Nationalism, National Identity and Football
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“Football is War”: Nationalism, national identity and football 2003179111 BA Political Studies Mette Wiggem 11,223 words PIED3750 Dissertation 2010 Michael R Wood 2003179111 BA Political Studies Contents 3. Introduction 5. “Delije” – Football supporters and the rise of nationalism in the former Yugoslavia. 18. “Mes que un club” – FC Barcelona, Athletic Bilbao and nationalism in stateless nations. 32. “We love Brazil, because they are Braaazzzzziiiiiiiiiiiiiilll” – The role of national football teams in the creation of a national myth, and the depiction of nations by the football media. 40. Conclusion 41. Bibliography 2 Michael R Wood 2003179111 BA Political Studies “All that I know most surely about morality and obligations I owe to football.” Albert Camus Football is, undoubtedly, the most popular pastime on earth. FIFA, the global governing body of the sport claims that 240 million people in over 200 countries play organised football (2006), and that is to say nothing of the further millions who play casually, attend matches or watch them on television. The mass appeal of football lies in its simplicity; all that is necessary to play is a ball, which can be improvised easily, and almost any surface can be played upon. Fan culture is also extensive, as matches are ninety minutes long but often contain long passages in which very little happens, which allows for tension to build and collective emotions to ferment – football crowds, above those of any other sport, entertain themselves; through music, songs and chants which can be used to express emotions and to encourage one’s team. This gives rise to a culture which is non-disposable and tribalistic; a supporter cannot simply stop supporting a team, and cannot simply change allegiance – and even cannot extricate themselves from the sport, in the same way that they could with music, cinema, art, opera or any other form of recreation. Football is also a product of modernism and industrialisation, and came to mass consciousness around the same time as the nation-state took hold across the globe, which has forged a strong bond between nationalism and football. National football team matches comprise 3 Michael R Wood 2003179111 BA Political Studies the pinnacle of the world game, the World Cup, and reflect the truly internationalist nature of the sport. National team matches are routinely the highest viewed programmes of the year in most states, and the players of national teams amongst the most popular and famous people in the country. In England, there is a long standing joke that the job of the national team manager is the second most important job in the country, after the Prime Minister (Washington Post, 10/6/06). The prevalence of the nation within the game is a residue from the expansion of the sport, which was done through British traders and businessmen, who spread the game across the globe in the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries, and provide the founding myths of football in most countries, and who were, of course, strongly versed in the Edwardian love of King and Country. As ever with nationalism, myth provides emotional backing to sporting events; whether through legends of players and teams past or through political and historical events, which are replayed on the football field. The way in which we project our existing stereotypes of nations onto their national football teams will be examined. Nationalism as a force within football is not only confined to the international sporting arena; indeed, some of the most interesting and important stories of nationalism are expressed through club football, as clubs can take on mantles which pushes them beyond mere sporting associations and can provoke radical political and social change. The role of football clubs as the exemplification of suppressed national identity will be advanced through study of stateless nations in Spain, and their football clubs; FC Barcelona in Catalunya and Athletic Bilbao in the Basque Country. Also, the way in which football clubs and the cultures that surround them can be manipulated by ultra-nationalist agents will be 4 Michael R Wood 2003179111 BA Political Studies discussed, with particular reference to the role of football supporters from the Dinamo Zagreb and Red Star Belgrade clubs of the former Yugoslavia in the eventual breakup of that state, and in the conflict that followed. “Delije” Sunday 13 th May 1990 and Saturday 11 th July 1998 are arguably the two most important dates in the last 60 years of Croatian history. They represent the symbolic start and end points of the travails of the young Croatian state, the covers of a book wrought with destruction, violence and brutality. On Sunday 13 th May 1990, Dinamo Zagreb, second-placed in the Yugoslav First League and the pride of Croatia, faced Serbian side Red Star Belgrade, top of the table, reigning champions, who, in just over a year’s time, would win the 1991 European Cup. It was all set to be a classic, the two best teams in the country, playing off in the biggest stadium in Zagreb, the cavernous (if dated) Maksimir, the league title hanging in the balance. What transpired, however, was a display of football violence that went far beyond the scenes that had become regular across Europe in the 1980’s. The riot that ensued that day in the Maksimir Stadium was the breaking point, the moment at which it became clear that the Yugoslav state, and its federal, multi-ethnic structure, was over. Given what followed, the surprising thing about Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is that it lasted so long in the first place. Founded in 1945, from the partisan movement which had emerged during the Second World War as a collaborative, pan-Yugoslav movement which fought against the occupying 5 Michael R Wood 2003179111 BA Political Studies Nazis, it became a popular front government after the war, headed by Marshal Josip Broz Tito, the predominant figure within the communist faction of the front. He presided over a federal state which encompassed six federal republics – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia, Montenegro and Serbia (which, after constitutional reform in 1974, included two autonomous provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina) and three languages (Serbo-Croat, Slovene and Macedon), as well as inter-religious tensions between the predominantly Orthodox Serbs, the predominantly Catholic Croats and the predominantly Muslim Bosnians, whilst all the while the state was official atheist, in line with its Communist principles. Whilst Yugoslavia professed a communist ideology, it remained distinct from the Soviet Bloc, and remained neutral. The ethnic troubles that would eventually bring about the demise of the Yugoslav state began to materialise after Tito’s death in 1980, although, initially, there seemed to be enthusiasm for continuing; on the day that Tito died, a football match, which was taking place in the Croatian town of Split, between local side (and Tito’s favourite, it was alleged) Hadjuk and Red Star Belgrade was halted for a minute silence, and the 50,000 in the stadium, supporters of both teams, spontaneously started singing “Comrade Tito we swear to you, we will never leave your path!” (Bourneman, 2004). The presidency of Yugoslavia passed from Tito to a committee of the federal republics within the state, and the seeds of ethnic tension grew. Each individual republic threw up characters who sought to enhance their political power by acting along ethnic lines; most notably, Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic and Croat leader Franjo Tu đman. 6 Michael R Wood 2003179111 BA Political Studies Tu đ man increasingly saw the federal Yugoslavia as a mechanism by which the Serbs could subjugate non-Serbs; similarly, Milosevic, who had risen from the ranks of the Belgrade Communist League, became associated with the status of Serbs in areas where they were not the majority – particularly in the autonomous region of Kosovo. As the regime in Belgrade increasingly struggled to contain nationalist sentiments across the republic, the Croats began to organise against what they saw as the increasingly Serb-dominated JNA (“ Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija” or Yugoslav People’s Army ), with a view to an independent Croatia, free from communism and Serb influences, and with an outlook that embraced Western Europe and not the Soviet Union (Tanner, 1997). Relations between Serbs and Croats soured further because of the perceived lack of recognition within Croatia for the substantial Serb minority – Tu đ man’s program, which embraced Catholic values and the free market, was not to the liking of the some of the Serb leaders within the Croat assembly, who walked out in protest. They looked to Milosevic, who had put down nationalists in Kosovo and Vojvodina, to intervene, but he was unable to. In early 1990, Croatia and Slovenia held multi-party elections, where nationalists were victorious, and Yugoslavia seemed to be on the way out. Tu đ man’s nationalists began the processes of dismantling the influence of Serbs within Croatia, resulting in the purging of many Serbs from jobs in the public sector (BBC, 11/12/1999). Both Serbs and Croats began to organise around national banners, and nowhere was this more evident than on the terraces of Zagreb and Belgrade, The stage was set for the game. Emotional and political baggage well beyond 7 Michael R Wood 2003179111 BA Political Studies the average football match surrounded the build-up, and this was reflected in the turnout from supporters. 3,000 Delije (“Heroes”), the hardcore Red Star fans, had travelled from Belgrade, lead by their figurehead, the notorious Željko Ražnatovi ć , better known as Arkan. Arkan had made his name across Europe as a career criminal – he was wanted in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, France, Austria, Switzerland and Italy on charges of attempted murder, burglary, assault and escaping from a prison in Amsterdam.