#DigitalDissentRhetoric: A Rhetorical Grounding of Contemporary Social Media

Activism

A dissertation presented to

the faculty of

the Scripps College of Communication of Ohio University

In partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree

Doctor of Philosophy

Justin Gus Foote

May 2019

© 2019 Justin Gus Foote. All Rights Reserved. This dissertation titled

#DigitalDissentRhetoric: A Rhetorical Grounding of Contemporary Social Media

Activism

by

JUSTIN GUS FOOTE

has been approved for

the School of Communication Studies

and the Scripps College of Communication by

Michael L. Butterworth

Professor of Communication Studies

Scott Titsworth

Dean, Scripps College of Communication

ii Abstract

FOOTE, JUSTIN G., Ph.D, May 2019, Communication Studies

#DigitalDissentRhetoric: A Rhetorical Grounding of Contemporary Social Media

Activism

Director of Dissertation: Michael L. Butterworth

The increasing use of social media as a venue for political discussion creates an opportunity for rhetorical scholars to (re)evaluate the rhetorical nature of such discourse.

Understood colloquially as “social media activism,” or “digital activism,” one unique tool utilized to convey political messages has been the implantation of “hashtag campaigns.”

Specific to this project is the usage of hashtag campaigns to convey messages of dissent.

Termed digital dissent, this project examines the implications of hashtags illustrating racial inequality. This project explores a rhetorical grounding of contemporary digital activism and argues the proliferation of digital dissent influences a reconceptualization of democracy. Embracing dissent as fundamental democratic discourse, this project also argues that social media can serve as a venue for robust democratic political action. This work evaluates social media as a mechanism for enacting a rhetorical robust democratic public in an effort to identify and initiate social change.

iii Dedication

To those who strive to make the world a better place.

iv Acknowledgments

There is no way I would have completed this project without the guidance and encouragement of many. Thank you:

To Dr. Michael Butterworth, without your guidance I can firmly say I would have never finished. You told me early to “trust the process.” Easier said than done. I always maintained that after talking to you I was motivated to continue. I will continue your strong influence in seeing others do meaningful work and continue to advocate for positive social change.

To my committee, each of which helped influence the evolution of this project.

Dr. Aden, your Rhetorical Criticism class demonstrated the richness of rhetorical scholarship and the knowledge we can offer others. Dr. McKerrow, thank you for introducing me to the work of Jacques Rancière—it profoundly changed my life and annoyed many who have had to listen to me talk about his work. Your guidance and positivity always pushed me further. Dr. Grant, your Radical Political Theory class taught me people have the get a little crazy if they want to change the world. Your class taught me to be steadfast in doing what is right in whatever means I can undertake to influence change. Dr. J.W. Smith, your Black Rhetoric class fundamentally influenced my realization of just how prevalent the issue of racial equality is in contemporary society.

Simply put, without your class I do not write this dissertation. Thank you, all.

To my friends, Stevie, Justin, Andrea, and Jen have all provided moments of levity and advice whenever needed. We all started together and you all remain close friends. Steve, Kristen, Sean, and Sidi—your friendship is invaluable and I always look

v forward to the times we can continue our chats. A special thanks goes out to Lanie, who always responded to my crazy texts with motivation. You are a great friend and will forever maintain that you are one of the best scholars I have ever met.

To Peter Raposo, your impact on my life is exceptional. You are always in my memories and I was reminded of your words as I say and agonized over single words.

One thing at a time, one day at a time, it all gets done.

To Todd Holm, who held me accountable even if he could only do so from across the country. Without you I probably finish my academic career at Miami University and who knows where I would be now. Thank you to Dan West, you furthered my love of speech and debate and, along with Todd, taught me how to lead my own team.

To my sister and her family, thank you for the laughs and fun times that while keeping me from writing also kept me sane. To my Aunt Lisa, your unending positive belief in me truly means more than I can ever convey.

To my mom and dad, your support of my education has been beyond belief. There has been no greater impact on my life than the lessons you have instilled in me. My love for you is only surpassed by my student loan debt—thank you for making me the person I am today.

To Rachel Michelle Foote, you have literally been there for every word, for every frustration, and for every success. I love you and the support you have given me demonstrates just how far we will go to make sure each other reaches their dreams. You are perfect and I can only hope to equal you care and compassion.

vi Table of Contents

Page

Abstract ...... iii Dedication ...... iv Acknowledgments ...... v Introduction ...... 1 Rhetoric and Social Media Activism: An Under-Explored Connection ...... 13 Social Media as a Digital Public Sphere ...... 17 The Vernacular Nature of Social Media Activism ...... 23 Transition to a Digital Public Sphere ...... 28 Chapter I: Digital Dissent: The Need to Radically (Re)Frame Democracy ...... 36 Democracy in a Digital Public Sphere ...... 37 The Crisis of Consensus and (Re)Thinking the Political ...... 47 The Obligation of Dissent ...... 55 The Turn to Agonistic Pluralism ...... 58 Rhetorical Conception of Race and Social (In)equality ...... 62 Chapter II: From Civil Rights Movement to #BlackLivesMatter: Evolving Leadership . 70 History and Utilization of #BlackLivesMatter ...... 74 History of #BlackLivesMatter ...... 75 Utilization of #BlackLivesMatter ...... 78 From Civil Rights to #BlackLivesMatter: The Implications of Public Memory ...... 85 Historical Remembrance of the Civil Rights Movement ...... 86 Rhetoric and Public Memory: The Implication of Societal Remembrance ...... 89 Memory of Civil Rights as Unnecessary Critique ...... 94 The Evolving Role of Leadership in the Progress to Racial Equality ...... 98 Memory of the Civil Rights Movement Leadership and Its Discontents ...... 100 The Role of Leadership in #BlackLivesMatter ...... 105 Changing Advocacy: From Civil Rights to #BlackLivesMatter ...... 111 #BlackLivesMatter: Engaging Dissensus and the Shift to Agonism ...... 115 Rancière and the Crisis of Leadership ...... 116 Agonistic Pluralism and Problems of Leadership ...... 118 Leaving Leadership: Digital Dissent as Contemporary Political Advocacy ...... 122 vii Conclusion ...... 127 Chapter III: Digital Dissent and Doxa ...... 131 Doxa and Rhetoric, Rhetoric and Doxa: A Contentious Relationship ...... 132 Rhetoric’s Resuscitation of Doxa ...... 133 Understanding the Subjective/Objective Tension of Doxa ...... 137 Democratic Doxai and its Demonstration ...... 139 The Move to a Discourse of Citizenship ...... 142 Social Media as Venue for Demonstration and Critique ...... 147 #HandsUpDontShoot, #ICantBreathe: Digital Dissent as Demonstration and Critique ...... 151 History of #HandsUpDontShoot ...... 152 History of #ICantBreathe ...... 157 Utilization of #HandsUpDontShoot and #ICantBreathe ...... 160 Dissensus: Digital Dissent as Demonstration and Critique Doxa ...... 167 Digital Dissent as Demonstration of Democratic Doxa ...... 169 Digital Dissent as Critique of Doxa ...... 174 Digital Dissent, Doxa, and the Agonistic Turn ...... 182 Conclusion ...... 185 Chapter IV: Exploring Comic Framing: #CrimingWhileWhite and #AliveWhileBlack as Digital Dissent ...... 187 History and Utilization of #CrimingWhileWhite and #AliveWhileBlack ...... 188 History of #CrimingWhileWhite ...... 189 History of #AliveWhileBlack ...... 192 Utilization of #CrimingWhileWhite and #AliveWhileBlack ...... 194 Digital Dissent as Comic Corrective ...... 203 Connecting the ComicFrame and Hashtag Campaigns ...... 206 Digital Dissent as Comic Corrective ...... 211 Digital Dissent and Agonism ...... 220 Comic Correctives as Rancièreian Generative Equality ...... 226 Conclusion ...... 235 Conclusion: The Rhetorical Nature of Digital Dissent ...... 239 Retweet, without Comment: The Quick Share Version ...... 241 Avenues for Future Research ...... 247

viii Constant Evolution...... 251 The Unknown End ...... 256 Bibliography ...... 262 Notes ...... 284

ix Introduction

On Thursday July 17, 2014, Eric Garner was approached by police officers Justin

Damico and Daniel Pantaleo under the suspicion of evading state tax laws through the sale of untaxed cigarettes. A friend of Garner’s began recording the altercation on his cell phone, and after a brief verbal encounter, Pantaleo attempted to handcuff Garner, who swatted the officer’s hands away. Pantaleo responded by putting Garner in a chokehold and attempted to pull the 6’3,” 350-pound man to the ground. After being surrounded by a group of other officers, Pantaleo released his arm from Garner’s neck and pushed

Garner’s face into the sidewalk. Video of the incident captures Garner gasping, “I can’t breathe” repeatedly while lying on the sidewalk.1 Once an ambulance arrived on the scene, no initial attempts were made by paramedics to help an asthmatic Garner recover from his sustained injuries.2 Approximately an hour after the altercation, Garner was pronounced dead after suffering a heart attack on the way to the hospital. Medical examiners ruled Garner’s death a homicide due to compression on his chest and the use of a banned chokehold maneuver.3 Despite protests, a grand jury chose not to indict officer Daniel Pantaleo.4

On August 9, 2014, Michael Brown, leaving a local convenience store after stealing several packages of cigarillos and shoving the store clerk, began walking down the middle of the street. Officer Darren Wilson, notified of a robbery in progress, identified Brown and a friend as the perpetrators as they walked down the street and quickly blocked the pair’s route. A short altercation ensued between Brown and Wilson through the open window of the police vehicle resulting in Wilson’s gun being

1 discharged. Following a brief pursuit, an unarmed Brown turned, faced Wilson, and began moving toward the officer. Wilson fired multiple shots at Brown hitting him in the chest and arms, fatally injuring Brown.5 On November 24, 2014, following grand jury testimony, Darren Wilson was not indicted for the death of Michael Brown.6

On November 22, 2014, Tamir Rice was playing with a toy airsoft replica gun at the Cudell Recreation Center in Cleveland, Ohio. A 9-1-1 call was placed reporting

“there’s a guy in here with a pistol, pointing it at everybody.”7 Officers Timothy

Loehmann and Frank Garmback responded to the scene. Upon arrival the officers demanded Rice lay down the gun before firing, the exchange lasted approximately two seconds. Four minutes later, two additional officers responded and began first aid. 8 Rice was 12 years old. The replica gun he was playing with lacked the orange barrel insert identifying it as nonlethal. Reviewing the 9-1-1 call revealed the caller identified the gun as “probably fake”; however, this information was not relayed to the responding officers.9

During the investigation into the incident, investigators discovered Officer Loehmann had resigned from a neighboring police precinct, rather than be fired, after he was deemed to not hold the “maturity needed to work in our employment.” On December 28,

2015, the grand jury declined to indict either of the police officers.10

Unfortunately, the deaths of Garner, Brown, and Rice are not unique singular incidents but rather markers of an epidemic of African American deaths at the hands of negligent law enforcement personnel. The deaths of Garner, Brown, and Rice are just some of the instances that garnered significant national attention and resulted in mass outrage since the death of Trayvon Martin in 2012. The tragic deaths of Michael Brown,

2 Eric Garner, Tamir Rice, Dontre Hamilton, John Crawford III, Freddie Gray, Tanisha

Anderson, Walter Scott, Eric Harris, Sandra Bland, Samuel Dubose, and Christian Taylor have sparked numerous discourses regarding contemporary race relations in the United

States. Unique in their respective situations, the events surrounding the deaths of these individuals share a common thread: they were all black individuals, relatively young, unarmed, and their deaths were the result of actions undertaken by a white law enforcement officer accused of using excessive force. Additionally, the outcomes of the respective investigations led to substantial outrage when the individuals responsible for the deaths were found not guilty (in the case of Martin), not indicted for a crime (in the cases of Brown, Garner, Hamilton, Crawford III, and Anderson), not immediately held accountable (in the case of Gray), are currently awaiting trail (in the cases of Scott,

Harris, Dubose), or are under further investigation (in the cases of Bland and Taylor).11

The deaths of these individuals have been the impetus for tremendous discourse focused on the intersections of race, law enforcement behavior, and media coverage. Much of the discourse surrounding these deaths has materialized on social media. Some of the most conspicuous examples of this discourse have been the numerous social media hashtag campaigns created in response to the neglectful continuation of both law enforcement action and media representation of black individuals killed by law enforcement.

Preeminent among the hashtag campaigns has been #BlackLivesMatter, which has become the primary voice of dissent against law enforcement negligence. In addition, multiple other hashtags have supplemented the discourse.

3 My initial encounter with #BlackLivesMatter happened during a moment of transition in my academic career. Entering the second year of my doctoral program I needed to take an extra course and was encouraged to select one outside my comfort zone. I chose Black Rhetoric and the course was paradigm shifting. Being a white male with a middle-class Midwestern public school background, I was unaware of many of the challenges and systemic inequalities facing black people. Beyond the rich influence of black rhetors and the influence of African heritage on rhetorical scholarship, many of the course discussions shed light on issues of historical and contemporary racial inequality.

The readings and discussion I encountered that semester unfolded concurrently with the acquittals of the officers involved in the deaths of Brown and Garner and the shooting of

Tamir Rice. As my previous academic inquiries occurred within the context of social media, I was attuned to the amount of political discourse occurring on social media as the rise of #BlackLivesMatter seemingly engulfed contemporary discourse.

It was through this digital political discourse that I realized my own position afforded me a sense of privilege before unbeknownst. Through various social media posts utilizing #BlackLivesMatter, I began to realize the rampant inequalities black people face not just in terms of deaths related to law enforcement encounters but also in everyday behaviors. Encountering #CrimingWhileWhite and #AliveWhileBlack posts, especially from some friends, demonstrated that I had been caught falling into the supposed belief of a “colorblind” society. It was through these social media posts that I realized how severely different life was for non-white people in the United States. The discourse I found on social media paralleled the experience of a speaker in the Black Rhetoric

4 course. The gentleman was a pastor who noted he grew up accustomed to hearing the noise of locking car doors as he walked down the street. As I listened to his story I was struck by how two individuals can come to two entirely different understandings about society. At the same time, I was beginning to find myself gravitating to examining how political discourse on social media, led by #BlackLivesMatter, influenced understandings of racial inequality. Specifically, I began questioning how these social media discourses operate as a form of contemporary digital activism. Through these guiding contexts, I anchored my exploration in how this public discourse also influences our understanding of political action and democracy.

As my own experience is indicative of the value of such inquiry, I wanted to explore the rhetorical nature of contemporary social media activism. In this regard, I approached the topic not as a scholar devoid of objectivity but rather as one invested in particular viewpoints that inform my critique. Initially, as a white person, I do not desire to speak to how we must understand issues of race but rather how social media provides a venue for us to explore issues of racial difference. Through social media we can better understand differences through the sharing of discourse. Additionally, I am drawn to understanding democracy as agonistic—that is, that conflict can never truly be eliminated but that we must strive to find others as adversaries rather than enemies. This position warrants a drastic shift from our contemporary democratic behaviors. However, striving for this goal is worthwhile and necessitates new avenues of inquiry and discussion.

Finally, as a rhetorical scholar, I view rhetoric as an attitude—rhetoric is what rhetoricians do. Thus, this project does not subscribe to any set methodology. However, I

5 utilize multiple rhetorical concepts and arguments throughout as I advance a rhetorical grounding of contemporary social media activism. These guiding principles run throughout this dissertation as they influence my argument for how we can better understand these rhetorical messages.

One means for understanding the public discourse associated with Brown, Garner, and Rice is to make sense of the voices of dissent and advocates for change found on social media. As both violent and nonviolent protests emerged in response to the deaths of these individuals, and were rekindled with the one-year anniversary of Michael

Brown’s death in Ferguson, Missouri, social media has been a primary tool for organizing and enacting protest. Specifically, rhetorical criticism of the multiple social media campaigns created as a response to the death of these boys and men can further our understanding of the rhetorical conception of digital activism about contemporary race issues in the United States. In this dissertation, I rhetorically ground contemporary digital activism and argue the proliferation of digital activism influences a reconceptualization of democracy. As social media has received substantial attention focusing on the viability to initiate change within contemporary society, issues of racial inequality have arisen to the forefront.12 While this dissertation surely implicates the nature of democracy and discourse in our technologically advanced time, it also has much to tell us about the implications of racial injustice. This work evaluates social media as a mechanism for enacting a rhetorical robust democratic public and the selection of the campaigns focusing on racial injustice inherently raises issues of race to the center of the discussion.

However, while social media’s potential to enable social change has sparked much

6 scholarly discussion, communication scholarship that can help craft a more rhetorically- grounded conception of social media activism is needed. In this dissertation, I enter into this conversation in an effort to articulate a potential facilitation of how democratic discourse can be enacted within a digital public.

Acts of violence committed by law enforcement personnel against African

American males have traditionally been underreported.13 Thus, social media campaigns such as #BlackLivesMatter are significant for their ability to keep these instances in the news. The influence of these social media campaigns has reached far beyond traditional activist milieu, extending even to popular culture and sports reporting. David Zirin, sports editor for The Nation, argues, “Without the resilience of the #BlackLivesMatter movement, the shooting of this unarmed black man [Christian Taylor] would have gone unnoticed.”14 Much has been made of the popular culture references engaging

#BlackLivesMatter, from its portrayal in a Law & Order: Special Victims Unit episode to

Prince’s pronouncement during the 2015 Grammy awards that “Black lives, still matter.”

Perhaps the most important attribute of #BlackLivesMatter is the slogan’s ability to escape the structural control of the ruling establishment. #BlackLivesMatter “has confounded the politicians and the news media, accustomed as they are to using the same old scripts to discuss race and protest without challenge.”15 Fredrick C. Harris, lamenting the limitations of the civil rights era, argues #BlackLivesMatter protests have “not only put police reform on the policy agenda but demanded that American society reconsider how it values black lives”—a protest born from online hashtag activism and continually proliferated through social media.16

7 Due to the significant coverage of #BlackLivesMatter and similar social media activism, mass media have extolled the importance of social media as a vehicle for spreading democracy. The events of the Arab spring, colloquially dubbed “the

Twitter/Facebook revolution,” brought forth an avalanche of political change and academic research focused on the use of social media during this time.17 Research focusing on the intersection of social media and democracy has been prevalent in the fields of communication studies, media studies, political science, sociology, and technology studies; however, this research often focuses narrowly on the worth of political action taking place online. Conversations over whether social media helps or hinders democratic discourse have become commonplace; however, these conversations tend to veer toward either utopian or dystopian conceptions of social media—views of social media either being the savior for democracy or social media leading to democracy’s downfall. Simply accepting social media as a utopian/dystopian resource for democratic purposes presents a myriad of problems and ignores potential drawbacks.

Utopian/dystopian views greatly misguide and neglect our ability for identifying, explaining, and understanding social media’s ability to foster democratic discourse as they focus on vast, holistic practices and thus minimize the nuanced practices a person may utilize when engaging in political action online.

When absent a utopian/dystopian dichotomy, research has been both laudatory and critical of the connection between social media and democracy. Recent discussion has typically spotlighted the importance of social media and activism, such as

#BlackLivesMatter, concentrating on the positive aspects of social media and activism in

8 attempted refutation of popular critiques of social media acting solely as a means to circulate information.18 This trend provides contrary discourse to pervious research, which argued the limitations of social media activism to encourage change. Researching the role of social media within democracy must continue, as social media has become a predominant means of communication for individuals in current society.19 The continued growth of social media usage, along with consistent reinforcement of social media’s positive impact, has led scholars to praise the importance of social media as a means for,

“the powerless to collaborate, coordinate, and give voice to their concerns.”20

However, one of the problems conceptualizing “social media activism,” is the term “activism.” General critique of such action has revealed its lack of “real action” instigating change. Critics of social media activism have termed this behavior

“slacktivism” and many, including influential digital scholar Evgeny Morozov, argue this behavior is a detriment to democracy.21 However, professor Zeynep Tufekci attempts to refashion the debate from “whether social media or the people” provoke change by instead asking questions of “how.”22 “Social media is not a movement, it’s a tool and it certainly did not jump out of the screen and cause” people to care about racial inequality, she asserts; however, “it can be a potent tool for social change” by emphasizing and altering collective action.23 Focusing on social media activism as a tool for increased discourse and the coinciding increased opportunity for collective support, I argue rather than think of social media activism in terms of generating “action” we should instead direct attention to how the increase of “discourse” can be important to initiating social change. Tufekci observes the importance of collective support, positing, “the very

9 survival of our species may depend on finding a way to organize our way out” of social inequalities.24 This dissertation provides at least one exploration into the importance of increased participation as I argue social media can serve as a venue for increased democratic discourse by grounding the rhetorical capabilities of digital dissent. Thus, this dissertation begins to shift away from the emphasis of the result of “activism” and refocuses on the role of “social media” as a venue to foment social change.

In an effort to clarify the arguments made in this project, I want to justify my use of terminology. Research on new media technology uses terms such “social media,”

“social networking,” “new media,” “digital media,” and “participatory media.”

Interchangeable to some degree, dismissing the importance of terminology has implications for the rhetorical critique of mediated communication. Whereas “new media” initially appears relevant to this dissertation, the technology of primary interest has been around for over ten years and arguably longer.25 Similarly, “digital media” places excessive focus on the channel used in creating and disseminating information and disproportionately broadens the area under criticism—under the heading “digital media,” inquiry must take into account use of digital technology spanning beyond the scope of my arguments. “Participatory media” could be a viable option for this work, except that the focus on who participates is less a matter of consequence for this dissertation than an individual having the ability to participate. Finally, one is left with choosing between

“social media” and “social networking,” both viable as Facebook and Twitter are self- described as “social networking sites.” Nevertheless, social media conveys an important difference between the two terms. Whereas both social networking and social media

10 appeal to similar conceptions of connections between people, social media reveals an additional focus on created content. “Social networking” inherently places focus on the networking of individuals, an admittedly active process, but mitigates the importance of the function of created material as well as the site for the dissemination of material.

“Social media” thus focuses both on the created content of information (ranging from hashtag campaigns to multi media messages) and the areas for spreading information (the individual websites). Jimmy Sanderson notes social media’s focus on content creation as

“one of the more influential advantages that have contributed to the rise of social media.”26 As a hashtagged social media campaign, #BlackLivesMatter works as both an identifying function and an organizing function. People both identify with joining the conversation about racial inequality and organize their input simultaneously. Content creation and dissemination has become a feature of social media activism as people share stories as well as pictures and video. Finally, and perhaps most important, “social media” is the colloquially adopted phrase for recognizing activism on social networking sites.27

Working within the confines of quotidian discourse drives the focus of the discussion on the act and away from the mode of delivery.

Andreas Kaplan and Michael Haenlein define social media as “a group of

Internet-based applications that build on the ideological and technological foundations of

Web 2.0, and that allow the creation and exchange of user-generated content.”28 Web 2.0 has been credited with ushering in the era of participatory online user experiences, and the ability for users to easily generate and share content has remained the primary focus.

Social media platforms have continually exemplified Web 2.0’s drive for increased

11 “social connection and user participation” as they have been the primary source of internet traffic in recent years.29 Within the United States, the two most popular social media sites have been Facebook and Twitter. The popularity of these two sites is one reason for my choosing them as the primary sites for investigation of social media activism. As of November 2015, there were 1.55 billion unique users to Facebook, accounting for over a quarter of all internet traffic with an average of 42 minutes of daily usage.30 To fully understand the significant internet traffic Facebook receives, one must recognize that only five years ago Facebook broke the barrier to 500 million active users.

Twitter, second only to Facebook in active users in “microblog” based social media platforms, attracts over 316 million active users.31 Number of users is important to my argument for a reframing of social media activism. However, the second reason I chose

Facebook and Twitter as the primary sites for my argument is their ability to collate and search hashtag comments. All social media sites have the ability to search material posted on their sites, but both Facebook and Twitter have integrated their hashtag search into their traditional search bars rather seamlessly.

Manuel Castells argues the advent of social networking sites, within an already enlarging networked society, advanced digital activism from the theoretical realm into practical application.32 The increase in both ease of use and networking options created heightened ability for individuals to co-create content and share information. Facilitated by the proliferation of Web 2.0 technology, society grew to be an immersive “networked information economy,” creating a reduction in the cost of gathering, or gaining information, thus allowing individuals to make more informed decisions.33 Utilizing these

12 benefits, social media users have begun to enact various forms of dissent and resistance against power structures, in turn reshaping our understanding of political action. Marc

Lamont Hill, discussing recent social media campaigns against racial inequality, argues,

“As the Internet becomes an increasingly central part of everyday life, a new generation of activist has also made social media a key component of the resistance movement.”34

As more and more examples of police negligence resulting in the deaths of individuals occur, support for #BlackLivesMatter continues to proliferate through social media.

Hill’s argument closely aligns with the work of Catherine Palczewski’s work highlighting the importance of the internet in creating space for counterpublic discourse. Hill argues that social media users have asserted a discussion of racial inequality into everyday discourse that would otherwise have remained veiled. Palczewski argues the internet provides new space for counterpublic discourse “free from the surveillance power of state and commercial interests”—an act which #BlackLivesMatter, as noted above, has maintained remarkably well.35 Hill further notes, “Although there is nothing inherently radical about corporatized social media outlets, a new generation of activist is actively refashioning them into spaces of critical dialogue, political education, and global solidarity.”36 As social media activism demonstrates no signs of abating, rhetorical scholars find themselves optimally placed to understand the changing environment of activism.

Rhetoric and Social Media Activism: An Under-Explored Connection

This dissertation does not focus precisely on how society may ultimately solve the issue of law enforcement negligence, which will take both changes in government policy

13 and societal thinking. Instead, I seek to identify and evaluate the rhetorical efforts by citizens who utilize social media to intervene in political conflicts. The expeditious pace of technological change has ushered in an era of seemingly constant text and discourse circulation possibilities. These contemporary changes provide compelling areas for rhetorical analysis and critique, especially in ways that further our understanding of democratic discourse. Interesting work has begun exploring the connection between rhetoric and social media discourse; however, a robust conception of rhetorically grounded social media activism remains necessary.

A rhetorical-grounding of social media activism is warranted, as rhetoric has historically examined the inherent connection between discourse and our understanding of society, specifically our understanding of spaces within society. Barry Brummett defines rhetoric “as the social function that influences and manages meaning.”37

Although the landscape continues to change, Brummett argues rhetoric tends to be conceived as textual, limiting the capacity for popular culture artifacts to be the focus of rhetorical scholarship as we attempt to further our perceptions of societal order and meaning making.38 The desire for rhetorical criticism to focus primarily on texts limits the influential role popular culture artifacts have on societal meaning making and structure. Fortunately, a rhetorical perspective of social media activism can recall a rich history of research acknowledging the endless possibilities for individuals to create and garner meaning. A rhetorical perspective allows researchers to break free of the bonds attuned to narrowly deciding which online practices constitute political action and instead focus on how users employ democratic discourse within their social media usage.

14 Rhetorical criticism remains astutely positioned for the study of social media activism as it positions the critic within the role of “inventor,” allowing the critic to construct the text from “mediated experience.”39 Additionally, rhetoric acknowledges the fragmented nature of discourse, relating efficiently to social media activism, as such action typically revolves around multiple discourses and texts. #BlackLivesMatter represents such a fragmented text as the message is spread and presented through a multitude of social media users and actions. Subsequently, the supporting hashtag campaigns supplement

#BlackLivesMatter activism providing additional argumentation and awareness for activism directed at critiquing law enforcement negligence.

I argue that such a change legitimizes social media activism as a democratic act through a reconceptualization of how we understand democracy. Undertaking this critique refocuses our understanding of social media activism by reconceptualizing how an individual’s action on social media can be viewed as democratic action. As previously mentioned, past research has primarily argued for the viability of social media as a means to expand or limit democratic discourse. Past inquiry on the connection of social media and democracy has overlooked the importance of the communicative action social media users utilize in an effort to generate social meaning. I argue this neglect is due to a limited conceptualization of democracy within society, especially when discussed within the context of social media. This limitation arguably develops from society’s reluctance to describe democracy beyond institutional terms. Robert Dahl identifies the institutionalization of democracy when discussing six common institutions found within large-scale democracy—elected officials; free, fair, and frequent elections; freedom of

15 expression; alternative sources of information; associational autonomy; and inclusive citizenship.40 Of these institutions, elections/voting garners the majority of discussion.

Furthering Dahl’s focus on institutions, especially elections, is popular identification of democracy as a form of governance requiring elections.

In popular culture and mass media we oftentimes hear of a country’s citizens gaining the right to vote as the beginning of democracy. Framing democracy within an institutional frame helps explain why the connection between social media and democracy has been traditionally researched from the viewpoint: Can social media be a viable space for democratic action? As previously discussed, however, a rhetorical grounding of social media activism will allow for activism within the context of social media to be accepted as democratic behavior through a (re)conceptualization of society’s understanding of democracy. Such an investigation will allow rhetorical researchers to identify how seemingly minute action can (re)create individual meaning and connection amongst social media users. Scholarship has previously explored how (re)conceptualizing citizenship away from questions of what counts as citizenship toward questions of how we enact citizenship amplifies the process of discourse rather than focus on the concluding act. Robert Asen argues such refocusing “directs our attentions from acts to action. Inquiring into the how of citizenship recognizes citizenship as a process. From this perspective, citizenship does not appear in specific acts per se, but signals a process that may encompass a number of different activities.”41 William Connolly posits such attention to the process of democracy creates a “politics of becoming” and warrants an

“agonistic respect” and “critical responsiveness.”42 Such a focus continually escapes our

16 contemporary political landscape as the persistent institutionalization (e.g. voting) of democracy limits how we envision democratic action. Michael Butterworth contends this focus “limits democratic imaginations, equating the mere presence of elections with the ideals of freedom and liberty.”43 A rhetorical grounding of social media activism can escape the connection between democracy and the notion of an ideal democratic deliberative sphere—which I believe previous research on social media and democracy has relied upon.

As this dissertation seeks to identify a rhetorically-grounded conception of social media activism, I must first articulate the viability of a digital public sphere accommodating to democratic discourse. Accomplishing such an argument must begin by comprehending the historical significance of the public sphere through its initial conception in Jürgen Habermas’ book, The Structural Transformation of the Public

Sphere, critiques and modifications of Habermas’ conceptions, the importance of vernacular within the public sphere as argued by Gerard Hauser, especially as it pertains to social media, and the transformation to an online public sphere within contemporary society. Such analysis is key to understanding how social media may be utilized as a primary form of democratic discourse focused on activism.

Social Media as a Digital Public Sphere

The connection between the public sphere and social media, in terms of democratic practice(s), has been previously explored in regard to multiple issues. The events of the Arab Spring, as previously mentioned, brought the impact of social media’s role in contemporary activism to the forefront of academic and everyday discussion.

17 Dubbed the “Twitter Revolution,” for the role played in propagating and organizing activism messages, the Arab Spring encompassed a wave of protest that swept much of the Arab world into non-violent and violent revolution. Initiated due to significant dissatisfaction with numerous government leaders, what constitutes the beginning of the

Arab Spring has been open for debate; however, many point to the death of Khaled Said as the event that sparked wide-scale protest in Egypt. Said, a 28-year-old Egyptian, was beaten to death while in police custody on June 6, 2010, after allegedly presenting evidence of corruption within the police department.44 Police descriptions of the event, later corroborated by forensics authorities, suggested that Said died while trying to ingest a packet of hashish in an attempt to conceal the drug from police. Government controlled media coverage supported the narrative provided by the police and forensics accounts, but the story was soon deemed “illegitimate” by journalists and witnesses to Said’s beating.45 As a response to the controlled media coverage, Wael Ghonim created a

Facebook group named, “We are all Khaled Said.” The most provocative artifact initially found on the group was a picture of Said’s corpse taken by his cousin as the family visited his body. The severely beaten face ran contrary to the controlled media coverage and soon went viral on the internet.46 Additionally, the group used the Facebook page as a site to share videos of police brutality as well as to engage others in political discussion.47 Jennifer Preston contends that, while blogs and YouTube videos existed prior to Said’s death, the “We are all Khaled Said” Facebook page allowed all the material to share a common space and thus created a sense of community engaged in critiquing the actions of the state government.48

18 Protests and, ultimately, revolution began after labor groups and the April 6 movement joined the social media campaigns which sprung forth from the main “We are all Khaled Said” Facebook page.49 Shortly after these events in Egypt, protests began in

Tunisia. Following the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi on December 17, 2010,

Tunisia faced growing outrage exacerbated by the actions of a corrupt government.50

Bouazizi, humiliated by police after failing to hand over his cart of goods due to not having a permit, set himself on fire near the steps of the local government building. When the Tunisian government-run news media failed to cover Bouazizi’s death and the resulting protests, in hopes of stemming the uprising, citizens took to social media as an outlet to spread their frustration. As a means to share Bouazizi’s story, his cousin uploaded a video of the crowd gathering in protest to his Facebook account.51 The video was copied and distributed across various social media sites before eventually being picked up by Al Jazeera. As revolution spread throughout Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain,

Yemen, Libya, and Syria (as well as initiating uprisings in Saudi Arabia and Jordan), the rest of the world watched the events unfold, and protesters elsewhere began to utilize social media as a means to increasingly mobilize protests.

The Occupy Wall Street Movement (internationally known as the Occupy

Movement), which sought to raise awareness for social and economic inequality, originated less than a year after the events in Tunisia. Eventually located in Zuccotti Park of the Wall Street District, the Occupy protestors pledged, “Rebellion will not stop until the corporate state is extinguished.”52 Finding inspiration in the Arab Spring protests, the

Occupy Movement sought to bring attention to the corruption running throughout Wall

19 Street, primarily due to capitalist greed.53 Similar to the Arab Spring protests, the Occupy

Movement relied heavily on social media for expressing and circulating their message.

The Occupy Movement, focusing attention on the pitfalls of neoliberalism through an amorphous approach, drew criticism for a seeming lack of focus stemming from no direct leadership.54 The use of social media, nonetheless, was brought to the forefront of public sphere and social movement discussion as it has begun to occupy a prominent role in activism.55 The Arab Spring and the Occupy Movement share similarities with

#BlackLivesMatter, and the connection between social media and political activism continues to grow. Garnering both positive and negative praise, and advancing discussion about contemporary social movements, social media activism has wedged itself within our understanding of the public sphere.

An examination of the transition of the traditional public sphere into a digital public sphere is crucial to understanding how discourse on social media can help establish strong rhetorical democratic practices. Jürgen Habermas articulates the foundation of the public sphere as the space and place of private persons coming together to form a public.56 Habermas identifies the separation of the public and private as the primary reason for the creation of the public sphere. The public sphere thus allowed literate individuals to gather and discuss political issues, as the needs of individuals transcended their personal lives. The bourgeois public sphere thus was an inclusive realm open to the promotion of civic engagement focused on critiquing state action. Craig

Calhoun notes the amalgamation of private individuals uniting for political criticism and support increased societal integration.57 “The coordination of social life cannot be

20 undertaken by completely self-sufficient and self-referential individuals,” Simon Susen argues, “who find themselves immersed in hermetically sealed and autopoetically sustained private realms.”58 Searching for the ideal speech situation, Habermas desires a public sphere governed by implicit rules and focused on rational consensus.

Articulating the importance of a strong public sphere, Habermas identifies deficiencies within our contemporary public sphere. Habermas’ critique of the contemporary public sphere revolves around the extensive inclusiveness of the market within political discourse. He identifies increased commodification as the primary issue transforming the boundary between the public and private spheres. Habermas also fears increased commodification leading to the degradation of rational discourse. As individuals begin to focus on personal issues, their efforts are diverted from the wellbeing of the public sphere. “Representative publicity of the old type is not thereby revived,”

Habermas argues, “but it still lends certain traits to a refeudalized public sphere of civil society where” professional politicians primarily focus on bolstering their position.59 The emergence of career politicians and political pundits amplifies Habermas’ critique of the contemporary public sphere. Additionally, Habermas proceeds to illustrate how the specter of “public opinion” becomes “an act of acclamation within a public sphere temporarily manufactured for show or manipulation.”60 As Gerard Hauser notes, the increase of commodification within political discourse begins to focus primarily on numbers and statistics and less on communication. Who is winning in the polls becomes more important at times than the actual messages leveled for and against politicians.

Finally, the commodification feared by Habermas begins to obscure the boundary

21 between the public and private spheres. The importance of Habermas’ conception and defense of the public sphere should not be simply dismissed; nevertheless, there have been questions raised concerning the inclusivity of the bourgeois public sphere.

Nancy Fraser levels an important critique against Habermas when arguing about the limited scope of participants involved within the realm of the bourgeois public sphere.

She argues that Habermas fails to account for other “nonliberal, nonbourgeois, competing spheres,” specifically undervaluing women’s influence within the public sphere.61 Fraser discusses how women are drastically limited in their ability to join political discourse with Habermas’ framework of the bourgeois public sphere. “Insofar as the bracketing of social inequalities in deliberation means proceeding as if they don’t exist when they do,”

Fraser writes, “this does not foster participatory parity.”62 The basic elimination of entire groups of individuals opposes Habermas’ conception of the public sphere being open to all.

Perhaps the most important critique of Habermas, as it pertains to this project, is the negation of the importance of rhetoric within the public sphere. Habermas worries that rhetoric works as strategic speech utilized to advance personal goals and agendas.

For Habermas, who theorizes in what might be considered a Platonic tradition, rhetoric has an excessive potential to manipulate the reasoned and rational speech needed within the public sphere as a means to establishing legitimacy. Thus, Habermas’ emphasis on rational-critical discourse leaves him unsympathetic to rhetoric, and therefore misses the important nuances for a democratic public. Writing from a historical setting against

Hitler’s Germany, Habermas is wary of allowing rhetoric the opportunity to control

22 citizens. However, Habermas limits those who can participate in the public sphere, what can be discussed, and what discourse is allowed by focusing on the desire for rational discourse. Critiques of Habermas argue that his definition of “rational” constrains who and what can be discussed. Asen and Brouwer argue that a focus on rationality has the ability to create social inequality, which limits public sphere participation.63 Thomas

Farrell attempts to appropriate rhetoric alongside Habermas’ articulation of the public sphere by noting the importance of critical judgment and “the ordinary convictions of others.”64 Farrell argues that, rather than a strict focus on universal rationality, we should instead strive toward “real volatile controversy, partisan participation, and an uncertain forum for provisional judgments.”65 Rather than rely on a universal notion of “rational” and attempt to find a strict consensus, we should instead focus on a better understanding of rhetoric’s effectiveness in political discussion—choosing to focus on the importance of rhetoric rather than deny its inherent potential in political discourse.

The Vernacular Nature of Social Media Activism

Gerard Hauser offers a valuable critique and extension of the public sphere by arguing for the inclusion of vernacular rhetoric as the principal influence on public sphere discourse. Hauser, through the investigation of authoritative and vernacular rhetoric’s intricate relationship, identifies how individuals indulge others within reticulate spheres rather than an encompassing public sphere. Vernacular and authoritative have traditionally been defined in opposition to each other. Kent Ono and John Sloop contrast vernacular against civic/authoritative discourse. Civic discourses are “those discourses that are either meant to provide information . . . for a large population of people,” Sloop

23 and Ono argue, “or that a broad-based consumer group purchases or consumes.”66 In opposition to an authoritative discourse, Sloop and Ono define vernacular discourses as those, which “emerge from discussion between members of self-identified smaller communities within the larger civic community.”67 Subsequently, this opposition has implied questions of power. Furthermore, Judith Yaross Lee contends, “vernacular implicitly acknowledges yet explicitly rejects nationally and internationally homogenized, politically powerful standards of language in favor of colloquial speech of ordinary people and local places.”68 Within this relationship, vernacular belongs to the people rather than the state. Robert Howard elucidates the connection between vernacular and the sociality of human behavior, thus arguing vernacular belongs to the people and is connected to everyday human behavior.69 Vernacular allows people the opportunity to see in on themselves, to critique what has been presented them as an ideal versus their typical everyday life.70 Belonging to the world of the populous, vernacular helps readers experience information differently than they would when encountering information from an authoritative source. Lee posits that because vernacular works in opposition to an authoritative discourse, the vernacular allows, “us to see and understand things anew.”71

Social media embraces the circulation of both vernacular and authoritative as users have increasingly appropriated social media as their primary source for news.72

Users encounter both styles of discourse as they promulgate within a user’s social media homepage. Social media activism, especially a hashtag campaign, represents vernacular rhetoric for two primary reasons. First, social media campaigns are created by individuals and initially appropriated by smaller communities within larger social media networking

24 sites. Even when adopted within an extended context, social media activism represents the discourse and social connection of the common—alongside, as well as, divorced from authoritarian influence. 73 Second, social media activism campaigns are customarily created as a way to critique authoritarian power structures. #BlackLivesMatter, for example, was created as a means to disrupt the authoritarian conception of perceived equality in law enforcement interaction. The campaign thus focuses on illuminating the extensive mistreatment of African Americans within a purportedly “color blind” society.

Portia Vann asserts social media’s ability to contain public conversation and critique is generated through an individual’s ability to create and distribute content easily.74 Vann’s argument, without explicitly identifying the importance of vernacular rhetoric, asserts its impact on social media activism.

Vernacular rhetoric’s capacity to critique authoritative discourse further generates Hauser’s conception of the public sphere as reticulate rather than all encompassing. Hauser’s argument (re)defines the public sphere as a “plurality of publics located in the multiple arenas of a reticulate public sphere in which strangers develop and express public opinions by engaging one another through vernacular rhetoric.”75 Hauser therefore conceptualizes the public sphere as a reticulate public sphere representative of multiple networked publics rather than a single public sphere—each sphere incorporating a unique vernacular. “We belong to a community insofar as we are able to participate in its conversations,” Hauser writes, “We must acquire its vernacular language in order to share rhetorically salient meanings.”76 Social media’s “culture of connectivity” parallels

25 Hauser’s conceptualization of reticulate public spheres as users typically engage those users with which they find similarity.77

The insularity critique of social media commonly argues the limited nature in which users express views disparate to a user’s own network of followers/friends.78 I agree with this critique to an extent, however, I rather see social media networks as an amalgamation of views as social media users share a common experience on one issue but differ vastly on others, and users engage those similarities and differences regularly.

As Jose Van Dijck contends, social media users share their views and express commentary with others while navigating perceived similarities and differences between users, exemplifying the reticulate nature of social media.79 Additionally, returning to

Habermas’ underlying sense of community within his writing on the public sphere, a common vernacular is what brings people together in political discussion. Such action does not necessarily limit a person to a single venue of political discussion but rather begins to identify the networked community of public spheres. Hauser’s conceptualization of a reticulate public sphere demonstrates how different individuals focus their attention within different realms of political discussion. As one person is unable to remain current with all political issues, reticulate public spheres allow a tailoring of focus for effective political discussion.

Hauser also appropriates vernacular language as direct opposition to authoritative rhetoric. Rather than rely on an authoritative text as the sole information available for discussion within the public sphere, Hauser argues that vernacular rhetoric transcends official authority but focuses on the discourse of the speakers incorporating the historic

26 context of the speakers as well as defining the “rhetorical character of our public spheres.”80 Public opinion thus takes on a different role than traditionally conceptualized by Habermas. Vernacular rhetoric identifies the topics and reasoning of political discussion through the expression of “difference and identity” rather than relying on the seemingly excessive reliance of public opinion polls of contemporary society.81 Escaping the realm of public opinion run by a market-based media creates the opportunity for previously displaced publics to have their voice heard as they strive to escape institutional barriers. Unlike the proscribed narrative of an authoritative state, vernacular rhetoric allows for a larger, personal understanding of others. “We capture insights from these narratives that escape polls and the formulation of decision-making elites,” Hauser argues, “Listening to them teaches us about rhetorically active but overlooked publics dispersed across a land of strangers.”82 Vernacular discourse than allows for increased political participation within the public sphere has been previously explored. Rather than rely on authoritative text as the sole information available for discussion, Hauser argues vernacular discourse oftentimes provides the focus of public sphere discussion. Hauser explains, “public’s members converse through the everyday dialogue of symbolic interactions by where they share and contest attitudes . . . . There are vernacular exchanges expressed in the language and style that members of a society must share to negotiate daily life.”83 Social media activism is featured prevalently when explicating

Hauser’s argument for vernacular steering social conversation and Zirin’s argument for

#BlackLivesMatter keeping public attention on the plight of African American’s seeking equality. Even researchers who critique social media as limited in its ability to help enact

27 change recognize the value of social media in organizing and directing conversation. The importance of vernacular within social media is paramount to such an understanding.

Initially, standing firm in the belief of social media’s capacity to direct discussion,

I further argue that a rhetorical-grounding of social media can strengthen our understanding of social media activism as a democratic act. Second, vernacular’s critique of state sponsored discourse occurs prominently within social media activism as user’s can create messages isolated from state control. The events of the Arab Spring demonstrate the power of social media discourse in bypassing state power as Twitter and other social media sites were continually utilized in the face of government’s constraining internet use during times of upheaval. Finally, the vernacular nature of social media allows users to not only address those who share similar opinions, within the reticulate nature of social media, but also broaden such discussion as social media discourse is not limited to only those who share common sentiment. The connection between vernacular and social media activism particularly helps initiate the conversation on social media’s ability to act as a digital public sphere. Zizi Papacharissi posits the usage of vernacular transitions the internet from a medium to share messages into a space where individuals share common belonging and emotional connection.84

Transition to a Digital Public Sphere

As social media continues to propagate within society, the connection between social media and the public sphere continues to grow. Papacharissi investigates how social media has allowed citizens to embrace their private selves while attending to public discussion. Terming such transition a “private sphere,” Papacharissi explores how

28 individuals have begun to abandon the Agora for their own private settings.

Appropriating Habermas’ skepticism of capitalism and the market on the public sphere,

Papacharissi notes how individuals have begun to be weary of commodification of the private sphere.85 Additionally, Papacharissi argues that as convergence culture continues to proliferate within society we are ultimately seeing the convergence of our public and private spheres.86 Lacking a clear distinction between public and private stymies an individual’s ability to engage political discourse within the public sphere. “The result is a sphere of social contact that is more fluid,” Papacharissi writes, “but may also appear fragmented and contain elements of superficiality.”87 The fluidity between private and public is not limited to how individuals engage political discourse but also their roles as citizens. Papacharissi argues within a digital public sphere individuals must negotiate different characteristics of citizenship as geographical boundaries become less important to a person’s political identity.88 Rather, citizens are able to create stronger connections based on the common vernacular of the group they connect with online.

The increase of new technology on our lives creates the opportunity for these new civic vernaculars to adapt to a fluid sense of citizenship. The creation of a networked self now works within the stability of a home, yet accompanied by the flexibility of mobile technology.89 We can engage political discussion in the privacy of our own homes and not commit solely to a singular action, instead being able to multitask and connect at our discretion. Additionally, the digital public sphere allows us to build content through increased collaboration, as we are able to connect with a wider range of people.90

However, Papacharissi notes that most research supports the claim that just as social

29 media complements previous offline relationships, activist-prone participants typically utilize the digital public sphere as a complement to previous activism.91

Habermas’ original critique of the public sphere’s transformation can also potentially find worthwhile applicability to an increased digital public sphere. Just as he decried the role of media in transforming the bourgeois public sphere, media has just as equally (if not more so) infiltrated the digital public sphere. As social media sites continue to increase their expansion into additional marketing ventures, the influence of market forces will only continue to increase within a digital public sphere. Additionally, the ability for increased connection to multiple groups, and individual vernacular rhetorics, has the potential to heighten static among a digital public sphere. Although not entirely connecting to Hauser’s conception of reticulate public spheres, the ability for social media to connect us to such a vast array of people, interest groups, and public discussions may be providing individuals with such a multitude of differing vernaculars to the point that we are unable to effectively keep up with changing discourses. Perhaps we are becoming too connected—an issue that may have to be mitigated due to physical constraints with a traditional understanding of the public sphere. The conversation over the viability and effectiveness of a digital public sphere will carry on beyond the scope of this project; however, a reconceptualization of democracy will demonstrate how our traditional, institution-based, understanding of democracy severely limits perceptions of behavior constituted as democratic action.

In essence, I contend that rhetorically grounding social media activism, as digital dissent, warrants a reconceptualization of the political action, premised on a radical

30 agonistic understanding of democracy. To foster a reconceptualization of society’s understanding of democracy, I will draw on the works of Jacques Rancière and Chantal

Mouffe to establish the desire for a turn toward a radical appreciation of democratic pluralism. Furthermore, a rhetorical-grounding of social media activism will help demonstrate the ability for social media activism to enact democratic action through a form of digital dissent. Using a range of social media campaigns, I will present an overview of digital dissent messages and examine their use of multiple rhetorical frameworks. Prior to engaging these unique social media campaigns, however, I begin, first, by examining the intersection of dissent within the realm of the political and an exploration into agonistic pluralism. Second, I investigate the historical emphasis on civil rights rhetoric and the connection to contemporary society with a focus toward the initiation of relevant social media campaigns focused on dissent against current racial injustice.

The second chapter of this dissertation explores the creation of

#BlackLivesMatter and its enactment with an emphasis on examining the connections between this contemporary civil rights protest and that of the civil rights movement. After detailing the creation of #BlackLivesMatter, I next focus on the role of public memory and its influence on how the Civil Rights Movement is used as a comparison to contemporary social activism, specifically, digital dissent. I argue the Civil Rights

Movement’s reliance on strong leaders resulted in an emphasis on consensus as strong leaders demand support for their message in order to be effective. Emphasizing the role of dissensus, through digital dissent, I contend that comparisons to the Civil Rights

31 Movement are unwarranted, as #BlackLivesMatter eschews the role of leadership; instead, relying on dissent and the inherent increase of discourse to challenge systemic racial inequality.

Undertaking this work builds toward a historical account of Rancière and

Mouffe’s work so as to apply their arguments to contemporary social media activism.

Additionally, I provide support for digital dissent as an evolution of political advocacy premised on dissensus, which brings democratic discourse directly to an individual level.

Through this articulation, I suggest digital dissent allows individual’s the ability to directly engage Raniciere’s argument that politics only exists as a “demand for equality” from a “part that has no part.” Furthermore, I tie the emphasis on dissensus, and increased democratic discourse, to Mouffe’s argument for agonistic pluralism, as individuals are encouraged to share disagreement and difference as a means to challenge systemic racial inequality.

In the third chapter of this study, I take up the discussion on #HandsUpDontShoot and #ICantBreathe, focusing on the doxastic connection between these messages of dissent and the role of radical equality as discussed by Rancière. Through this examination I offer that a demand for equality necessitates a turn toward agonistic pluralism. Freya Thimsen frames the protest slogan “Corporations are Not People” as a demonstration and critique of doxa. Shifting her work from protest slogans to digital dissent, I examine how the incorporation of Asen’s discourse theory of citizenship bolsters digital dissent’s role as a critique of doxa. Furthermore, I discuss how these theoretical constructs frame digital dissent as an enactment of democratic discourse. As a

32 challenge to doxa, digital dissent can be understood as political action, further illuminating the influence of transitioning away from the institutional nature of contemporary democracy and instead engaging in an agonistic democracy.

The campaigns #ICantBreathe, and #HandsUpDontShoot have demonstrated how common sense behavior, which would typically keep an individual from harm, are consistently ignored by law enforcement when a crime involves a black individual.

#HandsUpDontShoot originated after the shooting death of Michael Brown and alongside

#BlackLivesMatter. The campaign also benefitted from a long list of popular culture displays as multiple sports teams and entertainment celebrities incorporated the

#HandsUpDontShoot symbolic posture into their performances. Within the performances and online messages it is typically easy to identify the cognitive sensibilities that were being disrupted, as the inherent message of #HandsUpDontShoot illustrates an act of declaring innocence, yet multiple shootings of black individuals enacting such behavior resulted in harm. Thus, the utilization of #HandsUpDontShoot demonstrates doxa by enacting collective support and critiques doxa by challenging belief that individuals perceived as harmful should not be treated as if they are threatening others.

#ICantBreathe was created after the video of the choking death of Eric Garner was released to the public. Similar to #HandsUpDontShoot, #ICantBreathe demonstrates how the traditional message of suffocation signifies a call for help yet resulted in yet another death. Enacting these dissensual messages generates a disruption within our doxastic understandings and should be understood as democratic events.

33 In chapter four I examine how the social media campaigns #CrimingWhileWhite and #IfTheyGunnedMeDown engage Kenneth Burke’s conception of the comic frame to create a disruption with our sense of politics. Such disruption again demonstrates

Rancière’s conception of dissensus and the demand for radical equality. The comic corrective, as Burke articulates, is marked by struggle and, as Ivie notes, “a comic voice

[seeks] to resist the constant temptation of pursuing singular versions of truth or beauty.”92 Combined with Mouffe’s conception of agonistic pluralism, Burke’s comic corrective, which treats conflict as a given, seeks to cultivate a broadening of thought— with a respect for others that can remain agonistic rather than antagonistic. Together this understanding has the potential to demonstrate social media activism’s ability to enact strong democratic action.

#CrimingWhileWhite was created as a response to the grand jury decision not to bring charges against the officer involved in the choking death of Eric Garner. The campaign demonstrates the racial profiling of individuals that currently continues.

#CrimingWhileWhite contains posts by white individuals that express how being arrested for similar crimes as black individuals has traditionally led to lesser punishments.

Whereas Eric Garner was ultimately killed for potentially illegally reselling cigarettes, through the campaign #CrimingWhileWhite we can see that white citizens arrested for

“worse” crimes have been treated much differently by the police.

#IfTheyGunnedMeDown was created in response to the media coverage of the death of

Michael Brown. Media coverage of the incident typically used a picture of Brown holding up “gang signs” or otherwise posed as a “thug” rather than pictures representing

34 Brown’s humanity. #IfTheyGunnedMeDown thus demonstrates how media covers black people in America differently than white people. To create a comic disruption

#IfTheyGunnedMeDown utilizes two pictures, one of the user in a “good” pose and a contrasting picture of the user in a “bad” pose, begging the question, if they gunned me down, which narrative would the media try to tell? #CrimingWhileWhite and

#IfTheyGunnedMeDown both highlight how society and media tend to draw on the negative aspects of black individuals while showing the positives of white individuals.

Drawing on literature from rhetorical studies, democratic theory, civil rights protest, and social media communication, this dissertation explores the relationships between each tradition as a means to examining how social media activism influences our political discourse. Undertaking this study will expand our rhetorical understanding of social media activism and demonstrate how this trend within contemporary digital dissent can enact democratic discourse.

35 Chapter I: Digital Dissent: The Need to Radically (Re)Frame Democracy

Technology and democracy have shared a convoluted connection in which expressive technologies have often generated heightened “narratives of emancipation, autonomy, and freedom in the public imagination.”1 The Introductory chapter features extended discussion on the role of technology, specifically social media, on the creation of a digital public sphere. This chapter focuses on how the historical conception of democracy has evolved, as well as investigates how a reconceptualization of democracy would advance our contemporary ability to enhance personal control over politics. Social media’s potential to enrich our democratic culture warrants specific examination into how we currently understand and enact democracy, as well as how different conceptions of democracy can expand our view of the political. Through this exploration of change within our understanding of democracy, we can thus discover how a

(re)conceptualization of democracy can contribute to further legitimizing social media activism.

Additionally, this chapter examines the evolution of civil rights rhetoric from historical conceptions to contemporary enactment, including the shift toward social media activism. At first glance, significant differences seem apparent between the civil rights movement of the 1960s and current social media activism. The most apparent is the difference between collective action in-person versus collective action online.2 However,

I argue that there are several productive connections bridging the two movements. With the proliferation of technology utilized throughout our everyday actions, it only makes sense that some of the traditional activity accustomed to civil rights protest occurs online.

36 These instances, though, force us to reexamine our understandings of activism and the subsequent connection to democratic practice. A primary example, which is further discussed in chapter 2, is the role of leadership in social movements. Primarily, I argue that precedent for a strong leader has become minimized as activism has engaged online channels. These, albeit brief examples, have begun to illuminate the connection to the civil rights movement. As the primary parallel event continually contrasted against contemporary social media activism, the civil rights movement provides significant insight into how the transition to a digital public sphere can increase our understanding of democratic discourse. As I detailed in the introduction, previous research has acknowledged a connection between social media and democracy focused on the ability for social media to enhance our conceived notions of democratic behavior. Refocusing the connection between social media and democracy through a rhetorical grounding will help create a more robust understanding of social media activism.

Democracy in a Digital Public Sphere

In the introduction to his book The Politics of Resentment: A Genealogy, Jeremy

Engels asks, “what can I say about democracy that hasn’t already been said?”3 This question acknowledges the vast literature on democratic governance and practice, yet it also implies that too many observers take for granted the definition and requirements of democracy. Common sense interpretations of democratic institutions fail to account for the innovation of democratic practices, including the changes facilitated by social media;

Robert Asen reiterates that such a focus magnifies the importance of acts rather than the process of action.4 The global expansion of democratic institutions facilitates an almost

37 essentialist understanding of social media’s connection to democracy, and the discussion in the previous chapter highlights those arguments. Social media has been praised and critiqued for how the institutions (i.e. voting) of democracy are expedited or impeded— some scholars have argued for social media serving as an emancipatory tool for citizens while others have critiqued social media for creating an echo chamber, furthering a digital divide, increased incivility due to anonymity, and other such detriments. However, simply investigating how the institutions of democracy are facilitated severely limits a rhetorical understanding of the connection between democracy and social media. Such an institutional focus tends to be limited to how social media can be the space for democratic discourse; however, I want to understand how social media can provide one such space for democratic discourse. Instituting such a change requires a refocusing of how we understand democracy on a societal level; I argue specifically for a shift away from a consensus driven deliberative democracy toward an agonistic pluralism focused on equality, while continually acknowledging the role of conflict and difference on mutual understanding. Such a conception seeks to provide a robust understanding of democracy within a social media landscape.

Engels adds in his introduction, “I think it is clear, however, that contemporary democracy in the United States is on life support, with the body due upon its passage to be handed over to corporate elites.”5 Democracy, as previously noted, at its most simplistic understanding, constitutes a rule of the people. Pure democracy, as it has been ideally conceptualized, provides equal decision-making capability to every citizen. Such a conception, though, arises through a utopian archetype and is operationally inadequate

38 for real society, with all of its attendant messy, imperfect implications. As a form of governance, democracy has been heralded as the forerunner in achieving “political equality, liberty, moral-self-development, the common interest, a fair moral compromise, binding decisions that take everyone’s interest into account, social utility, the satisfaction of wants, [and] efficient decisions.”6 Yet, which style of democratic governance can best achieve those goals has been hotly debated throughout American history.

Understood traditionally as a democratic republic, the United States is one of the oldest modern democracies. Robert Ivie posits that democracy has become the defining factor of the United States in terms of structuring the republic’s identity and political legitimacy. Yet, Ivie also argues that “the republic is, and always has been, conflicted between democracy as a professional ideal and an actual practice.”7 Jennifer Mercieca notes that a republic differs from a democracy in multiple respects; a republic is a form of government “based upon the will of the people, but the degree of citizen decision making can range from being almost nonexistent . . . to being almost ubiquitous.”8 The importance of democracy was contested even amongst the founding fathers – Engels and

Mercieca provide strong argumentation for how the early framers of American government scrutinized the inclusion of the public in policy decisions.9 Decrying the potential for mob rule, as the demos were equated with “passion, tyranny, and chaos,” many sought to limit the amount of democracy within the United States Constitution.10

This is a notion supported by Hauser, who adds, “from its beginning, democracy has been in tension with the elite, who invoke their privilege to decide based on superior training to engage in rational deliberation (education), and the common citizens, who point to

39 their numbers as expressions of public will.”11 The tension between who governs and who is governed continues to be a source of contention within contemporary society, as

“the people” in a democracy remains fluid. Interestingly, the United States has begun to shift its governmental structure away from democratic principles. Engels makes note of this shift as he argues, “we live in a time of oligarchic democracy, the rule of the plutocrats, the government of the rich by the means of the poor.”12 Engels’ writing parallels the research of political theorists Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, who found in a 2014 study of United States politics that “the preferences of economic elites . .

. have far more independent impact upon policy change than the preferences of average citizens. . . . When a majority of citizens disagrees with economic elites or with organized interests, they generally lose.”13 The shift away from democracy in our practice of governance, however, has not shifted our sentimental connection to the practice of equality.

Within the introductory chapter I articulated my stance as a rhetorical critic and how such grounding frames my view of democracy—I find an inherent problem in utilizing “democracy” as a catchall term for “effective, or best, style of governance.” My understanding has intensified as the idea of democracy continues to be adopted by institutions of government that have become decidedly less democratic. As individuals continue to feel increasingly disenfranchised within our contemporary political system, the opportunity arises to assert a reframing of democracy. Further facilitating the opportunity to explore a reframing of democracy is the current polarization between political parties. Whether the discourse surrounding the separation of democrats and

40 republicans is in fact overly emphasized is merely insignificant as the confrontation continues to focus on the ideological differences of liberalism and equality.14 Rhetorical criticism becomes inherently important as reframing a liberal democracy necessarily encompasses changes within our symbolic understanding of political discourse.

Despite being continually veiled in negative political connotations since Plato denounced the work of the Sophists, rhetoric retains a vital role within our conceptualization of politics. Russell Hanson writes, “rhetorical traditions such as liberal democracy are always being constituted and reconstituted in the process of political argumentation,” allowing scholars ample grounds to critique and modify such conceptions.15 Rhetoric lies at the heart of our political discourse, as rhetoric remains the focus for collective action and political discourse continually (re)conceptualized through conflict.16 Rhetoric helps us understand the world around us and is principle in identifying how individuals are constituted as subjects and how we constitute our relationships to others. Engels writes, “Everyone is an other to us. . . . In turn, our relationships are contingent on our ability and our willingness to engage the other, to see the others as a fellow.”17 Rhetoric encompasses the language used to form decisions and judgments within public deliberation; typically contrasted against reason, rhetoric was fraught with disrepute even from the days of the founding fathers of American politics, who commended logical deliberation and feared the passion of the demos.

Joseph Bessette argues the founding fathers thought rhetoric undermined the importance of deliberation as citizens were oftentimes given “to misinformation, deception, prejudice, passion, and demagogic appeals.”18 As such, direct democracy was

41 held in contempt and representative democracy was admired as “surrogate deliberators” stood in place for their constituents.19 However, as rhetorical scholars have continued to demonstrate the importance of language to the creation of identity and decision-making, society has begun to shift into a rhetorical republic. While deliberative democracy continues to be the primary goal within the political, there are growing concerns that necessitate the continuation of exploring rhetoric’s influence on all aspects of political discourse. The continued shift toward a rhetorical republic provides rhetorical scholars an opportunity to explore new theoretical challenges that arise within a society reliant on rhetoric as a cornerstone of their identity. Frederick M. Dolan and Thomas L. Dumm define a rhetorical republic as a republic of symbols representing the “claims and counterclaims that shape political discourse.”20 Dolan and Dumm also argue that rhetorical republics begin to establish a deviation away from a single public sphere and argue instead for multiple public spheres. Gerard Hauser later expands this articulation in asserting the importance of reticulate public spheres within the creation of public opinion.21

The conversion to a rhetorical republic also further complicates the incompatibility between liberty and equality within our political system. The plurality of public spheres, furthermore, intensifies the contestation between these two competing political ideologies. The tension between liberalism, founded on reason and self- determination, and equality, founded on the will of the people, creates multiple problems for our ability to enact democracy, especially as liberalism has pervaded our political discourse.22 Carl Schmitt insisted the tension between liberty and equality was the “crisis

42 of parliamentary democracy,” and characterized the conflict as “the inescapable contradiction of liberal individualism and democratic homogeneity.”23 For Schmitt, liberalism pervaded the political spectrum to the degree in which antagonism impaired the ability to enact democracy. Benjamin Barber argues that the continual privileging of liberalism has led to the focus on strong leadership in turn resulting in a weak citizenry.

Barber writes, “strong leaders have on the whole made Americans weak citizens. . . .

Civic responsibility has in turn ceased to mean self-government and come to mean electing governors to govern the public instead.”24 Such a belief in a weak citizenry has become amplified further within critiques of social media activism. The prevalence of articles noting the increase in “clicktivism,” “slacktivism,” and/or “hacktivism” demonstrate how our usage of social media can be, and has been, negated within our traditional understanding of democratic politics. Additionally, the focus on strong leadership, and the pervasiveness of liberalism, has reinforced our reliance on perceived political institutions. Relying heavily on institutional enactments of democracy reinforces the demand for a deliberative grounding of democracy, further negating the important potential contributions of rhetoric.

Deliberative democracy, represented throughout the work of Jürgen Habermas, ushered in the normative practice of rational critical argument as a means to developing consensus over political decisions. Habermas, as discussed in the introduction, articulates the ideal space for deliberation as the bourgeois public sphere. Craig Calhoun, extending

Habermas’ arguments, writes, “In this public sphere practical reason was institutionalized through norms of reasoned discourse in which arguments, not statuses or traditions, were

43 to be decisive.”25 Deliberative democracy finds its political roots within the discussion of the public sphere. John Dryzek, operating within the work of John Rawls, argues deliberative democracy tends to utilize “reasoning in impartial terms about the political arrangements that are best for society.”26 Habermas argues as much when positing the common criteria of the bourgeois public sphere that developed throughout Europe in the

17th and 18th centuries. Habermas writes, “they preserved a kind of social intercourse that, far from presupposing the equality of status, disregarded status altogether” and to “carry the day” meant the “parity of common humanity.”27 Habermas, and deliberative democracy in general, thought rhetoric problematic due to its passionate impulses.

Limiting the role of rhetoric, however, negates the potential for truly understanding the power of discourse. Hauser, in a critique of Habermas, argues, “excluding rhetorical process from our assessment of democracy’s ongoing conversation also excludes the agency by which democratic decisions are reached.”28 As a rhetorical critic, I cannot devalue the importance of rhetoric within democratic society. Chantal Mouffe’s formulation of democracy as agonistic provides a shift away from deliberative democracy and embraces a rhetorical orientation.

Chantal Mouffe introduces readers to her concept of agonism as evolved from principles advanced by Schmitt. After agreeing with Schmitt that democracy is unable to eradicate antagonism from the political, Mouffe embraces inherent conflict and proposes the democratic theory of agonistic pluralism.29 She argues that Schmitt correctly identifies liberalism’s inability to address the friend-enemy dichotomy, thus becoming blind to antagonism and ultimately forming the only acceptable style of governance:

44 authoritarianism. Instead of the role of enemy, Mouffe argues for an adversarial role.

Incorporating this change in how we perceive difference directs attention to the commonality shared by individuals while at the same time recognizing the inherent conflict within the political. Conflict remains a central theme throughout Mouffe’s work, as she contends “a healthy democratic process calls for a vibrant clash of political positions and an open conflict of interests.”30 For Mouffe, avoiding conflict results in an unchallenged consensus that deprives citizens of voice and renders no real alternatives to political action. Rejecting the Habermasian notion of a public/private sphere distinction,

Mouffe emphasizes that politics will always be both personal and public as people navigate relationships to others. “The distinction public/private, central as it was for the assertion of individual liberty,” she writes, “acted therefore as a powerful principle of exclusion.”31 Agonism thus acknowledges the complex public and private relational realities that exist in order for people to identify areas of inequality and work toward finding common ground. Reconceptualizing the private/public distinction further deconstructs the influence of rationality on political action. Our private thoughts and actions are never without the influence of publicly prescribed principles.

Additionally, unlike the work of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, which insists on the removal of political institutions, agonistic pluralism attempts to appropriate “a multiplicity of levels” and “realize that the political dimension cannot be localized in a privileged space.”32 The digital divide raises questions about the viability of social media to be utilized by all; however, the ability for agonism to be established within a multitude of spaces is particularly important to my project as I argue social media can be one such

45 space for agonism to flourish. Mouffe invites such argumentation by noting agonism “is a dimension that can manifest itself in all kinds of social relations, whatever the space may be.” 33 Expanding our traditional thinking of what constitutes a venue for political discourse increases the ability to include others and in turn incorporate difference. In defense of agonism on digital media, Natalie Fenton argues that the political concerns our positions to others locally, nationally, and globally.34 Social media is not, and I would argue should not become the sole area for political discourse, rather, social media can be another site of political discourse—one attuned to the sharing of dissent messages.

In an effort to articulate Mouffe’s agonism with rhetorical principles, Ivie writes that the “constructive role of rhetoric . . . resists the kind of extreme Othering that perpetuates the cycle of terror and counterterror.” Ivie recognizes the fear associated within a friend-enemy dichotomy and seeks to affirm the role of adversaries, instead of enemies, through the identification of “points of intersection between rivals to make them partially consubstantial with one another.” Envisioning a vilified enemy as an adversary thus creates shared agreement but perhaps disagreement on interpretation. Political conflicts necessarily emerge through this understanding, but they emerge between adversaries intent on embracing personal difference. Arguing this point, Ivie notes “peace may regain some standing by bolstering democratic culture and speaking across rhetorically blurred boundaries out of respect for the complexities of an increasingly interconnected and deeply divided world.”35 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe accept rhetoric’s influence, stating that the enemy/adversary roles “are not objective relations, but relations which reveal the limits of objectivity.”36 Embracing the importance of

46 rhetoric within agonism allows scholars to explore the ways in which we discursively constitute the Other, mitigating the importance on essentialist notions of consensus and rationality and instead embracing diversity.

The Crisis of Consensus and (Re)Thinking the Political

The emergence of “convergence culture,” developing similarly with Web 2.0 technology, generated an overlap of activities previously deemed democratic, and created an opaque shift toward what constitutes democratic action.37 The opaqueness arises when traditionally non-democratic action is seen to incorporate traditionally democratic action.

Zizi Papacharissi writes, “convergence adjusts the architecture of what was previously recognized as the political, thus allowing new opportunities for engagement, but also creating dissonance in how citizens are internalizing their civic obligation, and how societal institutions are accounting for those citizen behaviors.”38 Furthermore, the collapse and overlap of previously separate notions of democratic practice is responsible for much of the contestation over social media’s ability to create space for democratic discourse. As our culture continues to converge technologically, we continue to encounter areas of clash as new and old ideas combine. Papacharissi exemplifies such contestation through her discussion of declining voter turnout being “interpreted as cynicism and apathy” whereas “other acts of political interest and engagement, such as blogging” are not understood as institutions of democratic practice and thus warrant little attention.39 Incorporating and understanding how new areas of active political discourse extend traditional “politics” furthers our understanding of how individuals adapt with an ever-changing digital landscape. Rhetorically grounding our understanding of social

47 media activism can move us past the “decline thesis” and instead focus on a potentially robust segment of political action.

Such narratives add to the historical context developed throughout previous research. Mercieca notes the “decline thesis,” which argues “that America once enjoyed a vibrant and active . . . citizenry that has steadily declined into apathy and withdrawal from the political process.”40 Mercieca consequently writes that the “decline thesis” has been challenged, adding that scholars such as Jacques Rancière “have sought to change the focus from a scholar’s lament that citizens do not consistently participate to a celebration of the carnivalesque, sporadic participations of the multitude.”41 Interestingly enough, multiple scholars, political theorists, and pundits have described the social media landscape in differing terms of carnivalesque. Through a rhetorical-grounding of social media activism we will be able to see how such behavior fits within a societal reconceptualization of democracy, perhaps proving that citizen apathy may not be as chronic as we tend to believe. Rancière provides a compelling theoretical framework with which we can reexamine our understanding of democracy.

The Habermasian conception of the public sphere, and the resulting scholarly focus on deliberative democracy, desires rational debate as a means to adopting consensus. Rancière seeks to dismantle the consensus sought by those scholars who have long demanded an empirical process of the political. Since the publication of

Disagreement in 1995, Jacques Rancière has been regarded for his steadfast defense of radical democratic equality and his focus on the ills of consensus.42 Rancière, inspired by the French political revolutions of 1968, finds the traditional political philosophy

48 constricting in its demand for order, and subsequently consensus.43 “From Plato to

Aristotle, from Marx to Arendt, political philosophers,” Rancière argues, “have sought to supplant the anarchic disorder of politics with a hierarchical order of the philosopher.”44

In his view, traditional political philosophy seeks to eliminate the political as the focus on order necessarily polices speech, limiting the discursive nature of relationships, thus mitigating equality. The root of perceived ordered classes traces back to Plato’s work

Laws, which outlines an order of governance—an arkhê—which identifies the rulers from the ruled.45 Laws details Plato’s seven claims to rule: parents over children, elderly over the young, masters over slaves, the well born over those not well born, the lucky over the unfortunate, the stronger over the weaker, and the prudent over the ignorant.46

Rancière appropriates the term “archipolitics” in an attempt to critique Plato’s desire for order. Archipolitics, and the subsequent desire for order, systemically suppresses democratic politics by limiting participation.47 Instead, Rancière’s foundation emphasizes

“the assumption that everything speaks to everyone; that any form of discourse is in principle available to anyone.”48 Relying primarily on the focus of relationships amongst individuals, he couches his arguments primarily within terms of allowing “the part which has no part” the chance at equality.49 Within Rancière’s terms, social media activism remains a viable area for an unheard voice to be heard and highlights the importance of rhetoric as we further rethink political action.

Rancière’s understanding of the political, therefore, restrains the significance of reason and emphasizes the importance of rhetoric. “Equality is the equality of anyone at all with anyone else,” he argues, “in other words, in the final instance, the absence of

49 arkhê, the sheer contingency of any social order.”50 Damien Smith Pfister notes that the political’s traditional focus on familiar, rational, and specialized discourse limits democratic participation as such constriction limits “the complexity at the heart of contemporary life.”51 Familiar, rational, and specialized speech acts are oftentimes reserved for the role of “experts,” inherently limiting input, in turn hindering democracy.

The importance of rhetoric in building relationships and creating subjectivities is not lost on Rancière as he writes, “Political statements and literary locutions produce effects in reality. They define models of speech or action but also regimes of sensible intensity.”52

Matthew Clarke similarly argues, when discussing Rancière’s connection to critical education that, “issues of standards and accountability, are typically presented by politicians and policymakers as matters of technical efficiency rather than normative choices.”53 Rancière vehemently denounces such conceptions, reinforcing “the idea that human beings are equal not just in legal or moral terms, but also in terms of their intellectual and discursive capacities.”54

Ivie contends such desire for technical focus and order lies within the potential fear of Others, noting, “flawed rhetorical practice” tends to cast the demos as irrational.

As Ivie insists, “the problem here is in the kind of rhetoric practiced, not in the choice of rhetoric over reason.”55 This fear of a “demented demos,” whether elicited by politicians or throughout popular media, who constantly vociferate the importance of reason and rationality in the prolonged desire for consensus, also contributes to individual’s desire to depart the political sphere.56 The problem, Mouffe writes, is “too much emphasis on consensus, and the refusal of confrontation, leads to apathy and disaffection with political

50 participation.”57 Subsequently, Mercieca argues such apathy within the citizenry leads politicians to restrain citizen participation through new means.58 Because of this cyclical notion of citizen apathy and elite skepticism, Rancière circumvents our traditional understanding of politics. Contending the political is the very act of an individual demanding equality, Rancière firmly maintains that the working class was able “to denounce social domination and create new modes of collective life.”59 Additionally, he seemingly responds to the challenges of rhetoric producing strong relationships, and increasing equality, insisting on the creation of politics as a relationship between “what is done and what can be done,” thus incorporating a rhetorical conception of the political.60

As we identify the importance of rhetoric in undermining consensus, we find new ways of subverting traditional understandings of the political. Rancière’s conceptualization of the political increases rhetorical scholars’ ability to envision political action. It is within this generative aspect of Rancière’s work that I find myself drawn to the realm of social media as a new dynamic for increasing political action. Dismissing the institutional focus of democracy, as Mouffe, Rancière, and Ivie assert, creates opportunity for the alternative types of political action in the never-ending saga for equality. I contend that social media provides a venue for individuals to demand equality within this (re)conceptualized political space. Specifically, individuals utilizing social media activism initiate conversation regarding politics and equality.

Rancière thoroughly disregards the traditional institutions of the political when arguing, “Talking about ‘a political moment’ is not intended to evoke the idea that the political exists only in rare moments of insurrection violently detached from the normal

51 course of things.” In fact, when discussing events such as Occupy and the WTO riots,

Rancière writes “the events that motivated these articles often had more to do with demonstrations of oligarchic power than with radical expressions of egalitarian power.”61

Furthermore, in arguing for a turn toward “active equality”—through the work of

Rancière— Todd May defines these political acts as politically passive (or to be more direct, attempts at passive equality).62 Similarly, focusing solely on such passive acts hinders our understanding of “political moments.” Rather than fixating on both momentous and mundane actions of the political, he challenges his readers to radically alter how we view politics by focusing primarily on equality. This radicalization of politics, focusing on the equality of all persons, forms his basis for political action.

“Politics exists when the natural order of domination is interrupted,” Rancière posits, “by the institution of a part of those who have no part.”63 He thus moves politics away from the traditional venues of political action and instead opens up the possibilities for a person to act politically.64 Simply put, political action occurs when a group/individual who has no voice and is considered to be “un”—without identity—begins to demand equality. To be “un” within Rancière’s thinking means “being out of place, of not being entitled, of not belonging in one identity.”65

Rancière, as articulated previously, seeks equality based on the ability for the

“part which has no part” to enter into discourse, thus demanding equality. He remains less involved with the political and democratic process after the “part which has no part” gains, or forces, entrance into the discussion of equality. Rancière’s penchant for not defining a process within his work on the “political,” may seemingly negate his own

52 arguments; however, he argues politics is not a process but rather a necessary conflict with the desired outcome of greater equality. To clearly define a process, articulating what is and what is not political, would in turn place individuals within a refined status.

Defining the process would thus promote the concept of who can talk and who cannot, thus denying the relevance to a “part which has no part”—doing so would revert his arguments back toward Plato’s laws of governance. The ability for Rancière to separate his work from political philosophy allows him the ability “of dwelling with great mastery and flair in a zone of indistinction in between political and thought, provided that he never marks the separate status of his own discourse.”66 The aversion to creating a definitive conception of “the political” retains Rancière’s overall focus on subverting consensus.

Additionally, Rancière argues that our traditional understanding of the political continually begets policing behaviors that suppress an individual’s ability to demand equality. The actions that we commonly refer to as politics are described by Rancière as:

the set of procedures whereby the aggregation and consent of collectivities is

achieved, the organization of powers, the distribution of places and roles, and the

systems for legitimizing this distribution. I purpose to give this system of distribution

and legitimization another name. I propose to call it the police.67

The social norms and the systems of legitimatization Rancière refers to as “policing” are the forces that deny politics space in which to act.68 Usually, when discussing policing we are discussing the disciplining of bodies; however, Rancière argues that policing is what controls individual action, both explicitly and implicitly, in a manner “that defines the

53 allocation of ways of doing, ways of being, and ways of saying.”69 Furthermore, Rancière writes, “police logic aims to fix what is visible and what is not, what is given and what is not, what can be said about that given and what not.”70 For example, when the social media campaign #BlackLivesMatter is spread by white citizens, the reception of the message disturbs the normal flow of thought amongst those in control. This disruption of the norm initiates the process of dis-identification thus creating a political subject.71

Rancière defines the political subject as “a being that arrives as supplement to the social distribution, since it cannot be identified as part of the police order.”72 Policing, as argued by Todd May, has the goal of “eliminating politics,” especially democratic politics as the practice “is disruptive of order.”73 The intentional lack of definition, of what constitutes the political, and the intention to circumvent policing by introducing disorder, to help encourage equality, creates a generative quality within Rancière’s work.

This generative quality enables social media to be a venue for political action.

Acknowledging the potential setbacks of political discourse cannot be ignored, but the potential for individuals to access the platform as a means to initiate or continue political action, through the demand for equality, should not be dismissed. Social media provides a platform for people to make their voice heard. #BlackLivesMatter has been keeping the voice of inequality within range for all of us to hear, and while some have tried to shut it out, others have begun to listen. Interestingly, a critique of #BlackLivesMatter has been that it lacks leadership. However, a lack of leadership should not, and does not, nullify a movement’s effectiveness. In fact, Rancière posits, “the dominated do not need masters or leaders to tell them what to think and what to say. Their plight is not due to false

54 consciousness or ignorance, but to a social organization that systemically makes their voices and their achievement invisible and inaudible.”74 When individuals break free of their constraints and thus are able to be heard, we then have a renewed sense of the political. Social media has been heralded as a venue for increased voice, and while that voice can be lost at times through all the minutia of information, the demand for equality must persist. Furthermore, social media activism, as evidenced by the #BlackLivesMatter campaign, highlights that through the (re)conceptualization of the political, society can find new ways and spaces to express perhaps the most important democratic act, voicing dissent.

The Obligation of Dissent

Robert Ivie writes, “A healthy democracy encourages wide criticism and robust debate.”75 The social media campaigns created in response to the acquittals or lack of indictments by those responsible for the deaths of Brown, Garner, and Rice represent a unique form of digital activism highlighting the importance of dissent surrounding contemporary race issues within the United States. Ivie defines dissent as “the balancing point between stability and change, cleavage and consensus, politics and revolution, life and decay.”76 These instances of dissent on Twitter exemplify the ability to enact strong democratic action within a digital public sphere. Ivie’s work is instrumental in understanding the importance of dissent and its connection to agonistic pluralism within a rhetorical framework. As Mouffe argues, “It is necessary to subvert the consensus that exits in so many areas, and to reestablish a dynamic of conflictuality.”77 As such, the role of dissent cannot be underestimated within agonism.

55 Ivie argues that dissent has not held significant status within the realm of rhetorical scholarship, often taking a backseat to protest or social movements.78 Whereas protests and social movements are understood as inherently democratic, dissent, as a democratic practice, is seen as troublesome. Scholarship on social movements oftentimes appropriates dissent as a synonym for confrontation and protest, limiting the power of dissent, which invites diversity, as they attempt to focus on overcoming difference. 79

Additionally, dissent suffers from being an underprivileged political action due to the creation of conflict and struggle.80 “An obstacle to investigating the rhetorical dynamics of dissensus,” Ivie argues, “is the field’s traditional commitment to an agenda of consensus.”81 The desire for consensus marks dissent as problematic—another hallmark of the Habermasian articulation of a public sphere averse to rhetoric. Placing dissent in sole opposition to consensus, however, “does not allow a democratically adequate accounting for difference and diversity.”82 Dissent is a means to understanding other perspectives, but also to placing yourself within the given contestation. Engaging in social media campaigns that articulate dissent can establish a point of contention within contemporary society based on unequal roles.

The hashtag campaigns selected for this argument demonstrate the need for a social group to gain a sense of equality previously, and continually, denied.

#BlackLivesMatter designates a current message of dissent articulating the systemic repression forced on black individuals as a means to consistently keep them unequal to white individuals. Similarly, #CrimingWhileWhite and #IfTheyGunnedMeDown demonstrate continued prejudice within the media and law enforcement by establishing

56 particular differences between how white criminals and black criminals are portrayed. To fully understand dissent as a democratic demand for equality within the context of social media necessitates a change of how we view both politics and democracy, as our traditional understandings of both have been limited due to the apathetic nature toward social media activism. In order to understand this change, I argue that we must adopt a focus of politics and democracy within the formulation of Jacques Rancière and Chantal

Mouffe.

As Rancière argues, traditional political philosophy has sought to alleviate disorder and thus politics.83 For Rancière, taking away disorder is by nature eliminating the political act and thus falling into the tyranny of consensus. “Consensus,” Rancière writes, “means that the givens and the solutions of problems simply require people to find that they leave no room for discussion, and that governments can foresee this finding which, being obvious, no longer needs doing.”84 Consensus thus requires society to solely agree rather than invoke discussion—action decidedly counter to agnostic pluralism, but in line with much deliberative democracy. Rancière often refers to such governance as

“consensus democracy” in which “the experience of the social order is a common and non-litigious one. A consensual vision of politics always involves an attempt to define the preconditions that determine political choice as objective and univocal.”85

Consensus fails to account for those who have no part, the “un” who do not have a voice and are consequently continually silenced by the majority; thus, the sensible lies at the center of social order within Rancière’s work are widely shared. The sensible

“denotes the ambiguous logic whereby society relies on a bringing together of individuals

57 and groups (sharing as having in common), while functioning on the basis of the separation between those whose voices and actions count, are meaningful, and those who remain invisible and inaudible (sharing as separating).”86 Furthermore, “eliminating wrong, as consensus society demands,” Rancière argues, “is identical to absolutizing it.”87 Kendall Philips argues that consensus creates “the resistance of diverse communities” as it focuses on language of the common rather than “languages of diversity.”88 The focus on the common inherently limits the inclusion of difference and thus limits the ability for strong democratic politics. Ivie notes “dissent’s democratic intervention is ongoing and reconstructive” and I would argue the practice is even more valuable within the framework of agonistic pluralism, where diversity and conflict are met within an adversarial role rather than placed within a friend-enemy dichotomy.89

The Turn to Agonistic Pluralism

Mouffe’s concept of agonism acknowledges the political not as unipolar, but instead as multiplural. Thus, agonism adopts a framework requiring an individual to respect multiple perspectives, creating a necessary interaction of competing value systems; it is this focus on agonism that engages the importance of multiple voices.

Mouffe argues that agonism requires an expansion of understanding and “requires making room for the pluralism of cultures, forms of life, and political regimes.”90 So, rather than maintaining a monolithic sense of understanding, adopting an agonistic framework asks the individual to acknowledge and accept that differences between people exist. Agonism seeks to embrace multiple identities as a means to acknowledge possible differences; this project requires attentiveness to both oneself and others in an

58 effort to remain critical, and investigative, of both an individual position and the position/relationship to others.

Embracing agonism does not mitigate the occurrence of dispute. Instead, Mouffe argues that when confronting dispute in society, agonism acknowledges the perceived negativity. As Mouffe argues, agonism accepts the belief that conflict and division are inherent in disagreements and that there is “no place where reconciliation could be definitively achieved.”91 Her work on agonsim finds a suitable partner in rhetoric from

Kenneth Burke, who contends, “We need never deny the presence of strife, enmity, faction as characteristic motive of rhetorical expression.”92 Thus, agonism engages the negativity inherent in disputes as Mouffe asserts that the formation of a collective identity creates “a passionate affective investment that creates a strong identification among the members of a community.”93 Because of the ability for difference to create strong positions, and the inherent negativity associated with disputes, people face the decision to create either enemies or allies—the primary difference between antagonism and agonism.

Mouffe argues that rather than approach difference with an eye toward avoiding conflict, we should embrace conflict as a way to create greater meaning and mitigate against negative difference. Reversing the framing of antagonism, Mouffe challenges us to recognize differences and to ignore the extreme views we encounter. Agonism instead demands that we follow the lead of Levi-Strauss and “acknowledge that no part of humanity possesses a formula valid for the whole world.”94 Mouffe argues that adopting an agonistic framework allows individuals the ability to strive toward recognizing a way to deal with our differences. She requests us to “accept becoming part of a progressive

59 ‘collective will’ engaged in…establish[ing] a new hegemony” by realizing the passion we feel and using them to work together.95 Undertaking this action requires us to ignore the essentialist notion we carry about institutions and opposition.96

Whereas the generative quality of Rancière provides a shift in the political as a means to explore new ways in which individuals can engage demands for equality,

Mouffe’s concept of agonistic pluralism provides a shift in our focus on democracy as a system of politics accepting of social media discourse. Rancière argues “political activity is always a mode of expression that undoes the perceptible division of the police order by implementing a basically heterogeneous assumption . . . the equality of any speaking being with any other speaking being.”97 Mouffe remains in agreement about Rancière’s conception of radical equality in that those being excluded remain apart from the discussion, either because one has no voice or because an enemy would lie outside the framing of adversaries. One crucial area of difference between Mouffe and Rancière resides in the degree to which they include liberalism within their theoretical framework.

As Gert Biesta argues, “Rancière is very clear that dissensus is about the confrontation of the logic of the police or with the logic of equality, just as for Mouffe any redrawing of the existing political hegemony always needs to take place with reference to the principles of liberty and equality.”98 Although the two differ in how they understand the balance between liberalism and equality, it does not devalue how they work together. In fact, this tension between agonism as defined by Mouffe and radical equality as defined by Rancière is productive because it keeps a critical framing in place rather than focusing on a single polarization. Using both Mouffe and Rancière forces us to acknowledge the

60 balance between liberalism and equality to the extent that we must take into account the desires of others—who may not even be a part of the existing political discussion. The avoidance of others is where traditional political theory fails society. Adopting the work of Mouffe and Rancière demands that the part without a part becomes a viable form of political action.

Furthermore, as previously discussed, the ability to engage dissent, not as a problem in need of resolution but rather, as an opportunity to discuss difference is a hallmark of an agonistic democracy. Ivie argues for agonistic pluralism as a means to constitute a rhetorically robust democracy. He contends that agonism “is a perspective that promotes understanding over vilification, that seeks compensatory points of identification and articulates shared symbolic space, and that operates on the frontier of managing “us/them” relations rather than eradicating evil enemies.”99 Dissent provides the opportunity to question the status quo, to contest our normative actions, and to help thwart social rigidity.100 Dissent on social media provides a contemporary way for individuals to question the everyday actions they see around them. These rhetorical messages help illuminate social inequality and difference. Ivie contends, “Dissent that enhances democratic pluralism not only contests that which is taken for granted but also bridges differences to generate constructive dialogue and deliberation.”101 The instances of digital activism in the form of rhetorical messages of dissent selected for this project seek to invite a conversation about racial inequality within the United States.

61 Rhetorical Conception of Race and Social (In)equality

The events in Missouri, New York, and Ohio have been widely covered and enveloped in multiple political discussions. This project inherently incorporates a focus on race issues, thus it is imperative to account for the dynamics of race in our democratic culture. The important concern for this project is to highlight how protest about racial inequality can manifest within a digital public sphere. Issues of race and social inequality are especially compelling for this analysis, both because they are inherently connected to the struggle to enact better forms of democratic governance and, second, because racial justice activists have increasingly turned to social media in the past two-to-three years.

And, although my focus in this dissertation is on contemporary social media activism, it is important to acknowledge the rich tradition of democratic dissent rhetoric in the

African American community. Davis Houck and David Dixon in fact argue rhetoric should be the focus on civil rights scholarship because the “strategic words and actions lie at the heart of the movement’s successes.”102 Beyond the speeches we are most familiar with, Houck and Dixon argue that civil rights rhetoric was a mosaic of discourses including “sit-ins, boycotts, marches, pray-ins, wade-ins, public letters, songs, and, of course, the televised images of vicious attacks caught on film.”103 The intersection of social media and civil rights rhetoric has heightened the importance of some of these discourses (i.e. televised images, public letters) while limiting others (i.e. boycotts, marches). Houck notes the media’s role in the coverage of Emmett Till’s murder and describes the role of Till’s mother, Mamie Till-Bradley, and the newspaper coverage as a defining moment, along with Rosa Parks’ refusal to give up her seat, for igniting the Civil

62 Rights Movement.104 Incidentally, Dave Zirin’s article contends #BlackLivesMatter has kept incidents of African Americans killed by police in the news when historically it would be underreported.105 Thus, the connection between race, civil rights rhetoric, and social media warrants further consideration.

Rhetoric has been influential in overcoming injustice specifically within the Civil

Rights Movement. Celeste Michelle Condit argues that the Civil Rights Movement resulted in a clash of rhetorical arguments eventually leading to the national acceptance of inclusivity rhetoric surrounding racial difference instead of messages of segregation.106

Victoria Gallagher notes the importance of rhetors “who demonstrate reflexivity in public” and engage “political discourse directed to fellow citizens” when addressing the

Stokely Carmichael’s role in challenging racial inequality.107 The role of protester identity was explored early in civil rights rhetoric through Richard Gregg’s argument for the “ego function” of protest rhetoric. He demonstrates the “prominent personal stance” embodied by protest participants and explores how the role of protest defines “self-hood” and to “attack the life style of ‘establishment’ helps in the identification of one’s own style.”108 Adopting an antagonist frame, Gregg’s work seemingly limits the role of adversaries but there remain areas in which the work of Rancière and Mouffe can reframe issue within an agonistic context. Gregg’s argument, supported by his usage of Erving

Goffman, identifies the “beckoning of kindred spirits and “grudging respect” inherent in protest rhetoric.109 The inherent desire for respect and acknowledgment of similarity underpin notions of agonism, which thus have the opportunity to be highlighted in social media activism.

63 James R. Andrews identifies one potential reason for antagonism to pervade civil rights rhetoric through his exploration of coercive rhetoric. Andrews notes that past discussion on coercion focused on a contrast to “rational” discourse.110 Through his investigation of student protest at Columbia University, Andrews argues that rhetoric becomes coercive when it limits rather than provides individuals with increased choice.

However, Robert Scott and Donald Smith argue “civility and decorum serve as masks for the preservation of injustice.”111 Therefore, when choice is “limited” as a means to constrain protest, rhetorical critics must be cognizant of such inequality. Faced with Scott and Smith’s critique, Andrews ultimately concludes, “rhetorical criticism obviously must also provide for the examination of those cases in which civility and decorum are discarded for ends that are not obviously and unquestionably just.”112 Civil rights rhetoric, just like democratic discourse, should not be relegated to essential acts but rather must be holistically understood as a process so as to fully embrace action.

Civil rights rhetoric focused on the role of deconstructing racial injustices.

Gallagher argues that deconstructive rhetoric “challenges us as critics to disrupt reliance on dialectical constructions within discourse,” adapting a pluralist framework.113

Additionally, Mark Gaipa posits that deconstructionist rhetoric “may have made a real difference in helping to desegregate American society.”114 In these ways, civil rights rhetoric embraces dissent as a means to addressing inequality; while not explicitly agonistic, it is not constrained solely through the language of enemies either. These instances demonstrate the importance of public address within the Civil Rights

Movement, but the connection to rhetorical messages of dissent on social media

64 continues to be maintained, especially within our contemporary digital society and public sphere.

Along with the civil rights movement, rhetoric and race are also intricately linked.

Rhetoric and race have a long tradition of connection dating to Africa’s influence on

Greek society.115 Examination of the connection between race and rhetoric must start with the very creation of racial difference; there is a vast history of scholarship implicating race as a discursive creation, especially within a United States context.116

Additionally, scholars have posited arguments supporting the social construction of race through rhetoric.117 In a country founded under the principle of equality, at least to some extent, the rhetorical conception of race was utilized as a means to ensure separation between groups of people. Kelly Happe argues that the systemization of slavery created the need for “races of persons” as a means to answer for the division of people within a liberal democratic pluralism.118 Thus, Happe argues, “race served the interests of the white ruling class in that it simultaneously reconciled and mystified the contradictions between slavery and an egalitarian political discourse.”119 This separation has been correspondingly carried out in the action and rhetoric of our daily lives. Happe writes,

“Race survives because it is reenacted in daily life as a common sense way to explain social relations—in the United States context, the oppression of those thought to inhabit its status as a natural kind.”120 These examples demonstrate how issues concerning race center on society’s discourse. Audrey Smedley’s argument that race “does indeed exist and should be viewed not as something biologically tangible and existing in the outside world that has to be discovered, described, and defined, but as a cultural creation, a

65 product of human invention,” counters the traditionally contemporary slogan of

“colorblindness” in society. 121 However, because race is rhetorically constructed, rhetoric can also help people overcome racial disparity.

The election of Barack Obama as the President of the United States was hailed as key evidence for a “post-race” era, granting full acknowledgement that “race matters much less than it used to, that the boundaries of race have been overcome, that racism is no longer a big problem.”122 However, although blatantly overt instances of racism are increasingly concealed, “contemporary race and racism function more subtly and inferentially.”123 Since the election of Donald Trump instances of racism have become more overt; however, they are defended by his supporters as not focused on issues of race but are rather political in nature.124 Because of the normalization of white experiences, many have labeled contemporary society as post-racial.125 Ralina Joseph defines post- race as the belief that “despite the racialized and gendered nature of all aspects of

American life, including media coverage, twenty-first-century U.S. culture is replete with the idea that we are beyond, past, or ‘post-’ notions of race-, gender-, and sexuality-based discriminations.”126 Jamie Moshin and Ronald Jackson II argue that such thinking creates the belief that “color, sexuality, and religion do not matter, because anyone can overcome these barriers and succeed, to such an extent that these barriers must surely be relics of the past.”127 However, simply adhering to these beliefs causes many in society to overlook the systemic racial inequality continually maintained in our everyday lives.

Although some in our nation continue to maintain that the election of the first black president demonstrates a transition to a post-racial society, structural inequalities

66 continue to persist in the United States regardless of the Obama presidency. African

American high school dropout rates continue to be nearly double the national average, white household wealth continues to be nine times that of black households, and the incarceration rate of African American men remains seven times higher than that of white men.128 The rhetorical move to a “post-racial society” has allowed individuals to escape conversations about race and ignore inequality. Michelle Alexander writes, “we have allowed ourselves to be willfully blind to the emergence of a new caste system—a system of social excommunication that has denied millions of African Americans basic human dignity.”129 The election of our first black president has done little to curtail the dramatic inequality African Americans face within contemporary society.

Interestingly enough, Katherine Henry details how Obama’s own rhetoric has at times worked to constrain the role of race within social change. She argues Obama’s remarks on Reverend Jeremiah Wright’s “God Bless America, God Damn America” sermon, “demonstrates that it was no longer acceptable—at least for a politician with national ambitions—to condemn the United States broadly as a racist country without situating it in the past.”130 Henry details the rise and semi-fall of Cliven Bundy, one time

Tea-Party darling who once pondered, “I’ve wondered, are they better off as slaves, picking cotton and having a family and doing things, or are they better off under government sovereignty?”131 The sentiment expressed by Bundy was quickly denounced by many but nonetheless consistent with Tea Party rhetoric that has appropriated civil rights complaints. The rise of the Tea Party occurred against the backdrop of a jeremiad that “casts Obama in the role of the black tyrant who is demonizing and enslaving white

67 America, and substitutes a narrative of national pride and recovery for the shame of a racist past.”132 Michael Lerner argues this shift towards the Tea Party has not been entirely conducted because people “are racist, sexist, homophobic, or xenophobic,” but because “they become part of communities in which that racist, sexist, or homophobic discourse is a central part.”133 My understanding of Mark McPhail’s argument on racial reconciliation forces me to acknowledge the rise of the Tea Party due to the disinterest of whites to fully accept and respond to racial injustice.134 Such disinterest stems from white citizens’ incapacity to see their place within society from any position beyond contrast to an Other. This is reflected in the work of Thomas Nakayama and Robert L. Krizek, who define “whiteness” as an invisible, uninterrogated, and universalized construct in which all differences are thus racialized.135 From this standpoint others are deemed different and equality stems from the status of being white.

Resulting from anti-Obama and anti-left jeremiad, the Tea Party, and other right- wing protesters, embraced the idea of “colorblind society” and, faced with a decreasing sense of command, found within such fracturing the ability to appeal for “white rights.”

Such discourse has intensified recently; as Meryl Irwin notes, “white rights discourse has risen perceptibly in the mainstream press.”136 I contend that #BlackLivesMatter is not only a response to the historical conflict of racism in the United States but a direct response to the Tea Party, and other right-wing, jeremiads. The social media campaigns have a historical connection to civil rights movements in their demand for equality. The similarities between the media coverage of Emmett Till and contemporary social media campaigns showing incidents of young African Americans being killed are evident and,

68 unfortunately, demonstrate that society has not changed much in the 60 years since Till’s death. Examining the social media campaigns connected to the deaths of, Brown, Garner, and Rice highlight dissent against the current treatment of black citizens in the United

States. Many may profess the United States to be a country placed beyond issues of race, but recent trends in social media communication demonstrate that the nation still has a way to go toward finding social equality.

69 Chapter II: From Civil Rights Movement to #BlackLivesMatter: Evolving

Leadership

#BlackLivesMatter. This phrase has become one of the most prominent messages of dissent for the millennial generation as well as one of the most popular messages demanding racial equality since the Civil Rights Movement. Articulating dissent against systemic inequality preserved through both political and law enforcement systems,

#BlackLivesMatter accentuates the perilous position of black lives in a society that, supposedly “equal,” has seemingly deviated minimally from the inequality experienced by black citizens since the Civil Rights Movement in the 1950s and 1960s. As a message of dissent focused on resisting racial inequality, #BlackLivesMatter is inherently connected to the Civil Rights Movement. The vast similarities and differences between the two movements for racial equality could easily fill multiple dissertations.

Consequently, I focus my attention to the digital nature of #BlackLivesMatter and examine the rhetorical groundings of social media activism in order to better understand contemporary political activism.

The introduction chapter outlines my argument for a shift to a digital public sphere—one where privately created messages engage in a digital public space. Where once individuals engaged others face-to-face, we now have an ability to engage political discourse about racial inequality through online venues. The online venues significant to this project are social media platforms, particularly Twitter and Facebook. There is no denying that political discourse has pervaded our online interactions. Even if one attempts to disengage from political discourse while visiting social media sites, at times

70 they are bound to stumble across various political posts. A 2016 Pew Research poll found roughly twenty percent of social media users often discuss political issues while almost fifty percent follow multiple political figures and a similar amount acknowledge posting political content.1 The proliferation of political discourse on social media has raised questions directly pertaining to rhetorical theory as scholars try to make sense of this ever-changing digital context of advocacy messages. Additionally, digital political advocacy has raised questions of democratic theory as traditional democratic practices

(i.e. voting and protest) are enacted in a digital realm. #BlackLivesMatter, and other subsequent hashtag campaigns for racial inequality, provide a valuable opportunity to explore some of these questions.

The previous chapter framed the foundational theoretical arguments running throughout the course of this project. I outlined the role of dissent as democratic action and highlighted how an increased reliance on dissent promotes an agonistic democracy.

As I argued in chapter 1, the democratic practice of dissent is a valuable topic for exploration in order to help rhetorical scholars understand more fully the implications and democratic nature of social media activism. These middle chapters analyze the rhetorical sensibilities of what I have termed digital dissent. #BlackLivesMatter,

#HandsUpDontShoot, #ICantBreate, #CrimingWhileWhite, and #AliveWhileBlack all voice opposition to predominate belief in racial equality. These messages offer the belief that black individuals are treated unequal to white people in various aspects of society— especially pertaining to interactions with law enforcement. In chapter 1, I also analyzed how these messages dissent against the notion of a colorblind society based on racial

71 equality. I now move to an exploration of how dissent operates through the rhetorical foundations of leadership, doxa, and the comic corrective. In subsequent chapters I articulate how digital dissent fosters increased democratic discourse as the institutionality of political action is challenged. Furthermore, these chapters highlight a move toward an agonistic democracy as conflict and difference replace consensus as the foundation of democratic discourse.

I begin my rhetorical grounding of social media activism by examining how digital dissent has been compared to the activism of the Civil Rights Movement. Above I posited some political discourse has moved from a traditional public sphere into a digital public sphere. I contend this contextual shift from face-to-face interaction to digital dissemination of a message can be extrapolated through a comparison between the Civil

Rights Movement and #BlackLivesMatter. The Civil Rights Movement has served as a barometer for measuring the capabilities of contemporary social movements and, while differing variably, social media activism.2 Perhaps inequitably, this comparison between the Civil Rights Movement and social media activism often delegitimizes social media activism. Primary among this unequal comparison is the reliance on strong leadership which has permeated critique of #BlackLivesMatter. Comparing the physical activism enacted during the Civil Rights Movement and the digital activism on social media ostensibly highlights vast differences between these movements. I contend, however, that such differences become superficial as rhetorical scholars concentrate on the role of dissent, over the role of activism, within social media hashtag campaigns. Primarily, the critique of contemporary leadership roles relies on the traditional outcome of consensus.

72 However, I argue #BlackLivesMatter, as digital dissent, emphasizes the role of dissensus in fostering increased democratic discourse.

In this chapter I discuss the role of leadership as a primary difference between the

Civil Rights Movement and #BlackLivesMatter. This chapter unfolds through a comparison and contrast of the role of leaders and the rhetorical underpinnings of both the Civil Rights Movement and #BlackLivesMatter. First, I recount the history and utilization of #BlackLivesMatter from its genesis after the death of Trayvon Martin and the unfortunate deaths of multiple black individuals at the hands of law enforcement officers. As this contemporary social movement has become the primary call for racial equality it shares a direct relationship with the Civil Rights Movement. Labeled as the

“The Next Civil Rights Movement,” by various scholars, #BlackLivesMatter intrinsically draws comparison to previous movements for racial equality. In order to fully understand

#BlackLivesMatter as a form of contemporary activism, specifically as digital dissent, an exploration of the public memory of the Civil Rights Movement is warranted in order to demonstrate shifts in historical and contemporary social movements. Undertaking this comparison will further rhetorically ground contemporary digital activism.

This chapter next analyzes the historical remembrance of the Civil Rights

Movement, particularly the role of leadership, and how such remembrance can limit the robustness of a movement. Tethered to this remembrance of the Civil Rights Movement is the relationship between strong leadership and consensus building. A strong leader symbolizes a unified message for a movement supported by followers. Unification of a message requires supporters to abandon actions that run contrary to the unified beliefs of

73 the group. In essence, a dedicated leader, regardless of intent, requires the suppression of dissent, particularly against their supported message; whereas, dissent, in effect, broadens the political landscape by demanding a plurality of voice. The broadening of discourse is due to digital dissent’s position as vernacular rhetoric. The turn to a vernacular rhetoric negates the reliance of strong leaders and increases the potential for democratic discourse. Additionally, the contention of digital dissent as vernacular rhetoric aspires a turn toward an agonistic democracy.

The chapter closes with an exploration of how digital dissent embraces, and enacts, Jacques Rancière’s concept of dissensus and Chantal Mouffe’s theory of agonistic democracy in an effort to increase robust democratic discourse. Undertaking such an endeavor builds toward a historical account of Rancière and Mouffe’s work in application to social movements and further articulates their arguments within contemporary social media activism. Such a development within rhetorical scholarship will help delineate the changing nature of political advocacy. Finally, I conclude the chapter by arguing digital dissent eschews the institutionalized nature of contemporary democracy by broadening potential democratic action and bolstering democratic discourse.

History and Utilization of #BlackLivesMatter

Tracing the genesis of #BlackLivesMatter, through its creation and circulation on social media sites, does not require much effort; however, the contextual exigency surrounding the formation of the digital dissent message demonstrates how the slogan has become a touchstone for racial inequality. As noted in chapter 1, the election of Barack

Obama as President of the United States led many to declare an end to racial inequality

74 because the first black president ushered in an apparent “colorblind society.”3 Despite these arguments, racial inequality persisted and ultimately became a topic of discourse following a spate of shooting deaths involving law enforcement officers and unarmed black individuals. These interactions were almost universally followed by little action taken against the law enforcement officers in terms of being held accountable for the untimely deaths of unarmed individuals. Following an early instance of a person not being held accountable, #BlackLivesMatter was created as a response to the seemingly lack of attention given to these wrongful deaths. As the problem persisted, the usage of

#BlackLivesMatter grew until ultimately becoming one of the most used hashtags of all time.4 While #BlackLivesMatter has grown into a full-fledged movement, with both local and national organization, its usage as a form of social media activism, as digital dissent, remains its most prominent application to political discourse. Through the following examinations of the history and usage of #BlackLivesMatter, I highlight some of the rhetorical framings of contemporary digital activism.

History of #BlackLivesMatter

On February 26, 2012, Trayvon Martin was returning to a local gated community within Sanford, Florida when he encountered neighborhood watch volunteer George

Zimmerman. The events following Martin and Zimmerman’s interaction remain questionable in entirety but the basic facts are not in dispute. Around 7:15 p.m. George

Zimmerman called 911 to report suspicious activity by an individual and inquired about the response time for local law enforcement.5 Zimmerman affirmed that he was actively pursuing the individual when questioned by the police dispatcher and was instructed such

75 behavior was unnecessary; however, Zimmerman continued to pursue Martin.6 Events following the interaction with the dispatcher become much less definite. Between

Zimmerman’s 911 call and 7:30 p.m., when EMS from Sanford Fire Department arrived and pronounced Martin dead, multiple 911 calls were placed as witnesses reported hearing numerous calls for help before hearing a nearby gun shot.7 Zimmerman has maintained that upon confronting Martin he was attacked, reportedly being hit multiple times in the nose and being pushed to the ground, before firing at Martin in self-defense.8

Forensics testing, however, found only a slight cut on Martin’s hand and no DNA belonging to Zimmerman under Martin’s fingernails (which would be common in an altercation resulting in sustained contact such as the confrontation reported by

Zimmerman).9 Additionally, Zimmerman repeatedly declined medical attention both before being put in handcuffs and later at the police station.10 Because of Florida’s “Stand

Your Ground” laws, along with a potential self-defense claim, Zimmerman was released without being charged.11 Eventually, on April 11, 2012, as outrage over not charging

Zimmerman with a crime erupted across the country, special prosecutor Angela Corey charged Zimmerman with second-degree murder.12 After months of agonizing inaction the man responsible for the death of Trayvon Martin was brought to trial.

Over the course of two days in July 2013, George Zimmerman was tried for the death of Trayvon Martin. Prosecutors maintained that “stand your ground” laws should not be utilized when a person actively pursues another and engages them, since that defeats the notion of standing one’s ground. Additionally, many believed Zimmerman profiled Martin and found him a threat based on his skin color.13 The defense argued

76 Zimmerman was merely defending himself after Martin attacked Zimmerman. On July

13, 2013, a jury of six, comprised of five white women and one minority, found

Zimmerman not guilty of either second-degree murder or manslaughter in the death of

Trayvon Martin. Following the acquittal of George Zimmerman, Alicia Garza, an activist and writer, wrote a “love note to black people” on her Facebook page encouraging them to rise together “to ensure that black lives matter.”14 Garza’s friend, and fellow activist,

Patrisse Cullors shared her friend’s message on multiple social media sites and incorporated the hashtag BlackLivesMatter.15 Soon after, Garza and Cullors reached out to Opal Tometi, an activist in the field of immigrant rights, in an effort to organize an increased social media presence on other sites as well as some localized protests.16 The hashtag campaign gained recognition among activists but only gained slight traction amongst protesters until the death of Michael Brown.

On August 9, 2014 Officer Darren Wilson shot Michael Brown in Ferguson, MO.

Protests soon erupted over the death of Brown and unrest broke out as protesters and police officers clashed on the city streets. Viewing the aftermath of Brown’s death from

California, Garza, Cullors, and Tometi organized protesters across the nation to gather in

Ferguson under the banner of the #BlackLivesMatter campaign.17 In Ferguson,

#BlackLivesMatter ultimately became widespread as it was utilized as the primary slogan in multiple protest events and was vastly circulated on multiple social media sites. The failure to indict Officer Wilson, and the subsequent failure to indict the officer responsible for the death of Eric Garner in New York a month later, resulted in extensive use of the hashtag on social media sites. Surrounding benchmark events in the history of

77 #BlackLivesMatter (i.e. the death of individuals, court hearings, protest events), the hashtag would oftentimes be utilized in over 100,000 messages per day.18 Embodying black citizens’ historical frustrations with police brutality, lack of justice, and continued social and racial inequality, #BlackLivesMatter instantly spread across social media becoming, as James Taylor, professor of politics at the University of San Francisco, states, the most prominent slogan for renewed civil rights protest since “Black Power.”19

Embracing contemporary technology, #BlackLivesMatter spread beyond online activism and became the rallying cry for multiple mass protests around the nation encompassing both the black community and its allies in demanding, “that the breath in our bodies guarantees our right to life, our right to freedom, our right to love, dignity, and respect.”20

Utilization of #BlackLivesMatter

A 2018 Pew Research Center report conducted a content analysis of the usage of

#BlackLivesMatter and found six unique topics related to the hashtag’s usage: fatal police-related encounters, violent acts in general, police and law enforcement, national politicians and political parties, race (primarily, instances of racial inequality), and protests. The most commonly used themes were race, protests, and fatal police encounters. Researchers also found the usage of the hashtag spiked immediately following instances of fatal law enforcement interactions with unarmed black individuals.21 Of particular importance for this project are posts utilizing

#BlackLivesMatter along with themes of racial inequality and fatal law enforcement encounters. Specifically, I contend these posts articulate dissent messages, as they identify disagreement with contemporary systemic racial inequality and unjust policing

78 systems. Additionally, posts utilizing #BlackLivesMatter allows for many otherwise isolated events to be viewed as a common systemic problem, particularly that of continued racial inequality. The usage of #BlackLivesMatter brought advocacy directly to the forefront of discourse that otherwise may have been avoided. Social media posts tagged with #BlackLivesMatter, as digital dissent, demonstrate the ability for anyone to directly participate in democratic discourse.

As digital dissent, I contend using #BlackLivesMatter was a primary means to identify disagreement with a system perpetuating racial inequality. The very meaning of the slogan “indicates in actuality [black individuals] are treated as less than equal” and serves as a demand that “American society reconsider how it values black lives.”22

Examples of social posts utilizing #BlackLivesMatter as a digital dissent against systemic racial inequality are, “Saddens me that it’s 2014 and #BlackLivesMatter is a trending hashtag. Regardless of this jury decision, We have work to do (sic),” “The wounds are not ‘old.’ They never fade. They are present. They are real. They have not healed,”

“Everyday I’m reminded this system isn’t broke, it was built this way. Love my people who take it apart brick by brick,” and “To say #BlackLivesMatter doesn’t diminish the value of other lives. It simply states something that this nation has never believed.” These messages serve as digital dissent by expressing disagreement with the notion of a

“colorblind society,” as articulated in chapter 1.

In addition to these dissent messages that are organized based on their usage of

#BlackLivesMatter, the terminology of the hashtag campaign serves as a message of dissent. Catherine L. Langford and Montené Speight argue usage of the hashtag

79 campaign “creates a space to challenge. . . . White perceptions of Black Americans.”23

They also add, “When [individuals] use the hashtag, people . . . critique social and institutional practices” and “agitate in their local communities for social and political change.”24 Their argument frames how the creators of the hashtag campaign viewed its usage. When discussing the use of the hashtag Garza asserted that the hashtag exerts a sense of power in being able to drive a “narrative of what is right, what is wrong, what is just, what is unjust.”25 Through this challenge of supposed racial equality, I argue

#BlackLivesMattter directly serves as a message of dissent though the expression of disagreement to a colorblind society. Julius Bailey and David J. Leonard provide support for #BlackLivesMatter as digital dissent against systemic racial inequality writing, “the mantra is first and foremost a challenge to the affront of racial violence and prejudice; it is a challenge to white privilege and supremacy, and it seeks to disrupt the status quo by forcing America to unflinchingly examine the way state-sponsored agents treat black

Americans.”26 Used within a digital context, #BlackLivesMatter allows a profusion of individuals to engage directly with Rancière’s conception of dissensus by acknowledging difference and disagreement in addition to exhibiting support for social change. As digital dissent, #BlackLivesMatter fosters increased political discourse through its ease of use and its capacity to reach a wide-ranging audience. Additionally, it allows users to individually adapt their dissent message and directly engage political discourse to advocate social change.

Beyond articulating general disagreement within systemic racial inequality,

#BlackLivesMatter was utilized as a digital dissent message to express racial inequality

80 specifically within an unjust law enforcement system. Tweets such as, “Without looking it up – How many unarmed Black boys/men shot killed (sic) by the cops can you name?,”

“When #BlackLivesMatter, kids won’t need training on how to act safely in police encounters bc (sic) safety from police is a given,” and “A System Cannot Fail Those It

Was Never Meant To Protect (sic),” demonstrate dissent messages against a law enforcement system that statistically has treated black individuals unjustly. Created in response to the perceived injustice of Trayvon Martin’s killer not being indicted, and rising in popularity after Michael Brown’s fatal encounter with law enforcement,

#BlackLivesMatter is inherently tied to unjust law enforcement. Additionally, tweets utilizing #BlackLivesMatter highlighted direct instances of law enforcement shootings or inadequate accountability for law enforcement misconduct. Tweets such as, “It’s been a month since the murder of Mike Brown. Why hasn’t Darren Wilson been arrested yet,”

“19 yr old (sic) Tony Robinson was shot by a Madison Police Officer tonight. He was

Unarmed,” “If #BlackLivesMatter Eric Garner would be alive” demonstrate messages of direct instances of law enforcement interaction leading to the death of an unarmed black individual. Of particular importance for this project, all of these examples utilize

#BlackLivesMatter, which places them in coordination with each other and represent examples of dissent against systemic racial inequality.

Many of the social media messages utilizing #BlackLivesMatter demonstrate the ability for the hashtag to keep the issue of racial inequality as a primary topic for political discourse. #BlackLivesMatter serves as a digital marker affiliating these various dissent messages by a common slogan. Although the messages in the posts vary textually, they

81 are directly connected to support for #BlackLivesMatter through the use of the hashtag.

Certainly not all social media posts containing #BlackLivesMatter voiced dissent against system racial inequality as Deen Freelon, Charlton McIlwain, and Meriedith Clark conclude in their encompassing 2016 research report on the creation and influence of

#BlackLivesMatter.27 However, these messages are dramatically limited in scale compared to messages articulating dissent. Furthermore, social media sites continue to apply rather rudimentary algorithms when determining the popularity of a hashtag campaign—most algorithms simply accumulate the number of instances a hashtag is used. The influence of a hashtag campaign, in terms of popularity, is thus based on the amount of times the hashtag is posted regardless of accompanying messaging. As it pertains to the potential for a hashtag campaign such as #BlackLivesMatter to increase the potential for political discourse, messages of varying context are of lesser consequence; instead, the increase in potential discourse availability is of most consequence. Simply put, the more a hashtag is used the greater potential for increased discourse about the message conferred. The ability to be used by many and a fluid circumstance are a foundation of digital dissent’s ability to increase democratic discourse.

Langford and Speight argue the ability for #BlackLivesMatter to engage such open discourse is its flexibility in being “deployed in different contexts and by different individuals.”28 Various social media posts indicate the direct action one partakes by posting #BlackLivesMatter. Posts such as, “BlackLivesMatter is a response to the dehumanization of black people. But it’s also a call to action,” “When police departments routinely operate with impunity, it is our DUTY to resist. Democracy demands we take

82 action,” “#BlackLivesMatter began as a call to action in response to state-sanctioned violence and anti-Black racism,” and “Rest in peace Stephon Clark. Now is the time for all of us to take action” demonstrate how individuals can utilize digital dissent to directly engage political discourse. I am not arguing that individuals were deprived this action prior to the formulation of a digital dissent as there were many methods to engaging political discourse previously; however, I am contending digital dissent has the ability to allow individuals to reach a larger audience to engage political discourse due to the ease of message creation and dissemination due to the ease of social media usage. Keeanga-

Yamahtta Taylor argues that through social media, individuals “were no longer dependent on mainstream media’s interest; they could take their case straight to the people.”29 The social media posts in this section demonstrate how digital dissent, especially #BlackLivesMatter, can challenge structural inequality and the direct action one can take to engage political discourse.

This section establishes how individual users have used #BlackLivesMatter as digital dissent, in order to voice disagreement with the notion of a racially equal society.

The amplification of #BlackLivesMatter as digital dissent, as well as various other forms of social media activism, has garnered critique as not being on par with the actions of the

Civil Rights Movement. Additionally, critiques of #BlackLivesMatter, as well as other social media hashtag campaigns, have concentrated on the lack of leadership as a means to solidify their message in order to influence social change.30 The basis behind much of the critique of #BlackLivesMatter for being leaderless stems from comparison to the

Civil Rights Movement and past reliance on strong leaders to advance a movement’s

83 cause. Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor describes critique of #BlackLivesMatter as heralding from individuals who are directly accustomed to actions established during the Civil

Rights Movement, with some criticism even originating from individuals personally connected to events of that era.31 This critique arises due to the historical remembrance of the Civil Rights Movement. Consequently, this critique highlights the reliance on leadership, which inherently demands consensus, as strong leadership requires robust support without disagreement. Digital dissent on the other hand is reliant on the disruption of dissensus from a multitude of voices—an element of vernacular rhetoric.

Research on social movements, including rhetorical scholarship, has focused on the role of leadership in regards to advocating successful social change. The contemporary shift regarding the reliance on leadership upends traditional scholarship and warrants investigation into the rhetorical changes associated with digital dissent, along with other forms of social media advocacy. Past research has explored the changing role of leadership in contemporary social movements, especially as they pertain to social media usage.32 However, this chapter looks to ground how this change increases the emphasis on dissent as an act of political discourse. Analyzing the shift from leadership, based on consensus, to social media advocacy, based on dissent, requires an exploration of how #BlackLivesMatter differs from the Civil Rights Movement. Examining the influence of the historical remembrance of the Civil Rights Movement and the shift to

#BlackLivesMatter will help rhetorically ground the change from direct activism toward digital activism emphasizing dissensus. Furthermore, I establish the grounding of digital

84 dissent within the realm of vernacular rhetoric as the shift away from consensus-based leadership becomes apparent.

From Civil Rights to #BlackLivesMatter: The Implications of Public Memory

The historical remembrance of the Civil Rights Movement involves individuals and events that have garnered immense reverence. As a touchstone campaign against racial injustice, the Civil Rights Movement has stood as an exemplar for activism within the United States. However, the proliferation of digital social media complicates rhetorical scholar’s understanding of how individuals enact activism. Subsequently, contemporary scholarship across various disciplines institutes a shift away from our established appreciation of the Civil Rights Movement. Exploring the nuances of the

Civil Rights Movement has resulted in a far more intricate interpretation of the events and people that fostered a preeminent example of social activism. As a form of digital dissent, #BlackLivesMatter seeks to emphasize aspects of racial inequality, and in that vein carries similarities between the Civil Rights Movement’s goal of exposing unjust discrimination. At the same time, digital dissent lacks a comparative physical enactment of activism; however, the hashtag has been utilized to organize physical action such as protest marches. Comparison between social movements can provide valuable insight into the changing nature of social advocacy. Of importance for this project is how a comparison between the Civil Rights Movement and #BlackLivesMatter illustrates a shift in the role of leadership for digital social movements. A worthwhile comparison of these two social movements must begin with an exploration of how historical remembrance has framed the Civil Rights Movement.

85 Historical Remembrance of the Civil Rights Movement

Peniel Joseph argues that the primary remembrance of the Civil Rights Movement is characterized by the “heroic period between the May 17, 1954, Brown Supreme Court decision and the August 6, 1965, passage of the Voting Rights Act.”33 When one recalls the events and characters of the Civil Rights Movement we remember the iconic people and moments. For example: Martin Luther King Jr., Rosa Parks, Malcolm X, the March on Washington, the Montgomery bus boycott, the Woolworth’s lunch counter sit-in, police dogs and fire hoses being used to intimidate and control protesters. These individuals and events are enshrined into the historical account of the Civil Rights

Movement, and rightly so, as they all play significant roles in the movement. Kristen

Hoerl argues the memory of the Civil Rights Movement is typically relegated to an emphasis on King as the prophetic leader and the romanticized nature of the movement in achieving racial progress.34 She contends this became especially true with the inauguration of Barack Obama as president when media discourse continually relied on the narrative of Obama’s inauguration serving as the fulfillment of King’s “dream.”35 As

I argue in chapter 1, Obama’s inauguration was utilized by media, especially conservative media, as a culmination of the progression of racial equality. Hoerl supports this contention as she notes many in both liberal and conservative media described Obama’s inauguration as the “fulfillment,” “embodiment,” “culmination,” and “validation” of King and the Civil Rights Movement’s work.36 One reason for the historical remembrance of the Civil Rights Movement is the sheer way it is continually discussed socially. Simple repetition, as one means for memory to garner foothold, public memory, as argued by

86 Stephen H. Browne, will “bracket out certain memories and privilege others.”37 Through repetitive celebration of historical events/people, society begins to place importance on specific interpretations of past events. Such reverence creates implications for contemporary actions and shapes how we understand contemporary political discourse.

Public memory thus limits influence of prominent events/people of the past as they become overshadowed by those celebrated contemporarily.

Furthermore, Derrick Alridge contends public discourse tends to forget King’s increasingly radical later years, instead presenting him as a “heroic, one-dimensional, and neatly packaged” leader.38 The potential sanitizing of this moment was not lost on those actively participating in the movement. Bayard Rustin, an early advisor to Martin Luther

King, Jr., labeled the time between the 1954 Supreme Court decision on school desegregation and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as the “classical period” and argued that period “will undoubtedly be recorded as the period in which the legal foundations of racism in America were destroyed.”39 Rustin contends such recognition would limit the progression of the Civil Rights Movement, especially within the Southern United States, beyond this era as the “social movement” evolved beyond the legal core of the Civil

Rights Act.40 Rustin’s early articulation of the limiting nature of the “classical” remembrance of the Civil Rights Era remains intact, as the period is now held as a benchmark for other social movements. Rustin, in fact, argues against such a framing, suggesting that the movement from “protest movement into a full-fledged social movement” would convolute the continued progress of racial equality.41 Rustin’s fears have come to fruition as Hoerl contends popular media discourse has “reduced and

87 simplified the civil rights movement and its diverse struggles for racial justice.”42 The

Civil Rights Movement has become “an occasion of American self-congratulation for triumphing over past” racial inequality “under the banner of public commemoration.”43

The public memory of the Civil Rights Movement no doubt holds a cherished place in

American discourse on matters of race. However, these memories consist of only a portion of the movement.

Many others helped bring about the movement’s improbable success.

Commemoration, and colloquial discussion, of the Civil Rights Movement overly focuses on the role of the movement’s strong leaders and multiple events that were captured during the media of the time. Just as Kenneth Burke posits that terms both reflect and deflect meaning, so does how we remember the Civil Rights Movement. Steven H.

Browne argues the selective nature of memory is due to memory’s fragmented and textual quality.44 Barbie Zelizer analogizes Browne’s argument as a mosaic concept.

Collective memory, she attests, is “pieced together like a mosaic,” and there are political consequences based upon which parts are deemed significant for recall.45 Within our historical remembrance of the Civil Rights Movement we have created a grand mosaic of the standard bearer for societal change in the United States. But, the mosaic is also not entirely complete and, like all mosaics, it accentuates some areas and diverts attention from others. Additionally, our public memory influences our understanding of contemporary events and behaviors. Thus, as previously mentioned, we need to explore how our public memory of the Civil Rights Movement influences our understanding of

88 social media activism, specifically #BlackLivesMatter in order to ground the rhetorical nature of new political advocacy.

Rhetoric and Public Memory: The Implication of Societal Remembrance

Rhetoricians have extensively explored the rhetorical nature of memory. Hoerl argues, “public memory has rhetorical significance by virtue of its relevance to present historical conditions.”46 “Widely shared depictions of the past,” she adds, “may tell us more about contemporary issues than they do about the past.”47 Put simply, we rely on our public memories in order to interpret our societal environments. John Bodnar labels ingrained memories as public memory, asserting that the term acts as a “body of beliefs and ideas about the past that help a public or society understand both its past and present, and by implication its future.”48 Barbara Biesecker further defends his argument when writing, “what we remember and how we remember can tell us something significant about who we are as a people now, about the contemporary social and political issues that divide us, and about who we may become.”49 Just as both Bodnar and Biesecker apply public memory as a guiding influence on contemporary understanding, this project directly extends their argument to demonstrate that these influences also apply to how we understand modern social movements. As mentioned above, #BlackLivesMatter has oftentimes faced comparison against historical events/people—generally, these comparisons denote negative aspects of the contemporary movement. Specifically, an implication of this argument, as I argue in this chapter, is found in the preference for strong leadership in movements. Subsequently, I contend, a reliance on consensus materializes together with a reliance on leadership.

89 The selective nature of public memory initiates many of the struggles arising between historical events/people and contemporary politics. Rhetorical scholars have examined how public memory initiates contestation within current political understanding.50 Contestations arise surrounding public memory as representations of the past promote particular perceptions over others. Hoerl contends these points of contestation create “controversies over how particular historic figures and events should be remembered” especially within differing ideological groups.51 Kirt Wilson provides a valuable connection between issues of public memory within the context of the Civil

Rights Movement, the fight for racial equality, and an introduction to the contested role of leadership. Discussing Lincoln as the “Great Emancipator,” he asserts memory as a

“commingling of history and commemoration.”52 Additionally, he acknowledges support and criticism for Lincoln, bridges between the tropes of the strong leader and potential antipathy for African Americans. Rather than offer a concise conclusion on whether

Lincoln should be seen as a heroic leader or a flawed individual, Wilson maintains we should wrestle with these competing discourses as we then inherently struggle “over questions of what emancipation, freedom, and equality mean.”53 The debate surrounding

Lincoln’s role engages “the activity that Lincoln himself desired.”54 He contends one of

Lincoln’s primary roles was as a mediator for discourse. This role values the input of others rather than dependence on a sole message. Placing sole importance on Lincoln as the “Great Emancipator,” ignores the insight Lincoln gleamed from those whom he sought information—he commonly sought debate between potential solutions.55 One could easily continue commemoration of Lincoln, and he will continue to be celebrated

90 for his role, but Wilson demands we move beyond traditional consensual thinking and instead ponder dissenting voices that influenced strong democratic calls for racial equality. Wilson thus concludes by emphasizing the importance to continue discourse about both the role of leaders and public memory.

Rhetorical scholarship has also advanced arguments valuing multifaceted examination of rhetors in order to establish a robust understanding of influence in progressing racial equality. Celeste Condit and John Lucaites have done extensive work looking at the differences and similarities between Martin Luther King Jr. and Malcolm

X. Their work helped advance rhetorical scholarship by noting the rich style in which both communicators negotiated equality, as an ideograph, through their unique rhetorical choices.56 Further exploring the rhetorical implications of Malcolm’s discourse, they articulated the limitations of “revolutionary rhetoric.”57 Accentuating the revolutionary rhetoric of Malcolm, connected to dissent, Condit and Lucaites identify Malcolm’s eventual emphasis on unity, which was similar to other “established by national Black leaders,” position him as distinctly different than Martin Luther King Jr. or Bayard

Rustin.58 However, the two working in conjunction allowed for a more diverse historical movement. Lucaites and Condit maintain, “that King would not have achieved the position of a cultural hero if the likely alternative to his Christianized, integrationist vision of the ‘American dream’ has been the familiar status quo of the first half of the century, rather than the threatening vision of the future depicted by Malcolm X.”59 Public memory of King coalesces around his strong Christian leader persona, however, without having Malcolm as a perceptively violent contrast such imagery becomes opaque.

91 Without Malcolm, or those positioned as opposites, perhaps King does not ascend to his position among public memory. Their work then increases the ability for rhetoricians to understand the influences on the creation of public memory and how those influences pervade contemporary society.

Returning to the work of Wilson, one reason we continue to perpetuate the problems of public memory, oftentimes at the expense of a vigorous understanding of the past, is due to its sentimental nature. Wilson highlights how the commemoration of

Coretta Scott King produced a sentimental memory of the Civil Rights Movement. He writes sentimental memory “is a complex productive expression of culture and moral authority that constitutes communities and prescribes action as well as pleasure.”60 The prescription of action recalls the contentions of both Bodnar and Biesecker concerning public memory’s influence on the perception of contemporary events. Shawn Parry-Giles and Trevor Parry-Giles who describe public memory as containing political and rhetorical power note the influential power of public memory.61 “One significant problem,” they write about sentimental memory, is that it does not “provide a complete picture of what the Civil Rights Movement was or even, for that matter, what its protagonists did.”62 They go on to note the partiality of public memory as well as the desire for individuals to connect to “familiar and secure markers of collective identity” created through collective memory.63 The partiality of public memory creates problems as people attempt to create particular narratives that encompass wide-ranging influences.

Parry-Giles and Parry-Giles offer a potential reason for such critique. They write that while distinct from memory, nostalgia “distorts the past” by invoking an “idealized”

92 construct.64 The nostalgic nature of the Civil Rights Movement is evident in the numerous commemoration ceremonies dedicated to its people and events. However, the nostalgia of public memory becomes a problem, as the perceptions of the past are exploited as an easy critique of contemporary movements. Zelizer labels this problem

“the struggle to claim an authoritative voice in collectively remembering the past.”65 The problem becomes increasingly compounded when the authoritative voice of a collective memory is utilized to mobilize collective identity, which, as Michael Schudson describes, happens frequently during times of conflict.66 Although he writes through the context of war as an extreme example, I would add that public memory could also be weaponized to subvert other movements in an effort to lessen their impact.

As previously mentioned, I assert that such actions have been implemented in critique of #BlackLivesMatter. Additionally, I argue the nostalgia of the Civil Rights

Movement invokes much of the criticism directed at other social movements seeking to progress racial equality—especially as such criticism pertains to #BlackLivesMatter.

Stuart Tannock defends this claim arguing that nostalgia is often utilized to identify aspects of memory that are lacking in the present.67 The political and rhetorical power of public memory is important to this project as I contend public memory tends to limit dissent and is utilized as critique against contemporary social movements. Through the argument above, it becomes further established that, oftentimes, memories of the past are utilized to sanitize contemporary movements. Nevertheless, just as he did with a call for discourse on Lincoln’s role as the “Great Emancipator,” Wilson proposes advice on how to scrutinize contestations of public memory. The “point is not to reject sentiment or

93 memorialization” but warn against “its reign as the sole political language that the

American public is willing to accept.”68 We should not whole-heartedly accept or reject public memory but rather seek out discourse that challenges narratives and identify potential areas that silence rather than encourage difference. Due to these contestations of public memory, scrutinization of how the memorialization of historical events can restrict contemporary actions toward building racial equality warrants exploration.

Memory of Civil Rights as Unnecessary Critique

I previously asserted a common critique where the memory of the Civil Rights

Movement is used to criticize #BlackLivesMatter. The work of both Wilson and Parry-

Giles and Parry-Giles, amongst others, identifies reasoning for public memory to be utilized as criticism against this common critique of #BlackLivesMatter. Fostered through this line of thinking, individuals have critiqued social movements about racial equality as “not the Civil Rights Movement.” This critique has been common when some individuals discuss the usage and effectiveness of #BlackLivesMatter. Republican minster turned provocateur Mike Huckabee outlandishly claimed Martin Luther King Jr. would be appalled by the strategy of #BlackLivesMatter. Lest partisan politics become too much of a focus, folks across the political spectrum have voiced similar concerns.

Oprah Winfrey called for a reevaluation of leadership within the movement and cautioned against being too reactionary if the movement truly wants to influence change.69 Former civil rights activists have also joined the critique of #BlackLivesMatter.

Barbara Reynolds wrote a Washington Post Op-ed in which she admonished

#BlackLivesMatter for being too militant or, at the very least, for not condemning such

94 action.70 Many have also critiqued the usage of #BlackLivesMatter as a form of slacktivism.71 There should be no doubt that some have shared the hashtag with little or no expectation for social change, nonetheless, #BlackLivesMatter has been shared over

30 million times since its inception, clearly resonating across various societal realms, and remains the primary demand for racial equality.72 Additionally, the use of Civil Rights

Movement memory, as critique, is not unique to #BlackLivesMatter as previous social movements for racial equality have been encumbered with similar critique.

The Black Power Movement provides a valuable example of how the Civil Rights

Movement was used to critique subsequent social movements. The Black Power

Movement was intrinsically tied to comparisons against the Civil Rights Movement as the former’s rise to prominence overlapped the end of the latter. The Black Power

Movement grew out of a disenfranchisement of the Civil Rights Movement’s “passive, nonviolent, civil disobedience,” and was thus regarded as exceedingly militant.73 Parke

G. Burgess contends that as the slogan “Black Power” displaced “Freedom Now” as the primary challenge to racial inequality, black citizens began “stating their claims as citizens and human beings.”74 Burgess concludes those initial remarks advocating, “Thus, many if not most Americans find this new rhetoric abhorrent.”75 He also lays out how white citizens utilized the efforts of the Civil Rights Movement to silence and critique the

Black Power Movement. Wayne Brockriede and Robert L. Scott summarize such critique as they argue white individuals primarily interpreted Stokely Carmichael’s speeches as,

“Black Power is violent racism in reverse.”76 Criticism of this nature attempts to limit the nature of social change by harnessing the idea of consensus built racial equality after the

95 Civil Rights Movement. Burgess affirms this argument noting Black Power sought to upend the “business as usual” tendency, which was often countered by “They never had it so good” type rebuttals to attempts to upend societal order.77

The Black Power Movement was just one of the prominent groups to face harsh criticism as the battle for racial equality began to shift drastically away from the historicized, peacefulness of the Civil Rights Movement. The Black Panther Party and

Nation of Islam (both pre and post Malcolm X’s involvement) joined the Black Power

Movement in criticism for simply not being the Civil Rights Movement. Groups such as

CORE (Congress of Racial Equality) and SNCC (Student Nonviolent Coordinating

Committee) were also derided for advocating “armed self-defense” and shifting to a more

“militant and separatists stances.”78 The Black Power Movement was a shift in focus from the Civil Rights Movement, but it was not the creation of an entirely different argument for societal equality. The movement was similar to the Civil Rights Movement in that it continued the progression toward racial equality; however, as Burgess contends, whereas the discourse of the Civil Rights Movement was inadequate in addressing the

“racist core of the moral crisis,” the Black Power Movement “loudly confront[ed] the racist moral conflict” by recognizing the humanity of black people.79 The Black Power

Movement sought to redefine social relationships by illuminating dialectical tensions by challenging assumed relationships, a marked shift from the Civil Rights Movement.80 As

Rustin asserted, the Black Power Movement furthered the deviation from equality in terms of legality toward questions of societal equality. The movement though, as noted

96 above, garnered unwarranted critique as the framing of the Civil Rights Movement was used to question the necessity for further action concerning racial equality.

Utilizing the Civil Rights Movement as a frame for critique of succeeding social movements inherently limits the available messaging and action options. Oftentimes it is only idealized impressions that are typically recalled and, I would add, are thus utilized for critique.81 Such a decision to use historical memory in this manner creates opacity around the true richness of the Civil Rights Movement and subsequent movements.

Additionally, the reliance on public memory tends to further cloud actual details of events and actions of individuals over time. I contend, specific to this project, the reliance of the strong leader trope has led to much of the limitation of the richness of the Civil Rights

Movement. I argue through investigating the role of leadership within the Civil Rights

Movement we can identify how leadership limits the role of dissent, thus stifling political discourse. As I argue below, reliance on a strong leader negates the influence of others, as strong leadership is reliant on the formation of consensus.

Returning to Wilson’s work on Lincoln, and cross-applied to King, bolsters two main contentions I make throughout this chapter. First, the reliance on the role of leaders, expanded below, overshadows the work of others and privileges the role of consensus over dissensus. Wilson’s advocacy for expanding conversation on the historical remembrance of Lincoln challenges the role of leadership on enacting social change. I contend, within this argument the role of dissent as an important aspect to democratic discourse begins to form. Second, advocating the role of dissensus, by contesting public memory, increases democratic discourse through discussion on the nature of memory

97 construction and the subsequent implications. Promulgating discourse contesting

Lincoln’s memory, by embracing dissenting voices, increases political discourse.

Wilson’s work demonstrates how embracing dissent can increase democratic discourse as individuals share information on various contemporary issues. Examining the nature of leadership within the Civil Rights Movement demonstrates how our public memory has clouded the vast influences that made the era so memorable and illuminates how dissent increases surrounding democratic discourse.

The Evolving Role of Leadership in the Progress to Racial Equality

Traditional social movement rhetoric historically focuses on strong leadership.82

Prior to the Civil Rights Movement, professor Dewey M. Clayton asserts, social movements were perceived as “irrational.” Subsequently, he argues, scholars had to reimagine social movements due to the “exceptional leadership, coordinated protests, and structured organization” of the Civil Rights Movement.83 Herbert Simons’ early work in the rhetorical aspects of social movements sought to establish a leader-centered approach to movements. Within his work, modifying a sociological perspective, social movements must follow a prescribed nature. He writes, “The primary rhetorical test of the leader— and, indirectly, of the strategies he [or she] employs—is his [or her] capacity to fulfill the requirements of his [or her] movement by resolving or reducing rhetorical problems.”84

He also outlines three requirements for leaders to undertake for successful social movements. First, leaders must maintain efficient organization of their group. Second, they must secure adoption of their message by others. Third, they must react to resistance of larger structures.85

98 Through Simons’ work we begin to understand the reason leaders seek concensus as they attempt to “reduce rhetorical problems.”86 I contend such reduction of “problems” focuses on limiting competing messages or voice, in turn decreasing dissensus. Simons argues a particular point that I assert focuses primarily on limiting the role of dissent. A social movement’s success is based on “loyalty to its leadership,” he argues, and, a

“hierarchy of authority and division must be established in which members are persuaded to take orders, to perform menial tasks, and to forego social pleasures.”87 Rather than leadership filling this role in the Black Lives Matter movement, I contend the role is filled by the very literal message of the movement, #BlackLivesMatter. More so than any leader, as argued by various people within and apart of the movement, the theme is what has brought people together for a common cause. #BlackLivesMatter “has enlarged our collective vision,” Joseph asserts, “of what constitutes membership in collective” political advocacy.88 Mouffe also offers a defense of my point as she argues a movement’s

“objective is the construction of a collective will, a ‘people’ apt to bring about a new hegemonic formation.”89 Additionally, she offers support for the role of dissensus, and agonism, writing, the “process of recovering and radicalizing democratic institutions will no doubt include moments of rupture and a confrontation” with dominant others.90

Historically this disruption was adopted by the role of the strong leader within social movements; however, digital dissent is one method to bring such political action to the level of the individual. Examining the changing nature of leadership from the Civil

Rights Movement to #BlackLivesMatter will elucidate this shift.

99 Memory of the Civil Rights Movement Leadership and Its Discontents

Josh Grimm, through a study of media framing, concludes King was, and continues to be, “framed as a strong leader for the Civil Rights Movement worthy of both admiration and respect for his leadership of a righteous cause.”91 King’s role has become so ingrained in our memory of the Civil Rights Movement that Garth Pauley, arguing for the reclamation of John Lewis’ March on Washington speech, argues, “King’s speech has become so central to the memory of the March itself that it has overshadowed the speeches delivered by other civil rights advocates.”92 King looms so large over our remembrance of the Civil Rights Movement that Hoerl argues he has become a synecdoche of the movement’s activism.93 Overall, Martin Luther King Jr. remains the dominant leader of the movement, but the image of the “flawless” leader hinders our remembrance of King’s truly profound critique of American politics and eclipses the work of other leaders.

The failure of our public memory of the Civil Rights Movement can be found distinctly within how we remember the movement’s leaders. First, as Joseph argues, our memorialization of King has failed to account for his increasingly radical critique of racism, poverty, and military exploits. Additionally, King’s spotlight in American politics began to shift away from solely dealing with the Civil Rights Movement. “Indeed, in the last three years leading up to his Thursday, April 4, 1968, assassination,” Joseph argues,

“most national observers regarded King as more of a pariah than a prophet.”94 Similarly,

Dowd Hall asserts King’s writings and speeches “endlessly reproduced and selectively quoted, his [works] retains their majesty yet lose their political bite.”95 Not to say that

100 King had begun to command less influence within the conversation of racism, but his political capital had begun to wane as the nation began to move past the race issue and the focus on Vietnam expanded. Second, the iconicity of King has located other individuals in auxiliary roles or as a contrasting role, utilized to further the role of King’s nonviolent positive spiritual leader. Dowd Hall argues memorializing King in this singular way not only hinders recognizing the work of others around King but also reduces the dynamic leader into a singular version. Malcolm X and, to a lesser extent,

Stokely Carmichael have traditionally been cast as the instigators to King’s peacemaker.

Malcolm X and Carmichael’s subordinate roles to King are both an indictment to our historical remembrance of the Civil Rights Movement and an exemplar of the way in which leadership can be utilized to stifle dissent. Despite appearing in the contemporary shadow, in terms of public memory, Condit and Lucaites assert Malcolm X stretched “the vision of Black America far beyond the social and political horizons that had been publicly articulated prior to his expression of them.”96

Previously mentioned, Reynolds argued she could not support #BlackLivesMatter as factions of the movement have been too militant. Clayton offers a rebuttal to Reynolds, noting during the Civil Rights Movement many black elders and white people criticized the movement for being too violent and engaging in extreme civil disobedience.

Furthermore, he writes, “social movements have always engaged in confrontation in order to place their issues at the top of the public agenda.”97 Simone Sebastian takes

Clayton’s critique a step further arguing, “Whether in the 1960s or the 2010s, the aggressive disruption of American race relations has caused the same anger and fear—

101 from Northerners and Southerners, from blacks and whites, from liberal ‘allies’ and racist adversaries.”98 She was replying to critique of #BlackLivesMatter from Juan Williams and Alveda King, Martin Luther King Jr.’s niece, both of whom condemned the movements actions. The nostalgic public memory of the Civil Rights Movement provides a mythologized time where strong leaders used non-violent means to enact positive social change in the desire for racial equality. “Erased altogether is the King who opposed the

Vietnam War and linked racism at home to militarism and imperialism aboard,” Dowd

Hall writes, “Gone is King the democratic socialist who advocated unionization, planned the Poor People’s Campaign, and was assassinated in 1968 while supporting a sanitation workers strike.”99 Not only do the nuisances of many in the movement get shuttered, others become almost completely forgotten.

After the August 28, 1963 March on Washington, Davis Houck writes, “several women still fuming” after “the women of the civil rights movement had been thoroughly rebuffed in seeking at least one speaking opportunity.”100 Recent work, however, has found that “women did more than dutifully follow orders from the men; in fact, they often led movements in their own communities, regions, and across the nation.”101

Among the most notable were Fannie Lou Hamer, Ella Baker, and Angela Davis. A primary reason Hamer’s contributions to fighting racial inequality are long overdue is the rarity of her public speeches, along with the careless preservation of those that were delivered. Hamer was a prominent grassroots activist; and alongside Bob Moses, Hamer helped organize the Freedom Summer. Meghan Parker Brooks contends that her rhetorical education grew from her personal experience dealing with racial oppression

102 and was typically contrasted against “institutionalized power.”102 Most important,

Hamer’s utilization of vernacular rhetoric helped “encourage oppressed audiences to recognize the potential for change.”103 Hamer’s belief the genesis of social change must arise out of everyday folk was a tenet also shared by Ella Baker. Baker’s influence on the fight for equality should not be understated. Stokely Carmichael reserved strong praise for Baker, once quoting, “The most powerful person in the struggle of the sixties was

Miss Ella Baker, not Martin Luther King.”104 Nikki Orth, analyzing Baker’s address at the Hattiesburg Freedom Day Rally, writes, “Baker saw progress in the struggle for civil rights as dependent on communal action: progress could not be brought about by charismatic leaders alone, but had to arise out of the efforts of the entire community.”105

Baker herself was hesitant to drum up demand for a strong leader, even stating, “I have always felt it was a handicap for oppressed people to depend largely on a leader, because unfortunately in our culture, the charismatic leader usually becomes leader because he has found a spot in the public limelight.”106 Baker’s influence is evident within the work of Angela Davis. Davis, perhaps the most well known of the women discussed in this chapter, even as her immediate rise to national attention is rather dubious, is still regarded as a secondary figure in the Black Power Movement. She has commented that her

“approach has always been to emphasize independent, more radical politics,” relying on forums where people can find their own methods to influence change.107 Davis also has been attentive and supportive of current activism, especially #BlackLivesMatter. She has argued in support of #BlackLivesMatter being a message for change from all who desire change rather than the reliance on singular leadership. Davis argued that such

103 conceptualization has kept the movement together, writing, “When various public figures asked, ‘Where are the leaders?’ the movement said we are not a leaderless movement, we are a leader-full movement.”108 Additionally, Davis contends that while many talk about

“action” we also need more “discussion”—we must heed the call for public discourse on race and develop a contemporary vocabulary to perpetuate insightful conversation.109

Davis also provides a fitting explanation for investigating new methods of political advocacy asserting, “We definitely love Martin and Malcolm and deeply appreciate their historical contributions, but we need not replicate the past.”110 Davis provides a valuable defense of the shift away from the strong leader trope for advocating social change as the inherent desire for consensus negates the influence of many.

As argued above, strong leadership requires the collective formation of a message, thus renouncing the desire for dissent. Digital dissent subverts the role of leadership instead encouraging dissensus through the collective discourse—

#BlackLivesMatter continues to prevail as the leading slogan for racial equality through the usage of many unrequited of leadership. Furthermore, the shift away from strong leadership, and subsequent emphasis on dissensus, increases the importance on discourse as political engagement. The exemplars of Hamer, Baker, and Davis also identify the connection between understating the role of leadership and instead focusing on increasing discourse among individuals. Such a shift increases both the importance of vernacular rhetoric, as participation increase democratic discourse, and the Rancierian framing of dissensus, as individuals engage politic discourse and action directly through an individual demand for equality. Furthermore, the emphasis on agonistic democracy

104 increases as consensual-based leadership capitulates to the significance of dissent and disagreement. #BlackLivesMatter provides a distinctive shift away from the traditional conception of leadership in advocating social change.

The Role of Leadership in #BlackLivesMatter

The founders of the hashtag campaign acknowledge the ability for individual users to engage discourse directly through their own social media use. Garza herself notes the democratic implications of the hashtag in connection to political discourse when stating usage of the hashtag highlights a challenge for the country “to live up to its values, freedom, justice, [and] democracy for all.”111 As Garza and Cullors began framing the message of #BlackLivesMatter, Tometi realized the potential for the message to gain traction through social media use. She thus created accounts dedicated to the slogan “Black Lives Matter” on Twitter and Tumblr to help advance usage of the hashtag.112 Providing users the ability to enact dissensus directly emphasizes the importance of disagreement and increases the ability to engage democratic discourse within a digital context. Garza further defends the ability for social media activism to extend the role of an individual in being able to engage political discourse, even if on a small scale. She asserts her exasperation at not being able to have “my concerns, my needs, and my dreams, addressed;” instead, #BlackLivesMatter allowed her, and others who shared similar concerns “to address the challenges that we face every day.”113

DeRay Mckesson expresses that #BlackLivesMatter allows individuals to subvert the institutional nature of contemporary democracy instead; the hashtag allowed individuals to serve as a “source of live, raw information.”114 Finally, #BlackLivesMatter’s usage on

105 social media provides what Shawn A. Ginwright defines as a space for both the creation of new meaning making and social advocacy.115 The founders of the hashtag campaign understood that using #BlackLivesMatter both allows individuals to partake in democratic discourse and challenge societal inequalities. Digital dissent in this manner shifts how we understand social advocacy as consensus-based leadership becomes secondary to the ability for individuals to directly engage democratic discourse. The shift is hastened due to the proliferation of social media usage in regards to political discussion.

This shift, however, should not be surprising, as movements for social change have historically taken advantage of their surrounding technology in regards to organization and garnering support.116 Thus, it was only natural for contemporary social movements to exploit social media as a method to increase advocacy. As I argue, social media provides a venue to social advocacy, especially as it pertains to disseminating dissent messages. #BlackLivesMatter is understood as a digital dissent message, which repudiates the notion of racial equality. Deploying #BlackLivesMatter in social media posts demonstrates how individuals can utilize social media activism. As a form of digital dissent, #BlackLivesMatter provides individuals the ability to advocate for positive social change unreliant on leadership. Utilizing the hashtag within a social media context thus provides individuals a venue to engage political discourse by intensifying the role of dissensus. Rather than relying on leadership for formal messaging and coordination, utilizing #BlackLivesMatter, as digital dissent, allows individuals to engage a vernacular discourse divorced of the consensus-based nature of leadership. Subsequently, usage of

106 the hashtag allows individuals the ability to directly engage and influence political discourse. This shift, I argue, is drastically different than traditional social movements, particularly the Civil Rights Movement, and influences much of its critique. Because of the heightened difference between the two movements, many critique the usage of

#BlackLivesMatter; however, the ability to focus on messages of difference, through dissent, and allow individuals to directly engage democratic discourse, without the reliance on leadership, increases one’s ability to advocate social change.

Joseph writes that the comparison to the Civil Rights Movement “betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of [#BlackLivesMatter’s] importance and its broader agenda, as the slogan has no doubt inspired “grassroots tactics” to critique “institutional racism.”117 He takes his praise of #BlackLivesMatter a step further asserting “BLM (sic) has forged a movement that is far more inclusive and democratic than either the Black

Panthers or civil rights activists ever envisioned,” as its “decentralized structure fosters participation and power sharing” by implementing both “protest and politics.”118 His contention supports the contention of digital dissent serving as a democratic discourse.

Exemplifying how digital dissent can serve as direct political action, Joseph illustrates

Robert Asen’s conception of a discourse theory of citizenship. The shifting nature of leadership, and thus political advocacy, embraces a revision from the institutional nature of contemporary politics. As #BlackLivesMatter continues to change the nature of advocacy by “transforming how Americans talk about, think about, and organize” we begin to find an evolving embrace of dissent.119 Digital dissent repudiates the role of leadership, and the limitations of consensus-based messaging, in favor of accepting the

107 increase of discourse associated with an expansion of individual disagreement and difference. Affirming the importance of vernacular rhetoric associated with deferring traditional top-down messaging, #BlackLivesMatter allows individuals the ability to engage directly in political action, expanding the venue for democratic discourse.

Sarah J. Jackson and Brooke Foucault Welles promote the work of Clay Shirky and Manuel Castells in defending a decentralized leadership conception of social media activism. Jackson and Welles assert, “social media activism may be more nimble than traditional (offline) activism because it does not require unified messages or legitimizing groups to influence the terms of mainstream political dialogue.”120 Their argument mimics Castells’ argument of social media activism embracing dispersed power and leadership structures, which “challenges the power embedded in the institutions of society for the purpose of claiming representation for their own values and interests.”121

One reason for this shift toward dissipating leadership is the ability for social media users to create their own content regardless of influence. Shirky argues this shift is due to the

“mass amateurization” that has proliferated across social media as individuals can now easily create and disperse messages.122 This shift allows for social media to serve as a venue for “unique possibilities for public debate” among citizens.123 This changing nature of advocacy is a direct transformation from the leader led movements of the past.

Mckesson effectively makes the argument that the utilization of #BlackLivesMatter is basically adapting to contemporary technology in an effort to advance social change by allowing a community of people to dissent against the idea of racial equality.124

Emphasizing the role of dissent creates opportunities to engage disagreement on an

108 individual level and highlight difference. Utilization of #BlackLivesMatter demonstrate how social media provides a venue to engage these discourses efficiently as individuals gain direct control to engage political discourse.

Jeffery Robinson, Deputy Legal Director for the American Civil Liberties Union, notes the public nature of digital activism and extolls the ability for #BlackLivesMatter in keeping the names of many at the forefront of discourse on racial equality. Specifically, he contends #BlackLivesMatter has “disrupted our everyday lives by making us focus on the everyday lives of people who live with policing based on pro-active racial profiling.”125 The rhetorical implications of this disruption in everyday life will be empathized fully in following chapters as I articulate how such action leads to potential changes in thinking. For this chapter, it is significant for allowing individuals to engage political discourse regardless of status, as well as being able to keep issues prevalent and germane within public deliberation. Beyond the ability to concentrate political discourse, the utilization of #BlackLivesMatter generates an increase of individuals who can use the slogan to advance advocacy for racial equality. Unlike a traditional organizational structure, digital activism circumvents the necessity of leaderships. Often serving as gatekeepers, a reliance on leadership oftentimes obstructs disparate messages and individuals from advocating for positive social change.

Additionally, Robinson writes, #BlackLivesMatter is “redefining leadership” by

“recognizing and addressing gaps in movement spaces and leadership” especially as it pertains to traditionally marginalized groups—especially women, queer, and transgender individuals.126 Erica Perry, a Black Lives Matter organizer in Memphis, argues

109 #BlackLivesMatter maintains an “unstructured leadership model . . . far removed from traditional structures of past movements.”127 The unstructured nature of

#BlackLivesMatter limits the role of leadership and thus restricts the traditional influence of consensus in contemporary politics. This shift increases democratic discourse by bringing in people who before would not have been inclined to participate in advocacy or who would otherwise have been unable to participate. As Charles McKinney, history professor, argues, #BlackLivesMatter “says we’re affirming people who have not traditionally been affirmed” in an effort to engage a multitude of voices for change.128

Fredrick Harris, political science professor, explicitly indicates the shift in the role of leadership as he writes #BlackLivesMatter rejects “the charismatic leadership model that has dominated black politics for the past half century.”129 He argues the reliance on the previous model directly correlates to the role of Martin Luther King Jr. and Malcolm X but is understood as a risk for contemporary movements. He writes, “activists today recognize that granting decision-making power to an individual . . . poses a risk to the durability of a movement.”130 Inherently he condemns the reliance on consensus, which has been used to limit political discourse; instead, he argues for a “group-centered model” facilitated through new technology led by “ordinary people.”131 Harris thus articulates a reliance on dissent based vernacular discourse, which can be provided through social media, as a means to challenge norms and advocate social change. Utilization of

#BlackLivesMatter thus shifts the nature of social advocacy through a focus on dissent and the negation of leadership oriented messaging—a direct move away from the historical conception of the Civil Rights Movement.

110 Changing Advocacy: From Civil Rights to #BlackLivesMatter

Leland M. Griffin, writing a seminal essay about social movements in rhetorical studies, proscribes researchers to “judge the discourse in terms of the theories of rhetoric and public opinion indigenous to the times.”132 His instruction asks for keeping critique of social movements, which may “operate within rhetorical and political traditions different from those within which the critic is living,” from being compared to each other in terms of success.133 Social movements occur within their own unique timeframes and while comparison of movements can help further understanding and/or offer valuable critique, movements should not be understood as static within singular eras. The very nature of human progress means that movements will occur within differing circumstances, surrounded by different technology, different political and historical climates, and focused on different goals. Essential to limiting critique from engaging beyond the operational limits of a movement existing within different historical contexts from the critic, Griffin’s argument further requires rhetorical scholars to engage the existing rhetorical and political traditions in order to further our contemporary understanding of social movement rhetoric. Ultimately, the foundation to which Griffin stakes his argument is, “essentially, the student’s goal is to discover, in a wide sense of the term, the rhetorical pattern inherent in the movement selected for investigation.”134

Griffin’s argument aligns with my refrain on common criticism of new social movements that increasingly utilize social media—we should not compare them holistically, “for effectiveness,” when they occur in completely different political, historical, and technological paradigms. That being said, it is important to analyze and critique

111 movements as a means to further understand the unique properties of each. This chapter defends social media advocacy, as digital dissent, prominently relies on facets of dissensus—a conspicuous variation from traditional leaders-based social advocacy.

A probable reason for this change is social advocacy, and its critique from traditionalist thinking, lies in the turn to “new social movements.” Such natural evolution, as evidenced by Griffin’s work, of social movements requires the reimagining of the rhetorical implications. #BlackLivesMatter provides us a prime example of such evolution as, I assert, its utilization, as digital dissent, advances how we understand social advocacy. Much of what we understand as traditional political advocacy stems from the

Civil Rights Movement. As Clayton attests, prior to the Civil Rights Movement, movements were considered irrational.135 The classic period of the Civil Rights

Movement ends with the August 1965 passing of the Voting Rights Act. This event also serves as the peak of the movement representing the final significant legal action toward racial equality. This time period, however, is also marked by a shift in social movement framing as the advent of “new social movements” introduced an increased emphasis on

“identity politics.” Rhetorical scholarship sought to identify the changing nature of movement discourse. Examining early scholarship on new movements finds both changes from and reinforcement of traditional social movement research.

For instance, Griffin’s article on “New Left” movements highlights the importance of “direct action tactics” as well as a “physical rhetoric of resistance.”136 Both of which articulate notions of personal engagement over leader reliance, but also continue the focus on action over communicative acts. Much of this work found a maturing focus

112 on social movement rhetoric as new movements became increasingly understood as a distancing from coalitional politics. “What made these theories of social change ‘new,’”

Robert Heusca writes, was “their attention to identity formation as a locus of coordinated action and their de-emphasis of group access.”137 Burgess argued a distinct shift between the Civil Rights Movement and the Black Power Movement as the latter emphasized the distinct standpoint of being a Negro—bringing racial identity to the forefront of advocacy.138 Kevin DeLuca extends support for identity as a primary constitutive aspect of movement formation and argues for an emphasis on the discursive activity as political action.139 In addition to a shift away from coalition politics, new social movements scholarship also found fresh emphasis on new methods to engaging advocacy.

Rather than rely on the traditional social movement actions, Steven Buechler writes, “New social movement theorists, by contrast, have looked to other logics . . . as forms of collective action.”140 Not all of these new actions have found to be effective.

Bonnie Dow provides valuable arguments about the evolution of technology as documentaries and even television shows were utilized to promote advocacy; although, she argues these new methods coopted the respective messages rather that increase awareness.141 Kevin DeLuca and Jennifer Peeples offer a counter argument by modifying the public sphere into a “public screen,” suggesting, “new technologies introduce new forms of social organization and new spaces for politics.”142 My assertion throughout this project is that social media provides such a venue, especially as we adapt past the institutional nature of contemporary politics. As digital dissent, social media activism has

113 increased the potential for people to engage democratic discourse by embracing conflict and disagreement over traditional consensus based actions.

Darrel Enck-Wanzer suggests shifts in “rhetorical patterns” can demonstrate new

“more holistic engagements of specific protests.”143 #BlackLivesMatter, demonstrates a method of holistic engagement by enacting dissensus accessible to a broad spectrum of individuals across multiple personal identities. This project provides arguments grounding this contemporary rhetorical action helped by the contention of a reimagining of democratic politics. The common critique of #BlackLivesMatter as not following the tradition of the Civil Rights Movement fails to realize the limitations of both the public memory of the Civil Rights Movement and contemporary democracy dependent on consensus. Past research has identified how previous social movement research fails to identify and explain new, non-traditional advocacy. Julie Kalil Schutten writes, “much social movement theory is ill-equipped to address political aspects of everyday life as part of a social movement.”144 I contend along with understanding the rhetorical foundations of advocacy such as digital dissent, we must also explore how these new methods encourage evolution of our current politics.

Emphasizing the role of dissensus, digital dissent affirms the ability for individuals to directly exercise democratic discourse, thus eclipsing the role of leadership in instituting social change. Rancière’s work on dissensus helps illuminate the importance of individual enactment by demonstrating how leadership prevents political discourse.

Additionally, the emphasis on dissensus accepts the importance of disagreement and conflict. This change is at odds with contemporary democratic institutions reliant on

114 consensus. Digital dissent then strengthens the demand for an agonistic style of democracy by observing the importance of conflict as a means to developing a richer sense of understanding others. Furthermore, this new way of understanding politics advocates a transformation to a discourse style of political action. Expanding the realm of political action is demonstrative of a deviation from traditional institutional politics.

Throughout this chapter I argue digital dissent increases the potential for democratic discourse. Asen’s discourse theory of citizenship further articulates how digital dissent can serve as direct political engagement.

#BlackLivesMatter: Engaging Dissensus and the Shift to Agonism

As asserted above, dissent is unique in its condition of individual control.

Subsequently, reliance on a singular leader limits dissent due to the necessity for consensus—a strong leader emerges out of support for their message. Failure to develop and foster support around that message hinders a leader’s effectiveness. Strong leadership must foster consensus lest their position be weakened. The problem of leadership is thus tied to the problem of consensus. Rancière argues that consensus is a return to the normal state of things—a return to the status quo.145 Leadership, in turn, asks for individuals to follow the message of the leader. In essence, leadership asks for people to acknowledge the sensible message and to gather in support. However, leadership thus creates a hierarchy between people: the leader and the led. This division of people keeps individuals out of “true politics,” as Rancière describes the term. He argues politics only occurs when one demands equality; thus, politics is a break with the “normal distribution of positions.”146 The reliance on a strong leader then prevents the individual from

115 partaking in politics as this only occurs when one is able to disrupt the sensible—through an act of individual dissensus.

Rancière and the Crisis of Leadership

Rancière does not directly address questions of leadership throughout his work but readers can explicate how “the demand for equality” eclipses the role of a strong leader. Rancière, influenced by the student uprising in Paris, diverged from Louis

Althusser’s teaching of ideology by articulating how knowledge and power continually perpetuate inequality. The teaching of knowledge, as traditionally understood, confounded Rancière in that knowledge always remained with those “who know.” He thus equates the role of the teacher with that of the master—those with knowledge are perceived as have the sole ability to fully understand how to enact social change. Thus, in order to overcome social inequality, individuals must first learn how inequality works before they understand what actions must be taken to escape their subordination.

Teachers, through his work, take on the role of leaders, remaining the barrier for individuals to advocate equality. Rancière understood two flaws created through this dichotomy of those who know and those who do not. First, those who were passive were so because they did not understand the whole of social relationships. This quandary led to the other flaw, what to do with the knowledge once it was gained. “The point is acting according to that knowledge,” he writes, “shifting from passivity to activity.” 147 The problem then becomes what to do with this knowledge once it is gained. As Rancière contends, “it appeared that the most difficult thing was to know what to do on the basis of what science, in what circumstances it could be turned into action and how that could be

116 done.”148 He concludes that the dominated are positioned as such because they are ignorant of the system in which they find themselves and if they begin to understand some of the system they continue to be dominated as they do not understand the whole system. Essentially, the reliance on “knowing” how to act and when to act perpetually repeats so as to limit discourse in order to protect the role of the teacher (or leader).

Any “method” to equality is set up through a system of the master and the ignorant. Only through emancipation can one begin to break the bonds of the master- ignorant relationship. Thus, rather than continue along in this manner of perpetual classification, and inherent inequality, he argues for a disruption of the sensible through the enactment of dissensus—a personal demand for equality. Because the sensible perpetuates the crisis of consensus, Rancière argues politics arises from a person’s demand for equality. Specifically, he writes, politics “cuts across forms of . . . hierarchies between discourses and genres, working to introduce new subjects and hetergenous objects into the field of perception.”149 In what amounts to an infuriating position for some, is Rancière’s unabating insistence on not defining actions that enact dissensus; defining, and thus knowing, would be a contradiction against his argument that only an individual can demand equality. Rancière’s early work hedged against an outright acknowledgement of any particular action to disrupt the sensible, even writing that there,

“is no direct road from intellectual awareness to political action.”150 His later work articulates the conscious decision to avoid defining “the political.” Arguing, instead of thinking in grand notions of “revolution” and becoming fixated on overthrowing state power, we should focus on actions that increase visibility. Thus, he argues for dual efforts

117 to disrupt the sensible—efforts to “constitute something” and efforts to “re-describe a situation.”151 There is an impression of freedom inherently connected to Rancière’s determination to resist definition in this instance as the choice to demand equality and method in which to enact the demand is held within the individual.

In his recent book, The Method of Equality, he acknowledges similar thinking, when writing, “I think that ‘the rest is up to you’ is an essential maxim in my work.”152

Rancière purposefully pursues a route counter to the need for strong leadership, instead relying on the actions of individuals. Leadership, as we historically prescribe the role, intrinsically limits dissensus as the focus is taken away from the demos and must rely on representation. The ability for individuals to enact digital dissent directly demonstrates how dissensus increases the potential to engage democratic discourse and increases the ability for people to advocate social change. Furthermore, Rancière’s work on dissensus inherently reframes democratic politics opposite of contemporary consensus based institutions; instead, his arguments furthermore promote the necessity of an agonistic democracy.

Agonistic Pluralism and Problems of Leadership

Similar to Rancière, institution of a conforming leadership concerns Mouffe in the way adherence to a leader’s message could constrain the expression of difference. Her foundational argument against institutional constraints arises from the inherent loss of pluralism, which is the very basis of her notion of agonistic democracy. As mentioned, institutionalized leadership has a tendency to fabricate message consensus, due to the desire to build support and stifle dissent. Mouffe analogizes this argument through a

118 discussion of “harmonious democracy.” She writes, “Democracy requires us to always have the possibility of questioning existing institutions. Imagine if we had a ‘harmonious’ democracy: it would mean that the people who disagree would be portrayed as either mad or irrational and consequently be stripped of their voice.”153 She later contends, “Such a fully realized democracy would in fact mean the very destruction of democracy.”154

Honestly, perhaps ironically, the articulation of harmonious democracy evidentially appears similar to the fractured nature of our current political landscape, vastly different from an idealized democracy of equality. Rather than continue the quest for rationality and consensus, Mouffe argues that an individual’s ever changing subject positioning always results in an ever shifting us-them dynamic. As Peter Dalhgren contends,

Mouffe’s dismissal of rationality shifts the focus to Wittgenstein’s language games.

“Inevitability, rhetoric, persuasion, compromise, rather than rational consensus,”

Dahlgren writes, “prevails.”155 Thus, Mouffe’s focus eschews Habermasian rationality in favor of strong argumentation without reliance on leadership. Rather, agonistic pluralism relies on the decentered nature of social relationships and embraces the importance of individual influence and voice.

Shifting power back to the people also increases, as previously argued, the ability for people to participate. Such a shift is important to help us understand how social media activism can allow for increased political participation through the increased ability to broadcast a message. Mouffe argues, “Thinking of participation along these lines will always require the choice between different alternatives: to participate, you need the possibility of choice, not simply participating in the creation of a consensus.”156 Dahlgren

119 contends the Internet serves as venue for facilitating progressive versions of political discourse. “Knowledge and competencies are being shared and spread through activist networks,” he writes; as people are able to utilize social media sites to share differences,

“such networking continually reiterates core democratic values.”157 Anna Mari Smith suggests Ernesto Laclau and Mouffe’s demand for democracy subverts the demand for leadership as she warns, “even the most ‘progressive’ leaderships can deteriorate into some form of authoritarianism.”158 Furthermore, Smith contends to ensure the equality of individuals and avoid discriminatory participation skepticism of charismatic leadership is warranted.159 The aversion to leadership arises due to Laclau and Mouffe’s desire not to place groups within hierarchical relationships.

Laclau and Mouffe combine Gramsci’s articulation of hegemony with Michel

Foucault’s notion of discourse analysis in order to argue a “unifying principle” between positional differences between groups faced with a common enemy.160 Laclau and

Mouffe thus argue erasing the hierarchical relationships between subject positions seeks to “fix the meaning of the social in an organized system of differences.”161 Within these assertions we recognize Mouffe’s expression of agonistic pluralism as a system requiring the role of adversaries over enemies. Laclau and Mouffe’s work seeks to subvert the classist thinking of Marx and Lenin. Marx clearly demarcated people within the role of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, the working class and owners, the labor class and the capitalist class. Lenin, influenced by Marx, introduced the importance of the vanguard in imposing revolutionary change. Laclau and Mouffe argue that the division of people within a classist structure neutralizes the fluid nature in which people engage the

120 political. Such a division affirms a singular path toward socialism. Laclau and Mouffe argue equality between groups, as “plurality and diversity are not problems to be overcome,” but rather are the very expression of the democratic.162 Maintaining a plurality requires the necessity of dissent as a means to preserve viable alternative choices. Thus, the role of strong leadership desiring consensus remains antithetical to the role of dissent as a strong democratic practice due to the limitation of individual interaction and control. Laclau and Mouffe’s contention eclipses the one-size-fits-all notions brought forth by Marx and Lenin and instead moves power back to the people.

Rather than rely on the vanguard, or strong leaders, or even the role of a particular class

(workers), Laclau and Mouffe demand the role of the people to actively engage in political action and discourse.

“A healthy democratic process calls for a vibrant clash of political positions,”

Mouffe argues, “and an open conflict of interests.”163 The primary focus of Mouffe’s work is dedicated to the plurality of voices on an issue working within a prescribed framework or issue. I seek to expand this argument by exploring the localness within agonistic pluralism and how a plurality of voices can grow around an issue from differing locales. However, Mouffe’s work, I argue, is not entrenched in the singular notion of how difference arises solely within a public sphere in a dedicated locale but rather can encompass difference arising throughout a plurality of locales.

Mouffe begins this argument when she writes, “To accept pluralism requires accepting that “the people” are not one, but divided.”164 Furthermore she adds, “power of the people will always be power of a part of the people—hence the importance of being able

121 to challenge the existing hegemony.”165 Thus, Mouffe notes the important nature of a fractured public, which also contributes to the aversion she and Laclau maintained in avoiding hierarchical relationships. Perhaps not central to her overall argument, she nonetheless leaves open the ability to construe a difference in people over distance and circumstance. Mouffe furthers this argument when writing, “We should really think of legitimate forms of democracy in a pluralistic way, and not believe that our so-called modern form of democracy is the only legitimate and correct model. It is really important for people to envisage their own vernacular form of democracy.”166 Envisioning large scale, radical change occurs rarely, and even then is remembered historically much different than it actually occurred. Instead, a focus on what people can do within their unique vernacular circumstance and situation delineates a greater democratic discourse.

Leaving Leadership: Digital Dissent as Contemporary Political Advocacy

Taking his cue from Mouffe, Robert Ivie argues that politics inherently involves contestation and necessitates an agonistic form rather than “a universal rational consensus.”167 Similar to Gerard Hauser, Ivie contends the fundamental property of a strong agonistic pluralism stems from the ability for individuals to “express public opinions by engaging one another” through vernacular rhetoric.168 The importance of vernacular rhetoric minimizes the importance of a singular leader sanctioned message, instead establishing the public as the most important agent for dissent. Within this discourse, individuals must not diverge into antagonistic discourse as difference and division must be encountered within the realm of allies, not enemies. Ivie argues, “the burden of resisting dehumanizing discourses, I want to suggest, falls squarely on the

122 many who are ruled by political elites rather than onto the elites who govern in place of and over the citizenry.”169 Thus, the need for “a humanizing style of democratic dissent under the shadow of the modern warfare state.”170 Through the work of Rancière, we can identify how social media can provide an outlet for such discourse.

Dissensus, in contrast to the sensible that classifies people through knowing, transforms through the acknowledgement of presence—the people, the citizens, are now present and demanding equality.171 Dissensus thus relies on emancipation. Emancipation, as Rancière contends, is the choice to negate the thinking that there are static classifications of people within society. The citizens are emancipated from their classification and the relationship between master and ignorant is now splintered.

Emancipation refutes the logic behind Plato’s myth of medal as well as neutralizes the master-ignorant relationship. The relationship between master and ignorant is subverted as intelligence becomes accessible to everyone. Once it is understood that the master is not needed to disseminate knowledge, then knowledge becomes available to everyone.

Rancière analogizes the argument through the comparison between the scientist and the young child. One uses the scientific method to build on their previous knowledge while the other experiences what they did not previously know and combines it with their previous knowledge. “This is not a path from ignorance to knowledge,” Rancière argues,

“it is a path from an existing knowledge to further knowledge.”172 Rather than continue a path of inequality in which a person must start from a specific point and move to a determined new point he asserts a pathway of equality in which a person can start from any point and follow any path to a new non-predicted point. The only precondition is that

123 an individual can learn “because one participates in an intelligence that is the intelligence of anybody.”173 Dissensus thus works as a disruption of the sensible, the individual demanding change and making seen what was once unseen enters a political space. There must not be a leader. There must be a demand for equality. Digital dissent can serve as a tool for a demand for equality. Utilization of #BlackLivesMatter demonstrates this claim as Julius Bailey and David J. Leonard argue the hashtag is “an act of collective imagination,” which “represents an active engagement” within “our present moment.”174

Furthermore, Rancière’s work is keenly positioned to combat problems of racial inequality. In his book, Moments Politiques, Rancière briefly tackles the problem of racism and how it fits within consensual society. “Racism is not an unfortunate consequence of social problems that the objectivity of consensual policy should resolve,”

Rancière writes. “So-called social problems, consensual realism, and racist outbursts are all aspects of one and the same phenomenon.”175 Traditional politics only increases the reoccurrence of such action as we continue to disregard such instances as nonsensical rather than facing the issues outright. We view such outbursts as a sign of old times that will eventually change; however, through this action we continually make sense of them.

As such, racism is persistently built into our consensual politics. In order to change we must disrupt the sensible. Rancière argues, “Consensual realism is not a form of natural healing capable of ridding society of its monsters. . . Dissent is what makes society livable. And politics, when it is not reduced to petty management and police work is precisely the organization of this dissent.”176 Dissent is a political act. And

#BlackLivesMatter is the community, as individuals, demanding equality as it calls to

124 recognize the lives in society that are unequal. Ivie warns, however, “[o]nly the vernacular voices of a dissenting demos speaking in a humanizing idiom about those who have been designated enemies of the state offer some possibility of escaping the regression from lively politics to deadly passivity.”177 Digital dissent, as vernacular rhetoric, spread through social media, has the ability to help foster such humanizing discourse.

Zizi Papacharissi and Robert Ivie both promote the importance of an individual’s control over dissent messages. Papacharissi argues the mere evasion from public discourse toward a “digitally enabled” private political discourse, itself, represents a form of dissent. Reverting from the public sphere into an autonomous, controlled, private sphere, where one can still voice political concerns, and take part in political messaging/action, is an act of dissent against society’s traditionally understood political activity.178 Agreeing with Papachrissi’s conception of individual’s retreating to an autonomous, controlled environment, I argue that the engaged discourse remains attributed to a public sphere. The veneer of “privacy” on social media activity has long been fractured. Additionally, because of the public nature of social media activity I attest that individuals are publically engaged through such messaging. Furthermore, through dissent messages, in this instance digitally enabled dissent messages, individuals transform and enhance democratic practice. Robert Ivie writes, “at the intersection of media and messages is where we need to look more closely at how the discourse of ordinary people can enrich the democratic practices of society.”179 Ivie’s argument for a humanizing style of dissent relies on the “quotidian-everyday-colloquial discourses,”

125 which originate from individuals.180 Within these vernacular actions we ultimately detect the vibrancy of democratic discourse. Explicating digital dissent from the broad term

“social media activism” illuminates a shift toward control by the demos. Digital dissent, in this instance #BlackLivesMatter, only stays prevalent with the help of sustained usage from users. Such discourse encourages a robust understanding of democratic action.

Digital dissent’s reliance on the demos helps reframe democratic action—a move away from an institutional understanding of democracy. Rather than the single act of voting, or protesting, dissent offers the ability to illuminate and discuss tensions of equality. These small, yet crucial, actions help align the importance of individuals with ensuring the robustness of our understanding of democracy. As Robert Asen further asserts, democracy is found in the everyday actions of citizenship; thus, “to situate democracy in this way invests democracy dramatically in ordinary folks, not leaders or elected or appointed officials.”181 Asen’s argument focuses primarily on establishing a discourse theory of citizenship and eventually asks readers to contemplate different modalities of citizenship.182 Consequently, I argue that digital dissent provides one venue for a more robust democratic action. The institutional fixation on what constitutes democracy limits the role of the individual; however, dissent as a democratic, and rhetorical act, helps reiterate the importance of the individual on reframing democracy.

Social media thus offers another site for an expression of dissent beyond traditional means.

126 Conclusion

The rise of #BlackLivesMatter has reinvigorated our exploration into those who have historically helped overcome racial inequality. In this chapter, I have addressed the role of leadership within the Civil Rights Movement and its role within the contemporary social movement #BlackLivesMatter. As political discourse continues to be enacted through digital environments it behooves rhetorical scholars to further investigate how these persuasive campaigns function rhetorically. This chapter highlighted how digital dissent disregards the role of leadership in favor of a more democratic political discourse.

By outlining leadership’s emphasis on consensus, to the detriment of dissensus, I have attempted to construct a foundation for understanding the rhetorical potential of digital dissent. Delineating Jacques Rancière’s argument for dissensus and Chantal Mouffe’s conception of agonistic pluralism, I have argued that digital dissent privileges dissensus and warrants a shift from deliberative democracy toward agonistic democracy. Shifting from a focus on consensus to one of dissensus embraces difference and encourages a more robust democratic political discourse.

John Lucaites argues “every rhetorical performance enacts and contains a theory of its own agency—of its own possibilities—as it structures and enacts relationships between speaker and audience, self and other, action and structure.”183 Leadership, focused on the creation and enactment of a consensual message, limits the amount of dissent an organization can partake in as well as limits the agency of other supporting individuals of the movement. Throughout this chapter I have discussed how the fixation on leadership, as a necessity for social movements, continually inhibits the ability for a

127 multitude of voices to impact a movement. The role of a strong leader demands consensus to build support for a singular cause; thus, dissent is not encouraged and oftentimes viewed with contempt. Those who speak against or even simply in contrast from the strong leader are traditionally contrasted negatively at the time and overlooked within historical remembrance. For example, Malcolm X was often vilified for his opposition to King’s message of peace and the work of Ella Baker went largely unknown;

Bakers work still remains underappreciated to the vast public. Furthermore, within this chapter I have articulated how digital dissent, through the digital public sphere, utilizes social media platforms to allow individuals to demand equality—to engage directly with the political. Rancière argues such action is political. As such, digital dissent acts as a form of the political by allowing a venue for “the part that has no part” to engage directly in political discourse. Digital dissent’s enactment of increased dissensus fosters a more robust understanding of democratic action by embracing individual difference.

Addressing digital dissent’s ability to promote a more robustly democratic discourse I also argued the shift toward agonistic democracy. Deviating from the rational consensus building of deliberative democracy, agonistic democracy acknowledges the necessity of conflict and difference. Realizing the need to engage adversaries instead of enemies increases our ability to draw upon difference as a method to enhanced understanding of a situation. Social media definitely has its pitfalls but as a venue for addressing difference and voicing dissent, it provides a venue for political discourse.

Users have the ability to interact and struggle with other users who share differing views.

Importantly, this action can occur in the face of the silo(ing) critique of social media.

128 Social media users have a tendency to connect with those who share similar views but our political leanings can be quite vast and intricate. Where users agree in some instances they are likely to disagree in others. Furthermore, users may disagree on the enactment policy of issues. Rather than shy away from these differences and our desire to build consensus, a focus on dissent fosters greater political discourse. Mouffe argues in order to enact an agonistic pluralism dissent must be incorporated as a viable political discourse.

She asserts, a democracy’s “survival depends on collective identities forming around clearly differentiated positions, as well as on the possibility of choosing between real alternatives.”184 In addition, by drawing attention to local based knowledge, I also argued agonism allows for action and discourse which can be shaped by local influence and variables. This articulation allows for sharing of differences based on individual assessments of a given issue. Embracing such a view fosters increased discourse and notes the importance of engaging conflict and difference.

Investigation into these messages, and their critique, expands our understanding of how digital dissent promotes a move toward agonistic pluralism. Within an agonistic democracy, messages that emphasize disagreement not silenced but understood that through discourse such messages will be understood for their harmful negativity and discredited. Avoiding devolving into similar rhetoric is paramount to continuing a focus on agonistic pluralism. Having addressed digital dissent’s ability to emphasize dissensus and foster a shift toward agonistic democracy, by subverting the role of strong leadership and privileging democratic discourse over the institutionality of contemporary politics I

129 next turn my attention to digital dissent as a function of the demonstration and critique of doxa.

130 Chapter III: Digital Dissent and Doxa

In the previous chapter, I argued #BlackLivesMatter has become the predominant rallying cry for those working toward racial equality and is the prominent dissent message of the time. Additionally, I argued #BlackLivesMatter serves as a statement of digital dissent circumventing the reliance on strong leadership and allowing greater participation and participating in more robust political action. As a form of dissensus, articulated through the work of Jacques Rancière, digital dissent limits the influence of consensus in democratic discourse. I asserted digital dissent messages function as an act of dissensus—a demand for equality—that amplify the influence of dissent as democratic action. Furthermore, I demonstrated how digital dissent warrants a (re)conceptualization of democracy as agonstic pluralism. In this chapter, I turn to investigating digital dissent messages as they function as a form of demonstration and critique of doxa.

This chapter progresses through an introduction of the complex nature of doxa, especially focusing on the work of A. Freya Thimsen’s argument about the demonstration and critique of doxa. Within this section the prominence of critical discourse becomes important as I argue digital dissent critiques doxa in an effort to challenge racial inequality. Robert Asen’s discourse theory of citizenship engages the role of critique by broadening discursive venues and “inviting greater participation.”1 Understanding digital dissent within Asen’s framing brings the role of critique to social media users, as through engaged discourse meanings are (re)imagined, increasing the potential for democratic discourse. I next move into an introduction of the hashtag campaigns supporting

#BlackLivesMatter, specifically, #HandsUpDontShoot and #ICantBreathe. Third,

131 returning to Thimsen’s work, as well as asserting a divergent observation, I extend the complexities of doxa by connecting the conception of digital dissent as it functions as a demonstration and critique of democratic doxai. I finish the chapter by arguing the reliance on dissensus reinforces digital dissent as contemporary democratic discourse and argue this (re)conceptualization of social media activism assists a shift toward agonistic democracy.

Doxa and Rhetoric, Rhetoric and Doxa: A Contentious Relationship

Doxa, as is the case for many rhetorical terms, carries a convoluted history.

Additionally, doxa finds itself mired in criticism from rhetoric’s primary antagonist,

Plato. Understood as a style of knowledge, doxa is commonly contrasted against episteme. Plato’s primary critique, found within his works Phaedrus and Republic, separates doxa as “mere opinion” from episteme as “true knowledge.” Within this framing, Plato argues the inability to adopt a strict dialectical structure to learning results in a reliance on doxa in which “true opinions” become similar to “blind men [sic] who go the right way.”2 The distinction articulated here separating doxa and episteme engages the belief that opinion should be subservient to reason. Bernard Miller contends Plato

“associates doxa with appearances that are marked in all cases by the deficiency of copies or pale reflections of things more genuine or essential.”3 Doxa thus inhabits the realm of rhetoricians—the Sophists—whereas true knowledge remains grounded in reason and dialectic. “Episteme, on the other hand,” Miller writes, “is wedded with reason and reality in Plato’s scheme and is the very animus of purity, truth, and flawless clarity that he undertakes to disclose incessantly in his dialogues.”4 Surmising Plato’s desire to place

132 episteme above doxa requires negligible effort when considering his aspiration for consensual truth. Thus the subjective nature of doxa, according to Plato, is insurmountable when attempting to understand the creation of true knowledge.

This narrow conception, however, fails to encapsulate the influence doxa has on our ability to understand the creation and sharing of knowledge within society. For the

Sophists, doxa existed on a continuum along with knowledge and truth—each malleable in creating belief.5 Plato, in the effort to establish truth, warned against the multiple points-of-view nature of doxa—instead coveting singular truth and knowledge. Episteme thus represented objective truth that was not malleable and relied on certainty and strict reasoning. James Jasinski sums up Plato’s want as he writes, “Toleration of inconsistency

[for Plato] and contradiction founded on the existence of multiple perspectives had to be replaced by one overarching perspective that could ground inquiry and social existence.”6

Rhetorical scholars have sought to rescue doxa from Plato’s critique, reasoning that doxa remains valuable to understanding the creation of knowledge and arguing that the very nature of society is created through doxastic knowledge.

Rhetoric’s Resuscitation of Doxa

One of the initial rebuttals to Plato’s judgment of doxa was his anxious suspicion of contradiction of multiple viewpoints in the creation of knowledge. Eric A. Havelock, however, warns the fear of contradiction is overstated, writing,

Contradiction is a disease only if we assume that it is not the immediate events

and situations that are real but isolated abstractions such as greatness or smallness

or right and wrong. It is only of these that statements can be made which are

133 never contradictory. . . . In short, the appeal to banish contradiction is another

form of the appeal to name and to use and to think about abstracted identities or

principles or classes or categories and the like, rather than concrete events and

acts of living passionate people.7

While Plato derided doxa as the mere appearance of knowledge, rhetorical scholars have established the importance of shared meaning and creation of knowledge. For example,

Robert Hariman argues “doxa can be understood better by identifying how it is a complex of the relationships of regard, ranking and concealment.”8 He contends that doxa, along with its connection to opinion and appearance, also contains a connection to objective knowledge due to its nature as “both a description of one’s being and one’s worth.”9

Doxa is objective as a style of describing and realizing reality while at the same time it remains subjective in the substance of knowledge. Havelock argues for a subjective/objective tension within doxa arguing, “The noun correspondingly is both the

‘impression’ that may be in my mind and the ‘impression’ held by others of me. . . . It is the ‘seeming show of things’, whether this panorama is thought of as within me or outside of me.”10 Thus doxa acquires a subjective/objective ambiguity. A. Freya Thimsen summarizes this tension by noting doxa “is also the objective appearance of the subject who appears to speak.”11 Before expanding upon this subjective/objective tension, I want to take time to place rhetoric at the forefront of understanding the nature of doxa.

Throughout Hariman’s work on doxa, the work of Kenneth Burke becomes apparent. Burke does not give much time to the influence of doxa directly on his work; however, parts of his writing demonstrate the connection to his belief in common

134 understanding, particularly, his work about terministic screens. “Men [sic] seek for vocabularies that will be faithful reflections of reality,” he writes, “To this end, they must develop vocabularies that are selections of reality. And any selection of reality, must, in certain circumstances, function as a deflection of reality” (emphasis original).12

Deflection in this instance can also represent concealment. Hariman echoes Burke’s thinking when he contends we understand our world “through a process of selecting and deflecting, revealing and concealing.”13 Although Burke’s writing here focuses on how individuals use vocabularies to understand their world and thus those vocabularies also shape how one perceives their world, I contend it is important to realize the emphasis

Burke places on people to create how they see, and act within, the surrounding contextual world. Burke inherently contends that meaning is found within people. Combining the work of these two theorists, Jasinski concludes that doxa then “refers to the way in which the world of appearances becomes manifest through the dynamic interplay of concealment and unconcealment or deflection and selection.”14 In other words, a focus on doxa underscores the reliance on rhetoric as a means to discern our complex relationships to language and knowledge.

In an effort to reinvigorate doxa from the throes of Platonic critique, Miller argues, “Doxa can be understood as the practical wisdom inherited from tradition, that collection of beliefs, convictions, and attitudes we accept for no other reason than that they are anchored in some more or less coherent way in our cultural system.”15 Such a definition continues to feature rhetoric as an integral tool for understanding the doxastic nature of society. James Jasinski writes, “A doxastic [society], then, contains multiple

135 points of view that are in competition with each other, and this competition is enacted discursively.”16 The doxastic nature of society places rhetoric in a critical position to identify the creation of meaning but more importantly to critique previously constructed beliefs. Such expanded definitions of doxa, and the acknowledgment of rhetoric as a means to understand our doxastic world, create another dilemma for rhetoricians.

Beyond the subjective/objective tension rhetoricians have faced what J. R. Cox terms “the scandal of doxa.”17 His argument contests the notion that rhetoric could strive to create new understandings of phenomena while being constrained by the material of the contemporary time. For Cox, rhetoric is constrained by the material surrounding it, the common beliefs and knowledge—doxa. How can we create something new when all we have to work with is prevailing “common knowledge?” Thomas Farrell posits a similar argument as Cox as he writes, “The question is, may rhetoric be liberating? May it, in other words, put us in touch with a range of issues and experiences outside our normalized, received opinion, our doxa? And, paradoxically, can it do this through received opinion and the traditional resources of rhetoric?”18 Such questions have been important as the field of rhetoric has challenged and (re)examined knowledge and relationships of meaning. Farrell, and others, concludes that the materials available to rhetoric, specifically the rhetorical principle of invention, serve as the necessary means for rhetoric to flourish. He argues that rhetoric has the ability to disrupt common thinking when he asserts, “Although it always relies on what appears, as inflected by received opinions and convention, it may also recombine and individuate these so as to interrupt the quotidian of ordinary policy and practice.”19 Invention, as noted here, serves an

136 essential role in employing disparate nodes of information and polysemic texts in creating new and inventive meanings and understandings of various phenomena. Jasinski concludes that Farrell realized “that an advocate’s ability to use doxa to interrupt or disrupt what is commonly accepted is a critical component of rhetorical art.”20 Their arguments initiate my argument to the importance of critical discourse in digital dissent’s ability to demonstrate and critique doxa. Additionally, shifting to critical discourse requires a return to the discussion on the subjective/objective tension of doxa.

Understanding the Subjective/Objective Tension of Doxa

As mentioned above, there remains a subjective/objective tension within doxa that needs further exploration. Doxa, as initially defined as “opinion,” carries the inherent position of being subjective perception. Opinions are created individually and potentially vary between persons. This potential resulted in Plato’s anxiety toward doxa. The primary reason for such anxiousness remains his search for eternal truth—singular truth

(colloquially simplified to Plato’s search for capital “T” Truth). This fundamental issue is one of the reasons Plato praises dialectic and philosophy while condemning rhetoric.

Aristotle, Plato’s student, reinvigorates the study of rhetoric resulting in the initial formation of the objective nature of doxa. Plato exalts philosophy as the realm of establishing eternal truth. Aristotle, remaining content with the role of philosophy, views rhetoric as the counterpart to dialectic, allowing him to elucidate rhetoric as a means to explore practical truth. Doxa connects to Aristotle’s conception of rhetoric through the creation of practical knowledge. It is within this establishment where rhetoricians extend the argument of doxa as objective knowledge.

137 Havelock succinctly asserts doxa can be understood both as the subjective impression in one’s mind as well as other’s objective impression of him/her. Shared knowledge then becomes an important factor for understanding doxa. Furthermore,

Hariman’s work on doxa expands the term’s objective nature. He writes, “Rhetorical inquiry is both an account and an example of doxa, and this participation in the structure of doxa limits the inquiry’s relation to truth—it necessarily is antecedent or attendant to the experience of truth.”21 Hariman here argues that doxa remains unable to attend to the full project of finding truth but nonetheless is important to attending to the nature of truth as it concerns shared knowledge. As the material of rhetorical inquiry, doxa attains an objective nature as it serves as the emergent appearance of social knowledge. Thus, as

John Muckelbauer adds, doxa becomes “the singular rhythms of the common.”22

Exploring the application of doxa within rhetorical scholarship reveals how knowledge and truth are experienced throughout society. As a subjective concept doxa, contrasted to episteme, remains malleable as practical knowledge. As an objective concept, doxa becomes a mode of understanding the appearance of common knowledge. Additionally, the objective nature of doxa, especially through Hariman’s argument that doxa as discourse that both conceals and reveals knowledge and belief, influences rhetorical inquiry on the democratic nature of doxa and the critique of doxa as collective knowledge is often influenced by unforeseen power structures. Thimsen sums up the result of this tension when noting doxa “straddles subjective perception and objective appearance.”23

Expounding the objective/subjective nature of doxa illuminates the differing modes of democratic doxa.

138 Democratic Doxai and its Demonstration

The expanded definition of doxa, one acknowledging the ambiguity between the term as subjective and objective, has become the accepted usage in rhetorical scholarship.

This more expansive notion of doxa orients rhetorical scholarship to doxa’s influence on political rhetoric, specifically the exploration of democratic doxa. Within the study of democratic doxa two schools of thought diverge. Thimsen argues the first group approaches doxa as “material that is necessarily and effectively taken up and enacted in the course of politics and public life.” The second group “sees [doxa] as the means by which collective life is subject to the forces of power and excessive uniformity.”24 The second group thus views doxa as a necessary target of critique. Both of these groups are important in bolstering my conception of digital dissent. The first group demonstrates the emphasis of collective knowledge and action—although collective action premised on dissensus rather than consensus, as argued in chapter 2. The second group, I argue, emphasizes digital dissent as a potential challenge contesting systemic power structures.

Specifically, for this project, systematic racial inequality.

Thimsen argues the first group finds clear influence from the work of Aristotle, in which “the people” emerge as “the stuff out of which democratic politics such as public deliberation, community solidarity, utopian imagination, and relations of collective identification are made.”25 Democratic doxai thus become important tools to change political order and coalesce a political community. Doxa becomes the material by which political change occurs. The first group, she argues, “valorize[s] democratic doxai as necessary components of politics such as building movements, enacting change,

139 community self-governance, and deliberative talk.”26 Much of the work done within this first group is influenced by the work of Jürgen Habermas and John Dewey, two scholars interested in the conventional role of collective democratic politics. Thimsen notes such scholars traditionally gravitate toward “the process of demonstrating hopeful and practical activities of collective self-governance.”27 Doxa, within this group, is the discursive material in which politics occurs and which must be utilized to enact political and social change. Andreea Ritivoi argues doxa functions as a “set of assumptions, values, and beliefs that inform positions and claims” and remains the imaginative substance for political reimagining.28 Her work is influenced by the writings of Paul

Ricouer, who positioned doxa as the “sedimented universe of conventional ideas.”29 The importance of this group should not be understated; however, implicated in many of the cited works is the role of consensus. I have already touched upon the nature of consensus inherent in the work of Habermas and we can trace the reliance on consensus through uniformity. In chapter 2, I dissected how previous social movement scholarship demonstrates reliance on consensus; oftentimes, at the expense of dissent.

The influence of the first group of scholars remains important for this project as support and advocacy for #BlackLivesMatter, and the subsequent hashtag campaigns demanding racial equality, remains tied to the collective use of the message. In order to keep conversations about racial equality in the forefront of discourse, social media activism is reliant on the continued advocacy by “the people.” Such continued support has become a common critique of social media activism due to the nature of continuous change amongst social media sites. The common critique of social media activism as

140 “slacktivism” relies on the ever-present, and fast-paced, demand of information consumption. Because of the hurried nature of social media, topics seemingly gain traction, slow in use, and are ultimately replaced by new causes and campaigns.

#BlackLivesMatter, and the other hashtags investigated in this project, have remained in the spotlight of discourse. Dave Zirin argues the resilience of #BlackLivesMatter has sustained attention on the numerous shootings of unarmed black people.30 Unfortunately, their usage remains tied to the continuation of negligent deaths of black people by law enforcement. Nonetheless, it bears remembering that hashtag campaigns only remain of consequence if supported by a collective of users. However, and here my arguments from chapter 2 carry over, I contend that the usage of these hashtags, as digital dissent, represent a movement premised on the necessity of dissensus rather than a reliance on consensus. Such a transition expands the variety of discourse and welcomes a diversity of participation amongst individuals. Emphasizing dissensus over consensus also alludes to the importance of the second group of rhetorical scholars Thimsen identifies as important to understanding the role of democratic doxai. Scholars identifying with this group recognize the potential for democratic doxai, especially the reliance on consensus, as a force to mitigate and suppress people. She defines this second group as one that realizes democratic doxai can become “the sedimented and institutionalized material that produces undemocratic practices.”31 Critiquing doxa thus becomes important as a means to challenge systemic inequality. Although her work here relies on the role of scholars, through critical rhetoric, to challenge doxa, I contend framing critique within Asen’s

141 discourse theory of citizenship relocates critique, through digital dissent, within an individual level.

The Move to a Discourse of Citizenship

I have discussed Asen’s work at various points over the course of this project, most notably in the initial two chapters. Here I expand the role of discourse in critique of doxa through an examination of “citizenship as a mode of public engagement.”32

Emphasizing the role of discourse as citizenship “recognizes the fluid, multimodal, and quotidian enactments of citizenship in a multiple public sphere.”33 Placing emphasis on discourse “shifts our focus from what constitutes citizenship to how citizenship proceeds”

(emphasis original). 34 He provides an invocative defense of a critical discourse asserting, such discourse “draws attention to action that is purposeful, potentially uncontrollable and unruly, multiple, and supportive of radical but achievable democratic practices.”35

Directly connecting to the role of social media activism, Asen observes that refocusing citizenship as a mode of public engagement “loosens conceptual restrictions, which, in turn, may broaden our view and deepen our understanding of existing practices.”36 This is an important aspect for digital dissent as Asen provides an initial argument for the potential of social media activism to be recognized as political action. As I have previously argued, digital dissent provides a venue for political discourse. Expanding our understanding of what constitutes citizenship furthers the potential for democratic discourse.

Reimagining political engagement through discourse draws a shift from our traditional conceptualization of democracy. Asen draws inspiration for this theorizing

142 from John Dewey who writes, “democracy is a personal way of individual life . . . it signifies the possession and continual use of certain attitudes, forming personal character and determining desire and purpose in all the relations of life.”37 Asen observes that, through Dewey’s contention, democracy “is not confined to a set of institutions or specific acts, but appears as a guiding sprit that informs human interaction [and] . . . their creative participation.”38 To fully ground his argument in the heart of the people who actively engage in political discourse Asen heartily affirms “Democracy’s heart does not beat in the halls of Congress or in the voting booth, but in the everyday enactments of citizenship.”39 There are two important implications to elicit from these arguments. First, these arguments position democracy within the realm of individual engagement.

Dissolving the popular institutional nature of politics provides individuals an expanded ability to engage political action directly, potentially increasing democratic discourse.

Bolstering the ability for people to enact democratic discourse highlights the importance of social media providing a venue for individuals to engage others across various audiences. Second, situating democracy within the hearts of “ordinary folk[s],” underscores the importance of vernacular rhetoric, especially in conjunction with digital dissent as a critique of doxa.40 Returning to the arguments of the preceding chapter, relying on leaders or institutions, limits the role of dissent. Establishing digital dissent within the framing of a discourse of citizenship increases the potential for an individual to engage democratic discourse—especially as a method to critique doxa and in turn advocate social change.

143 Seyla Benhabib observes public discourse arises through the engagement of people across various networks, writing, “it is through the interlocking net of these multiple forms of associations, networks, and organizations that an anonymous ‘public conversation’ results” (emphasis original).41 In the introduction chapter, I articulated the argument for social media to serve as a space for a networked public. This space is similarly premised on the sharing of information through discourse. As argued throughout this project one such type of information is digital dissent. Sarah Jackson and

Brooke Foucault Welles defend the ability for social media activism to serve as a method for individuals to “express goals of both legitimizing and communicating their lived experiences and pushing the mainstream public sphere to acknowledge and respond to these realities.”42 This argument extends Nancy Fraser’s contention about the need for social-based critique. “If power is instantiated in mundane social practices and relations,

“ Fraser writes, “then efforts to dismantle or transform the regime must address those practices and relations.”43 Conceptualizing discourse as an act of civic engagement allows individuals the ability to challenge systems of inequality through discourse between shared relationships. Additionally, reframing of discourse provides a generative quality for political engagement through the broadening of discursive space and greater participation.44 Digital dissent, as a method of social media activism enacted through networked discourse, provides one such venue for individuals to critique doxa—specific to this project is the ability to critique doxa that conceals racial inequality.

I assert Rancière’s conception of dissensus, enacted as digital dissent, falls within the same parameters of discourse as civic engagement as “the part with no part” is

144 unbeknownst until a demand for equality is enacted. Social media provides a networked space for individuals to enact dissensus directly. Rancière specifically argues against a philosophy of political science, as such an articulation would in fact be anti-political.

Instead, he argues for the organic nature of politics, which are not reliant on specific conditions or acts. Furthermore, he argues, as mentioned in chapter 2, that politics is not limited to specific contextual barriers. Reliance on such constructs denies the existence of true equality. In his book, The Ignorant Schoolmaster, he argues the structural nature of education oftentimes creates barriers to equality through the institutionality of those who can and cannot participate—even arguing that the most progressive systems continue to perpetuate the classification of pupils. Arguments such as this align with Asen’s assertion of discourse of citizenship in which contemporary progressive discourse remains accessible for individual engagement. Additionally, Rancière demands a focus on “active equality,” reliant on the “now” rather than established conceptions of presumed equality.45 Social media activism provides a unique ability for individuals to instantly engage discourse, potentially as a demand for equality, through the ease of sharing discourse online. Beyond the ability for individuals to efficiently utilize digital dissent as a means to directly engage democratic disclosure, the emphasis of vernacular rhetoric is similarly important to a discourse theory of citizenship.

Robert Glenn Howard connects doxa and vernacular when he writes, “the vernacular is imagined as a shared resource, a sensus communis, or community doxa. In this ‘common’ view, the vernacular is a communal chorus that emerges from the multiplicity of voices speaking in the noninstitutional discursive spaces of quotidian

145 life.”46 He is supporting the acknowledgement of a doxastic society created through discourse and shared meaning—meaning that is created through the shared discourse within social relationships. Gerard Hauser’s conception of vernacular rhetoric is reinforced through Howard’s work. Furthermore, doxastic society is built upon Hauser’s framing of vernacular rhetoric. Doxastic society is reliant upon the social relationships and shared meaning which emerge through “mundane transactions of words and gestures that allow us to negotiate our way through our quotidian encounters.”47 As mentioned, these quotidian exchanges can in fact conceal power structures but are also the venue for transformative social change. Asen co-opts the importance of the quotidian in asserting that is where “the spirit of democracy lies.”48 Because doxastic society is built upon social relationships and changed through the modification of discourse, a discourse of citizenship provides the opportunity to critique existing doxastic norms.

The establishment of digital dissent, as an act of political engagement, especially focused on critique of systemic inequality, widens the field to the study of unique texts and expands both the realm of critique and strategies to change the status quo. Both are important to this project as digital media has proliferated the amount of texts and hastened text fragmentation. Additionally, digital dissent enacts dissensus, and advocates change through the social relationships shared by users within this digital realm. Of course, issues arise specific to social media platforms, but the venue remains open to critique of doxa through social discourse, especially as new rhetorical understandings abound. Specifically important for digital dissent is the ability to address public discussion, through a digital public sphere, that maintains the power to change societal

146 meanings. Linda Flower, in her article on “difference-driven inquiry” contends, “Public discussion based on social knowledge . . . when imaginatively reconstructed by a speaker, even challenge and transform doxa.”49 Through the demonstration and critique of doxa, digital dissent identifies ways individuals can influence positive social transformation.

The viability for social media has been discussed throughout this section but should be expanded before moving onto the role of #HandsUpDontShoot and #ICantBreathe as digital dissent.

Social Media as Venue for Demonstration and Critique

Without rehashing the debate over social media as a dichotomy between digital optimists and digital pessimists, I want to reiterate that my argument falls between the opposing sides. I assert the prominent capacity for social media, and the digital public sphere in general, is found in the opportunity to stymie state-run or traditional news media dominated information structures, and unseen hegemonic discourse venues. I do not argue that social media provides the utmost space for democratic discourse. Rather, I assert, our ability to utilize social media as a space to engage individual differences and use that space to encourage greater understanding of others increases our ability to engage democratic discourse. Within this frame of argumentation, I specifically assert our ability to enact dissent, through digital venues, invigorates users’ capacity for democratic action. As the work of Manuel Castells and Yochai Benkler suggest, social media presents an opportunity to encounter various and often dramatically different viewpoints, and encourage horizontal communication structures.50 Within this understanding, but still cognizant of research acknowledging the perils of social media,

147 this project demonstrates social media’s ability to disseminate, engage, and debate alternative perspectives and challenge dominate ideologies through the enactment of digital dissent.

#ICantBreathe and #HandsUpDontShoot function as digital dissent through their ability to frame what Fraser describes as “agitation activities directed towards wider publics.”51 Social media is able to help converge differences between individuals in order to build increased understanding, as Pollyanna Ruiz argues through her investigation of

Indymedia. Working outside the realm of state run news sources, Indymedia, Ruiz argues, “recognizes the ways in which information flows structure our understanding of the world, and offers explicitly alternative understandings in an attempt to instigate social and political change.”52 Ruiz argues Indymedia assumes these structural changes due to their ability to spread editorials and “non-hierarchical polyvocal dissent” beyond the realm of state sanctioned discourse.53 I contend social media, conducted through comparable frameworks, works similarly to Indymedia by extending her argument through horizontal communication venues. Horizontal communication, a hallmark of social media activism, especially as I have argued for digital dissent, represents the ability for all users to participate without the diversion of leader-led objectives. Social media users can create and circulate digital dissent messages amongst wide-ranging audiences with ease. As argued previously, digital dissent’s strength to create a more robust form of democratic discourse is the ability for horizontal message dissemination and for not relying on leaders. Such a shift preferences dissensus over consensus and broadens the range of available discourses. Without the reliance on leaders, digital dissent

148 users maintain the ability to engage dissent while accommodating their own personal experiences and differences. Indymedia, as conceived by Ruiz, still maintained a vertical communication flow as it pertained to content shared. An easy analogy for how the vertical nature of Indymedia, in terms of dispersing information, can be found in the role of social movement leaders. Leaders inherently increase reliance on consensus, as support for their ideas remains prolific in maintaining their positionality within a movement. In chapter 2, I argue why digital dissent expands beyond vertical communication models by inviting the role of dissensus and the elimination of the role of leaders.

Concerning informational gatekeepers, although Facebook and Twitter initiated some changes to limit the spread of fake material, and of course the traditional limits on

“hate speech,” contemporary social media have continued to purposefully oppose instituting requirements for posting information. Twitter has gone to the lengths of issuing policies asserting that limiting the speech of elected leaders, as well as prominent users, “would hide important information people should be able to see and debate.”54

Although Twitter’s policy pertains to elected leaders and prominent users, their other guidelines only attempt to limit “hateful conduct and abusive behavior.”55 Although such a policy admittedly limits how information that can be spread on social media, I argue that such information intends to be antagonistic and inflammatory; thus, not intended to advance discourse or encourage societal change. Instead, as I argued in the introduction, the transition to a digital public sphere has proliferated the amount of venues for political discourse and advanced the ability for individuals to engage others in creating shared

149 meaning—both through demonstrative and challenging discourses. My argument that digital dissent operates as a demonstration and critique of doxa furthers our understanding of the rhetorical nature of social media activism. Through a digital public sphere, where individuals can engage in democratic discourse, we begin to identify how the venue can create more robust understandings of differing perspectives.

Through Charles Taylor’s conception of the social imaginary, we ascertain how a collection of individuals can create shared meaning, such as “that common understanding that makes possible common practices and a widely shared sense of legitimacy.”56 Just as

Indymedia, as argued by Ruiz, challenges hegemonic discourse, digital dissent similarly operates as dissensus and challenges the concealing nature of doxa. Scholars have also argued that hashtag campaigns help drive discourse beyond traditional news sources. Zizi

Papacharissi and Maria de Fatima Oliveira offer an argument defending social media user’s enactment of political discourse as “developed hashtag feeds deviate from the organizational logic of prominent news values.”57 The two scholars do not directly address the role of dissent in their argument but dissent is a readily accessible act of social media use. Furthermore, they assert, “hashtags exploit the affordances of the

Twitter platform more aggressively and innovatively than any news organization.”58

Through this contention, the demonstration of digital dissent to challenge discourse becomes increasingly prominent. Relating directly to the nature of doxa within a digital public sphere, Papacharissi and Oliveira posit the notion that hashtags thrive due to the necessity of “user-generated collaborative argument.”59 As doxa is created through shared social relationships, the use of hashtags to increase discourse, especially discourse

150 that challenges preconceived meaning, helps identify the rhetorical nature of digital dissent. This chapter now transitions to the discussion of two prominent hashtag campaigns, discussing their history and utilization as they serve to demonstrate and critique doxa and increase democratic discourse.

#HandsUpDontShoot, #ICantBreathe: Digital Dissent as Demonstration and Critique

Many subsequent hashtag campaigns have been generated in support of

#BlackLivesMatter, but have concentrated on singular issues alongside the holistic argument for racial equality. Two of the most prominent of these hashtag campaigns have been #HandsUpDontShoot and #ICantBreathe. Both campaigns focus on how normal, everyday actions have ended in deadly encounters with law enforcement. I argue both of these hashtag campaigns serve as a form of dissensus against perceived racial equality.

Through the connection to dissensus, I contend digital dissent utilizes Asen’s argument of discourse as political engagement as a way to (re)define commonly held beliefs.

Specifically, I argue digital dissent provides a critique of doxa. Through examination, we can realize how social media activism can critique enacted power structures. I posit digital dissent operates as a tool for society to accentuate difference and serve as a method for increased understanding of others. The transition to reframing democracy as a process, rather than an act, fosters our ability to understand how digital dissent can present a disruption within hegemonic political thinking.

#ICantBreathe and #HandsUpDontShoot demonstrate how commonsense behaviors, which would typically keep an individual from harm, are consistently ignored by law enforcement when a crime involves a black individual. #HandsUpDontShoot

151 originated after the shooting death of Michael Brown and, following multiple popular culture demonstrations, arguably became the most recognizable hashtag campaign beyond #BlackLivesMatter. #ICantBreathe was created soon after video of the choking death of Eric Garner was released to the public. Both campaigns demonstrate how the traditional messages describing personal safety resulted in death. Enacting these dissensual messages generates a disruption within our doxastic understandings and should be understood as democratic events. Through their usage, individuals are able to demonstrate how typical calls for help have resulted in deadly instances for black people.

Utilization of the #HandsUpDontShoot and #ICantBreathe provides a sense of disruption against common sense cognitive sensibilities. #HandsUpDontShoot stands as a message of innocence, or at the very least a sense of acquiescence, and remains a message of attempting to surrender to authority and avoid future harm. #ICantBreathe stands as a message of personal safety and remains a common message requesting help.

Unfortunately, for black individuals, neither of these previously understood meanings have been able to stand as such during encounters with law enforcement. As such, they have become messages of dissent against racial inequality and operate to create a disruption and critique societal norms.

History of #HandsUpDontShoot

The hashtag campaign #HandsUpDontShoot came to fruition soon after the shooting death of Michael Brown. According to Dorian Johnson, who was with Brown when he was shot, and other witnesses, Brown had his hands in the air when officer

Darren Wilson shot him.60 This claim was further supported by the body position of

152 Brown as he lay on the asphalt—hands alongside his head—for over four hours before paramedics covered his body and later loaded it into an ambulance.61 On August 11,

2014, two days after Brown was shot, protestors gathered around the Ferguson police department and stood with their hands raised, mimicking the posture of surrender. The pose would come to symbolize the movement taking shape by multiple actors in a variety of contexts. By August 13, 2014, #HandsUpDontShoot had become a trending topic on

Twitter and rose to prominence on other social media sites. James McVey and Heather

Suzanne Woods suggest #HandsUpDontShoot was one of the primary hashtag campaigns that garnered a following across multiple platforms thus working both “mimetically and multimodally.”62 #HandsUpDontShoot, and any accompanying action/message, became a cry for racial equality. DeRay Mckesson, an activist who rose to prominence during the events of Ferguson, and has continued his activism across the country, asserts

#HandsUpDontShoot is about declaring a “pattern of police brutality.” Additionally,

Mckesson argues #HandsUpDontShoot remained popular because individuals can “relate to it on a personal level” without the need for an intermediary.63 This description facilitates the argument of digital dissent serving as a strong democratic action.

#HandsUpDontShoot serves as a message for any individual to take direct action to dissent against racial inequality, without the necessity of an intermediary, and thus, create a disruption in our sensibilities.

I would be remiss to gloss over the contested nature of #HandsUpDontShoot.

While #HandsUpDontShoot propagated on social media, various witness accounts and the coroner’s report deviated from the hashtag’s narrative. Although multiple witnesses,

153 significant amongst them being Dorian Johnson, reported that they saw Brown with his hands above his head, other witnesses countered that Brown was indeed acting in a threatening manner. Additionally, the autopsy report concluded that forensic evidence supported Brown did not have his hands-up position when he was shot. Despite the evidentiary support opposed to the hands-up narrative, support for the hashtag campaign continued to garner support and praise. Montague Simmons, Organization for Black

Struggle director, argues the campaign “keyed into something that everybody’s been feeling for a very long time. I remember after Trayvon, and after the verdict, people just felt helpless.”64 Furthermore, Jonathan Capehart, writing for the Washington Post, argued that the official autopsy report sustains the notion that Brown did not have his hands up and had previously struggled with officer Wilson. However, he also argued “this does not diminish the importance of the real issues unearthed in Ferguson by Brown’s death. Nor does it discredit what has become the larger ‘Black Lives Matter.’”65 Despite evidence against the premise for its creation, #HandsUpDontShoot became a contemporary call for racial equality.

New York Congressman Hakeem Jefferies argues #HandsUpDontShoot “is a rallying cry of people all across America who are fed up with police violence – in community, after community, after community, fed up with police violence in Ferguson, in Brooklyn, in Cleveland, in Oakland, in cities and counties and rural communities all across America.”66 Some defenders of the #HandsUpDontShoot narrative have questioned whether Brown had his hands raised at any point during the altercation; however, the importance of the campaign, especially for this project, remains situated in

154 the campaign’s ability to critique and advance understanding of racial differences and inequality. In that regard, #HandsUpDontShoot remains a poignant reminder of the loss which has occurred in order to demonstrate the racial inequality that remains between white and black people. Cristian Farias, writer for The New Republic, supports this claim by arguing the campaign has become “so much more” than what occurred during the altercation between Brown and Wilson and thus should remain a call for racial justice

“for as long as there’s neither justice nor peace.”67 The critique of racial equality raised by #HandsUpDontShoot helps us understand how hashtag campaigns function as digital dissent. I am not arguing that social media campaigns should not rely on the veracity of the events, which result in their creation; however, some hashtag campaigns, which function as part of greater societal arguments, retain significance beyond their creation details. #HandsUpDontShoot remains a prominent campaign for racial equality and thus warrants investigation of its rhetorical influence. Additionally, #HandsUpDontShoot helps us understand how social media activism can function as digital dissent and lead us to a more robust perception of democratic action.

Furthermore, there are plenty of instances of black individuals involved in non- threatening or harmful behavior that still resulted in loss of life. 50-year-old Walter Scott was pulled over for a non-functioning brake light on April 4, 2015. Officer Michael

Slager reported upon returning to his vehicle Scott exited his car and ran. Slager gave chase and a brief physical encounter occurred in which Slager fired his taser at Scott.

Scott attempted to flee again and was shot by Slager five times. Soon after Slager radioed in, “Shots fired and the subject is down. He grabbed my Taser.”68 Slager initially reported

155 Scott had taken his taser and he feared for his life. Video footage would soon show that

Slager’s report was false. It was determined that Scott’s death was caused by multiple gunshots to his back. Furthermore, video evidence shows Slager going back to the area where Scott began running, picking up an object, then carrying it over to where Scott was laying and dropping it next to his body.69

A similar unfortunate death also embodying the messages #HandsUpDontShoot occurred in Tulsa, Oklahoma. On September 19, 2016, a 9-1-1 call was placed about a potentially abandoned or broken down vehicle in the middle of the street. Law enforcement responded as Terrence Crutcher continued walking around his vehicle.

Helicopter footage of the incident recorded officers in the helicopter stating, “It’s time for a taser . . . I’ve got a feeling that’s about to happen . . . that looks like a bad dude, too, could be on something.”70 Video then shows Crutcher walking back toward his car with his hands above his head as officers follow. Soon after Crutcher turns around and appears to lean toward the car with his hands at his side, he was then shot. The incident showed

Officer Tyler Turnbough firing his taser at Crutcher as Officer Betty Shelby fired one gunshot, hitting Crutcher in his upper body. Crutcher’s body remained unattended for two minutes before an officer came and checked Crutcher’s pockets. An additional 45 seconds would pass before anyone offers aid.71 Crutcher died the next day. No weapons were recovered from the area. Both of these cases received notoriety for the unfortunate deaths of the two men and for subsequent charges brought against the officers; however, both victims were criticized once it was found each man had illegal substances in their bodies. Nonetheless, these specific instances represent the claim Farias affirms about

156 #HandsUpDontShoot emerging beyond the sole representation of Michael Brown’s death and developing into a prominent message of digital dissent.

One last example confirms the importance of #HandsUpDontShoot as a message of digital dissent demonstrating racial inequality, the shooting of Charles Kinsey. Kinsey, a mental health therapist, was tending to his autistic patient who had wandered away from his care facility. Law enforcement, responding to reports of a potential armed person threatening to commit suicide, arrived and Kinsey got on the ground with his hands in the air. Kinsey tried to assure law enforcement that his patient carried only a toy truck and was not responding to their commands due to autism.72 As Kinsey pled with law enforcement, Officer Jonathan Aledda fired three shots from 150 feet away, with one shot hitting Kinsey in the leg. After being shot, officers handcuffed Kinsey and waited twenty minutes before administering first aid.73 Kinsey’s statement from the hospital represents the nature of the #HandsUpDontShoot message. “As long as I’ve got my hands up, they’re not gonna shoot me, that’s what I’m thinking,” Kinsey states, “Wow, was I wrong.”74 Kinsey’s statement demonstrates the doxastic meaning behind the message of a person holding their hands up—I am not a threat, don’t harm me. #HandsUpDontShoot thus works as digital dissent by disrupting previously created societal meaning.

Illuminating instances of black individuals repeatedly being harmed or killed by law enforcement inverts common belief of racial equality.

History of #ICantBreathe

The death of Michael Brown prompted the creation of #HandsUpDontShoot; unfortunately, it would not remain a singular campaign advocating racial equality in the

157 shadow of a black man being killed my law enforcement. On July 17, 2014, a month before the events in Ferguson, Eric Garner died after being subdued by New York Police officer Daniel Pantaleo. Officers approached Garner as he stood on Bay St. in Staten

Island, NY shortly after a fight occurred between two other individuals in the vicinity of

Garner. Under the suspicion of selling “loosies,” single cigarettes without tax stamps, officer Pantaleo questioned Garner about his recent activity. According to Matt Taibbi,

Garner, irritated by continual police harassment became incensed and both he and

Pantaleo engaged in a verbal altercation.75 Video evidence then shows officer Pantaleo approach Garner and grab his right arm with both hands. As Garner turned, Pantaleo was able to get his arms around Garner’s cheek and neck. Soon after, Pantaleo shifted his weight and pulled Garner to the ground, allowing Pantaleo to tighten his hold. As he was lying on the ground Garner can be heard gasping, “I can’t breathe” multiple times. Upon falling, Pantaleo pushed Garner’s head down while applying his body weight to fully subdue Garner. Four other officers attempted to put Garner in handcuffs, all applying some weight as he continued to gasp, “I can’t breathe.” Eventually Garner lost consciousness.

Taibbi later writes, “Soon after, the officers got off of Garner, who by then was unconscious, handcuffed, and facedown in the doorway of the store. Nobody was even considering the need to administer aid.. . . . Garner lay unattended, facedown on the sidewalk, alone.”76 After lying on the ground for a couple minutes, officers radioed for paramedics. Additional video evidence captured Garner lying on the ground for a full eight minutes before being attended to. At the time, witnesses stated that officers believed

158 Garner was “faking it.”77 Almost a full 45 minutes after losing consciousness, paramedics administered CPR. Within twenty minutes Garner was pronounced dead. The two reporting officers and four paramedics were placed on leave, and Pantaleo eventually lost his position in the NYPD. On August 1, 2014, New York’s Chief Medical Examiner ruled Garner’s death a homicide, alleging that he died from “compression of the neck

(choke hold), compression of the chest and prone positioning during physical restraint by police.”78 There was discussion over the legality of officer Pantaleo’s usage of a chokehold in this situation as the statute mentions that there should not be “any pressure to the throat or windpipe, which may prevent or hinder breathing”; however, the legality of using a chokehold has never been fully articulated throughout a court decision.79 The case eventually was passed to a grand jury, which on December 3, 2014, found “no reasonable cause to indict officer Pantaleo.”80 This decision came less than a month after the decision not to indict office Wilson in the shooting death of Michael Brown and sparked renewed usage of #ICantBreathe, and other protests, across the country. The protests also included an increase in the usage of the digital dissent messages

#CrimingWhileWhite and #AliveWhileBlack that are discussed in the following chapter.

Demonstrations and increased usage of #ICantBreathe lasted throughout the year as black people continued to be treated unequally during encounters with law enforcement. This specific hashtag eventually became Yale Library’s “quotation of the year” as it was intended to “capture the political and cultural mood of the country.”81

Standing as a reminder that even in times of need black individuals may not be treated equally, #ICantBreathe proliferated whenever another black person was killed, or treated

159 neglectfully, by law enforcement. Even two years after its initial rise, #ICantBreathe continues to stand as a reminder of how black and white individuals are systemically treated differently. Standing as a message of digital dissent, #ICantBreathe continues to critique a supposed racially equal society that is actually steeped in structural inequality.

Utilization of #HandsUpDontShoot and #ICantBreathe

#HandsUpDontShoot and #ICantBreathe were both launched as responses to the death of black individuals during encounters with law enforcement and have shared a continued prevalence as dissent against supposed racial equality. Their usage varied greatly from one example to another—accompanying both written messages and pictures—the common thread remaining a call against racial inequality. The importance of these texts highlights the ongoing struggle black people face, specifically in regards to their treatment by law enforcement. Both served as key dissent messages throughout their usage and took hold in the multitude of cultural discussion. #HandsUpDontShoot and

#ICantBreathe serve to remind people that, even years later, “the protest is still going strong” as hashtag campaigns for racial equality remains as one of the top ten moments of social media usage in the ten years of Twitter’s existence.82 Specifically,

#HandsUpDontShoot and #ICantBreathe focus “on the precise moment of a tragic death from the victim’s perspective.”83 Perhaps even more important, these hashtag campaigns illuminate instances in which claims to innocence and cries for help have remained insufficient when proclaimed by black individuals.

#HandsUpDontShoot started as a dissent message proclaiming the death of

Michael Brown was unwarranted as he was claiming innocence, or surrender, before

160 being shot. Although forensic evidence proved Brown was not in a hands-up stance when he was shot, multiple occurrences exist of black people having been shot and killed while they had their hands raised as a sign of innocence. The primary utilization of

#HandsUpDontShoot was to bring attention to the failure of police to be held accountable when involved in the deaths and/or injury of black people. The hashtag begs the question, if black people proclaiming innocence or surrender cannot find justice, then who can?

#HandsUpDontShoot opposes the common refrain of “if [insert name of person shot by cops] had simply listened to police commands they would still be alive today.”

#HandsUpDontShoot directly challenges the idea that if people, especially black people, plainly listen to police they will not be harmed. Dora Apel argues, “The gesture of surrender, then, failed to do its work, exacerbating the outrage at the killing of an unarmed black [person] by making it seem even more vicious and gratuitous.”84 Serving as strong messages of digital dissent, #HandsUpDontShoot disrupts the traditional belief that a person proclaiming, and enacting, a sign of innocence and surrender should not be harmed. The hashtag thus served as dissent by circulating instances where black individuals were injured or killed while they should have been perceived as harmless.

#HandsUpDontShoot serves as a digital dissent by illuminating continued law enforcement maltreatment when encountering black people and critiquing the nature of a racially equal society.

An additional use by #HandsUpDontShoot was to counter the narrative of violent protests. Images circulated on social media showing peaceful protests, often with their hands above their heads, as a means to exhibit how nonviolent measures should not be

161 met with violence. Additionally, these messages sought to draw a line between protestors and looters. Apel contends many see the two as similar writing, “Black protest, it would seem, is regarded by many not as constitutional right in a democracy but as a form of

‘violence.’”85 These instances of dissent brought forth connection to Civil Rights Era instances of black protesters being treated violently. Circulation of the various

#HandsUpDontShoot messages, demonstrating solidarity to the cause of the hashtag campaign, sought to drive discourse about the inequality of law enforcement treatment between white and black individuals. McVey and Woods posit the usage of

#HandsUpDontShoot remains popular due to the ease of circulating its message and encouraging “conversation around the topic of racist police violence.”86 Both

#HandsUpDontShoot and #ICantBreathe function as a means to drive discourse through their ability to connect large-scale audiences. Axel Bruns and Jean E. Burgess argue hashtags are utilized to assemble tweets about “a unified, common topic . . . that the senders of these messages are directly engaging with one another.”87 As digital dissent, these hashtags both identify hegemonic inequality within law enforcement and concentrate discourse in order to garner support for the controversy. Furthermore, they invite discussion on the issue by challenging common understandings about how individuals should be treated. While #HandsUpDontShoot serves as digital dissent emphasizing police brutality, #ICantBreathe serves as digital dissent by challenging our common general desire to help in times of crisis.

Similar to the hashtag #BlackLivesMatter, #ICantBreathe acts as dissent and attempts to further the demand for racial equality. Furthermore, Grace Ji-Sun Kim and

162 Reverend Jesse Jackson indicate #ICantBreathe “has become a slogan for the people, led by African Americans, who have taken to social media and the streets to protest the killing of unarmed African Americans, challenging a system that fails to indict and calling for greater equality.”88 All of the hashtag campaigns discussed in this project serve as messages of dissent against hegemonic racial inequality. Kate Danzer Hoyt indicates, #ICantBreathe, among others, “attempts to spread awareness of the spectacle, suspicion, and risk that follows black bodies like a shadow within a society that perpetuates—but does not openly discuss” racial inequality.89 #ICantBreathe then works as digital dissent through the ability to anyone to provide voice against an unequal system and to join support for a demand for equality. Ben Zimmer argues, the use of “I” brings us within the experience of Garner and is ultimately “modified into the more inclusive

‘we can’t breathe.’”90 The use of “I can’t breathe” has a similar linguistic structure as “I have a dream” and recalls the collective nature of those demanding racial equality.

Zimmer further articulates the linguistic nature of #ICantBreathe “work[s] to say ‘I am the same as you,’ and ‘we are all in this together.’”91 As articulated in Chapter 2, digital dissent allows individuals to voice a wide range of dissent through various means without the role of a leader, while also embracing a collective demand for change.

#ICantBreathe is yet another attempt to build upon solidarity for the

#BlackLivesMatter campaign. Unlike #BlackLivesMatter, which serves as a call for equality, #ICantBreathe places the reader in direct reflection of the statement. As mentioned previously, rhetorically, #HandsUpDontShoot and #ICantBreathe place the reader of the message on the precipice of empathy and challenging the common response

163 to these claims. Parents and teachers typically ingrain into children the statement “I can’t breathe” as a commonly held call to action. Using the slogan “I can’t breathe” helps us identify with an individual in need. Utilizing the hashtag #ICantBreathe helps users identify the oftentimes perilous and harmful situations black people find themselves, especially as it pertains to law enforcement interaction. Hoyt asserts the usage of

#ICantBreathe and #HandsUpDontShoot places the user in the positionality of the victim.92 I contend this rhetorical move works as a style of digital dissent by placing the user within the situation and challenging the perpetuated act of inequality—finding a person in this situation demands we act to help them. The continued proliferation of these hashtags thus challenges our notion that help is occurring. Instead, people are dying.

Thus, we begin to challenge our currently held belief as a society built of racial equality.

Furthermore, utilizing #ICantBreathe also demonstrates solidarity as a demand for equality through its inherent connection as dissent against a society steeped in racial inequality.

Seeking to garner increased support, outrage, and empathy, these specific hashtags were often accompanied by photographs typically demonstrating individuals maintaining a “hands up pose” or accompanying pictures portraying a black individual physically harmed as a result of law enforcement engagement. Protesters with their hands up surrounded by law enforcement provided an intriguing juxtaposition of peaceful protests surveilled by armed groups meant to protect the citizenry. Two of the most prominent pictures that were oftentimes attached to these hashtags were of Brown or

Garner’s body lying on the ground unattended. The power of these pictures provides an

164 opportunity for users to recognize the severe difference in which white and black bodies are treated by law enforcement. Specifically, Taibbi argues, “the picture of Brown’s [or

Garner’s] body encapsulated in one unshakable image the dichotomy in attitudes toward black and white life.”93 Even in death black people were not treated respectfully by law enforcement. Combining visions of individuals in peril, or in death, with claims for safety and help allows others to understand the severe nature of how unequal society can be when it comes to race in society. #HandsUpDontShoot and #ICantBreathe serve as digital dissent as they operate to oppose a hegemonic system built upon the perpetuation of racial inequality. The violence that led to the creation of #HandsUpDontShoot and

#ICantBreathe means “that in a country where racial equality has yet to be achieved, blackness itself is regarded as a threat.”94 These hashtags allow users to identify how black people calling for help still face the consequence of violent and deadly law enforcement action.

Taibbi writes that these hashtags ask individuals to look at the ways in which black and white people are treated differently, to experience what it would be like to be black and suffer some of the inequality black people deal with even within the most mundane situations.95 As digital dissent, #HandsUpDontShoot and #ICantBreathe create an opportunity for individuals to question the commonly held beliefs about how people should be treated. By challenging and demonstrating that the common understanding of

“hands up, don’t shoot” and “I can’t breathe” has resulted in death generates discourse through which common understanding may be (re)framed. Dissent, through the operationalization of difference, increases our ability to engage discourse and reimagine

165 common understanding. Thus, the importance of digital dissent to guide and encourage discourse cannot be understated. Robert Ivie writes, “Without dissent, there is no democratic polity of adversaries and thus no politics, only forced unity and unmitigated enmity that is the end of politics, per se.”96 #HandsUpDontShoot and #ICantBreathe, due to their focus on the victims of violence, provide a venue to engage difference through discourse in the hopes of (re)creating a more robust common understanding of others.

Ivie argues engaging dissent and critique in this manner “enriches the social imaginary for the purpose of enhancing human relations.”97 Social media provides a venue because such discourse and the hashtags #HandsUpDontShoot and #ICantBreathe, as digital dissent, help to generate discourse which can lead to greater common understanding between individuals who hold differing perceptions.

Dani McClain, reporter for The Nation, argues social media allows users to share information forging “collective meaning” out of shared news. Most importantly, social media provides those who have yet to consider themselves as activists a venue to engage discourse.98 Despite the meaningful allegations of “slacktivism,” the ability to share support for a cause remains an important venue to persistently keeping a topic at the forefront of discourse. As digital dissent the hashtags are easily dispersed and continue to advance discourse addressing the needs for social change toward greater racial equality.

The success of these particular hashtag campaigns should not be understated as their previous usage was important for directing public discourse and as they continue to illuminate racial inequality. Deen Freelon, Charlton D. McIlwain, and Meredtih D. Clark, of the Center for Media & Social Impact, confirm Twitter users alone shared 8.5 million

166 messages after the Darren Wilson’s non-indictment and 4.4 million messages after Daniel

Pantaleo’s non-indictment. Over the course of these two periods, #ICantBreathe was the third most trending hashtag.99 Additionally, demonstrating the broad reach of these hashtags campaigns, #HandsUpDontShoot and #ICantBreathe, was utilized by users in every state.100 The vast and robust usage of these hashtag campaigns demonstrates the ability for users to engage others in discourse which can, hopefully, (re)imagine our awareness and perception of others as well as (re)create our recognition of common belief.

Dissensus: Digital Dissent as Demonstration and Critique Doxa

As I have noted above in the discussion about the utilization of

#HandsUpDontShoot and #ICantBreathe, the ability for the hashtags to illuminate how black individuals are treated differently at the hands of law enforcement creates a challenge to doxastic norms. I contend throughout this chapter that digital dissent frames a new method of democratic action helping expand beyond the institutional framing of democracy. Highlighting dissent demonstrates how discourse through the venue of social media can increase the potential for democratic discourse. Through the demonstration of doxa, digital dissent illuminates the democratic nature of dissent through the support of discourse attempting to enact transformative social change. As a demonstration of doxa, digital dissent relies on dissensus to provide expansive support beyond reliance on a single, consensual message. Through the critique of doxa, digital dissent demonstrates how discourse can challenge power structures in an effort to overcome inequality.

167 As asserted by Flower, public discourse, in this instance digital dissent, utilizes social relationships to “challenge and transform doxa.”101 The remaining portion of this chapter further grounds the rhetorical nature of digital dissent as a form of democratic discourse.

In her argument for dissensual democracy, conceptualized through the work of

Rancière, Thimsen contends, the slogan “corporations are not people” both “demonstrates and critiques the doxa of democracy” by supporting the creation of collective people and by challenging previously conceived doxastic norms. She defends this dual notion by arguing, “On the one hand, the [slogan] enacts democratic doxai to demonstrate that it is a properly democratic subject and, on the other, it critiques the way doxai reproduce power.”102 The creation of a collective subject and cause illustrates the democratic nature of the slogan thus demonstrating democratic doxai. At the same time, the slogan challenges established democratic doxai (that corporations have the same legal status as people) thus critiquing doxa.

Thimsen’s ultimate goal surpasses my focus in this project by conceptualizing a new perception of democracy; however, her focus on messages both demonstrating and critiquing doxa benefit the role of digital dissent as expanding democratic discourse. I argue, and I imagine she would agree, the slogan “corporations are not people” is a message of dissent. Expanding her framework into the digital realm we can understand how the slogan becomes a message of digital dissent. I contend digital dissent such as

#HandsUpDontShoot and #ICantBreathe function in a similar manner to “corporations are not people” by demonstrating support for racial equality and challenging doxastic behavior; however, digital dissent places greater emphasis on the role of dissensus.

168 Digital Dissent as Demonstration of Democratic Doxa

Social media and hashtag campaigns, as digital dissent, provide a venue for democratic discourse and foster collective support, which demonstrate democratic doxai.

Just as the slogan “corporations are not people” evokes a call to “the people” to undertake control of governance, so too can digital dissent. Many scholars, as Thimsen argues, hold in regard contemporary democratic doxai that emphasize the people as a means to drive social change, oftentimes through deliberative discourse. Many of these doxai generate out of the institutional nature of current democratic politics. The role of mass protest, deliberative rational discourse, and voting are the traditional stalwarts of democratic governance. Although these are important democratic acts, this project attempts to expand the nature of democratic action. As such, digital dissent as argued in this chapter serves as a way to demonstrate a collective movement, similar to the memorialized contemporary doxastic action, and broadens such action through enactment within online social relationships. First and foremost, I want to connect digital dissent to being able to recognize collective action and support for a cause.

In her work, Thimsen contends protest slogans maintain different “critical, propositional structure[s]” and not all slogans are a “message of critique.”103 Comparing and contrasting the slogans “Corporations are not people” and “We are all Khaled Said,”

Thimsen articulates how protest slogans can operate as tools to build solidarity for/within a movement while at the same time not offering similar levels of critique as she argues the latter remains solely as “an utterance of solidarity and commonality.”104 Though I agree that not all protest slogans provide critique against hegemonic power I would argue

169 “We are all Khaled Said” both articulates support for a cause and critiques existing power structures. She provides a glimpse into my argument by writing “We Are All Khaled Said expresses the injustice of being subject to repressive force. The ‘we’ of the Khaled Said slogan is enacted by those who are critical of power and how it is exercised.”105 The explicitness of the claim “corporations are not people” separates the two slogans in

Thimsen’s argument. I assert the implicit nature of “we are all Khaled Said” allows it to still function as a form of critique against repression and power.

As previously noted, Zimmer contends #ICantBreathe and #HandsUpDontShoot place us within the victim’s perspective during an encounter which oftentimes led to death.106 Initially, utilizing these hashtags demonstrates solidarity for the cause of racial equality; however, he contends there is a greater move afoot when such slogans are utilized. #ICantBreathe also creates empathy for its subject when it is modified as

#WeCantBreathe, thus becoming “not just about empathizing with Garner’s dying moment but about mobilizing that moment into social action.”107 The call for social action thus critiques a now declared unjust system/society. Employing this argument, I contend, both #HandsUpDontShoot and #ICantBreathe continue to serve as messages of dissent against established power structures. While #HandsUpDontShoot functions as a plea of innocence being met by violence and #ICantBreathe promotes a call for help during a crucial moment of peril, both demand a critique of excessive use of violence and unequal treatment by law enforcement.

Thimsen notes that scholars such as Evengy Morpzov, Mark Andrejevic, and Jodi

Dean commonly decry the use of social media as a means for protest, seeing it instead as

170 a sign of continued slacktivism.108 Their critique questions the true ability to garner support and ability to achieve action in response to online discourse/petitions. Such critique varies scantly from the general criticism leveled against new social movements, which rely on leaderless organization. However, as argued in chapter 2 and extended briefly here, social media provides a venue for democratic discourse and action if we deviate from the institutional approach to our understanding of democracy. Substantiation of support for a cause and the ability to engage new understandings of democratic action within the context of new technologies reiterates the importance of this work in rhetorically grounding digital dissent. Through this continued exploration we begin to discern the changing nature of political advocacy. Luckily, work has also fostered this exploration into interpreting increasingly robust democratic action/discourse.

Focusing on the role of online petitions, Thimsen articulates how simply writing off discourse on new media prevents insightful inquiry. Additionally, the expeditious write-off concerning acts such as petitioning restricts meaningful political, and democratic, action. After noting Susan Zaeske’s work illuminating the role of petitioning in increasing women’s political subjectivity, Thimsen argues, “both physical and digital petitioning has a certain kind of democratic potential even if it requires little time of those who sign and fails to have immediate measurable results. Much of this potential endures over the transition from quill to parchment to keyboard to app.”109 As Thimsen mentions in her later article about protest slogans representing the demonstration of democratic doxai (although admittedly not contextualized in digital activity) the act of protesting, similar to acts of petitioning, serves as traditional democratic action and thus represents

171 democratic doxai. Both utilize the doxa as a means to build solidarity with a movement, in this regards we return to the primary use of #BlackLivesMatter as a message for racial equality. #BlackLivesMatter has often been used as a protest message. Protest and dissent carry similar connotations but I argue dissent aligns more with social media activism as the act invokes disagreement—further aligning with Mouffe’s conception of agonism.

Additionally, I argue dissent is more attuned to a digital environment, especially when utilized as hashtags.

Aziz Douai contends social media discourse, specifically the use of hashtags, facilitates promoting and evolving conversation while serving as a venue for enacting social change.110 The ability to guide and frame discourse supports the ability to enact change. While this will be expanded in the section on digital dissent’s ability to critique doxa, through this current discussion it becomes apparent how social media activism, as digital dissent, can also act discursively similar to traditional democratic behaviors.

Furthermore, digital dissent’s enactment of democratic doxai demonstrates the concept’s discursive ability to initiate positive social change. Rachel Kuo utilizes the work of

Erving Goffman’s “collective action framing” as a means to offer the contention,

“hashtags offer discursive frame processes in articulating and circulating observed events and experiences.”111 The ability for #HandsUpDontShoot and #ICantBreathe to illuminate continually and arrange discourse on racial inequality demonstrates how digital dissent can function similarly to our traditional ideals of democratic behavior.

Digital dissent then further connects to Asen’s argument for discursive civic action and unmoors the reigns of our institutionalized desire for democratic action.

172 Kuo further attests, “Twitter also serves as [a] discursive terrain where racial justice meaning is contested by social movement and countermovement actors.”112

Although, as mentioned previously, social media sites risk becoming silos of similar messaging, there is a wealth of instances for individuals to encounter contested material.

Kuo concludes this assertion when she notates how hashtag campaigns sustain discourse between various publics.113 Moving discourse about racial justice throughout multiple publics increases the input and variation of information discussed. I am not arguing that we all must agree on this discourse, as difference and disagreement are warranted democratic ideals. As further argued throughout the project, especially within the next chapter, sharing difference helps to foster increased understanding of difference and seeks to create a more holistic shared meaning.

Even though Rancière’s work, at first glance, appears to find commonality with critique, there are vestiges of argument that demonstrate a connection to the demonstration of doxa. Dissensus appears as a critique of systems of inequality; however, such a simple depiction neglects the dynamic range of Rancière’s work. Specifically,

Rancière articulates the “demand for equality,” as politics and such acts help increase democracy. Davide Panagia writes, “democracy is dissensus for Rancière: democracy is the name given to forms of individuation that dissent from the given.”114 Here we begin to connect his argument of dissensus with the demonstration of democratic doxai. “For

Rancière,” Thimsen writes, “democratic demonstration is an eventual performance of rhetorical doxa of political equality that happens through doxastic collective personae.”115

Through the disruption of the sensible, the action demonstrates collective demand for

173 equality. We can then connect Rancière’s contention here with the traditional political belief of rule by the demos.

Although Rancière does not solely rely on the acts of collective groups in articulating a demand for equality (individual action is valid throughout his work) he does articulate the importance of collective action. He contends a collective group arises by “constituting a kind of community of sense experience that works on the world of assumption, of the as if that includes those who are not included by revealing a mode of existence of sense experience that has eluded the allocation of parties and lots.”116 By this nature, the utilization of #HandsUpDontShoot and #ICantBreathe helps support the call for society built as if the declaration of equality truly was shared by all individuals.

Digital dissent operates in this manner by functioning as “the appearance of a people, the minimum of equality that is inscribed in the field of common experience.”117 His contention here demonstrates how the “demand for equality” can in fact function as a demonstration of democratic doxai. Initiating discourse, in the demand for equality, remains the primary act of politics for Rancière and helps establish the front to collective action for social change. Having argued for dissensus, and digital dissent, functioning as a demonstration of democratic doxai, I now move to conclude the argument of digital dissent as a critique of democratic doxai.

Digital Dissent as Critique of Doxa

Although both have demonstrated an ability to build support for the cause of racial equality, #HandsUpDontShoot and #ICantBreathe also function as sources of critique against established power structures which perpetuate an unequal society. The

174 latent issue at hand in both Plato’s critique of doxa and rhetoricians’ demonstration and critique of doxa involves the role of consensus and dissensus. In her article, Thimsen notes scholars who tend to focus on the demonstrating role of doxa tend to draw on the works of Habermas and Dewey, both of whom argued for deliberative democracy and the significance of consensus. Additionally, it has been noted earlier one of Plato’s critiques of rhetoric, among many, was his reliance on consensus for identifying truth/knowledge.

I have previously argued how the shift away from a consensus driven politics helps proliferate disagreement and in turn builds upon shared discourse. I argue this point specifically as consensus could be understood as an act of concealment as it seeks to limit opposing views in a manner that builds toward singular understanding. Through the work of both Rancière and Ivie, I argue, dissent fosters increased democratic discourse, especially as it serves as critique through the act of revealing. Dissent can serve as critique of doxa by revealing competing points of view about our shared understanding and can conceal perpetuated power structures.

Competing points of view are the hallmark of dissent when people present new information that goes against the prevailing structural thinking. The importance of dissent thus returns us to Rancière’s articulation of democracy as he argues democracy is found within the demand for equality, specifically, through the role of “the part that has no part.”

Rancière writes:

The community of equals can always be realized, but only on two conditions.

First it is not a goal to be posited from the outset and endlessly reposited . . . The

175 second condition, which is much like the first, may be expressed as follows: the

community of equals can never achieve substantial form as a social institution. It

is tied to the act of its own verification, which is forever in need of reiteration.118

Here we again encounter Rancière’s connection to citizenship as discourse. He firmly believes that democratic politics must materialize naturally without formal introduction and must continue to be investigated, challenged, upheld continually and in a manner that demands equality for all. A networked system of individuals provides a venue for an increase in democratic discourse through the enactment of dissensus.

Todd May further elucidates Rancière’s connection to the critique of doxa by articulating how society continues to abide structural inequality through “a commitment to the hierarches and dominations of a given police order” while remaining committed to the ideal of being “founded on the equality of their citizens.”119 Through May’s argument, I contend such a view is not doxastic as there is no agreed upon belief in a

“commitment to inequality.” However, as he maintains, the implicit reliance on inequality, which remains as the primary desire to separate people into roles, “is at least ethically permissible and indeed ethically proper.” 120 Just as there can be found a doxastic premise that society is colorblind, there is also the notion that society is based on equality. Through these examples we can realize the concealing nature of doxa. How else does a society founded on the notion of equality continually perpetuate acts of inequality against individuals? Dissent, and by extension digital dissent, attempts to reveal the doxastic creation by challenging this perpetuated power structure through discourse.

176 Both Jennifer Mercieca and Rancière have delineated the means by which the

United States was founded under the notion of equality while nevertheless committed to a system of inequality amongst the citizenry. In her book Founding Fictions, Mercieca argues, from 1764 to 1845, United States citizens were portrayed as romantic heroes, tragic victims, or ironic participants. Within her criticism of these roles, she contends a participatory citizenry were antagonistic to the stability of political elites and thus the ideals of democracy were separated from the enactment of democracy.121 Additionally,

Rancière contends the ruling classes cultivate a hatred of democracy, through the limitation of dissent, while concurrently extoling the virtues of democracy, oftentimes by forceful transnational military action defended as “spreading democracy.”122 These examples demonstrate how individuals rely on the guise of democracy even though an elite ruling class continually silences them. We perpetuate a doxastic belief in equality even as the police order, and the hegemonic ruling class, pursues hierarchies inhibiting political participation. These actions demonstrate the concealing nature of doxa as articulated by Thimsen. Moreover, the importance of a critique of doxa initiated by dissent, as the doxastic norm is created through shared meaning—created through discourse and can be critiques just the same.

Rancière’s labeling of the “police order” easily conjures imagery and belief in the notion of a “police state” as traditionally understood; however, the articulation of the

“police order” is grander than simply the control of human behavior through law enforcement. For Rancière, the “police order” is the systemic hegemonic order of society.

He thus argues that hierarchies are created and maintained through people. The

177 conception of police order, of course, encompasses law enforcement but also incorporates the vast intricacies that support and protect the hegemony. The influence of Antonio

Gramsci and Michel Foucault are unmistakable in realizing Rancière’s argument. May observes how Rancière’s argument recognizes the ability for dissent to occur within numerous venues and actions when he writes, “If hierarchies are maintained at the level of the sensible, at the level of our experience of the world, so dissensus can operate there as well.”123 Rancière’s argument for dissent as disruption of the sensible relies on the ability for individuals to create the sensible through their shared interactions both in real life and through social media. May provides a skillful assertion on why Rancière believes in a broad sense of where politics, as dissensus, may occur. He argues that politics, once we remove the notion from the institutional agenda, happens in numerous methods.

Politics no longer becomes casting a ballot to pick our next representative and instead delves into the multitude of areas we share with other people. May provides the lunch counter sit-ins during the Civil Rights movement as an example of people using various arenas to enact demands for equality.124 Through these actions individuals begin to alter discourse and (re)create shared meaning through our social relationships.

Through dissensus one begins to critique our doxastic society—perhaps revealing concealed power structures our discourse perpetuates. Although not all dissent is going to critique power structures, the digital dissent examples investigated within this project demonstrate the ability for dissent to serve as critique of power. Additionally, as individuals begin to engage dissensus, the realm of political action broadens. Supporting this argument, May writes, “As we intervene politically on each of these, we can make

178 them more democratic, disrupting the police order that maintains oppressive relationships in favor of a participation that starts from the idea that each participant is equal.”125

Dissensus and an emphasis on discourse as political engagement, I contend, go hand in hand with an effort to build a stronger rhetorical society based on equality. Ivie argues dissent “constituted in rhetorical discourse” could be “the most constructive vehicle for managing hierarchical relations.” Combined with an emphasis of discourse as political action, Ivie argues criticism continues to be the method in which positive social change can be formulated. Criticism, he argues, serves “to transform social inequalities, tacitly or overtly, by rendering them contestable and subject to critical reflection and reformulations.”126 Digital dissent furthers the tradition of critique set forth by Ivie expanding his arguments into a digital context. Furthermore, through Asen’s reimagining of discourse as political action, we can better understand the democratic nature of digital dissent and the subsequent advocacy for social change.

In regards to this project, I have previously argued for a transition to a digital public sphere where political discourse is taken up through various social media sites.

Kuo provides support for my contention of social media as a venue for democratic politics, understood as a demand for equality, writing, “Through activist hashtags, counterpublics can collectively disseminate, demonstrate, and demand their needs.”127

Relating to this project I argue the demand of their needs equates to the demand for equality. The hashtag campaigns examined contain differing messages of dissent that declare black individuals have not found the equality many in society believe to be already attained. Ganaele Langlois and Greg Elmer argue social media users “can

179 become aware of the way their actions are going to find an echo and define a new attentional context” as they interact with other users. Utilizing Rancière’s conception of

“disruption of the sensible,” they contend users can identify and engage “processes that ultimately define specific ways of being together and understanding one’s existence within a community of others.”128 This argument relies on the shared discourses which

(re)create doxastic society. Samuel Chambers provides a compelling argument drawing

Rancière’s conception of dissensus into the realm of rhetoric and doxa. He contends

Rancière’s work condemns epistemic knowledge, as boundaries tend to conform around the order of who have and who do not have proper knowledge.129 Instead, as Rancière argues, “Politics is always emplotted in historical configurations.”130 I assert that such historical configurations are created through shared discourse and are embolic of a doxastic society—one where meaning and a demand for equality are created through our social relationships.

Additionally, I contend Rancière’s conception of dissensus, as discussed above through the discourse as political engagement, allows individuals to directly enact digital dissent as a means to critique doxastic norms. As part of the “part with no part,” one must declare their demand for equality. Zivi contends such an act tends to happen not with ease but oftentimes with historical failures as precedent.131 Her argument supports Ivie’s articulation of democratic dissent being “ongoing and reconstructive.”132 Ivie places dissent directly in connection to the role of invention as a rhetorical practice. He contends dissent works as discovery in finding areas for criticism and “holds prevailing perspectives accountable” to continued criticism.133 Digital dissent operates within Ivie’s

180 articulation of democratic dissent by similarly critiquing shared norms. Jonathan

Havercroft and David Owen contend hashtag campaigns that demand racial equality

“[critique] an order of continuous racial perception enacted in and through everyday practices of racecraft.”134 #HandsUpDontShoot and #ICantBreathe critique the very nature of racial equality as black individuals are continually treated unequally while engaging messages that represent acts of innocent and help. Finally, these critiques are enacted rhetorically as a means to critique currently shared discourses and meaning.

Having discussed Rancière’s connection to rhetoric, specifically within this chapter as the demonstration and critique of doxa, it is important also to investigate how we begin to understand how dissent furthers the necessity for an agonistic democracy. As

I previously noted, with support from May, Rancière remains vague in his application of how to enact and/or navigate actions of dissent—instead relying on the argument that dissensus is the only true form of democratic politics. May contends Rancière infers a sense of agonism as he asserts we must treat “those from who we dissent” with a

“presupposition of equality.”135 May asserts the actions of elites “must be resisted, as must the police order that benefits them. However, that resistance must recognize the equal humanity of those who see themselves as greater than equal to the rest of us.”136

Following the influence of Ivie, I argue that adopting a frame of dissensus, in an effort to build positive transformational change, must also acknowledge the role of democratic agonism.

181 Digital Dissent, Doxa, and the Agonistic Turn

I contend Rancière’s commitment to dissent further demands an agonistic frame of democracy even as it attempts to circumvent power structures. Rancière notes throughout his writing that he is not attempting to build a thorough political philosophy.

In fact, he frequently scorns the devotion to the continuation of “the great classic doctrines and the usual forms of state legitimization we know as liberal democracies.”137

In this framing of political philosophy, he laments the loss of the political to the reliance of institutions. Operating under the guise of participation and open deliberation, institutions indeed silence the disenfranchised in the name of the global free market and the adaption of practices sustaining its spread.138 His argument demonstrates that political philosophy concerning how to navigate and understand the political realm has veered substantially away from true politics—which he defines as the interruption of the dominant order.139 Politics, for him, lies within the quandary, “When is there and when is there not equality in things between who and who else?”140 However, Rancière does not provide concrete description or guidance on how one navigates the terrain of demanding equality or pathways for future discourse after the initial appeal. For him, such a description would be tantamount to trying to create a political philosophy reliant on the political institutions he so vehemently denies. Some scholars find his lack of finality disconcerting, especially when trying to insert his thinking within contemporary spaces; however, I contend his argument contributes insight into developing a more agonistic democracy and broadening venues for political discourse.

182 Eschewing an entire rehash of the principles of agonism outlined in chapter 1, I want to discuss how digital dissent thus furthers the acknowledgement of the role conflict in engaging democratic discourse. Mouffe writes, “A well functioning democracy calls for a clash of legitimate democratic political positions . . . such confrontations should provide collective forms of identification strong enough to mobilize political passions. If this adversarial configuration is missing, passions cannot be given democratic outlet and the antagonistic dynamics of pluralism are hindered.”141 Ivie has long argued the necessity for a humanizing style of democratic dissent—one that can only be created through the foundations of agonism. His argument necessitates that individuals adopt a

“humanizing idiom” in order to engage a “lively politics.”142 I have discussed how, despite the critiques of polarizing viewpoints on social media, users continue to engage differing opinions and perceptions. Thus further enacting Mouffe’s argument for developing contending views as adversarial becomes readily important.

Lincoln Dahlberg contends social media, specifically Twitter and Facebook, facilitate a pluralization of topics and opinions serving to engage a robust democratic discourse.143 Mouffe’s argument advocates for differing views to encompass fully a democratic process elsewise dissenting views are shuttered and democracy becomes hindered. However, social media users have also helped increase the dispersion of opposing views. Papacharissi and Oliveira contend Twitter provides a platform for individuals to subvert the traditional gatekeepers of political discourse influencing how stories were told, how individuals came to understand these stories and their own situatedness within them, and how others responded.144 I contend the conclusion they

183 draw represents the influence of doxa within a digital public sphere as users participated in discourse to create positive social change. Papacharissi and Oliveira further assert that once social media became a driving force for the challenging of structural hegemonic messages and served as the venue for increased democratic discourse little could be done to curtail its influence.145 Conflict thus becomes an important aspect of digital dissent while engaging discourse aimed to influence racial equality.

Embracing the role of conflict in democracy, Anna Tsing argues conflict helps us understand new ideas through the creation of “awkward, unequal, unstable and creative qualities of interconnection across difference,” which are created outside of our traditional understanding of the public sphere.146 Additionally, Asen writes, “Engaging others encourages people to step out from familiar and comfortable situations to encounters in which our beliefs and values will be tested.”147 These scholars identify how agonism requires individuals to adopt a new role of thinking about difference in political discourse. As this argument pertains to digital dissent, the importance of this change relies on social media users. This project helps illuminate how this potential shift can occur by exploring the role of digital dissent as social media activism. Realizing the democratic nature of dissent serves as a means to engage difference with individuals in the hopes of building a more equal society. Acknowledging the (re)created shared meaning that can flourish from these discursive interactions identifies the importance of agonism over our contemporary belief in institutional democracy.

184 Conclusion

Avoiding the pitfalls of institutional reliance requires individuals to understand political discourse in new and innovative methods. Asen has provided support for shifting away from institutional politics through his explication of a discourse theory of citizenship. Furthermore, Ivie provides the primary argument for this project by reiterating dissent’s role as a prominent democratic action. Rancière provides both a bridge and an extension between these two scholars and my own work as he challenges us to think democracy anew. As May notes, Rancière believes, “A democratic politics is a creation of those who participate by acting together out of the presupposition of equality. As such, it is made rather than granted. Democracy comes to pass not where we receive it but where we produce it.”148 Through digital dissent, I argue social media can serve as a venue for such democratic action through the role of discourse concerning racial inequality.

#ICantBreathe and #HandsUpDontShoot declare messages that are typified as needing help and showing innocence. They are common sense messages understood across contexts and backgrounds. To see how they serve as statements illuminating the unfair treatment of black individuals disrupts the normal association we assign to these messages. As the hashtags referenced in this chapter have demonstrated, knowing an individual who was being choked and states multiple times that they can’t breathe but receives no help disrupts how we believe humans should be treated. Additionally, knowing an individual can end up dead while showing no harm to others disrupts how we believe humans should be treated.149 Their usage demonstrates support for the ongoing

185 demand for racial quality. At the same time, they represent a critique of a supposed racially equal society.

This chapter has explicated how digital dissent operates as a demonstration and critique of democratic doxa. Digital dissent demonstrates democratic doxa by functioning as a demand for equality, typically through collective action, thus adopting a traditional understanding of democratic politics—rule by the people. Simultaneously, digital dissent embodies a critique of democratic doxa by challenging power structures often concealed through the doxa created through shared discourse. Throughout this chapter, I continued to identify the connection between digital dissent and Rancière’s conception of dissensus by articulating how it fits within a discourse theory of citizenship. Finally, I articulated how the proliferation of dissent furthers the shift to an agonistic democracy by engaging the positive role of difference and conflict. Having identified how digital dissent engages dissensus in order to circumvent the consensus based role of representative leadership in chapter 2 and the role of digital dissent as demonstration and critique of doxa in this chapter; I next turn my attention to digital dissent as comic corrective.

186 Chapter IV: Exploring Comic Framing: #CrimingWhileWhite and

#AliveWhileBlack as Digital Dissent

The death of Trayvon Martin, and subsequent acquittal of George Zimmerman, served as the catalyst for #BlackLivesMatter, the preeminent slogan for racial equality in recent memory. In addition to #BlackLivesMatter, multiple social media hashtag campaigns have bolstered the demand for racial equality. Two prominent supportive hashtag campaigns, discussed in the previous chapter, were #HandsUpDontShoot and

#ICantBreathe. These campaigns, and others, are supportive of the #BlackLivesMatter movement while also providing discourse that highlight multiple areas, and instances, of racial inequality. Whereas #HandsUpDontShoot and #ICantBreathe operate as messages illustrating common sense behavior which should not warrant violent responses, other hashtags have utilized messages demonstrating contrasting differences in how black people and white people are treated by police. Identifying such systemic differences promotes a necessary turn in our understanding of democracy from a deliberative democracy based on reason toward an agonistic pluralism based on identifying and engaging difference.

In the previous chapter, I argued digital dissent campaigns have the potential to demonstrate and critique doxastic beliefs, which promote a Rancierian “demand for equality,” and facilitate a transformation toward understanding democracy as a process.

Transitioning our understanding of democracy in such a manner fluctuates further away from deliberative based democracy to a democracy based on agonism. In this chapter, I turn to exploring how digital dissent engages a comic corrective. Drawing on Kenneth

187 Burke’s conception of the comic corrective and his articulation of perspective by incongruity, I argue digital dissent functions as a “disruption of the sensible.” Serving as a disruption, digital dissent thus represents a Rancierian form of dissensus. Within this manner of dissensus a greater sense of democratic discourse forms—we begin to comprehend democracy as a process rather than as institutional. Furthermore, through

Robert Ivie’s framing of democratic dissent and Chantal Mouffe’s articulation for agonistic pluralism, this chapter exhibits how digital dissent emphasizes differences people share in society and how understanding those differences can help better comprehend an agonistic democracy. I conclude the chapter by suggesting that digital dissent serves as a vernacular form of dissent based in illuminating societal differences.

History and Utilization of #CrimingWhileWhite and #AliveWhileBlack

Before examining Burke’s formulation of the comic corrective and perspective by incongruity I want to establish the genesis of both #CrimingWhileWhite and

#AliveWhileBlack. Both illuminate the differences between how white and black people are viewed unequally in society—especially how they are treated by law enforcement.

The two social media hashtag campaigns provide further examples of Rancière’s

“disruption of the sensible” by providing examples of white people receiving leniency in committing crimes. #CrimingWhileWhite specifically disrupts the notion of societal equality through highlighting the continued pervasiveness of racial profiling/institutional racism. #AliveWhileBlack highlights how the oftentimes-everyday activities of white people have been cast as criminal behavior when black people perform the same actions and in the severest of cases resulted in death. These campaigns thus disrupt our sense of a

188 post-racial society leveled in equality. Additionally, both campaigns similarly represent a comic corrective through dissent against hegemonic norms. Through Burke’s conception of the comic corrective we can see how social media messages can serve as a form of dissent, which highlights how people perceive individual difference and cultivate a restored understanding of those differences. Burke’s argument of the comic corrective, leading to a greater sense of understanding individual difference, further introduces how

Mouffe’s argument for agonistic pluralism can lead to more robust democratic action.

Mouffe’s argument urges an understanding of politics as a “we/they relation” in order for conflicting parties to define differences and operate toward common ground.1 Digital dissent facilitates a shift toward agonistic pluralism where dissent bolsters the ability to illuminate and engage differences thus inhibiting the desire of consensus and focusing on building through disagreement—focusing on common goals through differing interpretations.

History of #CrimingWhileWhite

#CrimingWhileWhite and #AliveWhileBlack initially became prominent after the strangulation death of Eric Garner. Regrettably, however, the Tamir Rice case stands out as the most devastating representation of how black people are systemically treated differently than white people by police. Beyond sharing a common skin color, Garner and

Rice were also killed for mundane activities that otherwise should not have resulted in death—Garner selling untaxed single cigarettes, Rice for playing with a BB-gun in a park. Similarities aside, Rice was only 12 years old at the time of his death. On

November 22, 2014, Cleveland police dispatch received a call reporting an individual at

189 the Cuddell Recreation Center pointing a gun at people. At the beginning of the call and once more during the call the caller indicated that the gun was “probably fake.”2 Two police officers, Timothy Loehmann and Frank Garmback, were dispatched to the area, but neither the knowledge of a possible fake gun, nor the caller’s statement that the person is “probably a juvenile,” was communicated to the officers. Upon arriving at the scene, Garmback drove the police car over a curb and pulled up within twenty feet of

Rice. According to police reports, Loehmann then exited the car and after shouting multiple warnings to Rice, and believing the suspect was reaching to point a gun at him, shot twice hitting Rice once in the abdomen. Rice would die the next day from his gunshot wound.

Officers initially reported believing that Rice was “over 18 years old and about

185 pounds.”3 Surveillance video of the event would refute officers’ claims, exhibiting officer Loehmann shooting Rice within 1 to 2 seconds after exiting the vehicle. Video also shows Loehmann was between 4.5 to 7 feet away from Rice when he fired. Further tarnishing the police response, the surveillance video also highlighted Rice struggling with his wounds for several minutes before receiving any sort of medical attention as police were not equipped with the training, nor equipment, to manage gunshot wounds.

The gun in question was later found to be a non-lethal airsoft pistol that had its protective orange tip removed by friends. Witnesses to the incident denied hearing verbal warnings before hearing gunshots fired.4 On December 28, 2015 a grand jury, despite noting multiple faults ranging from officer hires to actions at the incident, decided not to indict officers Loehmann and Garmback.

190 In response to Tamir Rice’s death, and later the grand jury decision not to indict the officers involved, there was a reemergence in the usage of the hashtag

#CrimingWhileWhite. On December 2, 2014, Jason Ross, a “The Tonight Show” writer, tweeted, “Busted 4 larceny at 11. At 17, cited for booze + caught w gun @ school. No one called me a thug. Can’t recommend being white highly enough.” He soon followed up with the comment, “OTHER WHITE PEOPLE: Tweet your stories of under-punished f-ups! It’s embarrassing but important! Let’s get #CrimingWhileWhite trending!”5 Over the course of the next two days over 300,000 tweets would utilize the

#CrimingWhileWhite.6 Tweets displaying racial differences in regards to interactions with law enforcement were common. For example, users (mostly white) posted tweets where criminal actions ranging from jay walking to breaking and entering were met with little when police were involved. Thorough analysis of tweets will follow a discussion over the usage of #AliveWhileBlack.

The hashtag proves consequential in illustrating how white and black people were treated in regards to committing similar crimes. A 2013 report by the American Civil

Liberties Union affirms that black people are almost four times as likely to be arrested for marijuana possession.7 The difference in arrest rates becomes astoundingly unequal when accounting for all drug arrests. Human Rights Watch asserts when accounting for all drug usage, black men are incarcerated on drug charges at a rate approximately thirteen times greater than white men.8 Yet, as Michelle Alexander contends in her book, The New Jim

Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness, black and white populations tend to use drugs an equal percentage—ultimately meaning that more white people use

191 drugs overall than black people. Yet, the majority of arrests for drugs, and subsequent incarceration numbers, are black people.9 The studies cited here demonstrate our historical upbringing within a police system that consistently treats individuals unequally based on skin color. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the Presidential election of Barack

Obama ushered in a supposed era of a colorblind society, yet, the stories highlighted through the #CrimingWhileWhite hashtag not only demonstrated historical inaccuracy of a colorblind society but also that contemporary society still perpetuated these vast inequalities.

History of #AliveWhileBlack

As #CrimingWhileWhite grew in popularity, a competing yet similar hashtag campaign also began in an effort to illuminate and confront the unequal police treatment of black and white people. Critiquing #CrimingWhileWhite as a campaign that allowed white people to guide the narrative of police violence and shift focus away from how black people are treated, #AliveWhileBlack was initiated in an effort to allow black people to regain control of the police violence narrative. Sarah Galo, writer for The

Guardian, posits, “While well-intentioned, #CrimingWhileWhite distracted attention from policy violence against black citizens” and, in return, “satirically highlighted the privilege of being a white person in America—but at the expense of actually listening to actual black voices.”10 White allies in the fight to combat racial inequality have to actively regulate overshadowing the narratives of others. #CrimingWhileWhite focused on white people’s narratives and experiences. Although such white narratives help acknowledge the existence of white privilege, an extremely worthwhile endeavor, the

192 existence of such privilege is extensively known by black individuals. #AliveWhileBlack created the chance for the experiences of black people to be placed at the forefront of illuminating the unequal treatment of black people.

Jamilah Lemieux, senior digital editor for the Ebony, began #AliveWhileBlack as a counter-narrative highlighting how police have treated black people. After tweeting the idea behind #AliveWhileBlack, Lemieux followed up with the tweet, “Got raped+robbed.

Police took forever to interview me, mentioned that women sometimes lie to hide

‘gambling, overspending.’”11 A black person sharing their narrative circumvents simply experiencing “white privilege” by instead illuminating actual harm wrought upon individuals. #AliveWhileBlack “demonstrates that black people experience law enforcement in ways their white counterparts may never understand, because racism in the system remains largely unchecked.”12 Focusing on the experiences of black people, rather than the leniency police prescribe white people, fixated the attention on the abuse and harassment black people face daily from law enforcement. Author Jessica Valenti argues, “There are experiences and stories that matter more right now than how cops let white people slide . . . demonstrating that we know racism exists and benefit from it doesn’t change the existence of racism or that we benefit from it.”13 Black people accentuating their experiences of violence and neglectful treatment by police officers advances an argument of systemic inequality more so than white people perpetuating their privilege. Rather, #AliveWhileBlack allowed black people to share their real life fears about how everyday activities can lead to not only violent reactions but time spent incarcerated—leading to an even more systemic inequality.

193 Tweets utilizing the #AliveWhileBlack hashtag explicitly detailed violent behavior and extensive neglect faced by black people when encountering law enforcement. Tweets utilizing #CrimingWhileWhite explicitly detailed the leniency white people received when encountering law enforcement, highlighting the influence of white privilege when engaging in illegal activities. Both hashtag campaigns strive to identify structural inequalities found within society by documenting discrimination, systemic racism, and violence toward black people. While #CrimingWhileWhite brought attention to the perils faced by black people, it also was instrumental in fostering an acknowledgement of the detriments others face due to white privilege. Subsequently,

#AliveWhileBlack directly attacked the racial inequities of society. As both play a role in demonstrating problems with insinuating a colorblind society, this chapter concentrates on their roles in enacting a disruption of the sensible. As such, both play a role in underscoring racial differences and helping challenge the racial divide—even if simply acknowledging unequal law enforcement treatment of white and black people is just a beginning.

Utilization of #CrimingWhileWhite and #AliveWhileBlack

Having discussed the creation of both hashtag campaigns, I want to turn attention to the contents of each campaign in order to demonstrate directly how they serve to highlight racial differences in terms of law enforcement engagement.

#CrimingWhileWhite, as acknowledged, turned the focus away from black experience but, nonetheless, exemplified the degree to which white people are not policed to the extent of black people. Similarly, #CrimingWhileWhite demonstrated how some of the

194 activities white people have engaged in, and been negligibly punished, have led directly to the death of some black people. No tweet more so demonstrated this inequality than the one sent from @HalpernAlex stating, “Played with realistic toy guns my entire childhood, wherever we wanted. #CrimingWhileWhite.”14 Reading this as a direct response to the death of Tamir Rice establishes gross racial differences between how law enforcement treats white and black people.

Other #CrimingWhileWhite tweets exhibited glaring differences in the way white people are treated by law enforcement in comparison to black people. Common sentiment for the usage of #CrimingWhileWhite surrounded the seemingly mundane tweets, such as, “successfully shoplifted A LOT back in the day because nobody ever followed me around or assumed I was a risk,” to the more outrageous, “A cop caught me breaking and entering with some (white) college friends. He told us to get lost. No warnings. Nothing.”

Other seemingly innocuous tweets were similar to, “Jay walked. not shot,” “I once jumped a turnstile while trying to catch a subway. Received a warning. Wasn’t choked out & killed. Nice,” “Not panicked when I get pulled over,” and “Shoplifted when I was a teenager. Was apprehended but never charged because I looked ‘like a good kid.’” More serious tweets included, “Many white friends pulled over for DUI in college. Cops followed them home to make sure they got home safe, no arrests,” “3 minors, out past curfew in a county park, 2/3 obviously drunk, told to head home, cop left 1st, we stayed another hour,” “Threw a beer bottle in front of a cop. He acted like he arrested me, but just took me home and said to have a safe night,” and “Someone very close to me assaulted a state police officer at a traffic stop once. Was out by 9 am and later beat

195 case.” Whether seemingly small in magnitude or outright illegal acts these tweets recognize a concession to racial differences.

Other tweets openly displayed racial differences in how white people were treated in comparison to black people while engaging in similar acts. Tweets such as, “In high school I got in a 3 car wreck that might have been my fault. The cop told me it was the

‘illegal alien’s’ fault,” “I would have a story for #CrimingWhileWhite but I only seem to get stopped by police while I’m with my Black friends. Oh, wait…,” “PoC friend asked me to hold paraphernalia for him after a car accident. Said he’d be searched & I wouldn’t.

He was right,” and “At 13 I stole a car with my friends & drove it 2wks before we got busted. Only one charged was black.” These tweets openly recognize how, even in the exact same situation, black people are discriminated against in comparison to white people, again, demonstrating the systemic inequality of law enforcement.

Crimes that were represented in tweets associating #CrimingWhileWhite ranged from minor offenses such as speeding, shoplifting, being out past curfew, and trespassing to major offences such as vandalism, burglary, assault (including assault of police officers), and driving under the influence. As previously argued, #CrimingWhileWhite was criticized for foreshadowing the experiences of black people, yet the hashtag still was able to resonate with white people as a means to initiating the ability for some to see white privilege at work in their own lives. Tweets such as, “it is hard to write about

#CrimingWhileWhite because I always thought justice was colorblind, not

#WhitePrivilege. Makes me ashamed,” demonstrate a shift in previously held beliefs.

Others followed up with similar notions, “The #CrimingWhileWhite hashtag is

196 welcomed. Thanks for being honest re: #WhitePrivilege. It’s not a hard process, it's a healing process,” “#CrimingWhileWhite is like introducing yourself at AA. Self awareness is a huge hurdle, but it’s just the first step,” and “Some of you have pointed out that #CrimingWhileWhite helps other White folks realize policing isn’t fair. My heart still hurts.” However, the above tweets demonstrate a disruption of the sensible for people who were able to acknowledge the influence of white privilege in their own lives and how it has shaped their understanding of the justice system, including law enforcement, as well as their understanding of others.

#AliveWhileBlack elicits attention to the experiences of black people rather than how interactions with law enforcement were understood through a white lens. Tweets utilizing #AliveWhileBlack emphasized the drastic differences in how black people must navigate their everyday lives differently than white people. People shared tweets about how everyday behavior garnered both petty police encounters, such as, “Walking to library. Campus security stops me and asks for ID. Several times. Claims I don’t ‘look’ like a law student,” to severely dangerous actions by law enforcement, such as, “Gun put to head for refusing to get off of a recorded phone call with my insurance company.

Agent cried.” #AliveWhileBlack thus provides messages acknowledging the inequality black people face everyday and sharing these stories demonstrates that black people must not only understand their own behavior but how to navigate a white privilege based police society.

Other #AliveWhileBlack tweets openly displayed discrimination against black people, racist behavior of law enforcement, and a wanton neglect of black life. Tweets

197 demonstrating outright discrimination of black people while engaging in everyday behavior were similar to, “Cop stops me. Illegally searches the car. I call my wife. She arrives. He writes her a jaywalking ticket for ‘interferring’ [sic],” “Stopped b/c child ‘did not look like he shld [sic] be w/me’ Asked to prove my light-skinned nephew was not being kidnapped,” “Pulled over w my mom. People think shes white, she was driving.

Cops asked for my ID and license ‘for her protection,’” and “Brother drove to school.

Pulled over and handcuffed. Police claimed car was too nice to be his and that he stole it.” Beyond just discrimination, people expressed instances of outright racist behavior by law enforcement. Tweets such as, “Walking to school at 12. Harrassed by 2 cops every day for weeks. Complete with racial slurs,” “I was stopped 29 times by cops in E. Europe during my 18 months as a Fullbright Scholar. Police racism is a world issue,” “My dad &

I were pulled over after leaving an open house in affluent neighborhood. Questioned why we’d want to move there,” and “White cops pulled me over/out of car at 1 am while at red light. Accuse me of prostitution. Detained for 30min. #AliveWhileBlack…& a woman,” exemplified willful racism.

Tweets using #AliveWhileBlack also exemplified malicious neglect of black life ranging from, “A car wrecked into mine—face bleeding, concussed, the police and medial [sic] workers told me to stop crying and faking,” “I was mugged after dropping a friend off late at night after work. the cops harassed me & asked why i was ‘really there,’” “Age 15 walking 2 bus stop after school. Cop & his .357 asked where I came from. Hands up, I nodded to HS. Waited to be ID’d,” and “Tackled to ground. Cop put knee in my back & drew gun. My clothes looked like some ‘suspects.’ Talked my way

198 free. I was 15.” Whether mundane in nature, dropping a friend off late after work or walking to school, to potentially needing police assistance, car accident or house break- in, these tweets demonstrate the dangers black people face when engaging with law enforcement.

#CrimingWhileWhite helped white people understand how white privilege is enacted in their lives but #AliveWhileBlack helped underscore a system of racial difference that white people could never fully comprehend. Additionally,

#CrimingWhileWhite accentuated how white people are treated unfairly when committing a crime whereas #AliveWhileBlack concentrated on how black people were treated unfairly when committing no crime. Both of these campaigns, however, help illuminate differences by examining how both white and black people understand our encounters with law enforcement and the inherent systemic imbalance that has permeated our everyday lives. The campaigns are similar in their desire to illuminate racial inequalities. The campaigns have continued to rise to prominence after violent encounters with law enforcement resulted in the death of a, usually unarmed, black person. Eric

Garner was choked to death for selling cigarettes. Tamir Rice was shot for playing with a toy gun in a park. Freddie Gray was beaten to death for running from police. Walter Scott was shot in the back after running from police during a traffic stop. Samuel DuBose was shot during a routine traffic stop. Philando Castile was shot during a stop for a possible traffic violation, and after allegedly alerting the police officer to his legally concealed firearm. Alton Sterling was shot and killed after being confronted for selling bootleg music and movie discs. Terence Crutcher was shot while waiting by his broke-down car.

199 Stephon Clark was shot in the back after allegedly breaking a window. Officers reported he pointed a gun at them but later reports note only a cell phone was found.

The aforementioned cases resulting in death represent the most extreme instances of racial inequality when encountering law enforcement. However, examples of

#CrimingWhileWhite and #AliveWhileBlack continue to have a presence on social media as individuals utilize the campaigns with daily updated accounts of racial inequality.

Although the hashtag originated in 2014, a contemporary search for

#CrimingWhileWhite finds multiple daily examples of social media users utilizing the hashtag in a continued effort to emphasize the continued privileging of white lives over black lives. Furthermore, while not as popular, incidentally supporting the argument that

#CrimingWhileWhite allows white people the opportunity to acknowledge white privilege while at the same time placing black experience secondary, #AliveWhileBlack continues to be utilized to highlight racial inequality. Contemporary searches for the hashtag will undoubtedly return multiple examples of users documenting their own experiences with society’s racist double standard. Societal inequality based on race is as deeply engrained, as it is vast in the manner in which it occurs. The two aforementioned campaigns primarily detail law enforcement inequality but expand occasionally to promote difference through many daily activities.

The last argument I want to make pertains to the hashtag campaigns’ wording and concerns the previous argument about how #CrimingWhileWhite can overshadow the experiences of black people. The crux of my assertion is the focus on active decision making versus normal daily activity. As previously mentioned, advocates for

200 #AliveWhileBlack claimed that usage of #CrimingWhileWhite subverted authentic black experience in favor of the acknowledgement of white privilege. Simply noting what responsibility white people evaded when committing a crime focuses primarily on the deliberate action of the individual—in this case the choice to commit an illegal activity.

As mentioned above, such activities ran the gamut from curfew violations to underage driving while intoxicated. Regardless of the illegal act, and the outcome, these individuals chose to act in such a manner. By contrast, the actions represented in the majority of #AliveWhileBlack messages were typically normal everyday activities in which black individuals were presumed to be committing an illegal act—or simply being treated with suspicion of having committed an illegal act. The difference between the two campaigns illustrates racial inequality black individuals encounter daily. Disregarding this inequality as white people benefitting from white privilege eliminates the truly drastic measure of systemic inequality. Instead, focusing on black people being treated unequally, merely for not being white, demonstrates the vast nature of inequality within society. #AliveWhileBlack shows us that not only are black people treated unequally when committing a crime, but are treated harshly when solely engaging in mundane daily activities. It is bad enough that black people are held to a different standard than white people in regards to the law, but it is truly infuriating to see how such inequality permeates daily life.

Understanding this racial inequality in daily life has been a topic for rhetorical scholars at least since W.E.B. Dubois introduced the concept of “double consciousness.”

Dubois asserted black people are born within a veil creating a “sense of always looking at

201 one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity.”15 Because of this double consciousness, Dubois argued black people were enabled with insight unfamiliar to white people—as black people understood themselves as both black and American they negotiated both identities. In this instance, and in contemporary society, American identity equates to the identity of the majority population, thus meaning white American identity. Undertaking this negotiation forced black people to discern both the black identity they embodied and the white identity in which they operated daily. Dubois contends that it takes great strength to navigate such a reality, writing that black people engage “two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder.”16 Such strength and ability to endure hardship has fostered in black people a potential innate ability to ascertain a more robust insight into American politics—especially democracy.

#AliveWhileBlack and #CrimingWhileWhite help social media users who encounter the messages identify racial differences in terms of how people are treated by law enforcement. Of course, not everyone who encounters these hashtag campaigns, for reasons mentioned in previous chapters, will be open to realizing these differences. Due to echo chambers, political ideology, and simple over-inundation of information people will have various interpretations of messages; however, these campaigns provide the potential for social media users to comprehend how others experience our world differently. #AliveWhileBlack and #CrimingWhileWhite provide examples of digital dissent through exhibiting variance in how people are treated differently based on race in a supposed “post-race” society. Furthermore, these hashtag campaigns demonstrate a

202 comic corrective that recognizes and emphasizes different versions of truth. Realizing these robust differences advocates a transition away from the desire for consensus within the societal conception of democracy and reaffirms the importance of dissent.

Digital Dissent as Comic Corrective

Despite the intentions of some to subvert the importance of dissent, it remains an important democratic practice. Ivie vehemently places dissent within the pantheon of democratic discourse, writing, “democracy cannot be true to the principle of self- governance when dissent is stifled, and public opinion is manipulated by elites.”17

Without the ability to dissent, democracy inherently turns feeble, relying on the consensus of the ruling class over the voice of the demos. Understanding dissent’s connection to democracy also inherently places dissent as a form of criticism. “Dissent,”

Ivie posits, works by “continually adjusting to circumstances and extant relationships of force on the margins of power and at the miniscule or microlevel of a cultural field.”18

Dissent allows those who Rancière describes as “the part with no part” an ability to challenge consensus. Furthermore, relating directly to rhetorical study, Steven Shiffrin asserts dissent challenges the “conventions, habits, and traditions” of society among other

“pressures to conform.”19 Understanding dissent’s role in rhetorical critique further emphasizes the connection between dissent and Kenneth Burke’s “comic frame.”

“A frame,” Burke contends, “becomes deceptive when it provides too great plausibility for the [individual] who would condemn symptoms without being able to gauge the causal pressure behind the symptoms.”20 Burke argues people select between frames of acceptance and frames of rejection. Frames of acceptance welcome agreement

203 whereas frames of rejection warrant disapproval. The two frames of acceptance Burkes deals in are tragedy and comedy. Tragedy relies on inherent enlightenment, personal limitations, and the perpetuation of villains.21 The comic frame, on the other hand, understands individuals as “necessarily mistaken” actors playing the role of the “fool.”22

The comedic frame thus positions situations as opportunities for potential correction. The comic frame, according to Burke, “opens up a whole new field of social criticism” as criticism helps us understand the relationships we share with others.23 The comic frame requires us to hold an empathetic view of others—to try to understand the material and relational constraints to how we view others. Undertaking a comic frame thus propels us to perceive others not as deceptive but rather as unknowing.

Through a comic frame, society understands others not as cruel but rather as obtuse. Reinvigorating our understanding of difference, and the actions of others, must change for us to engage Burke’s argument for greater understanding rather than the normal return to violence. Burke writes, “The progress for humane enlightenment can go no further than in picturing people not as vicious, but as mistaken. When you add that people are necessarily mistaken, that all people are exposed to situations in which they must act as fools, that every insight contains its own special kind of blindness.”24 The shift in understanding difference in this manner avoids the tendency for outrage instead focusing us toward learning. The connection between the comic frame, rhetorical criticism, and dissent becomes apparent as the importance of learning for robust understanding becomes magnified.

204 William Rueckert terms the connection between the comic frame and rhetorical criticism as comic criticism, arguing such criticism is “mainly concerned with teaching, curing, and consoling.”25 Dissent, understood within a comic frame, allows one to look in on his or her self, thus providing critique in the essence of learning and teaching.

“Thinking of dissent in this way,” Ivie adds, “makes it an ongoing exercise of rearticulating relationships among components within a cultural field, of rhetorical critique from within an established framework of understanding.”26 Thus, he concludes, dissent establishes Burke’s concepts of identification and consubstantiality, which helps

“bridge social and other divisions between deeply conflicted parties.”27 Dissent operating within a comic frame strives to identify and correct inequality. Additionally, understanding dissent within a comic frame helps to alleviate the degree of difference between people and instigate positive change. “The comic frame, in making a man [or woman] the student of himself [herself], makes it possible for him [her] to ‘transcend’ occasions when he [she] has been tricked or cheated,” Burke writes, “since he [she] can readily put such discouragements in his [her] ‘assets’ column, under the head of experience.”28 Ivie defends Burke’s claim, writing, “rhetoric negotiates the politics of hubris and humility where opposing identities and interests confront one another.”29 Both

Burke and Ivie write against the threat of war in their desire for a more inclusive method for overcoming difference. As the past has demonstrated, too often war and violence are the answers to differences between people. The answer both pursue is to negate the tendency to war by instead focusing antagonism into agonism. Thus, Ivie concludes, dissent, understood as a comic frame and as a form of critique, strives to enlarge society’s

205 definition of the common good and resolve conflict.30 Shiffrin adds dissent inherently requires an ability to critique existing power structures and embedded understandings of inequality in order to identify and combine “a different vision of … priorities, [and] a better sense of values.”31 Dissent contests powers within a given context in an effort to increase understanding. In this way, dissent, within a digital field, increase an individual’s ability to voice dissent and widens the ability to contest power structures.

Connecting the ComicFrame and Hashtag Campaigns

#CrimingWhileWhite and #AliveWhileBlack operate through a comic frame, offering an opportunity to learn the pervasive nature of racial inequality throughout society, by allowing the audience an ability to look upon their selves, and advocate a desire for correction. For example, the tweet, which was attached with

#AliveWhileBlack, “Walking to library. Campus security stops me and asks for ID.

Several times. Claims I don’t ‘look’ like a law student,” offers the chance to understand how an act as simple as attending college as a black student is met by racial inequalities.

Different people can now understand how something as mundane as walking to class can be perceived so differently. Similarly, the tweet, “Not panicked when I get pulled over,” which was tweeted with the hashtag #CrimingWhileWhite, demonstrates how simple traffic stops are interpreted differently based on race. My own experience changed dramatically as I listened to a visiting speaker during graduate school. The speaker, a black preacher from a nearby town, described his upbringing in the south and then upon moving north, had grown accustomed to the sound of car doors locking as he passes cars while walking on the sidewalk. Having never had this experience it terrified me that I too

206 have contributed to this inequality simply by not being attentive to the issue. The preacher’s guest lecture occurred soon before the jury decision of acquittal for Darren

Wilson in the shooting death of Michael Brown. The use of #CrimingWhileWhite and

#AliveWhileBlack allowed me the capability to understand further society’s racial inequality. Utilizing contemporary technology, individuals have an ability to expand the ability to share their voice and reach a larger audience.

Although Burke’s writing did not primarily focus on aspects of technology, he understood how, as symbol using and misusing animals, humans use technology to interpret the world. He also understood how those messages may change due to their usage of different technologies. Rueckert surmised Burke’s general sense of reasoning for the comic corrective, at least within Attitudes Toward History, was “How best adapt the symbol-using animal to the conditions of world empire that are being forced upon us by the irresistible ‘progress’ of technology.”32 Understanding the use of the comic frame, with a rhetorical grounding in social media, furthers our ability to understand how contemporary digital dissent messages operate as contestation against consensus built power structures, in this instance, against systemic racial inequality.

It is important when discussing the comic frame to recall that the discourse does not entail comedy in a humorous sense but rather comedy in the sense of interpretation— we are discussing how people’s foibles can be featured as a method to garner understanding. Kathryn Olson contends the comic frame does not refer to being humorous; instead, “the comic frame is defined by a posture of humility, gentle prodding, and optimism for a better shared future through a repaired social order instead of

207 punishments; unlike the tragic frame, the comic frame does not require winners and losers.”33 Comedy, in this instance, thus concerns the everyday nature of humanity. Burke argues, “Comedy must develop logical forensic causality to its highest point, calling not upon astronomical marvels to help shape the plot, but completing the process of internal organization whereby each event is deduced ‘syllogistically’ from the premises of the informing situation.” Thus, Burke concludes, “Comedy deals with man [sic] in society.”34 Unlike tragedy, which he argues belongs in the cosmic realm, the comic corrective works to repair the divisions created through human nature’s desire for identification. Burke’s differentiation between tragedy and comic derives from the agency available to the subject within each situation. Within a tragic frame, the cosmic

[hu]man remains under the guise of the hopeless situation. The cosmic [hu]man remains without agency as he or she’s power is ultimately contained to the reliance of outside influence. Whereas a cosmic [hu]man represents one at the mercy of the situation, the comic [hu]man presents a person in society, one able to influence their situation. Along with this control comes Burke’s overall thesis that we work within the assumption, “that getting along with people is one devil of a difficult task, but that . . . we should all want to get along with people (and do want to).”35 Doing so means we must understand the fallibility of each other while operating under the belief in adversaries over enemies.

Thus, we can recover hope and understanding of each other.

Hashtag campaigns, as digital dissent, can employ the comic frame and help bolster democratic action. Burke argues the role of the critic to point out comic correctives deserves utmost importance in spreading democracy in the face of constant

208 authoritarianism. The role of “critics,” Burke asserts, “must persist in their attempts to spread and perfect a ‘comic’ interpretation of human motives, aware that, . . . the movement towards the humane and civilized is maintained precisely insofar as the astute self-consciousness of comedy is ‘implemented’ by the accumulated body of comic shrewdness.”36 #CrimingWhileWhite and #AliveWhileBlack, amongst others hashtags, utilize the comic frame in a way to cultivate an acknowledgement of difference that we have, as fools, have continued to perpetuate, creating a system of inequality. Through the usage of the comic corrective, these hashtags provide the ability for us to see a broken system and, hopefully, restore equality. Functioning as comic correctives, these hashtags allow individuals the opportunity to see a flawed system as the opening of a digital public sphere and broadens the capability of people to share dissent messages. The ability to detect inequality is the fundamental aspect of digital dissent and its ability to act as comic corrective provides individuals a chance to address recourse action.

Burke contends that humans inherently desire to correct injustice, writing,

“Insofar as they are resolvable contradictions [they act] to resolve them.”37 Dissent as comic corrective pursues to resolve difference by challenging created norms.

#CrimingWhileWhite and #AliveWhileBlack challenge our perception of equality and seek to create greater understanding of difference and provide us with an ability to avoid dangerous dehumanization of others. Burke attests the comic frame “might provide important cues for the composition of one’s life, which demands accommodation to the structure of others’ lives.”38 Being able to reflect on one’s self allows one to articulate further the differences we all share. Importantly, his concept of the comic frame, as it

209 pertains to an individual’s ability to accommodate an others’ life connects to Burke’s discussion of identification become significant.

Through his discussion of “identification,” Burke argues our desire is to find similarity with each other while still acknowledging our differences.39 Thus, Burke famously argues, “identification is compensatory to division.”40 He terms this difference/common connection as “consubstantiality,” positing that we share markers and aspects allowing us to engage encouraging cooperation.41 This understanding of

“identification” provides some similarity to my previous argument on the role of social media providing a space where people who share connection but also share differences generating the capacity for discourse. Judith Butler also takes up the question of identification, noting identification cannot be sustained within the uniformity of consensus.42 Burke finds identification and division as a dialectical principle–between identity and division–because we cannot identify with someone entirely, thus division will always be present. Burke’s argument here lends credence to Mouffe’s belief that conflict is omnipresent in politics because politics must always contain the negotiation of personal identity.

Furthermore, Rancière connects to the division of people even though his own theoretical stance is to pursue the removal of levels between people. Rancière argues that democracy, as traditionally understood, and perhaps as we idealize it in contemporary

American government, (supposedly) attempts to do away with the natural division between people either by birth or wealth.43 He also adds that democracy, as currently practiced in government, depoliticizes the struggles of public life by “denying the forms

210 of domination that structure society.”44 This denial led Rancière to his foundational argument that the supposed practitioners of democracy truly demonstrate a hatred of democracy, as they fear the power of the people. While his argument against democracy considers the removal of division between people, Rancière’s contention is that politics occurs when people demand equality. Rancière describes political beings as a “being- between,” as individuals recognizing similarities from differing perspectives but also between conditions.45 We again find traces of Burke’s conception of consubstantiality appearing as we find ourselves sharing common ground while also having unique individual perspectives. These divisions can only be overcome through rhetoric, as divisions need to be illuminated, discussed, and negotiated. Dissent finds importance here as the ability to challenge power structures by providing critique, as mentioned earlier, and the opportunity to self question. Looking inward on one’s self begins to move our focus into Burke’s conception of the “comic corrective” and how it fits within my argument for digital dissent.

Digital Dissent as Comic Corrective

Digital dissent’s contestation of consensus helps identify difference even within realms of people who share commonalities. Although users may converge due to shared commonalities, few share entirely identical perceptions. Burke’s conception of identification does not entirely encompass the understanding of social media in regards to the sharing of similarities and differences but it leaves open the door for discourse to work as a way to increase understanding of each other. Importantly, Burke asserts, “Since identification implies division, we find rhetoric involving us in matters of socialization

211 and faction.”46 Only through rhetoric can we work toward understanding our differences.

Ivie argues, “Dissent, like other forms of rhetoric or symbolic action, walks a wavering line between division and identification, inducing cooperation among factions .. . .

[requires] fashioning political rivals as consubstantial.”47 Digital dissent operates with this sense of consubstantial distinction between social media users. On the one hand, digital dissent contests the nature of power structures, while; on the other hand, it must rely on the similarity of others in order to garner substantial usage to reach as many users as possible. Thus, digital dissent necessitates identification and division in order to allow users to bridge factions. Kenneth Burke contends the comic frame “also makes us sensitive to the point at which one of these ingredients becomes hypertrophied, with the corresponding atrophy of the other. A well-balanced ecology requires the symbiosis of the two.”48 When faced with division, through dissent we have the moment to either embrace or deny discourse. Understanding dissent within a comic frame, we have the capability to engage corrective behavior depending on how we view the situation. As

Burke famously contends, “a way of seeing is a way of not seeing,” so our ability to see will depend on the contextual nature of the act.49 Social media has increased our ability to both enact and encounter dissent, opening up the possibility to engage difference, hopefully with a mind toward correction and accommodation.

According to Burke, “the comic frame should enable people to be observers of themselves, while acting. Its ultimate outcome would not be passiveness, but maximum consciousness. One would ‘transcend’ himself (sic) by noting his own foibles. He would provide a rationale for locating the irrational and the non-rational.”50 As previously

212 mentioned, Burke asserts the “comic frame” obliges people to become observers of their selves in hopes of transcending affronts and instead learning with experience.

Additionally, Burke argues, the “comic frame of reference also opens up a whole new field for social criticism.”51 This criticism is based on rationalizing people as fallible and resisting the desire to find singular motivations for truth. Burke writes, “the materials for such a frame by no means require a new start. . . . Instead, it cherishes the lore of so- called ‘error’ as a genuine aspect of the truth, with emphases valuable for the correcting of present emphases.”52 Digital dissent, acting as a comic frame, then functions through the illumination of current divisions and differences in an effort to enact positive change.

Burke supports this argument by noting how the comic frame offers a course of action in response to difference and antagonism. He attests the comic frame can work by mitigating a shift in perspective and “cues for the composition of one’s life, which [also] demands accommodation to the structure of others’ lives.”53 The “comic corrective,”

Burke offers, provides an acknowledgment of the comic frame as “equipment for living,” as it helps distinguish situational difference and attitudes in an effort to abolish singular, consensual, points of view.54 Without the necessity for such “equipment,” the narrowing of perspectives oftentimes leads to violent encounters between enemies. According to

Rueckert, the comic corrective enables individuals to “correct and connect with each other, thereby avoiding the reification of an absolutist frame.”55 The comic corrective then provides people the possibility of engaging and contesting differences in the real world. The role of the comic corrective aligns with our understanding of the functions of dissent. Kendall Phillips, in arguing against the dominance of consensus within

213 communication research, identifies dissent’s three roles: dissent as obstacle, dissent as heuristic, and dissent as corrective.56 Dissent then offers an ability to contest the realization of consensus driven hegemony.

Dissent as comic corrective can be associated with W.E.B. Dubois’ previous contention concerning the insight black people share about society by virtue of their survival within the veil. Double consciousness imposes greater societal insight for black people, as they must perceive society from both their own viewpoint and from the viewpoint of the white majority.

Dubois writes:

Work, culture, liberty,--all these we need, not singly but together, not successively

but together, each growing and aiding each, and all striving toward that vast

brotherhood, gained through the unifying ideal of Race; the ideal of fostering and

developing the traits and talents of the Negro, not in opposition to or contempt for

other races, but rather in large conformity to the greater ideals of the American

Republic, in order that some day on American soil two world-races may give to

each those characteristics both so sadly lack.57

The corrective nature of dissent further propagates the ability for individuals to deal with and overcome difference. In essence, #CrimingWhileWhite and

#AliveWhileBlack are allowing users, even if just for those who decide to participate, behind the veil of the double consciousness that black people have to survive with constantly. I am not arguing that through these hashtag campaigns white people are then gifted the insight and hardship of understanding the double consciousness of black

214 people. I am, however, arguing that dissent can give us a glimpse into how another perceives the world. As the hashtag campaigns I discuss throughout the project comprise messages of racial inequality, they provide white people the chance to identify racial differences and the problems they create. Undertaking such an opportunity for greater comprehension fosters the competence to engage positively. Additionally, I have previously discussed the comic corrective within social movements. A. Cheree Carlson argues a movement appropriating Burke’s comic corrective would “free society by creating a consciousness of the system as a system, revealing its inherent weaknesses, and preparing an aware populace to deal with them.”58 Dissent’s ability to offer the prospect of enlightenment for everyone was key to Burke’s defense of the comic corrective. Ivie defends this role of dissent when arguing that “the tactics of resistance are most aptly focused on expressing the unity of humanity.”59 #BlackLivesMatter emphasizes the desire for humanity within its own message of dissent as it calls for the same humanistic equality granted to white people. Ivie further articulates dissent’s ability to expand understanding, asserting dissent attempts to “articulate an alternative order of understanding, a way of grasping the common humanity of those who would otherwise be designated as mutual enemies and/or made the subjects of deadly struggle.”60 The examples given, as mentioned, contain historical, and real world examples but the move to a digital realm does little to diminish the ability for dissent to engage as comic corrective. Dissent has historically been focused on discourse within the public sphere or across traditional media channels. This project, however, concentrates on the use of dissent within a social media context.

215 Gerald Hauser and Carol Blair define the public sphere as a “social- psychological definition of geography which citizens share and which permits social intercourse to transpire” along with being a “discursive space in which individuals and groups may interact freely in ways conducive to forming public opinion.”61 The demand for face-to-face discourse is a remnant of historical public sphere discourse. This is not to say that a digital public sphere does not encounter viable questions (chapter 1 covers the transition to a digital public sphere), however, discourse through digital technology carries the ability to address digital dissent as comic corrective. Trevor Garrison Smith bolsters this argument by contending digital media enables a greater space to contest and engage political discourse.62 Social media, and hashtag campaigns, have an ability to instigate and drive contemporary political discourse. Yarimar Bonilla and Jonathan Rosa, in their investigation into digital protest, indicate hashtag campaigns bear the power to shape public discourse and challenge racial inequality.63 Hashtag campaigns, as they operate as digital dissent, also provide an example of the comic corrective through their ability to challenge power structures. Thus, the political nature of hashtag campaigns as dissent messages can reconfigure public discourse as they are connected to individual users who desire to establish an understanding of difference. The role of digital dissent can be to serve as a demonstration for a comic corrective based on establishing adversaries over division and the creation of enemies.

Digital dissent, through the use of the comic corrective, allows individuals the opportunity to see anew, to recognize a new perspective, through the completion of the comic circle. Burke writes understanding others as “necessarily mistaken” and “that all

216 people are exposed to situations in which they must act as fools, that every insight contains its own special kind of blindness, you complete the comic circle, returning again to the lesson of humility that underlines great tragedy.”64 Digital dissent, as I argue, provides the audience an opportunity to see this humility—seeing the difference others face in society. #AliveWhileBlack and #CrimingWhileWhite ground their dissent with the comic corrective, providing an opportunity to those who ordinarily may not see how individuals experience racial differences. Such a comic circle, or comic corrective, is evident within the tragedy of Tamir Rice.

Previously articulated earlier in this chapter, Tamir Rice, a twelve-year-old boy playing with a replica airsoft pistol in a playground, was shot within seconds of police arriving to the scene. Although many people argued Rice was negligent in his own death by playing with a realistic pistol and aiming it at people, examples of digital dissent are prevalent in regards to utilizing a comic corrective as a form of dissent. One exemplar of digital dissent representing a comic corrective was the tweet from user @HalpernAlex which stated, “Played with realistic toy guns my entire childhood, wherever we wanted.”

Digital dissent in this manner provides individuals the chance to recognize how others are treated differently in society. In the aforementioned example we see how the user connects his/her own lived experience against that of Tamir Rice.

#CrimingWhileWhite and #AliveWhileBlack continue to be employed during the apprehension of many white male domestic terrorists as a means to demonstrate that violent white individuals have been treated differently than nonviolent black individuals.

Terence Crutcher (black) was shot while next to his broken down vehicle in the street.

217 Philando Castile (black) was shot while pulled over for a traffic violation. Alton Sterling

(black) was shot while selling bootleg compact discs at a convenience store. Walter Scott

(black) was shot in the back as he fled after being pulled over for a broken taillight. The list could go on and on. Nikolas Cruz (white) killed 17 people, and was taken into custody. Robert L. Dear (white) killed three people, including one police officer, and was taken into custody. Scott Michael Greene (white) killed two police officers, and was taken into custody. Dylann Roof (white) killed nine people, and was taken into custody and brought to Burger King to be fed on way to the police station. While these are extreme examples, they defend the argument that black people face systemic racial inequality. Some of these instances made national news and forced important discourse— this could be explained by the continued success of #BlackLivesMatter keeping issues of racial difference in the spotlight of national discourse—but many more instances were shared and engaged through social media. As a form of digital dissent, the sharing of these hashtags affords people the ability to find systems of inequality in society. Nathan

Rambukanna notes that the social mobilization around hashtags incorporating dissent expressing racial inequality “has led to unprecedented response” both national and internationally. He also maintains that without the insistent usage of these dissent messages the response would not have had a sustained impact.65 The ability for digital dissent to drive political discourse, argue for the understanding of racial difference, and demand humanity for others serves as a comic corrective in hopes of creating greater societal understanding of others. Digital dissent, though, requires users to provide self-

218 introspection, as a means to diverting easily accessible desires to form enemies and instead instigate discourse as a means to developing adversaries.

Gregory Desilet and Edward C. Appel contend Burke’s comic corrective would allow for introspection and, “Ideally, were each side of a conflict to adopt the comic frame with its double vision and ironic humility, were each side to look inwardly for blindness as well as search for the insight and legitimacy in the ‘enemy’s’ position, then negotiation rather than victimage and bloodshed would be the natural progression of conflict.”66 This decision, however, remains with the individuals engaging with digital dissent messages. The opportunity is there to engage discourse but users must supply the determination and sympathy to engage an agonistic relationship. Importantly, according to Burke, “acting rhetorically upon themselves and one another” through a “sustained rhetorical effort, backed by the imagery of a richly humane and spontaneous poetry, to make us fully sympathize with people in circumstances greatly different from our own” allows people the opportunity to see each other a new through a humanistic lens.67 Ivie doubles down on this notion when he writes, “the burden of resisting dehumanizing discourses . . . falls squarely on the many who are ruled by political elites rather than onto the elites who govern in place of and over the citizenry.”68 #CrimingWhileWhite and

#AliveWhileBlack do not attempt to demonize those who perpetuate racial inequality, instead offering to illuminate the myriad ways black individuals have been treated, particularly as it pertains to law enforcement interaction. These two digital dissent messages employ a comic corrective in an effort to critique society and correct inequality.

The creators of the hashtags seek to enlighten and correct, and so too must those who

219 choose to engage and move the conversation further. #CrimingWhileWhite and

#AliveWhileBlack also promote Burke’s belief in critique producing “humility without humiliation.”69 Digital dissent in this manner enables a proliferation of new potential understandings, increasing the robustness of potential democratic discourse. Digital dissent thus abides by Ivie’s claim that “dissent that enhances democratic pluralism not only contests that which is taken for granted but also bridges differences to generate constructive dialogue and deliberation.”70 In the case of #CrimingWhileWhite and

#AliveWhileBlack, both challenge the norms of racial equality and hope to invoke discourse about corrective action. Perhaps most importantly, these hashtag campaigns raise awareness about the vast systemic inequality black people face on a regular basis while engaging in even the most mundane tasks. Digital dissent’s engagement of pluralism and desire for adversaries to learn and engage corrective action refocuses how democratic discourse further encourages an agonistic turn.

Digital Dissent and Agonism

Ivie maintains through robust criticism and debate we can understand the emergence of healthy democratic practices.71 Addressing dissent’s impact on creating more robust democratic action, Roland Bleiker, utilizing both McKerrow’s critical rhetoric as praxis and Mouffe’s belief in working within systems, asserts that dissent maintains a collective and continually adapting process that works within “an existing web of power and knowledge.”72 The transformation to a digital public sphere has further enhanced this ability. Phillips, echoing Burke, argues the openness of the public sphere, as posited by Habermas, Goodnight, and Hauser, results in tension between differences,

220 which inherently remain unsolvable. Participation in the traditional public sphere consequently requires an individual to either forego their unique difference in an attempt to engage the rationality of the public square or to remain excluded and blamed for not participating.73 Phillips thus contends there is a necessity to reconfigure the role of dissension by removing dissent from the shadows of consensus. Undertaking such a departure would instead reanimate critique to “consider the issues of diversity, difference, and dissent seriously.”74 Phillips concludes with the acknowledgment that any ability to refocus our consideration of dissent must occur along with a similar reflection on the role of consensus. Phillips’ concern about the dominance of consensus in rhetorical study operates similarly within my current argument for a shift away from democracy based on consensus building deliberation and toward agonistic pluralism. In chapter 2, I outlined and critiqued the limitations our contemporary political focus on consensus. In this section, I will further develop the necessity of adopting agonistic pluralism concentrated on the commitment to conflict and difference.

The comic corrective, as Burke articulates, is marked by struggle and, as Ivie notes, “a comic voice [seeks] to resist the constant temptation of pursuing singular versions of truth or beauty.”75 Combined with Mouffe’s conception of agonistic pluralism, Burke’s comic corrective, which treats conflict as a given, seeks to cultivate a broadening of thought—with a respect for others that can remain agonistic rather than antagonistic. The underlying assumption for Mouffe, and for Burke, is that difference, and thus conflict, should not be curtailed in the quest for consensual thought. Such a decision diminishes the ability for true democratic discourse and understanding of

221 others—in fact, this action renders many unable to engage in political discourse. Pateman attests, “to argue that everyone should be treated in the public world as if the facts of sex, class, colour, age and religion do not count, is to insist that we should deny the most basic human facts about ourselves.”76 Following Pateman’s argument we also find support against understanding society as colorblind society. The nature of social media facilitates the ability to engage discourse within a public sphere while also identifying personal difference and navigating the discourse as adversaries.

Pollyanna Ruiz writes the importance of managing relationships on the

“antagonistic/agonistic divide is central to the well-being of democracy in an increasingly fragmented and fractured world.”77 Ruiz’s main argument concerns the need for understanding dissent messages not within traditional modern “clear-cut boundaries” but rather as polyvocal.78 This argument allows rhetoricians to understand dissent messages, especially those discussed here, as constitutive of an interconnected message. Her argument elicits Nancy Fraser’s critique of the Habermasian public sphere, as well as

Hauser’s articulation of reticulate public spheres, and supports Mouffe’s belief in the necessity for agonistic democracy. Ruiz concludes by arguing the continually shifting and expanding understanding of how these spaces have created the opportunity to advance the articulation of difference. “These spaces are characterized by an emphasis on innovation and participation,” she writes, which have revitalized our ability to voice dissent. This shift has thus changed, how dissent and by connection protest, are utilized by individuals.

Previously, Ruiz argues, people had to wait until the optimal time to voice dissent whereas now we find ourselves with “endless opportunities for contestation.”79 The vast

222 nature of social media use warrants attentiveness in order to be realized—especially as it pertains to digital dissent.

Burke similarly cautions that we need to be cognizant of ways in which the comic corrective is at play. Casually relying on our critical ability to point out the real from the fake has proven arduous. Social media users must be attuned to the information and critique they encounter via the comic corrective. Burke asserts, “Dealing with man [sic] in society, it requires maximum awareness of the complex forensic material accumulated in sophisticated social structures.”80 However, undertaking such careful action creates a unique ability to engage the dissent as a means of generating difference and understanding of others. “We hope,” Burke contends, “incidentally, to have so weighted our discussion that the comic frame will appear the most serviceable for the handling of human relationships.”81 Additionally, Burke argues the comic corrective allows “the audience, from its vantage point, [to see] the operation of errors that the characters of the play cannot see.”82 Burke’s argument here articulates the rhetorical ability of

#CrimingWhileWhite and #AliveWhileBlack to demonstratively illuminate differences between individuals. Subsequently, I argue, by analogizing Ivie’s contention of dissent from war, digital dissent furthers agonistic democracy through the challenge of embodied beliefs and discourse. Robert Cathcart contends that such conflict and challenges serve as

“the necessary ingredient” to instigating social movements.83 Together, this understanding has the potential to demonstrate social media activism’s ability to enact strong democratic action. Digital dissent as comic corrective allows for increased

223 understanding of others and becomes increasingly valuable in the transition to a digital public sphere.

Taylor contends the ability for individuals to contest and engage differences can build to “common understanding” amongst individuals, highlighting the changing nature of a digital public sphere.84 Consistent with my argument for a digital public sphere being a space for digital dissent to function as comic corrective, Manuel Castells has argued social media provides a space “where power is decided.”85 The reliance on traditional public sphere theory, and how it limits the role of dissent, has been frustrating. Digital dissent, however, has demonstrated how dissent can further work as disrupting power structures. Phillips laments the modern/postmodern divide surrounding public sphere discourse pitting consensus and dissent as opposites and instead contends we should

“envision dissension as that area of ambiguity and contestation at the edges of .. . . alternative rationalities, arguments and interests.”86 Both Ivie and Phillips have taken up the question of “how to best demonstrate the importance of dissent as democratic action.”

Ivie affirms the argument that dissent “returns human struggle to the realm of political contestation.”87 Phillips laments the dualism of consensus and dissensus ingrained in our political thinking. Furthermore, Phillips presents an argument against the traditional public sphere by positing Michele Foucault’s argument against rationality. Phillips argues, along with Foucault, that the “goal is not to evaluate each rationality against some prescriptive ‘neutral’ algorithm; rather, it is to seek the moments of rupture from which new rationalities appear and transform existing discursive systems.”88 He furthers his argument against a consensus driven public sphere, arguing dissent presents the “site for

224 struggle between, and transformation of” sensibilities.89 The contestation of the sensible is what keeps the rich nature of diversity of political thought alive. When disruption is denied or repressed then the consensual nature of contemporary politics limits discourse and impedes the nature of the comic corrective. Phillips further argues, “emphasis on a common framework reduces our understanding of the diversity of subjectivities and rationalities that move through and between different frameworks.”90 Burke’s comic corrective and Rancière’s articulation of dissensus provide methods in which dissent circumvents the natural inclination of consensus within the public sphere. Both of which also contribute to a shift toward an agonistic public sphere.

Finally, Ivie’s primary declaration surrounding the importance of dissent demands the uprooting of the rhetorical presumption that war in inevitable and necessary. He professes such thinking makes war “regrettable but sane, rational, right, proper, and easier” than “dissenting from war.”91Although Ivie’s term “warfare” within his work spotlights America’s war on terror, the transference is easy enough when imagining hashtag campaigns spotlighting racial inequality as a means to dissenting against a constant state of police warfare against black people. Just as we connect Ivie’s argument for dissent from war, digital dissent can be “a vehicle of communication for everyday citizens to speak up and speak out against a chronic state of warfare” or a constant state of racial inequality.92 The ability to “speak up” also invigorates the importance of understanding the rhetorical nature of digital dissent as it provides people the ability to break into political discourses.

225 Comic Correctives as Rancièreian Generative Equality

Whereas communication scholars such as Ivie have previously argued the connection between Burke and Mouffe, little has been done to connect Burke to

Rancière. Throughout this chapter, I have woven strands of the two theorists together, demonstrating their influence on digital dissent. Along with the broadening shift to agonistic democracy, the comic frame and comic corrective provide intriguing insight into Rancière’s argument for dissensus and politics being represented as a “demand for equality” from “the part that has no part.” As previously argued, Rancière and Mouffe argue against consensus as it serves to stifle difference and the contestation of conflict.

Furthermore, Mouffe and Rancière both argue for pluralistic political thought. Rancière’s connection to digital dissent differs from Mouffe’s as he is more concerned with the entrance into political discourse. In rhetorical terms, Rancière dedicates his most profound arguments to the process of invention—“real” politics occurs when those without voice break free and demand to engage the demand for equality. He famously writes, “Politics exists when the natural order of domination is interrupted by the institution of a part of those who have no part.”93 His argument for the necessity of a demand for equality coincides with Burke’s conception of the comic corrective being able to transcend difference in order to build understanding. In order for the comic corrective to serve as a viable option, there must first be the introduction of difference— there must be dissensus. Ivie’s articulation of dissent works well with Rancière’s argument for dissensus as politics. Within Ivie’s argument for dissent as a robust rhetorical form of democratic discourse Ivie writes, “[w]ithout dissent, there is not

226 democratic polity of adversaries and thus no politics, only forced unity and unmitigated enmity that is the end of politics.”94

Jean-Luc Nancy argues dissensus, and thus democracy, is based within individuals, writing, “the democratic kratein, the power of the people, is first of all the power to foil the arche and then to take responsibility, all together and each individually, for the infinite opening that is thereby brought to light.”95 The corrective nature of the comic corrective first relies on the ability for difference to be acknowledged and then relies on the ability of the collective to embrace discourse. Initially, he defends this point as he adds, “Political demonstration makes visible that which had no reason to be seen.”96

As political demonstrations have moved within a digital realm we have had to

(re)configure how they play a role in protesting and rhetoric. This project exhibits that hashtags can function as digital dissent and demonstrates how they perform acts of demanding equality. Hashtag campaigns fit within this understanding, as John Postill and

Sarah Pink contend hashtags serve as “a form of #self-expression” that also organize and shape collective discourse.97 Burke and Rancière deny articulating explicit recommendations for what does and does not constitute the instigation of a “demand for equality” or the ignition point of comic corrective action. However, both express the role of rhetoric and the engagement of others as points for inviting corrective action.

Importantly, Rancière argues, “a demonstration is political not because it occurs in a particular place and bears upon a particular object but rather because its form is that of a clash between two partition’s of the sensible.”98 Burke remains noncommittal in determining what makes an introduction as comic corrective arguing an attempt to

227 change one’s attitude or the attitudes of others constitutes an act.99 The ability for digital media to disperse messages from the “the part that has no part” has been archived previously. Time Magazine, in 2006, named the digitized citizen, “YOU,” as its “person of the year, noting “seizing the reins of global media, founding and framing the new digital democracy, and beating the pros at their own game” has allowed individuals to gain a sense of control over their own messages and advocate for causes.100 Digital dissent helps us understand how an online realm can continue these arguments for the importance of challenging inequality and offering corrective action.

In chapter 2, I argued the change in protest from vertical leadership based organization has begun to be transcended by the horizontal nature of digital protest and organization. Additionally, as argued, this shift has allowed for more people to participate in protest, especially as it pertains to digital dissent. This has been documented to greatly increase participation for minority individuals, as black women and LGBTQ individuals have significantly led recent protests. Shaun Scott, in his book Millennials and The

Movements that Made Us, argues new media “amplifies intersectional dissent among progressives, people of color, sexual minorities, and more.”101 The nature of this disruption helps deconstruct consensus-based domination and opens up discourse to new individuals who otherwise have been ignored. The invisible nature of the part with no part is a direct consequence of entrenched elites determining who constitutes a speaking subject. Butler contends consensus works “by producing what will and will not count as a viable speaking subject and a reasonable opinion within the public domain.”102

Additionally, Mouffe argues in her book, Agonistics, that “the consensus, which is the

228 result of the unchallenged hegemony of neoliberalism, deprives democratic citizens of an agonistic debate where they can make their voices heard and choose between real alternatives.”103 As we have found with #CrimingWhileWhite and #AliveWhileBlack, hashtag campaigns as digital dissent serve the role of bringing people together and challenging power structures. Rancière contends political meaning is found in “collective staging of expressions and statements of equality” and there is no overcoming power structures “except by an effort of movements and organizations.”104 The collective action of hashtag campaigns and their ability to create potential for individuals to better understand each other and their differences serves to demonstrate how digital dissent still works to build corrective action.

As previously mentioned, social media provides individuals with the ability to speak when previously they may not have been able. In the context of being able to speak when originally unable, we can find accord with Karlyn Kohrs Campbell’s definition of rhetorical agency. She explains the concept as “the capacity to act, that is, to have the confidence to speak or write in a way that will be received or heeded by others in one’s community.”105 This opportunity creates a unique ability to disturb consensus based policing (if we discuss Rancière) or consensus based exclusion (if we discuss Mouffe).

However, it is important to remember that this disruption did not occur within the antagonistic nature of current, consensus based, political action but rather through those who are not vicious but rather mistaken. Rancière argues, “Dissensus is not a confrontation between interests or opinions. It is the demonstration of (manifestation) of a gap in the sensible itself.”106 His argument here refers to the connection between people

229 and a willingness to advocate a comic corrective. For example, Rancière finds commonality with Burkean consubstantiality when he claims, “We should take disagreement to mean a determined kind of speech situation: one in which one of the interlocutors at once understands and does not understand what the other is saying.”107 In this instance, Rancière posits that the conception of difference is not of those who see entirely different “things” but rather share in the notion of seeing the same situation through different perspectives. Burke, as mentioned advocates the comic corrective occurring amid similar context. Additionally, this type of consideration aligns with the agonistic focus of seeing others as adversaries rather than enemies.

Burke’s primary reason for his critique, but especially for his advocating for a comic corrective, was to correct the “problem of evil,” whereby he writes, “We have tried to reveal the subterfuges to which the poet or thinker must resort, as he organizes the complexity of life’s relationships within the limitations imposed by his perspective. . . .

He finds good and evil elements intermingled. But he cannot leave matters at that.”108 His writing after the terror of World War II influenced much of this thinking in terms of avoiding the perilous nature of war. Rancière introduces similar thinking when he contends dissensus is what keeps us from devolving into consensus-built malaise.

Rancière writes, “consensual realism is not a form of natural healing capable of ridding society of its monsters, but a new madness that nurtures them. Dissent is what makes society livable. And politics . . . is precisely the organization of this dissent.”109 Dissent thus allows for greater democratic discourse as it seeks to expand the meaning of others and reshape understanding. Rancière explores how the disruption of the sensible reorders

230 society—how a person’s demand for equality begins to diverge from Plato’s hierarchical classification of persons.

This understanding explores how digital dissent functions as a means to bridge the understanding of others that share differing perceptions. As previously mentioned, Burke articulates the need for a rhetorical effort to “fully sympathize with people in circumstances greatly different from our own.”110 Likewise, Rancière argues we should desire and engage “poetic moments in which creators form new languages enabling common experience to be described differently.”111 An underlying emphasis of this argument is that dissent, and democratic discourse in general, does not need to occur during most speech situations. A remnant of public sphere theory is that face-to-face communication allows for the ideal speech situation; however, we also need to be aware of how even small fractions of dialogue can have lasting impact. Hashtag campaigns have an ability to disrupt society and this ability cannot be understated within the framing of digital dissent. Rancière writes, “politics’ penchant for dialogue has much more to do with literacy heterology, with its utterances stolen and tossed back at their authors . . . than with the allegedly ideal situation of dialogue.”112 Even these small word choices can seek to disrupt the sensible and (re)order societal perspectives. Bonnie Honig, articulating

Rancière’s placement in understanding the importance of societal order against other contemporary thinkers, argues Rancière’s “interstitial rhetorical devices themselves work the interval between the serious and the comic, the internal and the external qualities of language, enabling democratic actors to reconfigure distributions of public and private, universal and particular, mortal and citizen.”113 These spaces of discourse warrant

231 investigation as we continue to contest the venue of political discourse. The transition to a digital public sphere broadens the space for dissent. Furthermore, Rancière himself argues that the ability for new spaces of dissent must arise as society “is incessantly privatized by police logic.”114 Digital dissent can create what Foucault terms “spaces of dissension” where contradictory knowledge emerges and individuals engage new power structures and discourses.115 Digital dissent serves as such a space to circumvent consensual structures of power and highlight difference as a means to creating greater understanding of differing perspectives.

Within this understanding of digital dissent, the enactment of dissenting against the norms of social media usage also deserves attention. Beyond asserting dissent against racial inequality, #AliveWhileBlack and #CrimingWhileWhite serve as digital dissent as they contest the very nature of social media usage. Despite the advent of “Black Twitter,” a collective of active black twitter users that work to push events and issues of black

Americans to the forefront of topics, and other similar social media collectives, Kishonna

L. Gray, noting the work of other digital media researchers, asserts, “Internet technologies and virtual communities are assumed to be white and masculine.”116

Because of these norms, the usage of #AliveWhileBlack and #CrimingWhileWhite do not attempt to advance dissent against the social media site’s primary timeline algorithm.

Twitter, and other social media sites, operate by applying an algorithm which determines what information are present to users and which topics gain prominence within the site overall.

232 Hashtag campaigns, which bring issues of black users to the forefront, thus act as messages of digital dissent breaking free of the dominant white and male-based user algorithm. Stereo Williams, writer and editor for The Daily Beast, asserts hashtag campaigns focused on racial equality have been utilized to both increase awareness and influence change through messages of dissent, especially on Twitter.117 Propagating issues pursuant to the importance of black people to the forefront of discourse, within a venue dominated by white people, articulates dissent by placing issues of black importance on an equal plane with white topics. We can look at how the genesis of

#BlackLivesMatter demonstrates such an enactment of digital dissent. Furthermore, keeping #BlackLivesMatter prominently within the national discourse continues to circumvent the desire for consensus, especially as many would just as soon move past the issue as if nothing has happened, or worse imagining the issue as solved.

As previously discussed, the hashtag #BlackLivesMatter was created after the acquittal of George Zimmerman in the death of Trayvon Martin. Shared amongst a group of predominantly female black activists, the hashtag sparked discourse but not far beyond the circle of California activists. Just over a year later, officer Darren Wilson shot

Michael Brown, leading to his death. In the aftermath, the initial creators of

#BlackLivesMatter redoubled efforts to promote the hashtag campaign alongside organizational efforts in Ferguson, Missouri. Soon after the grand jury returned a verdict of no indictment for officer Wilson, #BlackLivesMatter became viral across social media platforms. The increase in usage amongst black activists and intellectuals fostered the rise of #BlackLivesMatter and it soon dominated social media discourse, even becoming the

233 American Dialect Society’s word of the year by the end of 2014.118 Between June 2014 and May 2015, a period encompassing the wrongful deaths of Eric Garner, Michael

Brown and Freddie Gray, #BlackLivesMatter was shared over 41 million times on

Twitter alone.119 Consequently, after the wide range of usage of social media, discussion of racial inequality filtered into political discourse with politicians from Hillary Clinton to Rand Paul addressing the issue.

The use of the #BlackLivesMatter is important in keeping the topic of racial inequality at the forefront of social media discourse; furthermore, those who utilize the hashtag highlight how #BlackLivesMatter was enacted as digital dissent. Researchers

Deen Freelon, Charlton D. McIlwain, and Meredith D. Clark investigated who were the prominent voices employing #BlackLivesMatter and found “during no period [did] non-

Black voices constitute an overwhelming majority of the most-referenced users.”120

Furthermore, Freelon, McIlwain, and Clark conclude the majority of those promoting

#BlackLivesMatter were black activists, black celebrities, and black youth.121 The predominance of these groups to drive discourse on Twitter demonstrates how they can enact digital dissent in an effort to bring issues directly pertaining to their lives to the forefront of discussion. The digital aspect to this cannot be ignored either; as Freelon,

McIlwain, and Clark contend, “activists used digital tools to generate alternative narratives about police violence to counter the so-called neutrality of the mainstream press.”122 Digital dissent thus has the ability to both circumvent mainstream media and allow minority voices to drive discourse on social media. Rancière contends authority and media serve their order by arguing their rationality extends beyond the realm of the

234 people, thus, an irrational people view change as futile.123 Social media research, at the very least, has acknowledged social media can serve as a tool for the easy dispersal of information to a multitude of people. Social media thus contains multiple methods for enacting digital dissent. First, through establishing and presenting difference in how others are treated/perceive societal inequality. Second, through the ability for direct political discourse on issues consequential to the dissenting group. Both of these help create a better understanding of the other. And, according to Rancière, democracy “is this principle of otherness.”124 Additionally, this form of dissensus maintains, and argues, for the humanity of others. Scott writes, “activists spurred the #BlackLivesMatter movement for . . . the radical assertion of Black humanity.”125 Instead of antagonizing others and searching for an enemy the creators, and most users, called for the humanizing of others.

They demanded equality and sought to engage in a comic corrective.

#CrimingWhileWhite and #AliveWhileBlack carried the same sense of agonistic framing as they challenged racial inequality, illuminated racial differences, and created a moment for corrective action. Understanding the potential for digital dissent to enact a comic corrective and provide the capacity for individuals to learn, and undertake corrective behavior, as a means to accommodate the other creates more robust democratic discourse.

Conclusion

#AliveWhileBlack and #CrimingWhileWhite represent digital dissent by delineating racial differences and contesting the nature of a colorblind society, where individuals are treated equally based on behavior and not race. Both campaigns operate as digital dissent through the expression of difference. Digital dissent articulates difference

235 through both contesting consensus and through keeping topics and discourse at the forefront of local and national attention. Bringing forth and keeping discourse focused on issues relevant to wide-ranging issues, especially those important to minority populations, as well as creating opportunities for debate over various topics and action, fosters more robust democratic practice. Dissent, as previously argued, remains a salient feature of a democratic society. Digital dissent produces an opportunity to engage dissent through critical thought and discourse—engaging the conflict people encounter through differing perspectives. Steve Shiffrin asserts that dissent operates as “speech that criticizes customs, habits, traditions, institutions, or authorities.”126 In this chapter I have demonstrated how digital dissent attempts to challenge dominate power structures first by showing inequality and second by challenging current norms and advocating corrective action via a comic corrective.

Understanding the rhetorical nature of digital dissent helps rhetoricians understand how dissent can be utilized within a digital public sphere—especially directed by agonistic principles. Such an understanding furthers our ability to realize the role of online activism especially as it pertains to persuasive messages of racial inequality.

Digital dissent’s utilization of the comic frame creates a space where difference can be identified and explored within the digital public sphere. An important aspect of digital dissent that must be remembered is the nature in which the individual must control the discourse. As previously argued, social media can play a role in creating a more robust democratic discourse but users must strive to utilize the channel in a positive manner.

Much social media usage can veer into trolling, or other antagonistic behavior, which

236 treats others as opposites and enemies rather than adversaries. Ivie reminds us that

“peaceful and robust political contestation requires the artful articulation of consubstantial rivals—the rehumanization of enemies.”127 Only through such a focus on extending the humanity of others can diversity be expected and keep our relationships with political opponents from devolving into irreducible opposites.128 Understanding and enacting dissent in this manner creates a more robust understanding of democratic action through the negation of the institutionality within our current political thinking. Instead, reverting action and power back to the demos; especially “the part that has no part” allows individuals to partake in robust democratic discourse and action. Rancière contends, “Democracy is not a definite set of institutions, nor is it the power of a specific group. It is a supplementary, or grounding, power that at once legitimizes and de- legitimizes every set of institutions or the power of any one set of people.”129 Digital dissent serves to enlarge the venue for dissent and engage users in an attempt to incite corrective action in hopes of overcoming societal inequality.

This chapter also furthers my argument for digital dissent buttressing the necessity for a shift to an agonistic democracy. The deviation from consensus reinforces the importance of difference and the role of conflict in our political thinking. Engaging this type of thought promotes dissent as a means to fully developing an understanding for others. Digital dissent helps broaden or ability to encounter difference through our immersion to a digital public sphere. This fluctuation in understanding political discourse creates tension, which welcomes dissensus. Postmodern thinkers have long critiqued our desire for consensus as a means to an end of understanding. Jean-François Lyotard

237 claimed dissensus and disagreement were worthwhile conclusions to discussion. This ambiguity is important in agonistic democracy, as Mouffe argues agonisim requires individuals to come “to terms with the lack of final ground” while also realizing “the dimension of undecidability which pervades every order.”130 This limitation of finality encourages digital dissent’s ability to advocate for a comic corrective through the desire to increase our understanding of others. In developing these theoretical claims, I maintain that digital dissent permits an increase in democratic action expanding an individual’s ability to participate in democratic discourse. In this next chapter, I conclude this project by considering how these theoretical arguments frame our perception of the digital public sphere, our understanding of democracy, and the role of dissent.

238 Conclusion: The Rhetorical Nature of Digital Dissent

There is no denying social media’s ability to influence the narrative direction of contemporary issues. In 2017, over eighty percent of the United States population had at least one social media profile. The average user spent over three hundred minutes on social media platforms between their various electronic devices through the course of a week.1 Although use by individuals between the ages of 18 to 24 remains the most predominant, users between the ages of 50 to 64 continue to grow rapidly, with 60 percent now using at least one social media site. Additionally, roughly 80 percent of the population between the ages of 18 to 49 used Facebook. Of those Facebook users, almost

75 percent acknowledge using the platform at least once a day with over 50 percent using the platform multiple times per day. Twitter remained the second highest text based social media platform. As Trevor Garrison Smith observes, “the internet [and by extension social media] is no longer new or strange, but is now simply a normal part of our lives.”2 Due to the proliferation of social media, I believe, along with Smith, that we must explore “how to use the internet to bring about more politicization while at the same time being aware that the internet can be used in many depoliticizing ways as well.”3

Thus, rhetorical scholarship on social media activism will continue to be valuable as scholars investigate the persuasive nature and potential implications of discourse within this digital environment.

Hashtag campaigns across social media have been prevalent and often fleeting.

Their ease of use and the accelerated nature of information consumption across social media demand an ever-changing flux of new material for people to share.

239 #IceBucketChallenge, #HeForShe, #JeSuisCharlie, #Brexit, and #OccupyWallStreet are just a few examples of prominent hashtag campaigns that have found their place within the lexicon of social media, and oftentimes offline, discourse. However,

#BlackLivesMatter has demonstrated a staying power unmatched among other popular hashtag campaigns. Unfortunately, the deaths of multiple, oftentimes unarmed, black individuals was the genesis of the hashtag. Soon, #BlackLivesMatter dominated social media discourse as a message of political advocacy illuminating the problem of police brutality against black people. Five years after its inception, #BlackLivesMatter has been tweeted an average of 17,002 times a day.4 The influence of #BlackLivesMatter cannot be understated as its use has proven to encourage political discourse and policy changes within a variety of contexts.5 There is little doubt #BlackLivesMatter was able to change the perceptions of many individuals, myself included; it also inspired this project.

The rise of #BlackLivesMatter, and the lamentable deaths inherent to the hashtag campaign, occurred during a time of transition in my life and proceeded to shape my worldview both academically and personally. The deaths of Garner, Brown, and Rice occurred shortly before and during my enrollment in a class dedicated to exploring the foundations and implications of Black Rhetoric. A black preacher was invited to guest lecture one afternoon and offered a stirring recount of his time spent visiting family in the southern United States. At one point, he described becoming accustomed to the sound of locking doors as he strolled along community sidewalks. His story prompted me to explore how two individuals could experience such a mundane activity as walking down a sidewalk entirely different. I also found myself further drawn to the problem of

240 society’s racial inequalities that were being exposed as #BlackLivesMatter continued to propagate throughout my social media use. Furthermore, as we examined the rhetorical practices and implications of many Civil Rights leaders, I found myself questioning how messages advocating social change functioned rhetorically within a digital context. These events all coalesced around my own fascination with exploring connections between rhetoric, political discourse, and social media.

Retweet, without Comment: The Quick Share Version

The general overarching purpose of this dissertation has been to explore the rhetorical nature of contemporary social media activism. Specifically, my argument has been that digital dissent, as a unique form of social media activism, provides the ability for social media to serve as a venue for expanded democratic discourse and advocate social change. Operating as a hashtag campaign, these messages offer dissent against societal power structures. Although digital dissent may generate critique against innumerable issues, the predominant hashtag campaigns explored for this project dissent against an unjust law enforcement system continually perpetuating racial inequality; particularly through the continued violence committed against black individuals.

Organized as a rhetorical analysis, this study examined digital dissent through three common principles of the rhetorical message: emphasis of dissensus based discourse contrary to consensus based leadership, demonstration and critique of doxa, and employment of the comic corrective. Through these three principles, I argued that digital dissent serves as a type of social media activism that fosters increased democratic discourse. Furthermore, I asserted through this exploration of digital dissent we could

241 better understand the role of dissent as democratic action. Lastly, I argued a focus on dissensus fostered a shift toward an agonistic democratic politics.

Exploring the limitations of consensus-based leadership, I argued that a strong reliance on leadership silenced many of the individuals who differed in their approach to supporting racial equality. I argued much of the contemporary reliance on leadership stemmed from a historical remembrance that fostered the role of “great leader,” oftentimes at the detriment of robust discourse. I demonstrated that a focus on dissensus allows for the proliferation of viewpoints, in turn, increasing the opportunity for discourse. The turn toward dissensus emphasizes the role of difference and conflict in democratic discourse. In our current consensus-based institutional based politics, conflict and disagreement are to be avoided. However, agonistic democracy realizes the ever- present nature of disagreement and conflict and implores individuals to treat others as adversaries rather than enemies. Escaping the institutionalized nature of democracy, I suggest digital dissent, by fostering an increase in disagreement and conflict, embraces the role of agonistic democracy. This shift from a consensus-based leadership toward an emphasis on dissensus thus illuminates the ability for social media to serve as a venue for democratic discourse—one that emphasizes the role of agonistic democracy.

Concerning digital dissent as a demonstration and critique of doxa, I have indicated digital dissent utilizes dissensus to critique power structures while also representing traditional democratic action. Initially, I argued digital dissent represents a traditional understanding of democratic doxa as it operates as a collective action of “the demos.” The organizing principle of hashtag campaigns serves to demonstrate the

242 democratic doxai of “rule by the people”—as individuals are able to express collective support for societal change. Subsequently, I contend digital dissent also operates as a critique of doxa. In this manner, utilizing the hashtags #HandsUpDontShoot and

#ICantBreathe serves as digital dissent by representing collective support for racial equality, at the same time critiquing doxa—as messages of innocence and a cry for help that have led to the deaths of black individuals.

In considering digital dissent as comic corrective, I suggest digital dissent operates as a method of exploring the differences individuals share and provide an opportunity for greater understanding of others. In chapter 4 I argue the hashtag campaigns #AliveWhileBlack and #CrimingWhileWhite operate as “a disruption of the sensible”—allowing individuals to peer into social situations of others and illuminate individual differences. Operating through Kenneth Burke’s comic frame, digital dissent positions individuals not as malicious but rather as flawed. Through this argument I contend digital dissent offers a venue for increased democratic discourse creating the opportunity to cultivate a broadening of understanding toward those who hold differing views.

Although there has been much debate over the ability for social media to foster democracy, much of this work encompassed contemporary institutional factors. Inherent in much of these contemporary factors is the reliance on consensus-based deliberative democracy. Eschewing a reliance on consensus, I explored how the role of dissent expanded our notion of democratic action throughout a social media context. Utilizing the work of Robert Ivie to articulate the democratic nature of dissent, I asserted social

243 media fosters dissent specifically through the use of hashtag campaigns. Furthermore,

Ivie posits dissent as a means for “rearticulating relationships among components within a cultural field.”6 Within this framing, I contend digital dissent operates as a method for increasing democratic discourse by enacting a “disruption of the sensible.” Employing the work of Jacques Rancière positions digital dissent as an act of political discourse.

Further crumbling our reliance on an institutional framing of democracy, Rancière argues dissensus is the only true political act. He writes, “Politics exists when the natural order of domination is interrupted by the institution of a part of those who have no part.”7

Through his work we can articulate dissent to be the foremost political act as one articulates a “disruption of the sensible.” In essence, Rancière argues that current political thinking is centered on the concept of consensus, which attempts to keep political order— he terms this political order the “sensible.” Politics as consensus strives to maintain the established order of people. Dissensus, as Rancière contends, disrupts consensual order by “the demonstration (manifestation) of a gap in the sensible” through placing “one world in another.”8 I contend throughout this project digital dissent carries an ability to enact a disruption of the sensible by illuminating societal inequalities—focusing primarily on racial inequality. Furthermore, I argue social media provides a venue for such discourse. I find support for this contention as he articulates the details for such an act remain negligible. Instead, he contends, “What makes an action political is not its object or the place where it is carried out, but solely its form, the form in which confirmation of equality is inscribed in the setting of a dispute.”9 Rancière remains focused on dissensus as a means to increase equality. His work also furthers our

244 understanding of the fundamental shift toward agonistic democracy, as dissensus necessitates disagreement.

Rancière argues dissensus is based on disagreement. Particular to this argument is his insistence on disagreement, not in a traditional sense of those who cannot understand the other, but rather as conflict between those who articulate similar messages but do “not understand the same thing by it or does not understand that the other is saying the same thing.”10 His articulation of disagreement here identifies the role of conflict just as it also hints at the role of agonism. The work of Chantal Mouffe further explores the arguments

Rancière brings forth by applying them to her work on agonistic pluralism. Agonism,

Mouffe contends, acknowledges the role of conflict inherent in democracy and rather than stifle these differences in the name of consensus, maintains conflict as a necessary variable for a robust democracy. She asserts an agonistic democracy fosters a diversity of terrains “so as to construct a different hegemony” and “the construction of more democratic, more egalitarian institutions”—institutions, in this instance, founded on dissensus, open to modification, and promoting increased participation. 11 Her contention for agonistic democracy is important as I argue digital dissent fosters the role of dissensus broadening disagreement in an effort to foster a more robust democratic discourse. Key to this ability, especially through the venue of social media, is her argument that agonism relies on the creation of adversaries over the creation of enemies in political discourse.12

Digital dissent, I argue, can help foster the role of adversaries by illuminating inequalities individuals endure, thus sharing alternative perceptions of societal power structures.

Mouffe contends alternative perceptions and discourse on alternative actions are essential

245 to building radical hegemonic orders.13 Digital dissent, operating through the work of these theorists, then utilizes difference as an instigator for a more robust democratic discourse in an effort to increase equality.

From the perspective of democratic theory and rhetoric, this dissertation provides an explanation for understanding the rhetorical sensibilities of social media activism.

Through the emphasis on dissent I have demonstrated how one application of social media activism—digital dissent—can circumvent the reliance on leadership, can demonstrate collective action and critique doxastic knowledge, and can provide a comic corrective illuminating societal inequality. This dissertation builds on the rhetoric of dissent by establishing dissent within a digital context and also exploring how dissent can serve as an organizational tool for social media discourse as well as a tool for critique.

Furthermore, this dissertation has added to democratic theory by examining the implications of social media as a venue for democratic discourse. Through the work of

Rancière and Mouffe, we can more fully understand the nature of dissent as a political act and how the role of difference and conflict may allow for a more robust understanding of democratic discourse. Perhaps most importantly, this dissertation has provided an exploration into the rhetorical nature of social media activism—demonstrating how discourse within a digital context can help people make sense of their world.

Finally, this dissertation provides an opportunity to understand further the systemic racial inequality in society. Returning to my discussion in the introduction, contemporary social media activism, specifically as digital dissent, can provide an individual, such as myself, the ability to critique his or her own position in society. This

246 dissertation thus explores how social media may serve as a venue for individuals to engage discourse in an attempt to influence positive social change by sharing dissent messages. My own experience demonstrates how a person can be influenced by digital dissent; I do not believe my experience was singular. The ability to share engage democratic discourse, especially digital dissent, through social media proliferates the ability for individuals to identify and (re)examine their positionality. Furthermore, through utilizing digital dissent messages individuals have the ability to recognize, and as

I argued, better understand issues of racial inequality. The value of this work is found in its ability to foster a world where we actively attempt identify and discuss our differences and disagreements through the lens of the other as adversary rather than enemy.

Undertaking this shift is not necessarily easy but it is worthwhile.

Avenues for Future Research

The breadth of social media activism overshadows the ability for a single dissertation to encompass all areas of inquiry. This dissertation argues for a single unique examination to help further rhetorical scholar’s understanding of social media activism.

There are thus many venues in which this dissertation could have ventured; however, I argue none of these potential directional changes detracts from the critique or theoretical work encompassed within this dissertation. Instead, other directional options highlight future avenues of research, which could either expand or entirely shift future rhetorical groundings of social media activism.

One particular avenue for the exploration of future research is the continuation of work on digital dissent removed from the context of racial inequality. A. Freya Thimsen,

247 as noted in chapter 3, argues the use of the protest slogan “Corporations are not People,” but does not place it within the realm of dissent, or within a digital context. Her project was not to establish the slogan as an issue of dissent but rather as integration into a dissensual democracy; however, it would be relevant to explore further digital dissent within contexts divorced from the advocacy for racial equality. Digital dissent against racial inequality has predominately been tied to the death of black individuals—how does its use change when it is tied to events inequitable to the loss of life? Perhaps the single largest difference is that inability to maintain similar levels of awareness, as demonstrated by the quick rise and fall of #OccupyWallStreet and comparable messages; but there could be other valuable rhetorical variables at play.

Another venue for future research would be examining digital dissent across various social media platforms, within the context of challenging issues of racial inequality—especially through sites such as YouTube and Instagram, which are video and picture platforms respectively. In chapter 3, and to a lesser extent chapter 4, I discussed at a glance the visual images at play in digital dissent within the context of the fight for racial equality. A few images have emerged during the lifespan of

#BlackLivesMatter that have found relevance along the line of iconic images from other movements for racial equality. Perhaps even more importantly, though, is the utilization of video technology to capture direct instances of police brutality, neglect of black bodies at the hands of law enforcement, and/or illustrate the excessive nature of law enforcement against black individuals. There is no doubt that video evidence of officer Michael Slager shooting Walter Scott in the back as he ran away was the prevailing reason he was one of

248 the few officers charged during the many instances discussed in this dissertation. Pictures of Michael Brown’s body lying on the pavement for hours after being shot are powerful images demonstrating the neglect black bodies have been treated at the hands of law enforcement. An entirely separate study, one grounded in visual rhetoric, could look at historical images, especially images of Emmett Till, and draw rhetorical connection to contemporary digital dissent. Finally, the picture of a lone peaceful protestor in her flowing dress standing opposed to a line of officers in riot gear as two officers approach to arrest her serves as a direct representation of the inequality in which law enforcement has engaged black individuals. Further scholarship is needed in exploring the implications for the visual component to digital dissent. Initially, work should be done focusing on the visual rhetoric theory at play in subsequent video and picture images— how do the pictures/video frame their subjects and what rhetorical principles are at play which increase our ability to understand racial inequality? Additionally, it would be beneficial to understand the rhetoric implications of these valuable images.

However, the visual component to digital dissent does not remain solely in the sharing of pictures or video alone. The hashtag campaigns discussed in this dissertation carry a visual component that, while not always prevalent, is nonetheless as important as the text of the message. #HandsUpDontShoot and #ICantBreathe conjure images of individuals holding their hands high or grabbing their neck when encountering law enforcement. These acts, aseeming apparent sign of innocence or call for help, produce visual elements regardless of a corresponding image. Additionally, each has the ability to call forth the image of the individual tied to the hashtag—usually the black individual

249 whose loss of life spurred the hashtag’s primary usage. Along with the above discussion on stand-alone images and video, future research should explore the evolving modalities of social media activism. As some social media platforms emphasize the visual over text digital dissent may evolve to encompass a variety of nuanced rhetorical strategies.

Furthermore, Rancière’s work on aesthetics would fit nicely into how these overt and implied images serve as a disruption of the sensible. Although unfortunate, these images can prompt political action by increasing democratic discourse about racial inequality— in other words, their rhetorical nature cannot be denied.

Lastly, I have identified these hashtag campaigns as digital dissent in the fight for racial equality. However, as hashtag campaigns do not have requirements as to their use, social media users have utilized these hashtags to argue support for other, sometimes nefarious causes. Regina Kreide concedes, “social networks are also being increasingly used by groupings that are politically opposed to democratic public sphere, such as the radical right-wing or fundamentalist terrorist groups.”14 I briefly discussed the use of

#AllLivesMatter as dissent against the message #BlackLivesMatter in chapter 2. It would be beneficial to investigate the rhetorical implications of #AllLivesMatter, as the message serves as a denouncement of a specific call for racial equality. Similarly,

#BlueLivesMatter has become another popular hashtag campaign offering dissent against the belief that law enforcement treat black individuals unequal to white individuals.

Exploring both of these hashtag campaigns could further illuminate how they have risen to popularity while seemingly defending the status quo while acting as dissent. Finally, it would behoove rhetorical scholars to examine the ways in which the hashtag campaigns

250 for racial equality have been contorted to present #BlackLivesMatter as a dubious message designed to hide the apparent pitfalls of black individuals. #BlackLivesMatter has been utilized by some to cast light on the purported criminality of black people— often this is attached to information regarding the level of “black on black” crime. Due to the ease of message dissemination in a digital realm, the perversion of hashtag campaigns will continue, comprehension of their rhetorical implications is vital to a holistic understanding of digital dissent.

Constant Evolution

The election of Donald J. Trump to the presidency in 2016 inherently changes how we talk about #BlackLivesMatter. His presidency, fraught with multiple negative racial undertones, is a marked difference from his predecessor who once opined, during remarks on the Trayvon Martin verdict, “You know, when Trayvon Martin was first shot

I said that this could have been my son. Another way of saying that is Trayvon Martin could have been me 35 years ago.”15 Although President Obama has been critiqued for his reluctance to fully address the racial divide in the United States, often shunning direct comment in favor of allowing the public to engage in discourse without his influence, his successor has continually bungled issues of racial significance. Additionally, President

Trump has backed law enforcement seemingly without regard to the issues facing black individuals—famously referring to football players kneeling in protest to the national anthem as “son of a bitch.”16 Additionally, he has continually pushed the notion of being a “law and order” president—a connotation harkening back to the war on drugs, which targeted and harmed black individuals exponentially more than white individuals. He has

251 gone so far as to propose reinstituting “stop and frisk” policies, which critics have argued are privacy violations and significantly discriminate against minority populations.17

In his words offering remembrance of Black History Month on February 1, 2017,

Trump took time to praise some of the individuals who have led the march to equality for black citizens. Praiseworthy for simply remembering the names of Harriet Tubman and

Rosa Parks, but hollow in how the rest of the statement unfolded, the statement demonstrated the neglected nature of racial equality in the United States. Beyond his claim of “fake news,” a target President Trump attributes to any negative news article, he also stated, “Frederick Douglas is an example of somebody who’s done an amazing job and is being recognized more and more, I notice.”18 The statement reads as if President

Trump recently discovered the work of Frederick Douglas who, despite having passed away almost 125 years ago, has long been regarded as one of the early pioneers for racial equality. Even if we let President Trump slide on his lax recollection of history, he continues to undermine even his meaningful addresses on racial equality through persistent remarks that are racially motivated. He consistently tweets demeaning comments about black politicians and celebrities that oppose him. Terms such as “dumb,”

“goofy,” “crazy,” “low IQ,” and multiple other insults are often directed at black people who stand in opposition to President Trump.

Oftentimes, President Trump has discussed the black community with the connotation of a commodity to be won over with either a discussion of his business or political acumen—often turning the discussion to himself. In his remarks for Black

History month in 2017, he recognized the work of Martin Luther King, Jr., but quickly

252 transitioned to how a news article incorrectly noted that he had removed King’s bust from the Oval Office. During his election campaign, President Trump continually declared inner-city communities to be worse than “war zones in countries we are fighting.”19 He later claimed such cities had crime rates “through the roof. People can’t walk down the street without getting shot.”20 His major argument to black voters was, basically, “you’re living in poverty, your schools are no good, you have no jobs, 58 percent of your youth is unemployed—what the hell do you have to lose?”21 Upon his election he continued to deride inner city violence—usually connecting his statement to crime statistics in

Chicago. Two years into his term he retorted, “Why are we having all these people from shithole countries come here” as members of his administration discussed protections for immigrants from Haiti, El Salvador and various African countries.22 He continually asserts that a return to increased law enforcement will help black communities succeed.

Trump essentially boils down his pitch to black individuals as he is the only one since the

Civil Rights Movement that has wanted to help black communities and that he alone can handle the challenge. However, Trump’s own contention limits both dissensus and the work of those who have made strides for racial equality.

President Trump’s statements echo a primary critique of #BlackLivesMatter, which continues to be a comparison to the Civil Rights Movement. However, I argue we should understand the movement for racial equality as a continuous evolution rather than individually unique eras of advancement in racial equality. I return to a comment by then

President Barack Obama who, during his remarks on Trayvon Martin, contends we must recognize the importance of differing perceptions of society. He states:

253 When you think about why, in the African American community at least, there’s a

lot of pain around what happened here, I think it’s important to recognize that the

African American community is looking at this issue through a set of experiences

and a history that doesn't go away.23

His comments echo two important arguments made throughout this dissertation. First, he emphasizes the importance of differing experiences creating distinct meanings within society. Second, he calls attention to the fact that history influences contemporary perceptions and actions. Both of these issues represent arguments prevalent throughout this dissertation.

In this project, I have argued for the role of digital dissent as a form of democratic discourse. Utilizing the work of Ivie and other rhetorical scholars, I maintain the acceptance, and in fact the increase of dissent, promotes political discourse about individual and group difference. Within current consensus-based political discourse, individual difference is mitigated as we try to argue that we are all similar in nature. The argument for a colorblind society is rooted in such consensus-based argumentation as individual differences are dissolved in favor of like-minded identification. While at some levels we demonstrate common traits, we should not neglect the individual differences and perspectives we share in understanding society. Reliance on consensus fosters an aversion to conflict, whereas dissensus requires individuals to wrestle with the difference of others. Acknowledging the role of dissensus helps people realize the differences we share—in turn illuminating and fostering discourse about inequality. Furthering this contention, I argue an increase in dissensus further demands a transition away from

254 contemporary consensus based politics. Realizing dissent and difference should not be avoided but rather acknowledged and embraced, facilitates a shift toward an agonistic style of democratic politics. Agonistic politics realizes the role of difference and conflict as important to the establishment of a strong democracy. Agonism, at its core, demands that society takes the passionate differences we hold and “mobilize them towards democratic designs.”24 Adopting an agnostic form of democratic politics can foster a greater sense of how individual differences shape perceptions and how these differences contribute to the “diversity of forms of life and modes of organization.”25 This dissertation then helps us recognize one venue for recognizing difference and engaging those differences—in an effort to form more robust democratic politics.

Similarly, I have argued throughout this dissertation that we should not be quick to distinguish the different eras advocating for racial equality against each other but rather realize the nature in which these eras build upon each other. As mentioned, a primary critique of #BlackLivesMatter is that it is not the Civil Rights Movement.

Chapter 2 fully explains why such action inherently limits the expansion of new ways to advocate for racial equality. #BlackLivesMatter is not the Civil Rights Movement. Just as

#BlackLivesMatter is not the Black Power Movement. Or the Black Liberation

Movement. Or the abolition movement. But #BlackLivesMatter is influenced by all of those movements and furthers their causes. #BlackLivesMatter builds upon the foundation of the Civil Rights Movement, overcoming some of its limitations and expanding some of its advantages. Some of the primary arguments for a colorblind society originate through the explanation of the Civil Rights Movement having achieved

255 racial equality. However, it would be remiss simply to argue that because black individuals have been granted the right to vote, along with other advancements made during the Civil Rights Movement, racial inequality simply ended. Michelle Alexander argues in her book, The New Jim Crow, how even within a supposed colorblind society many have yet to achieve true equality—especially in terms of treatment by law enforcement. #BlackLivesMatter is unique from the Civil Rights Movement, but returning to former President Obama’s quotation, we would be wise to realize the long history of racial inequality and how it influences contemporary action and perception.

This dissertation provides explanation of one venue in which these historical influences manifest in a digital context and in an effort to further the argument for racial equality.

The Unknown End

In this conclusion, I assert social media activism will continue to adapt as social media platforms continue to evolve. Because of this evolution, rhetorically grounding social media activism will endure as new platforms, and abilities to advocate, are created and evolve. I am sure this will lead to ambiguity and consternation. This dissertation has identified digital dissent as a single type of activism and explored rhetorical theories and implications at play. I contend that through the evolution of social media activism, digital dissent will continue to manifest as a form of political discourse, but that further exploration will be warranted. A common criticism of #BlackLivesMatter surrounds its seemingly unknown conclusion. What are the changes #BlackLivesMatter advocates and how will we know when they are achieved? I have argued that digital dissent is less concerned with concrete outcomes, instead favoring the ability to identify inequality and

256 advocate change. This contention aligns with Rancière’s conception of dissensus.

Rancière contends one important aspect to his argument is the belief in the unknown.

“[N]o one, it seems to me,” he writes, “really knows what we can and must want in the end.”26 He argues activism runs afoul when portending the outcome of actions. Digital dissent, even in its enactment of the comic corrective, seeks to increase the role of difference in creating the opportunity for greater understanding of individual difference.

There is not an “end goal” in the argument. Digital dissent, like dissent, will evolve and continue to demonstrate disagreement as new inequalities are recognized.

As I have argued above, #BlackLivesMatter, as a digital dissent, is a Ranciereian

“demand for equality.” While my argument centers around the use of the hashtag and less about the movement as an entity, there is no doubt a connection between the use of

#BlackLivesMatter as a dissent message supporting racial equality and the policy movements that have resulted from increased democratic discourse spurred by the hashtag campaign. Christopher Lebron’s argument about #BlackLivesMatter resembles

Rancière’s claim with the assertion that “there is no doubt that the movement itself is historically momentous, even if it remains unclear . . . of the policy efficacy

#BlackLivesMatter has been able to bring to bear on the problem of racial justice.”27

Hashtag campaigns have demonstrated the ability to remain relevant beyond their initial purpose. Ben Zimmer has argued that while the “hashtagification” of dissent messages could consume, and thus limit the messages meaning, he continues his discussion of

#ICantBreathe noting, the hashtag “has retained its visceral punch. It has outlived Eric

Garner. It Breathes.”28 #ICantBreathe as dissent against the death and non-indictment of

257 Officer Pantaleo, has become a demand for equality serving as dissent against unequal treatment of black individuals by law enforcement.29 #ICantBreathe, as digital dissent, is untethered to a specific policy outcome, instead serving as critique against unequal power structures. There is clear evidence #ICantBreathe, along with the other hashtag campaigns discussed in this dissertation, will continue to proliferate as new inequalities are highlighted.

As President Donald Trump has continued to instigate racial tensions, the use of digital dissent has persisted. During the spring and summer of 2018, a string of incidents occurred where black individuals had the police called on them for various mundane reasons. One individual identified as a police officer tweeted that one night he was searching an area for bullet casings after a nearby shooting. While searching for evidence, police dispatch received a suspicious persons call for a “black male in ‘police clothes’ using a flashlight to ‘look into ppls (sic) houses.’” The tweet was tagged with the hashtag #LivingWhileBlack. Soon after, users shared numerous stories of having police called on them while they were at the neighborhood swimming pool, delivering newspapers, taking a nap at a study table, selling bottles of water on the sidewalk, and various other mundane acts. Operating in a similar vein as #AliveWhileBlack,

#LivingWhileBlack sought to highlight the different ways black people were treated, usually by white people, during everyday life. The continuation of digital dissent to draw attention to these inequalities demonstrates its ability to direct and organize discourse both through a digital public sphere and in other venues for discourse.

258 Another popular form of digital dissent message that has blossomed in popularity towards the latter end of writing this dissertation is the meme-driven response to white individuals who have called the cops on black people over various petty actions. Two of the most widely used memes have been dubbed “BBQ Becky” and “Permit Patty.” In the first instance, a white woman called police on two black men for using a prohibited charcoal grill at a park in Oakland, California. In the latter incident, a woman called police to report an eight-year-old girl for “selling bottled water outside her apartment building to raise money for a trip to Disneyland.”30 Soon, video of the incidents went viral and images of the two women were photoshopped onto images of “Rosa Parks, NFL players kneeling during the anthem and former President Barack Obama.”31 Anne Rawls, a sociology professor at Bentley University, who has dubbed this behavior “citizen callers,” says, “the outing of white people on social media has begun to challenge what language and behavior is considered acceptable.”32 The memes, and corresponding tweets also serve as digital dissent by illustrating how average individuals are perpetuating

“racial attitudes that are entrenched in American society and cross political lines.”33 The evolution of digital dissent will allow for continued investigation of digital activism as users continue new ways to voice dissent as a means to challenge social inequality.

An important implication for recognizing the unknown conclusion of digital dissent helps us understand the emphasis on realizing #BlackLivesMatter as a continuation of the fight for racial equality. Interpretations of Rancière are often reduced to moments of general large-scale demands for equality; however, his work is much more reserved in that regard. In fact, if we think of a revolution/reform distinction, he falls

259 largely on the reform spectrum. Political scientist Mark Purcell argues Rancière’s work lacks the imagination of revolution, instead relying on modest reform.34 Understanding this nuance to Rancière’s conception of dissensus supports the enactment of digital dissent not along the lines of mass, wide scale real-life protests, but rather as individuals constituting his or her self as political subjects through the articulation of political disagreement. This argument shifts social media activism away from traditional assertions of political activism and instead requires us to abandon the idea of the revolutionary movements we have memorialized. Instead, this articulation of digital dissent supports a focus on what we can do, with what we have, in the moments we need to act. Digital dissent utilizes social media as a venue for discourse illuminating disagreement and difference within systems that perpetuate inequality. It is not the tool to combat racial inequality but it is a tool.

There will remain critics of social media activism despite any work done to highlight potential venues for increased discourse. There will always be those quick to antagonism in the face of difference. The ease of social media use and the implications of the private nature of the digital public sphere foster the propensity for one to engage the other as enemy rather than adversary. Even as this project identifies social media as a venue for increased democratic discourse, I argue users must embrace using the platforms responsibly. Additionally, there will also be those partial to the materialist critique of

“critical rhetoric” that asserts the need for action beyond the digital public sphere. Digital dissent does not equate to marching in the street or voting, nor should it. Dissent is its own unique act. It is an act that highlights disagreement and difference. It is an act that

260 fosters democratic discourse. It is not the action some desire but it is an action nonetheless. I am drawn to a James Baldwin quotation, one of the overshadowed advocates of the Civil Rights Movement, when faced with the dilemma of what is proper action. He attested, “You write in order to change the world . . . if you alter, even by a millimeter, the way people look at reality, then you can change it.”35 Digital dissent provides a venue for such action.

261 Bibliography

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Zimmer, Ben. “The Linguistic Power of the Protest Phrase ‘I Can’t Breathe.’” Wired, December 15, 2014, https://www.wired.com/2014/12/ben-zimmer-on-i-cant- breathe/ Zirin, Dave. “Why the Police Killing of Football Player Christian Taylor Matters.” The Nation, August 10, 2015, http://www.thenation.com/article/why-the-police- killing-of-football-player-christian-taylor-matters/ Zivi, Karen. “Politics is Hard Work: Performativity and the Preconditions of Intelligibility.” Philosophy & Rhetoric 49 (2016): 438-458.

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Introduction 1 J. David Goodman, “Eric Garner Case is Settled by New York City for $5.9 Million,” The New York Times, July 13, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/14/nyregion/eric- garner-case-is-settled-by-new-york-city-for-5-9-million.html 2 Georgett Roberts, C.J. Sullivan, and Laura Italiano, “4 EMS workers barred from duty after chokehold death,” The New York Post, July 20, 2014, http://nypost.com/2014/07/20/4-ems-workers-barred-from-duty-after-chokehold-death/ 3 Joseph Goldstein and Marc Santora, “Staten Island Man Died from Chokehold During Arrest, Autopsy Finds,” The New York Times, August 1, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/02/nyregion/staten-island-man-died-from-officers- chokehold-autopsy-finds.html 4 J. David Goodman and Al Baker, “Wave of Protest After Grand Jury Doesn’t Indict Officer in Eric Garner Chokehold Case,” The New York Times, December 3, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/04/nyregion/grand-jury-said-to-bring-no-charges-in- staten-island-chokehold-death-of-eric-garner.html 5 Frances Robles and Julie Bosman, “Autopsy Shows Michael Brown was Struck at Least 6 Times,” The New York Times, August 17, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/18/us/michael-brown-autopsy-shows-he-was-shot-at- least-6-times.html 6 Monica Davey and Julie Bosman, “Protests Flare After Ferguson Police Officer is Not Indicted,” The New York Times, November 24, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/25/us/ferguson-darren-wilson-shooting-michael- brown-grand-jury.html 7 Elahe Izadi and Peter Holley, “ Video Shows Cleveland Officer Shooting 12-year-old Tamir Rice within Seconds,” The Washington Post, Novemeber 26, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/11/26/officials-release- video-names-in-fatal-police-shooting-of-12-year-old-cleveland- boy/?utm_term=.fb8640a1cea6 8 Izadi and Holley, “Video Shows Cleveland Officer.” 9 Tom McCarthy, “Tamir Rice: Video Shows Boy, 12, Shot ‘Seconds’ after Police Confronted Child,” The Guardian, November 26, 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/us- news/2014/nov/26/tamir-rice-video-shows-boy-shot-police-cleveland 10 Timothy Williams and Mitch Smith, “Cleveland Officer Will Not Face Charges in Tamir Rice Shooting Death,” The New York Times, December 28, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/29/us/tamir-rice-police-shootiing-cleveland.html 11 As previously noted, George Zimmerman was found not guilty of murder or manslaughter in the case of Trayvon Martin. Darren Wilson, the officer involved in the death of Michael Brown, was not indicted on November 24, 2014 following an investigation presented to a grand jury. Daniel Plantaleo, the officer involved in the choking death of Eric Garner, was not indicted on December 3, 2014 following an

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investigation presented to a grand jury. The six Baltimore police officers involved in the death of Freddy Gray were indicted and are currently facing charges ranging from second-degree murder to reckless endangerment. Additionally all of the officers have been suspended. It is important to note the death of Zachary Hammond, a 19 year old unarmed white male fatally shot by police July 26, 2015, as a means to demonstrate that civilian death due to law enforcement negligence has not been constrained by racial bounds. The lack of uprising, media attention, and overall discourse surrounding Hammond’s death has been attributed to his being white and the lack of subsequent similar cases. Abby Phillip, “An ‘Unarmed’ White Teen was Shot Dead by Police. His family asks: Where is the Outrage,” The Washington Post, August 7, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/08/06/an-unarmed-white- teen-was-shot-dead-by-police-his-family-asks-where-is-the-outrage/ 12 Kevin M. DeLuca, Sean Lawson, & Ye Sun, “Occupy Wall Street on the Public Screens of Social Media: The Many Framings of the Birth of a Protest Movement,” Communication, Culture & Critique 5 (2012): 485. 13 Rob Barry, “Hundreds of Police Killings are Uncounted in Federal Stats,” The Wall Street Journal, December 3, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/hundreds-of-police- killings-are-uncounted-in-federal-statistics-1417577504 14 Dave Zirin, “Why the Police Killing of Football Player Christian Taylor Matters,” The Nation, August 10, 2015, http://www.thenation.com/article/why-the-police-killing-of- football-player-christian-taylor-matters/ 15 Khury Peterson-Smith, “Black Lives Matter: A New Movement Takes Shape,” International Socialist Review, Spring 2015, http://isreview.org/issue/96/black-lives- matter 16 Fredrick C. Harris, “The Next Civil Rights Movement?” Dissent (Summer 2015): 34. 17 Peter Beaumont, “The Truth About Twitter, Facebook and the Uprisings in the Arab World,” The Guardian, February, 24, 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/25/twitter-facebook-uprisings-arab-libya 18 Jamil Smith, “Black Lives Matter Protesters are not the Problem,” The New Republic, August 10, 2015, http://www.newrepublic.com/article/122510/blacklivesmatter- protesters-are-not-problem Smith provides constructive analysis on how #BlackLivesMatter has begun to change the national conversation of racial inequality in how individuals treated by law enforcement. 19 Nicole Ellison, Charles Steinfield, and Cliff Lampe, “The Benefits of Facebook “Friends:” Social Capital and College Students’ Use of Online Social Networking Sites,” Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication 12 (2007): 1145. 20 Malcolm Gladwell, “Small Change: Why the Revolution Will Not be Tweeted,” The New Yorker, October, 4, 2010, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/10/04/101004fa_fact_gladwell?currentPage= all

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21 Evgeny Morozov, “Foreign Policy: The Brave New World of Slacktivism,” National Public Radio, May 19, 2009, https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=104302141 22 Zeynep Tufekci, “New Media and the People-Powered Uprising,” MIT Technology Review, August 30, 2011, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/425280/new-media-and- the-people-powered-uprisings/ 23 Tufekci, “New Media and the People-Powered Uprising.” 24 Tufekci, “New Media and the People-Powered Uprising.” 25 Tom Standage, Writing in the Wall, (New York, NY: Bloomsbury, 2013). Standage’s book provides an important historical framing for “social media” that extends back to ancient Greece. 26 Jimmy Sanders, It’s a Whole New Ballgame: How Social Media is Changing Sports, (New York, NY: Hampton Press Inc., 2010), 3. 27 Although there is no formal consensus on the term “social media activism,” not that I would argue for consensus in the first place, important works have relied on the term. John Pollock provides a worthwhile read on the “hackers” responsible for the initiation of the Arab Spring (John Pollock, “Streetbook: How Egyptian and Tunisian Youth Hacked the Arab Spring,” MIT Technology Review, August 23, 2011, http://www.technologyreview.com/featuredstory/425137/streetbook/). Previously that same year Robert F. Worth wrote a provocative article examining how the Arab spring arose after news spread of Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-immolation, much of which spread through social media. (Robert F. Worth, “How a Single Match Can Ignite a Revolution,” The New York Times, January 21, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/23/weekinreview/23worth.html?src=twrhp&_r=1). After the rise of #CancelColbert, Jared Keller wrote an interesting think piece on social media activism noting the importance of such action but lamenting the potential loss of control for creators. (Jared Keller, “This Hashtag Kills Fascists: Does Social Media Activism Actually Work,” Al Jazeera America, April 2, 2014, http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/4/2/hashtag-activismcancelcolbert.html). Finally, director Jehane Noujaim’s 2013 documentary The Square highlights the events leading up to, during, and after the Egyptian Revolution noting the importance of social media activism. The film won 3 Emmy awards in 2014 (Jehane Noujaim, The Square, film, directed by Jehane Noujaim, Worldview Entertainment, 2013.) 28 Andreas M. Kaplan and Michael Haenlein, “Users of the World Unite! Challenges and Opportunities of Social Media,” Business Horizons 53 (2010): 60. 29 Felicia Wu Song, “Theorizing Web 2.0,” Information, Communication & Society 13 (2010): 249. 30 Facebook: Monthly Active Users 2015| Statistic (Statista), http://www.statista.com/statistics/264810/number-of-monthly-active-facebook-users- worldwide/. Facebook has far an away become the most popular website on the internet with a steady increase of older users. Although growth will ultimately decline, the near future seems to be ripe with growth. Additionally, Adrienne LaFrance, “Facebook is

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Eating the Internet,” The Atlantic, April 29, 2015, http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/04/facebook-is-eating-the- internet/391766/ finds that not only are users going to Facebook to connect with friends but also utilizing Facebook as their primary news gather site. Incidentally, the most frequently visited news site (The New York Times) only averaged 4.6 minutes of daily usage per visitor—suggesting that most users come to the site via link on social media sites rather than direct navigation. 31 Twitter: Number of Monthly Active Users 2015| Statistic (Statista) http://www.statista.com/statistics/272014/global-social-networks-ranked-by-number-of- users/ Twitter has been growing a strong market share of social media users outpacing many of the newer sites (i.e. Vine, Instagram, Snap Chat) and has been a steady source of social media user amongst college age and older adults. Twitter, although seemingly 7th on this list is second in terms of “microblogging” sites. 32 Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, (London, UK: Blackwell Publishing, 2000). 33 Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006). 34 Marc Lamont Hill, Nobody: Casualties of America’s War on the Vulnerable, from Ferguson to Flint and Beyond, (New York, NY: Atria Books, 2016): 182. 35 Catherine Palczewski, “Cyber-movements, New Social Movements, and Counterpublics,” in Counterpublics and the State, eds. Robert Asen and Daniel C. Brouwer (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2001): 165. 36 Hill, Nobody, 183. 37 Barry Brummett, Rhetorical Dimensions of Popular Culture, (Tuscaloosa, AL: Univrsity of Alabama Press, 2004), xii. 38 Brummett, Rhetorical Dimensions. 39 Raymie McKerrow, “Critical Rhetoric: Theory and Praxis,” Communication Monographs 56 (1989): 101. 40 Robert A. Dahl, “What Political Institutions Does Large-Scale Democracy Require?” Political Science Quarterly 120 (2005): 188. 41 Robert Asen, “A Discourse Theory of Citizenship,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 90 (2004): 191. 42 William Connolly, Pluralism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005): 121, 123, 126. 43 Michael Butterworth, “The Politics of the Pitch, Claiming and Contesting Democracy Through the Iraqi National Soccer Team,” Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies 4 (2007): 187. 44 Jennifer Preston, “Movement Began with Outrage and a Facebook Page that Gave it an Outlet,” The New York Times, February 5, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/06/world/middleeast/06face.html?pagewanted=all&_r= 0

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45 John Ehab, “Journalists Protest State Media Coverage of Alexandria Police Killing,” Egypt Independent, June 30, 2010, http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/journalists- protest-state-media-coverage-alexandria-police-killing 46 Jose Antonio Vargas, “Spring Awakening,” The New York Times, February 17, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/books/review/how-an-egyptian-revolution-began- on-facebook.html 47 Nahed Eltantawy and Julie B. Wiest, “Social Media in the Egyptian Revolution: Reconsidering Resource Mobilization Theory,” International Journal of Communication 5 (2011): 1213. 48 Preston, “Movement Began with Outrage.” 49 Bob Dreyfuss, “Who’s Behind Egypt’s Revolt?” The Nation, January 31, 2011, http://www.thenation.com/blog/158159/whos-behind-egypts-revolt 50 Marc Fisher, “In Tunisia, Act of One Fruit Vendor Unleashes Wave of Revolution in Arab World,” The Washington Post, March 26, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/in-tunisia-act-of-one-fruit-vendor-sparks-wave- of-revolution-through-arab-world/2011/03/16/AFjfsueB_story.html 51 Yasmine Ryan, “How Tunisia’s Revolution Began,” Al Jazeera, January, 26, 2011, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/01/2011126121815985483.html. 52 Peter Cohan, “What is Occupy Wall Street,” Forbes, October, 10, 2011, http://www.forbes.com/sites/petercohan/2011/10/10/what-is-occupy-wall-street/ 53 “What the Wall Street Protests Will Accomplish: 3 Theories,” The Week, September, 19, 2011, http://theweek.com/article/index/219407/what-the-wall-street-protests-will- accomplish-3-theories 54 Lauren Ellis, “Is #OccupyWallStreet Working?,” Mother Jones, September, 27, 2011, http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2011/09/occupy-wall-street 55 Jennifer Earl and Katrina Kimport, Digitally Enabled Social Change (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2011): 32. 56 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991): 27. 57 Craig Calhoun, “Introduction: Habermas and the Public Sphere,” in Habermas and the Public Sphere, ed. Craig Calhoun (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992): 6. 58 Simon Susen, “Critical Notes on Habermas’s Theory of the Public Sphere,” Sociological Analysis 5 (2011): 44. 59 Habermas, Public Sphere, 200. 60 Habermas, Public Sphere, 222. 61 Nancy Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy,” in Habermas and the Public Sphere, ed. Craig Calhoun (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992): 115. 62 Nancy Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy,” Social Text 25/26 (1990): 64.

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63 Robert Asen and Daniel Brouwer, “Introduction: Reconfigurations of the Public Sphere,” in Counterpublics and the State, eds. Robert Asen and Daniel C. Brouwer (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2001): 12. 64 Thomas B. Farrell, Norms of Rhetorical Culture, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993): 267. 65 Farrell, Norms of Rhetorical Culture, 225. 66 Kent A. Ono and John M. Sloop, Shifting Borders: Rhetoric, Immigration, and California’s Proposition 187, (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2002): 12. 67 Ono and Sloop, Shifting Borders, 12.

68 Judith Yaross Lee, Twain’s Brand: Humor in Contemporary American Culture, (Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi, 2012): 112. 69 Robert Glenn Howard, “A Theory of Vernacular Rhetoric: The Case of the ‘Sinner’s Prayer Online,” Folklore 116 (2005). 70 Lee, Twain’s Brand, 120. 71 Lee, Twain’s Brand, 158. 72 Adrienne LaFrance, “Facebook is Eating the Internet,” The Atlantic, April 29, 2015, http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/04/facebook-is-eating-the- internet/391766/ 73 Gerard Hauser, Vernacular Voices: The Rhetoric of Publics and Public Spheres, (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1999): 36. 74 Portia Vann, “Changing the game: The role of social media in overcoming old media's attention deficit toward women's sport,” Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media 58 (2014). 75 Hauser, Vernacular Voices, 12. 76 Hauser, Vernacular Voices, 67. 77 José Van Dijck, The Culture of Connectivity: A Critical History of Social Media, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013). 78 The insularity critique was popularly posited by Malcolm Gladwell (see Malcolm Gladwell, “Small Change: Why the Revolution Will Not be Tweeted,” The New Yorker, October, 4, 2010). Gladwell notes that social media relies on “weak tie” relationships, relationships with individuals of “distant connection,” and is suitable for finding ideas and news but not for sustained interaction leading to significant change. Additionally, in an academic setting, Kenneth Gergen (Kenneth Gergen, “Mobile Communciation and the Transformation of the Democratic Process.” In J. Katz (Ed.), Handbook of Mobile Communication Studies (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008): 310) argues that “monadic clusters” reaffirm an individual’s views constraining democratic difference. However, Scott W. Campbell and Nojin Kwak, (Scott W. Campbell and Nojin Kwak, “Political Involvement in ‘Mobilized’ Society: The Interactive Relationships Among Mobile Communication, Network Characteristics, and Political Participation,” Journal of Communication 61 (2011): 1019) identify a trend of individuals with larger networks to actively engage differences of opinion within their network.

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79 Van Dijck, Culture of Connectivity. 80 Hauser, Vernacular Voices, 67. 81 Hauser, Vernacular Voices, 11. 82 Hauser, Vernacular Voices, 265. 83 Hauser, Vernacular Voices, 36. 84 Zizi Papacharissi, A Private Sphere: Democracy in a Digital Age, (Malden, MA: Polity Press ,2010): 113. 85 Papacharissi, Private Sphere, 47. 86 Papacharissi, Private Sphere, 63. 87 Papacharissi, Private Sphere, 87 88 Papacharissi, Private Sphere, 110. 89 Papacharissi, Private Sphere, 138. 90 Papacharissi, Private Sphere, 153. 91 Papacharissi, Private Sphere, 160. 92 Robert Ivie, Democracy and America’s War on Terror, (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2005): 28. Chapter I 1 Zizi Papacharissi, A Private Sphere: Democracy in a Digital Age. (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2010), 2-3. 2 Dana Cloud’s article on the materiality of discourse provides a valuable critique of critical rhetoric. Dana L. Cloud, “The Materiality of Discourse as Oxymoron: A Challenge to Critical Rhetoric,” Western Journal of Communication 58 (1994): 141-163. 3 Jeremy Engels, The Politics of Resentment: A Genealogy (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2015): 7. 4 Robert Asen, “A Discourse Theory of Citizenship,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 90 no 2 (2004): 191. 5 Engels, Politics of Resentment, 7. 6 David Held, Models of Democracy, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1987): 3. 7 Robert Ivie, Democracy and America’s War on Terror (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2005): 12. 8 Jennifer Mercieca, Founding Fictions, (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2010): 15. 9 See Jennifer Mercieca, Founding Fictions (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2010) and Jeremy Engels, Enemyship: Democracy and Counter-Revolution in the Early Republic (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2010). 10 Ivie, Democracy War on Terror, 28. 11 Gerard Hauser, “A Rhetorical Democracy and Civic Engagement,” in Rhetorical Democracy: Discursive Practices of Civic Engagement, eds. Gerard Hauser and Amy Grim, (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 2004): 2. 12 Engels, Politics of Resentment, 7.

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13 Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens,” Perspectives on Politics 12 (2014): 576. 14 Chantal Mouffe, Agonistics, (London: Verso, 2014): 3. 15 Russell L. Hanson, The Democratic Imagination in America: Conversations with Our Past (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985): 25 and 53. 16 Thomas B. Farrell, Norms of Rhetorical Culture (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993): 80. 17 Engels, Politics of Resentment, 14. 18 Joseph M. Bessette, The Mild Voice of Reason: Deliberative Democracy and American National Government (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1994): 238. 19 Bessette, Mild Voice of Reason, 217. 20 Frederick M. Dolan and Thomas L. Dumm, “Introduction: Inventing America,” in Rhetorical Republic: Governing Representations in American Politics, eds. Frederick M. Dolan and Thomas L. Dumm (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1993): 1-2. 21 See Gerard Hauser, Vernacular Voices: The Rhetoric of Publics and Public Spheres, (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1999). 22 Both liberalism and equality are hallmarks of the American “liberal democracy” with which citizens continue to carry a fondness. 23 Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, trans. Ellen Kennedy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985): 17. 24 Benjamin R. Barber, A Passion for Democracy: American Essays (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998): 97. 25 Craigh Calhoun, “Introduction: Habermas and the Public Sphere,” in Habermas and the Public Sphere, ed. Craig Calhoun, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997): 2. 26 John Dryzek, Deliberative Global Politics: Discourse and Democracy in a Divided World, (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2006): 47. 27 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991). 27 Calhoun, Habermas and the Public Sphere, 36. 28 Gerard Hauser, Vernacular Voices: The Rhetoric of Publics and Public Spheres, (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1999): 273. 29 See Chantal Mouffe, Agonistics, (London: Verso, 2014) 30 Chantal Mouffe, The Return of the Political, (London: Verso, 2005), 6. 31 Mouffe, Return of the Political, 83. 32 Chantal Mouffe, “Part 1,” in Critical Spatial Practice 2: The Space of Agonism, eds. Nikolaus Hirsch and Markus Miessen (Berlin, GR: Sternberg Press, 2012): 22. 33 Mouffe, Space of Agonism, 26. 34 Natalie Fenton, “Left Out? Digital Media, Radical Politics and Social Change,” Information, Communication & Society 19 (2016): 349. 35 Ivie, Democracy War on Terror, 8.

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36 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, (London, UK: Verso, 2001): xiii-xiv. 37 Henry Jenkins, Convergence Culture: Where Old and New Media Collide, (New York, NY: New York University Press, 2006): 282. 38 Papacharissi, A Private Sphere, 17-18, 39 Papacharissi, A Private Sphere, 18. 40 Mercieca, Founding Fictions, 2. 41 Mercieca, Founding Fictions, 2. 42 Jean-Philippe Deranty, “Introduction: A Journey in Equality,” in Jacques Rancière: Key Concepts, ed. Jean-Philippe Deranty (London, UK: Acumen Publishing Limited, 2010): 1. 43 Ranceiere, Disagreement, viii. 44 Samuel A. Chambers, “Police and Oligarchy,” in Jacques Rancière: Key Concepts, ed. Jean-Philippe Deranty (London, UK: Acumen Publishing Limited, 2010): 57. 45 Chambers, Rancière Key Concepts, 64. 46 Plato, The Laws, trans. Thomas L. Pangle (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1980): 690a-d. 47 Bruno Bosteels, “Archipolitics, Parapolitics, Metapolitics,” in Jacques Rancière: Key Concepts, ed. Jean-Philippe Deranty (London, UK: Acumen Publishing Limited, 2010): 83. 48 Deranty, Rancière Key Concepts, 12. 49 Jacques Rancière, Disagreement, (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999): 11. 50 Rancière, Disagreement, 15. 51 Damien Smith Pfister, Networked Media, Network Rhetoric’s: Attention and Deliberation in the Early Blogosphere, (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press). 52 Jacques Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics, (New York, NY: Bloomsbury Press, 2013): 35. 53 Matthew Clarke, “The (Absent) Politics of Neo-liberal Education Policy,” Critical Studies in Education 53 (2012): 298. 54 Deranty, Rancière Key Concepts, 6. 55 Ivie, Democracy War on Terror, 90. 56 Ivie, Democracy War on Terror, 88-89. 57 Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, (London, UK: Verso, 2000): 104. 58 Mercieca, Founding Fictions, 217. 59 Deranty, Rancière Key Concepts, 5. 60 Rancière, Politics of Aesthetics, 35. 61 Jacques Rancière, Moments Politiques: Interventions 1977—2009, (New York, NY: Seven Stories Press, 2014): vii. 62 Todd May, The Political Thought of Jacques Rancière, (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 2008): 2.

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63 Rancière, Disagreement, 11. 64 Jacques Rancière, Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics, (New York, NY: Bloomsbury Press, 2010): 39. 65 Jacques Rancière, “What Does it Mean to be Un?” Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies 21 (2007): 559. 66 Bosteels, Rancière Key Concepts, 92. 67 Rancière, Disagreement, 28. 68 Rancière, Disagreement, 28. 69 Rancière, Disagreement, 29. 70 Rancière, What Does it Mean, 561. 71 Rancière, What Does it Mean, 561. 72 Rancière, What Does it Mean, 561. 73 May, Political Thought of Jacques Rancière, 43. 74 Deranty, Rancière Key Concepts, 6. 75 Robert Ivie, Dissent from War. (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, Inc., 2007): 6. 76 Robert Ivie, “Enabling Democratic Dissent,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 101 (2015): 46. 77 Mouffe, Spaces of Agonism, 21. 78 Ivie, Enabling Democratic Dissent, 47. 79 Ivie, Enabling Democratic Dissent, 47 - 49. 80 Robert L. Ivie, “Democratic Dissent and the Trick of Rhetorical Critique,” Cultural Studies ßà Critical Methodologies 5 (2005): 277. 81 Ivie, Enabling Democratic Dissent, 46. 82 Ivie, Enabling Democratic Dissent, 49. 83 Rancière, Disagreement, viii-ix. 84 Jacques Rancière, Chronicles of Consensual Times, (New York, NY: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2010): 1. 85 Steven Corcoran, “Editor’s Introduction,” in Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics, ed. Steven Corcoran, (New York, NY: Bloomsbury Press, 2010): 5. 86 Deranty, Rancière Key Concepts, 11. 87 Rancière, Disagreement, 117. 88 Kendall R. Philips, “The Spaces of Public Dissension: Reconsidering the Public Sphere,” Communication Monographs 63 (1996): 242. 89 Ivie, Enabling Democratic Dissent, 50. 90 Mouffe, Agonistics, 32. 91 Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 15-16. 92 Kenneth Burke, Rhetoric of Motives, (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 1969): 20. 93 Mouffe, Agonistics, 46. 94 Mouffe, Agonistics, 40. 95 Mouffe, Agonistics, 127. 96 Mouffe, Agonistics, 101.

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97 Rancière , Disagreement, 30. 98 Gert Biesta, “The Ignorant Citizen: Mouffe, Rancière, and the Subject of Democratic Education,” Study of Philosophy and Education 30 (2011): 152. 99 Ivie, Democracy War on Terror, 168. 100 Ivie, Enabling Democratic Dissent, 56. 101 Ivie, Enabling Democratic Dissent, 49. 102 Davis W. Houck and David E. Dixon, “Introduction,” In Rhetoric, Religion, and the Civil Rights Movement, 1954-1965, Volume 1 by Davis W. Houck and David E. Dixon eds. (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2006). 103 Houck and Dixon, Rhetoric, Religion, and the Civil Rights Movement, 5-6. 104 For a worthwhile article on Emmett Till see Davis Houck, “Killing Emmett,” Rhetoric and Public Affairs 8 (2005). The issue of Rhetoric and Public Affairs in which this article appears is dedicated to the 50th anniversary of Emmett Till and Rosa Parks. The significance of each of these individuals cannot be understated with initiating the Civil Rights Movement. 105 Dave Zirin, “Why the Police Killing of Football Player Christian Taylor Matters,” The Nation, August 10, 2015, accessed September 1, 2015, http://www.thenation.com/article/why-the-police-killing-of-football-player-christian- taylor-matters/ 106 Celeste Michelle Condit, “Democracy and Civil Rights: The Universalizing Influence of Public Argumentation,” Communication Monographs 54 (March 1987): 14. 107 Victoria J. Gallagher, “Black Power in Berkeley: Postmodern Constructions in the Rhetoric of Stokely Carmichael,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 87 (2001): 153. 108 Richard B. Gregg, “The Ego-Function of the Rhetoric of Protest,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 4 (1971): 71, 86, 89. 109 Gregg, Ego Function of Protest, 87. 110 James R. Andrews, “Confrontation at Columbia: A Case Study in Coercive Rhetoric,” The Quarterly Journal of Speech 55 (1969): 9. See also, Leland Griffin, “The Rhetorical Structure of the ‘New Left’ Movement: Part 1,” The Quarterly Journal of Speech 50 (1964). 111 Robert L. Scott and Donald K. Smith, “The Rhetoric of Confrontation,” The Quarterly Journal of Speech 55 (1969): 8. 112 Andrews, Confrontation at Columbia, 16. 113 Gallagher, Black Power in Berkeley,155, 114 Mark Gaipa, “‘A Creative Psalm of Brotherhood’: The (De)constructive Play in Martin Luther King’s ‘Letter from Birmingham Jail,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 93 (2007): 281. 115 Michael G. Lacy and Kent A. Ono, “Introduction,” in Critical Rhetorics of Race. Michael G. Lacy and Kent A. Ono eds. (New York, NY: New York University Press, 2011): 7.

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116 Kirt H. Wilson, “Towards a Discursive Theory of Racial Identity: The Souls of Black Folks as a Response to Nineteenth-Century Biological Determinism,” Western Journal of Communication 63 (1999). 117 David Domke, Philip Garland, Andre Billeaudeaux, and John Hucteson, “Insights Into U.S. Racial Hierarchy: Racial Profiling, News Sources, and September 11,” Journal of Communication 54 (2003): 607. 118 Kelly E. Happe, “The Body of Race: Toward a Rhetorical Understanding of Racial Ideology,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 99 (2013): 134. 119 Happe, Body of Race, 134. 120 Happe, Body of Race, 135. 121 Audrey Smedley, Race in North America: Origin and Evolution of a Worldview, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press): 5. 122 Lydia Lum, “The Obama Era: A Post-racial Society?” Diverse: Issues in Higher Education 25 (2009): 14. 123 Lacy and Ono. Critical Rhetorics of Race, 3. 124 Max Boot, “Trump is Normalizing Racism,” The Washington Post, May 30, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/president-trump-is- normalizing-racism/2018/05/30/7d5f726e-6417-11e8-a768- ed043e33f1dc_story.html?utm_term=.98862f296f05 125 Thomas K. Nakayama and Robert L. Krizek, “Whiteness: A Strategic Rhetoric,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 81 (1995): 293. 126 Ralina L. Joseph, “‘Tyra Banks is Fat’: Reading (Post-)Racism and (Post-) Feminism in the New Millennium,” Critical Studies in Media Communication 26 (2009): 254. 127 Jamie Moshin and Ronald L. Jackson II, “Inscribing Racial Bodies and Relieving Responsibility: Examining racial Politics in Crash,” in Critical Rhetorics of Race, Michael G. Lacy and Kent A. Ono, Eds. (New York, NY: New York University Press, 2011): 214. 128 Hettie V. Williams, G. Reginald Daniel, and David Roediger, “Preface” and “Foreword” in Race and The Obama Phenomenon. Eds. G. Reginald Daniel and Hettie V. Williams. (Jackson, MS: University of Mississippi Press, 2014): xii and xxi. 129 Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness, (New York, NY: 2012): 259. 130 Katherine Henry, “‘Slaves to a Debt’: Race, Shame, and the Anti-Obama Jeremiad,” The Quarterly Journal of Speech 100 (2014): 313. 131 Adam Nagourney, “A Defiant Rancher Savers the Audience that Rallied to His Side,” The New York Times, April 23, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/ 24/us/politics/rancher-proudly-breaks-the-law-becoming-a-hero-in-the-west.html 132 Henry, Slaves to a Debt, 304. 133 Michael Lerner, “The Crisis of Values in America: Its Manipulation by the Right and Its Invisibility to the Left,” in The Good Citizen, ed. David Batstone and Eduardo Mendieta (New York, NY: Routledge, 1999): 65 and 71.

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134 Mark Lawrence McPhail, “A Question of Character: Re(-)Signing the Racial Contract,” Rhetoric and Public Affairs 7 (2004). 135 Nakayama and Krizek, “Whiteness: A Strategic Rhetoric.” 136 Meryle Irwin, “‘Their Experience is the Immigrant Experience’: Ellis Island, Documentary Film, and Rhetorical Reversible Whiteness,” The Quarterly Journal of Speech 99 (2013): 93. Chapter II 1 Maeve Duggan and Aaron Smith, “The Political Environment on Social Media,” Pew Research Center, October 25th, 2016, http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/10/25/the- political-environment-on-social-media/ 2 A quick Google search returns a plethora of articles seeking to measure the Civil Rights against Black Lives Matter. The articles tend to vary between issues of direct action vs. online action, the role of leadership, and the pace of change due to social movements. National Public Radio hosted a worthwhile discussion about connections between the Civil Rights Movement and #BlackLivesMatter in which Dr. Khalil Gibran Muhammad raises some of the contemporary concerns for surrounding the two movements. Ari Shapiro and Dr. Khalil Gibran Muhammad, “Civil Rights Activism, From Martin Luther King to Black Lives Matter,” NPR Radio, January 18, 2016, https://www.npr.org/2016/01/18/463503838/civil-rights-activism-from-martin-luther- king-to-black-lives-matter 3 Multiple articles help further this argument. For instance, Meryle Irwin, “‘Their Experience is the Immigrant Experience’: Ellis Island, Documentary Film, and Rhetorical Reversible Whiteness,” The Quarterly Journal of Speech 99 (2013): 74-97 provides a formal argument for a colorblind society as understood from critics of the Obama presidency. Additionally, Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, “The Structure of Racism in Color- Blind, “Post-Racial” America,” American Behavioral Scientist 59 (2015): 1358-1376 provides a strong connection to current racial tension and its foundation in the myth of a “color-blind” society. 4 “Twitter Hashtags are 10 Years Old – So Here are the Most Popular,” BBC Newsbeat, August 23, 2017, http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/article/41010284/twitter-hashtags-are- 10-years-old---so-here-are-10-of-the-most-popular 5 Dan Barry, Serge F. Kovaleski, Campbell Robertson, and Lizette Alvarez, “Race, Tragedy and Outrage Collide After a Shot in Florida,” The New York Times, April 2, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/02/us/trayvon-martin-shooting-prompts-a- review-of-ideals.html?_r=0 6 Cynthia Lee, “Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias in a not yet Post- Racial Society,” Scholarly Commons 91 (2013): 2013-2097. 7 “‘Million Hoodie March’ held in Union Square in Memory of Slain Florida Teenager.” CBS Local New York Online. Updated March 21, 2012, http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2012/03/21/march-to-be-held-in-union-square-in-memory- of-slain-florida-teenager/

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8 Greg Botelho, “What Happened the Night Trayvon Martin Died,” CNN Online, May 23 2012, http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/18/justice/florida-teen-shooting-details/ 9 Botelho, “What Happened.” 10 Botelho, “What Happened.” 11 Adam Winkler, “What the Florida ‘Stand Your Ground’ Law Says,” The New York Times January 4, 2013, http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2012/03/21/march-to-be-held-in- union-square-in-memory-of-slain-florida-teenager/ 12 Botelho, “What Happened,” CNN Online. 13 Incidentally, the racial and ethic identity of George Zimmerman was also argued. Zimmerman, whose mother is from Peru, was quickly drawn within conservative media stories as a white while other media outlets continued to note his Hispanic heritage. The confluence of these messages has led folks to question how the story would have unfolded if Trayvon Martin wasn’t a black teenager. Isa Hopkins, “Is George Zimmerman white or Hispanic? That depends,” Salon Online, July 16, 2013, http://www.salon.com/2013/07/16/is_george_zimmerman_white_or_hispanic/ 14 Jessica Guynn, “Meet the Women Who Coined #BlackLivesMatter,” USA Today, March 4, 2015, http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2015/03/04/alicia-garza-black-lives- matter/24341593/ 15 Elizabeth Day, “#BlackLivesMatter: The Birth of a New Civil Rights Movement,” The Guardian, July 19, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/19/blacklivesmatter-birth-civil-rights- movement 16 Day, “#BlackLivesMatter.” 17 Day, “#BlackLivesMatter.” 18 Michael McLaughlin, “The Dynamic History of #BlackLivesMatter Explained,” The Huffington Post, February 29, 2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/history-black- lives-matter_us_56d0a3b0e4b0871f60eb4af5 19 Guynn, Meet the Women, USA Today. 20 Patrisse Cullors, “Opinion: #BlackLivesMatter Will Continue to Disrupt the Political Process,” The Washington Post, August 18, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2015/08/18/opinion- blacklivesmatter-will-continue-to-disrupt-the-political-process/ 21 Monica Anderson, Skye Toor, Lee Raine, and Aaron Smith, “An Analysis of #BlackLivesMatter and other Twitter Hashtags Related to Political or Social Issues,” Pew Research Center, July 11, 2018, http://www.pewinternet.org/2018/07/11/an-analysis-of- blacklivesmatter-and-other-twitter-hashtags-related-to-political-or-social-issues/ 22 Frank H. Wu, “The Meaning of ‘Black Lives Matter,’” Huffington Post, May 11, 2017, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/frank-h-wu/the-meaning-of-black-live_b_9884362.html and Fredrick C. Harris, “The Next Civil Rights Movement,” Dissent, Summer 2015, 34. 23 Catherine L. Langford and Montené Speight “#BlackLivesMatter: Epistemic Positioning, Challenges, and Possibilities,” Journal of Contemporary Rhetoric 5 (2015): 79.

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24 Langford and Speight, “#BlackLivesMatter,” 80. 25 Leah Fessler, “How the Leader of Black Lives Matter Defines ‘Power,’” Quartz, September 16, 2018, https://qz.com/1391762/black-lives-matter-co-founder-alicia-garzas- definition-of-power/ 26 Julius Bailey and David J. Leonard, “Black Lives Matter: Post-Nihilistic Freedom Dreams,” Journal of Contemporary Rhetoric 5 (2015): 68. 27 Deen Freelon, Charlton D. McIlwain, and Meredith D. Clark, “Beyond the Hashtag: #Ferguson, #BlackLivesMatter, and the Online Struggle for Offline Justice,” Center for Media & Social Impact (2016). 28 Langford and Speight, “#BlackLivesMatter,” 81. 29 Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, From #BlackLivesMatter to Black Liberation (Chicago, IL: Haymarket Books, 2016): 151. 30 Within the initial few pages, a Google search of “Black Lives Matter” returns articles containing a variety of the common critiques of #BlackLivesMatter. Additionally, Taylor, From #BlackLivesMatter to Black Liberation, comprises a vigorous recount of the critique against #BlackLivesMatter’s lack of leadership. Additionally, Barbara Ransby, Making All Black Lives Matter: Reimagining Freedom in the 21st Century, (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2018) provides examples of the critique directed at #BlackLivesMatter. 31 Taylor, #BlackLivesMatter to Black Liberation, 160-165. 32 There are multiple articles written discussing the role of leadership in contemporary social movements. For an examination of leadership within social movements check out Robert Cox and Christina Foust, “Social Movement Rhetoric” in Readings on the Rhetoric of Social Protest, eds. Charles E. Morris III and Stephen Howard Browne (State College, PA: State Publishing, Inc., 2013). For a supporting article tied directly to #BlackLivesMatter check out Harris, “The Next Civil Rights Movement.” 33 Peniel Joseph, Dark Days, Bright Nights: From Black Power to Barack Obama (New York, NY: BasicCivitas Books, 2010): 2. 34 Kristen Hoerl, “Selective Amnesia and Racial Transcendence in News Coverage of President Obama’s Inauguration,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 98 (2012). 35 Hoerl, “Selective Amnesia and Racial Transcendence,” 183-187. 36 Hoerl, “Selective Amnesia and Racial Transcendence,” 183. 37 Stephen H. Browne, “Reading Public Memory in Daniel Webster’s Plymouth Rock Oration,” Western Journal of Communication 57 (1993): 466. 38 Derrick P. Alridge, “The Limits of Master Narrative in History Books: An Analysis of Representations of Martin Luther King, Jr.,” Teacher’s College Record 108 (2006): 668. 39 Bayard Rustin, Down the Line: The Collected Writings of Bayard Rustin (Chicago, IL: Quadrangle Books, 1971): 111. 40 Rustin, Down the Line, 115. 41 Rustin, Down the Line, 115. 42 Hoerl, “Selective Amnesia and Racial Transcendence,” 187.

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43 P. J. Brendese, The Power of Memory in Democratic Politics (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2014), 4. 44 Stephen Browne, “Review Essay: Reading, Rhetoric, and Texture of Public Memory,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 81 (1995): 237. 45 Barbie Zelizer, “Reading the Past Against the Grain: The Shape of Memory Studies,” Critical Studies in Mass Communication 12 (1995): 224-225. 46 Hoerl, “Selective Amnesia and Racial Transcendence,” 180. 47 Kristen Hoerl, “Burning Mississippi into Memory? Cinematic Amnesia as a Resource for Remembering Civil Rights,” Critical Studies in Media Communication 26 (2009): 57 48 John Bodnar, Remaking America: Public Memory, Commemoration, and Patriotism in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992): 15. 49 Barbara Biesecker, “Remembering World War II: The Rhetoric and Politics of National Commemoration at the Turn of the 21st Century,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 88 (2002): 406. 50 The previously cited Biesecker article helps build the foundation for public memory as contestation. Kristen Hoerl, “Mario Van Peeble’s ‘Panther’ and Popular Memories of the Black Panther Party,” Critical Studies in Media Communication 24 (2007): 206-227 adds further support. 51 Hoerl, “Selective Amnesia,” 180. 52 Kirt H. Wilson, “Debating the Great Emancipator: Abraham Lincoln and our Public Memory,” Rhetoric and Public Affairs 13 (2010): 460. 53 Wilson, “Debating the Great Emancipator,” 475. 54 Wilson, “Debating the Great Emancipator,” 475. 55 Wilson, “Debating the Great Emancipator,” 467. 56 John Lucaites and Celeste Condit, “Reconstructing : Culturetypal and Counter-Cultural Rhetorics in the Martyred Black Vision,” Communication Monographs 57 (1990): 5-24. 57 Celeste Condit and John Lucaites, “Malcolm X and the Limits of the Rhetoric of Revolutionary Dissent,” Journal of Black Studies 23 (1993): 291-313. 58 Condit and Lucaites, “Malcolm X,” 301. 59 Lucaites and Condit, “Reconstructing ,” 19. 60 Kirt Wilson, “Rhetoric and Race in American Experience,” The Promises and Perils of Sentimental History,” in Sizing Up Rhetoric eds. David Zarefsky and Elizabeth Benacka (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 2008): 35. 61 Shawn J. Parry-Giles and Trevor Parry-Giles, “Collective Memory, Political Nostalgia, and the Rhetorical Presidency: Bill Clinton’s Commemoration of the March on Washington, August 28, 1998,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 86 (200): 418. 62 Wilson, “Rhetoric and Race,” 36. 63 Parry-Giles and Parry-Giles, “Collective Memory,” 418-419. 64 Parry-Giles and Parry-Giles, “Collective Memory,” 421. 65 Zelizer, “Reading the Past,” 225.

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66 Michael Schudson, “Culture of, Culture for, Culture with: Toward a Sociology of Collective Memory,” (paper presented at the International Communication Association, Washington D.C., May, 1993). 67 Stuart Tannock, “Nostalgia Critique,” Cultural Studies 9 (1995): 454. 68 Wilson, “Rhetoric and Race,” 37. 69 Jeanne Theoharis, “The Civil Rights Movement, Distorted: Weaponizing History Against Black Lives Matter,” Salon, January 31, 2018, https://www.salon.com/2018/01/30/the-civil-rights-movement-distorted-weaponizing- history-against-black-lives-matter/ 70 Barbara Reynolds, “I was a Civil Rights Activist in the 1960s. But it’s Hard for Me to get Behind Black Lives Matter,” Washington Post, August 24, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/08/24/i-was-a-civil-rights- activist-in-the-1960s-but-its-hard-for-me-to-get-behind-black-lives- matter/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.2174fb225f2e 71 Cecilia Lei, “Majority of Black Americans Value Social Media for Lesser-Known Issues,” National Public Radio, August 5, 2018, https://www.npr.org/2018/08/05/635127389/majority-of-black-americans-value-social- media-for-amplifying-lesser-known-issue 72 Caroline Simon, “How Social Media has Shaped Black Lives Matter, Five Years Later,” USA Today, July 12, 2018, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2018/07/12/black-lives-matter-movement-and- social-media-after-five-years/778779002/ 73 Charles J. Stewart, “The Evolution of a Revolution: Stokely Carmichael and the Rhetoric of Black Power,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 83 (1997): 431. 74 Parke G. Burgess, “The Rhetoric of Black Power: A Moral Demand?” Quarterly Journal of Speech 54 (1968): 122. 75 Burgess, “Rhetoric of Black Power,” 122. 76 Wayne Brockriede and Robert L. Scott, “Stokely Carmichael: Two Speeches on Black Power,” Central States Speech Journal 19 (1968): 4. 77 Burgess, “Rhetoric of Black Power,” 124. 78 Stewart, “Evolution of a Revolution,” 432. 79 Burgess, “Rhetoric of Black Power,” 129. 80 Victoria J. Gallagher, “Black Power in Berkeley: Postmodern Constructions in the Rhetoric of Stokely Carmichael,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 87 (2001): 150-154. 81 Parry-Giles and Parry-Giles, “Collective Memory,” 421. 82 For a well articulated framing of this claim I recommend Charles J. Stewart, Craig Allen Smith, and Robert E. Denton, Persuasion and Social Movements (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, Inc., 2012). 83 Dewey M. Clayton, “Black Lives Matter and the Civil Rights Movement: A Comparative Analysis of Two Social Movements in the United States,” Journal of Black Studies 49 (2018): 452.

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84 Herbert W. Simons, “Requirements, Problems, and Strategies: A Theory for Social Movements,” in Readings on the Rhetoric of Social Protest, eds. Charles E. Morris III and Stephen Howard Browne (State College, PA: Strata Publishing, Inc, 2013), 33. 85 Simons, “A Theory of Social Movements,” 34. 86 Simons, “A Theory of Social Movements,” 33. 87 Simons, “A Theory of Social Movements,” 34. 88 Peniel E. Joseph, “Why Black Lives Matter Still Matters,” New Republic, May 2017, 19. 89 Chantal Mouffe, For a Left Populism (London, UK: Verso, 2018): 45. 90 Mouffe, Left Populism, 45. 91 Josh Grimm, “Hegemonic Framing of Malcolm X and Martin Luther King, Jr., in Northeastern Newspapers,” Howard Journal of Communications 25 (2015): 326. 92 Garth E. Pauley, “John Lewis’s “Serious Revolution”: Rhetoric, Resistance, and Revision at the March on Washington,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 84 (1998): 320. 93 Hoerl, “Selective Amnesia and Radical Transcendence,” 187. 94 Joseph, Dark Days, Bright Nights, 3. 95 Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, “The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the Past,” The Journal of American History 91 (2005): 1234. 96 Condit and Lucaites, “Malcolm X,” 308. 97 Clayton, “Black Lives Matter and the Civil Rights Movement,” 458. 98 Simone Sebastian, “Don’t Criticize Black Lives Matter for Provoking Violence. The Civil Rights Movement did, too,” The Washington Post, October 1, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/10/01/dont-criticize-black- lives-matter-for-provoking-violence-the-civil-rights-movement-did- too/?utm_term=.24c10992bb74 99 Dowd Hall, “The Long Civil Rights Movement,” 1234. 100 Davis Houck, “Recovering Women’s Voices from the Civil Rights Movement,” in Women and the Civil Rights Movement, 1954-1965, eds. Davis Houck and David E. Dixon (Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi, 2009): ix. 101 Houck, Women and the Civil Rights Movement, xi. 102 Maegan Parker Brooks, “Oppositional Ethos: Fannie Lou Hamer and the Vernacular Persona,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 14 (2011): 518. 103 Brooks, Oppositional Ethos, 514. 104 Quoted in Lynne Olson, Freedom’s Daughters: The Unsung Heroines of the Civil Rights Movement from 1890 to 1970 (New York, NY: Scribner, 2001): 150. 105 Nikki Orth, “Ella Baker, ‘Address at the Hattiesburg Freedom Day Rally’ (21 January 1964),” Voices of Democracy 11 (2016): 26. 106 Ella Baker, “Developing Community Leadership” in Black Women in White America, ed. Gerda Lerner (New York, NY: Vintage (1973): 351. 107 Angela Davis, quoted in Sheryl Huggins Salomon, “Angela Davis Talks Black Liberation, History, and the Contemporary Vision,” Ebony, February 17, 2016,

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http://www.ebony.com/news-views/angela-davis-black-liberation- interview#axzz4hXzzoXto 108 Angela Davis, Freedom is a Constant Struggle (Chicago, IL: Haymarket Books, 2016): 85. 109 Davis, Freedom is a Constant Struggle, 88. 110 Davis, Freedom is a Constant Struggle, 85. 111 Fessler, “How the Leader.” 112 Chauncey Alcorn, “Black Lives Matter was Born Five Years Ago Today. Is America Better Off?” Mic.com, July 13, 2018, https://mic.com/articles/190211/black-lives-matter- was-born-5-years-ago-today-is-america-better-off#.NI9KR5fWO 113 Fessler, “How the Leader.” 114 Bijan Stephen, “How Black Lives Matter Uses Social Media to Fight the Power,” Wired, November 2015, https://www.wired.com/2015/10/how-black-lives-matter-uses- social-media-to-fight-the-power/ 115 Shawn A. Ginwright, Black Youth Rising: Activism and Radical Healing in Urban America (New York, NY: Teachers College Press, 2010). 116 Stephen, “How Black Lives Matter Uses Social Media.” 117 Joseph, “Why Black Lives Matter Still Matters,” 18. 118 Joseph, “Why Black Lives Matter Still Matters,” 19. 119 Frank Leon Roberts, “How Black Lives Matter Changed the Way Americans Fight for Freedom,” ACLU.org, July 13, 2018, https://www.aclu.org/blog/racial-justice/race-and- criminal-justice/how-black-lives-matter-changed-way-americans-fight 120 Sarah J. Jackson and Brooke Foucault Welles, “Hijacking #myNYPD: Social Media Dissent and Networked Counterpublics,” Journal of Communication 65 (2015): 935. 121 Manual Castells, Networks of Outrage and Hope (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2012): 15. 122 Clay Shirky, Here Comes Everybody: The power of Organizing without Organizations (New York, NY: Penguin Publishing, 2008). 123 Jackson and Welles, “Hijacking #myNYPD,” 936. 124 Stephen, “How Black Lives Matter Uses Social Media.” 125 Jeffery Robinson, “Black Lives Matter is Still Here - And Avoiding the Mistakes of Their Predecessors,” Newsweek, July 13, 2018, https://www.newsweek.com/black-lives- matter-still-here-avoiding-mistakes-predecessors-opinion-1023191 126 Robinson, “Black Lives Matter is Still Here.” 127 Linda A. Moore, “How Black Lives Matter Moved Civil Rights into the 21st Century,” Commercial Appeal, March 11, 2018, https://www.commercialappeal.com/story/news/2018/03/11/black-lives-matter-moves- civil-rights-into-21st-century/1049310001/ 128 Moore, “How Black Lives Matter.” 129 Harris, “The Next Civil Rights Movement,” 36. 130 Harris, The Next Civil Rights Movement,” 36. 131 Harris, The Next Civil Rights Movement,” 36 and 37.

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132 Leland M. Giffin, “The Rhetoric of Historical Movements,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 38 (1952): 187. 133 Darrel Enck-Wanzer, “Trashing the System: Social Movement, Intersectional Rhetoric, and Collective Agency in the Young Lords Organizations Garbage Offensive,” Quarterly Journal of Speech, 92 (2006): 177. 134 Griffin, “The Rhetoric of Historical Movements,” 188. 135 Clayton, “Black Lives Matter and the Civil Rights Movement,” 452. 136 Leland Griffin, “The Rhetorical Structure of the ‘New Left’ Movement: Part I,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 50 (1964): 127. 137 Robert Huesca, “Conceptual Contributions of New Social Movements to Development Communication Research,” Communication Theory 11 (2001): 416. 138 Burgess, “Rhetoric of Black Power,” 122 and 127. 139 Kevin DeLuca, Image Politics: The New Rhetoric of Environmental Activism (New York, NY: The Guilford Press, 1999). 140 Steven Buechler, Social Movements in Advanced Capitalism: The Political Economy and Cultural Construction of Social Activism (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2000): 46. 141 Bonnie J. Dow, “Ellen, Television, and the Politics of Gay and Lesbian Visibility,” Critical Studies in Media Communication 18 (2001); Bonnie J. Dow, “Fixing Feminism: Women’s Liberation and the Rhetoric of Television Documentary,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 90 (2004). 142 Kevin DeLuca and Jennifer Peeples, “From Public Sphere to Public Screen: Democracy, Activism, and the ‘Violence’ of Seattle,” Critical Studies in Media Communication 19 (2002): 131. 143 Enck-Wanzer “Trashing the System,” 178. 144 Julie Kalil Schutten, “Invoking Practical Magic: New Social Movements, Hidden Populations, and the Public Screen,” Western Journal of Communication 70 (2006), 336- 337. 145 Jacques Rancière, Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics, (New York, NY: Bloomsbury Press, 2010): 42-43. 146 Rancière Dissensus 30-31. 147 Jacques Rancière, The Method of Equality (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2016): 134. 148 Rancière, The Method of Equality, 134. 149 Steven Corcran, “Editor’s Introduction.” In Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics, eds. Steven Corcoran, (New York, NY: Bloomsbury Press, 2010): 2. 150 Rancière, Emancipated Spectator, 75. 151 Rancière, Method, 156. 152 Rancière, The Method of Equality, 90. 153 Chantal Mouffe, “Part 4,” in Critical Spatial Practice 2: The Space of Agonism, eds. Nikolaus Hirsch and Markus Miessen (Berlin, DE: Sternberg Press, 2012): 112. 154 Mouffe, Space of Agonism, 112.

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155 Peter Dahlgren, “Civic Identity and Net Activism,” in Radical Democracy and the Internet: Interrogating Theory and Practice, (eds.) Peter Dahlgren and Eugenia Siapera (London, UK: Palgrave Macmillian, 2007): 61. 156 Mouffe, Space of Agonism, 31. 157 Dahlgren, Radical Democracy and the Internet, 67. 158 Anna Mari Smith, Laclau and Mouffe: The Radical Democratic Imaginary (New York, NY: Routledge, 1998): 25. 159 Smith, Laclau and Mouffe, 32. 160 Marco Deseriis, “Technopopulism: The Emergence of a Discursive Formation,” Triple C 15 (2017): 443. 161 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (London, UK: Verso, 1985): 135. 162 Smith, Laclau and Mouffe, 33. 163 Chantal Mouffe, Return of the Political (London, UK: Verso, 1993): 6. 164 Mouffe, Space of Agonism, 112. 165 Mouffe, Space of Agonism, 112-113. 166 Mouffe, Space of Agonism, 59. 167 Robert Ivie, “Toward a Humanizing Style of Democratic Dissent,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 11 (2008): 454. 168 Gerard A. Hauser, Vernacular Voices: The Rhetoric of Publics and Public Spheres (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1990), 12. 169 Ivie, “Humanizing Style of Democratic Dissent,” 454 170 Ivie, “Humanizing Style of Democratic Dissent,” 454. 171 Rancière, Dissensus, 37. 172 Rancière, The Method of Equality, 139. 173 Rancière, The Method of Equality, 140. 174 Bailey and Leonard, “Black Lives Matter,” 68. 175 Jacques Rancière, Moments Politiques: Interventions 1977—2009, (New York, NY: Seven Stories Press, 2014), 28. 176 Rancière, Moments Politiques, 29. 177 Ivie, “Humanizing Style of Democratic Dissent,” 458. 178 Zizi Papacharissi, A Private Sphere: Democracy in a Digital Age (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2010): 131. 179 Robert Ivie, Dissent from War (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, Inc., 2007): 104. 180 Ivie, “Humanizing Style of Democratic Dissent,” 455. 181 Robert Asen, “A Discourse Theory of Citizenship,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 90 (2004): 197. 182 Asen, “Discourse Theory of Citizenship,” 207. 183 Quoted in Cheryl Geisler, “How Ought We to Understand the Concept of Rhetorical Agency,” Rhetorical Society Quarterly 34 (2004): 12. 184 Chantal Mouffe, “Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism,” Social Research 66 (1999): 756.

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Chapter III 1 Robert Asen, “A Discourse Theory of Citizenship,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 90 (2004): 199. 2 Plato, Republic, trans. Paul Shoery in Plato: The Collected Dialogues ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961): 506c. 3 Bernard A. Miller, “Retrieving a Sophistic Sense of Doxa,” Rhetoric in the Vortex of Cultural Studies: Proceedings of the Fifth Biennial Conference, ed. Arthur Walzer (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1992): 32. 4 Miller, “Retrieving a Sophistic Sense of Doxa,” 32. 5 Miller, “Retrieving a Sophistic Sense of Doxa,” 32-41. 6 James Jasinski, Sourcebook on Rhetoric: Key Concepts in Rhetorical Contemporary Studies (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2001): 183. 7 Eric A. Havelock, Preface to Plato (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963): 248. 8 Robert Hariman, “Status, Marginality, and Rhetorical Theory,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 72 (1896): 48. 9 Hariman, “Status, Marginality, and Rhetorical Theory,” 49. 10 Havelock, Preface to Plato, 250-251. 11 A. Freya Thimsen, “The People Against Corporate Personhood: Doxa and Dissensual Democracy,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 101 (2015): 486. 12 Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 1969): 59. 13 Hariman, “Status, Marginality, and Rhetorical Theory,” 49. 14 Jasinski, Sourcebook on Rhetoric, 185. 15 Miller, “Retrieving a Sophistic Sense of Doxa,” 32. 16 Jasinski, Sourcebook on Rhetoric, 183 17 J. R. Cox, “Cultural Memory and Public Moral Argument,” The Van Zelst Lecture in Communication (Northwestern University, Evanston, I, 1987): 7. 18 Thomas Farrell, Norms of Rhetorical Culture (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993): 231. 19 Farrell, Norms of Rhetorical Culture, 273. 20 Jasinski, Sourcebook on Rhetoric, 186. 21 Hariman, “Status, Marginality, and Rhetorical Theory,” 50. 22 John Mucklebauer, The Future of Invention: Rhetoric, Postmodernism, and the Problem of Change (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2009): 164. 23 Thimsen, “People Against Corporate Personhood,” 491. 24 Thimsen, “People Against Corporate Personhood,” 490. 25 Thimsen, “People Against Corporate Personhood,” 491. 26 Thimsen, “People Against Corporate Personhood,” 486. 27 Thimsen, “People Against Corporate Personhood,” 486. 28 Andreea Ritivoi, Paul Ricoeur: Tradition and Innovation in Rhetorical Theory (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2006): 58-59.

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29 Paul Ricouer, “Rhetoric – Poetics – Hermeneutics,” in From Metaphysics to Rhetoric, ed. Michel Meyer (Dordrecht, DE: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989): 143. 30 Dave Zirin “Why the Police Killing of Football Player Christian Taylor Matters.” The Nation, August 10, 2015. http://www.thenation.com/article/why-the-police-killing-of- football-player-christian-taylor-matters/ 31 Thimsen, “People Against Corporate Personhood,” 490. 32 Asen, “A Discourse Theory of Citizenship,” 192. 33 Asen, “A Discourse Theory of Citizenship,” 191. 34 Asen, “A Discourse Theory of Citizenship,” 194. 35 Asen, “A Discourse Theory of Citizenship,” 192. 36 Asen, “A Discourse Theory of Citizenship,” 195. 37 John Dewey, “Creative Democracy—the Task Before Us,” in The Later Works, 1925- 1953. Volume 14: 1939-1941, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1991): 226. 38 Asen, “A Discourse Theory of Citizenship,” 196. 39 Asen, “A Discourse Theory of Citizenship,” 197. 40 Asen, “A Discourse Theory of Citizenship,” 197. 41 Seyla Benhabib, “Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy,” in Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, ed. Seyla Benhabib (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996): 73-74. 42 Sarah J. Jackson and Brooke Foucault Welles, “#Ferguson is Everywhere: Initiators in Emerging Counterpublic Networks,” Information, Communication & Society 19 (2016): 398. 43 Nancy Fraser, “Foucault on Modern Power: Empirical Insights and Normative Confusion,” Praxis International 1 (1981): 280. 44 Asen, “A Discourse Theory of Citizenship,” 199. 45 Todd May, The Political Thought of Jacques Rancière: Creating Equality (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 2008): 38-77. 46 Robert Glenn Howard, “The Vernacular Web of Participatory Media,” Critical Studies in Media Communication 25 (2008): 493. 47 Gerard Hauser, Vernacular Voices: The Rhetoric of Publics and Public Spheres (Columbia, SC: The University of South Carolina Press, 1999): 11. 48 Asen, “A Discourse Theory of Citizenship,” 196. 49 Linda Flower, “Difference-Driven Inquiry: A Working Theory of Local Public Deliberation,” Rhetoric Society Quarterly 46 (2016): 321. 50 For further reading I encourage readers to check out Manuel Castells, Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2012) and Yochai Benkler, Networks of Wealth: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006). 51 Nancy Fraser, “Re-thinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy,” Social Text 25/26 (1990): 68.

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52 Pollyanna Ruiz, Articulating Dissent: Protest and the Public Sphere (London, UK: Pluto Press, 2014): 162. 53 Ruiz, Articulating Dissent, 162. 54 Twitter, “World Leaders on Twitter,” Twitter Inc., January 5, 2018, https://blog.twitter.com/official/en_us/topics/company/2018/world-leaders-and- twitter.html 55 Twitter, “Enforcing New Rules to Reduce Hateful Conduct and Abusive Behavior,” Twitter Inc., December 18, 2017, https://blog.twitter.com/official/en_us/topics/company/2017/safetypoliciesdec2017.html 56 Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004): 23. 57 Zizi Papacharissi and Maria de Fatima Oliveira, “Affective News and Networked Publics: The Rhythms of News Storytelling on #Egypt,” Journal of Communication 62 (2012): 267 58 Papacharissi and Oliverira, “Affective News,” 267-268. 59 Papacharissi and Oliveira, “Affective News,” 268. 60 Cheryl Corley, “Whether History or Hype, ‘Hands Up, Don’t Shoot Endures,” National Public Radio, August 8, 2015, https://www.npr.org/2015/08/08/430411141/whether- history-or-hype-hands-up-dont-shoot-endures 61 Julia Laurie, “10 Hours in Ferguson: A Visual Timeline of Michael Brown’s Death and Its Aftermath,” Mother Jones, August 27, 2014, https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/08/timeline-michael-brown-shooting- ferguson/ 62 James Alexander McVey and Heather Suzanne Woods, “Anti-racist Activism and the Transformational Principles of Hashtag Publics: From #HandsUpDontShoot to #PantsUpDontLoot,” Present Tense 5 (2016): 3. 63 Emanualla Grinberg, “Why ‘Hands Up, Don’t Shoot’ Resonates Regardless of Evidence,” CNN.com, January 11, 2015, https://www.cnn.com/2015/01/10/us/ferguson- evidence-hands-up/index.html 64 Corley, “Whether History or Hype.” 65 Jonathan Capehart, “‘Hands up, Don’t Shoot’ was Built on a Lie,” The Washington Post, March 16, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post- partisan/wp/2015/03/16/lesson-learned-from-the-shooting-of-michael- brown/?utm_term=.e61c8accfa8e 66 Michelle Ye Hee Lee, “‘Hands up, Don’t Shoot’ did not Happen in Ferguson,” The Washington Post, March 19, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact- checker/wp/2015/03/19/hands-up-dont-shoot-did-not-happen-in- ferguson/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.387e4c2847b6 67 Cristian Farias, “‘Hands Up, Don’t Shoot’ was not Built on a Lie,” The New Republic, March 18, 2015, https://newrepublic.com/article/121322/doj-ferguson-report-doesnt- mean-hands-dont-shoot-was-lie

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68 Mark Berman, Wesley Lowery, Kimberly Kindy, “South Carolina Police Officer Charged with Murder after Shooting Man During Traffic Stop,” The Washington Post, April 7, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2015/04/07/south- carolina-police-officer-will-be-charged-with-murder-after- shooting/?utm_term=.72e556a45f64 69 Andrew Knapp, “North Charleston Officer Faces Murder Charge after Video Shows Him Shooting Man in Back,” The Post and Courier, April 5, 2015, https://www.postandcourier.com/archives/north-charleston-officer-faces-murder-charge- after-video-shows-him/article_94a14b8d-ac18-5d40-8cdd-e37b4f9bf695.html 70 Tobias Salinger, “Video Released in Fatal Police Shooting of Unarmed Oklahoma Man Terence Crutcher (Warning – Graphic),” New York Daily News, September 19, 2016, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/video-released-fatal-police-shooting-unarmed- oklahoma-man-article-1.2798435 71 Bill Chappell, “After Police Killing of Unarmed Man, Tulsa Chief Promises to Achieve Justice,” National Public Radio, September 20, 2016, https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/09/20/494697359/after-police-killing-of- unarmed-man-tulsa-chief-promises-to-achieve-justice 72 Erik Ortiz, “Cops Shoot Unarmed Caregiver with His Hands Up while He Helps Man,” NBC News, July, 21, 2016, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/cops-shoot- unarmed-caregiver-charles-kinsey-his-hands-while-he-n614106 73 “Unarmed Man Shot by Miami Police asks: ‘Why?’ says Officer Replied: ‘I Don’t Know’,” CBC, July 21, 2016, http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/man-shot-police-miami- charles-kinsey-1.3688753 74 Catherin E. Shoichet, Joshua Berlinger, and Sheena Jones, “Police Accidentally Shot Man in North Miami, Union Says,” CNN, July, 22, 2016 https://www.cnn.com/2016/07/21/us/miami-officer-involved-shooting/index.html 75 Matt Taibbi, I Can’t Breathe: A Killing on Bay Street (New York, NY: Spiegel & Grau, 2017): 120-121. 76 Taibbi, I Can’t Breathe, 121. 77 Taibbi, I Can’t Breathe, 122. 78 Giri Nathan, “Eric Garner Died from Chokehold While in Police Custody,” Time, August 1, 2018, http://time.com/3071288/eric-garner-chokehold-death-nypd-medical- examiner/ 79 Barry Latzer, “The Chokehold Issue,” City Journal, October 2, 2017, https://www.city- journal.org/html/chokehold-issue-15469.html 80 Melanie Eversley and Mike James, “No Charges in NYC Chokehold Death; Federal Inquiry Launched,” USA Today, December 3, 2014, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/12/03/chokehold-grand- jury/19804577/ 81 Elahe Izadi, “‘I Can’t Breathe.’ Eric Garner’s Last Words are 2014’s Most Notable Quote, According to Yale Librarian,” The Washington Post, December 9, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/12/09/i-cant-breathe-eric-

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garners-last-words-are-2014s-most-notable-quote-according-to-yale- librarian/?utm_term=.ecc17524a884 82 Mary Bowerman, “Twitter Turns 10: Here are 10 Memorable Moments,” USA Today, March 21, 2016, https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/nation-now/2016/03/18/twitter- 10-years-memorable-viral-moments/81961748/ 83 Ben Zimmer, “The Linguistic Power of the Protest Phrase ‘I Can’t Breathe’,” Wired, December 15, 2014, https://www.wired.com/2014/12/ben-zimmer-on-i-cant-breathe/ 84 Dora Apel, “‘Hands Up, Don’t Shoot’: Surrendering to Liberal Illusions,” Theory & Event 17 (2014), https://muse.jhu.edu/article/559367 85 Apel, “Hands Up, Don’t Shoot.” 86 McVey and Woods, “Anti-racist Activism,” 4. 87 Axel Bruns and Jean E. Burgess, “The Use of Twitter Hashtags in the Formation of Ad Hoc Publics,” Proceedings of the 6th European Consortium for Political Research General Conference, Reykjavik Iceland 25 – 26 August 2011, https://eprints.qut.edu.au/46515/ 88 Grace Ji-Sun Kim and Rev. Jesse Jackson, “‘I Can’t Breathe’: Eric Garner’s Last Words Symbolize Our Predicament,” The Huffington Post, December 18, 2014, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/grace-jisun-kim/i-cant-breathe-eric- garne_b_6341634.html 89 Kate Danzer Hoyt, “The Affect of the Hashtag: #HandsUpDontShoot and the Body in Peril,” Explorations in Media Ecology 15 (2016): 30. 90 Zimmer, “Linguistic Power of the Protest,” 91 Zimmer, “Linguistic Power of the Protest,” 92 Hoyt, “The Affect of the Hashtag,” 31. 93 Taibbi, I Can’t Breathe, 152. 94 Apel, “Hands Up, Don’t Shoot,” 95 Taibbi, I Can’t Breathe, 153. 96 Robert Ivie, “Democratic Dissent and the Trick of Rhetorical Critique,” Cultural Studies ßà Critical Methodologies 5 (2005): 279. 97 Robert Ivie, “Productive Criticism Then and Now,” American Communication Journal 4 (2001), 1. 98 Dani McClain, “The Black Lives Matter Movement is Most Visible on Twitter: Its True Home is Elsewhere,” The Nation, April 19, 2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/01/not-just-hashtag-activism-why- social-media-matters-to-protestors/384215/ 99 Deen Freelon, Charlton D. McIlwain, and Meredtih D. Clark, “Beyond the Hashtags,” Center for Media & Social Impact, February 2016, 55 and 59. 100 Kerry Flynn,” This Map Shows how Outrage Over the Eric Garner and Mike Brown Decisions went Global,” The Huffington Post, December 11, 2014, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/12/11/eric-garner-map-twitter- world_n_6301352.html 101 Flower, “Difference-Driven Inquiry,” 321.

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102 Thimsen, “People Against Corporate Personhood,” 487. 103 Thimsen, “People Against Corporate Personhood,” 504 and 486. 104 Thimsen, “People Against Corporate Personhood,” 486. 105 Thimsen, “People Against Corporate Personhood,” 485. 106 Zimmer, “Linguistic Power of the Protest,” 107 Zimmer, “Linguistic Power of the Protest,” 108 A. Freya Thimsen, “Digital Petitions Against Corporate Rights: Slacktivist Democracy?” Review of Communication 15 (2015): 221. 109 Thimsen, “Digital Petitions,” 222. 110 Aziz Douai, “‘Sees of Change’ in Tahrir Square and Beyond: People Power or Technological Convergence, American Communication Journal 15 (2013): 28 – 29. 111 Rachel Kuo, “Racial Justice Activist Hashtags: Counterpublics and Discourse Circulation,” New Media & Society 20 (2018): 497. 112 Kuo, “Racial Justice Hashtags,” 497. 113 Kuo, “Racial Justice Hashtags,” 511. 114 Davide Panagia, Rancière’s Sentiments (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2018): 82. 115 Thimsen, “People Against Corporate Personhood,” 494. 116 Jacques Rancière, Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy, trans. Julie Rose (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999): 58. 117 Rancière, Disagreement, 88. 118 Jacques Rancière, On the Shores of Politics, translated by Liz Heron (London, UK: Verso, 1995): 32 – 33. 119 May, Political Thought of Rancière, 116. 120 May, Political Thought of Rancière, 116. 121 Jennifer Mercieca, Founding Fictions (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2010). 122 Jacques Rancière, Hatred of Democracy (London, UK: Verso Books, 2014). 123 May, Contemporary Political Movements, 24. 124 May, Contemporary Political Movements, 24 – 25. 125 May, Contemporary Political Movements, 24. 126 Robert Ivie, “Productive Criticism at the Crossroads: Interventions, Trajectories, and Intersections,” Review of Communication 16 (2016): 107. 127 Kuo, “Racial Justice Hashtags,” 499. 128 Ganaele Langlois and Greg Elmer, “The Research Politics of Social Media Platforms,” Culture Machine 14 (2013): 14. 129 Samuel Chambers, “Translating Politics,” Philosophy & Rhetoric 49 (2016): 545. 130 Jacques Rancière, “A Few Remarks on the Method of Jacques Rancière,” Parallax 15 (2009): 121. 131 Karen Zivi, “Politics is Hard Work: Performativity and the Preconditions of Intelligibility,” Philosophy & Rhetoric 49 (2016): 453.

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132 Robert Ivie, “Enabling Democratic Dissent” Quarterly Journal of Speech 101 (2015): 50 133 Ivie, “Enabling Democratic Dissent,” 50. 134 Jonathan Havercroft and David Owen, “Soul-Blindness, Police Orders and Black Lives Matter: Wittgenstein, Cavell, and Rancière,” Political Theory 44 (2016): 751. 135 May, Contemporary Political Movements, 23. 136 May, Contemporary Political Movements, 23. 137 Rancière, Disagreement, viii. 138 Rancière, Disagreement, viii. 139 Rancière, Disagreement, 11. 140 Rancière, Disagreement, ix. 141 Chantal Mouffe, On the Political (New York, NY: Routledge, 2005): 30. 142 Robert Ivie, “Toward a Humanizing Style of Democratic Dissent,” Rhetoric and Public Affairs 11 (2008): 458. 143 Lincoln Dahlberg, “Libertarian Cyber-utopianism and Globalization,” in El-Ojeili & Hayden (Eds.), Utopia and Globalization (London, UK: Palgrave 2009), 188. 144 Papacharissi and Oliveira, “Affective News,” 279. 145 Papacharissi and Oliveira, “Affective News,” 279. 146 Anna L. Tsing, Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connection (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005): 4. 147 Asen, “A Discourse Theory of Citizenship,” 200. 148 May, Contemporary Political Movements, 22. 149 I have previously discussed the myth of #HandsUpDontShoot has been disproven in the death of Michael Brown; however, this aberration does not excuse other cases of individuals being killed while exhibiting non-harmful behavior. For instance, Walter Scott was shoot in the back while running away from a law enforcement officer during a routine traffic stop. Chapter IV 1 Chantal Mouffe, On the Political (New York, NY: Routledge, 2005): 20. 2 “Hear the 911 Call about Tamir Rice: Gun is ‘Probably Fake,’ Caller says,” Los Angeles Times staff, Las Angeles Times, November 26, 2014, http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-tamir-rice-911-call-20141126- htmlstory.html 3 Catherine E. Shoichet and John Newsome, “Tamir Rice Shooting: Officers says Threat was ‘Real and Active,” CNN.com, December 2, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/01/us/tamir-rice-investigation-officer-timothy-loehmann- statement/index.html 4 Ida Lieszkovszky, “Tamir Rice Investigation Released: The Big Story,” Cleveland.com, June 14, 2015, http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2015/06/tamir_rice_investigation_relea.html

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5 Stacey Leasca, “After Chokehold Decision, Twitter Explodes with ‘Criming While White,’ Los Angeles Times, December 4, 2014, http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na- criming-while-white-20141204-htmlstory.html 6 Caitlin Dewey, “The Glaring Problem with #CrimingWhileWhite,” The Washington Post, December 4, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the- intersect/wp/2014/12/04/the-glaring-problem-with- crimingwhilewhite/?utm_term=.3dd64f094127 7 American Civil Liberties Union, The War on Marijuana in Black and White (New York, NY: ACLU Foundation, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/report/report-war-marijuana-black- and-white?redirect=criminal-law-reform/war-marijuana-black-and-white 8 Human Rights Watch, “Punishment and Prejudice: Racial Disparities in the War on Drugs,” Human Rights Watch 12 (May 2000). 9 Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness (New York, NY: The New Press, 2010): 98-101. 10 Sarah Galo, “#CrimingWhileWhite vs. #AliveWhileBlack: Twitter Weighs in on Garner Decision,” The Guardian, December 4, 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/us- news/2014/dec/04/eric-garner-twitter 11 Derrick Clifton, “#AliveWhileBlack Exposes Ugly Truths about Everyday Police Racism,” Mic. December 4, 2014, https://mic.com/articles/105740/alive-while-black- exposes-ugly-truths-about-everyday-police-racism#.gwY4EOTcr 12 Clifton, “#AliveWhileBlack Exposes Ugly Truth.” 13 Jessica Valenti, “#CrimingWhileWhite is Exactly what’s Wrong with White Privilege,” The Guardian, December 5, 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/dec/05/criming-while-white-people- privilege 14 Alex Halpern, Twitter Post, December 3, 2014, 7:14 PM, https://twitter.com/HalpernAlex/status/540297939512356864?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw&ref _url=https%3A%2F%2Facmillard.wordpress.com%2F2014%2F12%2F 15 W.E.B. Dubois, The Souls of Black Folk (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007): 8. 16 Dubois, Souls of Black Folk, 8. 17 Robert Ivie, “Enabling Democratic Dissent,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 101 (2015): 46. 18 Robert Ivie, “Democratic Dissent and the Trick of Rhetorical Critique,” Cultural Studies ßà Critical Methodologies, 5 (2005): 281. 19 Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment, Democracy, and Romance (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990): 95. 20 Kenneth Burke, Attitudes Toward History (Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 1984): 41. 21 Burke, Attitudes Toward History, 38-41. 22 Burke, Attitudes Toward History, 41. 23 Burke, Attitudes Toward History, 167.

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24 Burke, Attitudes Toward History, 41. 25 William H. Rueckert, Encounters with Kenneth Burke (Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1994): 128. 26 Ivie, “Dissent and the Trick of Rhetorical Critique,” 281. 27 Ivie, “Dissent and the Trick of Rhetorical Critique,” 281. 28 Burke, Attitudes Toward History, 171. 29 Robert Ivie, “Rhetorical Deliberation and Democratic Politics in the Here and Now,” Rhetoric and Public Affairs 5 (2002): 278. 30 Ivie, “Dissent and the Trick of Rhetorical Critique,” 282. 31 Shiffrin, The First Amendment, 156. 32 Rueckert, Encounters with Burke, 128. 33 Kathryn M. Olson, “The Comic Strategy of ‘Deferral to Study’: Creating Space in Divisive Religious Disputes to Value Both Community and Convictions,” Journal of Communication and Religion 30 (2007): 268-269. 34 Burke, Attitudes Toward History, 42. 35 Burke, Attitudes Toward History, i. 36 Burke, Attitudes Toward History, 79. 37 Burke, Attitudes Toward History, 92. 38 Burke, Attitudes Toward History, 174. 39 Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1969): 21-45. 40 Burke, Rhetoric of Motives, 22. 41 Lawrence W. Rosenfield, “Set Theory: Key to Understanding Kenneth Burke’s Use of the Term ‘Identification,’” Western Speech 33 (1969): 176. 42 Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (London, UK: Verso, 2004): 146. 43 Jacques Rancière, Chronicles of Consensual Times (New York, NY: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2010): 6. 44 Jacques Rancière, Hatred of Democracy translated by Steve Corcoran (New York, NY: Verso, 2014): 92. 45 Jacques Rancière, Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999): 137-138. 46 Burke, Rhetoric of Motives, 45. 47 Ivie, “Dissent and the Trick of Rhetorical Critique,” 280. 48 Burke, Attitudes Toward History, 167. 49 Kenneth Burke, Permanence and Change: Anatomy of Purpose (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1954): 49. 50 Burke, Attitudes Toward History, 171. 51 Burke, Attitudes Toward History, 167. 52 Burke, Attitudes Toward History, 172. 53 Burke, Attitudes Toward History, 174.

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54 Kenneth Burke, Philosophy of Literary Form, 3rd edition (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1973): 293-304. 55 Rueckert, Encounters with Burke, 112-114. 56 Kendall R. Phillips, “The Spaces of Public Dissension: Reconsidering the Public Sphere,” Communication Monographs 63 (1996): 233. 57 Dubois, The Souls of Black Folk, 13. 58 A. Cheree Carlson, “Gandhi and the Comic Frame: ‘Ad Bellum Purificandum’,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 72 (1986): 447. 59 Robert Ivie, Dissent from War (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, Inc., 2007): 107. 60 Ivie, Dissent from War, 108. 61 Gerald Hauser and Carol Blair, “Rhetorical Antecedents to the Public,” Pre/Text 3 (1985): 156-157. 62 Trevor Garrison Smith, Politicizing Digital Space: Theory, the Internet and Renewing Democracy (Westminster, UK: University of Westminster Press, 2017): 12. 63 Yarimar Bonilla and Jonathan Rosa, “#Ferguson: Digital Protest, Hashtag Ethnograpy, and the Racial Politics of Social Media in the United States,” American Ethnologist 42 (2015): 4. 64 Kenneth Burke, Attitudes Toward History, 41. 65 Nathan Rambukanna, “From #RaceFail to #Ferguson: The Digital Intimacies of Race- Activist Hashtag Publics,” Fibreculture Journal 26 (2015): 178. 66 Gregory Desilet and Edward C. Appel, “Choosing a Rhetoric of the Enemy: Kenneth Burke’s Comic Frame, Warrantable Outrage, and the Problem of Scapegoating,” Rhetoric Society Quarterly 41 (2011): 353. 67 Burke, Rhetoric of Motives, xiv and 34. 68 Ivie, Toward A Humanizing Dissent, 454. 69 Burke, Attitudes Toward History, 344. 70 Ivie, “Enabling Democratic Dissent,” 49. 71 Ivie, Dissent from War, 6. 72 Roland Bleiker, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000): 269. 73 Phillips, “Reconsidering the Public Sphere,” 238. 74 Phillips, “Reconsidering the Public Sphere,” 245. 75 Ivie, War on Terror, 28. 76 Carole Pateman, The Disorder of Women: Democracy, Feminism, and Political Theory (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1989): 134. 77 Pollyanna Ruiz, Articulating Dissent: Protest and the Public Sphere (London, UK: Pluto Press, 2014): 175. 78 Ruiz, Articulating Dissent, 177. 79 Ruiz, Articulating Dissent, 186. 80 Burke, Attitudes Toward History, 107. 81 Burke, Attitudes Toward History, 106. 82 Burke, Attitudes Toward History, 41.

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83 Robert S. Cathcart, “Defining Social Movements by Their Rhetorical Form,” Central States Speech Journal 31 (1980): 271. 84 Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003): 23. 85 Manuel Castells, “Communication, Power, and Counter Power in the Networked Society,” International Journal of Communication 1 (2007): 242. 86 Phillips, “Reconsidering the Public Sphere,” 244. 87 Ivie, Dissent from War, 7. 88 Phillips, “Reconsidering the Public Sphere,” 243. 89 Phillips, “Reconsidering the Public Sphere,” 243. 90 Phillips, “Reconsidering the Public Sphere,” 241. 91 Ivie, Dissent from War, 1. 92 Ivie, Dissent from War, 7. 93 Rancerie, Disagreement, 11. 94 Ivie, “Dissent and the Trick of Rhetorical Critique,” 279. 95 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Truth of Democracy, trans. Steve Corcoran, 2nd ed. Michael Naas (Bronx, NY: Fordham Press, 2010): 31. 96 Rancière, Dissensus, 38. 97 John Postill and Sarah Pink, “Social Media Ethnography: The Digital Researcher in a Messy Web,” Media International Australia 145 (2012): 10. 98 Rancière, Dissensus, 39. 99 Burke, Attitudes Toward History, 4. 100 Lev Grossman, “You – Yes, You – Are TIME’S Person of the Year,” Time, December 25, 2006, http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1570810,00.html 101 Shaun Scott, Millennials and the Moments that Made Us: A Cultural History of the U.S. from 1982-Present (Winchester, UK: Zero Books, 2018): 140. 102 Butler, Precarious Life, xix. 103 Chantal Mouffe, Agonistics: Thinking the World Politically (London, UK: Verso, 2014): 119. 104 Jacques Rancière, Moments Politiques: Interventions 1977—2009 (New York, NY: Seven Stories Press (2014): 162. 105 Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, “Agency: Promiscuous and protean,” Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies 25 (2005): 3. 106 Rancière, Dissensus 38. 107 Rancière, Disagreement, x. 108 Burke, Attitudes Toward History, 106. 109 Rancière, Moments Politique, 29. 110 Burke, Rhetoric of Motives, 34. 111 Rancière, Disagreement, 60. 112 Rancière, Disagreement, 59. 113 Bonnie Honig, “Antigone’s Two Laws: Greek Tragedy and the Politics of Humanism,” New Literary History 41 (2010): 22.

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114 Rancière, Hatred of Democracy, 61-62. 115 Michele Foucault, Archeology of Knowledge (New York, NY: Pantheon, 1969): 152. 116 Kishonna L. Gray, “The Internet: Oppression in Digital Spaces,” in The Routledge Companion to Media and Race, edited by Christopher P. Campbell, New York, NY: Routledge (2017): 134. 117 Stereo Williams, “The Power of Black Twitter,” The Daily Beast, July 7, 2015, https://www.thedailybeast.com/the-power-of-black-twitter 118 Alison Flood, “#BlackLivesMatter Voted 2014’s Word of the Year in US,” The Guardian, January 13, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/books/2015/jan/13/blacklivesmatter-2014-word-of-the-year 119 Gene Demby, “Combing Through 41 Million Tweets to Show How #BlackLivesMatter Exploded,” National Public Radio, March 2, 2016, https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2016/03/02/468704888/combing-through-41- million-tweets-to-show-how-blacklivesmatter-exploded 120 Deen Freelon, Charlton D. McIlwain, and Meredtih D. Clark, “Beyond the Hashtags,” Center for Media & Social Impact, February 2016, 75. 121 Freelon, et. al., “Beyond the Hashtags,” 75-76. 122 Freelon, et. al., “Beyond the Hashtags,” 78. 123 Rancière, Chronicles of Consensual Times, 2. 124 Jacques Rancière, Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics (New York, NY: Bloomsbury Press, 2010): 53. 125 Scott, Millennials and Movements, 229. 126 Steve Shiffrin, Dissent, Injustice, and the Meanings of America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000): xi. 127 Ivie, Dissent from War, 108. 128 Ivie, Dissent from War, 108. 129 Rancière, Dissensus, 52. 130 Mouffe, On the Political, 17. Conclusion 1 “Number of Social Media Users Worldwide from 2010 to 2021,” Statista, July 1, 2017, from https://www.statista.com/statistics/278414/number-of-worldwide-social-network- users/ 2 Trevor Garrison Smith, Politicizing Digital Space: Theory, the Internet and Renewing Democracy (Westminster, UK: University of Westminster Press, 2017): 3. 3 Smith, Politicizing Digital Space, 7. 4 Monica Anderson, Skye Toor, Lee Raine, and Aaron Smith, “An Analysis of #BlackLivesMatter and other Twitter Hashtags Related to Political or Social Issues,” Pew Research Center, July 11, 2018, http://www.pewinternet.org/2018/07/11/an-analysis-of- blacklivesmatter-and-other-twitter-hashtags-related-to-political-or-social-issues/ 5 Immediate change can be found in how #BlackLivesMatter has influenced perceptions of the United States Public. Since its inception, #BlackLivesMatter has illuminated issues of racial inequality to the point where public sentiment has begun to favor action to

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change unfair policing systems. “Black Lives Matter is Becoming Slightly More Conventional,” The Economist, September 20, 2018, https://www.economist.com/united- states/2018/09/20/black-lives-matter-is-becoming-slightly-more-conventional, provides a valuable overview of changes in the way the public view racial inequality in the years since #BlackLivesMatter was created. Additionally, Holly Yan, “‘Black Lives Matter’ Cases: What Happened After Controversial Killings,” Cnn.com, June 26, 2017, https://www.cnn.com/2017/06/26/us/black-lives-matter-deaths-outcomes/index.html, highlights many of the systemic changes that occurred due to changing public perception. 6 Robert Ivie, “Democratic Dissent and the Trick of Rhetorical Critique,” Cultural Studies ßà Critical Methodologies 5 (2005): 281. 7 Jacques Rancière, Dis-agreement: Politics and Philosophy (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999): 11. 8 Jacques Rancière, Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics (London, UK: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2010): 38. 9 Rancière, Dis-agreement, 32. 10 Rancière, Dis-agreement, x. 11 Chantal Mouffe, Agonistics: Thinking the World Politically (London, UK: Verso, 2013): xiv, 12 Mouffe, Agonistics, 7. 13 Mouffe, Agonistics, 125-127. 14 Regina Kreide, “Digital Spaces, Public Places and Communicative Power: In Defense of Deliberative Democracy,” Philosophy and Social Criticism 42 (2016): 482. 15 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President on Trayvon Martin,” (speech, Washington, DC, July 19, 2013), The White House Briefing Room, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/07/19/remarks-president- trayvon-martin 16 Bryan Armen Graham, “Donald Trump Blasts NFL Anthem Protesters: ‘Get that Son of a Bitch Off the Field,’” The Guardian, September 23, 2017, accessed December 12, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2017/sep/22/donald-trump-nfl-national- anthem-protests 17 Aamer Madhani, “Trump Suggest Chicago Police Bring Back Controversial Stop-and- Frisk Searches,” USA Today, October 8, 2018, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2018/10/08/trump-chicago-stop-and-frisk-stem- gun-violence/1570409002/ 18 Donald J. Trump, “Remarks by President Trump in African American History Month Listening Session,” (speech, Washington, DC, February 1, 2017), WhiteHouse.gov, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-african- american-history-month-listening-session/ 19 Jonathan Easley, “Trump Casts Inner Cities as ‘War Zones’ in Pitch to Minority Voters,” The Hill, August 22, 2016, http://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/presidential- races/292283-trump-casts-inner-cities-as-war-zones-in-pitch-to

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20 Adam Serwer, “Trump’s Black Outreach Repackages Racism as Earnest Concern,” The Atlantic, September 22, 2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/09/trump-black-outreach/501242/ 21 Tom LoBianco and Ashley Killough, “Trump Pitches Black Voters: ‘What the Hell do you have to Lose?’” CNN Politics, August 19, 2016, https://www.cnn.com/2016/08/19/politics/donald-trump-african-american- voters/index.html 22 Josh Dawsey, “Trump Derides Protections for Immigrants from ‘Shithole’ Countries,” The Washington Post, January 12, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-attacks-protections-for-immigrants- from-shithole-countries-in-oval-office-meeting/2018/01/11/bfc0725c-f711-11e7-91af- 31ac729add94_story.html?utm_term=.f69f1429ce93 23 Obama, “Remarks on Trayvon Martin.” 24 Mouffe, Agonistics, 9. 25 Mouffe, Agonistics, 64. 26 Jacques Rancière, Moments Politiques: Interventions 1977—2009 (New York, NY: Seven Stories Press, 2014): 160. 27 Christopher Lebron, The Making of Black Lives Matter: A Brief History of an Idea (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2017): xii. 28 Ben Zimmer, “The Linguistic Power of the Protest Phrase ‘I Can’t Breathe,’” Wired, December 15, 2014, https://www.wired.com/2014/12/ben-zimmer-on-i-cant-breathe/ 29 Zimmer, “The Linguistic Power of Protest.” 30 Jessican Guynn, “BBQ Becky, Permit Patty and Why the Internet is Shaming White People who Police People ‘Simply for Being Black,” USA Today, July 18, 2018, https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2018/07/18/bbq-becky-permit-patty-and-why- internet-shaming-white-people-who-police-black-people/793574002/ 31 Guynn, “BBQ Becky, Permit Patty.” 32 Guynn, “BBQ Becky, Permit Patty.” 33 Guynn, “BBQ Becky, Permit Patty.” 34 Mark Purcell, “Rancière and Revolution,” Space and Polity 18 (2014): 169. 35 John Romano, “James Baldwin Writing and Talking,” The New York Times, September 23, 1979, https://www.nytimes.com/1979/09/23/archives/james-baldwin-writing-and- talking-baldwin-baldwin-authors-query.html

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