen politischen Parteien. Nach Angaben einer E-Mail-Auskunft vom 15. Januar 2016 von einer iranischen Kontaktperson1 suchen die iranischen Be- hörden laufend nach Mitgliedern der KPD, KPD-I oder KPDI. Wenn eine solche Person verhaftet werde, werde sie praktisch immer strafrechtlich verfolgt und zu einer schwe- ren Strafe verurteilt. Dabei liegt die Bandbreite laut aktuellen Angaben der Kontakt- person zwischen mehrjährigen Gefängnisstrafen bis zur Todesstrafe. In den kurdi- schen Gebieten in Iran würden die iranischen Behörden oft Medienschaffende und zivilgesellschaftliche Aktivistinnen und Aktivisten der Mitgliedschaft in der KDPI, KDP oder KDP-I beschuldigen. Diese würden zu schweren Strafen verurteilt, auch wenn sie in der Realität gar keine Verbindung zu einer der Gruppierungen bzw. eine ge- meinsame Aktivität mit der KDPI, der KDP oder KDP-I aufweisen. Laut den Angaben eines westlichen Diplomaten und Iran-Experten in Erbil im Bericht des Danish Immigration Service (DIS) aus dem Jahr 2013 toleriert das iranische Re- gime keinerlei Aktivitäten in Zusammenhang mit kurdischen politischen Part eien. Jeg- liche Verbindung mit einer dieser Parteien könne ein Grund für eine Verhaftung sein. Die gleiche Quelle wies auch darauf hin, dass die Zahl der Hinrichtungen kurdischer Personen in Iran hoch sei. Oft würden Todesstrafen aufgrund von Drogenhandel ver- hängt, wobei auch politische Aktivisten fälschlich des Drogenhandels beschuldigt und hingerichtet werden. Eine weitere Kontaktperson des Norwegian People’s Aid in Irak bestätigte gegenüber DIS (2013), dass die Beschuldigung des Drogenhandels oft von iranischen Behörden gegen Personen vorgebracht werde, die politischer Aktivitäten verdächtigt werden und gegen die keine Beweise vorlägen. Laut den Angaben gegenüber DIS (2013) durch den Analysten Ziryan Roj Helaty vom Tanupo Magazine könne irgendetwas, das mit der KDPI zu tun habe, eine Person in Iran in Schwierigkeiten bringen. Jemand, der über die KDPI spreche,
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