“Football is War”: Nationalism,

national identity and football

2003179111

BA Political Studies

Mette Wiggem

11,223 words PIED3750 Dissertation 2010

Michael R Wood 2003179111 BA Political Studies

Contents

3. Introduction

5. “Delije” – Football supporters and the rise of nationalism in the former

Yugoslavia.

18. “Mes que un club” – FC Barcelona, and nationalism in stateless nations.

32. “We love Brazil, because they are Braaazzzzziiiiiiiiiiiiiilll” – The role of national football teams in the creation of a national myth, and the depiction of nations by the football media.

40. Conclusion

41. Bibliography

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“All that I know most surely about morality and obligations I owe to football.”

Albert Camus

Football is, undoubtedly, the most popular pastime on earth. FIFA, the global governing body of the sport claims that 240 million people in over 200 countries play organised football (2006), and that is to say nothing of the further millions who play casually, attend matches or watch them on television. The mass appeal of football lies in its simplicity; all that is necessary to play is a ball, which can be improvised easily, and almost any surface can be played upon. Fan culture is also extensive, as matches are ninety minutes long but often contain long passages in which very little happens, which allows for tension to build and collective emotions to ferment

– football crowds, above those of any other sport, entertain themselves; through music, songs and chants which can be used to express emotions and to encourage one’s team. This gives rise to a culture which is non-disposable and tribalistic; a supporter cannot simply stop supporting a team, and cannot simply change allegiance – and even cannot extricate themselves from the sport, in the same way that they could with music, cinema, art, opera or any other form of recreation. Football is also a product of modernism and industrialisation, and came to mass consciousness around the same time as the nation-state took hold across the globe, which has forged a strong bond between nationalism and football. National football team matches comprise

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Michael R Wood 2003179111 BA Political Studies the pinnacle of the world game, the World Cup, and reflect the truly internationalist nature of the sport. National team matches are routinely the highest viewed programmes of the year in most states, and the players of national teams amongst the most popular and famous people in the country.

In England, there is a long standing joke that the job of the national team manager is the second most important job in the country, after the Prime

Minister (Washington Post, 10/6/06). The prevalence of the nation within the game is a residue from the expansion of the sport, which was done through

British traders and businessmen, who spread the game across the globe in the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries, and provide the founding myths of football in most countries, and who were, of course, strongly versed in the

Edwardian love of King and Country. As ever with nationalism, myth provides emotional backing to sporting events; whether through legends of players and teams past or through political and historical events, which are replayed on the football field. The way in which we project our existing stereotypes of nations onto their national football teams will be examined. Nationalism as a force within football is not only confined to the international sporting arena; indeed, some of the most interesting and important stories of nationalism are expressed through club football, as clubs can take on mantles which pushes them beyond mere sporting associations and can provoke radical political and social change. The role of football clubs as the exemplification of suppressed national identity will be advanced through study of stateless nations in , and their football clubs; FC Barcelona in Catalunya and Athletic Bilbao in the

Basque Country. Also, the way in which football clubs and the cultures that surround them can be manipulated by ultra-nationalist agents will be

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Michael R Wood 2003179111 BA Political Studies discussed, with particular reference to the role of football supporters from the

Dinamo Zagreb and Red Belgrade clubs of the former Yugoslavia in the eventual breakup of that state, and in the conflict that followed.

“Delije”

Sunday 13 th May 1990 and Saturday 11 th July 1998 are arguably the two most important dates in the last 60 years of Croatian history. They represent the symbolic start and end points of the travails of the young Croatian state, the covers of a book wrought with destruction, violence and brutality. On Sunday

13 th May 1990, Dinamo Zagreb, second-placed in the Yugoslav First League and the pride of Croatia, faced Serbian side Red Star Belgrade, top of the table, reigning champions, who, in just over a year’s time, would win the 1991

European Cup. It was all set to be a classic, the two best teams in the country, playing off in the biggest stadium in Zagreb, the cavernous (if dated)

Maksimir, the league title hanging in the balance. What transpired, however, was a display of football violence that went far beyond the scenes that had become regular across Europe in the 1980’s. The riot that ensued that day in the Maksimir Stadium was the breaking point, the moment at which it became clear that the Yugoslav state, and its federal, multi-ethnic structure, was over.

Given what followed, the surprising thing about Socialist Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia is that it lasted so long in the first place. Founded in 1945, from the partisan movement which had emerged during the Second World War as a collaborative, pan-Yugoslav movement which fought against the occupying

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Nazis, it became a popular front government after the war, headed by Marshal

Josip Broz Tito, the predominant figure within the communist faction of the front. He presided over a federal state which encompassed six federal republics – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia,

Montenegro and Serbia (which, after constitutional reform in 1974, included two autonomous provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina) and three languages

(Serbo-Croat, Slovene and Macedon), as well as inter-religious tensions between the predominantly Orthodox Serbs, the predominantly Catholic

Croats and the predominantly Muslim Bosnians, whilst all the while the state was official atheist, in line with its Communist principles. Whilst Yugoslavia professed a communist ideology, it remained distinct from the Soviet Bloc, and remained neutral. The ethnic troubles that would eventually bring about the demise of the Yugoslav state began to materialise after Tito’s death in

1980, although, initially, there seemed to be enthusiasm for continuing; on the day that Tito died, a football match, which was taking place in the Croatian town of Split, between local side (and Tito’s favourite, it was alleged) Hadjuk and Red Star Belgrade was halted for a minute silence, and the 50,000 in the stadium, supporters of both teams, spontaneously started singing “Comrade

Tito we swear to you, we will never leave your path!” (Bourneman, 2004).

The presidency of Yugoslavia passed from Tito to a committee of the federal republics within the state, and the seeds of ethnic tension grew. Each individual republic threw up characters who sought to enhance their political power by acting along ethnic lines; most notably, Serb leader Slobodan

Milosevic and Croat leader Franjo Tu đman.

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Tu đ man increasingly saw the federal Yugoslavia as a mechanism by which the Serbs could subjugate non-Serbs; similarly, Milosevic, who had risen from the ranks of the Belgrade Communist League, became associated with the status of Serbs in areas where they were not the majority – particularly in the autonomous region of Kosovo. As the regime in Belgrade increasingly struggled to contain nationalist sentiments across the republic, the Croats began to organise against what they saw as the increasingly Serb-dominated

JNA (“ Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija” or Yugoslav People’s Army ), with a view to an independent Croatia, free from communism and Serb influences, and with an outlook that embraced Western Europe and not the

(Tanner, 1997). Relations between Serbs and Croats soured further because of the perceived lack of recognition within Croatia for the substantial Serb minority – Tu đ man’s program, which embraced Catholic values and the free market, was not to the liking of the some of the Serb leaders within the Croat assembly, who walked out in protest. They looked to Milosevic, who had put down nationalists in Kosovo and Vojvodina, to intervene, but he was unable to. In early 1990, Croatia and Slovenia held multi-party elections, where nationalists were victorious, and Yugoslavia seemed to be on the way out.

Tu đ man’s nationalists began the processes of dismantling the influence of

Serbs within Croatia, resulting in the purging of many Serbs from jobs in the public sector (BBC, 11/12/1999). Both Serbs and Croats began to organise around national banners, and nowhere was this more evident than on the terraces of Zagreb and Belgrade,

The stage was set for the game. Emotional and political baggage well beyond

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Michael R Wood 2003179111 BA Political Studies the average football match surrounded the build-up, and this was reflected in the turnout from supporters. 3,000 Delije (“Heroes”), the hardcore Red Star fans, had travelled from Belgrade, lead by their figurehead, the notorious

Željko Ražnatovi ć , better known as Arkan. Arkan had made his name across

Europe as a career criminal – he was wanted in Belgium, Germany, the

Netherlands, Sweden, France, Austria, Switzerland and Italy on charges of attempted murder, burglary, assault and escaping from a prison in

Amsterdam. Interpol tracked his movement from Belgrade to Zagreb for the match (The Guardian, 20/1/2000). They were met by 19,000 home supporters, including, in the North Stand, the Bad Blue Boys , named after the

1983 Sean Penn film, Bad Boys .

As the teams took to the field, the two groups of supporters lit flares and set off smoke bombs, a regular occurrence in big matches that continues to this day. The trouble was sparked by the Delije , who pulled down advertising hoardings in their enclosure, and chanted “We’ll kill Tuđ man” and “Zagreb is

Serbia” (Foer, 2004). They were met by a hail of stones and seats, ripped up from the crumbling Maksimir stands. They were forced to use the hoardings they had torn down as shields. The fences that had been installed to keep rival fans apart fell away under weight of numbers, and the stands were engulfed in violence – Serbian red fought Croatian blue fought the long since discredited Yugoslav police. Dinamo fans invaded the running track the surrounded the pitch and stole the banners from the front of the Red Star section. Surreally, the game continued, and pop music was pumped out through the speakers in an attempt to curtail the fighting. As the violence spread onto the pitch, the players took shelter in their dugouts; next to the

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Red Star manager, protecting him from assault, stood Arkan. A policeman who was assaulting a Dinamo fan on the pitch was kicked by Zvonimir Boban, the captain of the Dinamo team: it would become the defining image of the day. Boban was saved from arrest by the Bad Blue Boys , who swarmed around him and kept the police at bay. Police reinforcements, including water cannons and helicopters, managed to clear the stadium. Hundreds were injured, miraculously, there were no deaths.

In the days that followed, it became clear that the riot had been orchestrated and pre-arranged. Both sides had come with the intention to fight the other, and not just in the way that was generally associated with football hooliganism. Dinamo supporters had stockpiled stones in their end of the ground, and acid prepared so that the metal security fences could be easily dismantled. Arkan and the Delije had come to send a message to their Croat counterparts – Tu đ man had written the Serbian minority in Croatia out of his proposed constitution, and Arkan, himself an ethnic Serb who had spent part of his youth in Zagreb, was not going to let this go lightly. When war was eventually declared in 1991, Dinamo and Red Star fans rushed to join up; in

Kuper’s words (Orion, 1994):

“When Yugoslavia was just one country, the BBB [ Bad Blue Boys ] would follow Dinamo Zagreb to Sarajevo or Belgrade to fight Bosnian or

Serbian fans. When war broke out, they put on army uniforms and went to fight Serbian fans in uniform…A statue of a group of soldiers stand in front of the ground [Maksimir], and the text beneath them says: “To the fans of this

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Michael R Wood 2003179111 BA Political Studies club, who started the war with Serbia at this ground on May 13 th 1990”.

One of the key reasons behind the swift transition of the Delije and the Bad

Blue Boys from supporters to soldiers was the way in which they were organised. The structures and cultures of a militaristic organisation already existed on the terraces, complete with charismatic leaders, clear chains of command and enforced discipline. To understand the easy transition that was made in the aftermath of the Maksimir riot, it is necessary to understand the culture from which the two supporters groups arose, and the goals of the organisations, both on the terraces and in a wider society.

The predominant model to which hardcore football supporters orientate themselves on the continent and beyond is the ultra movement. Ultras

(meaning “beyond” in Italian, Italy being the spiritual home of the movement) adhere to four key principles which dictate the manner in which they support their team, and define what it is to be an ultra :

1) Never sit down during a match;

2) Never stop singing during a match, no matter what the score;

3) Attend as many matches as possible, regardless of the cost or

distance;

4) Loyalty to the group and to the curva (section of stand in which the

group is located). (UltrasUK.com)

These principles result in the ultras generally being the most vocal and most

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Michael R Wood 2003179111 BA Political Studies noticeable type of supporters in the ground, as they usually bring drums and musical instruments, as well as flares and smoke bombs in order to create the best atmosphere possible in the stadium. They also produced huge choreographed displays to greet their side as they come out onto the pitch before the match, intended either to encourage their team, to denigrate an opponent or to display a political message. Politicised ultra groups are common, and generally hold extreme views, from either the left or the right.

French club Olympique de Marseille’s “South Winners” ultras group display before the derby match against Paris Saint Germain, February 2008. The display includes banners bearing the name of the group, depictions of Che Guevara (South Winners have a left-wing allegiance) and the message “Offrez-nous le spectacle ce soir” (“Give us a show tonight”) as well as three layers of synchronised flags. Groups are receive no funding from clubs, and produce these displays, which are often planned months in advance, and at great expense, independently.

(www.gripofhysteria.wordpress.com)

The nature of the ultras , however, does not inherently result in situations such

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Michael R Wood 2003179111 BA Political Studies as those which arose in the former Yugoslavia in the late 1980s and early

1990s, as we can see above. The key tenets of ultra ideology do not even mention the opposing supporters, or violence in any form – they concentrate solely on backing your own group and on creating an atmosphere. It is noticeable that loyalty to a group is emphasised over loyalty to the club – it is not unheard of for ultras to boycott their clubs, and even form new clubs if they consider the club to have foregone its identity and its roots.

The way that ultras are organised is styled on a military organisation. There is a central control which dictates what the group does, and this is rarely more than 50 individuals, who are not elected and not accountable. Membership of this central organisation is gained through longevity and respect – those who founded the group, for example, and those who are seen to be “good” ultras , as was evident in the Delije , where the leaders were Arkan, and those aligned to him, and they ran the group with an iron fist. Most groups will have active leaders who are present on the terraces, armed with megaphones or microphones, directing the chanting of the group; manipulating the periphery, the casual supporters to align themselves to the ultras group, but do not have a say in what the group does.

Whilst it is not unheard of for individual ultras to attack opposing supporters

(as anyone who has visited Istanbul or Rome as an away supporter will testify), it is rare that a group sets out to confront opposing fans; a contrast with the “firm” or “casual” style of support that held sway in the United

Kingdom during the 1970s and 1980s. However, since the decline of

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Michael R Wood 2003179111 BA Political Studies communism and the fall of the Berlin Wall, there has been increased cultural flow between the United Kingdom and Eastern Europe, and one of the aspects of British culture that has been most enamouring to Eastern

Europeans has been football hooliganism. Films such as 1988’s “The Firm”, and bands such as Oasis and Blur (whose fashion mimicked the casual style) brought the aesthetics and glamour of football hooliganism to the mainstream on the terraces of Eastern Europe, and British flags became commonplace amongst the banners of any self-respecting ultras group. Occasional visits from travelling bands of Englishmen, following the national side or clubs playing European away games helped to spread the culture of heavy drinking and casual violence across the continent. The Delije and Bad Blue Boys groups could be seen as the vanguard of this fusion between the ultra supporting style and the more violent British style, as, being from Yugoslavia, which enjoyed a slightly less rigid border controls and thus more contact with the West. Zoran Timic, a leading member of the Delije told “The Guardian” newspaper:

“What we did at the end of the 1970s was to take the choreography from

Italian football and the hooliganism from England and mix it together to create our own style of football anti-communism. Hooliganism became a way of showing that we were free; of resisting the communist regime.” (18/1/2004)

The violence that surrounded the Dinamo-Red Star match in 1990 could also be seen as the culmination of an increasing level of politicisation amongst the two groups, as alluded to by Timic. Whilst politically-motivated actions by ultras is relatively common (most ultras share a common, vaguely anti-

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Michael R Wood 2003179111 BA Political Studies capitalist sentiment against what they describe as “modern football”, characterised by rising ticket prices and unscrupulous owners), the level of politicisation that existed in the two groups was unprecedented. Bellamy

(2003) notes “In Socialist Yugoslavia, football clubs were typically important channels for exercising political, social and economic influence. Typically a club was linked to, and financially dependent on, a political group and was identified with that group’s political views.” This was seen at both Red Star and Dinamo, but crucially, after the fall of Tito, it was the fans rather than the political benefactors who retained their communist era identities.

Red Star Belgrade had a history of dissent and political action in the Yugoslav

First League. They were long seen to be the club which opposed the communist regime, and attracted supporters around this label. They were

“sponsored”, and aligned to, the Republic of Serbia, which existed within the federal framework of Yugoslav state, and contained the Serb nationalist elements of the regime. Their main rivals were (and still are) Partizan

Belgrade, the club of the JNA, the Yugoslav Army, who symbolised the regime and the enforced federalism that the Delije stood against. The death of the leader of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, lead to increasing ethnic tensions and the Delije enhanced their a Serb identity, relishing games against the leading clubs from the other republics within Yugoslavia, chiefly against

Dinamo Zagreb but also FK Sarajevo (from Bosnia) and NK Olimpija Ljubljana

(from Slovenia). They became the club most associated with Serb ultra- nationalism, a link strengthened by the accession of Arkan to the Presidency of the Delije .

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Dinamo Zagreb had similar ultra-nationalist undertones. Whilst Partizan

Belgrade had the sponsorship of the Army, and Red Star the patronage of the

Republic Of Serbia, Dinamo were the club of the Republic of Croatia. They, according to Bellamy, were taken as the representatives of all Croatia within the Yugoslav league, as Croatia’s other leading club, Hadjuk Split (supported by no less than Tito himself) held strong regionalist connections, the city of

Split being the capital of the Dalmatian region of Croatia. Dinamo supporters had already made their support for the ultra-nationalist Franjo Tu đ man evident during the Croatian elections of 1990 (Krickovic, 1999), and were intrinsically linked with the Croatian cause. The Bad Blue Boys were allied to Tu đ man, but not (until the start of the war at least) uncritical; Krickovic quotes a Bad Blue

Boys ultra regarding their support for Tu đ man’s party, the HDZ (Croatian

Democratic Union, “ Hrvatska demokratska zajednica“ ): “We saw that they were the first party to come out with, let's say, an aggressive stance toward bringing about a free Croatia. We stood behind them because Croatia was our mutual interest ”. Relations have since soured; Tu đ man renamed Dinamo

Zagreb in 1992, claiming that “Dinamo” was a Serb name, and thus unacceptable in his new Croatia. The Bad Blue Boys disagreed, and, after 8 years as first “HAŠK Gra đ anski” and then “Croatia Zagreb”, they reverted to their old name. The links, however, with Tu đ man have been irrevocably slashed.

The foundations were laid for the riot; a heady mix of extremist political views, ethnic hatred, military discipline and a capacity for football hooliganism on an

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Michael R Wood 2003179111 BA Political Studies unprecedented scale met that day in 1990, and continued throughout Serbia and Croatia during the years of war that followed. Wilson (2006) notes the movement from hooligans to soldiers in the late 1980s and early 1990s:

“They had been one of the most feared hooligan firms in Europe, but under Arkan the Delije became something more sinister, as he drew from the ranks to form the Tigers. Weeks after the victory in Bari [where Red Star won the 1991 European Cup, the highest honour available to a club team in

Europe] – where there was “choreography Europe will never forget”, as one fan told me – the Tigers, chanting songs they had sung from the North Stand, marched to the front”.

The Delije had become the infamous death squad known as “Arkan’s Tigers”, and were present at the massacres that were committed at Vukovar, Bijeljina and across Bosnia and Croatia. Arkan also used his position within the

Serbian Army to greatly enhance his personal wealth, to the point where he attempted to buy his beloved Red Star Belgrade, in 1995. There were similar scenes on the other side of the war as well. Krickovic notes that, in the early days of the Croatian Army, when they did not have proper insignia on their uniforms, soldiers would stitch their Dinamo badges onto their sleeves. Some

Croat soldiers, who did not want to use the red-and-white checkerboard flag used by Tu đ man (which had been the flag of the Ustase, the Nazi- collaborationist government in Croatia in the Second World War) would fly a

Dinamo flag – for them, there was no greater symbol of Croatia than the flag of Dinamo Zagreb.

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It was, however, the checkerboard flag that would become the international symbol of Croatia. In 1996, emerging from the destruction of the war, the

Croatian national team, captained by Zvonimir Boban, who had kicked a

Yugoslav policeman live on television on that day in May 1990, qualified for the European Championships which took place in England. Two years later, on the 11 th of July 1998, wearing the red and white squares, the Croatian team defeated the Netherlands by two goals to one to win the bronze medal at the World Cup in France. When Croatia’s other leading sporting star,

Grand-slam winning tennis player Goran Ivanisevic retired from the sport in

2004, he donned the national football jersey before saluting the crowd (BBC,

25/7/2004). The football team has become the premier international image of

Croatia; the new country that had emerged from the ashes of Yugoslavia had been forged – as the war that had symbolically begun with the football riot on the 13 th of May 1990, so it was the success of the football team in Paris on the

11 th of July 1998 that introduced the world to the new Croatia.

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“Més que un club ”

The images of nationalism that were evident in the former Yugoslavia are an extreme example of the existence, within football, of the potential for radical action. Nationalism and football have a long relationship, but it is not always the case that nationalist or separatist sentiments on the terraces spill over into violence. I will present a seperate case study which exemplifies the existence of a more moderate nationalism within football, and use this to question the position of football within a wider international context regarding the image of the nation, both from within and without. The alternative form of nationalism that is generally seen in football is that which is evident at clubs such as FC

Barcelona and Athletic Bilbao, and to a lesser extent at former Soviet clubs

Dinamo , Ararat Yerevan and Dinamo Minsk. These clubs hold a unique position in their states, as they are seen to represent a separate nation or ethnic group within the state in which they play.

FC Barcelona and Athletic Bilbao are the premier clubs of Catalunya and the

Basque Country respectively, and categorise themselves as being Catalan and Basque above being Spanish – they fly their own autonomous flags instead of the Castilian flag above their stadiums, deal with the outside world predominantly in Catalan and Basque above Spanish, and promote local, homegrown talent – even to the extent that Athletic Bilbao operate a policy, by which they do not field players who do not have Basque heritage. I will attempt to deconstruct these expressions of nationalism, and to place them within the framework of nationalism and football. It is important, first of

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Michael R Wood 2003179111 BA Political Studies all, to understand the history which underpins the growth of FC Barcelona

(henceforth known by their colloquial name, Barça) and Athletic Bilbao, and the wider regions which they represent.

Catalunya, which occupies the north-east corner of modern Spain and extends into France as far north as Narbonne, is a culturally distinct area, with a proud history separate of Spain. The capital, Barcelona, has long been a centre of commerce (based around its Mediterranean port) and art (Gaudi,

Picasso and Dali all called it home). It has not been a politically separate part of Spain (barring a few months during the Spanish Civil War in the mid 1930s) since the 15 th Century, but has always been culturally and linguistically independent, and has, by and large, coexisted with the Spanish centre in

Madrid. The growth of romanticism in Europe in the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries begat the Renaixença , or Catalan revival, a huge spurt of interest in

Catalan culture, language, dance and music – it is no coincidence that Barça was formed in 1899 and retains this flavour. It was at this time that Barcelona became one of the principal cities of the world, utilising its position on the

Mediterranean Sea, its (relative to Madrid) proximity to the rest of Europe and its rapid industrialisation to become Spain’s major economic and cultural driver. Catalan identity contrasted itself with the perceived backwardness of the rest of Spain, which was still largely agricultural. There was a clash within the Catalan movement between the wealthy industrialists, who wanted a level of autonomy from Spain but also wanted to keep the rich seam of cheap labour which streamed in from the south and the poorer workers, who saw the wealth of Catalunya being diverted to subsidise the rest of Spain. Barcelona

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Michael R Wood 2003179111 BA Political Studies was also the city with the most political action, as socialist and anarchist groups grew and the influence of the Catholic Church, which dominated politics in the rest of Spain, declined.

The history of the Basque nationalism bears several similarities to that of

Catalunya. The Basque Country, which is situated on the north coast of Spain and the South West coast of France, also has a history of economic strength, based around mining, ship-building and steel-making. There was also a substantial financial sector, which served to make Bilbao the richest city in

Spain by the turn of the 20 th Century. The Basque people, however, have a much longer history than the Catalans. They have inhabited the northern regions of Spain since prehistoric times, and the is totally unique of any other language in the world (Amorrortu, 2003). The Basque language is perennially deemed to be under threat from Castilian Spanish, and, as Bilbao and surrounding areas grew in line with the Industrial

Revolution, Basque nationalist groups sprang up to defend the Basque culture from the perceived threat posed by Castilian immigrants – Sabino Arana, father of the Basque nationalist movement, was a disciple of some of the nastier elements of European genetic theory in the late 19 th century; he saw the Basques as a race apart from the Spanish, and purer as a result of their lack of integration – if a language was the representation of a culture, he surmised, then Basque culture must be the most pure, as the Basque language was free of contamination by other languages (MacClancy, 1996).

He founded the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV, Basque Nationalist Party), a conservative movement which opposed Castilian erosion of Basque culture

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Michael R Wood 2003179111 BA Political Studies anti-clericalism and communism, all of which it saw as being products of immigration.

The key era in the history of separatism in Spain was between 1930 and

1939; bookended by the fall of the previous dictator, General Primo De

Rivera, and the accession of the next dictator, General Francisco Franco, who came to power after the Spanish Civil War, which began in 1936. In between these two figures there was a brief period known as the Spanish Second

Republic, during which democratic elections were held, and a Popular Front government, made up of liberals, socialists, communists, anarchists and regional nationalists. There were three key values within the Republic: liberalism and respect for institutions; secularism and dismantling of the influence of the church and the monarchy; and socialism, and the need for social reform (Smith, 2008) – which were widely accepted by the nationalists in Catalunya, but caused issues within the PNV in the Basque Country, who respected the authority of the Catholic Church and feared the anti-clericalism they saw as prevalent amongst other members of the Republican government. The Republican government elections of 1934 were won by a coalition of right-wing forces, who began to roll back the advances of the previous administration, which resulted in uprisings by socialists and anarchists in Asturias and by nationalists in Catalunya . Politics became polarised between the extreme left and the extreme right, with little room for the centre ground, and, in 1936, civil war broke out after a coup by military leaders in Spanish Morocco. The nationalists fought alongside with the

Republicans against the Franco’s nationalists and fascists – the Basque

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Country saw some of the worst fighting, as German and Italian forces, who back the right-wing nationalists, decimated the region, notably the town of

Guernica, which was immortalised by Picasso’s painting. Barcelona saw fighting on the streets between the forces within the Republic – anarchists fought communists fought socialists fought Catalan nationalists – before the whole city fell to Franco in January 1939. Nationalist sentiments were immediately set up on by the Franco government. Catalunya’s government, the Generalitat was deconstituted, the Catalan flag, the senyera , was banned and the singing of the national anthem, Els Segadors was outlawed. In the

Basque Country, similar measures were instigated. Speaking Catalan or

Basque in public was criminalised. It was amidst this repression that football came to be so important to the people of Barcelona, Catalunya, Bilbao and the Basque Country.

With their language, their flag and their anthem forbidden, new nationalist symbols were needed to show dissent from the regime. Athletic Bilbao and

FC Barcelona were already two of the most successful clubs in Spain, and had always been seen as separate from Spanish identity. FC Barcelona was set up at the height of the Renaixença by a Swiss immigrant, Joan Gamper

(born Hans Kamper, he adopted a Catalan name), alongside a handful of

English ex-patriots and local Catalans. They quickly established a reputation for both excellent play on the field – winning many Catalan championships and Spanish Cups – and for their political status – they had their stadium closed down for 6 months in 1925 (Ball, 2003). Their status as the representatives of Catalan separatism was helped by the formation

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Barcelona’s second club, RCD Espanyol – who represented the pro-Spanish elements within Barcelona. (RCD stands for “Real Club Deportivo”, or “Royal

Sporting Club”, after it received royal patronage in 1912). FC Barcelona suffered heavily in the Civil War; its president, Josep Sunyol, was executed, its stadium bombed and its members – a veritable who’s who of the Catalan nationalist movement – threatened. The name of the club was forcibly changed from the Catalan “Futbol Club Barcelona” to the Castilian “ Club de

Fútbol Barcelona” .

Before the war, Barça had been a major symbol of what it meant to be

Catalan, and had been adopted by immigrants to Catalunya wanting to assimilate and leading politicians wanting to appear populist alike, but Franco made més que un club’ (‘more than a club’), the motto of Barça, mean so much more. Barça came to represent dissent, democracy and national identity in a way that few could have predicted. The club’s stadium, Les Corts, was scene of many incidents, most notably in 1951, where, with a passenger boycott of the tram system in effect, the crowd of near 60,000 chose to collectively walk home, despite rain and Francoist threats (Richards, 1999).

The way that Barça was (and still is) organised, by which ordinary supporters can become socios (“members”) of the club, and have a say in how the club is run, provided a rare democratic input in the years of the dictatorship, as well as a signifier of commitment to reform and to Catalunya. The club developed a fierce rivalry with Real Madrid, the club that Franco supported, and who had always courted the image of being the team of Castilian Spain – their stadium is named after a former President and Francoist soldier, Santiago Bernabeu.

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Barça’s Camp Nou stadium was the only public place in which one could speak Catalan without fear of reprisal. It was these conditions, imposed by

Franco, which gave Barça the status it has today; as the biggest symbol of

Catalunya, the de-facto national team, as Marc, a member of Barça’s fiercely separatist ultra group, Almogavers, states – “it’s one and the same thing – to be with Barça is to feel Catalan” (Burns, 1998).

Athletic Bilbao came into existence in the same manner as most early football clubs on the continent – through British businessmen who brought the game with them, backed up by the children of the local elite, who returned from schooling in England with a taste for the new game that was sweeping the country. The two groups came together in 1901, adopting the name of the local’s team, Athletic Club, and the colours of the ex-patriots – red and white, modeled on Southampton and Sunderland’s shirts, as many of the British players had migrated from the coalfields of the north-east and the ports of the south coast to Bilbao. It was no coincidence that red, white and green are the colours of the Basque flag, as Basque nationalism was very much in vogue, particularly amongst the young middle classes, who were enamoured by

Romanticist ideas and the new wealth of their region. They gained a reputation which still exists to this day – whereas Barça and Real Madrid are praised for their extravagant, attacking style, Athletic became known for a no- nonsense, effective, British method of play which was well suited to the muddier pitches and more precipitous climate of the Basque Country. Basque clubs dominated the early years of the Spanish League, as the majority of

British emigrants were to be found in the northern regions – of the 10 clubs in

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Michael R Wood 2003179111 BA Political Studies the league, four were Basque, three were Catalan, leaving Racing Santander

(also on the north coast) and the two Madrid clubs, Atletico and Real (Ball,

2003). Franco changed the name of Athletic too, if subtly, to the more Spanish

Atletico. Franco, however, inadvertently aided the assumption of Athletic to the forefront of the Basque nationalist movement under the dictatorship: he instigated a rule which only allowed teams to field three foreign players;

Athletic, who were lacking the necessary finances to compete for foreign stars with the likes of Real Madrid and Barcelona, used the rule to instigate their cantera policy, which has formed the backbone of the club ever since. La cantera , or quarry, is the system by which clubs produce their own players, similar to a youth academy in the UK. However, in the context of Athletic

Bilbao (and, until 1989, their neighbours , from San Sebastian), this has meant that they have only fielded players with proven Basque heritage, similar to those which are required to play for a national representative team. To play for Athletic Bilbao, one must have at least one

Basque grandparent, or have been born in the Basque Country, or have learnt football in the region. This is controversial, as it can be construed as discriminatory against those who are not Basque, and also because it has severely hindered the progress of the team – although they have never been relegated from the top division of Spanish football, and, in the words of their

President, Fernando Garcia Macua: “We'd rather go down than change our habits. I know the supporters feel the same [as me]” (Times, 20/12/2007). The other side of this, of course, is financial; in the summer of 2009, Real Madrid and Barcelona spent a combined total of €445 million on transfer fees

(Guardian, 28/10/10) on new players: Athletic hardly ever pay transfer fees,

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Michael R Wood 2003179111 BA Political Studies as they hardly ever sign players. Athletic enjoy a connection between supporters and players that is near-unparalleled in professional sport; almost all players are also supporters – and thus have been brought up in the traditions of the club, which includes a heavy slant towards Basque separatism and nationalism. The moment which created this indivisible link came in 1976, a year after the death of Franco, when Athletic legend, goalkeeper and captain Jose Angel Iribar, marched onto the field before a match with fellow Basques Real Sociedad, carrying an Ikurriña (the Basque flag), which he planted in the centre of the pitch. It was the first public display of the banned flag in forty years (AP, 19/1/10). Athletic Bilbao provides the focal point for Basque nationalism – how often do the Basque people get to face themselves against the Spanish foe? Every year, when Real Madrid come to town. As ever, the spectre of Real Madrid is present, so linked they are to the Castilian centre and the dictatorship of Franco, under whose patronage they enjoyed their halcyon years. There is a dark side to Basque nationalism, in the form of Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (“Basque Homeland and

Freedom”) otherwise known as ETA, a militant group which uses violence to attack symbols of the Spanish state – it has in recent years targeted matches between Real Madrid and Basque clubs, particularly when Basque teams travel to the capital to play. The ultra group associated with Athletic, Herri

Norte , fly their flag at matches, and Iribar, the former Athletic goalkeeper who planted the flag in the centre circle of Athletic’s San Mames stadium pitch, has also campaigned for the release of political prisoners from the group.

Iribar’s actions, and the way which they were received by Athletic supporters

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Michael R Wood 2003179111 BA Political Studies give an insight into the two different nationalisms at play in the Basque

Country and in Catalunya by it with a similar moment in the history of FC

Barcelona. In 1973, as Franco’s health was deteriorating, and as strikes were gripping the country, the saviour of Barça arrived. Johann Cruyff, star of the

Ajax Amsterdam team which had won three consecutive European Cups, arrived to a wave of enthusiasm – not only was he the best footballer in the world, he also let it be known that he had signed for Barça because he could not bring himself to play for the team of General Franco, Real Madrid (Burns,

1998). He further endeared himself to the Catalan faithful by naming his first child Jordi, after the patron saint of Catalunya, barely days before the team were due to travel to play Real Madrid, in a top of the table clash. Barça won five nil. The New York Times, not a paper which gave much mention to soccer, reported that in leading Barça to a resounding victory in the Bernabeu,

Johann Cruyff had done more for the spirit of the Catalan nation in ninety minutes than many politicians were able to achieve in years of stifled struggle

(Burns,1998). Barça’s victory in Madrid in 1974, however, came from a totally different tradition to the actions of Iribar in the Basque derby of 1976 – whereas Catalan nationalism has always prided itself on its cocksure, civilised sentiments of superiority to Spain, Basque nationalism is more visceral, a tradition based in land and industry. Catalunya took in immigrants from the rest of Spain and beyond and made them Catalans, the Basques saw immigrants as a threat to their unique culture. Nili (2009) summarises the differences in nationalisms, as shown through Cruyff and Iribar:

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“The Dutchman, who was the most famous of Catalunya’s “adopted sportsman”, explicitly supported Catalan nationalism just as much as he attacked Franco’s dictatorship... It was Iribar who carried the Ikurrina onto the pitch in the 1976 derby between Bilbao and Real Sociedad, a politically seminal act which all Basques remember...Yet the crucial point here is that he had to be Basque. There could have been no Dutch hero for Bilbao.”

This division of nationalisms is seen across the political spectrum in

Catalunya and the Basque Country. Catalan nationalism is a civic nationalism, of nationalism as adoption of shared values and traditions rather than denigration of a different entity. This has resulted in a situation by which the Catalan independence movement has had little success; there has been no serious paramilitary movement ( Terra Lluire , or “Free Land”, achieved little and disbanded in 1995), there is a consensus within the autonomous Catalan parliament that a separate state is not a viable option and most opinion polls suggest that the population are not in favour of independence ( Institut de

Ciències Polítiques i Socials, 2007 ). Catalan nationalism seems content with celebrating Catalan culture and keeping the Catalan language in use and in schools – and Barça is one of the key players in this to this day.

In the Basque Country, however, they have had a more sustained struggle for independence from Spain. The PNV, the nationalist yet conservative party, has struggled to gain a monopoly over nationalist sentiments, as, during the

Franco era, there was an active insurgency against the dictatorship, spearheaded by ETA, who approach Basque nationalism from a staunchly

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Marxist perspective. Formed in 1959, ETA represented a different argument to the prevailing one within the Basque nationalist movement, as they saw themselves as cultural nationalists, defending their language and traditions from repression under Franco, as opposed to the ethnic nationalism that was espoused by the PNV. They also saw the PNV as being too moderate in its campaigns, and adopted a direct action tactic to undermine the Fascist regime – which manifested itself in a series of assassinations and bomb attacks on government figures. When democracy returned to Spain, ETA did not put down their guns, and instead engaged in a protracted battle with the forces of the Spanish state which continues, albeit in a lesser form, to this day. They developed strong links with the Irish Republican Army (IRA), and used many of the same tactics as were seen in the north of Ireland and the

United Kingdom (Woodworth, 2002). Opinion towards separatism in the

Basque Country has lessened in recent years, as people adapt to increasing levels of peace and prosperity. As with Catalunya, the Basque Country enjoys greater autonomy from Spain than other regions, but unlike the Catalans it struggled in the 1970s and 1980s because of its previous dependence on manufacturing and mining, both of which were in decline. Herri Batasuna, the party most associated with ETA, is now banned because of alleged terrorist links, but regularly came second in the polls in the Basque Country, behind the conservative PNV. Nationalism in the Basque context is still a defensive action – preserving language and culture from increasing Spanish advances; a perennial problem, given that just 49% of Basques can understand the language, as opposed to nearly 96% of Catalans (Amorrortu, 2003).

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It is clear about Athletic Bilbao and FC Barcelona is that, despite being clubs, they have become the de facto national teams of the Basque Country and

Catalunya. This trend is reflected in other sports too – the Catalan Dragons rugby league club and the USAP club, both based in the capital of Northern Catalunya, on the French side of the Pyrenees, wave senyera and sing Els Segadors before entering the field, and are seen as the premier representatives of the nation in their particular field as well. A similar situation exists with Biarritz Olympique rugby union club in the French Basque Country, and both Biarritz and the Catalan Dragons have held matches over the border. However, FC Barcelona and Athletic Bilbao go far further as symbols of the nation’s sporting prowess; they have become the symbols of their nation. This is not a new thing in football, and if one looks towards Eastern

Europe, it is easy to find examples of subjugated nations being represented by football teams – and a trend through which we can see further issues surrounding national identity and football.

The Top League, the premier division of football in the Soviet Union, included, at various points, teams from thirteen now-independent states, of which 5 were champions – from obvious candidates such as and

Dinamo Kiev to more obscure clubs such as Ararat Yerevan (from ) and Dinamo Tbilisi (Georgia). The successes of these smaller clubs can be seen to represent two different topics; one concerning the rise of nationalism within the Soviet Union, the other concerning the way in which we project national stereotypes onto football teams, with wider reference to the position of national football teams as the primary representatives of a nation on the

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Michael R Wood 2003179111 BA Political Studies global scale. The Soviet Union was, ethnographically speaking, a massive undertaking – there were hundreds of different ethnic groups, languages and seperate cultures – but very few outlets for people to espouse nationalist sentiments. The provided a rare opportunity for those from smaller and less influential republics to make a mark on a national scale, and never was this truer than in the case of Ararat Yerevan. Yerevan is the capital of Armenia, a small independent state tucked away in the Caucuses region, sandwiched between Georgia, Azerbaijan and Turkey. Even by the standards of the Soviet Union, it was a fairly remote outpost, but, in 1973, Ararat won the double, capturing both the Soviet Top League title and the . They were a club with slight nationalist overtones to begin with; their name came from Mount Ararat, the national symbol of Armenia, which carries strong emotional ties, as it lies within Turkish borders, and carries weight attached to the genocide of Armenians by Turks from 1915-17, which Turkey still does not recognise. Ararat’s triumph in 1973 signalled a new awakening for the

Armenian people; their matches were characterised by nationalist chanting and the singing nationalist songs and attendance at their matches sky- rocketed. The Lenin statue, in the centre of Yerevan, had a number 8 daubed on the back, 8 being the number of Ararat’s goal scorer in the cup final, Levon

Ishtoyan (Wilson, 2006). A similar situation also occurred in the Georgian

Soviet Republic, where Dinamo Tbilisi were successful, and came to be the public face of the Georgian people on a national stage. Both sides have, however, suffered massively after independence – without the oppression suffered in the Soviet era, they have lost their meaning as clubs, as well as top quality opposition to play against; crowds have dwindled, an apathy has

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Michael R Wood 2003179111 BA Political Studies set in. The successes of Ararat Yerevan and Dinamo Tbilisi had a side-effect within Soviet sporting culture, and it has been reflected across the globe.

Ararat were known for an expansive, attacking style, and thus that became the “Armenian” way of playing; Dinamo Tbilisi, and Georgia in general, have a

“tradition” (as these things are, in the clichéd way of football, usually referred to) of dribblers and wingers – Georgi Kinkladze, a Manchester City and

Derby County favourite in the mid-1990s, being the classic example of this to a British audience. This way of classifying cultures and players runs deep in football, and has had provided an insight into both the way in which we see nations, and the way in which we appropriate our existing views of nations into our views of their football teams.

“We love Brazil, because they are Braaazzzzziiiiiiiiiiiiiilll”

The World Cup is where we can see the extent to which football has become the primary method of self-promotion that a nation can partake in. By qualifying for the finals tournament, a nation guarantees itself airtime and column inches in almost every country in the world, and gives itself a stage from which to display an image that will capture the imagination of the world.

One only has to look at the aforementioned case of Croatia or at Cameroon in the 1990 World Cup, or Senegal at the 2002 tournament to understand the extent by which the international exposure gained through a successful world cup can turn into economic and social benefits. Ask the average Briton to name ten Croats and the reply will most likely be the names of nine footballers and Goran Ivanisevic. This is replicated across the globe, and there are major

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Michael R Wood 2003179111 BA Political Studies concerns surrounding the way in which the media, particularly in Britain, portrays foreign national teams, and guarantees that they are presented in a way which conforms to our pre-existing stereotypes of that particular nation.

The classic example of this is to be found with the nationalmannschaft , the

German national team, especially when they come up against the English team. When the two clash, the British tabloid media reaches an apoplectic state, and whips up nationalist hysteria with historical overtones that reach far beyond the confines of what one might expect to be produced by a football match. The travelling “army” of English supporters are described as “invading” the town in which the game is to be held; they sing songs which glorify British military and sporting victories – “Two World Wars and One World Cup”, “Ten

German Bombers – and, when the Germans win, they are “typical Germans”.

The British media nicknames for German players also conform to these rules -

Franz “der Kaiser” Beckenbauer and Gerd “der Bomber” Muller are just two of many – they even derive Nazi comparisons from the German side announcing a black away kit; the supreme irony, of course, being that the Nazi storm troopers wore brown shirts, and it was the Italian fascists who wore black

(Daily Star, 28/1/10). But this war-obsessed attitude from the British tabloid media is not an exclusively British trait: the Dutch football media is also rife with references to their occupation by the Nazis. In the wake of their triumph at the 1988 European Championships, which were held in Germany, Kuper

(1994) reports that 60% of the population of Holland took to the streets to celebrate – the biggest public outpouring of emotion since the liberation in

1945. In the United Kingdom, we have come to expect different attitudes from our broadsheets and our tabloids – a difference that was exemplified by the

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Michael R Wood 2003179111 BA Political Studies contrasting reactions to post-match comments made by Alex Ferguson, manager of English champions Manchester United after they had been knocked out of the 2010 Champions League by German champions Bayern

Munich – Ferguson pinned the moment at which the tide turned against his charges as the sending off of Brazilian defender Rafael, and described the

Bayern players, who crowded round the referee and pressured him to dismiss

Rafael as “typical Germans”. The tabloid media backed Ferguson to the hilt

(The Sun, 7/4/10), and decried the tactics of the Bayern players; however, the broadsheets rightly pointed out that the players who had crowded the referee were Ribery, Olic and Van Buyten (a Frenchman, a Croat and a Belgian), and that English players are just as likely to crowd referees as any of their counterparts on the continent (The Guardian, 7/4/10). What was unusual in the case of the Dutch was that it was not just the tabloid media that were getting in on the act; the intelligentsia and even the players were just as guilty.

A book of poetry was produced entitled “Holland-Germany Football Poetry”, which included works by both players and professional poets, and pulled no punches – Hans Boskamp (1989), a former national team player wrote:

“Dumb generalisations about a people Or a nation, I despise A sense of proportion is very Dear to me

Sweet revenge, I thought, did not exist Or last very briefly And then there was that unbelievably beautiful Tuesday evening in Hamburg”

[The game, in which the Dutch defeated the Germans by two goals to one, took place on Tuesday 21 st June at the Volksparkstadion in Hamburg].

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Many have theorised an inferiority complex which runs right through the obsession many of the leading international football rivalries, particularly where Germany are concerned. Kuper and Szymanski (2009) question the myth that England underachieve, particularly in comparison with Germany by undertaking an economic analysis of sporting success, with particular reference to football. They develop an analysis that factors in population, economic strength, the number of active footballers and a whole host of other factors and come to the conclusion that the order of things in European football is almost totally as it should be – Germany, as the biggest country by population and with the strongest economy (even before reunification), comes out on top more often than not; but even then, Germany only has a win percentage of about 70% - not greatly more than England (between 62% and

66%) – Kuper and Szymanski produce a cold, economic analysis which

(whilst somewhat depressing to those of us who love football and its unpredictability), debunks many of the myths that pervade European football.

The relevance of these findings with regards to nationalism are significant – if one surveys the strongest rivalries (and thus the biggest arenas for nationalist outpourings), they are more often than not startlingly lop-sided; the rivalries between Germany and England, Holland, Austria and Poland respectively all heavily favour the Germans – the same is true regarding England and the other home nations and Russia and its former dominions in Eastern Europe.

As we have seen in Catalunya and the Basque Country, repressed nations can harbour the strongest nationalisms, and it is fair to say that the rivalries above are very much one-sided – Germans are not particularly bothered about beating England (certainly in comparison to how much England are

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Michael R Wood 2003179111 BA Political Studies bothered about beating Germany). Political factors obviously influence this as well – the Second World War, Soviet domination of Eastern Europe and

British imperialism have created hierarchies of nations and, as Rinus Michels said, “Football is War” (Guiliani et al, 1994) – we use clashes on the football field to settle scores that we started on the battlefield.

The extent to which the British media reverts to existing national stereotypes when describing the football teams that represent certain nations goes further than mere “typical Germans”. Come the World Cup (of which every single match is broadcast live on terrestrial television in the United Kingdom), commentators and pundits are required to give opinions on players and teams whom they have seen very little of; whilst the fortunes of the major nations are well known, and their players are internationally recognizable stars, half of the teams in the World Cup never advance past the first stages, and will be comprised of players either from local leagues or the lower leagues of Europe

– particularly in the case of African, Asian and South American nations. Thus we are treated to a litany of stereotypes from commentators, which, whilst usually well meaning, are rife with ignorance and borderline racism. Sub-

Saharan African teams, such as Senegal, Angola and Togo, who have few major Europe-based stars, are characterised as being flamboyant and physically imposing but lacking in tactical rigour and discipline – almost completely the same charges that were given as excuses by white British managers who did not want to sign black players in the 1970s and 1980s

(Kuper and Szymanski, 2009). It would appear that, when faced with uncertainty, the media reverts to lazy generalizations and crude stereotypes.

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As previously mentioned, Germany is often victim to this attitude – there exists a predesigned way in which the British media feels that the German national team, and German clubs, and even German players, play. They are seen as automatons, set within strict tactical boundaries and adhering to them with discipline and restraint. They are experts at penalty shootouts, and will do anything to win. But it is Brazil who are hostages to this weight of expectation regarding the kind of football that they play – winning can become secondary to style, and our perception of the Brazilian national team, the selecao , is intrinsically linked with our perceptions of Brazilian culture as a whole. Again, the lexis used is important. Brazil play “samba football” in a “carnival atmosphere” – they are the principle exponents of joga bonito , the “beautiful game” – and we love them for it; Brazilian shirts are found around the globe, more so than any other nation’s colours, and we associate the phrase

“Brazilian footballer” alongside “French chef” or “Swedish design”: there is a gravitas that goes with it that makes the person being described intrinsically better because of their provenance. Our global love for Brazil derives from the way in which they play, and the primacy of football within their cultural expression. Brazilians themselves like to draw comparisons between their footballers and a folk character from Brazilian mythology – the malandro . The malandro is celebrated in samba music, and represents the characteristics that Brazilian men value: he is a ladies man, a fun-seeking bohemian, work shy and prone to cheat and lie to further himself. Physically he is represented as a black dwarf, with feet that pointed in the opposite direction to the way in which he was travelling – so that his footprints would mislead anyone

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Michael R Wood 2003179111 BA Political Studies attempting to track him. It seems the Brazilian obsession with feet goes back long before the arrival of futebol . Similarly, there is a concept in Brazilian known as “Gerson’s law”; after a TV advert which depicted a man exploiting the weaknesses of others with style and panache, ending with the strap line

“You also like to take advantage in everything, right?”. Unsurprisingly, Gerson, a goal scorer in Brazil’s 1970 World Cup Final victory, was known for his liberal attitude to the rules of football. (Bellos, 2002)

As Bellos puts it: “We love Brazil, because they are Braaazzzzziiiiiiiiiiiiiilll” mimicking the commentary style of a Brazilian announcer after a goal has been scored. But is this characterisation still applicable? It is indisputable that it was once true – the World Cup classes of 1970 and 1982 were certainly amongst the most attacking and flamboyant seen ever seen; and, in the case of the 1970 squad, their ascendancy coincided with the rise of colour television, something which undoubtedly added to the allure, as the multiracial team, in their luminous yellow shirts became champions of the first World Cup to be shown worldwide and in colour. However, since 1982 the Brazilian team has, despite World Cup victories in 1994 and 2002, been largely defensive and disappointing. It could be a result of globalisation (most players now play in Europe, and thus are better known to European defences, who can stifle their creativity), increased physicality (big, fast players are now valued above smaller, more skilful types, which Brazil produced in abundance) or perhaps

Brazil are just not as good as they used to be. This is all secondary, however, to presentation. Brazil are still expected to produce “samba football”, but, if they do, they stand little chance of success, as they will be out-muscled and

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Michael R Wood 2003179111 BA Political Studies tactically restrained by bigger, more disciplined teams. It is a dilemma which strikes straight at the heart of national identity in a football-obsessed country; were Brazilians proud of their team because they won, or because they played the way they did? They have proved themselves capable of winning ugly, as they did at the 1994 and 2002 World Cups, but are those victories as sweet? Bellos certainly feels that the 1982 team, which lost, is held in greater regard in Brazil than the 1994 vintage, who won on penalties after a goalless final against Italy. Vickery (2008) cites Johann Cruyff, the Dutch legend, as the harbinger of the downfall of the Brazilian style, but also, through defeating the Brazilian way of playing in 1974, passing the mantle on to Holland, who are now bereft with the same issues as Brazil. The Dutch style, known as

“total football”, is again viewed within the context of their national culture. The great Dutch sides of 1974, 1978 and 1998 fit perfectly into the Dutch psyche; they were individually and collectively brilliant, they played with creativity and versatility, their dressing room was one in which the team’s tactics were openly debated between players and coaches (still quite unique, especially when seen through British eyes), and, crucially, they all lost (Winner, 2000).

Winner sees the Dutch team in the tradition of Van Gogh – supremely talented but ultimately self-destructive. Holland have been eliminated from tournaments on penalty kicks three times (1996, 1998 and 2000) – which they steadfastly refused to practice in advance, as many of the players considered winning on penalties to be a dishonourable method of victory and an implication that they could not win in normal time. Winner also points to the intellectualisation of football that was realised by the likes of Johann Cruyff and Johann Neeskens, and in later times by Marco Van Basten and Dennis

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Bergkamp, who, in tune with the naming conventions used by the media, are referred to as “Dutch masters”, evoking the spirit of Rembrandt and Vermeer.

The Dutch themselves, however, hold the opposite opinion to the Brazilians on the subject of style; they remember most fondly the 1988 team, who won the European Championships, albeit with much less flair than the unsuccessful squads of the 1970s. This, however, might be because, as noted above, the 1988 team beat Germany.

Conclusion

What is undeniable is increasing link between national identity and footballing success. We can see in newer countries, such as Croatia and Serbia, and in stateless nations, such as Catalunya and the Basque Country, that football holds massive weight in terms of expressions of both international perceptions of nations and in terms of the way that a nation sees itself. Whether it be FC

Barcelona, which offered immigrants a route to assimilation, and provided cultural continuity through dictatorship, Ararat Yerevan, who allowed a small and ignored nation to be seen and heard across the expanse of the Soviet

Union, or Brazil, for whom the pinnacle of their culture and the national identity is still pinned to the success (and the way in which success is achieved) of their football team. The flipside, however, is in the passion that football can evoke. The events in the former Yugoslavia go to show how influential football can be in a failing state, and how nationalism can be exploited to do unspeakable evils. Whilst nationalism in this country does not take the same form that it did in Yugoslavia, we can see from the methods

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Michael R Wood 2003179111 BA Political Studies used by far-right groups, who recruit on the terraces, that that methodology is not completely extinguished – and the ignorant attitudes and depictions of foreign cultures that the tabloid indulges in can have sinister overtones. The joy of football lies in its simplicity and its accessibility – all one needs is a ball to play, and even less to support a team, and millions across the globe peg their hopes, their dreams, their aspirations and their ideologies to the colours of their club and their nation: as JB Priestley wrote of a football crowd in 1928:

“To say that these men paid their shillings to watch twenty-two hirelings kick a ball is merely to say that a violin is wood and catgut, that Hamlet is so much paper and ink”.

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Camus, Albert, quoted in Galeano, Eduardo H. “Soccer in Sun and Shadow”,

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th “Hewitt ends Ivanisevic dream” BBC Sport, 25 June 2004.

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Daily Star, “Return of ze Blackshirts” 28 th January 2010

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United exit” 7 th April 2010

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Voetbalpoezie” Timmer, 1989

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Identity” Routledge. 1994.

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Football Phenomena Explained”. Harper Sport. 2009

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