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# N000014-16-1-2693 1 ISIS Cubs Ashbal al Khilafa 2 Socialization Process for Children into ISIS Cubs 6. Stationing Role assignment! 5. Specialization Fostering expertise, specialized training 4. Subjugation Isolation from family; brutalization, military training! 3. Selection Screening for aptitude, special attention, “grooming” and preparation for training 2. Schooling Direct exposure to personnel, intensive teachings," religious indoctrination! 1. Seduction Learning about the Islamic State’s ideas, practices via peripheral exposure 3 Life Cycle of Ashbal Cub - From bystander to fully committed insider “The Furqan Foundation in the “Race Towards Good,” Al-Hayat Media Center, “Uncovering an Enemy Within,” Company of a Migrant Family,” The November 22, 2014. Al-Hayat Media Center, January Furqan Foundation, October 14, 2013. 13, 2015. 4 Analysis of ISIS Social Media 5 Project 2: “Documenting the Virtual Caliphate” Monitoring Official Channels & Chat Rooms 6 7 8 9 10 Children’s Roles in VEOs INFORMAL (Peaceful) Protestor Human shield Student Rock thrower Youth club First-aid Appren>ce Cook Porter SUPPORT COMBAT Courier Arllery operator Scout Spy Anaircra gunman Youth mentor Guard Patrol Prison guard Sniper Foot-soldier Recruiter Murabit Bomb-maker Execuoner Propagandist Bodyguard FORMAL Inghimasi Suicide bomber 11 Image via ‘TheIraqWitness v 3’ 12 Children as recruiters 13 14 15 16 Children and Inghimasi Operations 17 18 Contrast between Children in Propaganda &Children on the Front-Lines May 2016 “Sang Pour Sang” Video 19 August 26, 2016 Video 20 Fityan al Islam Boko Haram Banser, the youth wing of Indonesia’s Nahdlatul Ulama 21 Free Syrian Army Uses Children Extensively …But they do not Travel Far 22 Children &Youth Deaths in Syria (by Group) 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 TOTAL FSA SAA YPG/J IS NDF HIZBULLAH JN SSNP OTHER 23 sources Picture of sources for each group 24 Examples of Distance to Crime Studies 25 D2C study of Children’s Deaths Hasakah Aleppo Idlib Raqqa Lattakia Deir ez-Zor Hama Homs Damascus Daraa 26 Hasakah Aleppo Idlib Raqqa Lattakia Deir ez-Zor Hama Homs Damascus Daraa 27 Hasakah Aleppo Idlib Raqqa Lattakia Deir ez-Zor Hama Homs Damascus Daraa 28 Hasakah AleppoAleppo IdlibIdlib 97% Raqqa Lattakia Deir ez-Zor Homs Hama Hama Homs Damascus Daraa 29 Hasakah Aleppo Idlib Raqqa Lattakia Deir ez-Zor Hama Homs Damascus Daraa 30 Hasakah Aleppo Idlib Raqqa Lattakia Deir ez-Zor Hama Homs Damascus Daraa 31 Hasakah Aleppo Idlib Raqqa Lattakia Deir ez-Zor Hama Homs Damascus 95% Daraa 32 Hasakah Aleppo Idlib Raqqa Lattakia Deir ez-Zor Hama Homs Damascus Daraa 33 Hasakah Aleppo Idlib Raqqa Lattakia Deir ez-Zor Hama Homs Damascus Daraa 34 Hasakah Aleppo Idlib Raqqa Lattakia Deir ez-Zor Hama Homs Damascus Daraa 92% 35 Hasakah Aleppo Idlib Raqqa Lattakia Deir ez-Zor Hama Homs Damascus Daraa 36 Hasakah Aleppo Idlib Raqqa Lattakia Deir ez-Zor Hama Homs Damascus Daraa 37 Hasakah Aleppo Idlib Raqqa Lattakia Deir ez-Zor Hama 73% Homs Damascus Daraa 38 Hasakah Aleppo Idlib Raqqa Lattakia Deir ez-Zor Hama Homs Damascus Daraa 39 Hasakah Aleppo Idlib Raqqa Lattakia Deir ez-Zor Hama Homs Damascus Daraa 40 Hasakah Aleppo Idlib Raqqa Lattakia Deir ez-Zor Hama Homs 53% Damascus Daraa 41 Hasakah Aleppo Idlib Raqqa Lattakia Deir ez-Zor Hama Homs Damascus Daraa 42 Hasakah Aleppo Idlib Raqqa Lattakia Deir ez-Zor Hama Homs Damascus Daraa 43 Hasakah Aleppo Idlib Raqqa Lattakia Deir ez-Zor Hama Homs 83% Damascus Daraa 44 Hasakah Aleppo Idlib Raqqa Lattakia Deir ez-Zor Hama Homs Damascus Daraa 45 Hasakah Aleppo Idlib Raqqa Lattakia Deir ez-Zor Hama Homs Damascus Daraa 46 Hasakah Aleppo Idlib Raqqa Lattakia 74% Deir ez-Zor Hama Homs Damascus Daraa 47 Think Again Turn Away 3 September 2014 48 49 Future Directions of the Projects Year 2: Expand study to other groups, e.g. Boko Haram, Taliban (Pakistan and Afghanistan), Houthis etc. Show how FTO’s formalize children’s involvement through institutions Psychological Effects of Trauma on Children How to create children specific DDR programs for youth exposed to/involved In violent extremism (as witnesses or as participants) Year 3: Formulate Counter Narratives that will resonate with communities Ascertain whether we can objectively determine when, & under what conditions, we get to a “hurting stalemate.” What does post conflict Justice look like? Analysis of Future Trends 50 Students Trained PhD Students (6): • Chelsea Daymon (GSU) • Sinem Dilan Basaran (GSU) • Wojciech Kazkowski (GSU) • Tracy Hipp (GSU) • Shaun Walsh (UML) • Elizabeth Nimmons (BCH) Post Docs (1) • Emma Cardeli (BCH) Consultants (2): • Tanya Zayed • Hassan Hassan 51 Publications and Op-Eds • Bloom, M. and Horgan, J., Small Arms: Children and Terrorism. Cornell University Press, Roger M. Haydon editor, forthcoming 2017 • Bloom, M. M. (2016). How Islamic State Recruits and Coerces Children. Washington Post August 25, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/08/25/how-the-islamic-state-recruits-and-coerces-children/?utm_term=.e40859c32a75 • Horgan, J., Taylor, M., Bloom, M. and Winter, C., “From Cubs to Lions: A Community of Practice Perspective on Child Socialization into the Islamic State.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. • Elliott, I., and Bloom, M., “Grooming for Violent Extremism: A self-regulation approach to the grooming of children for violent extremism.” [Under review at American Psychologist] • Bloom, M. M. (2016). Was the Nice Attacker Really an ISIS ‘Lone Wolf’? The Wire. http://thewire.in/author/mia-bloom/ • Bloom, M. M. (2016). Are Bystanders to Blame for Terrorism. Daily Beast June 14, 2016 http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/06/14/terrorism-s-bystander-effect.html. • Bloom, M. M. (2016). Brussels Terrorist Brothers: Why Does Jihad Run in the Family? Daily Beast March 24, 2016. http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/ 2016/03/24/brussels-terrorist-brothers-why-does-jihad-run-in-the-family.html. • Bloom, M. (2015) “Cubs of the Caliphate: Children of ISIS.” Foreign Affairs July 21, 2015, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2015-07-21/cubs-caliphate • Bloom, M. and Horgan, J. (2015). “Rise of the Child Terrorist.” Foreign Affairs, February 9, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/143020 Outreach • Bloom, M. (2015) “Six Things You Need to Know About ISIS and Women.” Washington Post, Monkey Cage, June 4, 2015 http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/06/04/six-things-you-need-to-know-about-women-and-isis/ • Bloom, M. (2015) “Exploit Schisms Already Hurting ISIS.” New York Times, June 1, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/06/01/can-victory-over- isis-be-more-than-a-mirage/exploit-schisms-that-are-already-hurting-isis • Bloom, M. (2014). “How the Islamic State is Recruiting Western Teens.” October 5, 2014, Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2014/10/09/how-the-islamic-state-is-recruiting-western-teen-girls/ • Bloom, M. (2014). “Armed and Innocent?” Washington Post, Monkey Cage, September 11, 2014 http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/09/11/armed-and-innocent/ • Bloom, M. & Horgan, J. (2014). “New Terror Weapon: Little Girls?” CNN Opinion, January 7, 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/01/07/opinion/bloom-horgan-afghanistan-girl/ 52 Thank you. Office of Naval Research Sponsored Grants: Grooming the Next Generation: Children & VEO’s # N000014-16-1-2693 Georgia State University 53.
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