COMMENTARYTHE MULTIPLE FACES OF JABHAT AL-NUSRA/JABHAT FATH AL-SHAM IN ’S CIVIL WAR

The Multiple Faces of Jabhat al-Nusra/Jabhat Fath al-Sham in Syria’s Civil War

CHRISTOPHER ANZALONE*

ABSTRACT Jabhat al-Nusra has long been one of the most militarily effective armed actors against the Syrian Ba’thist regime and it continues to play a central role in the country’s civil war. With a leadership that mixes the transnational jihadi ideology of al-Qae- da with Syria-specific interests, the group is also at the forefront of battling the Islamic State in Syria. In the midst of its battlefield offensives, Jabhat al-Nusra is also busy building governing struc- tures to control territory in different parts of the country including Idlib, Latakia, Hama, Homs, Damascus, and Aleppo governorates.

ince its public emergence in Syria after laying the groundwork January 2012, Jabhat al-Nusra for its expansion during 2011 lead- Shas proven itself to be both a ing up to its public announcement military asset and a complex political of its existence in January 2012. Led problem for the Syrian political oppo- by its amir, Abu al-Jaw- sition and other rebel groups fighting lani, one of the Syrian ISI members the Syrian Ba’th Party-run govern- dispatched back home, the group co- ment of Bashar al-Assad. Organized alesced around a collective of jihadi originally by a group of Islamic State veterans, such as the group’s spokes- of Iraq (ISI, now the Islamic State/ man Abu Firas al-Suri, who was ISIS) members returned from Iraq killed in a U.S. drone strike in April together with veteran Syrian - 2016, and ideologues such as shari’a is with experience in the country’s council members Sami al-Uraydi and * John F. Fighting Vanguard movement that Abu Abdullah al-Shami, bringing to- Kennedy School of Government, fought the Syrian regime during the gether both military experience and Harvard early 1980s and al-Qaeda’s training creedal puritanism. University, USA camps in , Jabhat al-Nus- Insight Turkey ra quickly developed significant mili- Operating at first as an extension of Vol. 18 / No. 2 / tary capabilities on the ground inside the ISI, Jabhat al-Nusra proved itself 2016, pp. 41-50

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emergence meant for the Syrian up- On the ground, Jabhat al- rising as a whole and whether or not to actively provide military support Nusra, in addition to honing and supplies on the ground. Despite its military capabilities and desires to see al-Assad overthrown, expanding its membership concerns over the expansion of Jabhat al-Nusra and Islamist rebel into the thousands, also groups, such as Harakat Ahrar al-Sh- established and quickly am, Jaysh al-Islam and others, came to dominate much of the discussion developed an impressive and debate over whether and how to media capability support Syrian political and armed opposition groups. This concern cul- minated in December 2012 when the to be a major military asset in the U.S. Department of State designated war against the Syrian government, Jabhat al-Nusra as a foreign terrorist successfully carrying out a number organization acting as an “alias for of well-planned bombings against al-Qaida in Iraq” (the ISI), making it key military, intelligence, and secu- illegal to provide material support or rity forces nodes in Damascus, Idlib resources to, or transacting with the and Aleppo. These included attacks group and freezing the assets of any on the headquarters of the criminal individuals belonging to or affiliated police and a center run by the feared with the group inside the U.S. In its air force intelligence wing in March designation, the department noted 2012, multiple attacks in October that since November 2011 the group 2012 in Aleppo city, and multiple op- had publicly claimed to have carried erations in Idlib and Hama governor- out almost 600 attacks including 40 ates. As other rebel grounds began suicide bombings that killed Syrian to see their victories dwindle against civilians as well as members of the renewed government counter-offen- government and its security forces. sives, Jabhat al-Nusra emerged as a It also accused the ISI and Jabhat new capable force against the regime. al-Nusra of attempting to “hijack” the “legitimate Syrian opposition and de- These military benefits to the Syri- cried the latter’s “sectarian vision.”1 an opposition and rebels, however, came with major political and public The main Syrian political opposition relations baggage. As an extension of groups, including the National Coa- the ISI and later directly of the origi- lition for Syrian Revolutionary and nal al-Qaeda organization headed by Opposition Forces, the Syrian Na- Ayman al-Zawahiri, Jabhat al-Nusra tional Council, and the Syrian Mus- became the center of political and lim Brotherhood, together with many public debates among external ac- rebel groups on the ground vocifer- tors, particularly in the United States ously opposed and condemned the and Western Europe, over what its U.S. government’s decision to black-

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list Jabhat al-Nusra, which cost them Agency which released multiple vid- dearly politically and in the realm of eo reports that focused primarily on public relations, particularly in the Jabhat al-Nusra’s provision of social U.S. where it raised significant doubt services and the group’s missionary amongst many government officials propagation (da’wa) activities among and politicians about the Syrian op- local populations. The group fur- position and rebels as a whole. Apart ther honed its media presence with from the official condemnations by a series of interviews with Al-Jazeera the Syrian political opposition and Arabic and Orient News, two major other rebel groups, including the Arabic satellite television news net- Free (FSA) umbrella, works, between 2013 and 2015. popular protests on the ground inside the country following the U.S. gov- In April 2013, ISI leader Abu Bakr ernment’s designation also showed al-Baghdadi unilaterally announced support for Jabhat al-Nusra, further that Jabhat al-Nusra would be, as far inflaming the political and public re- as he was concerned, subsumed with- lations hits. in an expanded ISI, which now called itself the and On the ground, Jabhat al-Nusra, in al-Sham (ISIS/ISIL). As the original addition to honing its military capa- direct parent organization and pro- bilities and expanding its member- vider of strategic advice and funding, ship into the thousands, also estab- it was only natural, according to him, lished and quickly developed an im- that it take direct control of al-Jaw- pressive media capability. It began to lani’s organization now that the lat- release an increasing number of writ- ter had developed significant local ten public statements and communi- presence and support on the ground qués and issue well-produced, high inside Syria. Despite al-Baghdadi’s definition propaganda films, many of proclamation, however, al-Jawlani them documenting its military oper- and other Jabhat al-Nusra leaders and ations. The latter were released by the commanders resisted his attempts to group’s official media department, forcibly re-assert control over their the White Minaret Media Founda- group. The latter countered al-Bagh- tion, which is named after a minaret dadi’s claims and refused to accept of the Umayyad Mosque in Damas- the ISIS amir’s claims of authority. cus city that is associated in hadith This dispute festered throughout the reports and eschatological writings rest of 2013, leading to splits among with the return of Jesus or the Mah- segments of Jabhat al-Nusra that re- di. Previously the group had released sulted in the desertion of some mem- videos on YouTube and other vid- bers to ISIS and the coalescing of a eo-sharing web sites. As it continued fully independent (of ISIS) Jabhat to expand its media capabilities and al-Nusra around al-Jawlani and his territorial control, the group also loyalists. Attempts to mediate the launched a semi-official media wing dispute between the two sides includ- that it branded as the Himam News ing by al-Zawahiri failed, with Jabhat

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Fighters from Al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate Al-Nusra al-Nusra leaders blaming al-Baghda- al-Suri, in a February suicide bomb- Front drive in the di and the ISIS leadership of stone- ing in Aleppo.2 In May of that year, northern Syrian city walling mediation attempts. The ISIS ISIS spokesman Abu Muhammad of Aleppo flying Islamist flags as leadership ignored al-Zawahiri’s de- al-Adnani excoriated al-Zawahiri in they head to a cision in November 2013 that Jabhat a lengthy message for “betraying” the frontline, on May al-Nusra alone would act as al-Qae- legacy of al-Qaeda founder Osama 26, 2015. Once da’s official Syrian affiliate organi- bin Laden and the principles of Islam Syria’s economic zation under the official expanded and jihad, presenting a lengthy indict- powerhouse, Aleppo has been name of “the al-Qaeda Organization ment that included allegedly “protect- divided between in Bilad al-Sham.” ing Iran and the Rejectionists (Shi’ite government control Muslims)” and hindering “true jihad.” in the city’s west By early 2014 the conflict between In an extra dig at al-Qaeda’s amir, he and rebel control ISIS and al-Jawlani’s Jabhat al-Nus- referenced slain al-Qaeda leaders in- in the east since ra, together with other Syrian rebel cluding bin Laden, Atiyyatullah al-Li- shortly after fighting there groups, erupted into full-scale war- bi, and Abu Yahya al-Libi in his at- began in mid-2012. fare between the two sides after the tacks, claiming that they represented AFP PHOTO / AMC / former began to target other Syrian the “true al-Qaeda,” which was com- FADI AL-HALABI rebel groups such as Harakat Ahrar pletely different from the corrupted al-Sham, killing important leaders in- organization now led by al-Zawahiri. cluding Abu Khalid al-Suri, a former friend and confidant of the famed ji- Fighting between ISIS and Jabhat hadi strategist and writer Abu Mus’ab al-Nusra and Syrian rebel groups

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implementation of a harshly black- Since the autumn of and-white interpretation of Islamic law and legal penalties, an interpre- 2015, Jabhat al-Nusra tation that is essentially boiled down has continued to follow to the exercising of the hudud or “set” a similar strategy, that legal punishments for offenses such as theft, murder, highway robbery, being the formation sexual offenses such as fornication of alliances with and homosexuality, and spying un- der the widened rubric of “hisba” other Islamist rebel (regulation of the market and, more groups and operating broadly, public and, under ISIS, pri- in concert with them vate morals) and the Islamic creedal imperative of “commanding the right in launching major and forbidding the wrong” (al-amr offensives against the bi’l ma’ruf wa-l-nahy an al-munkar).

Syrian government and While it has also established struc- its allies tures of governance and control over areas it controls, increasingly now in concern with allied rebel groups and alliances such as Harakat Ahar al-Sh- continued throughout the year and am and Jaysh al-Fath, Jabhat al-Nusra became increasingly bitter, taking on has not placed as much of an empha- religious creedal overtones. Clashes sis on territorial control masquerad- between ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra and ing as claimed “statehood” as ISIS has. Syrian rebels were particularly fierce This is not to say that the former does in Aleppo, Idlib, and Deir al-Zur gov- not also seek to provide some social ernorates, with ISIS being pushed out services to local populations under of much, but not all, of Aleppo and its control. Indeed, Jabhat al-Nus- Idlib but snatching Deir al-Zur from ra since 2013 has sought to demon- Jabhat al-Nusra’s commander there, strate and publicize its capabilities in Abu Mariya al-Qahtani, who has the social sphere by highlighting the since taken a prominent role in de- collection of zakat (charitable do- nouncing ISIS and its attacks on Syri- nations required by Islamic law on an rebels and rival jihadi groups such certain forms of wealth and proper- as Jabhat al-Nusra. As it did in Raqqa, ties) and its distribution to the needy, ISIS forcibly took over much of Deir the establishment of a form of law al-Zur from Syrian rebels and began and order, and the organization and to implement its broader insurgent hosting of da’wa outreach campaigns political program, which includes the and communal events, such as com- establishment of bureaucratic struc- petitions, iftar meals, group prayers, tures of control and the provision of and celebrations during Ramadan some social services together with the and for Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha.

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sitions), Jabhat al-Nusra and its allies Despite its focus on fighting succeeded in over-running Syrian regime forces and capturing the base. the Syrian government and Influential Islamist ideologues were its allies inside Syria, Jabhat present, both from Jabhat al-Nus- al-Nusra also maintains a ra and affiliates of other groups, the two most important being the for- transnational identity similar mer’s Abu Abdullah al-Shami and the to that of al-Qaeda and it is this young Saudi religious scholar Abdul- lah al-Muhaysini, who was taught by aspect of the group’s makeup senior politically activist Saudi Salafi together with the related issue religious scholars and is closely af- of the group’s recruitment filiated with the Islamic Front and Jaysh al-Fath rebel coalition umbrel- of foreign fighters, that is las, Harakat Ahrar al-Sham, and the the most concerning to the ETIP. Al-Shami oversaw the mass ex- ecution of regime soldiers captured at international community the base, declaring the verdicts to be based on the legal concept of “retalia- tion in kind” (qisas). The group has not, unlike ISIS, fo- cused more on establishing political Since the autumn of 2015, Jabhat control over territory at the expense al-Nusra has continued to follow a of its military goals against the Syr- similar strategy, that being the forma- ian government and has continued tion of alliances with other Islamist to carry out major offensives against rebel groups and operating in concert and attacks on it and its allies, such as with them in launching major offen- Hizbullah, Iraqi Shi’ite militias, and sives against the Syrian government Iranian and Russian military forces and its allies. During the spring of aiding al-Assad inside the country. this year the group has followed this strategy in northern Aleppo gover- In early September 2015, Jabhat norate against ISIS and in southern al-Nusra spearheaded the final push Aleppo against the Syrian regime and against the Abu al-Zuhur military air its Shi’ite militia and Iranian allies. base in Idlib governorate, a regime Major continuing offensives have, as stronghold that had been under siege of this writing, pushed back regime since 2012, as part of a rebel coalition forces in areas such as Khan Tuman, that included Ahrar al-Sham and the Ma’rata, Khalsa, and Humaira. These East Turkestan Islamic Party’s (ETIP) offensives have been conducted by a growing branch in Syria. Strategi- coalition of Syrian Islamist rebel forc- cally using suicide bombers to open es including contingents from Jabhat its offensive followed by “inghimasi” al-Nusra, Harakat Ahrar al-Sham, (rapid-response, highly-mobile forc- Jaysh al-Fath, Ajnad al-Sham, and al- es used to pierce enemy lines and po- lied groups like the ETIP. Rather than

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sending waves of suicide bombers, as the south of the center of Damascus ISIS began to do in late 2015 when city and in other districts in southern faced with increasing battlefield pres- Damascus where two groups allied to sures, Jabhat al-Nusra is currently ISIS, the Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade using strategic suicide bombings to and Harakat al-Muthanna al-Islami- open up new pushes into regime-held yya (which recently merged to form territory as a way of softening up key a new group, Jaysh Khalid ibn al- positions before assaults by rebel in- Walid), have been pushed back by an fantry and armored units. These tac- alliance of anti-ISIS rebel forces that tics have thus far proven quite effec- includes both Jabhat al-Nusra and tive and have resulted in significant Harakat Ahrar al-Sham alongside casualties among regime forces and local FSA groups.3 In the midst of its allied Shi’ite militias, which are made conflict with ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra up primarily of Iraqis, and among also continues to target Syrian gov- Iranian officers on the ground. ernment forces and their allies in Lat- akia, Homs, and Hama governorates, Recent pushes by Jabhat al-Nus- launching in June a major offensive ra, Harakat Ahrar al-Sham, and alongside Ahrar al-Sham, Jaysh al- other Syrian rebel groups in May Fath, the East Turkestan Islamic Par- and June 2016 in northern Aleppo, ty, Ajnad al-Sham, and other Syrian which initially made rapid advances Islamist rebel groups against the Syri- against ISIS, have since been turned an regime in Jabal al-Akrad. back due to fierce counterattacks by al-Baghdadi’s group, including mul- Despite its focus on fighting the Syr- tiple suicide bombings, and shifting ian government and its allies inside of reinforcements to the area. How- Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra also maintains ever, as pressure on ISIS grows in a transnational identity similar to that other parts of northern Aleppo, par- of al-Qaeda and it is this aspect of the ticularly in and around Manbij, and group’s makeup together with the re- northern Raqqa governorate, it is lated issue of the group’s recruitment likely that Jabhat al-Nusra and oth- of foreign fighters, including individ- er Syrian rebel groups will begin to uals from Western Europe and North succeed in once again pushing back America, that is the most concern- ISIS’ territorial holdings to the north ing to the international community. of Aleppo city. Heavy fighting also In its media output and statements continues between Jabhat al-Nusra, from its senior leaders and chief along with other Syrian rebel groups ideologues, Jabhat al-Nusra is clear including Jaysh al-Islam and Harakat about belonging to a transnational Ahrar al-Sham, with ISIS in East- jihadi current that includes al-Qaeda ern and Western Ghouta and in the and its regional affiliates in Yemen, Dar’a region in southern Syria. A North Africa, , and South particularly bitter contest continues Asia. Like al-Qaeda groups and ISIS, between ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra the group’s leadership promotes the over the Yarmouk Refugee Camp to notion of the “golden age” of Islam

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An image released on July 28, 2016 by Al-Manara al-Bayda, the official news arm of Al-Nusra Front, Al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, allegedly shows the group’s chief Abu Mohammad al-Jolani at an undisclosed location, in the first ever picture to be released of him. HANDOUT / AL-MANARA AL-BAYDAA / AFP

and for Muslims during the lifetime The transnational/globalist jihadi as- of the Prophet Muhammad and un- pects of Jabhat al-Nusra’s identity and der the Rashidun caliphs and the glo- creed, in addition to leading the U.S., rious expansion of Islam and Muslim Russia, and other international actors rule under the Umayyad Caliphate in to target it militarily and financially, the seventh and eighth centuries. The have also led to, at times, tensions beginnings of Muslim servitude, di- between the group and other Syr- vision, and decline began, according ian rebel groups including various to Jabhat al-Nusra’s narrative, during rebel militias under the loose FSA the age of European colonialism and umbrella and even close allies such rule in Muslim-majority regions such as Harakat Ahrar al-Sham, which as the Levant, North Africa, Iraq, and seeks to improve its relations and Central, South, and Southeast Asia. It reputation with the United States and is only through armed struggle (jihad other international powers. Serious al-askari), following strategic guide- discussions about a merger between lines provided by jihadi leaders such Jabhat al-Nusra and the latter even- as bin Laden and strategists including tually broke down over the refusal Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, that Muslims will of al-Jawlani and other senior lead- be able to return to glory and self-re- ers to disassociate their group from spect in the world of nation states. In al-Zawahiri and al-Qaeda. Internal short, despite its bitter conflict with debates over whether to remain af- ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra also endorses filiated with al-Qaeda have report- the idea that ultimately what is need- edly led to fissures within the group ed is a single unified Islamic state that itself, with some leaders, such as is capable of defending the rights of Abu Mariya al-Qahtani, advocating Muslims in the contemporary world a split and a more Islamist-nation- of nation-states. alist approach and others continued

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ties to the transnational/globalist ji- hadi current of al-Qaeda while also The Syrian opposition and maintaining a local/regional focus on fighting the Syrian regime and its other rebel groups will allies in the Levant. While the group continue to simultaneously remains unified, in the future under benefit and suffer from the certain circumstances on the ground it is possible, though perhaps not im- presence of Jabhat Fath mediately likely, that internal debates al-Sham as a major player in among the group’s membership and leaders could result in certain seg- the country’s civil war ments of the group breaking away to either ally with other existing groups or to form new, independent groups. aiding Syrian rebels, even so-called “vetted” groups, out of fear that Jabhat al-Nusra plays multiple roles any weapons given will be captured in the and presents or otherwise fall into the hands of more mainstream Syrian opposition al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate. The de- and rebel groups with a dilemma. sertion of fighters from these vetted On the one hand, Jabhat al-Nusra is groups with some of their weapons a powerful and capable military force has done nothing to ward off this against the regime and has been in- concern. The presence of the group volved in handing al-Assad’s forces and ISIS has also been used as a cover with a number of its most significant by Russia in justifying its air strikes defeats and losses since 2012. Howev- across Syria, regardless of whether or er, on the other hand, the group’s af- not either group is even active in ar- filiation with al-Qaeda and the more eas under Russian attack. puritanical creedal impulses of at least some of its leadership and ideo- In a public relations move in late July, logues is concerning to some seg- Jabhat al-Nusra and al-Qaeda Central ments of the Syrian opposition and coordinated the announcement of the Jabhat al-Nusra’s attempts to imple- former’s official dis-affiliation, at least ment its own interpretation of Islam- in name, with the latter. Abu Muham- ic law in areas under its control have mad al-Jawlani announced that his led to tensions between it and other group’s new name would be Jabhat Syrian rebels, particularly FSA mili- Fath al-Sham (Conquest of Sham tias, and some locals. Front) and that the group would con- tinue striving to unify the disparate The presence of Jabhat al-Nusra has strands of the Syrian armed opposi- also negatively impacted the Syrian tion. The dis-affiliation was blessed opposition and rebels as a whole be- by al-Qaeda representative Ahmad cause it has resulted in the hesitancy Hasan Abu al-Khayr, who did so in of international powers such as the the name of Ayman al-Zawahiri. The United States from more actively move by the Nusra leadership was

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warmly welcomed by a number of guarantees that Jabhat Fath al-Sham important Syrian rebel groups includ- will continue to play a major role in ing Ahrar al-Sham, Jund al-Aqsa, and the Syrian conflict for the foreseeable the Jaysh al-Fath coalition as well as future. If dynamics shift, particularly by influential religious and ideologi- on the ground inside Syria, it is pos- cal voices among Islamist Syrian reb- sible that the group or at least some els such as Shaykh Abdullah al-Mu- segment of it may eventually disasso- haysini and Abd al-Razzaq al-Mahdi. ciate from al-Qaeda and the global ji- Jabhat al-Nusra’s dis-affiliation with hadi current it represents, but this too al-Qaeda has been a major hurdle seems to be unlikely in the near term. for closer unity between al-Jawlani’s Thus, the Syrian opposition and oth- group and Syrian Islamist rebels and er rebel groups will continue to si- the recent move was primarily tak- multaneously benefit and suffer from en for public relations reasons and the presence of Jabhat Fath al-Sham to take away an excuse used by the as a major player in the country’s civil Ba’th regime and Russia for bombing war. areas controlled by Jabhat al-Nusra and claiming they are only attack- ing “al-Qaeda.” It remains to be seen, Endnotes though it is unlikely, that ideology of 1. U.S. Department of State, “Terrorist Desig- the new Jabhat Fath al-Sham will dif- nations of the al-Nusrah Front as an Alias for al- Qa’ida in Iraq,” (December 11, 2012), retrieved fer significantly from Jabhat al-Nusra. June 3, 2016, from http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ prs/ps/2012/12/201759.htm. The major dilemma posed by Jabhat 2. Aron Lund, “Who and What was Abu Khalid al-Nusra/Jabhat Fath al-Sham to al-Suri?,” Parts 1 and 2, Carnegie Endowment for those opposed to the Syrian gov- International Peace (February 24 & 25, 2014), retrieved June 3, 2016 from http://carnegieen- ernment and its allies is unlikely to dowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=54618 and http:// go away. The group’s military pow- carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=54634. er, which is bolstered by its working 3. Phil Sands and Suha Maayeh, “Far from Raqqa relationships and battlefield suc- and Falluja, Syria Rebels Open New Front against cesses with powerful Syrian Islamist ISIL in the South,” The National (May 28, 2016), re- trieved June 5, 2016 from http://www.thenation- rebel groups such as Harakat Ahrar al.ae/world/middle-east/far-from-raqqa-and-fal- al-Sham and other anti-government lujah-syria-rebels-open-new-front-against-isil-in- armed factions such as the ETIP, the-south#full.

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