april 2014 . Vol 7 . Issue 4

Contents Guns, Money and Prayers:

FEATURE ARTICLE 1 Guns, Money and Prayers: AQIM’s Blueprint for Securing AQIM’s Blueprint for Securing Control of Northern Mali By Morten Bøås Control of Northern Mali By Morten Bøås Reports 6 AQIM’s Threat to Western Interests in the Sahel By Samuel L. Aronson 10 The Saudi Foreign Fighter Presence in Syria By Aaron Y. Zelin 14 Mexico’s Vigilante Militias Rout the Knights Templar Drug Cartel By Ioan Grillo 18 Drug Trafficking, Terrorism, and Civilian Self-Defense in Peru By Steven T. Zech 23 Maritime Piracy on the Rise in West Africa By Stephen Starr

26 Recent Highlights in Political Violence 28 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts

An Islamist policeman patrolling the streets of Gao in northern Mali on July 16, 2012. - Issouf Sanogo/AFP/Getty Images l-qa`ida in the islamic As a result, even if the recent French Maghreb (AQIM) is military intervention in Mali has occasionally described as pushed back the Islamist rebels and an operational branch of the secured control of the northern cities of Aglobal al-Qa`ida structure. Yet AQIM Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu, a number of should not be viewed as an external al- challenges remain.1 The Islamists have Qa`ida force operating in the Sahel and not been defeated. Apart from the loss of Sahara. For years, AQIM and its offshoots prominent figures such as AQIM senior About the CTC Sentinel have pursued strategies of integration leader Abou Zeid and the reported death The Combating Terrorism Center is an in the region based on a sophisticated of Oumar Ould Hamaha,2 the rest of the independent educational and research reading of the local context. AQIM and leadership as well as many of its core institution based in the Department of Social its offshoots leverage money, guns and fighters are alive and motivated to fight. Sciences at the United States Military Academy, prayers to establish their presence in They do not seek a negotiated settlement, West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses poorly governed areas in the Sahel and and they still have the capacity to resist the Center’s global network of scholars and the Sahara. Their use of religion is of and execute attacks inside towns under practitioners to understand and confront particular importance in an area where French control. While capturing the contemporary threats posed by terrorism and the local governing administration, to major cities of northern Mali may have other forms of political violence. the degree that it exists, is generally perceived by the domestic population as corrupt, whereas AQIM and affiliated 1 France’s military intervention in Mali is known as Op- The views expressed in this report are those of eration Serval. The operation, which began in January the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, Islamist militants present themselves 2013, is still ongoing. the Department of the Army, or any other agency as honest and pious Muslims. This is of the U.S. Government. especially the case in northern Mali. 2 “Leading Militant Killed in Mali, Military Officials Say,” New York Times, March 14, 2014.

1 april 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 4 been a swift, successful French military managed to establish some nominal and it has become an integral part of a operation, controlling the vast territory control over northern Mali and the minority of Tuaregs’ livelihoods.6 To a of the Sahel and preventing AQIM’s Tuaregs lost key privileges, including certain extent, the current increase in reemergence is a much more daunting their right to collect taxes and to offer informal or illicit trade also represents challenge. protection services for trans-Saharan a revitalization of the ancient routes of caravans.4 Today, northern Mali trade, commerce and pilgrimage that Based on fieldwork in Mali and close may seem isolated and economically used to pass through the area, connecting coverage of the field of insurgencies in marginalized, but historically it served West Africa to the Mediterranean, and the Sahel for almost a decade, this article as an important frontier region, well to the Middle East and the Persian argues that AQIM is best understood as integrated into the global economy. Gulf. a complex and multi-dimensional group In some ways, northern Mali remains that combines a Salafist ideological integrated into the global economy even The Tuaregs’ position in the northern orientation with a pragmatic approach today—through the economic power region was turned upside down by to integrate itself into local communities of trafficking contraband, migrants French colonialism (1892-1960) and and drugs.5 Trans-Saharan smuggling made permanent by the post-colonial “AQIM should not just operations are profitable enterprises, state system. The Tuaregs, who had be viewed as a predatory, once seen themselves as the “masters 4 Ibid. of the desert,” became a minority in 7 external force in northern 5 The increased popularity of these routes across the several countries. In Mali, this entailed being ruled by a black population Mali, but also as an Sahel-Sahara is a consequence of more stringent border controls in Europe as well as recent technological ad- against whom they had previously 8 actor that has managed vances that have made desert travel much easier. Global directed their slave raids. The Tuaregs view themselves as distinct from the to integrate into local Positioning System (GPS) navigation devices, satellite and cellular phones, and four-wheel-drive vehicles have other groups that constitute the Malian communities over time.” become standard equipment for desert travelers, mak- polity—in language, lifestyle and 9 ing it possible to travel from Kidal in northern Mali to heritage. Traditionally, the Tuaregs’ Tamanrasset in Algeria in about one day without ever livelihood has been one of semi- traveling on a marked road. Some of these routes run up nomadic pastoralism, where pastoralist and conflicts. The article provides and down dry riverbeds, whereas others are little more background on the Tuareg, explains than camel paths. Ordinary commodities are transported 6 Latin American cartels are increasingly using West how AQIM gained influence in northern on these routes, but also contraband such as cigarettes, Africa as an important transit point in their attempt to Mali, and examines the links between drugs and weapons, and these same routes are used for penetrate the European market with cocaine and can- AQIM, the Movement for Unity and the trafficking of people seeking to reach Europe. The nabis. The route through northern Mali has not been Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and cigarettes, mainly but not exclusively Marlboro, used the most important route for trafficking drugs, but since Mokhtar Belmokhtar. It finds that to come in presealed containers from Zouerat in Mauri- about 2006 it has been a part of the trans-Sahara trade AQIM’s strategies of integration in tania to Kidal, where the cargo was off-loaded and split in contraband and illicit goods. According to informa- northern Mali are key to its longevity, into smaller lots and taken across the border to Algeria tion received from local sources in Kidal, a successful trip and these same strategies could be on four-by-four pick-up trucks. Some were sold locally in across the border from Mali into Algeria with a load of co- employed by the group in other regions Algeria, while other shipments made their way across the caine could earn the driver as much as 3,000 euros. This of the Sahel and the Sahara. Mediterranean to the European market, where they were is a considerable amount of money in a place with scarce sold at a lower price than non-smuggled cigarettes—even resources and few employment opportunities. Accord- Background on the Tuareg of Northern Mali after a number of middlemen took their cut. The traffick- ing to information obtained from sources in Kidal prior Northern Mali, home to the country’s ing of people across the Sahara has also increased, but it to the Islamist takeover of the area in 2012, the smugglers Tuareg minority, comprises the broad is impossible to estimate the number. Until the town of were organized in small gangs, numbering 10-15 people, part of the Sahel-Sahara that borders Gao was captured by French forces in early 2013, how- and these gangs were connected to local authority figures Algeria, Burkina Faso, Mauritania and ever, Gao had been an important informal hub for Con- (state and nonstate) who were paid to ignore these opera- Niger. Conflict in this area is not new. golese, Cameroonians, Liberians, Nigerians and others tions. Some of the Islamist insurgents who roamed this Throughout history, many Tuaregs who sought to leave the African continent. Once in Gao, area (such as Mokhtar Belmokhtar) were also at times viewed external intervention as a threat migrants were picked up for a Sahara crossing through involved in these operations, either directly or indirectly to their traditional life of nomadic Kidal into Algeria. Other main routes for human traffick- through informal taxation. It is important to stress, how- pastoralism and fought several wars ing through the Sahara include a route through Maurita- ever, that these interactions were fluid and pragmatic to maintain these customs. When the nia, Western Sahara and Morocco to Spain, and a route and not based on relationships other than business. Also French arrived in the 19th century, through Tunisia to Italy or Malta. Considering how much see Bøås, “Castles in the Sand: Informal Networks and many of the Tuaregs’ religious leaders attention this topic is given by European media, it is quite Power Brokers in the Northern Mali Periphery.” declared them infidels, and the Tuaregs remarkable how little is actually known about the num- 7 Not all Tuaregs share this view, but it is a fairly wide- spearheaded resistance to colonial rule ber of people using these routes and how these operations spread sentiment. See Bruce Hall, A History of Race in in northern Mali.3 By the early 20th are organized. See Morten Bøås, “Castles in the Sand: Muslim West Africa 1600-1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge century, however, the French had Informal Networks and Power Brokers in the Northern University Press, 2011). Mali Periphery,” in Mats Utas ed., African Conflicts and In- 8 Berge. 3 Gunvor Berge, In Defense of Pastoralism: Form and Flux formal Power: Big Men and Networks (London: Zed Books, 9 Jennifer Seely, “A Political Analysis of Decentraliza- Among the Tuaregs in Northern Mali (Oslo: University of 2012), pp. 119-134. This chapter is based on interviews tion: Co-opting the Tuareg Threat in Mali,” Journal of Oslo, 2002), Ph.D. thesis. conducted by the author in Mali between 2008-2011. Modern African Studies 39:3 (2001): pp. 499-524.

2 april 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 4 activities were supplemented by trade This gave fresh momentum to the idea How AQIM Gained Influence in Northern Mali and farming.10 They speak their own of a larger rebellion, and a new Tuareg AQIM originated from Algeria’s civil language, Tamasheq, and their society is movement was formed in 2011: the war, which erupted after the military constructed as a pyramid, with nobles at Movement for the National Liberation leadership annulled the election results the top and various levels of dependents of Azawad (MNLA). Whereas Tuareg in 1992 after it became clear that an and servile groups below, stratified independence and nationalism had been Islamist party would achieve victory. into the imushar (warriors), ineslemen more rhetoric than a concrete goal in This resulted in a devastating civil war (Muslim scholars), inhaden (artisans) previous rebellions, the MNLA declared between the military and the armed and iklan/bella (slaves).11 This hierarchy full independence of Azawad17 from Islamic opposition known as the Armed was established over time based on Mali in April 2012.18 Islamic Group (GIA). Officially, the discourse and interpretations of race civil war in Algeria ended with the as well as descent, with noble families What little that may have existed amnesty of 1999,23 but some fighters typically from fair-skinned lineages of Tuareg unity, however, quickly were unwilling to lay down their arms. of Berber origin, whereas the Bella disappeared. As MNLA fighters Those who continued fighting currently were black-skinned people of slave looted and plundered the north,19 and form the core of AQIM. origin.12 Regardless of how solid this the Malian army fled and committed social pyramid may have been (and the March 21, 2012, coup in Bamako, The Salafist Group for Preaching and to a degree still is), the Tuaregs have other forces stepped in and effectively Combat (GSPC), AQIM’s predecessor never constituted a coherent polity. sidelined the MNLA. These forces were organization, was formed by Hassan Historically, they have been divided the Tuareg Islamist organization Ansar Hattab in 1998 as a breakaway faction between a number of sultanates, ruled al-Din,20 led by Iyad ag Ghaly, a veteran of the GIA, mainly as a reaction to the by different royal families, sometimes Tuareg fighter from the 1990s, and two immense and senseless violence of the in cooperation with each other, but other regional movements: AQIM and GIA in the latter years of the Algerian also experiencing violent conflict MUJAO.21 The latter two groups are civil war. Rooted in the Salafist among themselves.13 It is important not Tuareg movements per se, but their tradition, most GSPC commanders to recognize this aspect of the Tuareg senior members have been present in and rank-and-file were committed to a social structure, as it continues to the area since at least 1998.22 Thus, Qutbist form of Salafism that justifies inform their society and influence perceiving these Islamist fighters as violence.24 Officially, the GSPC moved processes of social change. part of a new and foreign invasion force into northern Mali in 2003-2004, but is not accurate. they already had rear bases in the area The first Malian Tuareg rebellion took since 1998.25 The relationship between place in the early 1960s, and the second the GSPC and al-Qa`ida is opaque, as in 1990.14 The 1990 uprising ended with there is a history of statements of mutual the National Pact of 1992, although collaboration but also of conflict. When that agreement failed to placate all of the GSPC was established in 1998, the the Tuareg factions and a new rebellion 17 The term “Azawad” originates from a large dry river organization expressed support for 15 emerged in 2006. The 2006 rebellion bed in the Timbuktu area, but it is also used as a common al-Qa`ida, only to claim that it had 26 was initially a relatively small affair denominator for the supposedly historical homeland of broken away from al-Qa`ida in 2001. in Kidal organized around the now the Tuareg. In the Malian context, this territory would The GSPC reaffirmed its loyalty again deceased Ibrahim ag Bahanga and include most of the area of the country north of the Niger in 2003, was blessed by al-Qa`ida in concerned with local discontent. Yet River. 2006, and then finally adopted the al- that dynamic changed when Tuaregs 18 Lydia Polgreen and Alan Cowell, “Mali Rebels Pro- Qa`ida banner in 2007 when the GSPC 27 began to return from post-Qadhafi Claim Independent State in North,” New York Times, changed its name to AQIM. 16 Libya with new supplies of arms. April 6, 2012. 19 “Human Rights in Occupied North Mali,” Interna- 23 A referendum was held after the 1999 elections that 10 Hall. tional Society for Human Rights, April 9, 2012. approved the Civil Concord Initiative. The initiative par- 11 Iklan is the Tuareg name for this group, whereas bella 20 Ansar al-Din has been alternatively translated as An- doned many political prisoners and granted thousands is the Songhay term. The latter is much more commonly sar Eddine, Ansar ed-Dine, and Ansar al-Dine. of members of armed groups exemption from prosecu- known in Mali. Bella is therefore not a separate ethnic 21 When the MNLA rebellion began, elements from tion under a limited amnesty in force until January 13, category, but a collective term for people of slave descent. AQIM and MUJAO supported the MNLA, and Ansar 2000. This was followed by the 2004 Charter for Peace See Jon Pedersen and Tor Arve Benjaminsen, “One Leg al-Din also had a tactical alliance with the MNLA. When and National Reconciliation approved in a referendum in or Two? Pastoralism and Food Security in the Northern the MNLA rebellion devolved into looting and sexual September 2005. This charter offered amnesty to most Sahel,” Human Ecology 36:1 (2008): pp. 43-57. violence, however, the Islamist factions used the oppor- guerrillas and members of government security forces 12 Ibid. tunity to chase the more secular MNLA out of most of for acts conducted during the civil war. 13 Baz Lecocq, “Unemployed Intellectuals in the Sahara: northern Mali. 24 There are different variants of Salafism. Some Salafists The Teshumara Nationalist Movement and the Revolu- 22 Although AQIM was not formed until 2006/2007, are non-violent, while others pursue violence to achieve tions in Tuareg Society,” International Review of Social the militants who now fight with AQIM used to fight with their goals. See “Understanding Islamism,” International History 49:S12 (2004): pp. 87-109. the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). Crisis Group, 2005. 14 Berge. These same militants have been active in northern Mali 25 Bøås and Torheim. 15 Bøås, “Castles in the Sand: Informal Networks and since 1998. See Morten Bøås and Liv Elin Torheim, “The 26 “Islamist Terrorism in the Sahel: Fact or Fiction,” In- Power Brokers in the Northern Mali Periphery.” Trouble in Mali – Corruption, Collusion, Resistance,” ternational Crisis Group, 2005. 16 Ibid. Third World Quarterly 34:7 (2013): pp. 1279-1292. 27 See John Rollins, Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical

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The GSPC may have adopted al- to create order based on a religious- example, AQIM communicated a “green” Qa`ida’s name for ideological reasons, ideological framework. Already in cell phone number that people could but more pragmatic brand concerns 1998, GSPC members started to arrive call if they were harassed by MNLA also likely played a role. The GSPC’s in the Timbuktu area31 and they members or ordinary bandits.38 members had lost the war in Algeria portrayed themselves to the local and some members were on the run in population as honest and pious traders. AQIM’s strategy was a careful and the deserts of northern Mali. Neither In one example, when they wanted to gradual one of integration and the Algerian government nor the buy a goat from the locals, they paid the penetration into local communities international community wanted to owner double his asking price.32 They based on a combination of military, negotiate with them, thus no settlement, bought themselves goodwill, friendship political, religious, economic and not even an honorary surrender, was and networks by distributing money, humanitarian means. The latter possible. The organization felt they offering medicine, treating the sick component was clearly facilitated by had little to lose and something to gain and providing cellular phone access.33 the money that AQIM leaders had at by officially joining al-Qa`ida: local They also married locally—not into their disposal due to their involvement communities would perceive them as powerful families generally,34 but poor in smuggling and kidnap-for-ransom. more “global” and powerful than the local lineages, deliberately taking the Therefore, AQIM should not just be reality at the time. side of the impoverished.35 Thus, in viewed as a predatory, external force some ways, the GSPC/AQIM acted as an in northern Mali, but also as an actor When AQIM began to materialize in Islamic charity, with the exception that that has managed to integrate into local northern Mali in 2007, it had more than they carried arms and did not hesitate communities over time. just al-Qa`ida’s brand name. AQIM to use them if needed. also had money. The group’s source This is also partially true for MUJAO. of wealth originated from kidnap-for- AQIM’s penetration of the Timbuktu There was undoubtedly some local ransom, particularly the kidnapping of area has, therefore, been underway support for the group in and around 32 European tourists in 2003.28 These for more than a decade, but its Gao, but its style of governance was tourists were captured when traveling tactics also gradually changed also more violent than AQIM’s. through the Sahara and were held from distributing money and small As a much younger organization— hostage for several months before they benefits to aggressively promoting essentially a splinter movement of were released.29 its interpretation of Islam. This AQIM, formed in late 2011, comprised became particularly evident after they of non-Algerian elements from Money matters in the context of gained territorial control in northern Mali and elsewhere in the Sahel— northern Mali, as the traditional role Mali in 2012. To facilitate this, AQIM it consists of various factions that of the chef du village (traditional also established alliances with some need to demonstrate their Salafi- chief) has diminished rapidly, yet local marabouts (religious teachers) and jihadi credentials. It is, therefore, no new systems of governance have encouraged them to preach AQIM’s coincidence that whereas AQIM only not replaced traditional rule.30 The version of Islam.36 AQIM thus utilized carried out one amputation as part of history of AQIM’s mission creep in a pre-existing traditional structure its implementation of Shari`a (Islamic the region of Timbuktu is therefore of cultural importance for its own law) in Timbuktu, MUJAO carried out instructive as it reveals that its ability purpose. Yet while the marabouts 15 in Gao.39 Even if MUJAO is more of a to embed locally not only derives from historically did not have much power, youthful firebrand insurgency, its ability its use of force, but also on its ability AQIM empowered them by supplying to carry out attacks in Gao after French “their marabouts” with vehicles, money, forces took control of the town indicates 37 Perspective, Global Presence and Implications for U.S. Pol- weapons and bodyguards. After the a certain level of civilian support icy (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, MNLA offensive, AQIM also offered (particularly in Peul communities) 2010). locals protection. In Timbuktu, for because these attacks were reportedly 28 “14 Tourists Kidnapped in Algeria Head Home,” Los made possible through arms hidden 40 Angeles Times, August 19, 2003. 31 “Understanding Islamism.” among the civilian population. 29 The German government reportedly paid a ransom of 32 These details are based on personal interviews con- five million euros ($6 million) to secure the release of the ducted in Bamako in February and March 2013 with a 38 Ibid. 32 mostly German hostages. The German government number of people who lived in northern Mali when the 39 This is based on interviews conducted in Bamako has denied that it ever paid any ransom money, but ac- Islamists controlled the area. Also see Bøås and Tor- with doctors and hospital staff who lived in Timbuktu, cording to local sources the Salafists had a lot of money heim. Gao and Kidal in 2012-2013 when these towns were to spend after the tourists had been released. See “News- 33 Ibid. controlled respectively by AQIM, MUJAO and Ansar paper: Berlin Paid Ransom to Free Hostages,” Deutsche 34 One exception is Mokhtar Belmokhtar. At least one al-Din. Welle, August 6, 2004. of his four wives comes from a prominent family in the 40 This is based on conversations with a Malian colleague 30 Due to a combination of external shocks such as in- Timbuktu area. who conducted fieldwork in Gao and the surrounding ar- creased climatic variability and the penetration of the 35 Bøås and Torheim. eas between the Malian elections in the autumn of 2013. modern state, the traditional systems of governance are 36 Ibid. Some needed encouragement in the form of the The reason why MUJAO managed to recruit more ex- less useful than they used to be. Even if the modern state incentives that AQIM provided, but this was not the case tensively in Peul communities is still not entirely clear. is more present in people’s daily lives, it is most often per- for everyone, as some also started to embrace the Salafist It may be that people in this community already had ceived as a nuisance or a negative factor because it has ethos either due to AQIM’s influence or on their own. started to swing religiously and ideologically in the same failed to respond adequately to people’s needs. 37 Ibid. direction as the discourse of MUJAO, but there are also

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The Relationship Between AQIM, MUJAO and through kidnapping and smuggling.45 another attempt by Belmokhtar to gain Mokhtar Belmokhtar Some ambitious jihadists who did not dominance in the region. The relationship between AQIM belong to the hardcore AQIM leadership and MUJAO and the role of Mokhtar that originated from the GSPC may have Belmokhtar’s moves may have Belmokhtar has been the center of much craved more autonomy and decision- negative consequences for the future debate and speculation since MUJAO making power.46 sustainability of AQIM. Nevertheless, emerged in mid-December 2011.41 AQIM has always had more depth Initially, some observers claimed Exactly what role Mokhtar Belmokhtar beyond Belmokhtar and his katiba. that the formation of MUJAO was due played in the emergence of MUJAO AQIM operatives were also present to the dominant position of an old is still unclear. Yet even prior to the in Gao, whereas the Timbuktu region guard of Algerian nationals and other establishment of MUJAO, it was evident was controlled by the katiba of Tarik Arabs in AQIM.42 These observers that there were internal divisions ibn Ziyad loyal to Abou Zeid. There pointed to MUJAO’s West African within AQIM and in particular between are no signs that these and other AQIM rhetoric and reference to historical Abou Zeid and Belmokhtar. The two structures have followed Belmokhtar figures of West African jihadism and senior AQIM figures were divided into a merger with MUJAO. anti-colonial struggle, such as Umar over issues concerning leadership ibn Said al-Futi Tall, Usman dan and strategy, but also over money.47 Moreover, the original AQIM leadership Fodio and Amadou Cheikhou (Seku These divisions eventually led to and cadre have survived similar Amadu).43 This analysis, however, is the departure of Belmokhtar’s katibat infighting in the past.51 Some of these challenged by interviews conducted (battalion) al-Mulathamin (The Veiled disputes were resolved over time, while by the Italian scholar Luca Raineri in Ones) from AQIM.48 Therefore, even others were not. Yet none of these Gao in November 2013 that corroborate if the circumstances surrounding past disagreements have prevented previous interviews made by this Belmokhtar’s departure from AQIM are AQIM from continuing to function as author suggesting that a majority of not known, it is clear that there was a an insurgency with a proven ability to MUJAO’s ranks were comprised of great deal of rivalry between Belmokhtar integrate into communities and tap into Arabs and Moors from Mauritania, and Zeid. This may have been purely local conflicts and grievances. Algeria and Western Sahara—not about strategy or money, but it may also “black” Africans from other parts of have been about leadership. Perhaps Conclusion West Africa.44 Thus, another possible Belmokhtar never really accepted AQIM AQIM and its offshoots are no longer hypothesis is that the rift in AQIM that leader Abdelmalek Droukdel’s decision in control of cities and territories in led to MUJAO’s formation was based on to appoint Abou Zeid as his main Sahel northern Mali. Nevertheless, they other disagreements, but that the West amir over him.49 have not been defeated. Apart from the African rhetoric and reference to West death of Abou Zeid and the reported African jihadism was used to legitimize Belmokhtar’s decision to merge with death of MUJAO commander Hamaha, the formation of a new insurgency with MUJAO elements that he already the leadership remains intact, and a broader regional platform than that knew in Gao (such as Hamada Ould most of its rank-and-file fighters have offered by AQIM. Internal disputes Muhammad Kheirou) would give survived the French intervention. between AQIM and MUJAO were not him a larger platform than what he Some have returned to their homes only about the role of religion, military could achieve only with his own or moved elsewhere to seek out other tactics and social strategy, but also about katiba. 50 The subsequent merger opportunities (not necessarily violent money. In particular, disagreements between MUJAO and Belmokhtar’s ones).52 Some have left for other areas arose on how to share funds generated katiba to form al-Murabitun (Those of the Sahel to continue their struggle, Who Remain Steadfast) is likely just whereas others are hiding in northern Mali in the desert or among local 53 other possibilities. One is that this kind of allegiance was 45 See also Ould Idoumou Raby, “Al-Qaeda Splinter populations. The ability to blend in used to gain the upper hand in local rights-based con- Group Reveals Internal Erosion,” Magharebia, Decem- with the population is possible due to a flicts over access to land, pasture and water. ber 30, 2011. combination of local support (based on 41 In this video, MUJAO declared its existence and 46 Ibid. their previous strategies of integration) claimed responsibility for the October 23, 2011, kidnap- 47 Rukmini Callimachi, “Rise of Al-Qaida Sahara Ter- ping of three European hostages from a refugee camp in rorist,” Associated Press, May 28, 2013. 51 See, for example, Raby Ould Idoumou, “AQIM Under Tindouf, southern Algeria, presumably under the con- 48 In this regard, it is important to note that AQIM in Siege,” Magharabia, January 13, 2012. Also see the de- trol of the Polisario (the insurgency that still fights for the northern Mali and the Sahel has always consisted of and tailed analysis of collaboration and fragmentation among independence of the Western Sahara from Morocco). hosted semi-independent groups under the AQIM ban- Algerian Islamists in “Islamism, Violence and Reform in 42 See, for example, “Mali’s Irrevocable Crises,” al-Jazi- ner. These have included, in addition to Belmokhtar’s Algeria: Turning the Page,” International Crisis Group, ra, April 16, 2012. group, Yahya Abu al-Hamam’s (also known as Jemal 2004. 43 Ibid. Oukacha) al-Furqan Squadron, al-Ansar (headed by Ab- 52 This conclusion is based on interviews conducted 44 Luca Raineri, MOJWA: Complex Dynamics Between delkrim el-Targui, who is Iyad ag Ghaly’s cousin), and in Mali in February and March 2013, and a number of Armed Groups and Organized Crime in Northern Mali, 2014, the Youssef ben Tachfine brigade (headed by Abu Ab- follow-up conversations with Malian colleagues, diplo- unpublished manuscript. This finding is not based on an delhamid al-Kidali). See also Raineri. mats and other scholars who follow the region, and staff accurate headcount of MUJAO’s ranks, but on inter- 49 Callimachi. members in the United Nations and other international views with people present in Gao during MUJAO’s rule 50 See also Oumar Jemal, “In Aménas Attack Magnifies organizations involved in Mali and the Sahara-Sahel. who were asked about the group’s composition. Belmokhtar, AQIM Rift,” Magharebia, February 7, 2013. 53 Ibid.

5 april 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 4 and uncertainty about the future. As and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), long as French forces remain, few local AQIM’s Threat to Western Boko Haram, and its splinter group, inhabitants believe that AQIM will Interests in the Sahel Ansaru.4 While each of these groups return to the same level of control it has a unique context and dynamic, it had in 2012 and early 2013; however, By Samuel L. Aronson is widely recognized that, in recent many locals also understand that the years, they have—at the very least— French presence on the ground is only already one of the most volatile and communicated with one another.5 short-term. The UN Multidimensional impoverished regions of the world,1 Less clear, however, is the extent of Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali Africa’s Sahel has been on the forefront inter-group collaboration and the (MINUSMA) remains understaffed and of U.S. foreign policy following the coup subsequent threat increase to Western few Malians have much hope in the d’état in Mali in 2012. The subsequent interests. The possibility of continued national army’s reform process.54 As French military intervention, Operation or increased collaboration in the near a result of these factors, accepting the Serval, served to disorganize extremists future makes it important to examine presence of AQIM figures in the local and stabilize the region, including the two typologies of motivation—criminal community is one strategy to hedge neighboring countries of Niger, Algeria, kidnap-for-ransom and politically- against the future. Nigeria, and Mauritania. Yet in a region motivated terrorism—insofar as they with vast open land, weak central highlight an analytical distinction These illustrations of AQIM’s governments, and porous borders, between attacks. Since the start of approach to the region indicate terrorist groups are able to operate Operation Serval, several larger that it is an organization with an transnationally with few restraints. terrorist attacks have occurred in the understanding of the local context. Sahel, underscoring cooperation between AQIM and its offshoots make use of Although the Sahel region has been groups and indicating a potential shift a combined strategy of force, trade viewed by some policymakers as from the former to the latter. and the distribution of other benefits, lacking significant Western political while maintaining the image of honesty and economic interests, there has been With an emphasis on the private and piousness; this is in contrast to the moderate oil and gas drilling over sector, this article explores four central corrupt local officials of the state whom the last decade along with mining findings. First, it highlights the linkages they replaced. This strategy served operations, including for gold and between AQIM, Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s AQIM well in northern Mali. Therefore, uranium.2 As is commonplace in post- al-Murabitun brigade, Boko Haram, as AQIM searches for new safe havens colonial Francophone Africa, a sense and Ansaru. Second, it finds a notable in the Sahel and the Sahara, such as of hostility still exists toward French (and possibly temporary) shift from the southwestern Fezzan region of nationals, thus contributing to the criminality to politically-motivated Libya,55 it can be expected to once difficulties of conducting business or terrorism. Third, it finds that among the more employ its strategy of guns, residing in the region as a Westerner. most threatened interests in the Sahel money and prayers to integrate into Nevertheless, the Sahel has a sizeable are extractive companies operating near new local communities. presence of Western aid workers, border regions. Lastly, it finds that the extractive industry employees, faith- adaptability of Belmokhtar makes him Morten Bøås, Ph.D., is Research Professor based personnel, and, to a lesser extent, one of the region’s greatest near-term at the Norwegian Institute of International diplomats and tourists.3 threats to Western interests. Affairs (NUPI). He has conducted extensive fieldwork in West and Central Africa, Since the rebranding from a domestic Linkages including Mali, and traveled widely on Algerian Salafist group to al-Qa`ida Although collaboration was once the African continent. Dr. Bøås’ work has in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in questioned, it is now widely appeared in academic journals, books, and early 2007, a number of offshoots indicated that AQIM has linkages policy reports. His published books include and other terrorist organizations to al-Murabitun, MUJAO, and the African Guerrillas: Raging Against the have formed in the region, including Nigerian terrorist groups Boko Haram Machine and The Politics of Origin in Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s katibat (battalion) and Ansaru.6 To understand this Africa: Autochthony, Citizenship and al-Murabitun (Those Who Remain relationship, however, it is important Conflict. Steadfast), the Movement for Unity to examine the historical context.

54 See, for example, Boubacar Ba and Morten Bøås, The 1 “Sahel: Backgrounder on the Sahel, West Africa’s Poor- Mali Presidential Elections: Outcomes and Challenges (Oslo: est Region,” Integrated Regional Information Networks, 4 These groups have been covered extensively within Norwegian Centre for Peacebuilding, 2013). Also see June 2, 2008. both academic and policy literature. For more back- Bruce Whitehouse’s blog, Bridges from Bamako, avail- 2 John Campbell and J. Peter Pham, “Does Washington ground, see previous issues of the CTC Sentinel or The able at www.bridgesfrombamako.com. Have a Stake in the Sahel?” Council on Foreign Relations, National Counterterrorism Center’s (NCTC) “2014 55 The Fezzan region of Libya is one area that has caught January 14, 2014; Franklin Charles Graham IV, “Abduc- Counterterrorism Calendar: Terrorist Groups,” available AQIM’s attention in the aftermath of the fall of Qadhafi. tions, Kidnappings and Killings in the Sahel and Sahara,” at www.nctc.gov/site/groups/. This region is another borderland of the Sahel where the Review of African Political Economy 38:130 (2011). 5 “LRA, Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, AQIM and Other state exercises little influence, and local groups compete 3 Carlos Echeverria Jesús, “Kidnappings as a Terrorist Sources of Instability in Africa,” testimony by the coordi- for control of the region’s few resources. For details, see Instrument of AQIM and the MUJAO,” Paix et sécurité in- nator for counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State, to “Fresh Blood and New Safe Haven for Jihadists: Libya,” ternationales: revue maroco-espagnole de droit international the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, April 25, 2012. Today’s Zaman, October 27, 2013. et relations internationales, 2013. 6 Ibid.

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AQIM was formed in January 2007, al-Qa`ida core as only rhetoric.13 The in the region.19 A statement sent to formally rebranding from its previous idea that an inexperienced domestic Nouakchott Information Agency in name, the Salafist Group for Preaching insurgency from northeast Nigeria January 2014 reiterated Belmokhtar’s and Combat (GSPC). The official would be embraced by the broader desire to continue attacks against affiliation with al-Qa`ida—beginning transnational jihadist community “France and her allies” in the Sahel.20 several months prior—was largely seen was rebuked as aspirational at best. Keeping in mind the limitations as an effort to maintain relevancy as an Yet, by the summer of 2009, evidence of forecasting, it is clear that al- extremist group on the global stage, but suggested that Boko Haram members Murabitun’s intent, capability, and the group’s interest was still strictly were training with AQIM.14 In 2010, access throughout the region are likely regional in nature. The GSPC, formed AQIM leader Droukdel declared that a continued threat to Western interests. in 1998, was itself a derivative of the AQIM would provide Boko Haram with Against the backdrop of Boko Haram’s Armed Islamic Group (GIA).7 While weapons, support, and training.15 This legacy of domestic insurgency in much of the overarching ideology—a collaboration between Boko Haram and Nigeria, Ansaru and even some actors leading tenet of which is a Salafist AQIM is supported by public statements Qur’anic interpretation—remains static, from both groups, as well as clear “There is even some smaller philosophical and personal indications that Boko Haram’s suicide disagreements ultimately led to attack on the United Nations office in evidence that Boko Haram numerous spinoffs and splinter cells.8 Abuja, Nigeria, in 2011 employed tactics and its splinter group In the wake of a personality dispute with that were strikingly similar to bombings AQIM leader Abdelmalek Droukdel and by AQIM.16 Ansaru have both trained other subordinate leaders in northern and coordinated with Mali, Belmokhtar split from the group This again revealed that terrorist and formed the katibat al-Mulathamin groups in the Sahel are adaptive. AQIM, al-Qa`ida core, and (The Veiled Ones).9 Belmokhtar’s group Differences in ideology are not mutually even Somalia’s al-Shabab.” merged with MUJAO in August 2013 to exclusive in group membership, create al-Murabitun.10 Notwithstanding funding, and coordination. On the whether any of these groups continue contrary, splinters of AQIM, such to work with AQIM and its leader as al-Murabitun and the AQIM ally within Boko Haram have demonstrated Droukdel, it is widely understood that in northern Mali, Ansar al-Din,17 a capability and desire to continue the various units under Belmokhtar’s collaborate at least marginally. There executing attacks against Western control claim allegiance to al-Qa`ida is even some evidence that Boko interests. A video statement21 by Boko core, led by Ayman al-Zawahiri.11 Haram and its splinter group Ansaru Haram leader Abubakar Shekau in have both trained and coordinated February 2014 reiterated the group’s The study of Sahelian terrorism must with AQIM, al-Qa`ida core, and even aspirational intent to harm Western also consider the Nigerian violent Somalia’s al-Shabab.18 interests throughout Nigeria (including extremist groups Boko Haram and its the oil-rich delta region22) and into 2012 splinter Ansaru. The linkages Sahelian terrorist organizations neighboring Cameroon and Niger. between these two groups and AQIM appear willing to change their are less clear. When Boko Haram first names and sacrifice personal and Borderless Kidnapping transitioned into a jihadist group after ideological variances. The merger Belmokhtar’s legacy of kidnapping 2009,12 most scholars and policymakers of al-Mulathamin and MUJAO in spans more than a decade. A seasoned dismissed its affiliation with AQIM and August 2013 (themselves splinters Islamist militant with experience in of AQIM) created a larger and better Afghanistan and Pakistan in the early coordinated group, al-Murabitun, 1990s, he returned to Algeria in 1993

7 Ibid. which is asserting its prominence and rose through the ranks of the GIA 8 Paul Cruickshank, “Algeria Gas Facility Attack Fuels Jihadist Rivalry,” CNN, January 30, 2013; Jacob Zenn, 13 Zenn. 19 Seth G. Jones, “The Extremist Threat to the U.S. “Cooperation or Competition: Boko Haram and Ansaru 14 “Boko Haram: Growing Threat to the U.S. Homeland,” Homeland,” House Committee on Homeland Security, After the Mali Intervention,” CTC Sentinel 6:3 (2013). U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland January, 15, 2014; General David M. Rodriguez, “Posture 9 “AQIM Leaders Belmokhtar and Abdelmalek Droukdel Security, September 13, 2013. Hearing,” Senate Armed Services Committee, March 6, Split,” Militant Leadership Monitor 3:12 (2012). 15 Ibid. 2014. 10 “2014 Counterterrorism Calendar: Terrorist Groups.” 16 Marc-Antoine Perouse de Montclos, “Boko Haram: 20 “Terror Group Threatens France over Mali,” As- 11 Eric Ouellet et al., “The Institutionalization of al-Qae- Islamism, Politics, Security and the State in Nigeria,” sociated Press, January 6, 2014; “Les Mourabitoune de da in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM),” Terrorism and Politi- West African Politics and Society Series 2 (2014); personal l’Azawad menacent de s’en prendre a la France et ses cal Violence, 2014; personal interview, anonymous, U.S. interview, anonymous, U.S. Embassy, Abuja, Nigeria, allies,” Agence Nouakchott d’Information, January 4, Embassy, Niamey, Niger, January 21, 2014. January 17, 2014. 2014. 12 Boko Haram “…has gained recent notoriety because 17 The alliance between AQIM and Ansar al-Din is de- 21 “Nigeria’s Boko Haram Threatens Oil Refineries, Mus- of its transition from being a local radical Salafist group, tailed in the U.S. Department of State’s Foreign Terrorist lim Clerics,” Voice of America, February 20, 2014. which until 2009 had a largely quietest nature, to a Organization designation, March 21, 2013, available at 22 The likelihood of a Boko Haram attack in Nigeria’s Salafi-jihadi group that has demonstrated the capacity to www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/03/206493.htm. Delta is currently deemed as low, although the implica- carry out major operations…” See David Cook, “The Rise 18 “LRA, Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, AQIM and Other tions of an attempted suicide bombing or armed assault of Boko Haram in Nigeria,” CTC Sentinel 4:9 (2011). Sources of Instability in Africa.” would be much greater.

7 april 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 4 and, later, the GSPC.23 Belmokhtar’s Motivational Shift? to shadow what was likely an attempt to successes at making money through A major shift in Belmokhtar’s tactics obtain a hefty ransom payment. smuggling cigarettes, narcotics, and and procedures occurred at the end of possibly humans24 foreshadowed 2012 following his split from AQIM. This suggested shift in motivation was his alleged political motivation with In the days following France’s again seen in Niger in May 2013. Two al-Murabitun. Belmokhtar was not Operation Serval in northern Mali in simultaneous attacks were conducted by simply raising money to fund jihad January 2013, Belmokhtar instructed MUJAO and al-Mulathamin, targeting and insurgencies in Africa. On the several dozen followers to attack a a French uranium mine not far from contrary, while a portion of the gas facility near In Amenas, Algeria— the Algerian border and a military profits surely financed the operational within 50 miles of the Libyan border— camp housing French forces in central overhead costs of the group, a sizeable taking nearly 800 hostages. At least Niger.34 These attacks employed similar minority also benefited him and his 39 foreign workers, including three tactics and weaponry as the Algerian associates personally.25 Belmokhtar is Americans, were killed in the attack gas facility siege but included the use able to ensure his leadership role and and ensuing Algerian military of suicide vehicle-borne improvised prominence in the region by controlling rescue operation.30 In his claim of explosive devices (SVBIEDs).35 financial opportunities for his associates responsibility, Belmokhtar stated Belmokhtar’s spokesman immediately and followers. that the attack was in response to claimed responsibility for the attacks, the Algerian government granting stating they were in response to the In April 2003, the GSPC—of which airspace access to France, and he government in Niger cooperating with Belmokhtar was an active member— threatened to kill dozens of more the French.36 took 32 Europeans hostage in northern captives if France did not put an end Mali in his first major kidnapping to its military operation in northern The work of Belmokhtar and AQIM after operation.26 The group subsequently Mali.31 2012 must be examined in the context of released all but one hostage (who died both political terrorism and criminal in the desert) in return for a ransom His justification for the attack was kidnap-for-ransom. When analyzing the payment of more than $6 million.27 questionable for two reasons. First, attacks through a lens of criminality, Dozens of small-scale kidnappings the scale of the attack took precision it appears that Belmokhtar is a savvy of Western tourists, diplomats, aid and preparation that would likely have businessman who manipulatively workers, and extractive industry taken weeks, if not longer, to coordinate. leverages purported jihadist ideology to personnel since that time have netted Procuring an arsenal of weaponry and inspire supporters and solicit ransom Belmokhtar an estimated $50 million in explosives for several dozen militants payments by governments and private ransom payments.28 AQIM as a group is in less than a week is not likely. Second, organizations. Whether his political estimated to have made more than $90 his alleged motivation for the attack is motivation may be insincere is largely million in total ransom profits from inconsistent with nearly two decades of peripheral to mitigating the threat of 2003 to 2013.29 Belmokhtar’s patterns and priorities. kidnapping in the Sahel. Nevertheless, To be sure, Belmokhtar is known for it underscores that Belmokhtar is a his ability to adapt, even managing to businessman who is willing to adapt escape arrest and capture reportedly as necessary to engage in kidnap-for- seven times.32 This was not the first ransom. time he had justified his actions with

23 “Profile: Mokhtar Belmokhtar,” BBC, June 4, 2013. political ideology, but it had previously When examined through a lens of 24 Andrew Black, “Mokhtar Belmokhtar: The Algerian been peripheral to his criminality. The political ideology, Belmokhtar’s Salafi- Jihad’s Southern Amir,” Terrorism Monitor 7:12 (2009). magnitude of the attack at In Amenas, jihadi tendencies are a result of his 25 Belmokhtar was reportedly forced out of AQIM for, however, indicated a more coherent decades-long affiliation with al-Qa`ida 37 in the words of one Malian official, “straying from the motivation that resonated with Salafi- core in Afghanistan and Pakistan 33 right path.” Some members of AQIM questioned his de- jihadis worldwide. Nevertheless, and his role as a respected Islamist votion to Salafi-jihadism and believed his interests lied significant indications point toward the figure in North and West Africa. in criminality and smuggling. Also see ibid.; personal overt justification of political ideology As a former leader of AQIM and a interview, anonymous, U.S. Embassy, Niamey, Niger, supporter of various related factions January 21, 2014. 30 “Timeline of the In Amenas Siege,” Guardian, Janu- such as MUJAO, Boko Haram and 26 “Les disparus du Sahara seraient les otages d’un ary 25, 2013. Ansaru, Belmokhtar is viewed as an groupe terroriste islamiste,” Le Monde, April 17, 2003. 31 “New Video Message from Katibat al-Mulathamin’s amir of Salafi-jihadism in a region The exact role of Belmokhtar in this operation is not Khalid Abu al ‘Abbas (Mukhtar bin Muhammad Bil- entirely agreed on by policy experts. The public leader mukhtar): Claiming Responsibility for the In Aménas 34 “Suicide Bombings in Niger Kill Dozens in Dual of the GSPC operation, however, was Amari Saifi (also Operation,” Jihadology, January 22, 2013. Strikes,” New York Times, May 23, 2013. known as El Para). 32 “‘This is the Eighth Time’ -- Caution Greets Reports 35 SVBIEDs were rarely used by AQIM and Mokhtar 27 Jesús. of Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s Death,” Independent, March 3, Belmokhtar prior to this attack. 28 “Statement on Reported Killing of Mokhtar 2013; personal interview, Jeremy Keenan, University of 36 “Statement in Belmokhtar’s Name Claims Role in Ni- Belmokhtar,” U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, London, February 2014. ger Attacks,” Financial Times, May 24, 2013. March 2, 2013. 33 “Regional Security Lessons from the Attack on Alge- 37 William Thornberry and Jaclyn Levy, “Al Qaeda in 29 “Millions in Ransoms Fuel Militants’ Clout in West ria’s In Amenas Gas Plant,” U.S. Institute of Peace, Janu- the Islamic Maghreb,” Center for Strategic and Interna- Africa,” New York Times, December 12, 2012. ary 23, 2013. tional Studies, September 1, 2011.

8 april 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 4 that is predominantly Muslim. The million in 2011.40 The primary advice State Department’s Rewards for Justice French intervention in Mali may have given by most kidnap consulting and Program has offered rewards of up to reinforced his belief that Western negotiation firms is to not contact the $5 million and $7 million on Mokhtar governments are attacking Islam to U.S. or host-country governments, but Belmokhtar46 and Boko Haram leader exert political and economic influence rather communicate solely with the Abubakar Shekau,47 respectively. in Mali. firm.41 Two trends are evident when Indeed, as both typologies are feasible U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations analyzing the attacks and kidnappings within the context of Belmokhtar’s Samantha Power stated in relation to al- conducted in the Sahel during the last activity, a third explanation may Qa`ida, “We know that hostage takers five years. First, Western private exist. Insofar as evidence points to looking for ransoms distinguish sector groups—non-governmental Belmokhtar as a businessman and a between those governments that pay organizations (NGOs), corporations radical amir, it is quite likely that his ransoms and those that do not—and and even tourists—are the targets of actions are motivated by both money that they make a point of not taking choice for AQIM, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, and ideology. More debatable is the hostages from those countries that and Ansaru.48 Second, patterns of balance between these motivations, refuse to make concessions.”42 There target and location have appeared. which is far from confirmed and remains is even a credible belief among policy At most risk are the extractive fluid. As the UN Security Council experts that U.S. and British citizens industries (mining, oil and energy, and continues to push governments are less likely to be kidnapped but more construction) operating near border and private sector organizations to likely to be killed as a result of the U.S. regions.49 Evidenced through the work cease paying ransoms,38 the notion and UK governments’ categorical refusal of Ansaru in 2012 and al-Mulathamin/ of political terrorism vis-à-vis to pay ransoms. One such instance was MUJAO in 2013, there have been at criminality becomes a more beneficial the 2009 kidnapping of a British citizen least seven separate incidents affecting way to instill fear in Westerners while in Niger, who was subsequently held the extractive sector since 2010, all still producing funds through soliciting and killed in Mali.43 On the contrary, within 250 miles from a border.50 ransoms. French and other European hostages While the most fatal was the January have historically been released in 2013 attack near In Amenas, Algeria, The international community exchange for ransom payments.44 numerous smaller incidents occurred recognizes this transitive move by in Niger and northern Nigeria. Indeed, violent extremist organizations in Greatest Near-Term Threat to the West companies in the extractive industry the Sahel. Resolutions 1904 and 2133, The U.S. Department of State are likely to retain kidnap-for-ransom passed by the United Nations Security continues to warn against the insurance and have a set precedent for Council in 2009 and 2014, respectively, threats posed by violent extremist paying ransoms, compared with NGOs forbid the payment of ransoms to groups groups in Africa’s Sahel. In response and private citizens who may lack affiliated with al-Qa`ida. While the to attacks and kidnappings that financial resources. Conducting attacks U.S. and UK governments categorically specifically targeted private sector near borders often allows militants and follow this policy, European states organizations in Algeria, Mauritania, kidnappers to cross into a neighboring have been slower to follow suit. Niger, Nigeria, and elsewhere in the country undetected. The lack of any real enforcement region, the U.S. government declared mechanism inhibits the motivation for AQIM, Belmokhtar’s al-Murabitun (al- governments, and even private sector Mulathamin), and separately Ansaru organizations, to stop paying ransoms, and Boko Haram as Foreign Terrorist 46 “Rewards for Justice Program: Mokhtar Belmokhtar 45 leading to off-the-record deals with Organizations. Additionally, the (2014),” U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic kidnappers and hefty payments to Security, available at www.rewardsforjustice.net/index. AQIM and its affiliates, averaging 40 “Kidnap and Ransom Insurance. I’m a Client…Get me cfm?page=belmokhtar&language=english. $5.4 million per ransom in 2011—an Out of Here,” Economist, June 27, 2013. 47 “Rewards for Justice Program: Abubakar Shekau increase of nearly $1 million from the 41 This notion has been reiterated numerous times dur- (2014),” U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic 39 year prior. Multinational kidnap- ing interviews between this author and private sector Security, available at www.rewardsforjustice.net/index. for-ransom insurance, consulting, and corporate executives, NGOs, and security vendors. cfm?page=shekau&language=english. negotiating firms charge premiums to 42 “Statement by Ambassador Samantha Power, U.S. 48 This statement is not necessarily true for Boko lone businessmen and large corporations Permanent Representative to the United Nations, on the Haram. It is believed that Boko Haram operates primar- alike, creating an insurance and Adoption of UNSCR 2133 on Kidnapping for Ransom,” ily as a domestic insurgency—confined to a region of Ni- consulting market worth roughly $500 United States Mission to the United Nations, January 27, geria with few Westerners—rather than a transnational 2014. jihadist organization, although this article makes clear its 43 “Al-Qaeda Kills British Hostage,” al-Jazira, June 4, relationship with al-Qa`ida and its affiliates. 38 “Ransom Business: Blood Money,” Economist, Novem- 2009. 49 To be sure, the relationship between the target and ber 6, 2013; “U.N. Security Council Urges End to Ransom 44 “No More Ransoms Paid for French Hostages, Hol- location is not necessarily causal; there may be additional Payments to Extremists,” Reuters, January 27, 2014. lande Tells Families,” Radio France Internationale, variables that are not yet evident to this author. Regard- 39 “Remarks of Under Secretary David Cohen at March 19, 2013. less, the history of attacks affecting extractive companies Chatham House on ‘Kidnapping for Ransom: The Grow- 45 See list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, U.S. De- near borders in the Sahel is worth noting. ing Terrorist Financing Challenge,’” U.S. Department of partment of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism, available 50 Personal interview, anonymous, U.S. Embassy, Nia- the Treasury, October 5, 2012. at www.state.gov/j/ct/list. mey, Niger, January 21, 2014; Jesús.

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Conclusion in the 1980s were more “tourists” than As France’s Operation Serval begins The Saudi Foreign Fighter actual fighters.1 Therefore, a direct to draw down in northern Mali and Presence in Syria comparison to more recent conflicts may successful Western and Sahelian be informative in terms of observing counterterrorism operations continue By Aaron Y. Zelin how many left for each warzone, but it to rid the region of senior terrorists,51 does not account for the fact that the the Sahel is still a critical area to the foreign fighter trend currently situations are from a different time monitor during the coming years.52 developing in Syria is unprecedented period and context. The combination of weak central both due to the quantity of fighters as governments, porous borders, and vast well as the number of foreign nationals Nevertheless, through archival, primary open land allows terrorist groups such involved. For Saudi foreign fighters, source, and field research, Norwegian as AQIM and Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s this trend is not new. Saudis have academic Thomas Hegghammer believes al-Murabitun to operate with few been involved in foreign fighting since that “a majority of Arab Afghans were restraints. the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan from Saudi Arabia” from 1979-1992.2 in the 1980s. They played one of the This trend would continue in Chechnya These terrorist groups have most prominent roles in that war, in the 1990s, when the top leaders collaborated with Boko Haram as well as in subsequent conflicts in among the foreign fighters embedded in and its splinter group Ansaru in Chechnya, Bosnia, Afghanistan in the the insurgency against Russia were from Nigeria, highlighting the linkages 1990s, Afghanistan post-9/11, and Iraq. Saudi Arabia—with the most notable between various actors—even those Similarly, Saudis are one of the leading being Samir bin Salih bin `Abdullah with marginally different ideologies foreign national groups in Syria in al-Suwaylim, better known as Umar and objectives—and the adaptivity terms of the total number of individuals ibn al-Khattab.3 Moreover, according of terrorism in the Sahel. While the fighting, and also among those who to 51 biographies of Arab volunteers January 2013 French military incursion have died. to Chechnya that analyst Murad Batal in Mali motivated terrorists in the al-Shishani collated, Saudis accounted region to justify hostage taking and This article offers a brief history of for 59% of that dataset.4 In Bosnia, this armed assaults, it is clear that kidnap- Saudi involvement in past jihadist tendency remained, although not nearly for-ransom still plays a largely financial conflicts, the current statistics on how as prevalent. According to Bosnian and criminal role in the operations of many Saudis have traveled to Syria, and government intelligence records on the Belmokhtar and his associates. When highlights cases of important Saudis conflict, the Saudis were once again the taking into account recent terrorism who have joined the war. The article largest contingent, reportedly making incidents in the Sahel and statements by finds that similar to past foreign fighter up 25% of the foreign fighters.5 Mokhtar Belmokhtar and Boko Haram’s mobilizations, the Saudis have been one Abubakar Shekau, a pattern emerges, of the largest contingents, with some Even in the post-9/11 conflicts, Saudis revealing that extractive companies individuals taking important positions have been the top foreign national operating near borders face the most on the ground as clerics or leaders. This group involved in the more significant risk. With increasing counterterrorism development could have far reaching jihadist wars. In Iraq, for example, Evan resources devoted to the Sahel in recent implications. Saudi foreign fighters who years, it is clear that extremist actors in join jihadist groups such as the Islamic 1 Thomas Hegghammer, Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence the region remain a significant threat to State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or and Pan-Islamism since 1979 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Western interests. al-Qa`ida’s Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) will University Press, 2010), p. 47. Tourists can have a num- gain tactical experience and further ber of different meanings in this context. It could either Samuel L. Aronson is the West Africa ana- ideological indoctrination in Syria. represent those going for thrill and adventure, or could lyst at the U.S. Department of State’s Over- Once their “tour” in Syria ends, there is highlight individuals who only go to the front lines to say seas Security Advisory Council (OSAC). a risk that these fighters could adopt al- they have gone, but never actually fight. His research background lies in counter- Qa`ida’s targeting patterns and conduct 2 “Arab Afghan” is a moniker that has been used to de- terrorism partnerships and capacity build- attacks against the Saudi government or scribe the contingent of individuals who traveled to Paki- ing in Africa. He holds an M.Sc. from the Western interests. stan to fight in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union. See London School of Economics, is fluent in Thomas Hegghammer, “The Rise of Muslim Foreign Swahili, and conversational in Somali. From Khurasan to al-Sham Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of Jihad,” Interna- Scholars consider the anti-Soviet jihad tional Security 35:3 (2010/11): p. 71. The views expressed in this article in Afghanistan in the 1980s as the 3 Cerwyn Moore and Paul Tumelty, “Foreign Fighters do not necessarily reflect those of the first contemporary case of the modern and the Case of Chechnya: A Critical Assessment,” Stud- U.S. Department of State or the U.S. foreign fighter phenomenon in the ies in Conflict & Terrorism 31:5 (2008): p. 428. Government. context of Sunni militancy. Due to the 4 Murad Batal al-Shishani, The Rise and Fall of Arab fact that this influx was, at the time, a Fighters in Chechnya (Washington, D.C.: The Jamestown new development, researchers did not Foundation, 2006), p. 17. track the flow of foreigners as they have 5 These documents were obtained from Bosnian govern- 51 This claim is evidenced by many articles in major me- for Iraq or Syria in the past decade. ment records by J.M. Berger for research on the docu- dia publications during 2013. It should be noted, however, that the mentary Sarajevo Ricochet (Febris Film, 2010). Berger 52 See the statement by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State foreign fighter trend in the 1980s was e-mailed this author a picture of a pie chart breakdown Linda Thomas-Greenfield on October 30, 2013. far different than now; many who went on June 3, 2013.

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Kohlmann documented the foreigners While Saudis might currently be Instead, the public entrance of killed fighting in the insurgency from the highest foreign national group Lebanese Hizb Allah into the conflict June 2003 to June 2005. Kohlmann that has traveled to Syria, this only on the side of the al-Assad regime concluded that 55% of those killed came to pass around the summer during the battle of Qusayr in late were Saudi, with the next highest being of 2013.12 In the early days of the May 2013 precipitated the sudden Syrians at 12.7%.6 In October 2007, this conflict, foreign fighters from Syria’s increase in Saudi foreign fighters would later be affirmed when the U.S. neighboring countries (Lebanese, in Syria.17 Less than a week later, in military found a cache of documents in Iraqis, Palestinians, and Jordanians), response, mainstream clerics such as Sinjar from al-Qa`ida in Iraq identifying many of whom previously fought Yusuf al-Qaradawi called upon Sunni those who entered Iraq from August U.S. forces in Iraq, were the first to Muslims to go fight in Syria: “anyone 2006 to August 2007. Saudis were arrive.13 A year later, Saudis began the highest percentage, comprising increasing in number, although the 41% of the individuals where records largest contingents based on percentage “Exactly 300 Saudis have noted their nationality.7 This trend has were from Libya and Tunisia, two of died in Syria as of late continued in the current conflict in the countries that successfully deposed Syria. their leaders during the original wave February 2014, which also of uprisings in 2011. Many went as is the highest number of Current Estimates “tourists” to continue riding the wave In late March 2014, a Saudi official of the “Arab Spring,” while others went fatalities among foreign stated that 1,200 Saudis have traveled to assist the Syrian rebels militarily.14 A nationals.” to fight the Bashar al-Assad regime, number of fighters joined more radical placing Saudis at the top of the list forces such as JN and other smaller of foreign nationals in Syria.8 More jihadist factions.15 recently, the Saudi Interior Ministry who has the ability, who is trained to said that 25% of those who had gone What led to the influx of Saudi foreign fight...has to go; I call on Muslims to go have since returned.9 Based on a fighters? While ease of travel certainly and support their brothers in Syria.”18 database maintained by this author accounts for a portion of the rise in This statement was later praised by since the fall of 2011 on foreign the unprecedented numbers of foreign Saudi Arabia’s Grand Mufti Abdul jihadist “martyrdom” notices, exactly fighters, it is not the main factor in the Aziz al-Shaykh.19 Two weeks after al- 300 Saudis have died in Syria as of Saudi case.16 First, travel limitations Qaradawi’s announcement, Saud al- late February 2014, which also is the have never been an issue for Saudis, Shuraym, a Saudi cleric at the Grand highest number of fatalities among as they have been heavily involved in Mosque in Mecca, proclaimed that foreign nationals.10 This tentatively all prior large-scale jihadist foreign Sunni Muslims had a duty to support suggests that there could be close to fighter mobilizations. Second, if travel the Syrian rebels “by all means.”20 600 Saudis in Syria, Iraq (the ISIL uses was the main factor, then one would Before Qusayr, Saudi religious scholars individuals on both sides of the border) have expected to see a large-scale Saudi supported helping the Syrian rebels or elsewhere abroad.11 mobilization earlier in the conflict. through financial means, but were not overt in terms of foreign fighting. Hizb Allah’s admission of joining the conflict, the sectarianism that is intertwined in Saudi Arabia’s state 21 6 Evan Kohlmann, “Foreign Fighters Reported Killed 12 Based on open source data, the second highest foreign religion and education, the clerical in Iraq: June 2003-June 2005,” Global Terror Alert, June nationals are Jordanians, with an estimated 1,000 Jorda- framing of the conflict as wajib (duty), 2005. nians according to Abu Sayyaf, the top Jordanian Salafist campaigns of support for the rebels, as 7 Brian Fishman and Joseph Felter, Al-Qa’ida’s Foreign leader in the country. It is possible that higher numbers well as the summer months coinciding Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records (West of Lebanese and Iraqis have gone, but there is not much with the Muslim holy month of Ramadan Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2008). credible data on either cases due to a lack of government all helped catalyze efforts to send Saudi 8 It is difficult to acquire accurate data from the Tuni- estimates. See “Alf Anasir min al-Tayyar al-Salafi al-Ji- fighters to Syria. sian, Jordanian, or Lebanese governments on how many hadi Bi-l-Urdun yuqatilun fi Suriyya,” al-Quds al-Arabi, of its citizens have gone to Syria, but based on credible October 19, 2013. estimates they are just below the numbers from Saudi 13 Aaron Y. Zelin, “Foreign Fighters Trickle into the Syr- Arabia. See Peter Bergen, “Why the Saudis Unfriended ian Rebellion,” The Washington Institute for Near East the U.S.,” CNN, March 26, 2014. Policy, June 11, 2012. 17 Hassan Nasrallah, “Kalimah fi Eid al-Muqawama wa- 9 Fahd al-Dhiyabi, “Saudi Interior Ministry Says 25 14 Aaron Y. Zelin, Evan F. Kohlmann, and Laith al- l-Tahrir,” al-Manar, May 25, 2013. Percent of Fighters in Syria Have Returned,” Asharq Ala- Khouri, “Convoy of Martyrs in the Levant: A Joint Study 18 Yusuf al-Qaradawi, “Khutbah al-Jumu’ah,” May 31, wsat, March 24, 2014. Charting the Evolving Role of Sunni Foreign Fighters in 2013. 10 “Jihadi Martyr Notices,” author’s personal database, the Armed Uprising Against the Assad Regime in Syria,” 19 “Mufti al-Sa’udiyya yushid Bi-muwaqf al-Qaradhawi last updated February 25, 2014. Jihadology.net and Flashpoint Global Partners, June dhid Iran wa-Hizb Allah,” al-Arabiya, June 6, 2013. 11 Although jihadists have announced 300 martyrdom 2013. 20 “Al-Shuraym yada’u Li-da’im thuwar Suriyya wa- notices, this number does not include Saudis who died 15 Ibid. mudhaharah Bi-Misr,” al-Jazira, June 14, 2013. fighting with non-jihadist units in Syria nor does it pro- 16 Thomas Hegghammer, “Syria’s Foreign Fighters,” 21 Nona Shea et al., “Saudi Arabia’s Curriculum of Intol- vide information on unannounced deaths. Foreign Policy, December 9, 2013. erance,” Freedom House, 2006.

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From Where Do the Saudis Hail? shaykhs, including the controversial has been vocal in attempting to broker While it is difficult to determine Shaykh Sulayman al-Ulwan who was peace between the ISIL and other rebel specifics on the origins of all Saudi arrested by Saudi authorities in 2004 factions. Most notably, in late January foreign fighters, the 300 jihadist for supporting al-Qa`ida. After his 2014, al-Muhaysini tried to settle the death notices provide some insights studies, al-Muhaysini was an imam and disputes through Mubadarat al-Umma (the considering that 203 of them detail the da`iya (missionary) at the Qatar mosque Initiative of the Umma).33 Although individual’s origination city in Saudi in Mecca, Jami` al-Thani.25 the initiative failed because the ISIL Arabia.22 The 203 deceased came from did not participate, it highlighted al- 12 of Saudi Arabia’s 13 minatiq (regions). Since the Syrian uprising became Muhaysini’s stature since all of the Only Jizan, which is the smallest region a civil war, al-Muhaysini has been other key groups cooperated.34 in Saudi Arabia, is not represented.23 involved with fundraising to help While one cannot draw too many the rebels procure weapons as well `Abd al-Muhsin `Abd Allah Ibrahim al-Sharikh conclusions from incomplete data, the as assisting refugees.26 Unlike many (Sanafi al-Nasr) strongest recruitment networks appear other high-profile clerics from the Unlike al-Muhaysini, `Abd al-Muhsin to be based in the center of the country Gulf, al-Muhaysini—instead of just `Abd Allah Ibrahim al-Sharikh (also or on the coasts.24 This could be because traveling to the frontlines for photo known by his online moniker Sanafi the center of the country is more opportunities—moved to Syria around al-Nasr/@Snafialnasr) was not as well conservative overall, while all the areas 2013. Al-Muhaysini claims no affiliation known publicly prior to his “reported” have some of the highest population with any particular group, but he has death in Syria on March 21, 2014.35 On densities in Saudi Arabia. been seen with Umar al-Shishani, who April 18, al-Sharikh said that he had is now a leader in the ISIL, and Abu been in a coma since March, and that Since quantitative analysis regarding al-Walid al-Muhajir of JN.27 Since the JN claimed he was dead so that he could the foreign fighter phenomenon only infighting between the ISIL and JN recover from injuries sustained while provides one aspect of detail, reviewing began in January 2014, al-Muhaysini fighting.36 Al-Sharikh is allegedly an some cases of important individuals has distanced himself from the ISIL.28 important player within al-Qa`ida from Saudi Arabia who have joined the and tasked as being the head of its Syrian rebels is informative. While al-Muhaysini has been a presence “Victory Committee” in Syria.37 He is on social media and has become an third cousins with Usama bin Ladin, Cases important personality, he also is an and two of his brothers were detained Dr. `Abd Allah bin Muhammad al-Muhaysini actual player on the ground in Syria.29 at Guantanamo Bay, but have since One of the most influential and well- For one, he has fought and been injured been released.38 He fought in other known figures among Saudi foreign in battle.30 More importantly, he set up jihadist battlefronts from Chechnya fighters in Syria is Dr. `Abd Allah the Da`wa al-Jihad Center in December to Afghanistan to Pakistan.39 Before bin Muhammad bin Sulayman 2013, which has been involved with arriving in Syria, he was based in the al-Muhaysini. According to al- Islamic lessons, educating children, Afghanistan-Pakistan border region.40 Muhaysini’s autobiography, he was and aid.31 He also set up the al- born in Buraydah (Qassim region) Faruq training camp in March 2014, In 2009, al-Sharikh was placed on in north-central Saudi Arabia. He potentially as a reference to the Saudi Arabia’s 85 “most wanted” list.41 became a hafiz (one who has memorized infamous one in Afghanistan pre- the entire Qur’an) by the age of 15. For 9/11.32 Additionally, al-Muhaysini tus/443626270199644160; Dr. `Abd Allah Muhammad his bachelors studies, he majored in al-Muhaysini, “Mu’askr al-Faruq,” March 17, 2014, avail- Shari`a at the University of Umm al- 25 Dr. `Abd Allah Muhammad al-Muhaysini, “Sirah al- able at www.justpaste.it/erx4. Al-Muhaysini announced Qura in Mecca. He later completed his dhatiyya,” undated, available at www.mhesne.com. the establishment of the al-Faruq camp on March 17, master’s and doctorate in comparative 26 Asher Berman, “Saudi Preacher Relocates to Syria,” 2014, and called for people to join for training. fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) at al- Syria Survey blog, November 17, 2013. 33 Dr. `Abd Allah Muhammad al-Muhaysini, “Muba- Imam Muhammad ibn Saud Islamic 27 See the following Twitter posts at www.twitter.com/ darah al-Ummah,” Mubadarah al-Ummah Facebook University in Riyadh, writing his mhesne/status/395283462854569984 and www. twitter. page, January 23, 2014, available at www.facebook.com/ dissertation on legal provisions com/mhesne/status/395984154942504960. mobadratalomaa/posts/694970217214186. affecting war refugees in Islamic 28 Dr. `Abd Allah Muhammad al-Muhaysini, “Ila 34 Al-Muhaysini, “Ila hal ballaghat: ‘an mubadarah al- fiqh. He studied under a number of hal ballaghat: ‘an mubadarah al-ummah,” February 2, ummah.” 2014, available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=s08_Tm_ 35 For details, see www.twitter.com/alMutasim007/ 22 “Jihadi Martyr Notices.” Mbyg. status/447103519695200256. 23 This could be due to the small sample size of individu- 29 Miriam Berger, “How One Jihadi in Syria Became a 36 See his statement posted at www.twitter.com/Snafi- als whose origins are known. Twitter Sensation,” Buzzfeed, April 1, 2014. alnasr/status/457266856794292225. 24 Since a number of death notices mention only the re- 30 For details, see the YouTube video located at www. 37 Thomas Joscelyn, “Head of al Qaeda ‘Victory Com- gion an individual is from and not a city, this article iden- youtube.com/watch?v=WUUY1ckE4qM. mittee’ in Syria,” The Long War Journal, March 6, 2014. tifies only the region. The following is a list of regions in 31 See, for example, the following posts: www.twit- 38 Ibid. Saudi Arabia along with the corresponding number of ter.com/mhesne/status/408331097773473792, 39 For details, see www.twitter.com/1_K_Z/sta- dead jihadists in Syria from those regions: Riyadh: 62; www.youtube.com/watch?v=Swc3i5H5p5k&feat tus/447105984771919872. Qassim: 40; Makka: 27; Eastern Region: 22; Tabuk: 11; ure=youtu.be, and www.twitter.com/mhesne/sta- 40 Eric Schmitt, “Qaeda Militants Seek Syria Base, Jawf: 10; Najran: 9; Medina: 7; Northern Borders: 6; Asir: tus/427549360260648960. U.S. Officials Say,”New York Times, March 25, 2014. 4; Ha’il: 4; Bahah: 1. 32 See, for example, www.twitter.com/mhesne/sta- 41 “Qa’ima al-Matlubin 85,” Wizara al-Dakhiliyya,

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His listing states that he was born in Jughayman was a former professor at on January 5, 2014. Prior to his death, 1985 and is from Shaqraa in central King Faisal University in al-Ahsa. A he was the head of the ISIL’s Shari`a Saudi Arabia. In September 2011, he veteran of previous jihadist conflicts institute in Azaz.57 wrote for al-Qa`ida’s Vanguards of in Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Khurasan magazine about Saudi female and Kashmir, he served in at least two On January 18, 2014, `Abd Allah prisoners.42 He has kept a low profile jihadist combat tours in Afghanistan, Sulayman al-Dhabah (also known as during the infighting between the ISIL including one immediately after the Abu `Ali al-Qasimi), from Qassim, was and the rebels, although he is firmly on 9/11 attacks. After fleeing Afghanistan killed in al-Bab fighting with the ISIL. JN’s and Ahrar al-Sham’s side.43 Prior in early 2002, Jughaiman was captured He was killed by “sahwat,” a reference to the death of a key al-Qa`ida leader by Syrian authorities and imprisoned to the tribal uprising against al-Qa`ida in Syria, Abu Khalid al-Suri, who was for almost three years.48 in Iraq last decade, which has been used Ayman al-Zawahiri’s emissary for by the ISIL as a rhetorical tool against resolving the conflict between the ISIL Khalid al-Suwayd (also known as Abu any of their enemies within the Syrian and JN as well as a founding member Himam) died fighting against the al- rebellion. Prior to joining the ISIL, he and senior leader in Ahrar al-Sham, al- Assad regime in Damascus on March 5, was a member of JN. Previously, al- Sharikh stated that Abu Khalid confided 2013.49 Previously, he fought U.S. troops Dhabah fought in Afghanistan and in him that he believed the ISIL would in Iraq, presumably with al-Qa`ida in Pakistan with Abu al-Layth al-Libi send five inghimasi (fully committed) Iraq as part of a mortar team and later and the Pakistani Taliban’s Baitullah fighters to kill him.44 Following the an artillery team.50 He was arrested Mehsud. The main locations where initial announcement of al-Sharikh’s for two years after going to fight in he fought were Waziristan, Orakzai, “death,” there was a huge outpouring Iraq, and Saudi Arabia suspended his and Ghazni. He was also on Twitter: of support through the hashtag in passport.51 Unknown parties were able @mlng4455.58 Arabic “#Istishahid_Sanafi_alNasr” to transport him to Syria.52 He fought (Martyrdom of Sanafi al-Nasr), in eastern al-Ghuta before joining the Conclusion highlighting his career involvement fight in Damascus.53 During a raid In the case of Saudi foreign fighters, in jihad on a number of fronts.45 on the Ghasula security barrier, he past large-scale mobilizations have conducted a suicide-style attack with led to a number of consequences: Other Saudi Fighters four other foreign nationals from Saudi the rise of Bin Ladin and al-Qa`ida On October 20, 2012, Abu `Awn al- Arabia, Italy, Germany and Jordan that after the original anti-Soviet jihad Shamali died in Aleppo fighting for JN. allegedly killed 50-60 soldiers.54 Al- in Afghanistan in the 1980s, post- He conducted a suicide bombing in an Suwayd and the other assailants were 9/11 Saudis from the Afghan front explosives-laden vehicle at the French all killed in the attack.55 returning home and pursuing hospital. JN claimed that the attack an insurgency against the Saudi killed 300 people, while the Syrian Nayif al-Mutayri (also known as Abu al- government, and Saudis returning government said it only caused damage Bara’ al-Madani), who was from Mecca, from the Iraqi battlefield to join to the building.46 The operation was died fighting with the ISIL on January al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula detailed in JN’s official video release, 5, 2014. He was also a munshid (one who (AQAP) in Yemen, which led to attacks The Beginning of the End #5.47 does anashid) for the ISIL’s official nashid from Yemen into Saudi Arabia.59 There media outlet, the Ajnad Foundation for are already signs that some fighters `Abd al-`Aziz Jughayman (also Media Production.56 Abu Basir al-Murqi have gone to Yemen again to join AQAP known as `Abd al-Malik al-Ahsa’i), died fighting in Azaz for the ISIL also after fighting in Syria.60 who was from al-Ahsa, was killed fighting in Idlib on November 24, 2012. 48 “Sur # Istishahid al-Batal `Abd al-`Aziz_,” Ansar al- Mujahidin Forum, November 24, 2012; “Nazafa lakum February 3, 2009. Khabar Istishahid al-Batal `Abd al-`Aziz al-Jughayman 57 For details, see www.twitter.com/nashraljihad/sta- 42 Sanafi al-Nasr, “Hal sayafaji’na al-i’alam al-Sa’udi min al-Ahsa’ fi Bilad ash-Sham,”Shamukh al-Islam, No- tus/419879228067569664. bi-quwa’im al-matlubat,” Tali’a al-Khurasan, Issue #19, vember 24, 2012; “Saudi Man Killed After Three Decades 58 For more details, see www.shaghor.com/index. September 11, 2011. of Jihad,” Saudi Gazette, November 27, 2012. php?s=26&cat=10&subcat=7&id=1068#.UtrM86l- 43 Joscelyn. 49 “Al-Shahid al-Batal (Khalid al-Suwayd) min ardh jazi- 7B3A.facebook, www.twitter.com/silenttweep/sta- 44 For details, see www.twitter.com/Snafialnasr/sta- ra al-arab - Bilad al-Haramayn - wa-qisa istishahiduhu,” tus/424564345146593280, www.twitter.com/silent- tus/437590454604136448. Shamukh al-Islam, March 21, 2013. tweep/status/424564543415541761, www.twitter.com/ 45 For the entire archive, search on Twitter for 50 Ibid. silenttweep/status/424565071692324864. Also see # . 51 It is not clear which government arrested him. “Wanted Saudi al Qaeda Militant Killed in Syria: SITE,” 46 “Beginning of the End #5: Battle of the Commander 52 “Al-Shahid al-Batal (Khalid al-Suwayd) min ardh jazi- Reuters, January 24, 2014. Abu ‘Aisha: Blowing Up the Barracks of the French ra al-arab - Bilad al-Haramayn - wa-qisa istishahiduhu.” 59 Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower (New York: Al- Hospital in a Vehicle Martyrdom Operation,” Jabhat al- 53 Ibid. fred A. Knopf, 2006); Thomas Hegghammer, The Failure Nusra, January 10, 2013; “Qa’ima al-sharf: shuhada Bi- 54 Ibid. of Jihad in Saudi Arabia (West Point, NY: Combating Ter- lad al-Haramayn fi Suriyya al-habiba,” almadina55.com, 55 Ibid. rorism Center, 2010); Gregory D. Johnsen, The Last Ref- January 31, 2013; “Armed Forces Target Terrorists in 56 For details, see www.twitter.com/Bttar_mohajr/sta- uge: Yemen, al-Qaeda, and America’s War in Arabia (New Aleppo, Foil Terrorists’ Infiltration Attempts from Leba- tus/419852683122851841, www.twitter.com/AbuSiqr/ York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2013). non,” Syria News Agency, October 21, 2012. status/420725642217660416, and www.twitter.com/ 60 Rania El Gamal, “Saudis Hardened by Wars in Syria, 47 Ibid. zhoof1/status/421255925413187584/photo/1. Iraq Join al Qaeda in Yemen,” Reuters, March 14, 2014.

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While the Saudi government did not Mexico’s Vigilante Militias shifting and sometimes contradictory expend great effort to deter travel to position on the self-defense squads. It Syria,61 they have tried to be proactive in Rout the Knights Templar also looks at the future of the vigilantes, preventing violence once these fighters Drug Cartel and whether these groups will grow and return home.62 In early February 2014, become increasingly dangerous or be a the Saudi government issued a royal By Ioan Grillo passing phenomenon. order declaring that any citizen who fights in conflicts abroad will face mexican armed citizen militias, known Indigenous Origins three to twenty years of jail.63 A month as self-defense squads or autodefensas, The creation of Mexico’s self-defense later, the Saudis released a royal decree have mushroomed in early 2014 and squads is closely linked to the growth designating JN and al-Qa`ida in Iraq led a campaign that has dealt decisive of indigenous community police forces. (now known as the ISIL) as terrorist blows against the Knights Templar drug Mexico’s millions of indigenous people, organizations.64 cartel in the state of Michoacán. The who speak languages such as Mixtec vigilantes have changed the dynamic of and Nahuatl, have carried out a certain Furthermore, to deter more Mexico’s ongoing drug war. They have amount of self-policing for centuries.4 recruitment, the Saudis used the proved themselves as a significant third In 1995, amid heightened demands for television program Humumana (Our force—alongside government security indigenous rights that followed the Concerns) to promote the disillusioned forces and cartel gunmen—and have Zapatista uprising, indigenous activists Saudi foreign fighter Sulayman Sa`ud shown that powerful cartels can be in Guerrero state formed a network of Sbi`i after he returned home from vulnerable. community police forces, known as the Syria. The fighter described the Coordinadora Regional de Autoridades weaponization of takfir (declaring a Self-defense squads have won Comunitarios (CRAC), armed with Muslim an infidel, which in this context important support from residents in hunting rifles and shotguns.5 then implies that one can kill that person) Michoacán, in the neighboring state of among the different rebel groups. He Guerrero and in migrant communities As drug cartels wreaked increasing also noted how the Syrian jihad is not in the United States.1 Some see them as havoc in Guerrero in recent years, as glamorous as it is portrayed in the a sign of hope following years of cartel many indigenous residents turned to media and online.65 violence that ravaged many Mexican the community police, and the CRAC towns and villages. Others, however, has grown to command more than 1,500 At this juncture, due to the sheer worry about the rise of these vigilantes, volunteer officers in dozens of villages number of Saudis who have gone as a significant number of vigilante and small towns.6 The CRAC not only abroad to fight in Syria, there will gunmen have criminal records. In detains people, but also tries them likely be future ramifications. How recent months, for example, Mexican in village or regional assemblies and and when these ramifications occur police have arrested some vigilantes imprisons them in community jails.7 remains to be seen. for crimes including murder.2 Such arrests feed worries that vigilantism A Guerrero state law recognized the Aaron Y. Zelin is the Richard Borow Fellow will only inflame more violence, and CRAC as a legal force, but there is at The Washington Institute for Near East some fear that the self-defense squads fierce debate as to the parameters of Policy and the Rena and Sami David Fellow could begin to commit atrocities like the this parallel indigenous justice system.8 at the International Center for the Study of massacres perpetrated by paramilitaries The Mexican army has detained CRAC Radicalisation and Political Violence. He in Colombia in the late 1990s and early activists for carrying guns outside of their also runs the website Jihadology.net. 2000s.3 There are also signs of vigilante villages, while CRAC supporters have had groups spreading to other parts of violent clashes with state police.9 Mexico—including close to the U.S. border. 61 Early in the conflict, the Saudi government did not appear to actively try to stop individuals from traveling This article examines the roots of the 4 The history of indigenous self-policing is explained in abroad to fight in Syria. vigilante militias, their cadre, as well as “Justice at the Barrel of a Gun: Vigilante Militias in Mexi- 62 It is important to note that not all foreign fighters who how they arm and organize themselves. co,” International Crisis Group, May 28, 2013. It was also have gone to Syria are jihadists. Many in the beginning It examines the Mexican government’s detailed in personal interview, Raul Benitez-Manaut, fought with the Free Syrian Army. Center for Research on North America, National Au- 63 “182-184 | Royal Order: A Penalty of Imprisonment 1 Groups of migrants in California and other states have tonomous University of Mexico, Mexico City, Mexico, To All Those Who Participated In Hostilities Outside organized in support of the vigilantes. See Raymundo March 17, 2014. the Kingdom or Belonging to the Streams or Religious Pérez Arellano and Luis Díaz, “Autodefensas USA,” Not- 5 Personal interview, Eliseo Villar, leader of CRAC, Chil- Groups and Radical Ideas,” Wa-Kala al-Anba’ al- icieros Televisa, February 4, 2014. pancingo, Mexico, April 2013. Sa’udiyya, February 3, 2014. 2 Mark Stevenson, “Another Mexican Vigilante Accused 6 Ibid. 64 “Full Text of Saudi Interior Ministry Statement of Murder,” Associated Press, March 31, 2014. 7 Ibid. Designating Terrorist Organizations,” Asharq Alawsat, 3 The fear of the vigilantes turning into Colombian-style 8 For details, see the following state law: Ley Numero March 8, 2014. paramilitaries was voiced most forcefully by Human 701 De Reconocimiento, Derechos y Cultura de los Pueb- 65 “Al-Halaqa al-Sadisa: tujarib shabab maghrur bi- Rights Watch Americas Director Jose Miguel Vivanco. los y Comunidades Indigenas del Estado de Guerrero. him,” March 5, 2014, available at www.youtube.com/ See “Mexico’s Response to Vigilante Groups Insuffi- 9 Sergio Ocampo, “Se Enfrentan Policias de Guerrero y watch?v=lQ8SS1HmT2o. cient,” Agence France-Presse, January 21, 2014. Comunitarios en el Fortin,” La Jornada, March 19, 2014.

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In neighboring Michoacán state, some Fighting the Knights Templar Moreno was killed by Mexican marines indigenous residents inspired by The vigilante militias that rose in in March 2014.23 The Knights often the CRAC also took up guns against Michoacán’s Tierra Caliente in February behead or mutilate their victims and criminals. Most notably, a group of the 2013 quickly became a larger and better- leave their heads in discotheques or indigenous Purepecha people in the armed force than their counterparts town squares.24 Cheran municipality armed themselves in Guerrero.16 This is partially due to in 2011 to fight illegal logging and the fact that they had access to higher- The Knights also stood out for violence from the Knights Templar quality resources.17 Members were not the way they dominated the local cartel.10 Again citing their indigenous indigenous campesinos (peasant farmers), Michoacán economy. They diversified rights to self-policing, the Cheran but included many large farm owners from trafficking drugs into a more residents constructed barricades made and businessmen.18 They also had to substantial portfolio of crimes, of sandbags to guard the entrances to including kidnapping, extorting their town.11 Such barricades provide an businesses large and small, illegal effective defensive position to fend off “While Guerrero vigilantes mining and illegal logging.25 This cartel gunmen and have since been built fought peripheral cells of diversification into crimes that directly by the vigilantes across large swathes of harm civil society is an important Michoacán and Guerrero. fragmented drug gangs, factor that led to the formation of the the Michoacán self-defense vigilantes. In Guerrero, thousands of vigilantes rose up in the Costa Chica area squads faced one of the Other Mexican cartels such as the Zetas in January 2013 to fight cartel most powerful cartels have also moved into a range of criminal kidnappers and extortionists plaguing activities, but the Knights Templar was the mountains.12 These vigilantes in Mexico, the Knights perhaps the most systematic cartel, were led by indigenous Mixtec Bruno Templar.” extorting almost every business in Placido, a seasoned community police its territories. Corn growers say they activist.13 Yet the vigilantes rapidly were forced to sell their maize at three spilled over into non-indigenous pesos a kilo to the Knights Templar, villages and neighborhoods. The become a more potent armed force just who subsequently sold it to tortilla movement thus ceased to be a purely to survive.19 While Guerrero vigilantes makers for six pesos; lime and avocado indigenous affair, governed by self- fought peripheral cells of fragmented farmers paid a percentage on every ton determination laws, and entered drug gangs, the Michoacán self-defense of fruit they grew; local stores, builders, the majority Spanish-speaking squads faced one of the most powerful restaurants, and gas stations all paid population. cartels in Mexico, the Knights Templar. monthly quotas.26 The failure of the If the vigilantes did not fight together government to stop these pervasive The Costa Chica vigilantes carried and use more effective weapons, they extortion schemes is cited by the more potent weapons such as AR- would be defeated.20 Michoacán self-defense squads as their 15s and Uzis, as well as shotguns and main justification for taking up arms. hunting rifles.14 They also pioneered The Knights Templar cartel has the tactic of deploying hundreds grabbed media headlines for its “We believe that when the government of vigilantes to sweep into towns, cult-like practices and pseudo- is incapable of taking care of the people, overwhelming cartel gunmen.15 The religious ideology as well as its of defending the people, the people following month, self-defense squads brutal violence.21 The templarios name have the right to defend themselves,” rose in the seething Tierra Caliente themselves after medieval crusaders to said Estanislao Beltran, a leader and area of Michoacán using identical appear brave and righteous even as they spokesman of the Michoacán self- tactics. traffic crystal meth, heroin, marijuana defense squads. “The people here, and cocaine. They have a book of codes, fed up of the injustice caused by the conduct rituals in mock medieval armor Knights Templar said ‘basta,’ and they and idolize their leader Nazario “The rose up.”27 Maddest One” Moreno like a saint.22

10 Karla Zabludovsky, “Reclaiming the Forests and the 16 Personal reporting in Apatzingan, Paracuaro, Bue- Right to Feel Safe,” New York Times, August 2, 2012. navista, Antunez and Nueva Italia, Mexico, January, 11 Ibid. February and March 2014. 23 Ibid. 12 Personal reporting in Tierra Colorada, Guerrero, April 17 Ibid. 24 “Hallan Cuatro Cuerpos Decapitados en un Convulso 2013. Also see Adam Thomson, “Mexico Vigilantes Take 18 Ibid. Estado de Mexico,” El Dia, February 5, 2014. Law Into Own Hands,” Financial Times, April 12, 2013. 19 Ibid. 25 Dave Graham, “Chinese Iron Trade Fuels Port Clash 13 Ibid. 20 Ibid. With Mexican Drug Cartel,” Reuters, January 1, 2014. 14 This author witnessed vigilantes carrying these guns 21 Ioan Grillo, “Crusaders of Meth: Mexico’s Deadly 26 Personal interviews, businessmen and residents, Ap- during personal reporting in Tierra Colorada, Guerrero, Knights Templar,” Time Magazine, June 23, 2011. atzingan, Paracuaro, Buenavista, Antunez and Nueva April 2013. 22 Ibid.; Catherine E. Shoichet, “Notorious Mexican Car- Italia, Mexico, January, February and March 2014. 15 Personal reporting in Tierra Colorada, Guerrero, tel Leader Nazario Moreno Dead – Again,” CNN, March 27 Personal interview, vigilante leader Estanislao Bel- April 2013. 11, 2014. tran, Apatzingan, Mexico, February 2014.

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A Grueling Campaign attempted to fight them off, carrying a When the vigilantes led a major When the self-defense squads of rocket launcher.36 The vigilantes shot offensive into Nueva Italia and Michoacán’s Tierra Caliente first rose, him dead before he could return fire. Paracuaro, Michoacán, in January they were vulnerable to the heavily 2014, provoking prolonged firefights, armed Knights Templar and cornered in A vigilante known by the nom de guerre more than 12,000 police and soldiers a few towns and villages. They defended Comandante Cinco has led several of the descended on the state to keep themselves with layers of defensive major offensives. He stated that his men order. The government then forged barricades, manned day and night by will pardon lower level Knights Templar an effective alliance with the self- vigilantes armed with assault rifles.28 members, but the higher-level gangsters defense squads, holding a series of They gradually spread to neighboring and killers must flee or risk death.37 towns and villages, establishing cells “We have to kill them,” he said. “If they of vigilantes in each territory they captured me, do you think they would “The failure of the entered.29 The balance of power shifted let me live?”38 There has been no official government to stop these decisively in 2014, when the vigilantes count of the casualties from fighting advanced into the key towns of between the Knights Templar and self- pervasive extortion Paracuaro and Nueva Italia in January defense squads, but one vigilante said schemes is cited by the and Apatzingan in February.30 that more than 200 had been killed on both sides during a year of fighting.39 Michoacán self-defense The self-defense squads form cells of While concerning, this is a fraction of squads as their main about 10 men, led by a coordinator. the more than 70,000 estimated to have These coordinators in turn answer to been killed in cartel related violence in justification for taking up local or regional commanders.31 About Mexico since late 2006.40 arms.” 30 commanders sit on a governing council, responsible for major decisions Shifting Government Response and strategies in Michoacán.32 By April The government of President Enrique 2014, thousands of vigilantes bore arms Pena Nieto has led a varied and shifting meetings with their leaders.43 Some in 30 municipalities in the state.33 policy on the self-defense squads. After vigilantes became members of the the vigilantes first rose in the Tierra Rural Defense Corps—a volunteer corps The vigilantes smuggle in guns bought Caliente in 2013, the army arrested 51 linked to the Mexican army44—while illegally in the United States and capture members for the possession of illegal others continued to operate illegally, others from the Knights Templar.34 Some weapons.41 The vigilante movement but were still tolerated, operating of the vigilantes already had firearms defied these detentions and continued side-by-side with federal police and experience because they were members to grow and gain public support, with soldiers.45 The vigilante leaders say of rifle clubs. They also trained with leaders appearing on top television they passed information to the security members who had served in the Mexican news shows and opinion polls showing forces, including names and addresses army, learning tactics such as how to public sympathy toward them.42 of Templar leaders.46 advance into gunfire.35 Security forces were then cautious about arresting more vigilantes as their Pena Nieto, who had condemned Vigilantes often fight defensively numbers multiplied. vigilante justice, supported this against Knights Templar gunmen who new position. “Some of the so-called ambush them at barricades on the edge self-defense squads have genuinely of their communities. In other cases, organized themselves to defend against they fight offensively, confronting 36 Photojournalists captured images of the dead Knights the incursion of organized crime,” 47 cartel shooters as they advance into Templar gunman bearing the rocket launcher. he said. This effective alliance was towns. When vigilante groups took 37 Personal interview, vigilante leader Comandante Cin- formed when the vigilantes were in a Paracuaro in January 2014, a gangster co, Paracuaro, January 2014. position of strength and had gained 38 Ibid. the upper hand against the Knights 28 Personal interviews, vigilantes and vigilante com- 39 Personal interview, vigilante commander, Apatzin- Templar. With the security forces manders, Apatzingan, Paracuaro, Buenavista, Antunez gan, March 2014. and Nueva Italia, Mexico, January, February and March 40 While there is discussion about the number of deaths 43 Dudley Althaus, “With Friends Like These, Can Mex- 2014. caused by cartel related violence, most concur that at ico Find Justice?” Global Post, March 13, 2014. 29 Ibid. least 70,000 have been killed since December 2006, 44 “Mexico To Integrate Vigilantes Into Security Forc- 30 Ibid. using counts provided by the government and those by es,” BBC, January 28, 2014. 31 Ibid. Mexican media. 45 Richard Fausset, “Mexico Vigilantes Backed By 32 Ibid. 41 “Suman 51 Miembros de Grupo de Autodefensa De- Troops March Into Key City In Michoacán,” Los Angeles 33 Ibid. tenidos en Mexico,” Prensa Libre, March 12, 2013. Times, February 8, 2014. 34 Ibid. Also see Mark Stevenson, “Mexico Drug War: 42 Various opinion polls showed positive public per- 46 Personal interviews, vigilante barricades, Apatzin- 70 Percent of Guns Seized Originate in U.S.,” Associ- ception of the self-defense squads. One in January 2014 gan, Paracuaro, Buenavista, Antunez and Nueva Italia, ated Press, June 13, 2011; Tim Johnson, “253,000 Guns found that 52.3% said the vigilantes were good and only Mexico, January, February and March 2014. Smuggled to Mexico Annually, Study Finds,” McClatchy 29.7% said they were bad. See “Encuesta: Crece El Apoyo 47 Georgina Olson, “Pena Nieto: habia policias coopta- Newspapers, March 18, 2013. de Ciuadanos a Las Autodefensas,” ADNPolitico, Janu- das en Michoacan, zonas con debilidad institucional,” 35 Ibid. ary 29, 2014. Excelsior, January 24, 2014.

16 april 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 4 and vigilantes moving against the Nevertheless, this made the ranks of what groups such as the CRAC can do gangsters, the group of criminals who the vigilantes increasingly filled with and finding mechanisms to control have controlled Michoacan since about people who had served prison time, the authentic vigilantes.59 “We need 2006 largely collapsed, losing territory trafficked drugs or committed even to find an exit for these exceptional and resources. Mexican marines killed worse crimes. circumstances, a way to reintegrate Knights Templar leader Moreno and vigilantes into society, perhaps an his deputy Enrique Plancarte in March Spreading to Other States amnesty for crimes they committed 2014.48 This toppling of the Knights While vigilantes battle cartels in in fighting the Knights Templar,” he Templar sent shockwaves across the Michoacán and Guerrero, self-defense argued.60 Mexican crime world, as their gangsters squads have emerged in several other took refuge in surrounding states.49 states. In March 2014, groups of Conclusion indigenous Yaquis in Sonora, which Mexico’s vigilante self-defense squads As the Knights Templar were being borders Arizona, announced the began as an authentic movement to routed, however, the government formation of “Community Guards” to fight cartels, copying and expanding turned once again on the vigilantes. on the tactics developed by indigenous In March and early April, police and community police. The vigilantes clearly soldiers arrested dozens of members “A number of vigilantes broke laws, but they claimed they were of self-defense squads for crimes openly admitted that they forced to take up arms because the including murder, kidnapping, theft government failed to defend them. They and possession of illegal firearms.50 had worked for the Knights were effective in pushing the cartels out Among those arrested was founding Templar cartel before of territory because they could attack member Hipolitio Mora, imprisoned on their base in the community in a way the accusation he ordered the killing of ‘flipping’ sides to the self- that the government had failed. When a fellow vigilante.51 defense squads.” vigilantes and security forces worked together, they routed one of Mexico’s Mexico’s federal Attorney General Jesus most powerful cartels, the Knights Murillo Karam stated he had evidence Templar. that many of the firearms used by the stop drug producers who force them vigilantes had been provided by the off their land to grow marijuana.55 Also Despite these successes, it is important rival Jalisco New Generation Cartel, in March, a group handed out leaflets to note that some elements of the adding to widespread accusations in Tamaulipas, across the border self-defense squads are accused of about suspected gangster support from Texas, calling itself the “Alberto receiving resources from rival cartels.61 for the vigilante groups.52 While it Carrera Torres Brigade,” after a local Furthermore, the vigilantes have is clearly not the case that the entire revolutionary, and promising to target increasingly filled their ranks with self-defense movement is controlled the Zetas cartel.56 Different forms of former criminals and gangsters. They by the Jalisco Cartel, it is likely that vigilante groups have also appeared have been plagued by infighting among some vigilantes may work for them. A in Veracruz, Tabasco, Jalisco and commanders and accusations of crimes number of vigilantes openly admitted Oaxaca.57 in the territories they control. The that they had worked for the Knights Mexican government needs to forge a Templar cartel before “flipping” sides Nevertheless, whereas there are coherent policy to define the role of to the self-defense squads.53 Vigilante thousands of vigilantes in Michoacán community police while it reestablishes commanders defend the recruitment and Guerrero, there are only dozens the rule of law in these areas. If of former templarios by saying they in the other states. Alejandro Hope, vigilantes continue to be illegal but were better off having them on their a security analyst at the Mexican informally tolerated, they could keep side than working against them.54 Institute for Competitiveness and a spreading into other states and, though former member of Mexico’s intelligence well intentioned, further deteriorate 48 Olga Rodriguez, “Enrique Plancarte, Leader of Bru- services, warned that there is danger of Mexico’s rule of law and precipitate tal Mexican Knights Templar Cartel, Dead,” Associated the self-defense squads spreading if the another cycle of violence. Press, April 1, 2014. government does not forge a coherent 58 49 Rodrigo Villegas, “El Efecto Cucaracha,” Reporte In- policy to deal with them. One policy, Ioan Grillo is a journalist based in Mexico digo, January 21, 2014. Hope said, could involve a new federal City. He has covered Latin America 50 “Suman 54 Autodefensas Detenidos,” Quadratin, community police law defining exactly and the Caribbean since 2001 for media March 31, 2014. including Time Magazine, Reuters and 51 Adriana Gomez, “Mexico Charges Vigilante Leader gan and Antunez, February 2014. the Sunday Telegraph. He is author of the With Murder,” Associated Press, March 14, 2014. 55 Astrid Rivera, “Surgen en Sonora Autodefensas,” El book El Narco: Inside Mexico’s Criminal 52 Richard Fausset and Cecilia Sanchez, “Mexico Official Universal, March 27, 2014. Insurgency, which was a finalist for the Says Some Vigilante Arms Supplied By Drug Cartel,” Los 56 “Anuncian La Creacion de Una Brigada de Autode- Los Angeles Times’ Festival of Books and Angeles Times, January 30, 2014. fensa en Tamaulipas,” Proceso, March 5, 2014. The Orwell Prize. 53 Personal interviews, vigilante barricades, Apatzin- 57 “Autodefensas Se Expanden a 10 Estados del Pais gan, Paracuaro, Buenavista, Antunez and Nueva Italia, Afirma Estudio,”Sin Embargo, September 22, 2013. 59 Ibid. Mexico, January, February and March 2014. 58 Personal interview, Alejandro Hope, Mexican Insti- 60 Ibid. 54 Personal interviews, vigilante commanders, Apatzin- tute for Competitiveness, March 2014. 61 Fausset.

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Drug Trafficking, led by philosophy professor Abimael with state counterterrorism and Guzmán, waged a violent campaign counternarcotics efforts. Terrorism, and Civilian against any actor positioned to Self-Defense in Peru challenge their Maoist revolutionary This article offers a summary of Peru’s program.6 Guzmán and his followers counternarcotics strategy, showing how By Steven T. Zech originally targeted symbols of power the Peruvian state has attempted to in an effort to highlight social and simultaneously address security issues peru is poised to become the focal economic injustice, as well as the related to illegal narcotics production point of global efforts to combat the inability of the state to address the and armed Sendero militants. It then production and transportation of illegal people’s needs.7 The campaign later identifies the challenges faced by narcotics in South America. Between devolved into the indiscriminate and many communities affected by the 2006 and 2011, U.S. agencies provided brutal targeting of civilians, security $5.2 billion in counternarcotics support forces, and political actors alike.8 After “The Peruvian case to the Andean region of South America Guzmán’s arrest in 1992, state security to curb the annual flow of hundreds forces halted the revolutionary group’s provides a unique of metric tons of cocaine.1 Although momentum and eventually defeated the opportunity for Colombia received 76% of this funding, armed insurgency. Peru is now the world’s largest producer policymakers to learn from of coca leaves and is rapidly expanding Today, however, the remnants of the successes and failures domestic cocaine production.2 In June Sendero movement protect the illicit 2012, Peruvian President Ollanta narcotics trade and use the profits when civilians help to Humala gave the inaugural speech at to strengthen their organization and combat security threats.” the International Anti-Drug Conference acquire advanced weaponry.9 Drug in Lima. He assured members from traffickers and Sendero militants have more than 70 delegations that Peru disrupted local economies, generated is committed to a global effort to increased insecurity, and stunted post- illicit drug trade, as communities reduce the production, transport, and conflict institutional development in contend with state security forces, consumption of illegal narcotics. At many regions that cultivate illegal “narcoterrorists,” as well as legal and the conference, the European Union coca. As policymakers and state economic pressures related to coca pledged 34 million euros to help security forces in Peru address these cultivation. Finally, the article examines implement Peru’s 2012-2016 Anti-Drug challenges, they must now also contend the participation of civilian actors in Strategy.3 Since his election in 2011, with a growing number of civilian self- confronting security challenges. It finds President Humala has strengthened defense forces. Civilian actors played that civilian actors played a critical part Peru’s ties with the Barack Obama a crucial role in the initial defeat of in Sendero Luminoso’s original defeat administration and in the coming year Sendero Luminoso in the 1990s, and and will likely play an equally important the United States will almost double its many communities have reactivated role in combating the contemporary support for Peruvian counternarcotics local self-defense forces in the last few “narcoterrorist” threat. and development efforts with a $100 years. In some parts of Peru, armed million contribution.4 civilian patrols confront criminal and Peru’s Anti-Drug Strategy insurgent organizations, and they will When President Humala first took office Strong ties between drug traffickers play an increasingly important role in in 2011, La Comisión Nacional para el and remnants of the Sendero Luminoso addressing the challenges associated Desarrollo y Vida sin Drogas (DEVIDA), (Shining Path) insurgency from Peru’s anti-drug agency, announced the 1980s and 1990s complicate Bruce H. Kay, “Violent Opportunities: The Rise and Fall that it would scale back forced coca counterterrorism and counternarcotics of ‘King Coca’ and Shining Path,” Journal of Interamerican eradication and focus efforts on 5 efforts in Peru. Sendero Luminoso, Studies and World Affairs 41:3 (1999): pp. 97-127; John T. development projects and programs to 10 Fishel, “Coca, Cocaine, Sicarios and Senderistas,” in Gra- promote social inclusion. Peru’s Anti- 1 Counternarcotics Assistance: U.S. Agencies Have Allotted ham H. Turbiville ed., Global Dimensions of High Intensity Drug Strategy of 2012-2016 emphasizes Billions in Andean Countries, but DOD Should Improve Its Crime and Low Intensity Conflict (Chicago: University of Il- a holistic, multifaceted approach to 11 Reporting of Results (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government linois at Chicago, 1995): pp. 184-203; David Scott Palmer combating drug production. The Accountability Office, 2012). and Alberto Bolivar, “Peru’s Shining Path: Recent Dy- 2 Perú Monitoreo de Cultivos de Coca 2012 (New York: UN namics and Future Prospects,” Western Hemisphere 10 John M. Walsh and Coletta A. Youngers, “Interna- Office on Drugs and Crime, 2013). Security Analysis Center, 2011. tional ‘Anti-Drug’ Summit in Peru Attempts to Maintain 3 “Peru: Uniting Against Drug Trafficking,” Diálogo, Oc- 6 Ibid. Drug War Status Quo: Will It Succeed?” Washington Of- tober, 1, 2012. 7 Ibid. fice on Latin America, June 22, 2012. 4 Simeon Tegel, “As US Ups Aid to Peru’s Drug Battle, 8 Ibid. 11 The full document, Estrategia Nacional de Lucha Con- Farmers Say They Will Fight to Defend Cocaine Source,” 9 William Neuman, “Guerrilla Faction Leader is Cap- tra las Drogas 2012-2016, is available at www.peru.gob. NBC News, October 12, 2013. tured in Peru,” New York Times, February 12, 2012; Kelly pe/docs/PLANES/11793/PLAN_11793_Estrategia_Na- 5 For more on the historical relationship between Send- Hearn, “Shining Path on New Road as Drug Smugglers,” cional_de_Lucha_contra_las_Drogas_2012-2016_2012.pdf. ero Luminoso and drug traffickers, see Gabriela Taraz- Washington Times, April 25, 2012; Kelly Hearn, “Peru The summary and implementation plan for DEVIDA, ona-Sevillano and John B. Reuter, Sendero Luminoso and Guerrillas Set Aside Rebellion for Drug Money,” Wash- Estrategia Nacional de Lucha Contra las Drogas 2012-2016, the Threat of Narcoterrorism (New York: Praeger, 1990); ington Times, April 26, 2012. is available at www.devida.gob.pe/images/documentos-

18 april 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 4 initiatives outlined in the 2012- drug cultivation and trafficking. For He believes that removing incentives 2016 strategy include alternative example, the PNP had only one base offered by illegal narcotics production development efforts, various forms dedicated to counternarcotics efforts will eventually eliminate Sendero of interdiction, as well as prevention in the communities surrounding the militants. Carmen Masías, the head of and treatment programs aimed at Apurimac, Ene, and Mantaro River DEVIDA, also recognized the symbiotic drug users. Many of the regions most valleys (the VRAEM) in 2012, while the relationship between Sendero and the affected by counternarcotics initiatives, armed forces combating terrorism had illegal drug economy. He emphasized the however, have become increasingly 29 bases.15 Counterterrorism efforts in need to focus on eradication: “There are militarized as key political leaders communities cultivating illegal coca leftover terrorists to attack, but that’s and state security forces implement generate additional challenges, as the not the main problem. This year we’ve these strategies. Peru has prioritized military and police attempt to implement invested three billion [Peruvian] soles particular elements of interdiction and state counternarcotics strategies.16 in the VRAEM and [coca cultivation] eradication as evidenced by Humala’s didn’t go down a single hectare. commitment to eradicate 50% more Communities in the VRAEM are bracing When you don’t eradicate, it doesn’t illegal coca plants in 2013 than 2012.12 themselves for the Peruvian state’s affect drug-trafficking.”19 For Masías, Actual eradication surpassed targets response to expanding coca plantations successful counternarcotics policy with the removal of 23,600 hectares of and processing sites.17 Closer ties to the must include actively eliminating coca coca crops in 2013, and DEVIDA has United States and increased dependence crops. These two key actors in Peruvian set an ambitious 30,000 hectare target on U.S. funding may influence Peru’s counternarcotics strategy think that for 2014.13 Although key policymakers counternarcotics strategy to mirror the key to success includes interdiction recognize the importance of pairing past efforts in Colombia that prioritize (limiting supplies and transport) and eradication with development and social eradication. A close alliance between eradication (removing crops). inclusion programs, they often prioritize drug traffickers and Sendero militants security concerns.14 The national police exacerbates the danger of militarizing Peruvian security forces have also (Policía Nacional del Perú, PNP) and counternarcotics efforts. Sendero actively engaged in counterterrorism the armed forces simultaneously Luminoso militants have taken on a operations. The arrest of Sendero leader combat the two primary sources of mercenary role, and key political and Florindo Eleuterio Flores Hala (known regional insecurity: drug traffickers military decision-makers believe that as Comrade Artemio) in the Upper and the remnants of the Sendero attacking the insurgent group’s financial Huallaga Valley in 2012, as well as the Luminoso insurgency. Until recently, lifeline will lead to Sendero’s defeat. deaths of “Alipio” and “Gabriel” in the they have prioritized counterterrorism VRAEM in 2013, removed important efforts over halting the expansion of For example, General Leonardo Longa obstacles hindering state security López, the new head of the VRAEM forces’ ability to enter these regions disponibles/PPT_ENLCD_2012-2016.pdf. Special Command, explained recent to combat terrorism and illegal drug 20 12 In his annual address to the Peruvian public, Presi- Sendero attacks and kidnappings after production. The December 2013 arrest dent Humala noted that in 2012 they eradicated more a period of inactivity. Longa suggested of Alexander Dimas Huaman (also than 14,000 hectares of illegal coca plants and in 2013 that these actions are Sendero’s last known as Héctor), Artemio’s successor, they sought to eradicate 22,000 more. See “Mensaje desperate reaction to the military’s caused the head of Peru’s national a la Nación del Señor Presidente Constitucional de la efforts to halt drug trafficking in the drug police to declare that Sendero has República Ollanta Humala Tasso, con motivo del 192° region. “The production supplies disappeared from the Upper Huallaga Aniversario de la Independencia Nacional,” Presiden- aren’t getting through and the terrorist Valley and that the region has been 21 cia de la República del Perú, July 28, 2013. More recent remnants have withdrawn,” he said. pacified. Yet despite recent arrests that figures place DEVIDA eradication goals at 30,000 hect- “There are fewer and fewer [terrorists] dealt temporary blows to the Quispe 18 22 ares. See Vanessa Romo Espinoza, “Devida afirma que se because they’re abandoning the ranks.” Palomino clan that now controls entrará al Vraem para erradicar hoja de coca,” El Comer- cio, January 3, 2014. 15 Hans Huerto Amado, “¿Qué es el Plan VRAE y por Comercio, March 2, 2014. 13 Charles Parkinson, “Peru Sets Record Coca Eradica- qué no funciona?” El Comercio, April 16, 2012. The 19 Espinoza. The exchange rate between the nuevo sol tion Target for 2014,” InSight Crime, January 6, 2014. To VRAEM region produces the most illegal coca in Peru and the U.S. dollar is about 2.75 to 1. reach these new goals, Peru will need to expand eradica- and is home to the strongest holdout of Sendero Lumi- 20 For more on the arrest of “Artemio,” see William tion efforts to areas controlled by criminal organizations noso insurgents. The VRAEM and the Upper Huallaga Neuman, “Guerrilla Faction Leader is Captured in Peru,” and Sendero militants protecting the coca crop. Valley are the two regions with the strongest Sendero New York Times, February 12, 2012; “Peru Shining Path 14 For example, the head of DEVIDA, Carmen Masías, and drug trafficking presence. Leader Comrade Artemio Captured,” BBC, February and Peru’s new president of the Council of Ministers, 16 Pablo G. Dreyfus, “When All the Evils Come Together: 13, 2012. For more on “Alipio” and “Gabriel,” see Oscar César Villanueva, both suggested that eradication must Cocaine, Corruption, and Shining Path in Peru’s Upper Castilla, “Cabecilla de Sendero pidió a terroristas reagru- be accompanied by development efforts. See Sebastian Huallaga Valley, 1980 to 1995,” Journal of Contemporary parse tras caída de ‘Alipio’ y ‘Gabriel,’” El Comercio, Au- Ortiz Martínez, “Devida: Villanueva ‘contribuirá a re- Criminal Justice 15:4 (1999): pp. 370-396. gust 17, 2013; Mariella Balbi, “Jaime Antezana: ‘El clan forzar’ lucha antidrogas en el Vraem,” El Comercio, Oc- 17 Although total coca cultivation in Peru actually de- Quispe Palomino no volverá a ser igual,’” El Comercio, tober 31, 2013. When asked about his new role, however, creased 3.4% in 2012, cultivation levels rose in many August 19, 2013. Villanueva suggested that he will prioritize security. See regions, including in the VRAEM. See Perú Monitoreo de 21 “Con captura de ‘Héctor,’ Sendero Luminoso desapare- Gerardo Caballero and José Santillan, “Cambio ministe- Cultivos de Coca 2012, p. 26. cería en el Huallaga,” El Comercio, December 9, 2013. rial: los detalles de la llegada de Villanueva a la PCM,” El 18 Raul Mayo Filo and Vanessa Romo Espinoza, “Recru- 22 The Quispe Palomino clan is a powerful drug pro- Comercio, October 31, 2013. decen los ataques terroristas en la zona del Vraem,” El ducing and trafficking organization operating in the

19 april 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 4 much of the VRAEM, civilians in that Sendero Luminoso Threats and the Failure of some would voluntarily grow cacao, region remain doubtful about the a Coca Economy coffee, and other plants instead of coca. military’s capacity and intentions.23 Civilians in Peru feel they are once again One farmer explained, “Of course! We The Quispe Palomino clan, headed caught “between two fires,” fearful of would eradicate ourselves. We wouldn’t by brothers Víctor and Jorge (aliases violent reprisals from both Sendero and need the army or police to do it. It would “camarada José” and “camarada state security forces. One coca farmer be magnificent.”33 Coca has not provided Raúl”), recently demonstrated their in the VRAEM explained the dangers of a solution to the economic hardships ability to recover quickly from leaving his modest wooden home during faced by farmers and their families, military blows to their organization the night and warned, “You should not and few farmers have made substantial by reasserting control over key drug use a candle or flashlight.”26 He pointed profits through illegal coca.34 routes shortly after sweeping arrests up into the hills to the north. “The of suspected narcoterrorist actors. military controls that area over there.”27 Apart from continued poverty, Armed columns of narcoterrorists Then he pointed toward the hills to the farmers in the region have also took several communities by force, west, “And Sendero controls that area started to recognize the devastating despite supposedly being under over there. Either one of them might environmental effects of illegal coca military protection.24 Furthermore, take a shot at you if they see a light.”28 cultivation. They have experienced an indiscriminate military response Civilians often find themselves in an environmental degradation in the in some communities left civilians with impossible situation with few options to questions about the military’s concern ensure the safety of their families and for their well-being. One civilian improve their lives. Communities must “Civilian support and described the military operation that avoid accusations and physical attacks participation may prove followed as a barrage of missile fire from two fronts: state security forces from a helicopter around the periphery and Sendero militants. crucial in defeating of their village without clear targets.25 remnants of the Sendero For example, during a spike in violence in 2008, the military killed numerous Luminoso insurgency villagers in one VRAEM community and halting the expansion whom they labeled “subversives.”29 Months later, guerrillas came and of illegal narcotics VRAEM. The group focuses on drug trafficking, but abducted the village leader for production.” maintains at least a nominal connection to Sendero Lu- supposedly collaborating with the 30 minoso and their political ideology. The family and their military. Today, many communities organization had close ties to the revolutionary move- continue to help Sendero Luminoso 31 ment and its leadership dating back to the conflict in the out of fear. With punitive violence form of a disappearing jungle canopy, 1980s and 1990s. The current leadership are the children from both Sendero and state security the elimination of native wildlife like of Martin Quispe, one of the founding members of Send- forces, combined with increased drug monkeys and parrots, and widespread 35 ero Luminoso, in Ayacucho. For more information on the eradication efforts that threaten some soil erosion. More frequent harvests Quispe Palomino clan, see “La historia de la última gen- farmers’ livelihoods, many communities drain vital nutrients from the earth, eración de Sendero: el clan Quispe Palomino,” Panorama, in the region want change or to simply and pesticides used to protect the 32 August 18, 2013; “Clan Quispe Palomino es una poderosa be left alone. vulnerable coca leaves have poisoned organización de la droga, afirman,” RPP Noticias, April the soil. The effects of coca cultivation 22, 2012. Market pressures to grow the most have disrupted the production of other 23 Contemporary drug production is organized around profitable crops with more frequent important agricultural staples such as 36 clans or firmas based on local kinship or friendship ties. harvests originally led local farmers to yucca. Collaborating with Sendero These groups maintain close relationships with groups embrace illegal coca production. If local of peasants that cultivate coca leaves and control drug farmers could make a similar living 33 Tegel. trafficking out of the region. Some clans form alliances cultivating alternative crops, however, 34 Isaías Rojas, “The Push for Zero Coca: Democratic with Sendero members while others directly participate Transition and Counternarcotics Policy in Peru,” Drug in Sendero Luminoso activities. Sendero simultaneously 26 Personal interview, coca farmer, VRAEM, Peru, May War Monitor 2:1 (2003). Coca farmers have traditionally assists peasants involved in coca cultivation and pro- 14, 2013. made more than those who cultivate other agricultural vides protection for drug traffickers. See Vanda Felbab- 27 Ibid. goods, although these individual financial gains have not Brown, Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on 28 Ibid. led to broader regional economic development or facili- Drugs (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2010), 29 Simon Romero, “Cocaine Trade Helps Rebels Reig- tated social mobility. See Felbab-Brown, pp. 37-38. pp. 66-67. nite War in Peru,” New York Times, March 17, 2009. 35 Personal interview, nephew of a coca plantation own- 24 Gustavo Kanashiro Fonken, “El clan Quispe Palomi- 30 Ibid. er, VRAEM, Peru, May 14, 2013. He recently returned to no se ha recompuesto y recupera fuerzas en la selva,” El 31 “En el Vraem hay pobladores que se sienten obligados the region after more than 20 years away and described Comercio, October 18, 2013. a ayudar a SL, dice José Cueto,” El Comercio, August 20, the numerous environmental changes he observed as a 25 Ibid. Also, one coca farmer an hour outside Llochegua 2013. result of transitioning to coca cultivation. Other crops noted an increase in the frequency of helicopter flights 32 A teacher in one community stated, “What we want yield harvests around twice a year, while farmers harvest overhead with no change in the presence of armed state is that neither side interrupts our lives.” See Joshua Part- coca leaves four or five times per year. actors on the ground. See personal interview, coca farm- low, “In Peru, a Rebellion Reborn,” Washington Post, No- 36 One coca farmer’s wife explained that yucca used to er, Peru, May 14, 2013. vember 12, 2008. be easier to find and much larger. Since they began to use

20 april 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 4 and drug traffickers has failed to to combat Sendero Luminoso.43 Early have largely chosen not to become improve the lives of farmers and has CADs developed “organically” through involved in issues related to drug disrupted some indigenous groups’ the communities’ own volition. As the trafficking and terrorism, many of cultural traditions.37 Forced eradication conflict progressed, the armed forces the mountain communities leaving by state security forces, however, will sometimes stepped in to co-opt these the VRAEM have recently reactivated likely harm communities tied to the nascent organizations to provide them patrols to respond to these challenges. coca economy. Eradication does not with logistical and material support, or For example, 24 communities around work without supplementary programs in some cases to compel communities Luricocha coordinate with each other that generate broad and equitable to organize if they had failed to do so to train, organize patrols, and confront development, and finding sufficient on their own. The academic literature contemporary security challenges that resources to implement these programs on violence during Peru’s internal the state is either unable or unwilling to is challenging.38 armed conflict recognizes civilian address.46 mobilization as a key component in Civilian Self-Defense in Peru the defeat of Sendero Luminoso.44 These cases allow for a glimpse into the The civilian population will play Policymakers and state security actual process of civilian mobilization. an increasingly important role in forces see the potential benefits of Small groups of civilians armed Peru’s recent push for eradication in coordinating with community self- with 12-gauge Winchester shotguns the VRAEM. A similar effort in the defense forces to complement current aim to deter drug trafficking and to Upper Huallaga Valley in the mid- counterterrorism and counternarcotics protect the population from groups 2000s disrupted social order and operations, but the state has offered of bandits along the highway leading led to widespread violence until the only minimal support in terms of out of the jungle.47 Civilian patrols communities were able to organize and financial resources.45 Civilian support set up temporary roadblocks on the dirt provide for their own security.39 Peru and participation may prove crucial highway an hour outside of Luricocha has a long history of civilian self- in defeating remnants of the Sendero en route to the jungle. They stop defense, and armed civilian actors still Luminoso insurgency and halting and search automobiles and trucks help to maintain social order in many the expansion of illegal narcotics traveling in the middle of the night.48 rural regions of Peru. Communities in production. These actions generate great risks for the Cajamarca and the Piura regions the participants, but many of these of Peru originally organized rondas Past and present civilian participation individuals have previous military campesinas40 (peasant rounds) in in combating insurgent violence in this experience or belonged to civilian self- the 1970s to combat rampant cattle region is complicated. Although many defense forces during the civil war. thievery.41 Some credit the presence contemporary civilian self-defense of these organizations with limiting organizations in jungle communities Many policymakers oppose civilian Sendero Luminoso expansion into efforts to militarize. The press, these regions when the insurgent group 43 Elsewhere these organizations may also be referred to politicians, and academics often 42 initiated armed struggle in 1980. as comités de defensa civil, defensa civil antisubversiva (DE- debated the matter in the media Another form of civilian self-defense, CAS), or rondas contrasubversivas. during the internal armed conflict comités de autodefensa (CADs), emerged in 44 For example see José Coronel, Carlos Iván Degregori, the Central Sierras in the early 1980s Ponciano del Pino, and Orin Starn, Las rondas campesinas 46 Ibid. y la derrota de Sendero Luminoso (Lima: Instituto de Estu- 47 Jungle community self-defense forces often respond so much pesticide for coca leaves, however, she has no- dios Peruanos, 1996); “Informe Final, Tomo II, Capítulo to domestic disturbances and other issues, but stay clear ticed a difference. See personal interview, coca farmer’s 1.5. Los comités de autodefensa,” Comisión de la verdad y of insurgents and drug traffickers out of fear (e.g., in wife, VRAEM, Peru, May 14, 2013. Reconciliación, undated, pp. 437-462; Carlos Iván Degre- Pichari and Llochegua). The author bases this observa- 37 For example, some indigenous communities in parts gori, “Reaping the Whirlwind: The Rondas Campesinas tion on comments from an interview with self-defense of the VRAEM (e.g., the Ashaninka) subsist largely on and the Defeat of Sendero Luminoso in Ayacucho,” in organization leaders on May 13 and May 15, 2013. Near yucca and have resisted changes to their traditional way Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt eds., Societies of Fear: The Huanta, the patrols reorganized several years back and of life. Legacy of Civil War, Violence and Terror in Latin America have brought increased order to their communities. 38 Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy, “Finding an Alternative to Il- (New York: Zed Books, 1999); Oscar Espinosa, Rondas Some interview subjects suggested that two or three licit Opium Production in Afghanistan, and Elsewhere,” campesinas y nativas en la Amazonia peruana (Lima: Cen- years ago one could not walk the streets at night, but now International Journal of Environmental Studies 68:3 (2001): tro Amazonico de Antropologia y Aplicacion Practica, the streets are safer. This author’s research on civilian pp. 373-379. 1995); Mario Fumerton, From Victims to Heroes: Peasant self-defense forces finds that community narratives play 39 Mirella van Dun, “The Drugs Industry and Peasant Counter-Rebellion and Civil War in Ayacucho, Peru, 1980- a crucial role in explaining the emergence of these groups Self-Defence in a Peruvian Cocaine Enclave,” Interna- 2000 (Amsterdam: Rozenberg, 2003); Carlos Tapia, Au- and their behavior during the conflict. Community nar- tional Journal of Drug Policy 23:6 (2012): pp. 442-448. todefensa armada del campesinado (Lima: Centro de Estu- ratives help leaders bring meaning to the changing politi- 40 Rondas campesinas translates to “peasant rounds” and dios para el Desarrollo y la Participacion, 1995). cal landscape and define inter-group relations among the describes both the organization and the act of patrolling. 45 Personal interview, self-defense force leader in Luri- various armed actors. 41 Dun. cocha at the municipal government meeting of the “Com- 48 This author accompanied a commander and six other 42 Segundo Vargas Tarrillo, Crisis, violencia y rondas mission for Peace in Luricocha,” Peru, May 9, 2013. The armed men on patrol on May 29, 2013, to observe civil- campesinas, Chota - Cajamarca (Tacna: Fondo Editorial interview subject suggested that the reasons for the lack ian self-defense forces in action. They set up a roadblock de la Universidad Privada de Tacna, 1994); Orin Starn, of support reflected a combination of limited resources, from 1 a.m. to 5 a.m. to stop passing cars. They were es- Nightwatch: The Making of a Movement in the Peruvian An- corruption in the allocation of funds, and prioritizing the pecially interested in automobiles carrying only groups des (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999). funding of state-controlled institutions. of young men.

21 april 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 4 of the 1980s and 1990s. Many were self-defense initiatives collaborate with forces in Peru must be understood hesitant to arm civilians, fearful that state security forces, which can generate as “the expression of a massive, by supplying rural communities with better human intelligence. Community autonomous decision on the part of weapons they would arm the same members who organize and participate the rural population.”57 Continued militants they sought to defeat. In some in civilian self-defense know the terrain coordination with state security cases, civilian militia leaders have and the people, and they often share forces and legal accountability helped committed human rights abuses or their knowledge with security forces.54 minimize the risk of rogue paramilitary became involved in drug trafficking.49 These individuals also cater security mobilization. For the most part, however, their fears provision to local needs. Civilian self- never materialized and armed civilian defense organizations have generated In addition to addressing immediate actors never took on a large political stronger relationships between local security concerns in this case, the role in their communities during the intermediaries and the state to help Peruvian experience may shed light on post-conflict period.50 Furthermore, coordinate and implement development other contemporary cases where armed Peru has developed a legal framework efforts. civilian actors confront threats to social regarding civilian self-defense that order. As many Mexican communities facilitates state oversight and control Civilian Resistance in Peru and Beyond organize “self-policing” efforts to combat of these organizations.51 Although the Civilian participation in security drug traffickers, and towns in northern groups operate autonomously, they provision can lead to drastically Nigeria mobilize civilians to confront coordinate with the armed forces. For different outcomes. While the the Boko Haram Islamist insurgency, example, one group near Huanta, Peruvian case generally experienced policymakers will benefit from a better in the Ayacucho region of Peru, fewer instances of predatory behavior understanding of the dynamics behind carries out joint patrols with other by armed civilian self-defense civilian resistance.58 Peruvian civilian groups and they meet once a month forces, in other cases these types of self-defense forces varied in their at a local military base for training groups exacerbated existing armed origins, behavior, levels of support they and weapons maintenance.52 Groups conflicts. Scholars and policymakers received from the military, and their from the region also meet annually to should not make broad generalizations post-conflict trajectory. The Peruvian commemorate their role in the initial about the benefits of armed civilian case provides a unique opportunity for defeat of Sendero Luminoso and reaffirm mobilization. The conditions in which policymakers to learn from successes their support for the armed forces and armed civilian groups emerge often and failures when civilians help to police in pacification efforts as well as affect their goals and behavior. combat security threats. socioeconomic development.53 Civilian For example, in Colombia, Steven T. Zech is a Ph.D. candidate in 49 For example, several interview subjects suggested paramilitaries emerged to defend the Department of Political Science at that the infamous Comando Huayhuaco, a fearsome ci- against violence tied to revolutionary the University of Washington, Seattle. vilian militia leader in the late 1980s, had previously or- groups and the drug trade. The He teaches courses on political violence, ganized members of his community to collaborate with Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia terrorism, and counterterrorism. He the Sendero insurgency. But, later on, he saw the devas- (United Self-Defense Forces of was research affiliate at the Instituto tation they brought to the region and he switched sides. Colombia, AUC) emerged as an umbrella de Estudios Peruanos (IEP) in Lima After organizing and patrolling throughout Ayacucho to organization coordinating disparate from 2012 to 2013 while investigating help defeat the Sendero insurgency, he later became in- civilian paramilitaries. In Colombia, community responses to insurgent violence volved in drug trafficking, leading to a national scandal however, armed civilian defense mostly for his dissertation. 55 and stoking fears of an armed peasantry tasked with se- formed to protect private interests. curity provision. Paramilitary groups emerged as 50 This assertion is based on interviews in dozens of private protection organizations for communities in Ayacucho and Junín, April through June landowners, cattle ranchers, or other 2013, and on comments made by participants of a region- business elites with interests in regions 57 Carlos Basombrio, “Militarization of Public Security in 56 al congress for victims and displaced people in Junín, with conflict. Large landholders in Peru,” in Hugo Frühling, Joseph S. Tulchin, and Heather April 27-28, 2013. Colombia might pay armed civilians to A. Golding eds., Crime and Violence in Latin America: Citi- 51 For more on legal issues pertaining to armed civilian protect their property and guarantee zen Security, Democracy, and the State (Washington, D.C.: actors in Peru, see Alejandro Laos F., Edgardo Rodriguez their safety. Woodrow Wilson Center, 2003), p. 161. Gomez, and Pastor Paredes Diez Canseco, Rondando por 58 For more on cases of Mexican communities organiz- nuestra ley: la exitosa experiencia de incidencia política y Alternatively, in Peru, collective ing “self-policing” efforts, see Ioan Grillo, “Mexico’s Vigi- cabildeo de la Ley de Rondas Campesinas (Lima: Red Inter- custodians and small landowners lante Militias Rout the Knights Templar Drug Cartel,” americana para la Democracia, 2003). coordinated together to mobilize and CTC Sentinel 7:4 (2014); Karla Zabludovsky, “Mexican 52 Personal interview, self-defense force leader, Huanta, protect their own collective interests. Violence Prompts Self-Policing by Civilians,” New York Ayacucho, May 29, 2013. The formation of civilian self-defense Times, January 26, 2013; Linda Pressly, “Mexico’s Vigi- 53 “Comités de autodefensa del VRAEM celebran XXI lante Law Enforcers,” BBC News Magazine, April 16, 2013; aniversario de lucha contra el terrorismo,” Presidencia de Autodefensa solo tienen 18 escopetas para combatir al Katie Orlinsky, “Mexico’s Female Vigilante Squads,” del Consejo de Ministros, May 22, 2013. Communities ‘camarada Gabriel,’” La República, July 16, 2012. Daily Beast, October 5, 2013. For more on the case of ci- have formed self-defense forces in parts of the VRAEM 54 Ibid. vilian self-defense and an emerging “vigilante war” in as well, sometimes seeking aid from the state security 55 Felbab-Brown, p. 94. Nigeria, see “Nigeria’s Vigilantes Take on Boko Haram,” forces. For example, see María Elena Hidalgo, “Comités 56 Ibid. BBC, July 23, 2013.

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A Spate of Recent Attacks for crew kidnapping in the Gulf of Maritime Piracy on the The year 2013 marked a significant drop Guinea following 10 attacks since Rise in West Africa in international piracy due to the falloff December 2013 alone.16 In August in Somali-related attacks on Africa’s 2012, Togolese security forces traded By Stephen Starr east coast,8 but the slack has been taken gunfire with pirates who had hijacked a up on the other side of the continent. Greek oil tanker.17 More recent activity incidents of maritime piracy across the In early January 2014, 55 miles off the suggests piracy is expanding further globe have decreased in recent years.1 coast of Gabon, five pirates boarded a Yet a spate of attacks off the West liquefied natural gas (LNG) carrier only “More recent activity African coast centered around the Gulf to be frightened off when the crew raised of Guinea2 has drawn renewed attention the alarm and blew the ship’s horn.9 suggests piracy is from governments and shipping Also in January, the Greek-owned MT expanding further south companies. According to the industry Kerala vanished in Angolan waters south magazine Maritime Executive, pirate attacks of the Gulf of Guinea before reappearing to Angola’s coast in the in the Gulf of Guinea increased by 33% further north in Nigerian waters about southern Atlantic Ocean.” in 2013.3 At the current growth rate, the 57 miles southwest of a Nigerian oil number of attacks will be even higher for terminal10 and missing almost 13,000 2014. tons of its diesel cargo.11 To facilitate the theft, the pirates allegedly disabled south to Angola’s coast in the southern This article reviews recent incidents of the Kerala’s identifications system Atlantic Ocean.18 Angolan waters lie maritime piracy in West Africa, looks and communications equipment and almost 1,000 miles from the regional at some of the groups involved and used paint to conceal its identifying piracy epicenter in Nigeria, with Angola their tactics, and finally details efforts markers.12 the second largest oil producer in sub- to combat this trend. It finds that a key Saharan Africa behind Nigeria.19 difference between piracy off the coast Experts say pirates near the Gulf of of Somalia and piracy in West Africa is Guinea primarily hijack vessels to Eleven of the 40 global incidents of that Somali pirates target ships as part of siphon off the crude oil on-board; piracy, boarding, hijacking and armed kidnap-for-ransom schemes, whereas in however, serious threats to human robbery aboard ships recorded by the West Africa pirates primarily hijack ships4 life are emerging.13 On December 17, International Maritime Bureau (IMB) to siphon off crude petroleum to sell on the 2013, a Ukrainian captain and Greek Piracy Reporting Center thus far in 2014 local black market.5 This presents both engineer were abducted from their oil- were in the Gulf of Guinea.20 According problems and solutions to governments carrying ship off the Nigerian coast.14 to the IMB, West African pirate attacks and other interested parties. Since pirates Nigerian pirates released the two men comprised 19% of all piracy in 2013. and hijackers in West Africa operate in three weeks later after an unknown Although many attacks go unreported national, rather than international, ransom amount is believed to have been and figures accordingly vary, that waters, the security responsibility paid.15 In March 2014, a top UK-based figure was 10% in 2010, 14% in 2011 and shifts to national navy and police maritime intelligence organization 19% in 2012.21 As explained by Maritime forces. Yet nine countries6 share waters announced a special advisory warning Executive, “International navies are not along the Gulf of Guinea, corruption actively engaged in counter-piracy in these states is endemic, and pirates IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin, Spring 1999, pp. 98- missions in the region, unlike in the often conduct attacks in one state’s 104. It is important to note that attacks occurring in na- waters off Somalia, the piracy hotspot 22 territorial waters only to flee to another tional waters are categorized as armed robbery and not on the other side of the continent.” state’s jurisdiction. Moreover, maritime piracy. Piracy only occurs in international waters. boundaries in the Gulf of Guinea are 8 “Drop in Sea Piracy Helped by Big Somali Improve- often not properly delineated, hindering ment, Watchdog Says,” BBC, January 15, 2014. The cooperation between governments and Somali decrease has been attributed to the presence of 7 their navies. armed guards on ships, increased international naval presence and action taken by the Somali government. 16 “Dryad Maritime Warns of Surge in Gulf of Guinea 1 Rick Gladstone, “Global Piracy Hits Lowest Level Since 9 “First Pirate Boarding for 2014,” Maritime Executive, Kidnap Incidents,” Dryad Maritime, March 7, 2014. 2007, Report Says,” New York Times, January 15, 2014. January 4, 2014. 17 Chandrika Narayan, “Pirates Hijack Greek-Operated 2 “The Rise and Rise of Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea,” 10 “Navy Intercepts Hijacked Greek Ship MT Kerala, in Tanker Off Togo Coast,” CNN, August 28, 2012. Think Africa Press, July 18, 2013. Nigeria,” Vessel Finder, February 4, 2014. 18 “Oil Soaked Pirates in Gulf of Guinea.” 3 “Suspected Pirate Attack on Tanker Off Angola,” Mari- 11 “Oil Soaked Pirates in Gulf of Guinea,” Maritime Ex- 19 “Angola,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, time Executive, January 22, 2014. ecutive, March 15, 2014. February 5, 2014. 4 Offshore rigs in the Gulf are generally not targeted. 12 Ibid. 20 See, for example, the IMB Piracy & Armed Robbery 5 Keith Johnson, “Oil Pirates and the Mystery Ship,” For- 13 Personal interview, Chris Trelawny, head of maritime Map 2014 from ICC Commercial Crime Services, avail- eign Policy, January 29, 2014. security at the International Maritime Organization, able at www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/live- 6 The Gulf of Guinea is not territorially defined, although March 24, 2014. piracy-map. it generally includes: Liberia, Cote D’Ivoire, Ghana, 14 “Pirates Abduct Greek, Ukrainian from Ship Off Ni- 21 “Somali Pirate Clampdown Caused Drop in Global Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea and geria,” Reuters, December 17, 2013. Piracy, IMB Reveals,” ICC Commercial Crime Services, Gabon. 15 “Master and Chief Engineer of m/t Althea Released, January 15, 2014. 7 Daniel J. Dzurek, “Gulf of Guinea Boundary Disputes,” Nigeria,” Maritime Bulletin, January 7, 2014. 22 “Oil Soaked Pirates in Gulf of Guinea.”

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Responsibility for Attacks resulted in many Niger Delta militants are kept in different parts of the Nigerian piracy makes up the majority laying down their arms,30 yet recently country.36 of attacks on vessels in West Africa.23 alleged members of MEND have resumed The Nigerian navy estimates that up to attacks.31 In January 2014, elements The commander claimed that he made 200,000 barrels of crude oil—valued within the group claimed responsibility 10 million naira ($62,000) on his last at around $200 billion annually—are for an attack on a Nigerian tug boat and operation.37 lost daily to thieves and pirates.24 the abduction of two Agip Oil Company Although piracy involving the theft employees.32 “At the right time, we Moreover, the line between piracy and of oil dominates maritime attacks in will reduce Nigerian oil production conventional criminality is becoming the Gulf of Guinea, a rise in maritime- to zero by 2015 and drive off our land, increasingly blurred in Nigeria, related kidnappings occurred in late all thieving oil companies,” threatened resulting in the “cross-pollination” of 2013 and early 2014. Approximately Jomo Gbomo, a MEND spokesman, in the country’s naval and police forces’ 12 ships were hijacked and 20 crew January 2014.33 MEND also claimed the remits.38 The Gulf of Guinea is almost as members kidnapped in Nigerian waters kidnapping of two American sailors off big as the Gulf of Mexico,39 and policing alone during the first 10 weeks of 2014, the Nigerian coast in October 2013.34 the waters has proved difficult. with the kidnapping incidents generally The Americans were later released, occurring between 12 and 50 nautical allegedly in exchange for a ransom.35 Pirate attacks are spreading out miles from land.25 from Nigerian waters. The Economist Nigerian government elements are apportioned responsibility for the There is a history of paying ransoms also thought to be involved in the January 2014 attack on the MT Kerala for the release of kidnapped energy illicit movement of oil. Nigerian gang in Angolan waters to Nigerian pirates, company personnel in the Gulf of Guinea members suspected of piracy in the as “the pirates forced the vast vessel and, specifically, in Nigeria.26 The most gulf and arrested in late 2012 claimed to sail hundreds of miles up the coast notorious group responsible for kidnap- a network of government workers gave before offloading much of its cargo for-ransom operations in Nigeria is the information on the location and content close to the Niger Delta.”40 The increase Movement for the Emancipation of the of vessels in the Gulf. In the gang of naval and police patrols in Nigerian Niger Delta (MEND). MEND, which commander’s confession to Nigerian waters, albeit patchy and riven with was formed in 2005-2006, draws its authorities, he stated, corruption, has led to a knock-on effect roots from the 1990s, when Niger Delta in neighboring countries’ territorial politicians funded and armed university Once we complete the assignment, waters. In Ghana, the MT Mustard was youths to coerce political opponents.27 we would inform the pointsmen intercepted by a naval vessel in August All of the militant groups in the Niger who thereafter, contact the cabal 2013 after having been used to siphon Delta claim that they commit acts of theft that takes charge of the hijacked 3,500 tons of stolen crude oil from and violence to seek economic justice, as vessels. We usually meet at a the tanker vessel Cotton in neighboring the region is one of the richest in Africa designated point on the high sea, Gabonese waters.41 The pirate vessel in terms of resource wealth but remains from where they would offload siphoned the fuel in Gabonese territory one of the most underdeveloped and the contents from the hijacked before it “sailed into Ghanaian waters, polluted.28 vessels and thereafter, deposit first docking at the eastern port of Tema them in various oil facilities for before heading for an offshore oil facility MEND is not considered a unified distribution by oil marketers. off the town of Saltpond,” suggesting organization; instead, it is recognized as We are not directly involved in Ghanaian elements were involved in the a messy coalition of splinter groups and the sale of the product. We only robbery.42 factions.29 A 2009 government amnesty assist to convey the product to the designated point by 23 Mark Doyle, “Nigeria’s Piracy – Another Form of Oil acting as escorts in case of any 36 Bless Nube’s confessional statement cited in Evelyn Theft,” BBC, June 18, 2013. confrontation. My gang has about Usman, “Top Government Officials, Politicians -Con 24 “No Crude Oil Theft,” Nigerian Navy, available at 3,000 various weapons which tracted Up – Sea Pirates,” Vanguard, December 12, 2012. www.cot.navy.mil.ng/crude-oil-theft. 37 Ibid. 25 “Kidnapping Resurgent in Gulf of Guinea Piracy,” 30 “Nigeria: Government Amnesty Program for Niger 38 Christos Kyrou and Kaade Wallace, “The Gulf of KRMagazine, March 20, 2014. Delta Militants, Particularly with Respect to the Move- Guinea: Maritime Piracy’s New Global Nerve Center,” 26 Josh Margolin, “US Sailors Held Hostage Off Nigeria ment for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND),” Fair Observer, March 3, 2014. Freed,” ABC News, November 12, 2013. Refworld, August 5, 2011. 39 David Arnold, “Shippers Raise Alarm Over Oil Piracy 27 Caroline Duffield, “Who are Nigeria’s Mend Oil Mili- 31 See, for example, Elisha Bala-Gbogbo, “Nigeria’s in Gulf of Guinea,” Voice of America, October 14, 2013. tants?” BBC, October 4, 2010. MEND Rebels Threaten Future Attack on Oil Industry,” 40 “Angola in their Sights,” Economist, February 6, 2014. 28 The Niger Delta has one of the highest population Bloomberg, January 27, 2014. Cyrus Mody, assistant director of the ICC International densities in the world and is one of Nigeria’s most under- 32 Osa Okhomina, “We’re Responsible for Agip Tug Maritime Bureau, supported this claim in: David Kashi, developed regions. Also see “Oil Industry Has Brought Boat Attack, Kidnapping of Engineer, Captain – MEND,” “Nigerian Pirates Likely Hijacked Oil Tanker off An- Poverty and Pollution to Niger Delta,” Amnesty Interna- Leadership, January 28, 2014. gola’s Coast, Expert Says,” International Business Times, tional, June 30, 2009. 33 Bala-Gbogbo. January 24, 2014. 29 Stephanie Hanson, “MEND: The Niger Delta’s Um- 34 “MEND Claims Responsibility for Kidnap of U.S. 41 “Ghana’s Navy Intercepts Suspected Pirate Ship and brella Militant Group,” Council on Foreign Relations, Sailors,” This Day Live, November 18, 2013. Arrests Crew,” Reuters, August 2, 2013. March 22, 2007. 35 Ibid. 42 Ibid.

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In Cameroon, a group known as Africa market through government and non- government in Abuja [Nigeria] had Marine Commando has conducted a government facilitators. “These vessels taken too great a share of Nigeria’s number of attacks,43 while in September are attacked because there is a booming petroleum wealth, while distributing 2013 a Cameroonian newspaper claimed black market for fuel in West Africa,” little back to the oil-soaked communities a pirate was killed by government forces read a report published by the United of the Niger Delta. A plethora of militant following a raid there.44 Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in groups emerged to ‘reddress’ the oil 2013. “Without this ready market, there issue during this period.”57 This allows Victims of pirate attacks in Benin in would be little point in attacking these criminals to profit under the guise of 2012 reported assailants speaking vessels.”49 economic justice—although clearly English and French, suggesting that genuine grievances exist in the delta. they were from the Benin-Nigeria Both low- and high-level corruption border region.45 With Nigerian facilitate and encourage pirate-related Efforts to Combat Piracy waters under increasing surveillance activity in the Gulf of Guinea.50 Nigeria There have been efforts to combat from the combined naval forces of and Cameroon jointly languish at 144 piracy in the region. In 2012, Benin and Nigeria, local knowledge out of 175 countries in Transparency the Togolese army agreed to hire of Benin’s coast next door has become International’s 2013 Corruption private security companies to guard a valuable commodity for Nigerian Perceptions Index.51 Cote D’Ivoire sits anchored vessels at the port of Lome,58 pirates, suggesting piracy in Benin at 136, while Togo is close behind at while Nigeria installed anti-piracy may grow. “The shared history, culture 123.52 surveillance towers along its coast in and language of Yoruba communities December 2013.59 In February 2014, on both sides of the border encourage Government officials hold discretionary Cote D’Ivoire announced it would such collaboration,” explained a 2012 powers in many of Nigeria’s major expand its navy by 40 vessels to help International Crisis Group report.46 ports.53 A Nigerian corruption combat piracy within its waters.60 commission report co-sponsored by the Strategy, Tactics and Corruption United Nations Development Program Regionally, the Economic Community Pirates operating in the Gulf of Guinea recently found that “corruption is of Central African States (ECCAS) appear to employ similar tactics. reported to be a legitimate and accepted launched a coordination center in 2009 According to Noel Choong, the head tool to promote business interests. Gifts to pool money financed by maritime of the IMB’s piracy reports division, are accepted as normal and expected taxes to combat piracy in the gulf.61 In pirates typically hijack ships for five or even in the port agencies.”54 September 2011, neighbors Nigeria and six days, ransack the vessels, steal the Benin launched “Operation Prosperity” cargo, and leave the sailors.47 Hijacked In one of the worst cases of corruption, in an attempt to curb piracy, which is tankers are often taken back to Nigerian admirals of the Nigerian navy, Francis ongoing.62 In an attempt to coordinate waters, where the oil is siphoned off and Agbiti and Samuel Kolawole, were a response to attacks, an anti-piracy the crews are freed.48 charged with involvement in the illicit code was adopted by 22 West African bunkering of 11,000 tons of crude oil to countries in June 2013.63 Nigeria’s geography makes for easy an awaiting Russian-crewed vessel in flight. Pirates conceal boats and stolen 2003.55 The two officers were sacked and On the international level, the U.S. commodities in the thousands of inlets, demoted for their role in the theft.56 Navy has donated boats and carried rivers and mangroves that comprise out training in Nigeria,64 while the Nigeria’s coast. Crude oil is unloaded to According to maritime security U.S. Congress passed a bill on January criminal partners and resold on the local specialist James Bridger, in the early 7, 2014, “encouraging increased 2000s “the basic grievance [among cooperation between the United States 43 For more details, see the listing for the Africa Marine militants] was that the federal and West and Central African countries Commando in the Global Terrorism Database at the Uni- versity of Maryland’s START. 49 “Maritime Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.” 44 Interestingly, the pirate had possible familial ties to a 50 Personal interview, Chris Trelawny, head of mari- 57 James Bridger, “Piracy in West Africa: Preventing a leader in the Nigerian terrorist group Boko Haram. There time security at the International Maritime Organization, Somalization of the Gulf of Guinea, Pt.1,” Center for In- are not thought to be operational links between these March 24, 2014. For a confession of a Nigerian pirate, ternational Maritime Security, December 12, 2012. pirates and Boko Haram. See Yerima Kini Nsom and see “Oil Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea,” Conflict Trends 4 58 “Togo Implements New Anti-Piracy Measures,” Gard, Nformi Sonde Kinsai, “Pirates Kill 7 in Bakassi Again,” (2012). July 4, 2012. Cameroon Mirror, September 5, 2013. 51 “Corruption Perceptions Index 2013,” Transparency 59 Edd Gent, “Anti-Piracy Surveillance Towers Installed 45 “Maritime Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea,” United Na- International, undated. in Nigeria,” Engineering and Technology Magazine, Decem- tions Office on Drugs and Crime, undated. 52 Ibid. ber 20, 2013. 46 “The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone,” Inter- 53 “ICPC Study Unravels Cause of Corruption at Nige- 60 David Pugliese, “Ivory Coast to Expand Navy by 40 national Crisis Group, December 2012. rian Ports,” Marine and Petroleum Nigeria, undated. Ships To Fight Piracy,” Ottawa Citizen, February 9, 2014. 47 Quoted in Jon Gambrell, “Pirates Kidnap 24 in Gun- 54 “Corruption Thrives in Ports, Says ICPC,” Nigeria 61 “The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone.” fight Off Togo Coast,” Independent, August 28, 2012; Joe Intel, December 10, 2013. 62 Ibid. Bavier, “French Tanker Believed Held by Pirates Off 55 “NIGERIA: Conviction of Admirals Confirms Navy 63 “New West and Central Africa Piracy and Maritime Ivory Coast,” Reuters, February 6, 2014. Role in Oil Theft,” Integrated Regional Information Net- Law Enforcement Code Adopted,” Maritime Executive, 48 Harry Alsop, “Oil Tanker Near Ivory Coast Hijacked works, January 6, 2005. June 26, 2013. by Pirates,” Daily Telegraph, February 4, 2014. 56 Ibid. 64 “The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone.”

25 april 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 4 to fight armed robbery at sea.”65 crude oil exporters respectively, with These measures follow the U.S. Africa the latter an important supplier of Recent Highlights in Command’s ongoing efforts to train crude oil to China, the United States Political Violence national naval forces in the region and to and the European Union.71 Of the “promote relationships between nations nine Gulf of Guinea countries, eight March 1, 2014 (PAKISTAN): Tehrik-i- to combat these illicit activities.”66 export metals and oil to American and Taliban Pakistan announced a one-month European markets.72 Nigeria became cease-fire aimed at restarting failed peace The UN Security Council in 2011 passed Africa’s biggest economy in April talks with the Pakistani government. The a resolution condemning threats of 2014, exporting almost $100 billion following day, on March 2, the Pakistani piracy and armed robbery in the gulf,67 worth of crude petroleum in 2011.73 government announced a cessation of air and Japan contributed $1 million to an In 2011, 24% of all Nigerian exports strikes against the Pakistani Taliban in International Maritime Organization went to the United States, valued at the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. West and Central Africa Maritime $30 billion—although this number – Reuters, March 1 Security Trust Fund to curb piracy in has fallen significantly in 2012 and the gulf in March 2014.68 2013.74 March 2, 2014 (AFGHANISTAN): Afghan officials announced that a number of Onboard armed security details proved With a number of governments Taliban insurgents escaped from Sarposa important in dissuading pirates from holding territorial control of the Gulf Prison in Kandahar on February 25. attacking vessels in the international of Guinea—some of which suffer from According to the officials, someone waters off Somalia and East Africa high levels of corruption—pirates altered an official document, allowing in recent years. In the Gulf of Guinea and criminal enterprises are able to at least 10 prisoners to leave the prison context, however, only armed guards hijack ships and siphon off oil with freely. The New York Times stated that “the from or employed by the national forces little deterrence. Unlike the waters off escapees were believed to be among the of the state in whose territorial waters the Horn of Africa in the east, powerful most prominent insurgents being held at a vessel is in may operate on ships.69 international navies are not patrolling Sarposa on terrorism charges, followers As the majority of attacks in West the Gulf of Guinea. The states in the of a particularly notorious Taliban Africa take place in territorial waters Gulf of Guinea have their own national commander, Mullah Dad Mohammad of countries with standing governments navies—which are generally weak— Munib, who specialized in orchestrating and navies—which is in contrast to and the waters do not lie along major assassinations and suicide bombings.” the international waters off Somalia international shipping lanes. The Afghan Taliban claimed that 23 patrolled by pirates—coordination can inmates escaped. – New York Times, March 2 be difficult. This is especially true when A chief cause of piracy in West Africa some of the countries in West Africa is the vibrant black market for crude March 3, 2014 (GLOBAL): Rob deny that incidents of piracy have even oil in Gulf of Guinea states. As such, Wainwright, the head of Europol, warned taken place.70 with these structural impediments a that “multiple thousands” of young men symptom of a much greater illness, may have traveled to Syria as foreign Conclusion piracy in the Gulf is likely to continue fighters for militant groups linked to al- Piracy and armed attacks are not new despite qualified efforts at the regional Qa`ida. – Telegraph, March 3 ventures in West Africa, but growing level to reduce it. export volumes out of the region March 3, 2014 (PAKISTAN): Militants destined for Europe and China, among Stephen Starr is a journalist and author attacked a court building in Islamabad, other states, mean piracy will grow as a who lives in Turkey. the Pakistani capital, killing 11 people, critical issue for regional governments including a judge. The attack began with and international energy organizations. gunfire, followed by two suicide bombings. Nigeria and Angola are Africa’s top It marked the first suicide bombing in Islamabad since June 2011. Tehrik-i- 65 The bill is available at www.govtrack.us/congress/ Taliban Pakistan, which announced a bills/113/sres288/text. one-month cease-fire on March 1, denied 66 Captain Dave Rollo quoted in Donna Miles, “Africa any involvement in the attack. Instead, Command Helps Partners Promote Maritime Security,” Ahrar-ul-Hind, a group that recently split American Forces Press Service, October 28, 2013. from the TTP, claimed responsibility. 67 United Nations Security Council Resolution 2018, – AFP, March 3 October 31, 2011. 68 “Japan Gives One Million Dollar Boost to Gulf of March 3, 2014 (YEMEN): Suspected Guinea Fund,” International Maritime Organization, 71 “Angola.” fighters from al-Qa`ida in the Arabian March 17, 2014. 72 For more details, see the Observatory of Economic Peninsula ambushed a Yemeni military 69 Anna Petrig, “The Use of Force and Firearms by Pri- Complexity, MIT Media Lab Macro Connections, avail- convoy, killing seven soldiers. – AP, March vate Maritime Security Companies Against Suspected able at www.atlas.media.mit.edu. 3 Pirates,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 73 “Profile Nigeria,” the Observatory of Economic Com- 62:3 (2013). plexity, MIT Media Lab Macro Connections, available at March 4, 2014 (GLOBAL): General 70 “Angola Navy Says Missing Tanker Located, Crew atlas.media.mit.edu/profile/country/nga/. David Rodriguez, the head of U.S. Africa Faked Pirate Attack,” Reuters, January 26, 2014. 74 Ibid. Command, said that North Africa provides

26 april 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 4 a “significant source of foreign fighters” March 10, 2014 (GLOBAL): Al-Qa`ida attacks but didn’t detonate them because involved in the war in Syria. “Terrorists released an al-Sahab-produced video he was saving the bomb for an attack are learning their trade abroad [in Syria], promising a new English-language over America.” The man, Saajid Badat, returning to their countries with hard- magazine, known as Resurgence, that eventually backed out of his mission. earned skills that increase their lethality,” will seek to recruit and inspire Western – AP, March 11 Rodriguez said in testimony soon to be jihadists to conduct attacks in their own presented to the House Armed Services countries. Although al-Qa`ida in the March 11, 2014 (AFGHANISTAN): A Committee. – Bloomberg, March 4 Arabian Peninsula already produces Taliban splinter group shot to death Nils the English-language Inspire magazine, Horner, a Swedish-British journalist, on March 4, 2014 (FRANCE): A Paris Resurgence will supposedly be produced a street in Kabul while he was reporting court found Romain Letellier guilty by al-Qa`ida’s core leadership. As stated on Afghanistan’s elections. The splinter of “apology for terrorism” for his role by the Telegraph, the new video “mixes group, Feday-e-Mahaz, was reportedly in publishing al-Qa`ida propaganda graphics, images of George W. Bush and formed by loyalists of the late Taliban translated into French on the internet. warplanes launching missiles with a commander Mullah Dadullah. – AP, March He was sentenced to a year in prison. speech by Malcolm X…in which he said: 12 Letellier, also known as Abou Siyad al- ‘You can’t ever reach a man if you don’t Normandy, is a 27-year-old convert to speak his language. If a man speaks the March 14, 2014 (PAKISTAN): A suicide Islam. He was the first person in France language of brute force, you can’t come to bomber killed seven people in a suburb of to be charged under a new law directed at him with peace.’” The video ends with the Peshawar. – CNN, March 14 promoting and apologizing for terrorism. message: “‘So fight in the way of Allah…’ – Radio France Internationale, March 5 Resurgence. Coming Soon…” – Telegraph, March 15, 2014 (SOMALIA): A car bomb March 10 exploded near a hotel popular with March 4, 2014 (SOMALIA): Al-Shabab government officials and businessmen. announced on its Facebook page the March 10, 2014 (AFGHANISTAN): The The blast injured one person. – AFP, March recent execution of three men accused Taliban threatened to target Afghanistan’s 16 of spying for the U.S. or Somali upcoming presidential election on April governments. Al-Shabab is an affiliate 5, instructing its fighters to attack voters, March 17, 2014 (UNITED STATES): of al-Qa`ida. – Voice of America, March 4 polling staff and security forces. “It is the Federal prosecutors announced the religious obligation of every Afghan to arrest of Nicholas Teausant of Acampo, March 5, 2014 (IRAQ): Seven car bombs fulfill their duty by foiling the latest plot California, after he allegedly spoke of and two roadside bombs exploded in six of the invaders that is guised in the grab wanting to bomb the Los Angeles subway primarily Shi`a areas in Baghdad, killing of elections,” the Taliban’s statement said. system and attempting to travel to Syria at least 14 people. – AFP, March 5 – AFP, March 10 to fight with Islamist extremists. The San Joaquin Delta Community College March 5, 2014 (PAKISTAN): A roadside March 10, 2014 (SYRIA): Jabhat al-Nusra in Stockton student and member of the bomb killed at least six Pakistani militants released a group of 13 Greek U.S. National Guard was arrested on a soldiers in Hangu District of Khyber Orthodox nuns in exchange for dozens northbound Amtrak bus just short of the Pakhtunkhwa Province. – Reuters, March 5 of women held in Syrian government Canada border. – AP, March 17; KCRA, March prisons. The nuns were captured three 17 March 6, 2014 (YEMEN): Al-Qa`ida in months ago after militants overran a the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) killed one Christian village. Qatari and Lebanese March 18, 2014 (AFGHANISTAN): A of their own members and hung his body officials mediated the prisoner exchange. suicide bomber on a ricksaw detonated from a light post in Shahr, Hadramawt Jabhat al-Nusra is an al-Qa`ida affiliate. explosives outside a checkpoint at a Province. AQAP accused the man of – AP, March 10 market in Faryab Province, killing at least spying for the United States. – AP, March 6 13 civilians. – Guardian, March 18 March 11, 2014 (GLOBAL): Director of March 6, 2014 (SYRIA): A car bomb tore the Central Intelligence Agency John March 18, 2014 (RUSSIA): The well- through Homs, killing at least 15 people. Brennan said that Nasir al-Wahayshi, known Islamist website Kavkaz Center The bomb exploded in a mostly Christian the head of al-Qa`ida in the Arabian announced that Doku Umarov, the amir and Alawite area. – AFP, March 6 Peninsula (AQAP), has been appointed of the Caucasus Emirate, had been killed as al-Qa`ida’s second-in-command, in the North Caucasus. Umarov had been March 7, 2014 (SAUDI ARABIA): Saudi under Ayman al-Zawahiri. Al-Wahayshi fighting against the Russians in Chechnya Arabia declared the Muslim Brotherhood, previously served as Usama bin Ladin’s since 1994. – Business Insider Australia, March Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State personal secretary. – NBC News, March 14 19 in Iraq and the Levant as terrorist organizations. – Reuters, March 7 March 11, 2014 (GLOBAL): According March 18, 2014 (YEMEN): A suicide to the Associated Press, “A British man bomber in an explosives-laden vehicle March 9, 2014 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber testifying in the terror trial of Osama killed one person at a military intelligence in an explosives-laden minibus killed at bin Laden’s son-in-law [Sulaiman Abu headquarters near Aden in southern least 45 people in the largely Shi`a city of Ghaith] said Tuesday that he flew on Yemen. – AFP, March 18 Hilla. – Reuters, March 9 planes over the Middle East and Europe with explosives in a shoe after the Sept. 11

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March 19, 2014 (UNITED STATES): March 25, 2014 (AFGHANISTAN): Two CTC Sentinel Staff Shelton Thomas Bell, of Florida, pleaded Taliban suicide bombers detonated guilty to conspiring to travel to Yemen explosives outside an election office on Editor-in-Chief to join the al-Qa`ida-linked Ansar al- the outskirts of Kabul. Other militants Erich Marquardt Shari`a group. He recruited an unnamed subsequently stormed the facility. The Senior Editor, CTC juvenile, but they were unable to reach gunmen, and two police officers, were Yemen. – Reuters, March 19 killed. – CBS/AP, March 25 Editorial Board COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. March 20, 2014 (GLOBAL): The new March 25, 2014 (NIGERIA): Two suicide Department Head issue of Inspire magazine, which is bombers in an explosives-laden vehicle Department of Social Sciences (West Point) published by al-Qa`ida in the Arabian attacked a police patrol in Maiduguri, Peninsula, called on individuals to killing five policemen. – Reuters, March 26 COL Suzanne Nielsen, Ph.D. detonate car bombs in cities of symbolic Deputy Department Head importance, such as Washington, March 26, 2014 (UNITED STATES): A Department of Social Sciences (West Point) D.C., New York, Chicago, Los Angeles jury in New York City convicted Sulaiman and northern Virginia. The issue also Abu Ghaith, Usama bin Ladin’s son- MAJ Bryan Price, Ph.D. encouraged individuals to detonate in-law, of conspiring to kill Americans. Director, CTC bombs in the United Kingdom, – National Public Radio, March 26 France and “other crusader countries.” – Newsweek, March 20 March 27, 2014 (IRAQ): Bombs tore through commercial areas of Baghdad, March 20, 2014 (AFGHANISTAN): Four killing 26 people. – Canadian Press, March Taliban gunmen opened fire inside the 27 Serena Hotel in Kabul, killing nine people, including a reporter from March 28, 2014 (AFGHANISTAN): The Contact Agence France-Presse and his wife and Taliban attacked the offices of a U.S.- Combating Terrorism Center two children. The hotel is considered based charity in Kabul in a complex U.S. Military Academy one of the most secure sites for civilians assault involving four gunmen and a 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall in Kabul. – Wall Street Journal, March 21 suicide bomber in a vehicle. The charity, West Point, NY 10996 Roots of Peace, is involved in replacing Phone: (845) 667-6383 March 20, 2014 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber minefields with vineyards. – Washington Email: [email protected] killed at least 12 people at a Baghdad café. Post, March 28; al-Jazira, March 29 Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ – RFE/RL, March 20 March 29, 2014 (AFGHANISTAN): * For Press Inquiries: (845) 667-6383 March 22, 2014 (IRAQ): A roadside bomb Taliban militants attacked the exploded on a commercial street in Tikrit. headquarters of Afghanistan’s When policemen arrived, a car bomb independent election commission in exploded in the same area. The blasts Kabul. There were no injuries reported. killed at least seven people. – RTTNews, – Guardian, March 29 March 22 support March 29, 2014 (LEBANON): A suicide The Combating Terrorism Center would March 23, 2014 (KENYA): Gunmen bomber in an explosives-laden vehicle like to express its gratitude to its financial opened fire on worshippers at a church killed three Lebanese soldiers at an army supporters, for without their support and near Mombasa, killing two people. – Voice checkpoint in the Bekaa Valley. – CNN, shared vision of the Center products like the of America, March 23 March 29 CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If you are interested in learning more about how March 24, 2014 (YEMEN): Suspected March 30, 2014 (IRAQ): Gunmen shot to to support the Combating Terrorism Center, al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula death seven Iraqi soldiers at a security please visit http://www.ctc.usma.edu or call militants attacked a security checkpoint checkpoint in Mosul, Ninawa Province. Kristin Sorenson at West Point’s Association in Hadramawt Province, killing at least – Voice of America, March 30 of Graduates at 845-446-1561. 14 Yemeni soldiers. – AP, March 24 March 31, 2014 (GERMANY): Authorities March 25, 2014 (UNITED STATES): Jose arrested two people suspected of Pimentel was sentenced to 16 years in being current or former members prison for attempting to conduct an al- of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Qa`ida-inspired homegrown terrorism Levant. A third person was arrested campaign in the United States. Pimentel, for allegedly providing financial The views expressed in this report are those of 29-years-old, admitted trying to build support to the terrorist group. the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, pipe bombs to conduct terrorist attacks. – AP, March 31 the Department of the Army, or any other agency – AP, March 25 of the U.S. Government.

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