The Multiple Faces of Jabhat Al-Nusra/Jabhat Fath Al-Sham in Syria’S Civil War
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COMMENTARYTHE MULTIPLE FACES OF JABHAT AL-NUSRA/JABHAT FATH AL-SHAM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR The Multiple Faces of Jabhat al-Nusra/Jabhat Fath al-Sham in Syria’s Civil War CHRISTOPHER ANZALONE* ABSTRACT Jabhat al-Nusra has long been one of the most militarily effective armed actors against the Syrian Ba’thist regime and it continues to play a central role in the country’s civil war. With a leadership that mixes the transnational jihadi ideology of al-Qae- da with Syria-specific interests, the group is also at the forefront of battling the Islamic State in Syria. In the midst of its battlefield offensives, Jabhat al-Nusra is also busy building governing struc- tures to control territory in different parts of the country including Idlib, Latakia, Hama, Homs, Damascus, and Aleppo governorates. ince its public emergence in Syria after laying the groundwork January 2012, Jabhat al-Nusra for its expansion during 2011 lead- Shas proven itself to be both a ing up to its public announcement military asset and a complex political of its existence in January 2012. Led problem for the Syrian political oppo- by its amir, Abu Muhammad al-Jaw- sition and other rebel groups fighting lani, one of the Syrian ISI members the Syrian Ba’th Party-run govern- dispatched back home, the group co- ment of Bashar al-Assad. Organized alesced around a collective of jihadi originally by a group of Islamic State veterans, such as the group’s spokes- of Iraq (ISI, now the Islamic State/ man Abu Firas al-Suri, who was ISIS) members returned from Iraq killed in a U.S. drone strike in April together with veteran Syrian jihad- 2016, and ideologues such as shari’a is with experience in the country’s council members Sami al-Uraydi and * John F. Fighting Vanguard movement that Abu Abdullah al-Shami, bringing to- Kennedy School of Government, fought the Syrian regime during the gether both military experience and Harvard early 1980s and al-Qaeda’s training creedal puritanism. University, USA camps in Afghanistan, Jabhat al-Nus- Insight Turkey ra quickly developed significant mili- Operating at first as an extension of Vol. 18 / No. 2 / tary capabilities on the ground inside the ISI, Jabhat al-Nusra proved itself 2016, pp. 41-50 2016 Sprıng 41 COMMENTARY CHRISTOPHER ANZALONE emergence meant for the Syrian up- On the ground, Jabhat al- rising as a whole and whether or not to actively provide military support Nusra, in addition to honing and supplies on the ground. Despite its military capabilities and desires to see al-Assad overthrown, expanding its membership concerns over the expansion of Jabhat al-Nusra and Islamist rebel into the thousands, also groups, such as Harakat Ahrar al-Sh- established and quickly am, Jaysh al-Islam and others, came to dominate much of the discussion developed an impressive and debate over whether and how to media capability support Syrian political and armed opposition groups. This concern cul- minated in December 2012 when the to be a major military asset in the U.S. Department of State designated war against the Syrian government, Jabhat al-Nusra as a foreign terrorist successfully carrying out a number organization acting as an “alias for of well-planned bombings against al-Qaida in Iraq” (the ISI), making it key military, intelligence, and secu- illegal to provide material support or rity forces nodes in Damascus, Idlib resources to, or transacting with the and Aleppo. These included attacks group and freezing the assets of any on the headquarters of the criminal individuals belonging to or affiliated police and a center run by the feared with the group inside the U.S. In its air force intelligence wing in March designation, the department noted 2012, multiple attacks in October that since November 2011 the group 2012 in Aleppo city, and multiple op- had publicly claimed to have carried erations in Idlib and Hama governor- out almost 600 attacks including 40 ates. As other rebel grounds began suicide bombings that killed Syrian to see their victories dwindle against civilians as well as members of the renewed government counter-offen- government and its security forces. sives, Jabhat al-Nusra emerged as a It also accused the ISI and Jabhat new capable force against the regime. al-Nusra of attempting to “hijack” the “legitimate Syrian opposition and de- These military benefits to the Syri- cried the latter’s “sectarian vision.”1 an opposition and rebels, however, came with major political and public The main Syrian political opposition relations baggage. As an extension of groups, including the National Coa- the ISI and later directly of the origi- lition for Syrian Revolutionary and nal al-Qaeda organization headed by Opposition Forces, the Syrian Na- Ayman al-Zawahiri, Jabhat al-Nusra tional Council, and the Syrian Mus- became the center of political and lim Brotherhood, together with many public debates among external ac- rebel groups on the ground vocifer- tors, particularly in the United States ously opposed and condemned the and Western Europe, over what its U.S. government’s decision to black- 42 Insight Turkey THE MULTIPLE FACES OF JABHAT AL-NUSRA/JABHAT FATH AL-SHAM IN SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR list Jabhat al-Nusra, which cost them Agency which released multiple vid- dearly politically and in the realm of eo reports that focused primarily on public relations, particularly in the Jabhat al-Nusra’s provision of social U.S. where it raised significant doubt services and the group’s missionary amongst many government officials propagation (da’wa) activities among and politicians about the Syrian op- local populations. The group fur- position and rebels as a whole. Apart ther honed its media presence with from the official condemnations by a series of interviews with Al-Jazeera the Syrian political opposition and Arabic and Orient News, two major other rebel groups, including the Arabic satellite television news net- Free Syrian Army (FSA) umbrella, works, between 2013 and 2015. popular protests on the ground inside the country following the U.S. gov- In April 2013, ISI leader Abu Bakr ernment’s designation also showed al-Baghdadi unilaterally announced support for Jabhat al-Nusra, further that Jabhat al-Nusra would be, as far inflaming the political and public re- as he was concerned, subsumed with- lations hits. in an expanded ISI, which now called itself the Islamic State of Iraq and On the ground, Jabhat al-Nusra, in al-Sham (ISIS/ISIL). As the original addition to honing its military capa- direct parent organization and pro- bilities and expanding its member- vider of strategic advice and funding, ship into the thousands, also estab- it was only natural, according to him, lished and quickly developed an im- that it take direct control of al-Jaw- pressive media capability. It began to lani’s organization now that the lat- release an increasing number of writ- ter had developed significant local ten public statements and communi- presence and support on the ground qués and issue well-produced, high inside Syria. Despite al-Baghdadi’s definition propaganda films, many of proclamation, however, al-Jawlani them documenting its military oper- and other Jabhat al-Nusra leaders and ations. The latter were released by the commanders resisted his attempts to group’s official media department, forcibly re-assert control over their the White Minaret Media Founda- group. The latter countered al-Bagh- tion, which is named after a minaret dadi’s claims and refused to accept of the Umayyad Mosque in Damas- the ISIS amir’s claims of authority. cus city that is associated in hadith This dispute festered throughout the reports and eschatological writings rest of 2013, leading to splits among with the return of Jesus or the Mah- segments of Jabhat al-Nusra that re- di. Previously the group had released sulted in the desertion of some mem- videos on YouTube and other vid- bers to ISIS and the coalescing of a eo-sharing web sites. As it continued fully independent (of ISIS) Jabhat to expand its media capabilities and al-Nusra around al-Jawlani and his territorial control, the group also loyalists. Attempts to mediate the launched a semi-official media wing dispute between the two sides includ- that it branded as the Himam News ing by al-Zawahiri failed, with Jabhat 2016 Sprıng 43 COMMENTARY CHRISTOPHER ANZALONE Fighters from Al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate Al-Nusra al-Nusra leaders blaming al-Baghda- al-Suri, in a February suicide bomb- Front drive in the di and the ISIS leadership of stone- ing in Aleppo.2 In May of that year, northern Syrian city walling mediation attempts. The ISIS ISIS spokesman Abu Muhammad of Aleppo flying Islamist flags as leadership ignored al-Zawahiri’s de- al-Adnani excoriated al-Zawahiri in they head to a cision in November 2013 that Jabhat a lengthy message for “betraying” the frontline, on May al-Nusra alone would act as al-Qae- legacy of al-Qaeda founder Osama 26, 2015. Once da’s official Syrian affiliate organi- bin Laden and the principles of Islam Syria’s economic zation under the official expanded and jihad, presenting a lengthy indict- powerhouse, Aleppo has been name of “the al-Qaeda Organization ment that included allegedly “protect- divided between in Bilad al-Sham.” ing Iran and the Rejectionists (Shi’ite government control Muslims)” and hindering “true jihad.” in the city’s west By early 2014 the conflict between In an extra dig at al-Qaeda’s amir, he and rebel control ISIS and al-Jawlani’s Jabhat al-Nus- referenced slain al-Qaeda leaders in- in the east since ra, together with other Syrian rebel cluding bin Laden, Atiyyatullah al-Li- shortly after fighting there groups, erupted into full-scale war- bi, and Abu Yahya al-Libi in his at- began in mid-2012.