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Home , Alexey Gordeyev, Anatoly Chubais, Central Federal District, Dondukov, Georgy Poltavchenko, Konstantin Pulikovsky

WATCH No.1, June 2000 Graham T. Allison, Director Editors: Ben Dunlap, Henry E. Hale Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project Production Director: Melissa C. Carr John F. Kennedy School of Government Researcher: Emily Van Buskirk Harvard University Production Assistant: Emily Goodhue

Harvard’s Strengthening Democratic Institutions (SDI) Project is pleased to present the first issue of Russia Watch, a bi-monthly publication providing concise, informative, objective analysis of Russian politics. This new publication continues the tradition of our Russian Election Watch, which provided analysis and commentary on Russian politics during Russia’s decisive season of elections, beginning with the Duma campaign in the fall and culminating in the presidential elections in March. This issue offers background on the key players in Russian President ’s new government, a look at Putin’s agenda for action and an overview of events in April and May. Our second issue, which will appear in August, will continue tracking the new government’s policies, adding commentaries from a number of Russia’s own top political analysts. We hope that you find Russia Watch useful and we welcome corrections, feedback and especially suggestions about ways this report can be improved. – Graham T. Allison, Director, SDI Project TOP NEWS OF APRIL-MAY • Putin inaugurated May 7, calls strengthening the state top priority. SEE INSIDE: • Putin names Kasyanov PM, taps committed free-marketeers • Putin inaugurated, p. 2 • for key cabinet posts. Who is in Putin’s new • Government? Find out on Putin creates 7 new presidential representatives (viceroys) to pp. 2-5 rebalance power between federal government and 89 • Putin’s radical Federation “states.” reforms, pp. 5-6 and p. 12 • Unity declares itself a full-fledged political party at congress. • It’s party time for Unity, p. • 6 Russia ratifies START II, CTBT. • • Media crackdown, p. 7 and Russia takes tough line against ABM Treaty changes before p.9 Putin-Clinton summit. • Prospects for the summit, • Armed tax police raid main opposition media headquarters. p. 8 • Economy growing at 5% for first time since reforms began. • Putin government submits 13% flat tax plan • Kirienko leaves Duma to head new , Nemtsov named leader of in parliament.

APRIL AND MAY IN RUSSIA Since Vladimir Putin won election as Russian President on March 26, he has lived up to his reputation as a tough, BACK ISSUES OF RUSSIAN ELECTION WATCH CAN BE pragmatic man of action. Almost immediately, he confirmed a FOUND AT: strongly pro-market course in the economy, launched what www.ksg.harvard.edu/bcsia/sdi could prove to be a radical reform of the federal structure, and rammed the START II treaty through the parliament (Duma), which had refused to ratify the document for 7 years. But Putin’s early moves raise alarms among many about democracy and human rights. While he continues to laud these values as one of Russia’s few accomplishments of the past decade, an armed raid on the main opposition media group and other actions indicate a willingness to compromise them for stability and prosperity. (For a briefing on threats to the Russian media, see p. 9)

1 PUTIN INAUGURATED effectively the number two man in the government as On May 7, former President passed the overseeing the whole bloc of official symbols of office to Vladimir Putin, economic ministries. Kudrin (right) is also Finance declaring that the torch had passed to a new Minister himself. Another such generation “dedicated to the values of democracy” critical appointment was and “less frozen by the German Gref as Economics habits of the past.” Minister. Also an open associate Yeltsin concluded with a of the Gaidar-Chubais team, Gref charge: “Take care of is head of Putin’s Center for Russia.” Putin, his hand Strategic Research, where Putin on a copy of Russia’s has charged him with developing a strategic plan for Constitution, then took the Russian economy. (For the list of Putin’s the oath of office and was appointments and brief biographies of the new and officially sworn in as President. He used his important figures, see pp. 3-5 below.) inaugural remarks at the lavish ceremony to promise that he would revive Russia and improve the lives of Almost immediately after Kasyanov got the nod from its people. Putin, he began to struggle with the Gaidar-Chubais team for control over the new government’s reform PUTIN TAPS NEW REFORMIST agenda. Kasyanov, for example, said that he had not read all of Gref’s economic plan and that the new GOVERNMENT, RESTRUCTURES government’s plan would be its own, different from MINISTRIES Gref’s plan. Gref then reasserted that his plan was in The day before his inauguration, Putin declared that fact the blueprint that the new government would use. his top priority would be to strengthen the state, By the end of May, it appeared that Putin had starting with the government and presidential orchestrated a compromise that would retain Gref’s administration. He began by officially nominating plan as a basic guide to future policy. Prime Minister. On May 17, the Duma officially Kasyanov remains in a strong position vis-à-vis the confirmed the Gaidar-Chubais team, however, having managed to appointment of get his ally, , appointed as Kasyanov, Government Chief of Staff. This post gives previously Putin’s Berezovsky’s allies in the government a major voice first deputy PM and in the government apparatus, which powerfully Prime influences all ministries. Minister, with even the backing of some Putin also began downsizing the government, cutting Communists in a vote of 325-55. Kasyanov the number of ministries from 30 to 24 and the (pictured) is widely regarded as a supporter of market number of government agencies from 39 to 33. He reforms, although he comes from the team of media also eliminated the post of first deputy prime minister mogul and self-proclaimed “oligarch” Boris and reduced the number of deputy PMs from seven to Berezovsky rather than that of the early Yeltsin-era five. reformers and . New ministries: Putin then appointed the rest of his government. Ministry of Economic Development and Trade While almost all of the “power ministries” (Foreign Ministry of Industry, Science and Technology Affairs, Defense, FSB (ex-KGB), and others—see Ministries and agencies abolished: pp.3-4) kept their leaders, Putin named a series of Ministry for the CIS; Science Ministry; Trade radical pro-market (“liberal,” in current Russian Ministry; Economics Ministry; State Committee parlance) reformers from the Gaidar-Chubais team to for Northern Regions; Environmental Committee; Youth Policy Committee; Federal Service for Civil other key posts in government, in part as a Aviation; Federal Migration Service; Federal counterbalance to Kasyanov and Berezovsky. The Service for Currency and Export Control; Roads most important of these is Aleksei Kudrin, Agency; Cinematography Committee; Land Committee

2 PUTIN’S CABINET OF MINISTERS

The “Top Five” Prime Minister: Mikhail Kasyanov, 42, born in as a counterweight to Kasyanov (as far as oligarchic Solntsevo, suburb of . influences go). Kudrin will oversee the Finance, Tax, Previous position: Finance Economic Development and Trade, and Anti- Minister. Speaks fluent English. Monopoly Ministries as well as the Federal Kasyanov has brokered several Bankruptcy Service. debt-restructuring agreements, such as the $10.6 billion write-off Chief of Government Staff: Igor Shuvalov, 33, from the London Club this past February. Thought by studied at . Formerly analysts to be close to oligarchs Boris Berezovsky Chairman of State Property Fund (1998-2000). Close and Aleksandr Mamut (a banker with links to the to Aleksandr Mamut and Kasyanov, but part of the Kremlin “Family”). As Prime Minister, Kasyanov Chubais team until 1998. Holds considerable will oversee the State Customs Committee, the influence, as he is responsible for processing all Federal Securities Commission, and the Property government decrees, and for supervising the work of Relations Ministry. dozens of government departments.

Finance Minister, Deputy Prime Minister: Aleksei Deputy Prime Minister: , 42, Kudrin, 39, born in Latvia. Holds a degree in worked in the government in Cheliabinsk from 1990- Economics from Leningrad State 1997, mostly as Deputy (1991-96). In July University. Known as a of 1997, Chubais brought Khristenko to Moscow to “radical-liberal” economist. work for the Finance Ministry. Appointed First Worked closely with Putin when Deputy Prime Minister in May 1999. the two served together as deputy mayors in St. Petersburg under Minister for Economic Development and Trade: . Kudrin is a self-proclaimed German Gref, 35, trained as a member of Anatoly Chubais’ team. He was first lawyer. Deputy State Property brought to Moscow in 1996 to work as Chubais’ Minister from 1998-2000. He is a deputy in the presidential staff and as supervisor of member of the Petersburg group of the Oversight Department (this became Putin’s job liberal reformers and served on the when Kudrin vacated it). In March 1997, Kudrin committee of there. Heads Putin’s became Chubais’ First Deputy in the Finance economic think-tank, the Center for Strategic Ministry, a position he has held until this year. Seen Research.

The “Power Ministers” Foreign Minister: , 45, Director of the (FSB): Foreign Minister since 1998. A graduate Nikolai Patrushev, 48, born in Leningrad. Has been of the Moscow Institute of Foreign working in the security organs since 1974. Was Languages. Fluent in Spanish and English. Supervisor of the Oversight Department in 1998. Director of the FSB since August 1999 (Putin’s Defense Minister: Igor Sergeev, 62, born in successor in the post). . Defense Minister since 1997, with the rank of Marshall. Held various positions of command in Secretary of the Security Council: , the Rocket Forces for more than 30 years. 47, born in Leningrad. Worked in foreign intelligence for 20 years, Interior Minister: , served abroad. Fluent in English 47, holds the rank of Colonel-General. and Swedish. Deputy Director of Has worked in internal affairs since 1972. FSB since August 1998. Named Yeltsin promoted Rushailo from Deputy Secretary of Security Council in Interior Minister to his current post in November 1999. May 1999. Rumored to be close to Berezovsky.

3 Emergencies Minister: Sergei Shoigu, 45, was Director of the Federal Border Guards Service: named a Hero of the Russian Federation in Konstantin Totsky. 50, born in . Served in September 1999. Elected to the Duma on the Unity Border Guards Service since 1967. Stationed in party list in December ’99 but declined his seat. Afghanistan 1985-1989. First Deputy Chief of Staff, northwest border region, 1994-1996. Appointed Head of Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR): Sergei Director of Border Guards Service in September Lebedev, 52, born in Uzbekistan, KBG veteran. 1998. Like Putin, worked for KGB in during Soviet times. Since 1998, official representative of SVR to the US.

Other Ministers

Deputy Prime Minister, in charge of military Deputy Prime Minister in charge social affairs: industrial complex: Ilya Valentina Matvienko, 51, Born in Ukraine, degree Klebanov, 49, born and studied in Chemistry and Pharmaceuticals, in Petersburg. Worked for 20 was a People’s Deputy in the USSR, years in the Leningrad Optico- named a Deputy Prime Minister in Mechanical Association 1999. Got a lot of press this spring (LOMO), eventually as general when she dropped out of the director. Headed the Economics governor’s race for St. Petersburg, Committee under Petersburg having been Putin’s pick against Governor Yakovlev, later became incumbent Vladimir Yakovlev. Yakovlev’s deputy governor. Named Deputy Prime Minister in August 1999. Deputy Prime Minister and Agriculture Minister: Aleksei Gordeyev, 45, born in the former East Science, Industry and Technology Minister: Germany. Has worked in the farm sector since the Aleksandr Dondukov, 46, new to the government. 1980s and has served as Agriculture Minister since Previous job: General Director of Yakovlev aviation 1999. company (since 1993). Energy Minister (previously called the Fuel and Labor Minister: Aleksander Pochinok, 42, former Energy Ministry): Aleksandr Gavrin, 47, Born in Tax Minister, with a degree in Ukraine. Was mayor of the Western Siberian town Economics. A Duma Deputy from of Kogalym (Khanty-Mansy Autonomous District), 1993-1997, first elected on the since 1996. Kogalym is the Siberian capital of “Russia’s Choice” party list and then , and Gavrin once worked for in 1995 on the Democratic Choice of Kogalymneftgaz, a LUKoil subsidary there. Russia list. Long-time ally of Gaidar and Chubais. Currently a member of the Railways Minister: Nikolai Aksenenko, 51, Union of Right Forces. Railways Minister since 1997. A Berezovsky ally and one-time leading candidate for Prime Minister Communications Minister: Leonid Reiman, 42, under Yeltsin. Communications Minister since November 1999. For 14 years held various managerial positions at the Anti-Monopoly Policy Minister: Ilya Yuzhanov, Leningrad City Telephone Network. A Petersburg 40, studied economics at Leningrad State University. (formerly Leningrad) native, close to Putin. A member of the Chubais group, Yuzhanov worked in the Petersburg city administration in the early Transportation Minister: Sergei Frank, 39, nineties. Has served as Anti-Monopoly Policy Transportation Minister since 1998. Previous jobs Minister since May 1999. Previous positions include include Deputy Director of the Department of Marine chairman of the Russian State Committee on Land Transport and a key post in the Far-Eastern Shipping Resources and Land Policies Minister. Company.

4 Tax Minister: Gennady Bukaev, 52, new to the Culture Minister: Mikhail Shvydkoi, 51, born in government. Bukaev was chairman of taxation in Kyrgyzstan. Worked on the editorial staff of the from 1998-99 and then from 1999- journal Theater from 1973-90, was Deputy Cultural 2000 in Moscow, where he introduced voluntary Minister from 1993-97 and Chairman of the All- individual tax identification numbers. Russian State and Company from 1998-2000. State Property Relations Minister: Farit Gazizullin, 43, an ethnic Tatar. Has served as State Health Minister Yuri Shevchenko, 53. Among Property Minister since 1997 and previously was various positions he holds: director of the Military- director of state property in 1991-95. Medical Academy since 1992 and chief cardiologist of the Petersburg region since 1993. Media Minister: , 51, Media Minister Natural Resources Minister: Boris Yatskevich, 52, since July 1999. Former born in Poland. Previously First Deputy Minister for positions include Press Natural Resources (from 1996). From 1992-96, was Secretary and Deputy deputy chairman of the Committee on Geology and Director of the All-Russian Minerals. State Television and Radio Company. Federation and Nationality Affairs Minister: Aleksandr Blokhin, 49, from 1995-2000, Blokhin Education Minister: Vladimir Filippov, 49, holds a served as Ambassador to . Worked for doctorate in mathematics and the high rank of many years in power engineering, but has been in Academician. government since 1990.

Atomic Energy Minister: Yevgeny Adamov, 61, Minister of Justice: Yuri Chaika, 49, received law has served as Atomic Energy Minister since March degree in 1976 from Sverdlovsk Law Institute. Was 1998. First Deputy to the General Prosecutor (1995-98) and then Acting General Prosecutor. Has been Minister of Justice since August 1999.

PUTIN INTRODUCES MAJOR The new presidential “super-representatives” are REFORM OF FEDERATION expected to give Putin more power over governors In mid-May, Putin announced a series of reforms that for several reasons. First, since they will not reside promise far-reaching effects on the balance of power in most of the regions they oversee, governors will be between central and regional governments. On May less able to woo them or harass them with their 17, Putin fired the first shot, creating seven new power over housing and electricity, for example. “federal districts” on top of Russia’s 89 regions. Second, Putin appears Initially, the reform does not take away any formal to be concentrating power from regional leaders, whom Putin is anxious important federal to rein in. Instead, it involves a restructuring of the agencies around the “presidential representatives” that were already in new federal districts. place in the regions. In the past, each of the 89 Many observers region had its own presidential representative immediately noticed charged with overseeing the implementation of the coincidence federal policy locally. In practice, however, these between the seven figures were weak and had little formal power to federal districts and Russia’s seven military districts resist a determined governor. In fact, they often fell (while the coincidence is not perfect, corrections under the influence of governors, who could control would not be hard to make). The General their access to good apartments, local resources and Prosecutor’s Office has also announced that it will the like. Putin’s reform actually fired all 89 of these open up special offices for each federal district, and officials, replacing them with a single representative other agencies are already in line to do the same. in each of the seven new federal districts. Third, Putin is appointing major political figures to lead the new districts, including former Prime

5 Minister Sergei Kirienko (pictured on previous page), While the federal districts were created by decree, the who will manage the Volga district. It has also been latter two reforms require the approval of the noted that five of the seven new representatives have parliament. The Federation Council would likely background in the military, police or KGB. (For a have voted against reforms that strip its members of a sketch of the seven viceroys and a complete list great deal of power, but Putin’s team successfully Russian states with corresponding macroregions, see mobilized the two-thirds majority in the Duma p. 12.) While governors will still retain many levers necessary to override a Federation Council veto. of power, including control over local enterprises, they will also face a more formidable central power "The president is, in fact, structure. proposing to eliminate local government—one cannot put That, however, “This is what the it otherwise. He is proposing was the opening dictatorship of law means. to abolish elections of heads shot in a series It would mean we are living of local government in cities that shows that in one strong country, one with populations of over Putin has serious single state called Russia.” 50,000.” plans to strengthen Vladimir Putin the federal government in relation to the UNITY BECOMES A PARTY 89 governors’ “states.” A Over the weekend of May 27-28, the pro-Putin few days later, he introduced “Unity” organization culminated its spectacular a bill into the Duma that eight-month rise from zero to the pinnacle of partisan would deny governors and power by declaring itself a full-fledged political the speakers of regional party. This step signals that Putin and his Unity allies legislatures their seats in the are serious in their upper chamber of Russia’s effort to consolidate parliament, the Federation “Unfortunately, we are confronted not their position by Council. By forcing them to appoint their only with the creating a strong representatives in this body rather than join it weakness of state institution capable of themselves, Putin would strip regional leaders not institutions but also only of a bully pulpit in Moscow but also of the with the weakness of immunity from criminal prosecution that the Russian civil society Constitution bestows on its parliamentarians. This structures. Unity’s opens up the way for task is to overcome this weakness and to the federal government “Putin is destroying this to bring criminal attract into the elite. He is telling dozens organization as many competing and charges against of thousands of people as possible.” winning in future governors it does not politicians of the upper Vladimir Putin elections at all levels. like. echelon, 'I will be able to This is significant dismiss you.' This is since previous “parties of utterly unacceptable.” power,” notably Our Home is Russia, chose to Boris Berezovsky remain a more nebulous “movement,” not really trusting in the power of political organization. Moreover, Unity’s leaders (even Putin himself) talk Perhaps even more regularly about the need to create a three-party importantly, Putin also system in Russia (some want only two while others announced his intention to expect four). They envision Unity in the center, with provide for a process whereby the Communists remaining on the left, some a governor could be removed from office if he took combination of and the Union of Right actions that violate the Constitution. While he Forces on the right, and the rest (like Vladimir remained vague on just how this would happen, a bill Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic Party) effectively currently being developed in the Duma would require disappearing. In fact, a majority of party leaders and two separate findings by the Constitutional Court that political observers now appear to expect a major a governor was in violation before the President consolidation of Russia’s splintered party system would have the right to remove that governor. along these lines.

6 FIRST SIGNS OF A MEDIA raid was launched by the FSB and tax police without CRACKDOWN? his knowledge, it did not condemn the action, instead Few people would expect a longtime KGB agent to stating “all are equal before the law no matter what be enamored of media criticism, especially in matters business they are in” (RFE/RL 5/15). Even if Media- of national security, and Putin has so far done little to Most was committing real violations, however, the dispel such expectations, although he has not manner of the raid and the fact that the opposition altogether confirmed them either. The Babitsky case group was selected for a raid before other last fall set off the first major alarm bells among organizations that were likely involved in illegal defenders of the free press. The second major bell activity strongly rang in May, when FSB agents and armed tax police suggests that politics stormed the headquarters of Media-Most, the major was a primary media opponent of Putin during the recent campaign. consideration. The Owned by opposition oligarch question remains (pictured right) Media Most includes the NTV unanswered, television channel, radio stations, newspapers, and however, whether magazines. Putin ordered the raid or whether it was the initiative of lower-level The government said officials seeking to curry favor with their boss. that the raid was part of a criminal Meanwhile, Russia’s Press Ministry continued its investigation into attempt to revoke the license of TV Center, the the illegal use of television channel that backed the opposition surveillance Fatherland-All Russia movement in the December equipment by Media- 1999 Duma elections. The Ministry had issued two Most (and its own warnings to the channel, one for improper coverage security agency, of the election campaign and the other for failing to headed by General report a change of address in a timely manner, and on Bobkov, a former this basis invoked a Russian law allowing the KGB man himself. Ministry to hold an auction for a twice-warned Media-Most’s company’s broadcast license when that license representatives quickly went on the counterattack, expires. The auction was set for May 24, but TV charging that the raid was retaliation for reports on Center appealed to Moscow courts and won in corruption among high-level FSB officials published both instances, forcing the Ministry to postpone the shortly before. While Putin’s office reported that the auction at the last minute pending an appeal due to be heard in June.

Informative web sites on Russia: http://www.rferl.org (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty) http://www.iews.org/rrrabout.nsf (EastWest Institute's Russian Regional Report) http://www.polit.ru (Up-to-the-minute political news, more complete in Russian version than in English) http://www.ceip.org (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) http://www.lenta.ru (Good general political news coverage in Russian and English) http://www.pravitelstvo.gov.ru (New government web site, more complete in Russian version than in English) http://www.fas.harvard.edu/%7Eponars/ (Program on New Approaches to Russian Security) http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/bcsia.sdi (Strengthing Democratic Instutions Project)

7 RUSSIAN ECONOMIC TRENDS • Nominal GDP $222.1 billion (forecast for 2000 compared with $209 billion in 1999) “$10 billion in • GDP per capita US$1517 (forecast for 2000 compared Western capital with $1423 in 1999) poured into Russia in • the last 4 ½ months. April 2000 industrial production up 5.5% compared to This compares to $4.3 April 1999 billion invested in • April 2000 consumer prices up 19.9%. compared to April Russia for all of last 1999 year.” -- Putin advisor • Currency reserves (excluding gold), $11.5 billion, Andrei Illarionov (March 2000 compared to $6.5 billion in March 1999) • Exchange rate: 28.2450 R/$1. (May 30) One year ago, 24.5 R/$1 • Price of Russian crude oil: $28.69/barrel, 5/30 (up from $13.19/barrel in May 1999.

Assessments of Russian Economy: Improving • The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) raised its forecast for Russian GDP growth from 1% to 4%. • Moody's: In April, raised outlook for ratings to positive from stable, rating international bonds at B3 • Fitch IBCA upgraded the credit rating assigned to Russian eurobonds to ‘B-‘ from ‘CCC’ Sources: Russian Central Bank exchange rates provided by RTS; 4/11; The Economist 5/27; Russian Economy: Trends and Perspectives, April 2000; 5/31; Russian and FSU Emerging Markets; Europe Monitor 5/2000.

RUSSIA PREPARES FOR CLINTON- ABM Treaty to allow deployment of thin national PUTIN SUMMIT missile defenses against rogue states and cut The Russian foreign policy community continues to offensive forces further in START III to 2,000 position itself for the upcoming Clinton-Putin summit warheads. Putin has threatened to pull out of the arms scheduled for June 3-5 in Moscow. Moscow has control treaties that he just adopted should the US sought to demonstrate its willingness to follow follow through on its threat to disregard the treaty if through on arms control commitments made to the Russia refuses to agree on a modification. While West. Most dramatically, Putin pushed the START there are reports that some in the Russian Foreign II treaty through the Duma even Ministry believe that a modification of before his inauguration whereas “From now on, all international the ABM treaty is inevitable, the commitments, on the contrary, statements and actions of Russia’s top Yeltsin had failed to get the must be made to conform to the document ratified for years. The foreign policy officials indicate national security blueprint and otherwise. Duma then also ratified the the blueprint for the development Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. of the armed forces that have Putin’s team is now actively been drawn up by Russian While a surprise breakthrough on the working towards a START III experts… we now have the arms control front is not out of the treaty that would reduce the opportunity to arrange the work question at the June summit, tensions are number of nuclear warheads in this field in such a way that almost certain to flare up regarding possessed by the two countries our stance is an offensive one” issues related to human rights. While Vladimir Putin even more dramatically. Clinton is under strong domestic pressure to raise concerns about Russian military brutality in At the same time, however, Russia is staking out a and recent encroachments on the freedom tough stance against the Clinton Administration’s of the press, Putin is under equally strong pressure effort to reach a “grand nuclear bargain” at the June not to put up with any such “interference in the 4-5 summit. The proposed bargain would modify the domestic affairs of Russia.”

“In the , gigantic importance is being attached to this meeting. You know, it's just visible that all the highest leadership is kind of nervous, it's visible that they badly need results.”--Anatoly Chubais

8 RUSSIAN MEDIA CRY FOUL By Ben Dunlap SDI Research Assistant

The May 11 raid of Media-Most’s corporate offices Second, Media Most’s troubles are at least partially in Moscow by masked commandos provoked an explained by the fact that the company’s president, immediate outcry from Russian and international Vladimir Gusinsky, is locked in a fierce struggle with media watchers, who described the action as a show rival oligarch Boris Berezovsky, the Kremlin insider of force to intimidate one of the Kremlin’s toughest and de facto owner of the competing national TV critics. station (ORT).

Media-Most owns the Segodnya newspaper, Echo of Third, Media-Most is hardly a model of fairness and Moscow radio station, Itogi weekly magazine (a joint objectivity. While it looks relatively objective in venture with Newsweek) and NTV, the national comparison to ORT, which engaged in outrageously television station that has produced highly critical biased attacks on Putin’s opponents during reports on the Chechen war and corruption in the campaigning for the Duma elections last fall and government. Presidential elections in March, it consistently reflects the political and economic interests of its The Russian General Prosecutor’s Office, which owner. organized the raid, claimed that FSB and Tax Police troops, who forced their way into the building and Perhaps the most striking thing about the raid is that rounded up Media-Most employees before carting off it turned out to be a public relations coup for Media reams of documents, tapes, computer discs, and Most. Instead of intimidating Gusinsky and his electronic equipment, were investigating alleged journalists, it actually made them more formidable crimes by the Media-Most security service. and less vulnerable to harassment by state security and police structures. Regardless of the reasons for it, Others disagreed. At a special hearing before the US the effect of the raid was clear: Gusinsky and Media Congressional Commission on Security and Most became symbolic champions of free press. The Cooperation in Europe, hastily called less than two Moscow rumor mill even generated the theory that weeks later, Media Most Deputy Chairman Igor Gusinsky orchestrated the raid himself in order to Malashenko testified that the raid was intended as improve his image as a crusader for independent “punishment for material already published or aired media. on television” and also as “an act of intimidation to prevent further investigative reporting not only in But the odd collection of Russian journalists, Moscow but all over the country.” legislators, human rights advocates, and world leaders responded to the raid in outrage not because Some 2,000 citizens rallied in downtown Moscow to they like NTV or believe that Media Most is protest the action, and the independent newspaper innocent. Rather, they acted out of concern for the Obshchaya Gazeta published a special edition future of press freedoms under Putin. decrying infringements on press freedoms. DEFINING THE THREAT There are good reasons to be skeptical about Media- In the nearly six months since Putin took over the Most’s claims that it is an innocent victim of state presidency, Russia’s journalists and media executives censorship. For one, the Prosecutor’s allegations— have felt themselves increasingly under attack. For that Media Most-security was illegally spying on many of them the storming of Media-Most was competitors, members of the government, and its own another in a series of steps organized—or at least employees—are entirely plausible. Like many sanctioned—by the Putin government aimed at Russian companies, Media-Most employs former chilling critical press. KGB officers to collect compromising information that may be used against political enemies. Unlike Yeltsin, who tolerated public ridicule that would be criminal in some Western European countries, Putin has given several ominous signs that

9 he will not allow serious criticism of himself or his For example, the state owns the broadcasting policies in the press. frequency and stations must apply for a license to use it. The “media chill” started with an effort by Russian authorities to control press coverage of the Chechen In two widely publicized cases, the broadcasting war, restricting media access to the region to guided licenses of Berezovsky’s ORT and TV Center tours that carefully avoid scenes of bloodshed. (closely linked to Moscow Mayor Luzhkov) were put Reporters who refused to abide by such restrictions up for bidding in a competitive application in May. have been punished. According to existing Russian law, a TV station that violates any federal law (as determined by the Most notably, Radio Liberty reporter Andrei Federal Press Ministry) must reapply for its license Babitsky was detained and beaten by Russian special according to a process that is essentially a subjective forces before being “traded” to unknown Chechen decision by the Press Minister. (ORT won its license fighters in exchange for five Russian POWs. After back; TV Center is fighting a court battle to forego weeks in captivity, Babitsky appeared in neighboring the application process, claiming allegations against , where he was promptly arrested again by it were fabricated.) Russian authorities. Putin branded the renegade reporter a “traitor” and said “what Babitsky did is TO SEEK AND IMPART IDEAS FREELY much more dangerous than firing a machine gun.” Russia has signed a number of international treaties and conventions pledging to uphold the principles of At the same time, in most public statements Putin freedom of expression: the Universal Declaration of continues to express his commitment to the principles Human Rights, the Council of Europe Human Rights of democracy and specifically to the free press. In Convention, the OSCE Founding Act, and one interview he declared: “I am deeply convinced subsequent charters. that we won’t have any development and the country will have no future if we suppress civil freedoms and But these documents do little to help journalists in the media.” their daily struggles. As one Russian legal expert said: “International norms can sometimes be used by If Putin is serious about protecting press freedoms in a skilled lawyer, but usually it is difficult enough to Russia, he has his work cut out for him. Aside from get state authorities to obey Russian law, never mind high-profile cases like the Media-Most raid and the international rules.” Still, the international norms Babitsky case, a number of deeply embedded represent a line, however faint or fuzzy, that Russia problems threaten the lives and livelihoods of has promised not to cross. Russian journalists today. Russian law governing is fragmented and Regional media are more vulnerable than Moscow- poorly integrated. Regional commonly based media are. Regional TV, radio, and newspapers contradict federal laws and the Constitution. Federal are more likely to be subject to pressure from local or laws leave large gaps that are filled by administrative regional authorities, including licensing difficulties measures and arbitrary decisionmaking by (for radio and television), and limited access to bureaucrats. printing presses, paper, and ink (for newspapers). “Administrative measures”—bogus inspections by Legal reforms in a few areas could rationalize the the fire department, tax police, and other state system of media regulation. For example, passing an agencies—have become an increasingly widespread improved law on television and radio broadcasting tool for silencing the press, especially in the regions. could introduce greater public accountability to the licensing process, putting an end to the arbitrary rule Journalists working in some regions are more of the Press Ministry. vulnerable to threats of physical violence than their Moscow counterparts are. Moscow media usually Journalists do not commonly look to the courts to have greater economic and political resources at their defend their rights. Even in cases where the law disposal to defend themselves from state interference. clearly protects them, they are more likely to defend themselves in print or through private channels. Thus, Television is more vulnerable to pressure than print long-term development of legal culture is a necessary media are. The technical and economic resources component of any effort to institutionalize the tenets required to operate a television station make most of free press in law. stations dependent on the state in one way or another.

10 One of the keys to establishing an independent press structure, bringing all regional laws into line with the is creating the economic conditions for an federal constitution. independent editorial policy. Too many editors and journalists are dependent upon the “envelope” they In the latter sphere, measures to reduce and simplify receive from their sponsoring oligarch. In other cases, taxes, improve transparency and attract foreign a network or newspaper simply cannot survive investment can only be good news for private media without financial support from a municipal or companies trying to survive on their own. Media regional government. In exchange for paper, ink, or executives say that the only way to separate press air time, governors and mayors often expect from politics is to create viable, competitive favorable news coverage. companies that exist to make a profit, not to pursue a political agenda. To be sure, journalists themselves bear much of the responsibility for the failure to create a viable The danger is that Putin may end up doing more to independent . Journalistic strengthen the state than to democratize society. ethics, including such basic ideas as refusing to take When the principles of free press inevitably bump up bribes, have suffered through years of economic against the interests of the state, it seems unlikely that hardship and political expediency. Journalists could Putin will sacrifice the latter. do more to learn what rights they have and do not have under the law. But it is clear that economic As he once said to a reporter, “you and I understand independence (and increased salaries) at newspapers freedom of expression differently.” For Putin, “rule and TV networks should be the foundation for any of law” seems to mean essentially that the state serious reform effort. makes laws and citizens follow them. His Press Minister says that his job is to “protect the state from Two of Putin’s stated objectives—strengthening the the mass media.” state and reviving the economy—may actually improve conditions for Russia’s independent media. If these are the principles that will guide Russia’s His policy initiatives in the first sphere may limit the development for the next four years, Russia’s mass ability of regional autocrats to suppress local media media will be in for a long struggle. outlets and may unify the Federation’s legal

SOURCES FOR IMAGES APPREARING IN RUSSIA WATCH No. 1: Putin: www.nns.ru, 5/7; www.nns.ru, 5/11; www.nns.ru, 5/8; www.nns.ru, 5/31; Putin and Kasyanov: www.lenta.ru, 5/10; Kasyanov: www.lenta.ru, 5/7; Kudrin: www.nns.ru, 5/31; www.pravitelstvo.gov.ru; Gref: www.nns.ru, 5/28; I.Ivanov: www.pravitelstvo.gov.ru,; S. Ivanov: www.nns.ru, 5/31; Rushailo: www.nns.ru, 5/31; Klebanov: www.pravitelstvo.gov.ru; Pochinok: www.pravitelstvo.gov.ru; Matvienko: www.pravitelstvo.gov.ru; Lesin: www.lenta.ru, 5/22; Kirienko: www.prav.ru, 5/31; Berezovsky: www.nns.ru, 5/31; Nemtsov: www.prav.ru, 5/31; masked police: Obshchaya Gazeta, 5/17; Gusinsky: www.vesti.ru, 5/22; Illarionov: www.lenta.ru, 5/26; Chubais: www.prav.ru, 5/31.

Special thanks to: Anya Schmemann and Roman Ilto

The Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project works to catalyze support for three great transformations underway in Russia and other countries of the former : to sustainable democracies, economies, and cooperative international relations. The Project seeks to understand Western stakes in these transformations, identify strategies for advancing Western interests, and encourage initiatives that increase the likelihood of success. It provides targeted intellectual and technical assistance to governments, international agencies, private institutions, and individuals seeking to facilitate these three great transformations.

SDI PROJECT, BELFER CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS JFK SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY 79 JFK STREET CAMBRIDGE, MA 02138 Phone: (617) 496-1565 Fax: (617) 496-8779 Website: http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/bcsia/sdi Email: [email protected]

11 Putin’s Super Representatives

The seven new “super-regions” and the presidential representatives appointed to head them are: • Central region: , most recently the head of the St. Petersburg tax police, he spent years climbing the ranks in the KGB. His largest challenge will be reigning in Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov. • Northwestern region: Viktor Cherkesov, most recently deputy director of the Federal Security Service (FSB), he ran the regional FSB in St. Petersburg where he was well-known for his tough stance against dissidents and where he will now be based. • : Sergei Kirienko, former , key governors in his region include , Mintimer Shaimiev and Murtaza Rakhimov. • North : General , previously the commander of the Military District, he commanded the Russian troops in Chechnya until April. • Far East: Kazantsev’s deputy, General will be faced with managing the politics and resources of the Far East region and its governors including Yevgeny Nazdratenko. • Urals: Pyotr Latyshev, former Deputy Interior Minister who ran the police in the northwest military district. • : Leonid Drachevsky, minister for the Commonwealth of Independent States in the outgoing Government, former ambassador to Poland.

The 7 New Macroregions

The seven new macroregions are: (capital Moscow); the Northwest Federal District (capital St Petersburg); the North Caucasus Federal District (capital Rostov-na-Donu); the Volga Federal District (capital Nizhniy Novgorod); the Urals Federal District (capital Yekaterinburg); the Siberian Federal District (capital Novosibirsk), and the Far Eastern Federal District (capital Khabarovsk).

The Central Federal District: Region, Region, Vladimir Region, Region, Region, Region, Region, Region, Region, Moscow Region, Orel Region, Region, Region, Region, Region, Tula Region and Region.

The Northwest Federal District: , Republic of Komi, Archangel Region, Vologda Region, Region, Leningrad Region, Murmansk Region, Novgorod Region, Region, St Petersburg and the Nenets Autonomous Area.

The North Caucasus Federal District: Republic of Adygeya (Adygeya), Republic of Dagestan, Republic of , Kabardar-Balkar Republic, Republic of , Karachay- Republic, Republic of North Ossetia-Alania, the Chechen Republic, Krasnodar Territory, Stavropol Territory, Astrakhan Region, Volgograd Region and Rostov Region.

The Volga Federal District: Republic of Bashkortostan, Republic of , Republic of , Republic of Tatarstan (Tatarstan), the Udmurt Republic, the Chuvash Republic, Kirov Region, Nizhniy Novgorod Region, Region, Region, Perm Region, Region, Region, Region and the Komi- Permyak Autonomous Area.

The Urals Federal District: Kurgan Region, Sverdlovsk Region, Tyumen Region, Chelyabinsk Region, Khanty- Mansi Autonomous Area and the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Area.

The Siberian Federal District: Republic of Altay, Republic of , Republic of Tyva, Republic of , Altay Territory, Krasnoyarsk Territory, Irkutsk Region, Kemerovo Region, Novosibirsk Region, Omsk Region, Tomsk Region, Chita Region, Aga Buryat Autonomous Area, the Taymyr (Dolgan-Nenets) Autonomous Area, the Ust-Orda Buryat Autonomous Area and the Evenki Autonomous Area.

The Far Eastern Federal District: Republic of (Yakutia), Maritime Territory, Khabarovsk Territory, Amur Region, Kamchatka Region, Magadan Region, Sakhalin Region, the Jewish Autonomous Region, the Koryak Autonomous Area and the Chukotka Autonomous Area. (Source:ITAR-TASS 5/13)

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