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RD M M M M M Z Mmmmm m m m m m m m z i m m m m m mmmmm COMITE WlllfffK^M^^tfiPeÄW'ftQUE NORD m m m m m z mmmmm jJMS Control f\> MID UNCIÂ -MATO DECRET 13 August 1969 MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL FOR DEFENSE SUPPORT SUBJECT: Warsaw Pact Ground Force Order of Battle for Relative Force Capabilities (RFC) Study Reference: IMSM- 249-69, 8 May 69 1. The Warsaw Pact Ground Force Order of Battle prepared accord­ ing to reference, is forwarded as Enclosure 2, for use in th e Relative Force Capabilities Study. 2. This Order of Battle (00B) is consistent with MC 161/69, is of the same date, April, 1969, and does not reflect changes that may VoJ have taken place since that date, if required, this OOB will b e updated following approval of MC 161/70. 3. For purposes of clarification, definitions of division categories as contained in MC 161/69 are included in Enclosure 1 . \ N. G. PALAIOLOGOP OULOS Lieutenant General, H ellenic Army Director, International Military Staff > P REGRADED NATO UNC LASSIFIED {Approved for Public Disclosure) 2 ENCLOSURES: Perä ? Ä W SM'0462 1. Categories of Warsaw P act Divisions By. Date.Æ.i 2^^ I 2 , Warsaw Pact Ground Force Order of Battle r COPY TO: MILREPS, FMM, LIST B NATO SECRET - 1 This document consists of IMSM- 4i7-e>y one page plus 23 pages of Enclosure f S r`. e j CLASSIFIED NATO ie 1*0TAN APPROVED FOR PDBLIC DISCLOSDRE NATO SE< APPROVED FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE ENCLOSU RE 1 CATEGORIES OF WARSAW PACT DIVISIONS 1 . The following definitions of the categories of divisions are presented here as they appear in MC 161/69. They are repeated in order to prevent misinterpretation of the categorization of division in this order of battle. Categories of Divisions "12, The Soviet describe their military units as being maintained "in a full state of readiness for immediate operations” or else at "reduced strength”. There are also references to reduced strength Units capable of being made "ready to proceed to areas of concentration in several days". It is evident that the Soviets consider all their divisions in the GSFG ready for commitment to combat without further augmentation. Therefore, the divisions in GSFG and other Soviet divisions comparable to them in holdings of major items of equipment, manning, and training activity are manifestly in the first category, which is designated Category I in this estimate. 13. Other Soviet divisions have only 50 to 70 percent of the major items of equipment found in Category I divisions; however, they have substantially all of their combat equipment (e.g. tanks and artillery), and the majority of the shortfall is in wheeled vehicles and other items of common civilian usage. The peacetime manning of most of these divisions is generally estimated to be at about half strength. Some may be stronger than this and a few are probably substantially lower. Soviet preparations for military DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-04S2-Q2 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN DECLASSIFIE-MISE IMSM-04S2-Q2 DISCLOSURE DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC intervention in Czechoslovakia demonstrated that these shortages NATO SECRET - 1 - Enclosure 1 IMSM- 417-69 IMS® APPROVED FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE M§) NATO SECRET APPROVED FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE in men and equipment can be made up within a few days by calling up ready reservists and general purpose equipment from the civil economy. Divisions of this description are designated as Category II: i.e., reduced strength divisions capable of being made ready to move out "in several days". 14. The availability of Category II divisions was illustrated by the Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia. Of the estimated 11 divisions from the USSR employed in that operation, eight were Category I and three were Category II divisions quickly raised to Category I strength in men and equipment*. It is estimated that at the same time 10 other Category II divisions were raised to Category I strength, but were retained in the USSR, 15. There are also some divisions with even less equipment than Category II divisions and appreciably lower manning and training activity. They probably are not intended to be employed for early reinforcement, but rather are cadre divisions designed to provide a base for longer term mobilization. Divisions of this description are designated in this paper as Category III. 16. In conclusion the categories of divisions can be summarized as follows: Category State of Readiness I Combat Ready ) II Ready in several )Ready for early commitment days ) III Longer Term Not Ready for early Mobilization commitment w DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-04S2-Q2 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN DECLASSIFIE-MISE IMSM-04S2-Q2 DISCLOSURE DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC Eight Soviet Category I divisions from SOZG and three from Hungary were also employed. NATO SECRET 2 - Enclosure 1 IMSM- 417 -69 m m » ® mmAPPROVED FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE I* SOVIET d : i I N9 u jÏIGfowI71 [FUG? t Unit Type of a p p r o v e d FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE Designation Unit Readiness Category— 1` Location 1* Group of Sovie t Forces Germany (GSFG) HQ GSFG Zbssen-Wuensd orf a,. A rmies 1st Gds Tank Dr esden 3d Shock Magdeburg (2d?) Gd s Tank Fuerstenberg 8th Gds Nohra 20th Gds Eberswalde b. Motorized Rifle Divisions 6th Gds I Bernau 14th Gds I Jueterbog 19 th I Dallgow 20th I Grimma 21st Gds X Halle 32d I Perleberg 39th Gds I Ohrdruf 57th Gds I Naumburg 94th Gds I Schwerin 207 th I S tendal C. Tank Divisions 6th Gds I Wittenberg 7th Gds I R oss lau 9th Gds I Neustrelitz 10th Gds I Krampnitz llth Gds 1 Dresden 12th Gds I Neuruppin •13 th Hv I Riesa (20th?) Gds I Jena 25th Hv I Vogelsang 26th I Hillers leben 2. Northern Group of Forces in Poland (NGF) HQ NGF "Legnica (Liegnitz) a. Tank Divisions 20th I Swietoszow .(Neuhammer) U/l (Gds?) I Borne (Grossborn) 3. Southern Group of Forces in Hungary (SGF) HQ SGF Budapest DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-04S2-Q2 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN DECLASSIFIE-MISE IMSM-04S2-Q2 DISCLOSURE DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC a. Motorized Rifle Divisions (35th?) Gds I Kecskemet Area U/X Gds I Szekesfehervar Area JL/ A Re xs a ■ chang NATO SECR Enclosure 2 T O W — /T r/-fiQ APPROVED FfeRT PUBLIC DISCLOSURE 2d Gds APPROVED FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE Esz tergom U/I Gds Veszprem Area '*■ Central Group of Forces in Czechoslovakia (CGF) HQ ■CGF Milovice Area a. Motorized Rifle Divisions U/I I Milovice Area U/X i Zvoien Area U/X i M lada/Boles lav Area U/I .1 Mimon/Trutnov Area .Tank Division 31st i Brunta1 Area 5, Soviet Forces in Mongolia a . Motorized Rifle Divisions U/I II Ulan- Bator U/I II Choybolsan XI. SOVIET DIVISIONAL FO RCES IN USSR BY GEOGRAPHICAL AREA AND MILITARY 1. NORTHWEST USSR £ Leningrad Military District HQ Leningrad MD Leningrad M-0462-02 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN DECLASSIFIE-MISE M-0462-02 S *U) Armies 6 th Petrozavodsk (2) Corps SURE SURE IWi O U/I Arkhangelsk 13) Motorized Rifle Divis ions-î/ (37tb?) Gds II Pargolovo 45th II KurmarLsk/pechotiga 45th Gds II Vyborg 64th Gds III Priozersk (69th?) in Vologda 76th Abn Gds i Pskov (341st?) r Kandalaksha (367?) II Sortavala U/I in Isakogorka Tank Divisions DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCL DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC 2d Gds il Leningrad Area 2/ Inc lu NATO SECRE APPROVED~F&R>UBLIC DISCLOSURE Enclosure 2 T i / m r a 't n Unit PDIE) Designation ation ,t. WESTERN USSR — * Baltic M ilitary District HQ- Baltic MU Riga Armies 11th Gds Kaliningrad (2). Motorized Rifle Divisions—^ st Gds X Kaliningrad t23d?) Gds III Klaypeda-Plunge Area (30th?) Gds I Chernyakhovsk 31st Abn Gds I Kaunas/Kapsukas Area U/l Gds II Vilnyus/Kaunas U/Ï Gds II Sovetsk (3) Tank Divisions 1st II Kaliningrad U/I II Dobele Area b.* Belorussian Military District HQ Belorussian MD Minsk (1*) Armies 5th Gds. Tank .Bobruysk 7th Tank SM-0462-02 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN DECLASSIFIE-MISE SM-0462-02 Borisov M 28th Tank Grodno (2) Motorized Rifle Divisions^/ 12 th Gds I Brest ^7th Gds II Polotsk 103d Abn Gds I Vitebsk 120th Gds I Minsk 50th Gds II Brest 55 th Gds I Grodno (3) Tank Divisions 3d Gds I L/epe 1 Area « Gds I Marina Gorka M > II Slonim-Baranovichi II Borisov th?) I Bobruysk (22d?) I Slutsk-Urechye Area 29th Gds II Borisov V/T# Gds- DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE I DISCLOSURE DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC O* CarPathian Military District Lvov BQ Carpathian MD NATO SECRET ms®APPROVED FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE ."RÎy ï o 1 r t ' O ' USSf- 41*69 N A T O SECIPS® MêlMDPDi® APPR OVED FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE Unit Type of Designation Unit Readiness Category,!/ Location (1) Armies 8th Tank Zhitomir, 13tb Rovno 38 th Ivano-Frankovsk (2) Motorized R ifle Divisions 15th Gds I Vladimir-Volynskiy 17th L Khme lnitskiy Area 66th Gds LI Chernovtsy Area 70 th Gds XI Ivano-Frankovsk Area 97th Gds I ’Slavuta 128th Gds I Uzhgorod 161st I izyaslav Area (3) . Tank Divisions 23d I Ovruch m I Berdichev Area m I Hovograd .d, Moscow Military Distric t HQ Moscow MD Moscow (at*) Motorized Rifle Divisions— / 2d Gds II Alabino 53d Gds III Kovrov 106th Abn Gds Tula/Ryazan Area {2') Tank Div is ions 4th Gds II Naro-Fominsk U/I II Tambov S OUTHWEST USSR a. Odessa Military District HQ Odessa MU Odessa QJ Armies 14th Kishinev C2) - Motorized Rifle Divisions DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-0462-02 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN DECLASSIFIE-MISE IMSM-0462-02 DISCLOSURE DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC 33d Gds I Beltsy-Kishinev Area 59th Gds I T iraspol 118 (Gds?) I Boigrad Area m III Simferopol m rovskiy M T O SSCRET APPROVED FOR Pu b l ic DISCLOSURE Enclosure 2 TMP.M-ATZ-f^Q ” DEC LASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-0462-02 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE I» S C.; Ö A M W M H A O' •»■J ^ w a a c s C C.
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