The Discursive Production of Citizenship, Social Identity, and Religious Discrimination

Home , 2000s in Algeria, Bourguibism, Education in Tunisia, Human rights in Tunisia, Ifriqiya, Kusaila

The Discursive Production of Citizenship, Social Identity, and Religious Discrimination:

the Case of Tunisia

A thesis presented to

the faculty of

the College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University

In partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree

Master in Political Science

Fatma Jabbari

May 2018

this thesis titled

The Discursive Production of Citizenship, Social Identity, and Religious Discrimination:

The Case of Tunisia

FATMA JABBARI

has been approved for

the Department of Political Science

and the College of Arts and Sciences by

Nukhet Sandal

Associate Professor of Political Science

Robert Frank

Dean, College of Arts and Sciences 3

ABSTRACT

JABBARI, FATMA, M.A., May 2018, Political Science

The Discursive Production of Citizenship, Social Identity, and Religious Discrimination:

The Case of Tunisia

Director of thesis: Nukhet Sandal

Post-conflict state building projects aim to reform the conceptualization and implementation of citizenship mostly through education. The socialization of identity through schools tend to define social cohesion by promoting narratives based on nationalist rhetoric and national identity. This is especially true for countries with centralized authority such as Tunisia, where the educational institutions and curricula are sanctioned and monitored by the state. This thesis examines the discursive production of identity and citizenship boundaries in state narratives as embedded in Social Science textbooks through three time periods: The Bourguiba era 1956-1987, Ben Ali administration, 1987-201, and contemporary dynamics; 2011-Present.The thesis also analyzes the effects of identity production processes on social discrimination against religious minorities (Christians and Jews) in Tunisia. This study does so by means of mixed methods. First, it examines thirty-one (36) Social Sciences textbooks (History,

Civics, and Islamic Education) circulated nationwide in Tunisia as well as interviews, political declarations, and official documents. Second, it analyzes data from round 3 of

The Religion and State (RAS3) dataset (between 2009-2014) to examine the impact of state nationalist narratives on societal discrimination against religious minorities in

Tunisia and the MENA region. Understanding the impact of identity polarization on 4 religious discrimination is a critical step towards understanding the complex mechanisms of democratization, citizenship, and peacebuilding in diverse war-torn regions swayed by revolutions and uprisings.

DEDICATION

This thesis and all my academic achievements are dedicated to my family; I would not be who am I today without you all. First and foremost, to my parents Bahija and Mohammed

who have always loved and supported me unconditionally and whose good examples

have taught me to work hard for the things that I aspire to achieve. You made me the

woman I am, so thank you, I am forever grateful!

Also to my nieces and nephew Lyna, Lynda, Kenza, Dora, and Mohammed whose smiles

and hugs eased the challenges of distance and homesickness. You are all my shining

stars!

I finally dedicate my thesis to my brother and sisters, Mahdi, Madiha, Imen, and Hayfa.

You have always been a constant source of support and encouragement during the

challenging times. You celebrate with me when even the littlest things go right, and you

are there whenever I need you; I could not have asked for more!

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am very fortunate to have performed my graduate studies at the Political Science

Department at Ohio University. I met amazing faculty, staff, and colleagues whose support cannot be unmentioned. I would first like to thank my academic advisor and professor, Dr. Nukhet Sandal, for her mentorship, guidance, and unconditional support over the years. Under her mentorship, I have learned not only the particulars of academic and professional skills but also invaluable social skills. I can’t thank you enough for inspiring me to continue in the right direction and for making yourself always available. I would also like to thank my committee members Dr. Brandon Kendhammer and Dr.

Myra Waterbury for their contributions to this work. Over the course of my master coursework, their doors were open for me, provided me with many insightful suggestions and demonstrated a sincere interest in my work. Special thanks to my professors Dr.

Sarah Poggione, Dr. Myra Waterbury, Dr. Brandon Kendhammer who contributed to the progress I have made and were instrumental in my academic advancement. Finally, I would like to express the most profound gratitude to my family and friends in the USA and Tunisia.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract ...... 3 Dedication ...... 5 Acknowledgments ...... 6 List of tables ...... 10 List of Figures ...... 11 Chapter 1: Conceptual Framework, Literature Review, Theory And Methods ...... 12 Introduction ...... 12 Thesis Outline ...... 21 Conceptual Framework & Literature Review ...... 24 Citizen Engagement ...... 24 Social Sciences...... 27 Citizenship through Social Science Textbooks ...... 28 National Narratives...... 29 National Identity ...... 30 Religious Minorities in the MENA Region ...... 32 The Contribution of the Study ...... 33 Methods ...... 35 Qualitative Research Methods ...... 36 Quantitative Research Methods ...... 38 The Educational System in Tunisia; an Overview ...... 39 Chapter 2: Official Narratives And Romantic Nationalism ...... 41 Introduction ...... 41 National Narratives and Nationalist Discourse ...... 43 Identity Politics and National Narratives: Tunisia ...... 48 El-Habib Bourguiba Period (1956-1987) ...... 49 Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali (1987-2011) ...... 53 The Second Transition: In the Aftermath of the 2010-11 Revolution ...... 56 Analysis and Discussion ...... 58 Romantic Nationalist Prism; The Bourguiba Doctrine ...... 59 National Identity and Nationalist Discourse ...... 60 Patriotic Fervor ...... 62 8

Mandatory Islamic Education and Double Standards ...... 64 Pride in Glorious Times ...... 68 Correlating Diversity with Conflict ...... 69 Otherness: ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ ...... 70 Reinforcing Territorial Attachment and Illegal Immigration ...... 71 Politics of History: National Struggles and Heroes ...... 72 Pan-Arabism Dimension ...... 73 Omitted Historical Facts: Bourguiba’s Shadow ...... 74 Obstruction of Minorities’ Collective Memories; The Holocaust ...... 76 Conclusion ...... 79 Chapter 3: The Citizenship Meter: Citizenship, Civic Engagement, And Human Rights 82 Introduction ...... 82 Educating for Citizenship in Civics ...... 86 Citizenship Education: An Overview ...... 87 Education for Citizenship: The Case of Tunisia...... 91 Political Culture: Democracy and Citizenship ...... 92 Active Citizenship between Theory and Practice ...... 96 Attributes of the Ideal Citizen: the "Citizenship Meter" ...... 100 Universal Human Rights and Cultural Relativism ...... 102 Progressive Values: Women’s Rights and Gender Equality ...... 104 Democratic Learning; A Neglected Priority or a Lack of Political Will? ...... 106 Tolerance and Respect for Differences ...... 111 Conclusion ...... 112 Chapter 4: Revolution, Conflict, and Marginalization: Religious Minorities And Citizenship In Tunisia ...... 115 Introduction ...... 115 Religious Minorities in the MENA Region; An Overview ...... 118 Religious Minorities and Transitional Societies...... 120 The ‘Marked Citizen’ and Public Invisibility of Religious Minorities: The Case of Tunisia ...... 124 Religious Minorities in Tunisia: A Background ...... 125 Government Religious Regulation’s and Societal Discrimination: (RAS3) ...... 131 Regression Results ...... 134 ...... 134 9

Analysis and Discussion ...... 134 Religious Minorities in Tunisia: Contemporary Dynamics ...... 138 Societal Discrimination and government regulations in Tunisia and the core Arab Uprisings Countries ...... 145 Conclusion ...... 149 Chapter 5: Conclusion and Implications ...... 153 Policy Recommendations ...... 156 Future Research ...... 160 References ...... 161

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Regression for Factors Affecting Societal Religious Discrimiantion ...... 134

LIST OF FIGURES

Page

Figure 1. Conceptual Model of the Social Identity Theory (SIT) ...... 15 Figure 2. Word numerical count- History textbooks...... 57 Figure 3. Religious regulations and societal discrimination in Tunisia...... 146 Figure 4. Religious regulations and societal discrimination in Arab-Uprisings countries ………………………………………………………………………………………….148

CHAPTER 1: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK, LITERATURE REVIEW, THEORY

AND METHODS

Introduction

The notion of citizenship received a considerable amount of attention in different disciplines. Citizenship as a social practice has attracted interest among scholars (Brand,

2014; Dickenson, 2006; Hahn, 2010; Kymlicka & Pfostl, 2014). The concept in this sense overlaps with identity politics and nation-state projects. Citizenship as a social construct is to also link to some key terms such as national identity, nationalism, national narratives, and minority politics to name few. These concepts are highly influenced by sociopolitical change especially regime change. Previous scholarship on regime transition suggests a reconfiguration of identity, an instrumentalization of nationalist and religious outbidding (Anderson, 2003; Snyder, 2000; Toft, 2013). This is particularly true to the

Middle East North Africa (region) where democratic prospects have been short in supply and where governance implied a quintessential relationship between politics and religion.

The MENA region is historically predisposed to personalist and authoritarian persistence relying on nationalist and religious discourse (Brand, 2014; Brownlee, 2004).

Since 2011, the MENA region underwent drastic changes as part of the Arab

Uprisings. The wave of protests originated in Tunisia demanding freedom, dignity, and social justice. The slogan, as well as the movement, had a chain reaction to other countries in the region. Except Tunisia, uprisings in other countries resulted did not accomplish the intended outcome. Syria, Libya, and Yemen fell into a spiral of civil wars and Egypt reverted to military dictatorship. Tunisia’s democratic transition stands as the 13 most notable outcome of the Arab Uprisings. The changes Tunisia underwent politically influenced social aspects. Within the framework of dismantling the authoritarian traditions long embedded in the political system, Tunisia’s political scene now appears more pluralistic and heading towards democratic consolidation (Masri, 2017).

Identity politics and nationalist/religious outbidding tends to increase at times of political transition. Since the breakdown of the authoritarian regime, the national identity discourse, unity, and the minority question re-emerged (Brand, 2014; Masri, 2017;

Romdhani, 2013). Numerous attributes of states such its dominant religious affiliation were integrated into the political and elite rhetoric. With the transition and the rise of the

Islamism movement into politics (Ennahdha party) in Tunisia, religion increasingly reasserted it in the and political scene and the public sphere (Ferrari & Toronto, 2017).

While literature has significantly researched and theorized about the success of the democratic political transition in Tunisia (Brand, 2014; Haggard & Kaufman, 2012;

Masri, 2017; Nossett, 2014 Romdhani, 2013), little has been said about the changing dynamics of citizenship, belonging, and social pluralism ion a social level. The present thesis does so by focusing on the reconceptualization of citizenship, democratic learning, and religious pluralism within the framework of transitional societies. In this thesis, I examine The discursive production of identity and citizenship boundaries in state narratives as embedded in Social Science textbooks through three time periods: The

Bourguiba era 1956-1987, Ben Ali administration, 1987-2011, and contemporary dynamics; 2011-Present.The thesis also analyzes the effects of identity production processes on Christians and Jews in Tunisia. I depart form the Social Identity Theory’s 14 basic tenants in terms of group membership and social comparison to decipher the doctrines and ideologies embedded in the state discourse around identity. The promises of the democratic transition can be halted if the Tunisian state does not realign its nation- state building projects and religious regulation policies.

The main argument of this thesis is that state narratives in Tunisia perpetuate an ideological understanding of identity that makes being Tunisian and Muslim as mutually exclusive. According to Reynolds et al. (2012), the dynamic of in-group and out-group in terms self-conception creates an unconscious inherited bias in favor of the in-group. In a situation of comparison, the individual is more likely to promote a positive image of the in-group for self and group promotion. The comparison process overlaps with the boundaries of identity and group affiliation. Identity socialization through schooling, the communal value system, and the overarching political rhetoric establishes and confirms a group paradigm. This study found that ideologies and doctrines embedded in the school curriculum and political discourse generate a social comparison between the Muslim identity and religious minorities (Christians and Jews) in Tunisia.

Figure 1: Conceptual Model of the Social Identity Theory (SIT) (Age of sage, ND)

The Social Identity Theory (SIT) is a social psychology theory initially developed by Henri Tajfel and John Turner (1979). The SIT is a conceptualization that recognizes that the way we perceive others and ourselves on both our unique characteristics and our group membership. Tajfel and Turner (1979) defined social identity as the self- conception with a specific group in a society based on a social psychological attachment and group membership (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The theory’s initial theoretical underpinnings are that social identity is acquired through group membership and intergroup relations (Burke, 2006; Brown, 2000; Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

The basic tenants of Social Identity Theory assert that there are two sets of identity; a personal identity based on personal characteristics and a social identity based on affinities with the group identity. Social identity is derived from membership to a 16 certain group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Brown, 2000). Group identification and membership implies an in-group/outgroup dichotomy. On one end of the spectrum, the perception of the in-group is more likely to be characterized with a positive evaluation and a preferential treatment. The in-group favoritism does not necessarily reflect how we really think about our group but is mostly derived from the need to enhance one’s self- esteem. On the opposite end of the spectrum, as a member of the in-group, a person is most likely to be holding negative dispositions outgroup. Perceived threats to the self- esteem are often triggers for in group favoritism. The rhetoric creates archetypical dichotomies between in group and out group. These dichotomies are mutually constitutive. In other words, the in-group needs the out-group in order to maintain itself and the identity boundaries. The processes of contingent identity construction are based on identifying another collectivity as an outsider of the in-group.

As the figure shows, the process of formation of social identity is based on the categorization of the social environment to an in-group and an out-group within the same society. The social Identity Theory (SIT) according to Tajfel and Turner (1979) suggests the existence of three orderly cognitive processes for social identity; self-categorization, self-identification, and social comparison. Social identity within this framework is a social construct derived from group membership. Identity is understood within the affinities of social group we belong to, the in-group, and the differences of the group we do not belong to, the out-group. The evaluation of others is made on a basis on “we” and

“they” (the in-group and the out-group). 17

Social categorization establishes and defines the person’s place in the society based on group membership. The identification process is both “relational and comparative” (Tajfel & Turner, 1991, p. 283). Individuals would self-identify based on who they are and who they are not. One does so by positioning themselves within the parameters of the in-group and comparing themselves to the out group (in-group comparison). Self-esteem and the social status consists on perceiving the in-group as positively differentiated from the out-group. In this thesis, I use the SIT to examine the role of state narratives in the process of formation of social identity and the definition of the boundaries between the in-group and out-group. I examine the discursive production of identity in state narratives.

I utilize the SIT to decipher the patriotic and nationalist, and religious rhetoric in social science textbooks. In other words, I analyze the construction of group dichotomies

(in-group/out-group) through the national identity discourse as part of a nation-state building project. Schools are considered a social project where political elite and state officials implement the discourse around group membership national identity. I particularly investigate the process of social comparison and its implications on religious discrimination. Since this thesis tests the implications of identity polarization with the religious minorities in Tunisia, it understands group membership within the framework of

“public theologies” (Sandal, 2013). The process of identity formation, homogenization strategies assimilates religious minorities to the mainstream religion (Islam) and pushes

Christians and Jews to the outskirts of identity and society. 18

The theological underpinnings of the Muslim majority in Tunisia make it impossible to imagine any other religiously differentiated citizen Tunisian enough.

Through state narratives, national identity doctrine, the discourse sets citizenship boundaries and creates identities of the margins. These identities are often treated as second class citizens from a socio-political standpoint. The systems of exclusive governance couples with state narratives influence societal attitude towards religious minorities (Anderson 2003; Rieffer-Flanagan, 2016; Sandal, 2013; Snyder, 2000; Picard,

2012).

Focusing on Christians and Jews in Tunisia, this thesis highlights the limitations and challenges of the identity engineering. I discuss the implications of identity polarization focusing on the social consequences of politics of textbooks and political discourse on religious minorities in Tunisia. State narrative advances a quintessential identity of Tunisian and Muslim. The state’s religious exclusivity and special policies undermines the democratic consolidation in Tunisia.

While the Tunisian legal frameworks treat all citizens equally regardless of their gender and religious identification, the mechanisms of exclusive governance towards religious minorities falls short of equality and equal opportunity. The residual effects of concealment of diversity lies on a societal level. Religious discrimination derives its legitimacy from the political institution and the judiciary (The Modus Vivendi and the

1958 Law).

States have at their disposal many vehicles to inculcate particular state projects and official narratives to their citizens. Constitutions are primary texts that define the 19 contours of the nation in their first articles. Speeches by political leaders are also instruments in the disposal of state apparatus to do so. There are also other cultural channels such as literature and movies.

Official speeches by the national elite, documents such as “national charters” and constitutions are resources that can plausibly be used in analyzing national narratives national identity discourse. These official narratives are most likely to be studied and taught in schools within the framework of social science. School curriculum, in countries where public education is the norm, is the outcome of a political and cultural vision that the state is aiming to fuse into the incoming generations. The mission statement as published by the Ministry of Education (MoE) reiterates that role that schools play in students’ lives. The educational institutions not only serve learning purposes but also shape the personality of students on values like citizenship, governance, civic engagement, and tolerance. According to this mission statements, schools, educational curriculum architects, and teachers have a monopoly over knowledge but also values and societal behavior. It could be argued that this is a form of social control that extends the vision of the state on younger generations and the state-nation building project as a whole.

This is particularly true for the hybrid regimes in the Middle East North African

(MENA) countries, which were swept by the 2011 Arab Uprisings. In these countries, the educational institution and the development of the educational curriculum in particular are under the monopoly of the state and the political elites. In most MENA countries, ministries of education assume a highly centralized role in the process and tend to 20 promote official political and religious views. For instance, in Egypt, mass schooling contributed to the “functionalization” of Islam by “putting religion consciously to work for various types of social and political projects” (Starrett, 1998, p. 10). In countries where curricula are imposed, the understanding of legitimate knowledge is skewed by the state, elite, and the dominant groups’ interests.

The centralization of authority and power relations in society has its implications on institutional reconfiguration, the content, and consequently on the next generations.

What is included in and excluded from the school curriculum often heralds deeper implications of the political projects as well as cultural narratives and relations in a society. Some states craft and shape the educational institution as a “neutral enterprise,” while other political actors design official narratives to foster social control and maintain political legitimacy.

Through social sciences textbooks at both the primary and secondary levels of schooling, I explore the socialization of identity through state narratives in Tunisia

(where textbooks are state-sanctioned) as well as the role of political elites and intellectuals in identity reconstruction/ formation and promotion of ideal identity. In the first part of my research, I use content analysis while for the study of examination of societal discrimination and state policies on religious Minorities-Christians and Jews-I use mixed methods.

The second part of this research traces the implications of identity polarization

(Muslim majority identity) on social discrimination and social conflicts within a transitional society such as Tunisia. In order to understand how citizenship boundaries 21 affects the perception and social patterns of differentiated identities, I examine the religious minorities in Tunisia. Through the systems of exclusive governance devoted to these groups, I investigate the implications of identity polarization and theological underpinnings of citizenship on religious minorities. I analyze official documents, interviews, and state narratives. Through the study of government religious policies and societal discrimination, I examine the overarching and dominant narrative of Muslim majority societies vis-a-vis religious minorities.

Thesis Outline

This thesis will be divided into five chapters. This first chapter “Introductory chapter: Conceptual framework, literature review, theory and methods”, I lay the theoretical framework and methods used for the purpose of this study. Then, it defines concepts, reviews the most prominent literature on the topic, and outlines the contribution of the study.

In the second chapter entitled “Official narratives and romantic nationalism”, I examine the different state official narratives through an analysis of social science textbooks (Civics, History, and Islamic Education) throughout three time periods. First, the post-independence configuration of identity during the Bourguiba era (1956-1987); second, during the Ben Ali rule (1987-2011) and finally, I investigate state narratives and official stories after the authoritarian crackdown and during the implementation of the democratic transition following the Arab Uprisings (2011-2017). I focus on the embedded notions of patriotism and nationalism in national history and national 22 narratives. I also trace the symbolism of religion in identity manufacturing in textbooks and state officials’ statements.

The third chapter entitled “The citizenship meter: Citizen production, civic engagement, and Human Rights in Tunisia” examines civic nationalism and citizenship. I focus on citizen production within a newly emerging democratic environment as far as the preparation of engaged citizens in politics, policy and decision making. I also consider the commitment to universal human rights, individual rights. I argue that the discourse around civic engagement and political participation is constructed within the rhetoric of national identity, sacrifice, and loyalty to the country and its symbols. I conclude that while the theoretical underpinnings of the educational materials and statements endorse the democratic project, the reality remains polarized by authoritarian ideology and practices. The educational and political institution as it appears from the analysis overlaps with the authority of the religious institution to a greater extent. The push and pull between the two institutions questions the state secular model as far as political pluralism and religious pluralism is concerned.

The fourth chapter “Revolution, conflict, and marginalization: Religious minorities and citizenship in Tunisia” examines the implications of the coercive homogenization (the concept of Tunisianetee) throughout the educational curriculum and state discourse on religious minorities in Tunisia. I focus on Christians and Jews in the

Muslim majority Tunisia as the only two minority religions officially recognized by the state. I do so using mixed methods. First, I analyze data from round 3 of The Religion and State (RAS3) dataset (between 2009-2014). Second, I combine the findings from the 23 previous chapters with the analysis of official documents and interviews. These results with the content analysis of interviews and legal documents suggest that identity polarization, narratives, and regulations have created a hegemon identity (Muslims) and a

“marked citizen” (Pandey, 2006) for Christians and Jews. This chapter also echoes the previous findings of the relationship between liberal citizenship and state religious exclusivity.

The fifth chapter “Conclusion and Implications” revisits the findings of the previous chapters and the study’s contribution to the literature about citizenship, citizenship education, and minority politics in the MENA region. The chapter then offers policy recommendations and suggests areas for future research.

This study of belonging, citizenship, and state relationship with religious minorities is a critical step towards understanding the complex mechanisms of democratization and conflict prevention in regions shaken and surrounded by revolutions and uprising. This study has significant implications for the democratization of the concept of citizenship in the Middle East North Africa (MENA) region. It identifies the long-term implications of nation-state projects based on coercive homogenization and securitization of minorities on a societal level. More broadly, this study contributes to the existing literature on identity politics and minority politics in a region historically predisposed to the majority vs. minority dynamics as far as religious identity is concerned level. In the following section, I lay the most prominent conceptual frameworks used in the thesis. 24

Conceptual Framework & Literature Review

According to Freedom House (2016), the only countries in the MENA region that qualify as “Free” are Israel and Tunisia; with Israel being a fully-fledged democracy and

Tunisia considered in a relatively successful transition as it continues to build momentum around its commitment to democracy. In the MENA region, only Lebanon and Morocco are “partially Free” systems whereas Iraq, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Libya, Algeria, the West

Bank, and Yemen fall into the category of hybrid regimes. Tunisia, Lebanon, and

Morocco provide grounds for civil liberties and political rights (Freedom House Report,

2016).

Despite efforts in the pursuit towards democratization, the educational systems in countries affected by the Arab Uprisings continue to harbor ideologies maintaining the pre-revolutionary state of affairs albeit stated aspirations for reforming the educational systems. A study by Carnegie Middle East Center (2016) on citizenship education programs looked into eleven Arab countries and revealed that a wide gap exists between the stated goals of national education programs and their actual implementation. In light of this, there is an urgent necessity to reform the educational curriculums, textbooks, and pedagogies to nurture ground for the implementation of democratic principles such as civic engagement, political participation, and pluralism.

Citizen Engagement

Political participation and civic engagement are two concepts that tend to be used interchangeably (Conway, 1985; Verba et al., 1995). In political science, political participation is usually conceptualized as the involvement in elections, voting, and 25 partisanship (Conway, 1985). Other researchers forms of participation includes also community engagement and social movements (Verba et al., 1995). While the first, (civic participation) includes volunteering and community engagement to improve conditions on a community level, political participation aims to influence the government decisions and seeks a policy change. The lack of a unified definition of civic engagement makes it permissive to use it interchangeably with terms such as citizenship, community engagement, and/or democratic participation (Diamond, 1997; Hall, 1999; Putnam,

1993). The landscape of civic engagement literature is vast, containing multiple pathways. A significant amount of literature has linked political engagement and political participation to social status and political interest (Huyser et al., 2017; Krauss, 2015).

Brady et al. (1995) on the other hand focus on “civic skills” to explain political activity.

The authors, hence, argue that civic skills that facilitate participation are harvested by means of interaction within major secondary institutions of adult life.

The consolidation of democratic transitions and processes is contingent on the popular conception of political culture (Almond & Verba 1963). Putnam (1993) links the existence of a predisposed civic culture of engagement to the longevity of democratic institutions and culture. In his book Making Democracy Work, Putnam (1993) detects a

“path dependency” between “civicness”. (civic traditions and political cultures) and the performance of institutions in regional governments in Italy. Putnam (1993) in fact concludes that the high levels of community involvement in associational life increase social capital which in return impacts the performance of regional governments and institutions. 26

The concept of social capital has been defined differently by scholars. Before

Putnam, Coleman argued that social capital “inheres in the structure of relations between actors and among actors and actors” (Coleman 1988, p. 98). Fukuyama (1995), on the other hand, sees social capital as the “capability that arises from the prevalence of trust in a society or in certain parts of it”, embodied “in the smallest and most basic social group, the family, as well as in the largest of all groups, the nation, and in all other groups in between” (p. 26).

Putnam’s (1993) contribution lies in equating social capital to “civics” as a historically constructed component of the political culture. According to his definition, social capital encompasses a “social organization” (trust, norms, and networks) that assits and coordinates cllective action. In another account of Putnam (1995b; 2000) examines the relationship between social isolation and political disengagement in the United States.

He views social isolation as a result of industrialization which led to changing dynamics of society. Political disengagement is, however, the result of a decrease of social capital.

This change in social interactions, according to Putnam (1995b, 2000), hinders collective action which in return weakens the bond between citizens and their government. Hall

(1999), however, comes to a different conclusion after an examination of social capital in the context of Britain. Hall (1999) finds that there is a correlation between an increase of social engagement and the government’s initiative to embed volunteerism and associational activities in the delivery of social services.

For this study, I depart from Putnam’s (1993) conceptualization of the relationship between civic engagement and political outcome. Furthermore, I am looking 27 at how citizenship education promotes civic engagement which in return affects the political and social outcome. I use Putnam’s definition of social capital to look at in what ways does the degree of socialization into the concept of civic engagement in the educational curriculum shape the understanding of citizenship and civic involvement. I argue that the existence of vibrant political culture and promotion of civic engagement is the primary determinant of the institutional performances in democracies.

Social Sciences

Major social sciences, in general, are Anthropology, Archaeology, Economics,

Geography, History, Law, Linguistics, Politics, Psychology, and Sociology. Even though relatively new, social sciences explain human behavior and the processes of formation of society. Social sciences are part of the standardized educational curriculum in Tunisia.

These subjects are most likely to be based on official documents such as the Constitution, the Code of Personal Status, and secondary legal references. The courses and the materials usually aim to promote civic engagement and contour the identity features.

Social sciences are most likely to establish a collective memory stressing the communal sense of society. Within the school program in Tunisia in the preparatory and secondary levels, social science is an umbrella discipline.

The courses offered under social sciences includes civics and history, geography, philosophy and Islamic education. All the courses are part of a mandatory and state implemented curriculum. Students begin taking social sciences course at the 5th-grade of elementary school. The courses are either integrated within social sciences coursework and textbooks (Chou’oun Ijtima’ya) or taught separately with different textbooks. For 28 the secondary level, students take two years of mandatory Philosophy as part of the four years high school coursework (Baccalauréat) regardless of their field of specialization.

Citizenship through Social Science Textbooks

Citizenship education has been at the center of significant debates and attention both in academic scholarship and in policy reviews. It is considered a vital component of the educational systems and the workshops. The goal of the education for citizenship is to produce a young generation equipped with civic skills that enable them to identify and resolve issues in their communities and societies (Banks, 2008; Ehman, 1980; Machel,

1996; Olssen et al., 2004). Countries around the world are now implementing citizenship education with different approaches. While some include citizenship education as a distinct subject in the educational curriculum other countries incorporate it with social science courses (Hahn, 1998; Schulz et al., 2010).

Arab countries, for instance, adopt different approaches –that are not mutually exclusive- to citizenship education according to a Carnegie Endowment study (2016).

States “either offer a separate civics course or integrate civics within a unified curriculum of social sciences. The same study (2016) indicates that “most nations use civic concepts and values in their courses in Arabic language, Arabic literature, and religious education”

(p. 5). The same study found that the educational system in eleven MENA countries are based on passive memorization and are characterized by a scarcity of analytical and critical thinking. Teachers have monopoly over classroom discussion with little opportunities for students to question or debate in a classroom environment (Faour,

2013). The same approaches apply Tunisia. Since civic education implies teaching 29 effective communication and dialogue, it important to understand the culture of teaching civics in the country. The cut with the authoritarian culture and political democratization implies revisiting the paradigms of citizen production. Givn that Tunisia is curretnly undergoing a democratic transition, it is important to examine the processes of of the production of the civic identity in textbooks. It is also on the same level of importance to scrutinize the understanding of liberal citizenship and religious pluralism.

National Narratives

In addition to direct forms of control through law enforcement and judiciary, states also use other technologies of power to shape their authority, maintain state hegemony, and sustain their legitimacy. Regimes tend to use national narratives as peripheral political tools to coerce legitimacy and maintain hegemony within the framework of a nation/state-building projects. This is mostly true for authoritarian regimes which seek to maintain their legitimacy and approval from their citizens.

National narratives set the identity attributes and collective characteristics. For

Yadgar (2002), national narratives are “in the simplest sense […] the story that a collective tells about itself. It tells the individuals constituting the nation who they are, what compromises their past, the structure of their characteristics as a collective, and where they are heading that is how they should act in the political realm” (pp. 58-59).

States have at their disposal many vehicles to inculcate particular state projects and official narratives to their citizens. The production of narratives embeds the state society relationship as well as state and religion (Brand, 2014). The process of establishing a national identity for former colonies like Tunisia follows the same storytelling patterns; 30 emphasizing particular events (battles for independence) and invoking heroic narratives

(The Bourguiba figure as the most identifiable national hero). Burke III (1998), observes the same pattern between Algeria and Egypt’s post-independence (Algeria from French colonialism and Egypt from British colonial rule) that highlights a unified sense of identity. These historical accounts serve as counter-narratives to the of backwardness and a fractured sense of identities perpetuated by colonial powers as part of the “mission civilisatrice” The promotion of a sense of unity, national integrity, and homogeneity are at the center of these narratives in both Egypt and Algeria (Brand, 2014). The same would account for Tunisia given its colonial past being a former protectorate of France between 1881 and 1956.

National Identity

Utilizing the politicized definition of national identity is crucial to understanding state narratives and doctrines and ideologies. National identity is the process of identification of an individual with their nation physically and emotionally. The identification process is made along the lines of a shared history, collective memory, public culture and shared myths (Anderson, 1991). In the contexts of countries where governments have direct control of the educational system, textbooks are no longer expected to contain facts but rather an elitist political vision. The criteria of selectivity of aspects to emphasize or downplays reflects the state-nation project ideologies and doctrines.

Nationhood, according to Brubaker (2004), is imperative in incentivizing a large group of people to think of themselves on a broad scale, rather than as individuals, and to 31 allow them to assemble themselves in a manner that is indicative of their political desires

[and those of their leadership] italics are mine (p. 116-7). Wretch (2002) argues that shared attributes is a by-product of modern states’ s understanding of a national group in comparison to each other.

Homogenization attempts are often designed and implemented by political elites after conflicts and during transitions. Gellner (1996) argues that the preventive defense mechanism that a culture has to preserve itslef among a threat is by procuring one culture of its own. Homogenization is then a requirement of national/cultural survival in a competitive international system. For countries that underwent several transitions such as independence from colonialism and authoritarian breakdown such as Tunisia, state building akin to the reshaping of national identity towards a homogenous one. (Brubaker,

1996; Gellner, 1994; Anderson, 1991). This is true for countries like Tunisia. The country’s movement from colonialism to authoritarianism and then the implementation of democratic transitions and political pluralism influence its vision of a nation, hence, national identity.

One point of agreement between the definitions outlined above and others is that identity is a construct. National identity scholars map national identity as a product of historical features, belief system coupled with a dominant ideology and conscious manipulation of symbols (Anderson, 1991), as a socio-cognitive concept (Andersen,

1991). Others like Kelman (1997) establish that national identity is the social artifact of discovery and creation of common elements that are always -imagined and recreated. 32

Since we have established that national identity is a construct that is most likely to be evolving and changing, it is essential to talk about the different processes of its formation and re-imagination (Anderson, 1991), and development. This thesis aims to analyze the rhetoric of the national identity, national narratives and citizen production as inculcated by the state. The intellectuals and curriculum experts as elite strata shape ideology and national identity through education as an institution that produces and disseminates the truth.

For a highly centralized educational system such as Tunisia, all students have to use them and are exposed to their content repeatedly. Textbooks are implemented and sanctioned under the supervision of the state. Educational materials are distributed by a publishing entity that is state monitored. These textbooks, however, seldom change. The possibility to inculcate a state-sponsored version of history, identity, and mission through textbooks is much greater than through other mediums. Hence textbooks in this context are understood to spread official messages, doctrines, and ideologies. Many ideological and nationalist movements have originated in elite circles, which “rediscovered, selected and reinterpreted existing ethnic symbols, memories, myths, values and traditions, and out of these elements forged the narratives of the nation” (Smith, 2009, p. 101).

Religious Minorities in the MENA Region

In Arabic, the word ‘minority’ translates to Aqualiya, and the religious minority is

Aqualiya Diniya. This phrase is often used to refer to non-Muslims. This expression is often used interchangeably with the word “taifa or sect.” Under the Ottoman Empire, the word “minority” never existed; the more technical term used was ‘Milla, singular/Millet, 33 plural.' The terminology was introduced to the Middle East by Western powers in the late

19th century with the Treaty of Lausanne to refer to the Ottoman Christians. While these two terms are mutually substitutable, Aqualiya does not bear any identity specific attribute whereas Taifa ascribes a religious identity to the group. Thus, the use of minority is most common since it is an umbrella term that does not imply any religious differentiation and “recognizes the essential human commonality” (Picard, 2012, p. 5).

Since this study looks at the relationship between religious minorities and the

Tunisian state, it examines religion as a social categorization that is “significant in social, legal, and political terms” (Picard, 2012, p. 6). I use the “public theologies” framework

(Sandal, 2013) to examine the state-society relations. I look at how religious regulation targeting specific groups of the society alters the position of religiously differentiated groups legally, politically, and socially in Tunisia. I use the phrase religious minorities and not sects (Taifa) as I am looking at minorities in a context of a secular state that theoretically guarantees religious pluralism and maintains religion in the private sphere.

The Contribution of the Study

While there is an extensive literature on citizenship and belonging in Jordan and

Lebanon, little has been said in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings. Even within the existing literature about Lebanon, the most recent data collected about teachers’/students’ conception of citizenship was conducted in 2007. This study concluded that promoting democratic citizenship and religious pluralism in an environment where corruption and authoritarianism are systematically pervasive is challenging (Akar, 2006, 2007). Some studies in the MENA region have looked at textbooks and studied their role in citizen 34 production (Akar, 2006, 2007; Apple 1991; Brand, 2010; Hahn, 2010; Ichilov, 2005;

Maktabi, 2000; Nassar, 2004; Quaynor, 2011; Zajda, 2009). While these studies contributed to the understanding of citizen production, official narratives, and state projects, no study looked at Tunisia’s textbooks. As in stands right now, Tunisia is the only Arab Uprisings country to implement a democratic transition successfully. It is the only one to escape the turmoil. It is, however, still a fragile process. Social tensions are more likely to continue (and maybe escalate) if the exclusivity of one identity over others continues. Instability may hinder the democratization process.

Since then, the Arab Uprisings have transformed the region; autocratic regimes were toppled (Egypt, Tunisia), democratic reforms were implemented (Morocco, Jordan), and civil wars erupted (Libya, Syria), but most importantly new potential democracies emerged (Tunisia). Multiple studies of the affected countries, as comparative studies and single cases studies, are needed to better understand the dynamics and impact of citizen revolutions on societal configuration and the socialization of identity through state narratives.

This study contributes to the literature on conflict and citizenship dynamics in the

MENA region. The findings aim to provide a contemporary research on the discursive production of citizenship and identity in textbooks. The analysis of the implementation of liberal citizenship in educational curriculum exposes the doctrines and ideologies endorsed by the state in Tunisia. The study shows the ways in which the state-sanctioned educational institution manufactures national identity through narratives and what role does the religious narrative play in this process. It examines if these narratives inclusive 35 or exclusive of religious minorities. The study recommends reforming the educational system to align with the democratic transition. The democratic transition requires a more inclusive educational system that is not subject to conflicting interpretations and doctrines. More broadly, this study contributes to the existing literature on identity politics and minority politics in a region historically predisposed to the majority vs. minority citizenship dynamics.

The study also offers a set of recommendations to the state of affairs in Tunisia as far as religious pluralism and freedom are concerned. The findings of the research urges for the de-securitization of religious minorities including but not limited to dismantling policies such as the Modus Vivendi and the 1958 law.

Methods

States have at their disposal many vehicles to inculcate particular state projects and official narratives to their citizens. Constitutions are primary texts that define the contours of the nation in their first articles. Speeches by political leaders are also instruments in the disposal of state apparatus to do so. There are also other cultural channels such as literature, cinemas.

While speeches, documents such as “National Charters” and constitutions are great resources that may be of great importance in analyzing national narratives. National narratives are most likely to be incorporated in the school curriculum within social sciences. School curriculum is the outcome of a political and cultural vision that the state is aiming to fuse into the incoming generations. It also reflects the social and cultural norms of societies. For a highly centralized educational system such as Tunisia where 36 textbooks are prepared, sanctioned, and distributed by a publishing entity that is state monitored, all students have to use them, and there are exposed to their content repeatedly. These textbooks seldom change.

Nationally circulated textbooks are both designed by curriculum experts and state elites and taught by different teachers with different levels of commitment to the state project. Hence, while the state implies its hegemony over the content of the educational curriculum teachers monopolize the meaning. The educational institution is highly affected by power and authority dynamics which reduces the likelihood of its neutrality

(Apple & Christian-Smith, 1991). Given the power relations explained above, textbooks have an inherent textual authority and orchestrate the official narratives as imagined by the state project. To understand the underlying logic of the doctrines and ideologies, it is necessary to scrutinize the content in depth. This study uses mixed methods; a qualitative and quantitative research methods.

Qualitative Research Methods

First, the study employs qualitative methods to analyze text from thirty-four (34) social science textbooks (history, civic, and Islamic education). I also look at official documents and analyze interviews with religious leaders, state officials, and civil society activists. For the analysis of textbooks, guiding sheets, and official documents, I use

MAXQDA, a qualitative research methods software designed for computer-assisted qualitative and mixed methods data, text and multimedia analysis.

The sample of the study for the educational curriculum consists of thirty-six (36) textbooks: thirteen (14) history textbooks, thirteen (13) civic education textbooks, and (9) 37

Islamic education guiding documents published and circulated between 2006 and 2017.

The manuals are used for elementary (5th and 6th grade), preparatory (1st, 2nd, 3rd) and secondary (1st, 2nd, 3rd only for Arts and Humanities majors) levels of schooling. For

Islamic education, teachers are provided with guiding sheets to structure the course and are given full autonomy to develop the in-class teaching materials and provide extracurricular resources.

Some textbooks and official programs-more specifically Islamic education and history- were not updated since 2006. Some hard copies of textbooks and official programs were collected from bookstores during the research field trip. The rest of the data was retrieved from the Ministry of Education’s website or via correspondence with officials in the same ministry.

The present thesis is chronologically structured in three time periods reflecting regime change and transitions in Tunisia. The Bourguiba era (1956-1987), Ben Ali’s regime (1987-2011, and contemporary dynamics (2011-2017) It is worth noting that a majority of textbooks that were designed and implemented during Ben Ali’s regime did not change significantly in the post-revolution time period. The analysis of the three time periods focuses on three themes: national identity, minority politics, and educational policy.

Content Analysis is a suitable tool to analyze the meanings inferred in the educational curriculum. Content analysis according to Krippendorff (2004) is “a research technique for making replicable and vaid inferences from text (or other meaningful matters) to the context of their use” (p. 18). Accoring to this definition, content analysis 38 is a method used to analyze a maningful matter. Since this study examines political discourse and socioplotical rehtoric, I replicate Krippendorff’s (2004) definition. I use

CA to analyze text from thirty-six (36) social sciences textbooks (history, civic, and

Islamic education). I also look at official documents, and analyze interviews.

To analyze the ideology, and doctrines inferred from the textbooks about these themes, I use process-tracing. Process tracing is “an alaytical tool for drawing descriptive and causal inferences from diagnostic evidence” (Collier, 2011, p.824). The logic of using this method is to trace the implications of state narratives on identity polarization and the residual effect of state policies on social interactions and religious discrimination.

The units of analysis are chapters and segments of the textbooks that are related to the theme of the study. I use a code system and matrix designed for MAXQDA.

Quantitative Research Methods

The second part of the thesis, is an examination of the implications of identity polarization and perpetuated state narratives on religious minorities. Most precisely, I look at how the different transitions altered the position of religious minorities legally, politically, and socially. I do so by means of mixed methods of interviews and a multivariate regression analysis. First, I analyze data from round 3 of The Religion and

State (RAS3) dataset (between 2009-2014).

RAS3 codes religious discrimination by governments against all 566 minorities in

175 countries. It includes data on government religion policy and societal discrimination between 2009 and 2014. In this paper, I focus on 23 Muslim majority countries in the

MENA region including the core Arab Uprisings countries in the RAS3 dataset covering 39

2009-2014. This period uses 2009 and 2010 as baselines for the pre-Arab Spring years.

As the Arab Spring began in late December, most of its influence should start in 2011.

2014 is the most recent year available in the RAS3 dataset. I use four variables from the

RAS3 dataset. The first three measure government religion policy (including government religious discrimination, government religious regulation, and religious support). The fourth variable measures societal discrimination against minority religions. This set of variables is designed to examine restrictions the government places on the practice of religion by minority religious groups.

The qualitative part in this chapter consists on combining findings from the textbooks, guiding documents with interviews and legal documents such as The Tunisian

Constitutions (1959-2015) and government decrees, The Modus Vivendi, The 1958 Law and other government public records proper to the state regulation of the activities of both the Jewish and Christian minorities.

The Educational System in Tunisia; an Overview

According to the Tunisian educational system, basic-level education

(l’enseignement de base) is nine years split between 6 years of elementary/primary level schooling and 3 for preparatory level, also called College. High school, on the other hand, is four years of education. The first year is Gen. Ed). By the end of the first year, students-Except Physical Education-choose their first focus (Humanities (Lettres),

Sciences, Computer-Technology, Economics, and Services). By the end of the second year, students are re-oriented to their pre-final field focus: Arts and Humanities (Lettres),

Economics and Management, Mathematics, Computer Sciences, Experimental Sciences, 40 and Technical Sciences). Starting from the second year, Civic Education programs are taught based on field focus.

History-whether independently or within social sciences-is taught starting from the 5th-grade elementary school until Senior year of High school for all fields of specialization except Physical Education. Tarbiya Madaniya or Civics education, however, is taught from 5th grade elementary school up to the 3rd year of high school for

Arts and Humanities while it is discontinued for other majors from the 2nd year Gen.Ed

(tronc common). The course is either included with History and Geography and called social sciences textbook or called “civic education” when separated from other social sciences subjects. Until 9th grade (senior year of collège), there are no concrete textbooks for Islamic Education; teachers are provided with a road map or guiding documents to teach the subject. Hence, teachers have the monopoly over the substance taught in the classroom. In other words, they are the producers of the official knowledge.

In this chapter, I presented the theoretical framework and the most prominent literature. I also outlined the theory I use in the thesis as well as the methods. In the following chapter, I test the Social Identity Theory (SIT) on state narratives and political discourse focusing on the national identity engineering. I argue that in their quest for national identity construction/reconstruction, policymakers have consistently employed religious and nationalist outbidding. Through a content analysis of government-issued textbooks and political declarations regarding education, I conclude that state narrative advances a quintessential identity of Tunisian and Muslim which pushes religious minorities to the outskirts of identity. 41

CHAPTER 2: OFFICIAL NARRATIVES AND ROMANTIC NATIONALISM

Introduction

National narratives are stories that are designed to make sense of past events and national heritage. They also carry the task of creating national cohesion and reinforcing a sense of belonging and territorial attachment (Yadgar, 2002; Létourneau, 2017). In the past, national narratives used to be the canons through which masses are mobilized to wage wars (Grever, 2007b). With the same rationale, wars, defeat, and triumphs were primary sources for the manufacturing of national narratives. National elites, hence, have a monopoly on the storytelling of these narratives. While details of the specific stories change, national narratives have a dominant and common pattern regarding structure despite differences of (Feldman, 2001).

Schools function as channels to transmit the narratives about values and cultural heritage to the next generations. Education experts, elites, and academic historians have a monopoly over the selection of what they think is most relevant and aligns with the national and geopolitical state vision and project. Textbook narratives can outstand invalidation from academics or critical historians. The resilience towards critics as explained for Ray Raphael (2004) in his examination of United States history textbooks for ‘three reasons, thoroughly intertwined: they give us collective identity, they make good stories, and we think they are patriotic’ (p. 5).

By focusing on ideology, identity politics, and nation building, we need to critically deconstruct the meanings inferred in school-sanctioned textbooks. The textbooks are most likely to come with instructions for teachers about they how topics 42 would be conveyed and what the focus will be. For History textbooks, the textbook comes with the pedagogical guidelines for teachers in by the end of every chapter. The same applies to the Civics textbooks. Islamic Education, however, does not have a structured textbook. Instead, teachers are provided with a guiding document with the topics that need to be covered and are given the freedom to develop the lessons and choose the resources.

In this chapter, I draw from previous literature to provide a historical background to identity politics, minority politics and educational policy in this regard during three time periods: El Habib Bourguiba (1956-1987), Zine El Abidine Ben Ali (1987-2011), and in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings (2011-now). Then, I analyze contemporary social science teaching materials for history, civics and Islamic education. I focus on the social identity.

Educational curriculum and teaching materials examined are state-sanctioned and distributed nationwide by state accredited publishers. I look at state officials’ declarations and analyze interviews conducted with select state officials, community leaders, and civil society activists. I examine the data regarding the emerging patriotism and/or nationalism rhetoric, group membership and social comparison embedded in textbooks. I argue that in their quest for national identity construction/reconstruction, policymakers have consistently employed religious and nationalist outbidding. Social identity defined around religious lines already makes the distinction between the in-group and the out-group

(Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In the case of Tunisia, it creates and segments society into

Muslims and Non-Muslims. The symbolism of religion and nationalist discourse is made 43 through an emphasis on a patriotic discourse. Belonging and emotional attachment are embedded in pride in specific time periods and civilizations such as the Ottoman Empire.

Glorious times and legacies as well as different aspects of Islam present in the country’s official narrative. The narrative reinforces loyalty, territorial attachment, and regional belonging. Most importantly, while textbooks teach values such as tolerance, the presentation of a quintessentially Muslim Tunisian identity alienates religiously differentiated Tunisians and pushes Christians and Jews to the outskirts of the society.

In order to analyze the nationalist and religious outbidding in the textbooks, I use a qualitative content analysis supported by a word count. I use a qualitative content analysis supported by a numerical word count to code for national identity discourse.

The numerical count is made through a lexical search of selected words. Given the volume of the data, I reduce the sample to history textbooks (5th grade to senior year High

School) and Islamic education guiding documents (1st-grade elementary level to 9th-grade middle school). The descriptive evidence is presented through a further content analysis of passages, images, and texts referring to national identity including passages from civics textbooks. National identity discourse is multilayered, accounting for this specific feature of the concept, I code for four thematic categories. The categories are as follows:

(1) “Nationalist rhetoric” (2) “Patriotism” (3) “Muslim Identity,” “Pan-Arabism” and (4)

“National Heroes and Struggles.” I consider what is left out to be an “otherness” rhetoric.

National Narratives and Nationalist Discourse

National narratives establish the identity features of the national community along 44 religious, linguistic and ethnic lines (Yadgar, 2002). Narratives often highlight a past including different events and identify national heroes. Storytelling in national narratives usually follows a pattern: an emphasis on glorious past civilizations and conquests and the focus on national struggles such as independence battles. In countries where curricula are imposed by the state, the understanding of legitimate knowledge is skewed by the state, elite, and the dominant groups’ interests (Gellner, 1996). The need to establish shared traits and identity features came with the emergence of modern states in the world.

Features such as religion, language, more importantly, history not only define a national group as distinct from others but are also perceived as a defense mechanism –for the state to act on and for the citizenry to draw legitimacy of state acts from-against territorial and integrity threats. In other contexts, nationhood is used “to create a sense of national unity for a given polity" (Brubaker, 2004, p. 117). Political leadership is most likely to manufacture and evoke heroic narratives by focusing on major struggles and the role undertaken by the national leadership in times of crisis. Embedded in state ideologies and doctrines, historical stories are less likely to be framed around precision but rather around convenience. In other words, the narration of the past goes hand in hand with the state-nation project and not the other way around. (Brand, 2010, 2014; Berger & Lorenz,

2008). These strands tend to rearrange the public sphere serving the state’s agenda by establishing the relationship between the state and religion, state, and society, religion, and society.

States have at their disposal many vehicles to inculcate official narratives to their citizens. Constitutions are primarily the first nationally recognized text to institute the 45 identity markers. Hand in hand with the official narratives, political rhetoric of the elites is also another channel a regime uses to stress the communal sense of society. There are also cultural channels such as literature, cinema, and theaters primarily though media that establishes the contours of the nation (Anderson, 1991; Billig, 1995; Porat, 2001; Urry,

2000).

Homogenization attempts are often designed and implemented by political elites.

Identity scholars (Anderson, 1991; Brubaker, 1996; Hechter, 2001; Smith, 2001, 2009) discussed the elite role in manufacturing national identity using nationalist outbidding.

Smith (2009, p. 101) argues that these circles “rediscovered, selected and reinterpreted existing ethnic symbols, memories, myths, values and traditions, and out of these elements forged the narratives of the nation”. Elites play a role especially in times of transitions and post-conflict state-building project. National identity is mostly equated with a preventive defense mechanism against outside threat (Dwan, 2015). These aim to either construct or reform the conceptualization and implementation of citizenship is mostly intergenerational. To appeal to the next generations, the best and most efficient channel is education. Homogenization is hence a requirement for national/cultural survival in a competitive international system. For countries that underwent several transitions such as independence from colonialism and authoritarian breakdown such as

Tunisia, state building is akin to reshaping national identity towards a homogenous one.

The socialization of identity through schools tend to define social cohesion by promoting patriotic sentiments. The different narratives in social science textbooks, and political discourse promote an understanding of “a zero-sum game where one narrative 46 must prevail over all others (Korostelina, 2013, p. 313). The state creates symbols that aim at articulating and consolidating the national identity discourse. The symbolism lies in different layers of the citizen’s life. These projects range from subtle to pronounced.

Symbols are the flag, the national anthem, large-scale military parades, national anniversaries, political speeches, and hard laws. The second layer is embedded in the cultural institution and societal norms. The Cultural institution is hence epiphenomenal of political institution and political rhetoric.

Remembrance days, national holidays, and celebrations of national heroes become part of the everyday life. They conceal diversity, and shape the national identity

(Podeh, 2011). Both layers have direct effects on the widely accepted narratives and the understanding of the identity. Advancing a sense of unity enacts the conception of a nation as an “imagined community” (Anderson, 1991) and shapes the population understanding of identity. The cultural and political institution play a significant role in the construction of national identity. The articulation of nationalist discourse is heavily present in the educational institution as well. This is true for a centralized state such as

Tunisia.

Historical processes influence nation-state building projects. Tunisia’s colonial legacy influenced its vision of a national identity and patriotism. For instance, students should pay tribute to the flag anthem every day before proceeding to class is loaded with patriotic rhetoric and pride in the national symbols. The title of the national anthem is

“Humat al-Hima” which translate to “Defenders of the Homeland.” This ritual is a daily 47 requirement where students are compelled to stand through. Failure to show respect is often penalized.

Teaching history and historical representations in educational resources cannot be neutral to power dynamics and debates about national identity and citizenship. History teaching, in particular, is heavily influenced by the political elite’s agenda of construction and reconstruction of national identity and citizenship boundaries (Foster, 2011; Fuchs,

2011; Hasberg, 2012; Repoussi & Tutiaux-Guillon, 2010). Historical representation and the selection of content is always subject to debate among historians, curriculum experts, professional historians, and most importantly political elites. Social sciences textbooks and history textbooks in particular appeal mostly to young people as they are considered fundamental agents in ‘nation-building’ and promoters of ‘responsible citizenship’

(Berger & Lorenz, 2008, p. 12). This tends to manifest more during times of conflict and political transitions. A research conducted on Israeli history textbooks described history textbook as ‘agents of memory,’ ‘a supreme historical court’, and ‘another arm of the state’ (Apple & Christian-Smith, 1991; Podeh, 2000, p. 66).

Both the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Higher Education and

Scientific Research are among the most contested ministries after every election.

Transitions, and more particularly democratic transitions, entail ‘the enormous task of revising and rewriting textbooks to adjust to a new reality’ (Korostelina, 2014, p. 297). In the case of Tunisia, the transition from an authoritarian regime to a democratic consolidation entails the same process of revisiting curriculum and teaching philosophies. social science textbooks are designed to relay socially accepted norms, value systems, 48 doctrines and ideologies intergenerationally (Issitt, 2004; Lässig, 2009; Pingel, 2008;).

History textbooks, however, are designed to make sense of the past, operate as canons of collective memory and promote social cohesion. Despite attempts to implement other cultural and geographical perspectives, textbooks always aim to highlight the diversity of the past but at the same time stress the unity for both the present and the future. Erasure of difference for today and the future is most likely to marginalize differentiated identities and previously politicized identities. They are hence at the crux of identity politics and tools of socialization of identity (Brand, 2014). Given the role that textbooks play in truth production, identity socialization, and collective memory, it is important to scrutinize the embedded ideologies and doctrines inculcated in social sciences textbooks.

Questioning the perpetuation of national narratives in textbooks helps identify the citizenship boundaries as far as religious minorities and other differentiated identities are concerned.

Identity Politics and National Narratives: Tunisia

In order to understand the specific meanings of state narratives, it is crucial to know the different historical processes and trajectories in a given country. The rhetoric around citizenship and identity in Tunisia is primarily affected by the significant events that the country underwent such as…. These different events produced a patriotic ideology and a national identity that superseded ethnic, religious, and linguistic differences.

Tunisia underwent two major transitions throughout its modern history: Its independence from France (1956) and the Jasmine Revolution (2010-11). In the 49 following part of the chapter, I examine the Bourguiba era and the Ben Ali administration from three perspectives: National identity, minority politics, and educational policy.

Through the examination of the different time periods, I look at how the discourse around unity and national integrity was shaped as a resistance to the colonial rule.

El-Habib Bourguiba Period (1956-1987)

National Identity

The declaration of independence from France in 1956 led to a reconfiguration of identity from a fractured to a homogenous national one. The Neo-Doustour party, founded and led by Lahbib of Bourguiba, took over the power and governance after achieving independence. The part led by Bourguiba installed an institutional configuration (including political and economic institutions) heavily influenced by the

French system that is still operative. The progressive reforms introduced by Habib

Bourguiba (1956-1987) were inherited in his doctrine referred to as

Bourguibism1.Bourguibism distances the Tunisian politics and identity from any pan-

Maghrebi and pan-Arab identity and instead situates the Tunisian identity in an intersection between Arab Islamic civilization and Western ideals (Brown, 2001; MAsri,

2017). With Bourguiba, national identity was built on the resistance to the French colonialism and the Ottoman Empire’s influence.

The state project also introduced bilingualism (Arabic and French) with an emphasis on the Arabization of the education, government administration /bureaucracy,

1 Bourguibism (pragmatism) espoused doctrines of Kemalism (Turkey’s Mustafa Kemal Ataturk) that believed in the separation of church and state and embrace western ideals and lifestyle. Bougrguiba, however, emphasized a Tunisian uniqueness to this state-nation project. Economically, this doctrine adopted a state capitalist approach. 50 and media as part of a “language planning” project. In parallel to linguistic homogenization, the state officially endorsed a religious identity. The first Constitution

(1959) adopted Islam as the state religion and proclaimed Arabic as the official language of the Republic (Chapter “Dispositions Generales,” Article 1). While this article appeals to an overwhelming majority of Tunisians, it overlooks others such as the Tunisian

Christians (approximately 25,000) and Tunisian Jews (approximately 3000). The

Arabization of the public sphere suppresses formerly politicized identities such as the

Amazigh (The indigenous inhabitants of North Africa). One of the national scale projects that the Bourguiba administration actively implemented was to suppress any form of tribalism nationwide. From a legal standpoint, Bourguiba coercively changed all last names that hint towards a tribal appurtenance to random last names that did not carry any such meaning. The point was to override the concept of groupim (Brubaker, 2006) and exclusive communal understanding of identity in exchange for national identity.

“Tribalism”, which is a social configuration in both Morocco and Libya for instance, has been superseded by a strong sense of national identity.

The reconfiguration of identity was designed and implemented by the nationalist leadership advancing post-independence unity rhetoric. The new identity was coined as

“Unification” or “Tunisianetée”- a term introduced during the Bourguiba era by

Mohamed Mzaali (Tunisia’s first Prime Minister 1980-1986)-meaning that “Tunisia has its personality as a nation in view of its geographical position, national history, civilization, heritage, religion, and language” (Daoud, 1991, p. 24). 51

The Neo Destour2The party is renowned for its resistance to French colonialism departed from the readiness of Tunisia to be an independent country, Bourguiba adopted a one-party system. Bourguiba’s rule was characterized as paternalistic authoritarianism that later influenced his successor Ben Ali’s understanding of governance. Values such as political pluralism and democratic principles were trumped in the name of territorial integrity and societal unity. Most importantly, he lifted the term limit on the executive and granted himself lifetime presidency. The Neo Destour was proclaimed the sole legitimate political party in 1963. The Neo-Destour’s legacy influenced the course of politics from 1956 to 2011. It was the only ruling party in that period, and some of its legacies include a consolidated authoritarian regime.

Minority Politics

As far as minority politics are concerned, the Tunisian state under Bourguiba has devoted legal texts regarding the governance of religious minorities regarding regulations of the activities and places of worship for Jews and Christians. This system of legal checks is two folds: The Modus Vivendi document as a governance document that regulates the events of the Christian population in Tunisia and the 1958 Law for the

Jewish community.

In terms of state protection of events with religious significance, the Tunisian state expressed its commitment to the protection of shrines and religious sites of religious minorities. The cathedrals and churches enjoy special protection and are assigned law

2 Neo Destour (which translates to New Constitution) later changed its name to Socialist Destourian party and then to the Democratic Constitutional Rally (Known as RCD) under Ben Ali's leadership. 52 enforcement officers who are regularly protecting the sites. The Jewish community shrines have the same state oversight in terms of protection of synagogues and community schools. The Jewish population in Tunisia were guaranteed a regular state protection during their annual pilgrimage season in La Ghriba in El Hara-Sghira, a village in the island of Djerba (a Southeastern province in Tunisia). Although there have been serious questions about the security of Pilgrims, the state still provides tight protection and logistical contributions. The pilgrimage season since the Bourguiba era through Ben

Ali and until this moment is still attended by state officials, politicians, and political figure.

Educational Policy

One of the ways to promote the newly conceived identity has been through structures of social and political institutions. Education has been a prominent institution used to achieve homogenization of the national identity. Ever since what? the educational system in Tunisia is state monitored nationwide. The state actors and the political elite directly influence national narratives as well as citizenship education. Also, textbooks are uniform; they are issued and circulated nationwide by the state through accredited publishers and distribution houses. The textbooks under study were initially published between 2002-2009. Some were revised in 2015-2017.

The Bourguiba era is widely known for its focus on education as well as the quality of its educational system elsewhere in the Arab world and beyond. During his rule, there are accounts of ideological conflicts between the secular and religious trends within the government as well as curriculum architects. While the educational curriculum 53 espoused notions such as toleration, diversity, and religious pluralism, some contradictions were disputing Tunisia’s adopted form of governance as a secular republic.

The conflict was mainly between Islamic and Civics education’s curricula. While the former was perpetuated by the proponents of the Movement de la Tendance Islamique, the second emphasized the secular and civil nature of the State.

As recalled in Masri’s (2017) observations, the Republics were presented are a form of governance that contradicts Islamic teachings in the 4th-year secondary school

Islamic education. This description stood in open contradiction with what students were taught a year before (3rd year) in another Civics textbook about the core principles of civil state and citizenship (p. 284). Islamic reform movement (Jamal –Eddine Al-Afghani and

Mohammad Abduh) were overlooked while teachings of radical Muslim Brotherhood icons overtook philosophy textbooks. Tunisia’s history was presented within its geographical location of the Maghreb but emphasized its openness towards western cultures. The identity emphasized a Muslim identity with Tunisian uniqueness.

Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali (1987-2011)

National Identity

Initially, Ben Ali was appointed to offices such as Minister of Interior (1968) and the Director of National Security (1977-1980). Appointments in these offices were primarily because of his closeness to Bourguiba and his party affiliation. He was the

Prime Minister before he took over power in a bloodless coup d’état. Ben Ali filed a medical report that claimed President Bourguiba was medically unfit for Presidency. Ben

Ali’s national identity rhetoric was not different from the Bourguiba discourse given the 54 same party affiliation they both adhere to. The Ben Ali discourse was stronger yet resorted to coercive political tools to maintain social control; national identity was one of them. The discourse around economic and political stability and unity were at the forefront of his speeches and discourse.

Minority Politics

The state policies regarding the governance of religiously differentiated groups

(The Modus Vivendi and the 1958 Law) in Tunisia were not revisited throughout the Ben

Ali regime. However, during Ben Ali regime, Tunisian Jews, for instance, were socially visible and enjoyed representation in the parliament. Even though Roger Bismuth was not representing any faith-based community, he was the first and only Jew in the Arab World to be elected parliamentarian in a Muslim majority country. Joseph Roger Bismuth was elected to the parliament to represent the Tunisian Confederation of Industry, Trade, and

Handicraft (UTICA).

Educational Policy

Through Charfi (Ben Ali’s Minister of Education 1989-1994), the collusion of curriculum experts and teachers with the Islamist movement inherited from the

Bourguiba era was dismantled. The Islamist influence over the content of educational materials was expunged and substituted by reflections of reformists and progressive thinkers. Progressive values such as freedom of belief, religious pluralism, an adaptation of the religion to the times and Ijtihad) were further emphasized in textbooks and encouraged in in-class discussions. The course Religious Education (Tarbiya Diniya) 55 became Islamic thought (Tafkir Islami) to include critical thinking and discuss religious pluralism and religious freedom.

The revisions explicitly expressed the commitment to international law and human rights and promoted democratic principles. Taking into consideration the diversity of the social makeup and openness to other cultures, the new textbooks pushed for tolerance and coexistence (Mahjoubi, 2010). Students were exposed to non-Sunni sects of

Islam and other non-Abrahamic religions such as Zoroastrianism and Manichaeism within the framework of religious pluralism. The curriculum incorporated analytical and critical thinking lenses concerning Islam. Students were pushed to reflect on the need for

Islamic reform and its temporal adaptability.

In regards to the discussion of religiously differentiated groups, the first year secondary school textbook of Islamic thought was devoted to the reassertion of individual rights such as freedom of belief and cautioning against violent or systemic retaliations against apostasy such as denial of medical care or job discrimination (Masri, 2017).

Under Ben Ali’s presidency, the educational system remained a priority to the state during his first years in office. Endorsement of progressive values was also at the center of the educational materials and pedagogies. Overall, the educational curriculum continued to embrace principles of tolerance and acceptance espousing a balanced exposure to humanities and Sciences as well as Western philosophy. Philosophical thought was a crucial part of the curriculum throughout which students are acquainted with Renaissance and the Enlightenment philosophers. Students had to take two years’ mandatory philosophy out of the four years of high school. 56

The Ben Ali regime maintained the same policies as far as the educational system is concerned. The national identity discourse became more of the single party discourse.

The policies that religious minorities are governed with also remained intact and in full effect.

The Second Transition: In the Aftermath of the 2010-11 Revolution

The second major transition Tunisia underwent is the 2010-11 Jasmine

Revolution, the series of protests that started the Arab Uprisings. The Arab Uprisings

2010-2011 were the expression of a set of grievances related to social injustice, lack of individual freedoms and demands for citizenship rights and democratic governance

(Masri, 2017; Nossett, 2017). The series of protests that originated from Tunisia had a spillover effect in neighboring countries. Except for Tunisia, the Arab Uprisings fell short of delivering the intended outcome. Despite initial hopes for its democratization, Egypt reverted to military dictatorship. What started as a demonstration and popular resentment in countries like Libya, Syria, and Yemen turned into violent episodes and civil wars.

Tunisia arguably counts as the only successful case to implement relatively democratic measures. Following the authoritarian breakdown, the educational curriculum was revisited to some extent. One observation from tracing back the years of issuance and publication of textbook is that a higher numbers of the textbooks and teaching materials remained the same. In my analysis, I focus on the revisited content but also draw on previous findings. The focal point of the analysis is-if revisited-how the state discourse was influenced by the experiences of the Arab Uprisings countries regarding 57 identity configuration, regional affiliation, and the presentation of diversity and pluralism.

In this section, I use a qualitative content analysis supported by a numerical word count to code for national identity discourse. The numerical count is made through a lexical search of selected words. Given the volume of the data, I reduce the sample to history textbooks (5th grade to senior year High School) and Islamic education guiding documents (1st-grade elementary level to 9th-grade middle school). The descriptive evidence is made through a further content analysis of passages, images, and texts referring to national identity including passages from civics textbooks.

Given that national identity discourse is multilayered, I use four thematic categories: (1) “Nationalist rhetoric” (2) “Patriotism” (3) “Muslim Identity,” “Pan-

Arabism” and (4) “National Heroes and Struggles.”

Word Count (History Textbooks)

500 453 414 450 380 400 324 350 300 252 217 220 250 179 193 194 200 164 150 100 46 50 0

Figure 2: Word Numerical Count- History Textbooks (all grades)

Analysis and Discussion

The chart above shows the words that were given most importance. According to these coding outcomes, the Muslim identity scored highest regarding frequency occurring a total of 453 hits. Following this, the word “nationalist, national” which can imply both nationalism and patriotism. The ethnic aspect of the identity affiliation was not left out, but it came second after the Muslim identity. The word count in this section revealed a pattern regarding the most discussed phase of the Tunisian history in a total of 380 times.

Taking into consideration the fact that some textbooks discuss the independence of other states, I coded for “Tunisian National movement,” “French protection” and “El-Habib

Bourguiba.” The Tunisian National movement is the political movement that led the resistance against the French in Tunisia. It is credited for the Tunisian independence in

1956 both through negotiations and physical armed confrontations. French protection and protectorate of Tunis is the term used interchangeably to mean French colonialism of

Tunisia. Both French Colonialism and French protection scored 194-193 each. This means that the topic was y significant to the historical narratives. El-Habib Bourguiba is known as the nationalist leader who later became Tunisia’s first President after abolishing the Monarchy and proclaiming Tunisia as a republic in 1957. The pride in earlier glorious times included a significant discussion of the Ottoman Empire and its legacies. The word

“Bey” which is a Turkish title for rulers in areas of influence of the Ottoman Empire was used 220 times. Being considered one of the golden eras in Tunisian history, the emphasis on this specific period warrants consideration. While all the words are interconnected and significant to this research, I chose nationalist/patriotic discourse 59

(national identity), Muslim identity, and “national struggles and heroes” as central themes to the discussion. In light of this, I consider what is left out of the discussion to be an

“otherness” discourse.

In the following section, I discuss the word count and lexical search linking it to passages and references from the textbooks. I start by explaining the nationalist and patriotic discourse as well as national identity discourse. Second, I examine the relevance and functionalization of the Muslim identity. I discuss the portrayal of diversity and the conversation around this topic and its implications. Then, I look at the symbolism of national struggles and national heroes. Finally, I examine the Pan-Arabism as presented in the textbooks and the need for regional attachment.

Romantic Nationalist Prism; The Bourguiba Doctrine

National identity is the process of identification of an individual with their nation physically and emotionally. The identification process is made along the lines of a shared history, collective memory, public culture and shared myths (Anderson, 1991). National identity is ‘a relational concept’ that defines the boundaries between the inner group and the outer group. Its establishes the emotional connection based on affinities to the ‘us’ and attributes any differences to the ‘them (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Romantic nationalism influences the understanding of modern citizenship. The discourse evoked by a nation- state building projects often divorces nationalism from critical thinking. Historically, this prism has been used by authoritarian regimes to increase their popular support and maintain their authority. Democratic legitimacy and accountability is then underplayed by social stability and myths about sovereignty threats (Dwan, 2015). Political 60 romanticism in Tunisia started after the independence (1956). The figure of the guardian of Tunisian resistance and sovereignty had the face of Bourguiba.

The approach that the regime endorsed was a paternalistic and emancipatory image. This doctrine was propagated in all aspects of the citizens’ lives. Education was an important focus within the transitional state building project. The institution was not immune of the Bouruiba shadow infiltration. The figure was romanticized as part of a personalist populist rule; and remains so as we speak. in fact, Bourguiba is also referred to as “the supreme leader”. Any reference to his name or achievements are to commended and any attempt to critically putting his legacy into question is met with popular vexation.

National Identity and Nationalist Discourse

In the contexts of countries where governments have direct control of the educational system, textbooks are no longer expected to contain facts but rather an elitist political vision. The criteria of selectivity of aspects to emphasize or downplays reflects the state-nation project’s ideologies and doctrines. From personalist regimes, nationalism is a ‘governing principle’ that brings together different social fractions (Murray, 2011).

Previous research on the topic has shown that many governments utilized educational curriculum to shape the discourse of national identity and to maintain its legitimacy and social control (Apple & Christian-smith, 1991; Brand, 2014; Nassar,

2004; Zajda, 2009; Zhao, 2014). Implementing a socio-political strategy for social control has to be shaped to be ethically defensible. The presence of threats is overplayed with struggles and past resistance movements. A world count for all history textbooks 61 revealed that variations of the word “national identity” (Wataniya-watani (national-ist/ic) and watan (homeland)) was used 414 times in 11 textbooks. As shown in the chart above, the high frequency of nationalist discourse with all its variations in history textbooks reveals the power of history for ideology transmission. The different variations of words referring to Islam “Muslim. Islam, Islamic” were used in a total of 453 times in 11 textbooks. The history textbook for the 5th grade devotes a total of five (5) chapters for the different life stages of the prophet and the Islamic civilization including the early

Muslim conquests “Foutouhat Islamiya” of North Africa.

A sixth-grade Civics textbook sets the understanding of patriotism within a sports event asking the student to reflect on a picture and a short text. The instruction asks students to identify how the athlete is showing her patriotism (Al-Hiss Al Watani). The text that the students are supposed to reflect on reads as follows:

She was standing on the podium getting showing her pride by paying tribute the national flag being raised on the rhymes of the national anthem. She was decorated with a gold medal telling the story of her perseverance and hard work. Her pride in representing her country in the best way was discernible. (p. 221)

Patriotism as transmitted to the younger generation through an educational curriculum that they are daily socialized and have to memorize for exams as well. The

Muslim identity is prominent in the narratives and given much weight. It is often equated with the sense of belonging and identity. One of the activities in the 5th grade textbook for the Civic education and History is to memorize the significance of the symbols of the national flag. The crescent is a traditional symbol of Islam while the 5 points star indicate one of the five pillars of Islam (Shahada (the publicity and testimony of faith), Salat

(prayers) Zakat (charity tax) Sawm (fasting), and Hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca)). While the 62 circles or the disc holds both the crescent and the star together to symbolize national unity.

Patriotic Fervor

Patriotism and nationalism are two terms that are used interchangeably. While

Kauffman (2001) defines nationalism as the hate of the “other,” Wodack (2004) defines patriotism as national pride in the “us” and emotional attachment to one’s country. In the end, nationalism is the projected vision of the other while patriotism is the emotional attachment to one’s self-identifiers. Outbidding scholarship argues that elites tend to instrumentalize any nationalist and patriotic rhetoric to advance their agenda and legitimize their discourse (Raphael, 2004). This is usually embedded in a patriotic discourse. In the 5thth-grade civics textbook, belonging is defined as the feeling that makes citizens work towards the development and prosperity of their countries. It is presented as the behavior that reflects compliance and commitment to the norms, procedures, and regulations. Students are socialized into the idea that patriotism is often expressed within the framework of sacrifice and compromise. Young generations are socialized into the expression of patriotism as “the duty to protect the "watan"

(homeland) and preserve its integrity” (5th-grade Civics textbook, p. 213).

A wide range of classroom activities and homework, and instructions for teachers explicitly indicate that desired outcomes of the lesson/activity are national identity consolidation, deepening the understanding of belonging and cultural identity. One lesson in the 5th grade Civics activity asks the student to reflect on the inappropriate behavior that they noticed during the National Anthem and rituals that involve the flag, 63 and then write an article about it raising awareness of the need to respect the flag and the national anthem (p. 225). Notwithstanding that the culture in schools is permissive to punitive measure (including corporal punishment) in light of lack of respect and discipline to the national flag anthem in schools.

Even though the words ‘watan’(homeland), and ‘balad’ (country), and ‘dawla’

(State) are often used interchangeably, most ‘watan’ and balad’ words are intertwined.

Particularly, in the textbooks under study, the term ‘watan’ (homeland) is used whenever there is need to invoke nationalism especially regarding the relationship between the student and the community, or the relationship between the state-society relations.

Henceforth, the pillars of belonging are outlined as follows: (1) pride in one’s ‘watan’

(homeland), (2) loyalty to the country and respect of its national symbols, (3) the compliance to the laws and regulations, (4) the conformity to the values as well as traditions and the social customs, (5) the preservation of the country’s acquisitions, (6) respect the national symbols; the flag, and the national anthem, and (7) the willingness to sacrifice in defense of the country. Generally speaking, hallmarks of a “good citizen” in the MENA region countries emphasize patriotism and loyalty to the country and its national symbols.

Patritotic fervor is a nationalist agenda that improves social identity and reiforces pride in group membership (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 2004). The rampant patriotic discourse found in the textbooks suggests that the nation-state building project accroding to political elites in Tunisia is very well informed by the Social Identity Theory (SIT).

Social identitification consitsts primaritly on affinities with a common identity and the 64 adoption of a specific group identity. In the case of a national odenity based project, homogeniety and social cohesion suggests that memebrs of society subscribe to the patriotic feeling by expressing attachement to nationalist symbols, figures, and set of attributes.

Mandatory Islamic Education and Double Standards

Except Lebanon and Tunisia, Arab countries in the MENA region endorse Islam as a reference source in their legislations. Even though the first articles of the two

Constitutions (1956-2015) in the history of the modern state in Tunisia endorse Islam as the religion of the state, subsequent articles guarantee freedom of belief and religion. The progressive values that the state endorsed are however challenged by other factors such as a mandatory Islamic education that all students have to take. A contradiction that brings into question secularism as understood by the Tunisian state by “putting religion consciously to work for various types of social and political projects” (Starrett, 1998, p.

10).

The educational curriculum is expected to teach about comparative religion and history of religions. It is also desirable to provide an objective understanding of the role of religion in the state formation. What raises questions is the exclusive teaching of one faith over others. Other religions are briefly mentioned in Islamic education, in sections regarding the importance of belief and respect of other “all heavenly messengers and holy scriptures.” The 6th-grade guiding document expects teachers to devote three chapters

(equivalent of three classes) to teach about faith and the fact that it being a true believer 65

(Muslim) implies belief and respect of other Abrahamic religions, their prophets, and their respective holy books.

The persistence on the instruction of a particular religious teaching over others

(Islamic education) as part of a state-mandated curriculum is in itself a definition of an identity around religious lines. In the same vein, the fact that all the courses are mandatory to all students puts students who subscribe to other traditions at a challenging position. The absence of a mechanism of exemption or an alternative religious education course for those who are not Muslims constitute structural violence against those who do not wish to attend a class that imposes detailed Islamic training. For instance, according to the Islamic Education curriculum under study, in the first four grades (1st through 4th), students are trained and graded on memorialization and recitation of Quranic verses and

Surahs. Later, they are taught how to perform the prayers (7th grade). The compulsory aspect of this subject puts religious minorities at the outskirts of identity by compelling them to either comply (loyalty) or be exposed (Hirschman, 1970). Adherence and compliance would cancel their agency while exposure implies facing retaliation from their peers/teachers, or even their community. Islamic education, just like Arabic language courses, is a subject that follows students from their first grade of elementary school until advanced high school classes. Exceptions are in the last two years of high school for physical education and computer science.

During my interview with Rabbi Daniel Cohen, the Rabbi of la Goulette

Synagogue and a vocational teacher of Hebrew and Judaism in a Jews vocational school in Tunis, he recalled that when he was a student, he was subdued to corporal punishment 66 by his teacher for refusing to recite the Qur’an in the classroom. He added that “he was subject to bullying by his classmate” and that the situation escalated to the intervention of the school director who instructed the teacher to respect the students’ wish not to recite

Qur’an and accommodate his religious belief. Although the school director intervened in this case, this incident did not exempt Rabbi Cohen or any other student holding a different faith from taking and passing the “Islamic thinking/Islamic Education” course.

Even the religious schools that religious minorities have are not accredited to substitute the public school system and are mandated by law to restrict their activities to small communities. They face legal sanctions if they behave otherwise. This is, for instance, not true to Islamic Teaching schools that substitute kindergarten regarding fulfillment of prerequisites to enter elementary school.

The History textbook for the 5th grade elementary dedicated five chapters to the expansion of Islam in the region, Islamic civilization and scholarship figures, and most importantly, the life of the prophet (p.48-80). The remembrance of the expansion of

Islam in Afriqiya (Tunisia) is made through an emphasis on national symbols and physical places such as the governorates of Kairouan and Mahdiya. Localization of physical entities is a symbolism that aims at both consolidating territorial attachment and reinforcing belonging and pride in Islamic. In the 5th-grade elementary history textbook,

Kairouan is framed as the epicenter of the Muslim identity regarding culture, legacy, and architecture (p. 68). Historical narratives emphasize Kairouan and Mahdiya over other governorates in Tunisia and link it to pride in being a Muslim since it was the gate to

North Africa, Tunisia more specifically and the center of Sunni Islamic scholarship. 67

Anderson (2003) maintains that religion’s significance in politics is crucial due to “its role in discourses about national identity and models of future developments” (p. 184).

An accurate illustration of Anderson’s observation is what these national symbols stand for in the Tunisian collective memory. Kairouan embraces Islamic architecture and identity. The Great Mosque is hence a national monument that represents not only

Tunisia but also the Pride of Islamic civilization for Tunisians and elsewhere in the

Muslim World. In fact, the Great Mosque (built by the Aghlabids) is considered a holy pilgrimage site.

Among Sunni Islamic scholarship, it is believed that seven visits to this Mosque in Kairouan equals a pilgrimage to the Mecca site in Saudi Arabia. Also, it is registered as a UNESCO World Heritage site. It is the governorate where big scale celebrations of national Muslim holidays notwithstanding the Zaitouna Mosque in Tunis. Ukba Ibn

Nafaa, when he conquered Ifriqiya emphasized to make it the center of Islam and a source of pride for Islam till the down of times. Activity in the same textbook (p. 62) asks students to identify the role that Kairouan played in the expansion of Islam in the

Maghreb and Al-Andalus. It represents the Berber resistance to the Islamic expansion by

Ukba ibn Nafaa, who ended up being killed by Kusaila al-Barbari (a Berber Leader).

During the first encounter of students with History (5th grade elementary), the textbook focuses on the Muslim identity by introducing students to the life of the

Prophet, his way of life, and his character and habits. Fatimides are “the descendants of

Ali ibn Abi Taleb and Fatma (The Prophet’s daughter). Even though there is a mention of the old civilizations (Punic, Capsian, and Roman), it is less likely to be linked to the 68

Tunisian identity. Even though the Berbers were briefly mentioned as part of the national history, they are represented as those who opposed and fought the expansion of Islam.

The obvious emphasis on the descendence of the Prophet and other symbols of Islamic civilization and the presentation of regions of Tunisia as the gate of Islam to the region created a pride, nationalism and belonging to these national symbols. There is, however, no mention of any other religious minority or differentiated identity.

Pride in Glorious Times

National history tends to emphasize a glorious era in the history of the country.

The 6th-grade history textbook is dedicated to the Ottoman Empire expansion (1574-

1705) in Tunisia and its legacies. Moreover, the textbook discusses the timeline of the

French occupation of the country starting from the uniqueness of the geographic position of Tunisia that made it the center of trade between different empires. The chapter highlights that the rivalries over occupying Tunisia due to its strategic positionality until the French occupation in 1881. While the textbook mentions the different Bayat3 that was in charge of the Tunis Eyalet (Province under the Ottomans), it always glorifies the

Muslim side without any mention of any religious minorities.

Official stories as presented in the textbooks under study follow the same pattern of official national histories; an ancient past, a decline, and the conception of the modern movement. Following this pattern, the stories are most likely to recall the glory of earlier civilizations (Phoenician, Capsian, Punic, and Roman) and an ancient past (Fatimides,

3 Bey (Plural Bayat) is a Chieftain Turkish title to rulers in different areas of the Ottoman Empire. 69

Aghlabids, and Hafsids). A decline often follows the glory phase (The Ottoman Empire).

In the context of Tunisia, the decay was presented as the fall of Tunis Eyalet to the

French Protection. What was known as protection later developed to French occupation

(direct rule) from 1881-1956.

Correlating Diversity with Conflict

Scholarship on transitional regimes finds democratization attempts stand in contradiction with a diverse social configuration (Mansfield and Snyder, 2012; Snyder,

2000; Toft, 2013). In the phase of a transition, the discourse of the state and political elite often present diversity as a threat. Pluralism is hence understood as a source of social and political instability. Homogeneity and national identity are presented as the ideals. This idea is reflected in the 7th-grade Civics textbook activity that contrasts societal conflict with national identity. In this activity, students are asked to intervene on a media platform to express your opinion. The activity instructions read as follows:

You saw a TV show about a society that is long known for its ethnic, racial, religious diversity and political rivalries. Most often, this society is subject to different conflicts that have its origin in this difference/diversity regarding the societal configuration/composition. These disagreements usually entail violent disputes between the various components of society. You decided to intervene by phone and express your opinion about the subject matter. In your comments, you focus on the following points: (1) The reasons behind these violent conflicts (2) Political and Social Implications of the conflict providing examples. (3) Recommend strategies of conflict-resolution. (p. 272)

If we situate this activity in the context of a the Social Identity Theory (Tajfel &

Turner, 1979, 2004), this narrative maintains that any group that does not assimilate with the in-group and has a distinct feature is a potential threat to national security and stability. It could also be argued that it correlates diversity with conflict and instability. 70

The portrayal of heterogeneity as a factor that makes societies conflict-prone is embedded in the nationalist outbidding scheme. One of the arguments explaining the reason why

Tunisia survived a possible scenario of civil war like neighboring Libya, or Yemen is its national unity. When students reflect on the different outcomes in Arab Uprisings countries, they are more likely to link social heterogeneity with violent conflict.

Otherness: ‘Us’ and ‘Them’

Manufacturing a national identity is most likely to create a discourse of patriots versus foreigners; the “us” and “them”. In the textbooks, the “otherness” discourse comes at the expenses of “them” and sets the boundaries of citizenship around cultural, religious, and ethnic lines. The common shared social identity establishes an understanding of the relationship between the in-group and the out-group as adversarial

(Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 2004). Exclusive nationalism is an accessible self-placement tool that reinforces this relational continuum.

An inspection of the 5th-grade history textbook shows that the definition of citizenship boundaries ties back to the Carthaginians distinctiveness between the in group and the out group. The definition of the social makeup of the Carthaginian society reads as follows:

Carthaginian society consists of Carthaginian and Non- Carthaginian. While the first live inside the boundaries of the city, the latter live on the outskirts of the city. Non-Carthaginians are mandated to pay taxes and cannot participate in any form of political life. (5th grade, p. 23)

Newly independent states engage in a homogenizing political projects based on past struggles. Nationhood in these times is understood as monolithic. Any existing 71 diversity is either concealed or forced to integrate. This is true for religiously differentiated groups in Tunisia. Except for content paying lip service to tolerance and religious pluralism, there is no mention of any other religious identity that goes hand in hand with being Tunisian. The educational curriculum instills a symbiotic relationship between being Tunisian and being a Muslim. Any different self-identification is an exception to the rule. The ideological transmission of an identity that is Muslim or profoundly influenced by Muslim values pushed outliers to the outskirts of society.

Reinforcing Territorial Attachment and Illegal Immigration

States have a lot of platforms at their disposal to act against what they perceive as outside threats or intruders. Educational narratives try to appeal most to younger generations. States also use media to reinforce the emotional and psychological attachment to nationhood. Mental preparation for challenges starts by initiating citizens to accept the current social conditions and upcoming problems such as unemployment and economic hardship (Vural and Ozuyanik 2008; Foster 2011).

One of the societal problems that Tunisia is threatened by is the increase of illegal immigration to Europe. In the face of the increasing rates of unemployment and social challenges, young people are choosing to risk their lives by illegally immigrating to countries like France and Italy. This crisis is not only a domestic issue, but is also generating structural problems with European countries, who are pressuring the government to prevent this from happening. The state, hence, chose to counter the threat by raising awareness among younger generations about illegal immigration, its implications on the family and the society. It also provides teachers with pedagogical tips 72 to approach this topic. First, students are made aware of the legal ways to travel and the appropriate documents to have in acquisition such as a passport.

The activity on the Civics textbook for the 5th grade depicts a scene where a mother expresses her grief towards the decision of her son to use illegal ways to travel and being caught by the authorities. Students are then asked to produce a short story where they elaborate on how they see their future in their country. The goal as stated (for the teachers) to develop the activity for this topic is to develop critical and analytical thinking among students about a social phenomenon to deepen their cultural belonging

(p. 211-218).

Politics of History: National Struggles and Heroes

In the quest to frame a unique communal sense of identity, narratives are most likely to emphasize specific events and heroic tales, and resistance icons as well as glorifying martyrdom. History teaching, in particular, is crucial to identity-building processes. Storytelling, narrative threads of national history gives a sense of continuity and cascade (Porat, 2001; Brand, 2014).

Nationally framed stories are crucial to shape national identity and remembrance.

Identity, as constructed, generates its meaning from historical combinations between the different civilization intertwined in the country and previous conquests made in the name of expanding Islam in North Africa. Since the Bourguiba era, through Ben Ali and presently, the Tunisian identity was always rooted in its Mediterranean aspect coupled with some vestiges of both an Occident and orient influence. In the textbooks examined,

Tunisia’s pre-Islamic historical and cultural heritage such as the Punic, Roman, Capsian 73 civilizations were reinstated and discussed. National Symbols such as Hannibal, Al-

Kahina are identified and addressed as well. Tunisia’s history was established within a regional uniqueness, namely in a Maghreb context (North African).

National narratives are typically constructed around the prism of challenging periods and pride in resistance. In the context of Tunisia, architects of patriotic sentiment emphasize French occupation as a major crisis. Narratives about the colonial phase, resistance, and the battles of independence emphasize national unity in light of territorial integrity threat. Historiographies of newly independent states make extensive use of past struggles and heroes to frame the need for national unity. In this context, people are socialized into the idea that national interest comes before any other considerations. This is also true to transitional phases such as the democratic transition in Tunisia. In the 5th and 6th-grade History textbooks, pride and attachment to the motherland (Tunisia) are made by extensive use of national symbols and names linked to the struggle for independence. Visual references include pictures of historical figures like Hannibal, Ibn-

Khaldun and Al Kahina and the different Beyat (Ottoman empire). Also, history textbooks introduce students to national figures like Farhat Hachad; a Trade Unionist and one of the pillars of the pro-independence movement who was assassinated by the French intelligence service. However, (rivalries to Bourguiba)-inherited by Ben Ali later-such as

Salah Ben Youssef are not included.

Pan-Arabism Dimension

Nation-building processes target minorities and other identities that were politicized in the past. With the aim to spread homogenization, state officials are most 74 likely to impose linguistic assimilation. In the context of Tunisia, language planning through Arabization was a state mandate that made Arabic the language of the Republic according to the Constitution. The projection of the social function of Arabization was made through media, schools and government institutions (Stuurman, 2007). The project not only aims to achieve a monolithic identity through linguistic commonality, but also a geopolitical positionality. Tunisia joined the Arab League in 1958. Most of the adherents to this political organization have Arabic as their common denominator to some extent and identify as Arabs. Despite initially associating the country with the Maghreb, political elites often stress the Arab side of the country’s population. Textbooks, for instance, highlight the dual dimensions of the Arab and Muslim identity in the guiding documents as well as the textbooks. However, the Muslim identity carries more weight.

Pan-Arabism is understood in a geographical affiliation as well as membership to the

Arab League of Nations. Interestingly enough, the 2nd year High School Civics textbook textbooks push for externalization of the Tunisian secular state model to other neighboring countries. The passage posits that “no future for the Arab Ummah (nation) without a secular state and a civil society.” (p. 164) It continues to present the argument for this statement maintaining that “because this type of state is based on the separation of religion and state, separation of powers, and the reassertion of individual rights. (p.

164).

Omitted Historical Facts: Bourguiba’s Shadow

The downplay of certain historical events is part of nation-state building projects and is made after the deliberation of political elites and state officials. Since the initial 75 historiographies were written under Bourguiba, some historical facts were omitted. For the purpose of the heroic figure that Bourguibism embraced during the independence movements, other resistance figures were omitted from the narratives. After the 2010-11

Tunisian Revolution, other previously oppressed narratives re-emerged to the political scene calling for a rewriting of history. In one of the open session for the Truth and

Dignity Commission (TDC)4, the family of Salah Ben Youssef5 came out to the public demanding a re-writing of the history to include the figure ofSalah Ben Yousef and Abd

Laaziz Thaalbi6 as some of the independence icons who were completely obscured and repressed as part of Bourguiba’s ‘power game’.

Another historical fact that was omitted is the role of the UGTT- the national trade Unionists organization in the resistance and independence movement. The omission of these figures reinforces the heroic protagonist Bourguiba figure while undermining others in order to improve the Destour Party7’s legitimacy, popular support, and authority. Repression also included the torture of dissent during Bourguiba and Ben Ali’s regime mainly against the Islamist movements’ activist and public figures.

Chouika (2010)-a Tunisian Political Scientist-wrote that “authoritarian political power insists on monopolizing all past political experiences and on controlling their

4 The Truth and Dignity Commission- Instance Vérité et Dignité (IVD)-is a transitional justice ad hoc tribunal launched on 9 June 2014 by the then President Moncef Marzouki. Its mission statement is to investigate chuman rights violation in Tunisia staring from 1955. 5 Salah Ben Youssef (1907- 1961) led the party when Bourguiba was imprisoned by the French. Ben Yusuf was expelled from the party in 1955, established himself in Cairo, and initiated a six-year guerrilla campaign against the Neo-Destour, the French, and Bourguiba (Britannica.com) 6 Abd Laaziz Thaalbi (1876-1944), one of the founding fathers of Tunisian nationalism and co-founder of the Destour, had been a witness against Bourguiba during the events of April 9, 1938.

76 effects…imposing its vision of reconciliation with the past.” He adds that “all public activity becomes a ‘power game,’ including obviously the debate over national memory and past experiences.” (ICTJ, 2010). National memory is manufactured by regime preferences and interests. History iswritten to serve the regime’s interest during

Bourguiba, remained intact to maintain the Bourguiba figure as a national symbol omitting facts such as ‘the cult of personality’ inherited for the Bourguiba era.

Obstruction of Minorities’ Collective Memories; The Holocaust

The manipulation of historical narratives does not only invest in omission of national level collective memory but also manipulates international memory. One of the historical narratives omitted completely from the history textbooks and any discussion about the United Nations is the Holocaust. The origins of totalitarianism and totalitarian regimes is devoted two chapters in the senior year high school program for Arts and

Humanities (pp. 76-87) with a focus on Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy and their respective figures; Hitler and Mussolini. The two lessons discuss at lengths the origins of

WWII, its developments and its outcomes such as the separation Germany and the

Hiroshima. However, history textbooks throughout omit any reference to the Holocaust

(1933-1945). A re-examination of all the history textbooks of all the grades reinforced the intentional omission. The following chapter in the history textbook for the 4th year high school, discusses the founding of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights, mission statement, and structure (88-89).

Downplaying international scale atrocities against religious minorities is a perpetuation of the international narratives to fit the national sentiments. In Tunisia, the 77 topic of the Holocaust is controversial and is often linked to the Palestinian cause, Israel, and the Zionist ideology. The official historical discourse then sought to omit the topic from educational curriculum to avoid any debate around it.

In December 2017, a group of academicians, faculty, researchers as well as staff shut down an exhibition on the Jewish Holocaust at the National Library in Tunis. The visual exhibition consisted of visual images and was organized by a Tunisian academician and historian Habib Kazdhaghli in an attempt to expose students to a major historical period of Jewish collective memory. The memorial initiative came within the framework of remembrance of the atrocities they were subjected to by the Nazi regime.

The protestors were chanting “Zionist get out, Free Palestine” and referred to the event as a Jewish Propaganda. One of the protestors interviewed on site stated that “as one of the organizers of the protest, I am here to show my opposition to the set-up of such exhibition and the intention of spreading of such initiative in the educational program and other informative settings” (Meem Magazine, January 2018). She expressed her rejection of this exhibition and the propagation of the Holocaust narrative and described them as attempts towards Tatbiï (normalization with the Zionist entity) and a treason to the

Palestinian cause. Another interviewee echoes the sentiments of the opposition and considers the exhibition as “a scholastic and cultural normalization” (Meem Magazine,

January 2018).

Conversations about the Holocaust and the Jewish collective memory broadly is often considered as Zionist propaganda. Sympathizers with the Holocaust are in the words of one of the interviewee who is a civil society activist is considered a Zionist. The 78 overarching rhetoric echoed from the protestors in this exhibition is that the Holocaust is a myth perpetuated by the Zionist project to justify the formation of Israel and establish its international legitimacy (Meem Magazine, January 2018). Amidst the contestation of the Holocaust exhibition, state officials refrained from commenting or giving statements.

The rhetoric is not only a reaction to a public exhibition but is also a dominant discourse that overlooks the existence of Jewish Tunisians. Religious discrimination against religious minorities in general and towards Jews increased given the surge of the

Pan-Arabism rhetoric and religious outbidding with the Arab Uprisings. In an interview to “the Arab Kuds”, eli Trabesi, a Tuniso-French businessmen public figure and activist for the Jewish community responded to comments about Jerba becoming a “New

Palestine”. The wave of criticisms came after rumors that Jews and “outsiders” are increasingly purchasing properties. Trabelsi then commented that “these statements are misguided and part of The Arab Uprisings’ nationalist discourse. These stances miss out on the fact that Tunisian Jews have been in Djerba for more than 2,500 years. They are lawful and law-abiding citizens who are entitled to buy land whenever they want. On the contrary, if they do, it is a positive sign of patriotism and territorial attachment. In other words, that means that they are not thinking of going to Israel or to a European country"

(Alquds, March 17, 2018).

Memorialization and remembrance initiatives often overlap with the dominant social identity. While academic freedom is a principle of democratic practices and pluralism in particular undermines the democratic transition. The confusion over historical facts and ideologies reflects the limitations of the educational institution 79 primarily. The infiltration of ideologies in the educational system and the refusal to comment on such incidents reflects a complicity of state elites with the perpetuation of historical narratives. It furthers the marginalization of minorities on a social and political level and defines the ‘rules of the game’ in terms of social interactions.

Conclusion

It is clear that some specific narratives took over others. Most importantly, representation of some historical events was omitted, obscured and substituted by other regime/state endorsed narratives. One major finding of this study of history textbooks is the omission of the Holocaust from the educational curriculum. It is also worth noting that the topic is considered ‘taboo’ whether in classroom discussion or in certain platforms. The exclusion of minorities collective memory from the official history in textbooks has a residual effect on the social discrimination. In the manufacturing of national identity, political elites and curriculum architects extended a monolithic understanding of identity. Tunisia’s secular constitution guarantees freedom of belief and protects freedom of religion and conscience. The reality is, however, much more complex.

In this chapter, I discussed the nationalist discourse embedded in the educational curriculum, more specifically in what is regarded as social science in Tunisia. One of the emerging themes reflects an emphasis on a Muslim identity with Tunisian specific nuance. The educational system continues to be strong and promotes critical and analytical thinking as it was long credited for. Progressive values like tolerance, acceptance of other cultures and self-identifications were discussed. They, however, 80 remain on a theoretical level. In practice, state narratives champion a specific set of identity attributes and push any exception to the outskirts of identity. Given the different transitions that Tunisia underwent, the emphasis on homogenization is planned and emphasized in the educational curriculum. It is part of a chain of strategies designed and implemented by political elites in light of state visions. It can be argued that one of the factors that led Tunisia towards a democratic transition as opposed to the other scenarios of the other Arab Uprisings countries is the sense of national identity. This is true and is reflected in the discourse examined. Citizenship, as imagined by the state vision, endorses the Muslim identity over all attributes. Schools are expected to teach about comparative religions. In fact, teaching about the history of religions is much needed.

However, an entire course that students have to take every grade until high school equates the Muslim identity with “the being.” This is notwithstanding the fact that all institutional aspects-political, cultural, and social-around students and individuals socialize them into being Muslims. While the overwhelming majority of Tunisians identify as Sunni

Muslims, framing identity around religious lines marginalizes religious minorities.

Representation is one of the downfalls of majority rule. National narratives and state discourse that override the representation of existing differentiated identities has a residual effect on social interactions. The implications of state policies, historical narratives, and the socialization of a monolithic identity will be discussed further in chapter 4. In this chapter, I examine how the nationalist and patriot discourse coupled with prioritizing national interest has altered the position of religious minorities legally, politically and socially. 81

The following chapter examines the citizen engagement and democratic learning.

Focusing on Civics textbook, I consider the discourse of citizenship education from democratic accountability and political participation standpoint. First, I lay the theoretical framework for the terms. Then, discuss the content analysis findings. The focus of the following chapter will be the procedural and substantive understanding of democracy in

Tunisia. I examine the preparation of citizens to be actively engaged in politics and decision making. I also consider the commitment to universal human rights and individual rights and freedoms. I conclude that while textbooks and official documents in

Tunisia endorse the democratic political system and its principles-such as religious pluralism-, its applicability remains questionable. Moreover, I find that the promoting universal values of tolerance and acceptance of different religious identities remains theoretical and cut from reality. I finally conclude that the political institution is influenced by religious underpinning which bring the understanding of secularism as understood by the Tunisian model to question.

CHAPTER 3: THE CITIZENSHIP METER: CITIZENSHIP, CIVIC

ENGAGEMENT, AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Introduction

Citizen production was a central concern during the origins of the modern nation- state. In fact, socialization of youth into active citizenship has been at the core of the debate about of the implications of mass schooling into the creation of stable nations

(Astiz & Mendez, 2016; Benavot et al., 1991; Meyer et al., 1992). Now that new regions of the world are gradually moving towards transitions from authoritarianism or back to it, the conversation about attributes and impact of an active citizen re-emerged substantially.

Education is seen around the world as an artifact for nation-building and conflict transformation. It, however, remains contingent on political and socioeconomic factors.

Citizenship education, in particular, is heavily influenced by the institutional context and makeup, politics, and socioeconomics.

Given the recent political developments in the MENA region, the need to re- imagine and transform the communities for stable nation-building has been contingent upon the state’s ability to produce citizens. This is particularly accurate given that concepts such as civil society and political participation have experienced a significant revival in the social science in the past decade (Diamond, 1997; Hall, 1995; Fukuyama,

1995; Putnam, 1993). In fact, the resurgence of such concepts had implications policymaking worldwide and more specifically in post-conflict states such as Lebanon, Israel, and Algeria to name few. While states often present education as a neutral enterprise, an extensive amount of literature suggests that the process is contingent on how states 83 conceptualize their nation-building and conflict transformation strategies. Between compulsive social control and preparation of active citizens, citizenship education appears to reflect the underlying logic of a particular type of regime (Maktabi, 2000;

Joseph, 2005; Ichilov, 2005; Akar, 2006, 2007; Hahn, 2010, Brand, 2010; Quaynor,

2011).

State building projects are more likely to emphasize the role of citizens in maintaining stability. In fact, states often work towards the socialization and politicization of youth through mass schooling (Meyer et al., 1992; Benavot et al.). In the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings, countries like Tunisia invested in institutional reforms of educational curriculum and teaching philosophies in response to social unrests. There is an extensive amount of scholarship that focuses on the democratization of the political system and civil society. However, research about citizens-production from an educational curriculum standpoint and the role of civics in the process remains understudied. This chapter tackles the changing dynamics of educating for citizenship following demcoratic transition. I analyze ten Civics education textbook and official programs issued in Tunisia since the 2011 Arab Uprisings using a qualitative content analysis. Textbooks are stated sanctioned and monitored; they are also considered as

"legitimate knowledge" (Apple & Christian-Smith, 1991) as they reflect the political culture of societies and the state.

In the previous chapter, I examined state narratives through political elite’s official statements and social science textbooks. The chapter discussed the nationalist discourse embedded in the educational curriculum and other aspects of the social life 84 through the socialization of a patriotic identity. The Pan-Arab dimension is underplayed by the Muslim identity. The exclusivity of teaching Islamic education without taking into consideration the existence of other religious backgrounds equates the Muslim identity with citizenship. I concluded that limiting the understanding of citizenship to a certain religion over others contributes to societal discrimination. Social norms are influenced by official histories and state narratives. In other words, social hegemony could define ‘rules of the game’ based on these narratives and shape social interaction with the “alien” identities.

In this chapter, I tackle the education for citizenship with respect to citizen engagement, political culture, and commitment to the promotion of universal rights. I analyze Civic Education textbooks and Islamic Education8 Guiding documents. I primarily focus on citizen production and social capital and how they influence the political outcome. This chapter brings attention to the importance to revisit the mechanisms of youth socialization as important actors in transitions and the sustainability of democracy.

According to Freedom House (2016), the only countries in the MENA region that qualify as “Free” are Israel and Tunisia; with Israel being a fully-fledged democracy and

Bank, and Yemen fall into the category of hybrid regimes. Tunisia, Lebanon, and

8 At the secondary level (High School), the course Islamic Education changes its name to Islamic Thought. 85

Morocco provide grounds for civil liberties and political rights (Freedom House Report,

2016).

Despite efforts in the pursuit towards democratization, the educational systems in countries affected by the Arab Uprisings continue to harbor ideologies maintaining the pre-revolutionary state of affairs albeit stated aspirations for reforming the educational systems. A study by Carnegie Middle East Center (2016) on citizenship education programs looked into eleven Arab countries and revealed that a wide gap exists between the stated goals of national education programs and their actual implementation. In light of this, there is an urgent necessity to reform the educational curriculums, textbooks, and pedagogies to nurture ground for the application of democratic principles such as civic engagement, political participation, and pluralism.

The change of both the social contracts and the government-citizen relationships in the MENA region after the Arab Uprisings influenced the two forms of participation.

While regimes in Tunisia and Egypt were toppled, others such as Morocco and Jordan survived using authoritarian bargain. Small reforms and economic bargains were introduced in exchange for regime stability. Regardless of the outcome, political participation remains challenged. Khatib (2013) found that political, formal involvement in the MENA region is subject to enduring challenges. The author identifies four challenges: (1) “Endurance of formal political institutions that benefit from sustaining the old political status quo” (p.14). (2) There is a congruence between the political, social, and economic environment (p.15). (3) Political participation is often influenced by the dimension "survival vs. self-expression" which is translated into the trade-off between 86 politically active society, stability and national security. (4) And finally. the lack of capacity of specific groups like women and minorities to be involved in the formal political participation sphere. With the notable exception of Tunisia, the goals of democratization and change attached to Arab Uprisings were lost before they were realized. Given the changing dynamics in the political scene, a study of how the Arab

Uprisigns affected political participation, civic engagement, and political and religious pluralism is warranted. This chapter builds on the literature revisited and aims to contribute to the existing frameworks. It does so by investigating the education for citizenship and the institutionalization of pluralism both on the political and social level

(religious pluralism).

Educating for Citizenship in Civics

Citizenship education is considered a vital component of the educational systems and the workshop where youth acquire the “civic skills” that enable them to identify and resolve issues in their communities and societies (Banks, 2008; Ehman, 1980; Machel,

1996; Olssen et al., 2004). Countries around the world are now implementing citizenship education with different approaches. While some include citizenship education as a distinct subject in the educational curriculum (Schulz et al., 2010), other countries incorporate it with social science courses (Hahn, 1998; Schulz et al., 2010).

Arab countries, for instance, often adopt different approaches - not mutually exclusive- to implementing citizenship education according to a Carnegie Endowment study (2016). These states “either offer a separate civics course or integrate civics within a unified curriculum of social sciences. The same study indicates that “most nations use 87 civic concepts and values in their courses in Arabic language, Arabic literature, and religious education” (Carnegie Endowment, p. 5).The same approaches apply to the country under study, namely Tunisia. Since Civic education implies teaching effective communication and dialogue, it important to understand the culture of teaching civics in the country. However, according to the Carnegie study (2016), the educational system in eleven countries surveyed is based on passive memorization and is characterized by a scarcity of platforms for active training of civic skills. The classroom atmosphere remains didactic and subject to the teacher’s teaching philosophy. Students are limited in terms of critical and analytical thinking given that the teacher has the monopoly of moderation if any (Faour, 2013).

Citizenship Education: An Overview

Some studies have examined the topic of citizenship education and the inculcation of democratic principles in the educational curriculum. In a comparative study, Hahn

(1998) discusses forms of youth political socialization and the conditions under which liberal attitudes and principles thrive in the United Kingdom, Denmark, the Netherlands,

Germany and the United States over a span of three periods (1986–86, 1992–93, and

1994–95. The study looks at (1) adolescent political attitudes and behaviors, (2) gender and political attitudes, (3) support for free expression for diverse views, and (4) classroom climate. Another study by Ben-Porath (2006) posits that inherited tensions in civic education become especially pronounced in the context of war (referring to "The

War on Terror”). The author then asserts that recent approaches to citizenship education on the one hand tend toward being reflexively patriotic or what they refer to as “blind 88 patriotism” (Ben-Porath, 2006, p. 123) and insufficiently critical. On the other hand, these approaches are often characterized as weakly patriotic and hypercritical. Departing from the theory of “pedagogical remedy,” Ben Porath (2006) concludes that “educational practices…perpetuate belligerent conceptions” and “belligerent citizenship” (p. 11). To put it differently, conventional approaches to civic pedagogy are more likely to foster antagonism rather than encourage attitudes that lead to peace-building.

In the Latin American context, Astiz and Mendez (2006) highlight the emphasis on unified national identity and the suppression of difference by conducting a textual analysis of the core curriculum and textbooks produced by the best-selling presses in

Argentina. The authors later found inconsistencies on different levels. First, paradoxes that arise from the implementation of a Glocal (Global and Local) curriculum. Second, they found that discrimination in the textbooks is delusional since it deals with discrimination as a resolved social issue faded in history. Third, curriculum and textbooks purposely overlooked information about discrimination based on gender or disability status. Astiz and Mendez (2006) argue that the erosion of the principles stated in the

Federal Education Law [LFE] in the next level of curricular implementation reflects an identity struggle between a global identity (promoted by policymakers) and the

Argentinian identity (the next layer of implementation of the curriculum). Hence, patriotic sentiments overlap with efforts to produce a global citizen.

Literature about the evolution of citizenship in the MENA region extensively focuses on Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel with different levels of consideration (Maktabi,

2000; Joseph, 2005; Ichilov, 2005; Akar 2006, 2007; Hahn, 2010, Brand, 2010; 89

Ichilov,1993, 2005; Perliger et al. 2006; Quaynor, 2011). Two significant cross-national studies have been conducted about citizenship education in the MENA region (Hahn,

2010; Schultz et al., 2010; Torney-Purta et al., 2001).

After violent conflicts, states respond to the attempts to undermine their authority either through repressive or progressive policies. These policies inevitably change the existing concepts of belonging and redefine the attributes of the ideal citizen. Ichilov

(2005) examines liberal attitudes of pupils whereas and Perliger et al. (2006) focus on the rift between Israeli-Jews and Israeli-Palestinian-Arabs is reflected in students' citizenship orientation. Perliger et al., (2006) find that students who study civics reflect a better understanding of rights and responsibilities than those who do not. Further, the study concludes that students who openly discuss political topics in classroom conversations exhibit higher levels of political participation and democratically grounded knowledge than those who experience controlled classroom climate.

Ichilov’s (2005) study, on the other hand, reveals a societal divide between Arab and Jewish students. Through an analysis of the responses of students from Jewish state schools, Jewish religious schools, and Arab schools, the researcher concludes that students in Jewish schools are less likely to discuss politics extensively but are more positive about the political climate. Israeli-Palestinian Arab students, on the other end, were more politically potent and reported that they often discussed politics to a greater extent in classrooms. Moreover, Jewish students were more likely than Arab students to expect to engage in conventional political activities (voting and respect for the rule of law). Their Arab counterparts reported a tendency to engage in illegal protest activity 90

(Ichilov, 2005). The study demonstrates how existing rifts within Israeli society penetrate the schools and are visible in students’ understanding of citizenship.

Akar (2007) explores adolescents’ conceptions of citizenship and classroom- based citizenship education in Lebanon and concludes that the participants demonstrated a strong sense of national identity and a high interest in democratic principles, however, they were cynical about politics and politicians. In a previous study, Akar (2006) looks into Lebanese teachers’ conceptions of citizenship who highlighted that it is challenging to promote democratic citizenship in an environment of systematic corruption and authoritarianism. While they seemed skeptical, the teachers according to Akar (2006), shared the same values as their students about the centrality of citizenship and the importance of exchange of opinions and beliefs in the process. In a similar study, Joseph

(2005) examines the understanding of citizenship among 100 Lebanese children (age 5-

13) living in disadvantaged areas and concluded that there is an overwhelming consensus that civil rights were acquired through Clientelism-based-relationships. Such relationships guarantee an exclusive redistribution of resources that ensure access to education and healthcare. Hence, from a young age, the children were socialized into the concept of citizenship as equal to resourcefulness and access to privilege.

On the one hand, students inside the establishment demonstrated an awareness of their rights and an understanding of national cohesion meanwhile the disfranchised expressed a different understanding of citizenship. Children situated outside of the school settings, on the other hand, perceive civil rights through privilege and patronage relationships. The teachers acknowledge the significance of citizenship education but 91 blame its failure to achieve its intended goals in the milieu. In other words, teachers agree on the importance of the education for citizenship but remain incapable of delivering due to the repressive political culture at large.

The relevance of this topic for the post-Arab Uprisings period is acute amid the ongoing debate about youth radicalization points to a failing citizen production and a flawed educational system. Furthermore, the content of youth’s minds has long interested academic scholars as well as policymakers, especially in Muslim majority countries.

Also, following the wave of protests during and after what is commonly known as the

Arab Uprisings, the demands for political participation are increasingly pressuring regimes and governments to proactively implement these democratic rights as part of a survival impulse.

Given the authority that textbooks have, it is necessary that they undergo the scrutiny of a content analysis in juxtaposition with the state building projects and interests as opposed to being treated as delivery systems of facts. For Tunisia, the state monopoly over the regulation of education, its content, and the distribution makes textbooks "official knowledge." Berelson (1952) asserts that [content analysis is] "a research technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of communications" (p. 74).

Education for Citizenship: The Case of Tunisia

In the following section, I analyze citizenship in Tunisia’s Civics textbooks.

School curriculum in Tunisia is state mandated. I examine the conception of citizenship to which all students are required to abide by to at an earlier age. I also analyze political 92 elite and state officials’ rhetoric regarding younger generation's subscription and commentaries on the state performance.

Political Culture: Democracy and Citizenship

The debate around the political culture in the MENA region has been central to the scholarly discussion (give some names here). Scholars negated the effect of citizen's attitudes regarding the apprehension of the political system and political leaders on democratic regimes' longevity and stability (Dahl 1956; Almond & Verba 1963;

Tocqueville 1969). Putnam (1993) reinvigorated these theoretical underpinnings. The influence of political behavior-and more precisely the social capital- affects democratic outcomes. The state-mandated curriculum of “civicness” does not only serve as the source of "official knowledge" and a medium for the transfer of this language but also designed to produce a generation with specific values including democratic principles.

Approaches to embracing democracy as a political system differs from one country to the other.

While some adopt an integral approach, some other countries would endorse a partial understanding that does not contradict other sources of legislations they have; religious teachings are one of these considerations. In the context of the Arab world, only

Oman and UAE which uphold the Islamic political system of Shura’ in their textbooks.

The textbooks of the majority of the Arab countries theoretically discusses the democratic political system (Faour, 2014). Tunisia, in fact, endorses the democratic state project without reservations in its textbooks, political system, and official statements. The third year High School Civics textbook for Arts and Humanities major reflects a strong 93 commitment to democracy, pluralism, and openness to different political perspectives

(pp.43-46). 1st year High School Civic Education textbook explains the electoral system and the election process. It describes elections as a free. Students are acquainted with voter registration, voter turnout, and voting outcomes on their lives and as an expression of freedom (p. 43). Students are taught about forms of political participation such as voting and referendums. Voting is described as "a responsibility." The textbook devotes four chapters to the importance of the citizens in democratic governance. The introduction to voting is made through an in-class simulation. The same sections include activities covering law-making process where students draft a bill and cascade it pressing for its adoption by the assembly.

Despite the fact that most of the textbooks were issued under the authoritarian

Ben Ali regime, the content reflects an endorsement of the democratic model. A civics textbook for the secondary level (High School) issued in 2009 describes a system that merges and monopolizes governmental powers as totalitarian and tyrannical. The homework instructs students to reflect on this system regarding political lives, rights,

‘entitlements,' and freedoms that citizens are deprived of. The instruction also invites students to "determine how is that different from a political system that separates powers and its outcomes" (p. 68).

The superiority of the constitution and law enforcement is highlighted on multiple occasions throughout the textbooks. The aspects of the democratic republic are emphasized and coupled with classroom activities. For instance, the 5th-grade elementary textbook emphasizes the communal sense of society as well as democratic behavior 94 starting from the family to the neighborhood, school, and community.

Citizenship education is most likely to be tied to the form of government. While perspectives on other types of government may be incorporated in the educational curriculum or the conversation, "certain moral and interpersonal values prevail [over others]’ (Wringe, 1992, p. 32). Tunisian civics and history textbooks outline the political system and the superiority of the constitution. Students are also exposed to the judicial, legislative, and executive powers and the inherently democratic principle of separation of these powers. The materials and activities are tied to the knowledge about political life, political participation, and civic engagement to the semi-presidential representative type of government (1st year High School Civic Education, pp. 50-55). The 1st year of high school civics focuses on the particularity of democratic states and the hierarchy of authorities from local to the central authority. The principles of democratic governance are explained representation and that governments answer to their citizen (p. 51).

In addition, the textbook dedicates three chapters to teach about the power of citizens in decision making, influencing policies as well as rights and entitlements.

Chapter 2 entitled "Citizens put the Laws," the example provided from the Official

Gazette is a law text that reads: "On behalf of the People, and after the approval of the

National Constituent Assembly (Lower House), we, the President of the government at this moment issue the following law” (p. 52). The emphasis on the representation goes hand in hand with the assertion that citizens as the ones who put the laws. However, less emphasis is placed on public opinion and democratic accountability of state representatives and state officials. 95

Concerning duties, students are reminded of the citizenry duty of protecting state institutions. The 1st year High School Civics textbook reads that “the citizen is responsible for the best functioning of the public institution and responsible for the preserving of the public goods such as the infrastructure, means of transportation, and public administration.” The institutional constraints of democracy such as public opinion are also outlined, and respect for the law and state institution is the subject of multiple chapters starting from the 5th grade elementary school to the last year of high school. The understanding of the institutional constraints’ fundamental basis which is democratic accountability of state representatives and state officials is underplayed. This does not rule out that the textbooks analyzed do not tackle this topic.

It appears that the democratic principles taught in school curriculum cover the procedural aspect of democracy while shies away from the substantive understanding of it which includes democratic accountability. According to the Ministry of Education’s

Guiding Law (2002), the general goal of schools is to “prepare the youth to advance and face the future and ensure maximum flexibility in keeping with a changing dynamics and being to contribute positively in it” (Chapter 2, the MoE Guiding Law). This law was ratified in 2002 under the auspices of the authoritarian Ben Ali regime, it, however, remains in full effect without revisions. The language is abstract and does not indicate neither imply any reference to the role of youth in the democratic transition nor the democratic consolidation. It could be argued that the educational system and the lack of civic training did not prepare young people for the transitions ahead.

The same applies to the political elites who have no previous experience in public office except those who were part of the old regime.

Active Citizenship between Theory and Practice

While the role of civil society is overplayed in the educational setting, the reality seems much more complex. In light of the recent social movements, state officials’ statements or sentiments in other settings are found to be standing in open contradiction to these values inculcated in the textbooks. In different occasions, and when confronted with younger civil society activists expressing contempt for laws, decisions or statements, state officials.

The social movements “Manich Msamah”9 was a youth-led campaign against the administrative Reconciliation Law and the Finance Law, 201710. Fech Nestannew”11 is a social movement that mobilized the masses for protesting for the suspension and revision of The Finance Law of 2017. The law was controversial and faced a lot of social resistance and protest. The protestors expressed their contention to what they referred to as a systemic policy of improvement and marginalization. The contestation of this law comes in light of alleged lifting the subsidies on basic materials and increase the life cost simultaneously with a decline in purchasing power and a stagnation of salaries. On the other hand, corporations and big businesses are given tax breaks and other benefits such as the ability to reschedule public debt.

9 I will not forgive 10 The Administrative Reconciliation Law (adopted September 13) grants impunity to civil servants who were implicated in corruption under the Ben Ali Regime and allows them to hold positions of power…it also obstruct any investigation to the systematic corruption” (Human Rights Watch, 2017) 11 What are we waiting for? 97

In a TV show titled ‘Men Tounes’ (2018) broadcasted on Attesia TV (January 12,

2018) that compared “Manich Msemah”, "Fech Nestannew" and "Manich Msamah”, the state officials adopted a monologue of dominance and hegemony towards activists. Most importantly, narratives defined the attributes of “a good youth” and the boundaries of a good citizen. When confronted with a young leader of the movement, the deputy Mahdi

Ben Guarbiya (which party) described the civic engagement of Anouar Abidi

(representing the campaign) and by far the youth movements as an expression of

‘discomfort’ anger towards the lack of opportunity and unemployment. When it comes to

Samir Dilou (Ennahdha Deputy and the former Minister of Human Rights), labeled the movement’s leaders with arrogance and excess of confidence (Attesia TV Men Tounes,

2018).

Also, when Anouar Abidi explained his political vision and opinion about the current political scene and elites’ performance, he was faced with prejudice. Throughout the debate, state officials (Mahdi ben Garbiya, Samir Dilou, and Bochra Bel Hadj

H’mida) labeled the opinions and visions of youth as an expression of “Utopian

Activism” and ignorance of the political life and the democratic process (Attesia TV Men

Tounes, 2018).. The truth is that even the state officials are considered novice in terms of practical politics given the history of authoritarian regimes in Tunisia. Downplaying the role of youth and treating civic engagement and political participation as “amateur” reflects a gap between state officials and civil society activists. More importantly, the boundaries of a good young activist as implied include patience, sacrifice, and awareness and consideration of economic hardships. The exchange of opinions especially when 98 confronted with social dissent shows a divergence between the political stances and the social reality. The top-down approach towards civic engagement and political participation does not make it any different from "the lip service" to center citizens at the core of decision-making and the youth as the future.

One of the pillars of democratic governance is that the state answer to their citizens. These stances, on the contrary, label active youth and social movements with order disruption and consider their demands as illegitimate dissent. While the goals stated in the educational strategic initiatives and goals put the citizen in the center of decision making, state representatives, as well as people deputies, seem to override any accountability. The exchange of points of views in different encounters between young civil society activists and state officials often diverges to a covert investigation style. The questioning from the old political elite tackles thematic and technicalities with the aim to elicit incompetency and misunderstandings proofs from the young activists. The concluding remarks or inferences often point to active citizens and civil society activist as

‘novice’ in politics and distant from the reality.

In another encounter for the political debate segment of the TV show “75

Minutes” on on the national TV (January, 2018)12, the activist representing the youth- led movement “Manich Msamah” was openly accused of disrupting the public order. The

Show host blamed the young activists, the movement, and similar youth-led campaigns for the economic hardships (Attesia TV 75 Minutes, 2018). These stances contradict the previously advanced ideas about youth as the engine of change and the centrality of

12 Al- Wataniya TV is the national TV that represents the interests of the state 99 social movements to the democratic transition process. The contradictions between theoretical underpinnings and reality are also found in educational materials.

Active citizenship as understood by the political elites and state narrative

(textbooks) is self-contradictory. A perfect example is the defining roles of civil society as explained in the 6th-grade Civics textbook. The definition reads “civil society is an institution that serves as the channel conveying social grievances to the political scene. It oversees the government’s performance, expresses its discontent with political, social, and economic initiatives by the state and helps states to keep up with the aspirations and demands of its society” (p. 140). The same chapter reiterates the crucial role of active citizens and organizations in absorbing societal demands and transmitting them to the governmental platforms. However, the national identity rhetoric did not escape the definitional frameworks of civil society. An illustrative example that links national identity, patriotism and national interest to civil society is found in the 7th grade, Civic

Education section. The quote reads “Not only does civil society solidify national identity and patriotic allegiance, but it also increases the investment in the national interest through political participation and interest in the state of affairs of the state.” (p. 140).

The contrast between state narratives and reality reflects a gap between theory and practice. The inconsistency proves that civic engagement is understood within the boundaries of state interests, political elite's visions. Most importantly, the attitudes of state officials and political elites patronize the younger generation. Their appeals, demands, and visions are nor taken seriously neither are they (activists) considered partners in the transition. 100

Attributes of the Ideal Citizen: the "Citizenship Meter"

Apart from the attributes of a good citizen discussed in the previous section, citizenship and belonging are often interchangeably to refer to national identity as an attribute. The most interesting feature that kept coming up in the Civics textbook analysis is what I called “Citizenship meter” that quantifies the concept of citizenship. The

“citizenship meter” measures and scales national identity and community commitment. In the 10th chapter of the 5th-grade Civics textbook entitled "Territorial Belonging," the in classroom activity ‘defending the Homeland’ where students are instructed to check a list of behavior examples is accompanied with a scale. The text of the scale reads “If you answered ‘YES’ to the behavior examples number 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 9 and ’NO’ to the examples number 3, 5,8, that translates to "I am patriotic, my sense of belonging is extreme, and I put my country first". Failure to tick the right statements is explained as " an irregular behavior that should be revisited towards the better” (p.175). It goes without saying that the better is “blind patriotism” and “belligerent citizenship” (Ben Porath,

2006, pp. 11-123). Students are immersed in the ideology of physical and moral sacrifice towards the country. The failure of students to check the right answers would make them reflect on their sense of belonging and maybe make them subject to shaming from their teachers and classmates.

To avoid such scenarios, students are most likely to dogmatically check the boxes according to the activity answer key without any critical thinking. Also, students are not supposed to not express any patriotism since it is presented as an obligation. The measurement scale is a recurrent feature through the civics textbooks. There is enough 101 evidence to argue that the state narratives for civic engagement and patriotism are an indoctrination process that equates belonging, civic engagement, and "blind patriotism” to the understanding of citizenship. The term “mouwatana," Citizenship, is then used outside of its conventional use within political lines and territorial/ geographical perimeters of the nation-state to mean allegiance to the country and its national symbols.

In another instance, the textbook provides a scale for measuring community engagement. In an activity about the relationship between the citizen and their community, students are asked to check a list of what they think their duty is towards their neighborhood, village/town, and environment. The scale provided measures their territorial and psychological attachment and their pride in their community. The scale also quantifies their commitment to the social and cultural development of their environment. The scale is as follows: if the student scores 13-15 'YES,' that means absolute pride, sense of belonging, and commitment to the development of their community. Between 10-12 ‘YES,' translates into pride and a territorial attachment to their community. Commitment, however, needs improvements. Less than 10, the scale recommends that the student joins youth organization such as the National Scouts.

According to the "Citizenship Meter," if students do not check the right amount of

‘yes’ answers, they somehow lack community engagement and belonging. Students are first socialized with civic engagement, participation, and entitlement through family structures and role which in itself is authoritative. Then they are trained passively to develop civic competency in another restrictive environment through measurements and environment pressure. 102

The MENA regions’ school climate is notorious for its top-down approach and its rigidity to debate especially with the overarching authority projected by the teachers

(Faour, 2014). The authoritative climate coupled with the “Citizenship Meter” make the overall atmosphere unconducive for civic skills and competency development and growth. Systemic subscription into the communal and national psyche through coercion contradicts the previously advanced human rights, individual rights and freedoms in the same textbook. The overlap between individual rights and freedoms and the nationalist state narratives even in its understanding of civic engagement calls into question the democratic learning and citizenship education.

Universal Human Rights and Cultural Relativism

Endorsing and embracing human rights is primarily measured through signing and ratifying human rights declarations, treaties, and covenants. Most importantly through the

1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. While the situation of human rights in the

MENA region is not ideal, educational curriculum always seeks to implement a universal dimension through references to human rights. Similar to the varying levels of endorsement of democracy as a political system, some states adopt different approaches to human rights. Egypt and Jordan take a cultural relativist approach and restrict their endorsement with what does not contradict the Islamic fundaments (Faour, 2014).

Tunisia fully endorses the Universal Declaration of human rights in their universality whether in textbooks, school materials, and official statements. In Article 20 of the 2015

Constitution stipulates that “conventions approved by Parliament and ratified are superior to laws and inferior to the Constitution” (Article 20). Furthermore, the state building 103 project after the 2010-11 Tunisian Revolution expressed a strong commitment to human rights by specifying in the Constitution that “no revision can undermine the achievements regarding human rights and individual rights and freedom” (Article 49).

After the Tunisian Revolution of 2010-11, the Tunisian state moved further in safeguarding the previous grandfathering and guaranteeing more individual rights and

Freedoms such as freedom of belief, religion, and conscience. This does not rule out the fact that there are incidents of human rights violations that undermine the strong commitment expressed in official stances. Moreover, there are documented shreds of evidence of non-conformity to international standards. In the civic education textbook for third year High School students majoring in Arts and Humanities, it is explicitly stated that nothing can be prioritized over human rights including economic development (p.

38).

While citizenship seems to be secular, the state criminalizes homosexuality as it contradicts with Islamic tenets. The pretext of the conflating aspect of homosexuality with Islamic teachings controverts the Article 6 of the Tunisian Constitution guaranteeing freedom of conscience. There are even legal processes for identification including forced consent and forced medical examination. These ‘tests’ are not only inhumane but also invade individual privacy and stands in open contradiction with Article 24 protecting privacy. It also violates basic human rights. Such practices remain in full effect even after the ban on forced examination by the medical council.

In an interview with Mohamed Amine Jelassi, the Legal Affairs attaché for the

Tunisian Association in support of Minorities, he explained that invasive practices such 104 as the forced anal examination can halt the democratic transition’s legitimacy on the international level, and that Tunisia has moved forward in so many aspects from the influence of religious institution influence on politics and individual rights and freedoms but falls short in terms of ban on sexual orientations." (interview with author, date). An article published in Nawaat (an electronic journal), Hali writes that “Tunisia is a democratic country and when we say “democracy” we say respecting minority rights. We surely do not mean the majority’s hegemony” (Hali, 2015).

Progressive Values: Women’s Rights and Gender Equality

Tunisia is a leading example in the Arab World regarding Women’s Rights and gender equality. Tunisia has a long history of the institutionalization of equal opportunity between genders and safeguarding gender equality and parity. It is often considered the landmark for the advancement of women’s rights. It was the first in the Arab Muslim world to guarantee individual rights such as abortion (1973) and the first as well to ban polygamy. Equal pay and equal upward mobility is state-institutionalized and regulated by law. The constitution explicitly positions itself and the state as the 'chaperon' of women’s rights as it deploys all its assets to protects women against domestic mistreatment and abuse as well in the public sphere. According to the article 46 of the

Constitution, the state commits to protecting the acquired rights of women and ensuring their consolidation and promotion. Moreover, it guarantees equal opportunities between men and women for access to various responsibilities and in all areas. Furthermore, the state with all its apparatus expresses its commitment to devote parity between women and 105 men in elected assemblies and take the necessary steps to eliminate all types of violence against women.

Tunisia is the only country in the Arab world to have an explicit constitutional obligation towards gender parity in elected assemblies (Human Rights Watch, 2014). In the 7th grade, Civic Education section, the textbook devotes three chapters to discuss

Child and Women’s rights according to international declarations. For instance, students are socialized into consent of both spouses as the legal basis of marriage. The textbook also addresses divorce and specifies that it is regulated by law, cannot happen outside of a court setting, and can be initiated one of the two spouses or both of them in case of divorce by mutual consent. The same textbook states that polygamy is illegal and failure to comply is punishable by law (pp. 235-245). These progressive statements of equality between genders are contradicted in the same textbook.

The chapter discussing solidarity and participation within the family introduces the notion of ‘passive women’ illustrated by a caricature of a husband doing the house chores while the wife sips her coffee. A passive spouse is also known as the dominant woman who does not engage in power and duty sharing with her spouse. Passive women as explained in the chapter “are women who do not discuss family affairs with their husbands” (p. 225). The negative portrayal of women in educational curricula challenges the previously discussed ideas about respect towards women and gender parity. In order to urge students to understand family solidarity and participation as a joint liability and responsibility, the curricula experts sought to do it through a negative portrayal of women. 106

In 2014, Tunisia lifted all the reservations on the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). It is the first country in the

Arab Muslim world to take such a step toward the consolidation of Women’s’ rights. Not long after notifying the United Nations about its decision, the government released a statement that it does not project to “take any organizational or legislative decision in conformity with the requirements of this Convention where such a decision would conflict with the provisions of Chapter I of the Tunisian Constitution” (Human Rights

Watch, 2014). The first Chapter of the Constitution endorses Islam as the religion of the state.

Despite the progressiveness of the code of personal status, it still has discriminatory provisions much influenced from the Islamic teachings such as inheritance inequality that gives brothers and male cousins, for instance, a 2/3 as opposed to 1/3 for daughters. Another provision (article 58) denies the mother custody of her children if she remarries but allows it for fathers even in the event of remarriage. While the textbooks and official statements are embedded with progressive and democratic values, the extent to which citizenship education can be considered democratic depends on how much religion it has. While citizenship seems to be secularized, the code of personal status women's rights and gender equality appears to be relative to the overarching Muslim identity.

Democratic Learning; A Neglected Priority or a Lack of Political Will?

Reforming the Tunisian education system in the light of the 2011 revolution is a top priority in the period of democratic transition. Updating the frameworks, the content, 107 and the teaching pedagogies, especially in Civics education, is the backdrop for the citizenship of tomorrow. Relinquishing the paradigms about citizenship, civic engagement, and political participation is the cornerstone of democratic consolidation.

Educational Reforms are akin to a political vision.

Away from the overarching political strata propaganda that the country relies on its youth, the democratic transition needs to also anchor the democratic culture. The mission statement of education remains neutral as far as the democratic culture is concerned. It, however, subscribes to the nationalist rhetoric around citizenship education. In the 5th-grade Civics textbook, a quote from the Guiding Law of Education emphasizes its commitment to consolidate the national identity and "educating the youth, develop their sense of belonging, and instill societal values of citizenry and respect for human rights in future generations” (pp., 171-180).

The pedagogical goals for lessons about governance stress the need to develop the civic sense and the sense of public service. It, however, does neither include democratic citizenship education, not democratic consolidation. The whole curriculum is still embracing the old regime ‘lip service' for international legitimacy.

The mission statement of education remains the same. Also, textbooks and educational curriculum remained the same to a great extent. The fact that textbooks have not changed after seven years may be understood as a strong educational system that fits all times. The truth is that citizen production is quintessential to the political culture and the changing socio-political dimension. The fact that they did not change also reflects how the authoritarianism can implement a superficially democratic content for the 108 younger generation. However, the reality is much complex. Because of structural pressure, commitment to Structural Adjustment Programs (SAC) and foreign aid, education was much reformed under Ben Ali. The reality however is that it was a one- party regime that suppresses dissent and political hostility. Ben Ali’s regime also does not practically guarantee political pluralism, individual rights and freedoms, and human rights. All this is found in official documents and educational curricula as part of state propaganda.

Successive electoral campaigns often propose procedural reforms to the educational system, but not one political party projected to incorporate democratic principles, minority representation nor democratic accountability. Consecutive governments since 2011 lacked vision for education. The negligence explains the confusion and improvisation that characterized the period of Néji Jalloul at the head of the Ministry of Education. Jalloul introduced a set of reforms in public school system that were disputed by the teachers’ trade Union that reached suspension of public schools for one semester, national strikes, refusal to give exams and deliberate grades to students as well as a national level protests. The national crisis ended with the resignation of the

Minister of Education per request of the President.

The media handling of the educational question remains occasional and selective to newsworthy events such as back to school seasons, strikes, incidents, and end-of-year exams. Such coverage remains superficial, misses the bottom of the subject of education and proves to be incapable of meeting the criteria of democratic learning or post- authoritarianism citizenship education. The reforms suggested missing the point about 109 preparing citizens for a democratic phase. The content as it stands is mainstream and cut from the political reality. Little investment has been shown in reforming the educational system. However, terrorist attacks are always the opportunity to reflect on the limitations of the educational system and blaming it for producing a generation of potential terrorists

(Huff post, 2015). Precisely, with each terrorist attack-the last one at the Museum of

Bardo- the blame is directed to the educational system for producing such a plague.

Citizenship education is highly contingent to the policies, decisions, and budget allocations by the government. The institutional context of education in Tunisia is similar to other countries in the region. A considerable amount of the GDP is allocated to education. Despite the increase in the budget of National Education in 2016-2017, the sector remains unable to renovate. Reform proposals, if any, are caught between the trade-union demands and the budgetary and bureaucratic constraints of the Ministry of

Education. In addition to these constraints is the political tension around education as a social project. The content of some programs of history, civic education, education and

Islamic thinking goes beyond having a symbolic dimension for the actors of the Tunisian political scene; it is a nation-state project. (Nawaat, 2017).

The pedagogical goals of Islamic education for 4th-grade elementary level emphasize the communal dimension of teaching the course. The program stresses the role of Islamic education in strengthening social cohesion as well as social bonds. Most importantly, it serves as a tool “to assist the learner in of consolidating national identity, developing a sense belonging to the Muslim world and taking pride in the affiliation to the Islamic civilization” (p. 65). 110

One more illustrative example is the 2nd year elementary level guiding document.

One of the pedagogical goals is to aid learners to make the distinction between societal norms and individual rights and freedoms. The quote reads that "the student at this level must feel that social norms that are agreed on within not the community constitute a bond with the others but the extent of his/her adherence and compliance reinforces his communal belonging" (p. 8). Emphasizing social norms over individual convictions reinforces the understanding of a society from a 'groupism' (Brubaker, 2004) and communal life. In this context, citizenship is defined within the process of assimilation with social boundaries regardless of individual identity. The same source explicitly defines group identification as the priority compared to individuality.

In order to guarantee social approval, students need to learn how to accept and get along with the social norms agreed upon and refrain from differentiating him/herself “so that society won’t see him as amoral." (p.8-9). Arguably, individuals ought to sacrifice their privacy for the shared norms in quest of group identification (Starrett, 1998). In this context, adherence to the overarching Muslim identity. Any differentiation is an exception to the norm and should be treated as alien to the social project. These implications are in open contradiction with the Constitution that safeguards freedom of belief and guarantees freedom of religion and conscience. The conversation around discontinuing Islamic Education as a mandatory course is often faced with social vexation of the Muslim psyche.

The underlying ideologies and doctrines implemented by political elites and official narratives champion a specific set of identity attributes and push any exception to 111 the outskirts of identity. Given the different transitions that Tunisia underwent, the emphasis on homogenization is planned and emphasized in the educational curriculum. It is part of a chain of strategies designed and implemented by political elites in light of state visions of education for citizenship.

An examination of different political stances and statements from political elites reinforces the gap between theoretical teaching and the reality of the political environment. Most importantly, it does not reflect any political commitment to preparing free, democratically trained citizens. Instead of working towards anchoring the democratic culture and considering youth as part of the transition, political elites in different occasions showed the opposite.

There is no mention of the impact of social movements on regime change and democratic consolidation. It is then fair to say that regarding citizen production and citizenship education, the educational system theoretically says everything but does not deliver much in practice.

Tolerance and Respect for Differences

Tolerance and respect for differences are recurrent themes in the social science textbooks and teaching materials reviewed. The educational curriculum promotes tolerance, acceptance of differences and pluralism within a religious, political, and social context. In the 2nd year Secondary level for Civic Education, tolerance is defined using the universal framework provided by the Declaration of Principles on Tolerance adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO (1995). The quote reads:

Consistent with respect for human rights, the practice of tolerance does not mean toleration of social injustice or the abandonment or weakening of one's 112

convictions. It means that one is free to adhere to one's ow n convictions and accepts that others adhere to theirs. It means accepting the fact that human beings, naturally diverse in their appearance, situation, speech, behavior, and values, have the right to live in peace and to be as they are. It also means that one's views are not to be imposed on others. (p.271)

Throughout the Islamic education/thought textbooks, the discussion around other religions stresses a pan-humanist approach to religious differences as per conformity to

Islamic teachings. The conversation, is, however, restricted to Abrahamic religions as they are the only three faiths recognized by the state. Accepting other religions in hence introduced within the requirement of Islamic belief that urges for religious tolerance and social justice in regards to Jews and Christians. In fact, the teaching material for the 5th grade elementary of Islamic Education stresses the need to recognize and believe in all religions, holy books, and prophets as a requirement for being a Muslim (p. 63). Interfaith exchange and dialogue are also encouraged. In the same token, the guiding law of education issued in 2002 stipulates that the goal of the educational institution is to produce citizens that “with progressive mind-sets and inspired by the ideals of solidarity- ist pan-humanism. But most importantly, a generation that is immersed in universal principles of freedom, democracy, social justice and human rights.

Conclusion

The secular style of governance as portrayed in in social science Textbook conflicts with other fundamental documents to the republic including the Code of

Personal Status. The Code is heavily influenced by the religious institution. Such issues are omitted from the conversation about progressive values and human rights endowments. The conflict between the secular aspect of the state and the religious 113 institution is a fact. The religion of the state is not therefore exclusive to the state but also implies that it is the religion of the majority. The understanding of the secularism, therefore, conflates with the religious institution as opposed to the conventional secular underpinnings. Secularism implies the religious neutrality of the state and as well as religious pluralism. Moreover, public institutions in a secular state function independently of the religious institution and vice versa. Tunisia's integration of Islam as a source of legislation and a state of affairs in some aspects emphasizes the politicization of Islam.

Universal values of tolerance and acceptance of different religious identities remain theoretical, cut from reality and part of a ‘lip service’ adopted by certain governments. The presentation of citizenship as a quintessentially Muslim Tunisian identity alienates religiously differentiated identities. Societal attitudes are by far the manifestation of a residual effect of governmental regulations. Social discrimination against religious minorities in Muslim majority countries remains high while states reinforce narratives of marginalization that pushes minorities at the outskirts of societies.

Tunisia, for example, has a system of legal checks for the administration of cults. The different sets of laws are inherited form the post-independence state-building and remain in full effect with the ongoing democratic transition. These policies do not apply to

Muslims but are designed exclusively for Jews and Christians. They are two folds; The

Modus Vivendi (with regards to Christian community) and the 1958 Law (with regards to the Jewish community). 114

In the following chapter, I discuss the collusion of the state in the increase of societal discrimination against religious minorities using “public theologies” framework

(Sandal, 2013). I examine how Identity polarization through other institutions such as education coupled with the rhetoric of state elites is most likely to trickle-down on societal entities such as religious minorities. I show that post-2011 revolution democratic transition in Tunisia altered the position of religious minorities legally, politically, and socially. I do so using mixed methods. First, I analyze data from round 3 of The Religion and State (RAS3) dataset (between 2009-2014). Second, I analyze official documents and interviews. The restrictions on rights and freedoms of religious minorities hinder the understanding of citizenship. The focus on religion as an identity attribute over others not alienates Jews and Christians in Tunisia but brings into question secularism and religious pluralism as understood by the Tunisian political architects

115

CHAPTER 4: REVOLUTION, CONFLICT, AND MARGINALIZATION:

RELIGIOUS MINORITIES AND CITIZENSHIP IN TUNISIA

Introduction

The relationship between non-Muslim minorities and the Muslim majority populations in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has traditionally been shaped by the majority’s threat perceptions and their understanding of the meaning of citizenship. With the Arab Uprisings and the accompanying democratization processes, minority politics emerged to the public sphere, becoming “the barometer of a successful transition to democracy” (Picard, 2012, p. 67). While democratization implies an institutionalized accommodation of minorities, some forms of nation-building projects are more likely to foster a uniform national identity over heterogeneity and multiculturalism. In fact, some forms of minority politics can initially consolidate democratization; others can lead to an authoritarian backsliding. As of now, there are twenty-one countries in the MENA region that have Islamist regimes and fourteen others that are secular. In this paper, I focus on one of the secular state models. Tunisia successfully emerged as a transitioning democracy after the Arab Uprisings. Although one would expect the democratization process to touch upon minority politics, the

Tunisian state still has fallen short regarding minorities’ integration and a truly inclusive conceptualization of citizenship.

In this chapter, I examine the implications of the coercive homogenization (the concept of Tunisianetee) throughout the educational curriculum and state discourse on religious minorities in Tunisia. I focus on Christians, and Jews in a Muslim majority 116

Tunisia, since these are the only two minority religions recognized by the state. I use the

“public theologies framework” (Sandal, 2013) to examine the state-society relations. I look at how religious regulation targeting specific groups of the society alters the position of religiously differentiated groups legally, politically, and socially in Tunisia. I examine the implications of these politicizes on social categorization, group membership, and group comparison processes (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The findings suggest that identity polarization, national narratives, and state regulations have created a hegemon identity

(Muslims) and a “marked citizen” (Pandey, 2006) for Christians and Jews.

The classical understanding of democratic governance implies that religious freedom and pluralism are among the essential pillars of democracy (Bermeo, 1997;

Dahl, 1971; Huntington, 1965; Lipset, 1959; Philpott, 2007; Przeworski & Limongi,

1997). Democratic transitions, on the other hand, are seen as a move towards “the democratic end of the continuum’ (Fox, 2003, p. 469), hence, towards a more pluralistic and tolerance-based treatment of minorities. This conventional wisdom is yet to be challenged since transitional regime scholarship found that religious pluralism tends to be the most challenging task of transitional regimes and societies (Anderson, 2003;

Mansfield & Snyder, 2012; Toft, 2013). Fox (2016) reported an increase in religious discrimination in majority religion societies “including Western democracies which are supposed to be the most tolerant in the world” (p. 8). However, the Arab Uprisings’ aftermath leaves religious minorities in even more uncertain circumstances, especially in societies with deep religious and sectarian divides (Nossett, 2014; Rieffer-Flanagan,

2016). The accommodation of religious pluralism is explicitly challenging in this 117 transitional phase, which is characterized by “weak domestic institutions” (Mansfield &

Snyder, 2012, p. 722), nationalist outbidding (Snyder, 2000), and religious outbidding

(Toft, 2013).

The relationship between democracy and tolerance has been at the center of academic investigations (Buckley, 2017; Chandra, 2005; el-Issawi, 2011; Fox, 2015/6;

Grim & Finke, 2011; Sarkissian 2009; Stepan, 2000). Initially, the understanding of liberal democracy associated it with tolerance (Bermeo, 1997; Dahl, 1971; Huntington,

1965). The underlying logic of this school of thought is that the more democratic a state becomes, the more likely it is to be tolerant of religious minorities. The MENA region has historically been plagued with deep sectarian divides and conflicts. While it is important to study religious minorities in times of conflict, it is on the same level of importance to examine religiously differentiated minorities’ daily lives in peaceful times.

In the multivariate analysis, I show that although there was no significant difference in shifts in governmental religion policy in the aftermath of the Arab

Uprisings, social discrimination increased. The results for how much government religious discrimination are different. The results show that because government religious regulation and policy do not single out one identity group, they have no effect on social discrimination. However, government policies (government religious discrimination) target religious minorities, then societal discrimination against religiously differentiated groups increases.

While this study reveals a pattern on a regional politics level in the 23 Muslim majority countries studied, it is also a critical step towards understanding the complex 118 mechanisms of democratization and marginalization, and conflict prevention in war-torn regions shaken by revolutions and uprising.

First, I review the existing literature on regime change, transitional societies and religious freedom and pluralism. Then, I provide a brief historical background of the relationship between the state and religious minorities. I focus on historical processes mainly the Ottoman Empire’s millet system, arguing that it shaped the relationship between the state and religious minority groups as well societal behavior. The first layer of the study looks at Round 3 of the Religion and State Dataset (RAS3) (2009-2014) and concludes that government policy for religious regulation creates a set of systemic informal laws. The invisible norms in turn increase societal discrimination against religious minorities. The findings are not only valid for the case study, Tunisia, but also reveal a pattern in the core Arab Uprisings countries. Then, I analyze government documents as well as interviews with state officials and religious community leaders. The analysis looks at the subject matter within three frameworks: (1) from an accommodation approach, (2) from a securitization approach, and (3) co-optation as the most politically viable mode of accommodation in the state-building project.

Religious Minorities in the MENA Region; An Overview

In Arabic, the word ‘minority’ translates to Aqualiya, and the religious minority is

Aqualiya Diniya. This phrase is often used to refer to non-Muslims. This expression is often used interchangeably with the word “taifa or sect.” Under the Ottoman Empire, the word “minority” never existed; the more technical term used was ‘Milla, singular/Millet, plural.' The terminology was introduced to the Middle East by Western 119 powers in the late 19th century with the Treaty of Lausanne to refer to the Ottoman

Christians. While these two terms are mutually substitutable, Aqualiya does not bear any identity specific attribute whereas Taifa ascribes a religious identity to the group (Picard,

2012). Thus, the use of minority is most common since it is an umbrella term that does not imply any religious differentiation and “recognizes the essential human commonality” (Picard, 2012, p. 5).

Minority, as it stands, is more likely to be associated with inferiority and ‘the oppressed.' However, there are numerous cases around the world of influential minorities in power. In the context of the MENA region, Syria under the minority Alawite rulers is one such example. Since this study looks at the relationship between religious minorities and the state, it examines religion as a social categorization that is “significant in social, legal, and political terms” (Picard, 2012, p. 6). I use the phrase religious minorities and not sects (Taifa) as I am looking at minorities in a context of a secular state that theoretically guarantees religious pluralism and maintains religion in the private sphere.

In Middle East studies scholarship, religious minorities are frequently studied under ethnic minorities (Longva & Roald, 2012). According to Kaufman (2001), "an ethnic group is a group sharing five key traits: a group name, a believed common descent, common historical memories, elements of shared culture such as language or religion, and attachment (even if only historical or sentimental) to a specific territory" (p. 16).

However, the communal sense of religious identity has a transnational dimension to it that makes it slightly different from an ethnic identity. While the religious identity is usually not fundamentally tied to a specific piece of territory, the latter is usually linked 120 to a sense of “territorial homeland.” Furthermore, religious identity has a temporal quality that ethnicity lacks. The distinct characteristic lies in its embedded reward system (Toft,

2013).

While religious understanding of sacrifice is a permanent one (after-life) that offers mortality, the activation of ethnicity in conflicts does not seem much appealing since it provides an ephemeral rewards system of morality and group allegiance. Some religions are more likely to be politicized than others as part of an outbidding strategy

(Juergensmeyer, 2004). Political actors often use nationalist discourse and merge political and religious legitimacy using hegemonic narratives. Some states/societies are more likely to reaffirm religion in the public sphere as a reaction to the breakdown of the world order.

Religious Minorities and Transitional Societies

The Arab Uprisings were the expression of a series of grievances related to social injustice, lack of individual freedoms and demands for citizenship rights and democratic governance. The series of protests that originated from Tunisia in late 2010 had a spillover effect in neighboring countries. What started as a demonstration and popular resentment in countries like Libya, Syria, and Yemen turned into episodes of violence and civil wars, Tunisia emerged as a relatively successful case of democratic transition.

The literature on regime transitions also explores the outcome of developments on ethnic and religious plurality. This is true regarding countries that underwent the Arab

Uprisings and are experiencing a change from authoritarianism to democratic 121 consolidation. These changes also shape the positionality of religion in the public sphere.

Grim and Finke (2011) posit that religious identity is less likely to be salient and conflict- prone, it is instead the legal restrictions coupled with societal discrimination that are behind religious disputes. With these findings, the authors argue that persecution tends to be low in societies based on liberal ideas and religious pluralism.

In a separate study entitled Global Restrictions on Religion conducted by the Pew

Research Center’s Forum on Religion and Public Life, Grim (n.d.), asserts that “Nearly

70 percent of the world’s 6.8 billion people live in countries with high restrictions on religion, the brunt of which often falls on religious minorities” (The Pew Research,

2009). He adds that while these countries do not explicitly state in their Constitutions any restriction on religion, informal rules and social norms often act as enactors of infringements on religious freedom of minorities. These unofficial rules tend to influence societal behavior towards religious minorities. In some cases, maintaining the exclusionary policies inherited from the post-colonial era act as the ground for such societal discrimination. Moreover, Grim and Finke (2012) situate the nexus of religion and societal discrimination within transitional societies, stating that change tends to exacerbate social interactions since it takes longer to update legal frameworks.

Scholarship about outbidding argues that competitive influence strategies between ethnic groups result in outbidding processes, which are more likely to happen in transitional societies (Toft, 2013). Outbidding is highly critical for transitional societies since tensions are more likely to peak during these times. As Snyder and Mansfield

(2012) assert, “countries face rising demands for political participation by groups that had 122 been excluded from the political process but lack the institutional infrastructure to manage these demand” (p. 722). In fact, elites tend to instrumentalize any nationalist rhetoric to advance their agenda and legitimize their discourse (Snyder, 2000). On the other hand, institutions tend to be weak and unable to counter the political manipulation and regulate the competition. In sum, pluralism, as understood in the context of transitions, consolidates majoritarianism and exacerbates the status of minorities and marginalizes them even further.

Toft (2013) states that during transitions political elites use media propaganda and manipulate narratives in order “to outbid each other to enhance their credentials with domestic and foreign audiences” (p. 10). Even secular states can use the power of religious narratives to justify power dynamics and policy-making decisions. This concept is what Toft (2013) labels “religious outbidding” where religion is activated to maintain social control and sustain political legitimacy as well as the mythical interpretation of the script. Although transitions to democratic consolidation are often coined with a commitment to individual liberties and religious freedom, religious minorities are still the exception to the rule and to other minorities (Anderson, 2003; du-Plessis, 1994;

Romdhani, 2013; Seiwert, 2003). Level of secularism, the perception of national identity, and the salience of cleavages are among the factors that influence how minorities are treated in a given country.

Identity politics reach its climax during periods of change. While transitions often put restrictions on religion to achieve stability, religion is also sometimes activated in

“discourses about national identity” (Anderson, 2003, p. 184). Amidst an identity crisis 123 that uncertainty and change bring forth, societal behavior tends to change. Anderson

(2003) in the study of the religious freedom and attitudes toward religious pluralism, found “a correlation between the broader level of social tolerance and the degree of restriction or freedom available to minority religious groups” (p. 205). Public performance of rituals and related activities are often subject to scrutiny and societal criticism as they are often seen as a threat to “traditional religions and national culture”

(Sarkissian, 2009, p. 473). The state regulation of religion and activities related to religious minorities in the public sphere can sometimes be used as a basis for societal intolerance towards these minorities.

This research asks how did the post-2011 revolution democratic transition in

Tunisia alter the position of religious minorities legally, politically, and socially. I examine whether government religious policy in the aftermath of the uprisings exacerbated societal discrimination against religious minorities. While this study takes

Tunisia as a case study, it identifies a regional pattern in the MENA through data retrieved from The Religion and State (RAS) Round 3 Dataset.

This research is a reading of the state of affairs as well as the future of religious minorities in Tunisia and the MENA region. The topic necessitates a combination of methods in order to develop a holistic picture of the issue under investigation. First, I look at official documents and analyze interviews. Second, I analyze data from The

Religion and State (RAS) dataset (between 2009-2014). My qualitative analysis uses official document and interviews: 124

official documents include; The Tunisian Constitutions and government decrees,

The Modus Vivendi, The 1958 Law and other government public records proper to the state regulation of the activities of both the Jewish and Christian minorities. The semi- structured interviews were conducted during in Tunisia in summer 2017. The interviews took place in religious venues (Synagogue and Churches), local community centers where members of these communities frequently meet, and civil society organizations’ offices. Follow-up interviews were either by means of online correspondence or skype video-calls.

The ‘Marked Citizen’ and Public Invisibility of Religious Minorities: The Case of

Tunisia

In order to comprehend the current situation of the relationship between religious minorities and the state in the context of Muslim majority countries, it is necessary to understand the specific historical trajectories as well as the legacies of certain historical processes.

The first stage of my analysis is a multivariate regression analysis of variables retrieved from The Religion and State (RAS) Round 3 Dataset. RAS3 codes religious discrimination by governments against all 566 minorities in 175 countries. It includes data on government religion policy and societal discrimination between 2009 and 2014.

In this paper, I focus on 23 Muslim-majority countries in the MENA region including the core Arab Uprisings countries in the RAS3 dataset covering 2009-2014. This period uses

2009 and 2010 as baselines for the pre-Arab Spring years. As the Arab Spring began in late December, most of its influence should start in 2011. 2014 is the most recent year 125 available in the RAS3 dataset. I use four variables from the RAS3 dataset. The first three measure government religion policy (including government religious discrimination, government religious regulation, and religious support). The fourth variable measures societal discrimination against minority religions. This set of variables is designed to examine restrictions the government places on the practice of religion by minority religious groups. The variables chosen for the purpose of this study focus on restrictions on minority religions and societal discrimination against minority religions.

In the second section, I consider how the discourse of the Tunisian government during critical transitions (the 1952 independence and the Tunisian Revolution of 2011) was strengthened by a set of policies governing religious minorities defined the relationship between these groups and the state and shaped social interactions. This relationship evolved within a framework of a “neo-millet system” (Rowe, 2007).

Religious Minorities in Tunisia: A Background

Islam recognizes Jews and Christians as “People of the Book” (Ahl- Al-Kitab in

Arabic), Under the administration of the Ottomans, they were granted the right to uphold their religious identities and live peacefully in exchange for paying a tax known as jizya along with a military exemption tax. However, to be legally recognized as a citizen, religious minorities had to be under the umbrella of a milla (While the term milla means community in general and came later to encompass other identity attributes such as nation and nationality, in this context, it implies non-Muslim religious community) under a millet system. Under this system, non-Muslim religious minorities are granted self- governance with limited powers. For instance, they were allowed to have their court 126 system. While the millet system is considered a historical understanding of the relationship between religious minorities and Muslim-majorities countries (in this context, the Ottoman Empire), it set the basis for a governance system of religious minorities that continues today. While changing such policies takes a combination of mobilization and formulation of demands from the groups in question, it is also highly contingent on a political will by the state. Given the reluctance to do so, the system of legal checks that is still operative can be understood as a “neo-millet system” (Rowe,

2007) in a secular context.

Scholarship that looked at the millet system recognizes it as one of the prominent governance systems of ethnically divided societies (Sisk, 1996). Others, however, see it as a system plagued by inequalities and discrimination against the non-Muslim religious minorities (Ma’oz, 1999). Eamon (2012), who situates the system within the context of minority politics, suggests that “the Islamic legal treatment of non-Muslims is symptomatic of the more general challenge of governing a diverse polity” (p. 1). Aral

(2004) concurs, adding that the millet system as it stood before the Tanzimat reforms of the 19th century did not interfere with the “public sphere.” Finally, Bat Yeʼor et al. (2002) counter these argument introducing the concept of ‘dhimmitude’ as subjugation. In short, minorities within the context of dhimmitude are ‘associated with legal vulnerability, political marginality, and social inferiority” (Kymlicka & Pföstl, 2015, p. 11).

The legacy of the ‘millet system’ is still deep-rooted in the state structure, institutions and as well as the pattern of relationships on a social level. Today, the

Constitutions of most Muslim majority countries explicitly stipulate the religion of the 127 state. Even in the Constitutions that specify the secular nature of the state and guarantees religious freedom, religion still structures legislations concerning personal status and family relations which overrides religious pluralism and already sets the majority vs. minority categorization along religious lines. As opposed to the millet system that grants legal autonomy (having their laws and the court system), the current legal frameworks restrict to override the legal autonomy of religious minorities. According to Peteet (2008)

“its [the millet system] legacy distills complex social categories into bounded categories whose correspondence to reality is problematic” (p. 550).

With the independence and creation of new states, the majority of the countries in the MENA region did not get rid of the “religion variable” both in politics and on a societal level. Despite the most secular in the region, both Turkey and Tunisia subscribed to the same secular model merging political and religious legitimacy both on a state and societal level.

The process of decolonization in North African countries by the mid-late 1950s witnessed a considerable decline in the numbers of religious minority groups, notably

Christians and Jews. Moreover, with the establishment of Israel, the numbers of Jews living in North African countries went down. In spite of the fact that Constitutions in these countries stipulate Islam as the religion of the state, religious minorities have been present in countries like Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia.

After the independence of Tunisia from France in 1956, the nation-state building project adopted the secularist model yet declared the “country a secular republic with

Islam as the religion of the state” (Tunisian Constitution, Article 1). Even with a secular 128 state and one of the most progressive Constitutions in the Arab and Muslim world, Islam remains the constant reference to Tunisia’s code of personal status and family law as well as the cultural dimension.

As far as minority politics are concerned, the Tunisian state under Bourguiba has devoted legal texts proper to the governance of religious minorities regarding regulations of the activities and places of worship for Jews and Christians. This system of legal checks is two folds: The Modus Vivendi as a governance document that regulates the activities of the Christian population in Tunisia and the 1958 Law for the Jewish community.

The Modus Vivendi (or what is officially recognized as “The Working

Arrangement between the Holy See and the Republic of Tunisia” was signed on June 27,

1964 “between the Tunisian Government and the Holy See.” The convention “indicated the assent of the Catholic church that a certain number of places of worship and other real estate values be yielded definitively and on a purely free basis” (Article 6b). Only five churches remained under the disposal of the Christian community while 107 were transferred to the Tunisian state. In Article 1 of the Modus Vivendi, “the Tunisian government guarantees the freedom of worship of Christianity in Tunisia in conformity with article 1 of the Tunisian Constitution of June 1st, 1959 and as stipulated in the

Modus Vivendi” (Article 1). “Under this convention, the Catholic Church also agreed to permanently close down churches and hand them over to the Tunisian authorities free of charge” (Ferrari & Toronto, 2017, p. 81). 129

This accord does not only officially give up some churches but also abolished the title “bishop of Carthage” in return of “Tunis becom[ing] a territorial prelature” as stated in the convention. Most importantly, this agreement guarantees freedom of practice of religion for Christians and the observance of their religious holidays discreetly and exclusively inside the places of worship (Article 6c).

Jewish communal life in Tunisia is also regulated. Jews are guaranteed freedom of worship under the 11 July 1958 Law. The 1958 law is a government decree within the framework of the remaking of the institutional makeup of a secular state and an “urban renewal” post-independence. The former Minister of Justice, Ahmed Mestiri, pointed in his speech “the new law, as will be seen/examination, wipes out the previously existing

Jewish Community structure throughout.” Thus, the law ordered the abolishment of the

Rabbinical Court (1958), the dissolution of the Jewish Community Council, and the formation of a Provisional Commission for the Management of the Jewish religion

(Religious Society). All the synagogues became under the direct control of the grand

Rabbi under the jurisdiction of the state. In fact, the Rabbi is a state employee, and he receives his salary from the state.

Fox (2015) reports that government regulation of religion is increasingly widespread on a global scale. These findings might make Tunisia’s regulatory policies of religious minorities as part of a worldwide trend rather than a phenomenon exclusive to

Muslim majority countries. The policies towards religious minorities were put in place during a transitory phase after the 1952 independence but are still operative 65 years after. Despite an ongoing democratic transition in Tunisia in 2011 with the Arab 130

Uprisings, the category of the “marked citizen” (Pandey, 2006) prevails. Anderson (2003) argues that “the politics of religious liberty in transitional societies has a significance that transcends the narrowly religious […] historical legacies and contexts will continue to shape how politicians and political systems handle the public role of religion.” (p. 206)

Literature revisited above concur with this argument and predicted an increase in societal discrimination during the transition as well as an increase in the regulation of religion in post-conflict states. Anderson (2003) notes “a correlation between the broader level of societal tolerance and the degree of restriction or freedom available to minority religious groups” (p. 205). The social cohesion of a society is partly contingent on its political climate; the regression for change reflected in maintaining the same policies that were adopted after independence cannot be an indicator of state discrimination.

Furthermore, updating legal frameworks tends to take a long time. While the consideration of such policies might be down the list of reforms envisaged by the state, long lasting exclusionary policies such as the Modus Vivendi and the 1958 Law at a state level can have its manifestations on the social level.

Government regulation and policy have an effect on societal discrimination.

Findings about the effect of government religious discrimination advances our understanding of the underlying logic of the accommodations approaches majority religions countries implement to govern religious minorities. By controlling for government religious policy, support, and governments religious discrimination, this study reveals particularly interesting findings. More so it unveils a regional pattern of the relationship between government regulation of religion and societal discrimination 131 against religiously differentiated groups. When there is a more governmental religious support for all religions, then societal discrimination against religious minorities goes down. When the there is a negative religious regulation against all religions even majority religions, then societal, religious discrimination decreases. However, when government policies target religious minorities, then societal discrimination against religiously differentiated groups increases.

Government Religious Regulation’s and Societal Discrimination: (RAS3)

Shaping societal identity around religious lines establishes an understanding of self-esteem that regards the “out-group’s belonging as second to the in-group (Tajfel &

Turner, 1979. Religious discrimination is predicted by the logic of the social Identity

Theory (SIT). Discrimination against religious minorities is a complex phenomenon that cannot be measured only through descriptive statistics. A multivariate regression analysis is needed since it allows for the control of other factors that might affect societal discrimination against religious minorities.

I use The Religion and State (RAS) Round 3 Dataset which includes data on government religion policy and societal discrimination between 2009 and 2014. I focus on 23 Muslim-majority countries in the MENA region including the core Arab Uprisings countries in the RAS3 dataset covering 2009-2014. This period uses 2009 and 2010 as baselines for the pre-Arab Spring years. As the Arab Spring began in late December, most of its influence should start in 2011. 2014 is the most recent year available in the

RAS3 dataset. 132

I use four variables from the RAS3 dataset. The first three measure government religion policy (including government religious regulation, religious support, and government religious discrimination). While the first two is set of restrictions place on all religions including majority religion, government religious discrimination measures restrictions on religions other than the majority religion. The fourth variable measures societal discrimination against minority religions.

Societal discrimination accounts for discriminatory attitudes against religious minorities. Discriminatory attitudes are actions of discrimination, harassment, prejudice or violence against a religiously differentiated minority group by a group or a regular person (that does not have a government legal character/authority). Measuring societal attitudes involves 27 types of actions, each coded individually on a scale of 0 to 3 based on severity, multiple forms of public speech acts, vandalism, harassment, and violence

(both against people and property). The resulting variable ranges from 0 to 81.

The other three variables look at on policies by governments which include laws, formal and informal government policies, and actions taken by government representatives and officials. First, I use governmental religious discrimination. This is defined as restrictions placed by the government or its representatives on the religious institutions or practices of religious minorities that are not placed on the majority religion. This measure looks at 36 types of restrictions on religious minorities, each coded individually, including 12 types if restrictions on religious practices, eight types of restrictions on religious institutions and clergy, seven types of restrictions on conversion and proselytizing, and nine other types of restrictions. Each type is coded on a scale of 0 133 to 3 based on severity resulting in a measure that ranges from 0 to 108.

Second, restrictions placed on all religions including the majority religion. This measure includes 29 such restrictions, each coded individually, including five types of restrictions on religion’s role in politics, ten types of restriction on religious institutions, seven types of restriction on religious practices, and eight other types of restrictions. Each type is coded on a scale of 0 to 3 based on severity resulting in a measure that ranges from 0 to 87.

The third variable measures religious support (active support of all religions by the government). This measure includes 52 types of support each coded individually on a scale of 0 to 1 with 1 meaning the type of support is present. The types of support in the measure include 21 types of religious law or precepts that are enforced by the government, 5 types of institution or government activity intended to enforce religion

(e.g. religious courts), 11 ways the government can fund religion, six ways in which religious and government institutions can become entangled and nine additional types of support. This measure ranges from 0 to 52.

134

Regression Results

Table 1: Regression for factors affecting religious discrimination

Analysis and Discussion

Table 1 shows that there is no relationship between government religious regulations of all religions including the religion of the majority and societal discrimination against religiously differentiated groups in the Muslim majority countries in the MENA region. On one hand, governments’ religious support for all religions

(including majority and minority religions) does not seem to influence societal discrimination against religious minorities. On the other hand, government religious discrimination targeting a specific religious minority group does influence societal discrimination against religious minorities.

Starting with the effects of government religious discrimination which is the key independent variable, the coefficient of .664 is statistically significant and positive. The positive coefficient indicates that higher levels of government religious discrimination 135 against a particular group increase social discrimination against that particular group.

This supports that when the governments enforce specific regulation on specific groups then the social interactions that other people have of this group are shaped accordingly.

The general public is most likely to develop negative associations with the minority group and frame it as an active threat. This supports the notion that government religious discrimination influences yet increase religious discrimination on the societal level.

Moving on to religious regulations, the coefficient -.065 is negative and statistically significant. This means that the more government regulates all religions, social discriminations goes down/ is reduced. That means that people no longer see anything special about minority group and are less likely to perceive it as a threat.

Similarly, the coefficient for religious support is also negative (-0.85) and is statistically significant. This suggests that as government policy provides support for all religions, it reduces social discrimination. As government is providing support for all group, religious minorities are seen as comparable as all other religious groups.

Table 1 shows that there is no relationship between government religious regulations of all religions including the religion of the majority and societal discrimination against religiously differentiated groups in the Muslim majority countries in the MENA region. On the other hand, governments’ religious support for all religions

(including majority and minority religions) does not seem to influence societal discrimination against religious minorities. However, government religious discrimination targeting a specific religious minority group influences societal discrimination against religious minorities. 136

In the absence of a significant effect of government regulations on societal discrimination against religious minorities, results for government religious discrimination are different. Table 1 shows that the relationship between government religious discrimination and societal discrimination is a positive one. Restrictions placed by governments or government sanctioned authorities on religious institutions and practices of a religious groups’ that is not the majority religion are in fact marginalizing and make a case for a structural violence by the state on a minority group. Moreover, when the state alienates a certain group and treats them as an active threat, societal discrimination increases accordingly.

The findings show that when there is a more governmental religious support for all religions, then societal discrimination against religious minorities goes down. When the there is a negative religious regulation against all religions even majority religions, then societal, religious discrimination decreases. However, when government policies target religious minorities, then societal discrimination against religiously differentiated groups increases.

The first two control variables include formal and informal laws and actions taken by government representatives and officials against all religions including the majority religions. Both the government religious regulations of all religions and the support for all do not single out a certain group and treats them as active threats. Hence, restrictions put to facilitate the “management of all existing religions” does not securitize one group over the other. In other words, actions taken by governments and government officials and representatives do not highlight a “marked citizen” (Pandey, 2006) and treats all 137 identity attributes equally does not create societal discrimination. However, government religious discrimination targeting a specific group, -in this case, government religious minority- group does exacerbate societal tensions against religious minorities.

Restrictions placed by the government or its representatives on the religious institutions or practices of religious minorities that are not placed on the majority religion do fuel societal discrimination against religious minorities. Fox (2015) argues that this distinction between restrictions placed on minorities and those places also on the majority religion “is critical because actions that can be quite similar have considerably different implications depending on the object of these policies” (p. 106). For example, restrictions on places of worship applied to all religions can imply that the regime is overall anti- religious. Restrictions on religions or the active support of all religions do not single out a certain minority group probably because in this case a regime is understood to treat all religions equally. However, unilateral restrictions against minority religions indicate that the regime is not necessarily against all religions, just minority religions. Moreover, if restrictions are targeting minority religions, then religious discrimination against those groups go up.

State accommodation and equal treatment of all religions do not, in fact, influence societal behavior against a single religious identity. However, when a regime targets a specific religious entity, then that’s when the securitization does exacerbate existing prejudices and increase societal discrimination. In fact, by not treating all existing religions on an equal level field, governments create a narrative that implies that religious minority group is problematic to the majority religious group. The narrative and 138 messaging from the regime then reaffirms existing beliefs of “the other” as a problematic to both national identity and security. In sum institutionalized discrimination through governmental policies does, in fact, shape societal behavior promoting discrimination by allows the public to think of religious minorities are different or alien to the national fabric.

Religious Minorities in Tunisia: Contemporary Dynamics

One of the limitations of the secular model and the logic of democracy is creating a sense of identity that is exclusionary of the marginal identities (Brubaker, 1995).

Throughout two transitions, the Tunisian state-while secular from the independence- devoted a set of governance policies tailored to the existing religious minority groups. As a representative of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, Mrs. Battikh (interview with the author, July 28, 2017) reminded that the relationship between the state and the two recognized religious minority groups in Tunisia does not happen in a vacuum and is structured by the stipulations of the 1958 Law as well as the Modus Vivend. She reiterated the state’s commitment to promoting the integration and inclusion at a societal level. The Mufti of the Tunisian Republic concurred with the remarks above and expressed his commitment and that of his office to promote tolerance and inter-faith dialogue in Tunisia (interview with the author, August 2, 2017).

While the state seems to have adopted an accommodationist approach, the reality is much more complicated. The starting point that challenges this discourse is Article 74 of Title Four of the Tunisian Constitution that stipulates the requirements to run for president of the republic. “Every male and female voter who holds Tunisian nationality 139 since birth, whose religion is Islam shall have the right to stand for election to the position of President of the Republic” (Article 74, p. 19). When asked about this clause during the interview, the Ministry of Religious affairs reaffirmed the nationalist political discourse of the majority rule claiming that “we are 99% Muslims, anyone but a Muslim can not govern us”.

Another layer of the reality is the absence of representation of these groups in the

Ministry of Religious Affairs as well as the National Constituent Assembly . Only in

2013 that the Ministry of Religious Affairs added a task force in charge of the relations with organizations and associations that supervise the affairs of religious minorities according to the Decree 2013-4522 of November 12, 2013.

In parallel to straightforward stipulations as outlined above, nationalist outbidding comes in the form of informal laws. Religious pluralism as embedded in the system exempts religiously differentiated Tunisian citizens from national duties such as the mandatory army service. Rabbi Daniel Cohen, (the Rabbi of la Goulette Synagogue and a vocational teacher of Hebrew and Judaism in a Jews vocational school in Tunis) reiterated the existence of this systemic informal law. The same policy was stipulated by the millet system of which Jews and Christians were exempted from military duties in exchange for a military tax (defense tax).

An examination of the requirements for military service in both the Constitution and the Ministry of Defense’s official documents does not support the exemption. Article

9 of the Tunisian Constitution does not explicitly make any exceptions or exemptions for national service. It stipulates that “protecting the unity and integrity of the homeland is a 140 sacred duty for all citizens. National service is a duty according to the regulations and conditions established by the law” (p. 6). However, a personal account of the French-

Tunisian Jew, Yves Eliahou Kamhi to Inkyfadha (a long-form editorial and investigative journalism outlet)) accounted that he was denied military duty after submitting a request once he reached the statutory age to do so. In the interview, Yves recalls that his request was systematically rejected even though he checked all the requirements-except that he has a distinctly Jewish name. He was then denied any further explanation. Given the absence of an official text for such exemption, according to the article, it can be inferred that “the exemption seems to be applied informally since the founding of the Tunisian army after the independence” (Inkyfada, 2015). Mikael also made the same assertion in an interview given to the association Damj (integration). Mikael, a Tunisian Jew, one of the few Jews in Tunisia to attain a university level education, asserted that “as a Jew, we cannot serve in the army.”

The second aspect of discrimination is through creating unfavorable conditions for upward mobility in education and the work environment. While the religious identity is retired to what Habermas (2001) refers to as the ‘private sphere,' the Tunisian public sphere reaffirmed the marginalization of religious minorities (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

The Rabbi of La Goulette, Daniel Cohen reminds that the state overlooked the identities of the margins in the educational systems but also in the public sector. He explained that he was unable to further his education after the 6th grade (elementary) since he failed to pass the 6th-grade national exam. The reason is that some subjects’ exams are scheduled 141 on Saturdays 13, the Sabbath day for Jews. He further asserted that “per his religious teachings and convictions, he cannot take the exam during 'the day of rest,' Saturday.”

The second transition after the Tunisian Revolution did not change the situation.

Rabbi Cohen recalls that in recent years, his daughter could not sit for an exam on

Saturdays, too. After approaching the establishment and talking to the dean, the response was “in the absence of a law that exempts Jews from sitting for exams during Saturday; there are no exceptions to be made.” The long-term implications of these exemptions translated into an inability to serve in the public sector jobs over the years, according to

Rabbi Cohen. Tunisian Jews cannot work in public service because these positions do not observe non-Muslim religious holidays. Also, “most Jews are not able to pursue higher degrees because of the absence of accommodation.” These unfavorable conditions explain, Rabbi Cohen says, why younger generations are choosing to leave either to

Israel or Europe. The reality for Muslims is different since the public sector gives a

‘prayer break’ for the Friday prayers.

Father Ilario Antoniazzi (interview with the author, July 27, 2017) who is the

Archbishop of the Archdiocese of Tunis since February 2013 described the Modus

Vivendi as “restrictive in nature. The agreement that did not change since the Bourguiba era does not allow any margin of freedom and public visibility for us Christians living in

Tunisia.” Since the French colonial era, the social stigma around Christianity and

13 Until early 2000, in order to pass to Middle School, students are required to sit for a national exam on the 6th Grade. Since it is a national exam, it comes with a preset calendar and a uniform testing standards set by the Ministry of Education in Tunisia. 142 churches was associated with colonialism, proselytization and the imposition of an external agenda.

The focus on institutional re-engineering and the consolidation of democratic principles during transitions can leave other aspects on a societal level unchecked.

Rieffer-Flanagan (2016) states that overseeing government religious policies do not necessarily imply a discriminatory approach from the state since updating legal frameworks takes a long time especially at times of transition. From the interviews with the Archbishop of the Archdiocese of Tunis and the Ministry of Religious Affairs, it is evident that there is an ongoing dialogue aiming to change some clauses of the Modus

Vivendi. On the one hand, the Cathedral expressed its intention to amend articles 3 and 6 of the agreement around increasing the public visibility of the Churches (the bells and holding sermons outside the walls of the church). On the other hand, the spokesperson of the Ministry of religious affairs explained that “we-as the state- are asking for a reconsideration of how we can utilize the churches transferred to the state after the independence. 14

Transitions are mostly characterized by an instrumentalist elite stratum that utilizes nationalist outbidding to improve their qualifications and increase their legitimacy. Political elites will often use control of media to reframe secular domestic threats to their tenure (often opposition to corruption or incompetence or unneeded wars) as religious threats. This process of outbidding takes place most often in transitional

14 The Modus Vivendi, Article 3b conditioned the activities carried in the churches to be only of social, educational nature and explicitly excluded any political or religious activity. 143 regimes as political elites attempt to outbid each other to enhance their credentials with domestic and foreign audiences” (Toft, 2013, p. 10). In my interviews and conversations,

I heard concerns about any exposure or political mobilization against unanimity.

The religious leaders from both communities (Rabbi Cohen and Archbishop

Antoniazzi) characterized the dialogue about demands with the state as either passive or sterile. Most importantly, skepticism is mostly from the Arab nationalists. The two religious community leaders explained that any political mobilization effort has to take under consideration retaliations on the political level and societal level. Hence, they need to compromise demands for maintaining a good relationship with state officials. “It is still a taboo”, says Archbishop Antoniazzi, “we are aware that we have to make the distinction between keeping a good relationship with the state and having state officials visit us and opening any possible conversation about any change to the agreement. We risk hindering this relationship if we do so”. Arguably, fear of retaliation makes the strategic response of religious minorities revolve around the three strategic categories, as designated by Hirschman (1970): loyalty, exposure and political mobilization and exit.

In the case of the minorities in question, they opted for concealment and exit since the estimated costs of other strategies were not sustainable.

Habib Kazdaghli, a historian at Manouba University in Tunis, explained to the

Guardian (2017) that “It’s true that Tunisians generally cannot conceive of any other

Tunisian being anything other than Muslim.” The monolithic understanding of social identity as expressed above often links religiously differentiated identities with conspiracy theories instilling fear and stigma. Minority religious groups are often 144 perceived as a threat to the “traditional religion and national culture.” (Sarkissian 2009, p.

473). While Christians are more likely to be associated with proselytization and colonialist legacies, Jewish minorities are often suspected of collusion with “the Zionist project” and the state of Israel. In 2014, one of the names nominated to head the Ministry of Tourism was René Trabelsi, a Tunisian Jew. His nomination was subject to an orchestrated campaign instilling fear of collusion with the “Zionist project,” and the state of Israel (Center Blog, 2014).

While Christians and Tunisians are often branded as alien to the national project- often referred to as la Tunisiannité (attributes for being Tunisian), the degrees of tolerance are not the same. Tunisians seem to be more tolerant towards Christians than

Jews as they do not perceive them as a threat to the national identity considering their ephemeral presence in the country. In contrast, Jews are seen partners in identity hence more skeptical of them. It is worth noting that Archbishop Antoniazzi refrained from answering any questions about Tunisian Christians and limited the scope of the interview to Christians who are in Tunisian temporarily in diplomatic missions, working abroad, studying in Tunisia, or tourists. He reminded me that “while our Cathedral is open to anyone, the majority of its population and people who come here are foreigners and not

Tunisians” (interview with the author, July 27, 2017).

Identity securitization at a societal level applies more to Jews than Christians since the former have made claims of partnership in identity while the latter’s presence is temporally ephemeral. State narratives also shape these attitudes and political elite’s rhetoric, especially in times of transitions when nationalist and religious outbidding fuel 145 patriotic sentiments (Toft, 2013). Political actors would then strengthen a political discourse that distinguishes “us” form “them” mostly around ethnic and religious lines.

The monolithic, uniform socialization of identity in different levels, coupled with the nationalization of religion and the securitization of religious minorities, overrode the diversity component to the Tunisian society. The presence of a fundamental differentiating factor as strong as religion affects group evaluation and social comparison according to the Social Identity Theory (SIT) (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In other words, any identity other than the Muslim is considered an exception to the norm. The homogenizing nationalist project puts religiously differentiated groups on the outskirts of the societal fabric where they should uphold a low profile. Sustaining exclusionary policies against the religious identity expressions can increase societal discrimination.

The category of the “marked citizen” (Pandey, 2006) presents religious minorities as alien to the national project and overall unity of the societal fabric. Therefore, long- lasting policies targeting religious minorities at a state level have implications for the societal level. Maintaining such policies shapes societal behavior and makes social discrimination acceptable.

Societal Discrimination and government regulations in Tunisia and the core Arab

Uprisings Countries

State level policies have a residual effect on the societal perception of religiously differentiated groups in Tunisia. This is not exclusive to Tunisia but can has its implications on a regional level for the overall Muslim-majority states in the MENA region. Scholarship on regime transition suggests restrictions targeting religious 146 minorities to increase at times of political transition. In the following section, I examine religious discrimination in Tunisia first and then compare it to the core Arab Uprisings countries (Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen), I do so by using three variables the Religion and State round 3 (RAS3) dataset for the years 2009-2014.

I use three variables from the RAS3: two that measure government religion policy and one that measures societal discrimination against religious minorities focusing on the core Arab Uprisings countries (Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen). The three variables I examine are government religious regulation, government religious discrimination, and societal discrimination. By looking at the relevant data about the core

Arab Uprisings countries and Tunisia more specifically, I make a connection between a country level and a regional level.

Governmetal Regulations and Societal Discrimination Tunisia (2009-2014) 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

A_ SOCI_DISC A_GOV_REL_REG GOV_REL_DISC

Figure 3: Religious Regulations and Societal Discrimination in Tunisia 147

Figure 1 shows that governmental religion policies, as well as government discrimination against religious minorities, are both increasing. While is government religious discrimination is constant since 2011, government religion regulation is consistently rising. One set of explanations to this rise in government religious discrimination is the state’s failure to secure and protect religious minorities from discriminatory behavior on the societal level. For instance, during the month of Ramadan, the government failed to stop or to issue a warning against some groups raiding restaurant in a naming and shaming campaigns to non-fasters. Also, the local authorities required restaurants not to sell alcohol even to non-Muslims and needed to cover the glass of restaurants serving food during fasting time.

The results of societal discrimination against religious minorities are however significantly different. The chart shows that societal, religious discrimination increased dramatically after the Tunisian Revolution of 2010-2011. One set of possible indicators of the increase in discriminatory behavior is the emergence of hostilities against synagogues, churches, and cemeteries of Christians and Jews that went to vandalism of religious sites. Most importantly, the transition was marked by major demonstrations in front of Synagogues by extremist groups calling for the Islamization of the state and the exclusion of all religious minorities. While the increase is noticeable in Tunisia, it was not violent as compared to other core Arab Uprisings countries. The discriminatory sentiments, however, were not exclusively anti-Christian and anti-Jewish but they were among orchestrated campaigns targeting the Shia, Sufis, Bahai’ members and groups. 148

Fox (2016), suggests that “the Muslim world differs from the Christian world in

[the fact that] italics are mine-religious discrimination is considerably more common and severe, on average” (p. 121). In fact, in the rest of the core Arab Uprisings countries, there was the same pattern. An alternative explanation for the increase of government religious regulations and discrimination against religious minorities in what later became core Arab Uprisings countries might be a reaction to the turn of events in Tunisia.

Government Religious Regulations and Social Discrimination Core Arab Uprisings' Countries (2009-2014) 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

A_ SOCI_DICR A_GOV_REL_REG A_GOV_REL_DISC

Figure 4: Religious Regulations and Societal Discrimination in Arab Uprisings Countries

Figure 4 shows that governmental discrimination, as well as government religious regulations, are somewhat constant and if they changed, the change is not significant.

However, indicators of religion regulation show an increase in the core Arab Uprisings countries except for Egypt and Syria. For Bahrain and Yemen, this increase can be supported by the vandalism of the Shi’a Mosques in 2011in Bahrain and the restrictions imposed on the Shi’a sect. Libya and Tunisia can be explained by the inability of the 149 government to shield religious minorities from societal retaliation. Syria is absent from the data given that at the time of data collection, Syria did not have an effective government and the RAS3 dataset does not code for countries with dysfunctional governments. Societal, religious discrimination is on the rise same as Tunisia.

In light of the preceding, I conclude that maintaining exclusionary policies targeting religious minorities in transitional societies leads to an increase in a majority sentiment and the securitization of religious minorities. Hence, societal discrimination towards a group that is treated as an active threat on a state-level escalates. While the analyses show that there is little to no change regarding regulations and policies against religious minorities, they show, there is, however, evidence of a significant difference regarding societal discrimination.

Conclusion

The Arab Uprisings outcomes are still unfolding. The impact of such transitions on minorities and more specifically religious minorities are also still ongoing. From the literature revisited in this paper, transitional governments are more likely to implement restrictions to control religion and to use religion in a legitimacy seeking nationalist outbidding. The religion of the majority can also be activated to accomplish stability.

The MENA region, in particular, is an area plagued by sectarian divide and the politicization of the majority religion falls short of religious pluralism and freedom. The body of literature has predicted that religious discrimination would increase in times of change. Most importantly, that societal discrimination would increase quicker given the fact reconsideration of legal frameworks tend to be a longer process. The above finding is 150 particularly true for the Tunisian case. Transitional governance literature maintains that societal behavior is profoundly influenced by the political rhetoric of the regimes.

Overall in the scholarly literature about religious minorities, the focus tends to be on the impact of conflictual transitions on this identity group. While it is not less important to examine the status of religious minority groups where the cycle of conflict is violent, it is also of equal importance to study the impact of no-conflict transitions on religiously differentiated groups. This study does so by building on literature on religious pluralism and transitional societies to explain the effect of government securitization of minority groups on societal behavior towards both Christians and Jews in a Muslim majority Tunisia. Sustaining restricting and repressive measures such as the Modus

Vivendi and the 1958 Law along with systematically embedded informal laws have long- term residual effects. Securitization of religious minorities overlap with a democratization process Tunisia is undergoing. The pattern is reflected on a societal level that understands identity as a monolithic. While the Arab Uprisings took down the dictatorship of the regime in Tunisia, it instilled the tyranny of the majority on a social level.

One of the limitations of the secular model and the logic of democracy is creating a sense of identity that is exclusionary of the marginal identities. The Tunisian state’s interpretation of secularism understands the membership of religious minorities in the society as alien to the overall identity hence governed by alternative systems of legal checks. By keeping exclusionary policies in full force and effect on a state level, Tunisia has altered the position of religious minorities legally, politically, and socially. Most 151 importantly, policies such as the Modus Vivendi and the 1958 Law as an exclusive system of governance for a particular identity attribute emphasizes the concept of “the marked citizen” (Pandey, 2006). The label of active threats not only heightens societal discrimination, but also makes it permissible and unchecked which makes a case for structural violence and a green light for a discriminatory social behavior based on an exclusive understanding of national identity.

Democratic practices imply that religion is to be treated equally institutionalizing religious plurality and freedom. This is particularly true since the results of the statistical analysis show that government religious regulation and support for all religion does not influence societal discrimination. Treating majority and minority religions the same way can be understood as this institutional accommodation of religious identity. However, the peculiar alienation and marginalization of one group over the other does create a societal sentiment of “otherness”. Transitional societies such as Tunisia are more vulnerable to this social behavior against religious minorities. During transitions, social interactions are shaped by the residual effect of the state policy. Because the state openly discriminates against non-Muslim religious minorities, social behavior inherits the securitization and discrimination as ‘the rules of the game’. how behavior of the people defines ‘rules of the game’

While long-term outcomes of the Arab Uprisings, as well as the democratic transition in Tunisia, is still unfolding, this study contributes to the overall understanding of the residual effect of subnational politics and state policymaking on societal behavior towards religious minorities in Tunisia. 152

In this chapter, I examine the implications of the perpetuated narratives and state policies on religious discrimination. I find that group membership affects social interactions and pushes religious minorities to the fringes of society. The thread of national narratives and the boundaries of citizenship explored in chapter 1 and 2 are echoed in this chapter. The state officials and political influence group membership. The major finding in this chapter is that identity polarization, national narratives, and state regulations have created a hegemon identity (Muslims) and a “marked citizen” (Pandey,

2006) for Christians and Jews. The following chapter concludes and proposed policy recommendations.

153

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

National narratives are strategic initiatives that reflect the nation-state building project from the standpoint of political elites. While national narratives are often canons to make use of past events, they are also used in identity manufacturing and the promotion of national cohesion. These narratives often target future generations. The best channel to do so is the educational institution since it carries the task of preparing future generations. Educational curriculum and teaching materials examined are state- sanctioned and distributed nationwide by state accredited publishers. Not only that the education is a social project, but it also reflects the visions and narratives of political and state elites. This thesis examines identity polarization and national narratives in the educational curriculum and political elite's rhetoric and traces its implications to the social level.

Political elites and curriculum architects extended a state version of narratives and shaped it within the framework of the education for citizenship. This is true for Tunisia.

This thesis investigates state narratives looking at textbooks, official documents, and elite political discourse. The analysis establishes that the secular constitution and overall rhetoric emphasis the individual rights and freedoms. The legal frameworks and the content of the educational materials examined guarantees freedom such as freedom of belief and conscience and safeguards freedom of religion. The applicability of these theoretical underpinnings is questionable.

First, citizenship is defined by religious identity lines. The symbolism of religion and nationalist discourse is made through an emphasis on a patriotic discourse. Second, 154 belonging and emotional attachment is embedded in pride in specific time periods and civilizations such as the Ottoman Empire. Glorious times and legacies as well as different aspects of Islam present in the country’s official narrative. The narrative reinforces loyalty, territorial attachment, and regional belonging. Most importantly, while textbooks teach values such as tolerance, the presentation of a quintessentially Muslim

Tunisian identity alienates religiously differentiated Tunisians and pushes Christians and

Jews to the outskirts of the society.

This thesis also looks at the citizen engagement and democratic learning focusing on Civics textbooks. I analyze the process of citizen production and the preparation of younger generations to be actively engaged in politics and decision making. I also consider the commitment to universal human rights and individual rights and freedoms. I conclude that while textbooks and official documents in Tunisia endorse the democratic political system and its principles-such as political participation and religious pluralism-, its applicability remains questionable. Political participation is relative and theoretical.

There is evidence of a generation gap where political elites are excluding younger generation from the equation blaming their political immaturity. Religious pluralism is halted by the existence of restrictive legal frameworks for the administration of non-

Muslim cults mainly Jews and Christians in Tunisia. I find that the promotion of universal values of tolerance and acceptance of different religious identities remains theoretical and cut from reality. I finally conclude that the political institution is influenced by religious underpinning which brings the understanding of secularism as understood by the Tunisian model into question. 155

Citizenship in Tunisia has been defined by religious lines. Despite having a long- standing secular model of the state, the reassertion of religion in state affairs and as a source of some legislation brings into question the privatization of religion as a prerequisite of the modern state building. Most importantly, religion has been used as an excluding sociopolitical aspects and the layering criteria of citizenship. Identity socialization revamps differences and establishes a homogenous, monolithic national identity around religion. The need to have a separate system of legal checks and exclusive governance tools for religious minorities reinvented religion in the public sphere but also regulates it in the private sphere. The systemic violence lies in the existence of two modes of governance; one for the religious minorities through a set of restrictive measures and the other one for the majority religion, Sunni Muslims.

I test the previous findings on religious minorities in Tunisia using the public theologies framework to examine the state-society relations with the state endorsing

Islam as its religion and Christians and Jews on the other end of the spectrum. I look at how religious regulation targeting specific groups of the society alters the position of religiously differentiated groups legally, politically, and socially in Tunisia. The findings suggest that identity polarization, national narratives, and state regulations have created a hegemon identity (Muslims) and a “marked citizen” (Pandey, 2006) for Christians and

Jews.

The state discourse of double standards defines the ‘rules of the game’ and shapes social interactions. The literature revisited predicted an increase in religious discrimination in transitional societies like the Arab Uprisings states. Tunisia is 156 undergoing a democratic transition. Democratization attempts to produce intolerant governmental and social attitudes that welcome nationalist and religious outbidding tendencies. The existence of an inherited exclusive system of governance makes these implications worse. Systems of legal checks may be revisited or even dismantled sometimes soon. It may be on the government’s strategic initiatives checklist. Any revisionist or apprehension intentions were not made public. Religious minorities are welcomed in the Tunisian society in so many aspects except within the understanding of citizenship from an identity standpoint. The public perception as shown in chapter four does not consider religious minorities partners in citizenship but rather at the outskirts.

During transitions, state legal frameworks of taking a long time to be updated given the lengthy bureaucratic revision process. Societal behavior, however, can change more rapidly. Put differently, maintaining these policies have a broader impact on a societal interaction since it sets a norm. Social norms shape social interactions which make it challenging to reverse engineer such dynamics. State level policies have a residual effect on the societal perception of religiously differentiated groups in Tunisia.

This is not exclusive to Tunisia but can have its implications on a regional level for the overall Muslim-majority states in the MENA region.

Policy Recommendations

The Tunisian democratic transition sets a precedent in the region and is actively consolidating its democracy. It is praised by international actors for institutionalizing political pluralism and reinforcing political and economic development. It has the potential to be an example in long term, but the Tunisian state needs to realign its 157 policies. The following section suggests some policy recommendations in light of the findings of this study.

The general conclusion of the study indicates that educational reform should be prioritized in Tunisia in light of the democratic transition. It is time to take many practical steps towards reforming the education system towards a system based on the modern values of citizenship that endorses human rights without any cultural relativism. With the shifting social and global dynamics and understandings of the concepts of citizenship, a rethinking of its framework and applicability is warranted. Curriculum architects could benefit from international level trainings on citizenship education and citizen production in light of political and social transformation.

One of the recommendations of this study a cyclic and periodical review of educational materials to meet the social and global transformations. The focus on an integral citizenship should be established on the basis of objectivity and neutrality and based on the universality of human rights principles in conformity with international conventions.

The study also concludes that there is an imbalance in the degree of focus on the values of citizenship and civic engagement. The discrepancy reflects a lack of a clear vision and the absence of a strategic and specific objective in terms of citizen production.

Knowledge production is not an arbitrary process but one that requires a very specific roadmap and expertise. Also students could benefit from a practical citizenship experience. This value could be achieved with collaborations and partnerships with civil society organizations in order to give meaning to lessons about volunteering, community 158 engagement and political participation. An example would be simulations of a UN model, an extracurricular volunteering experience. While these opportunities exist more after the

Tunisian revolution, they remain cut from the school setting. Curriculum experts need to revamp the memorization tradition and rely more on practical simulations or experience.

The strategic initiatives towards reforming the educational curriculum could benefit from the contributions of civil society organizations in this process. The study also observed a generation gap and a hegemonic discourse from political elites towards youth-led social movements. The domination rhetoric ought to be revised and civil society should be considered a partner in the transition and not a platform where younger generations could ease their dissatisfaction of the political system.

Third, the study scores the use of a “Citizenship Meter” to scale national identity, loyalty, and patriotism in addition to emotionally charged language. The nationalist and patriotic discourse of national symbols indicates an ideology based learning system that did not get rid of the authoritarian influence. The emphasis on doctrines attributed to personalist and authoritarian regimes does not fit the democratic transition. It, however, reasserts the dominance of the state on citizens.

Also, the educational institution should be immune to ideologies. The omission of national historical facts is more likely to have a reverse effect and exacerbate social tensions. Additionally, the obstruction of international big scale facts such as the

Holocaust not only undermines Tunisia’s international reputation but also has its implications on a domestic level.

As the study showed, the omission of the Holocaust produced a generation that 159 internalized the mythical version of the genocide. This sentiment translated undermines academic integrity and challenges the educational institution’s neutrality. The study recommends a more inclusive educational system that is not subject to conflicting interpretations and doctrines. Official historical discourse should be integrative and celebrate the diversity of the social makeup. Compulsory courses such as Islamic

Education stands in contradiction to the freedom of belief, conscience, and religion stipulated in the Constitution but is also a systemic violence against religious minorities and religious skeptics.

On a state level, the Tunisian state should revise and dismantle any policy for the administration of cult such as the Modus Vivendi (regarding the Christian community) and the 1958 Law (regarding the Jewish community). The study finds that government religious discrimination targeting a specific religious minority group influences societal discrimination against religious minorities. To put it differently, when government policies target religious minorities, then societal discrimination against religiously differentiated groups increases. When the state alienates a certain group and treats them as an active threat, societal discrimination increases accordingly.

The study concludes that the system of exclusive governance devoted to

Christians and Jews is a violation of universal human rights and has social implications.

Societal interactions based on these policies established a two classes society where

Muslims dominate the public sphere whereas Jews and Christians are kept in the shadows. Government regulations and state discrimination against religious minorities undermines the democratic transition. It puts the secular state model into question and 160 challenges the core principle of the democratic political system which is religious pluralism.

Future Research

One of the areas of research that needs to be explored is the relationship between religious leaders of the different religious communities. Jews and Christians share the minority status in the political and social sphere. Discrimination against religious minorities cannot only be explained by the uncertainly of transitions. The government policies and social interactions existed long before the Arab Uprisings. Given the surge of religious discrimination, it could be argued that the nature of the relationship between the religious leaders and the communities at large is now based on identity alliances. Both groups leaders and communities’ most influential agents develop a broader sense of identity; that of the vulnerable. The need to bring the attention of social and political actors, Christians and Jews, and Bahai’s are collaboratively involved in civic activism in order to influence policies. The emergence of solidarity reinvents the discourse of self- identification and translated into social bonds that go well beyond what the traditional understanding of religion. This is noticeable in panels, faith based initiatives, and civil society platforms. It would be interesting to look at these emerging social dynamics between the marginalized identities and the formation of coalitions.

161

REFERENCES

Anderson, B. (1983, 1991). Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread

of nationalism. Brooklyn, NY: Verso.

Anderson, J. (2003). Religious liberty in transitional societies: The politics of religion.

New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Akar, B. (2006). Teachers’ reflections on the challenges of teaching citizenship education

in Lebanon: A qualitative pilot study. Reflecting Education, 2(2), 48-63.

Retrieved from: http://www.reflectingeducation.net/index.php/

reflecting/article/view/35/35

Akar, B. (2007). Citizenship education in Lebanon: An introduction into students’

concepts and learning experiences. Educate, 7(2), 2-18.

Apple, M.W., Christian-Smith, L.K. (eds). (1991). The politics of the textbook. London,

UK: Routledge.

Retrieved .عيشة يهودي تونسي Association Damj. (2017, June 27). La vie d'un juif Tunisien

from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fe_agSYaC7I

Astiz, M. F. (2006). Education for citizenship: The Argentine case in comparison.

Education, Citizenship and Social Justice, 1(2), 175–200.

https://doi.org/10.1177/1746197906064678

Banks, J.A. (2008) Diversity, group identity, and citizenship education in a global age.

Educational Researcher 37(2): 129–139.

Bat, Y., Kochan, M., & Littman, D. (2002). Islam and Dhimmitude: Where civilizations

collide. Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press. 162

Bat, Y. (1985). The Dhimmi: Jews and Christians under Islam. Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh

Dickinson University Press.

Ben-Porath, S. R. (2009). Citizenship under fire: Democratic education in times of

conflict. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Berger, S. and Lorenz, C. (2008). Introduction: National history writing in Europe in a

global age’. In Berger, S. and Lorenz, C. (eds) The Contested Nation: Ethnicity,

class, religion and gender in national histories (pp.1–23). Basingstoke, UK:

Palgrave Macmillan.

Berlin, I., Hardy, H. (Ed.), Hausheer, R., et al. (2013). Against the Current. Essays in the

History of Ideas, Second Edition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Bermeo, N. (1997). Myths of moderation: confrontation and conflict during democratic

transitions. Comparative Politics, 29(3), 305-322.

Billig, M. (1995). Banal nationalism. London, UK: Sage.

Boukhayatia, R. (2015). Enseignement en Tunisie: Un système "malade" en mal de

réformes. Huffpost Maghreb. Retrieved from:

http://www.huffpostmaghreb.com/2015/03/24/tunisie-education-

_n_6931240.html

Brand, L. A. (2010). National narratives and migration: Discursive strategies of inclusion

and exclusion in Jordan and Lebanon. International Migration Review, 44(1), 78–

110. doi: 10.1111/j.1747-7379.2009.00799

Brand, L. A (2014). Official stories: Politics and national narratives in Egypt and Algeria.

Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 163

Brown, R. (2000). Social Identity Theory: Past achievements, current problems and

future challenges. European Journal of Social Psychology, 30, 745-778.

Brownlee, J. (2007). Authoritarianism in the age of democratization. New York, NY:

Cambridge University Press.

Brubaker, R. (1995). National minorities, nationalizing states, and external national

homelands in the new Europe. Daedalus 124 (2), 107–132.

Brubaker, R. (1996). Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in

the New Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brubaker, R. (2004). In the Name of the Nation. Citizenship Studies, (8)2, 115-127.

Buckley, D. T. (2017). Faithful to secularism: The religious politics of democracy in

Ireland, Senegal, and the Philippines. New York, NY: Columbia University

Press.

Burke, E., III. (1998). Theorizing the histories of colonialism and nationalism in the

Arab Maghrib. Arab Studies Quarterly,20 (2), 5-19.

Burke, P. (2006). Social Identity Theory. In Contemporary Social Psychological Theories

(pp. 111-118). Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.

Chandra, K. (2005). Ethnic parties and democratic stability. Perspectives on Politics.

3(2): 235-252.

Center Blog (2014, January 21). Tunisie: René Trabelsi coupable d’être Juif [Blog Post].

Retrieved from: http://ridhabenkacem.centerblog.net/453-tunisie-rene-trabelsi-

coupable-d-etre-juif 164

Collier, D. (2011). Understanding process tracing. PS: Political Science & Politics,

44(4), 823–830. doi: 10.1017/S1049096511001429

Conway, M. M. (1985). Political participation in the united states. Washington, DC:

Congressional Quarterly.

Cordall, S. S. (2017) The virgin of Trapani: Tolerance and tradition go cheek by jowl in

Tunis. The Guardian. Retrieved from: https://www.theguardian.com/global-

development/2017/aug/16/virgin-of-trapani-tolerance-tradition-tunis-procession-

of-assumption

Dahl, R. (1971). Polyarchy: Participation and opposition. New Haven, CT: Yale

University Press.

Daoud, M. (1991). Arabization in Tunisia: The tug of war. Issues in Applied Linguistics,

2(1),7-29.

Diamond, L. (1997) Cultivating democratic citizenship: Education for a new century of

democracy in the Americas. Social Studies, 88(6), 244–51.

Dickenson, V. (2006). History, Ethnicity and Citizenship: the role of the history museum

in a multiethnic country. Museum International, 58(3), 21-31.

Du Plessis, L. M. (1994). The protection of religious rights in South Africa’s transitional

Constitution. Koers 59(2): 151-168.

Dwan, D. (2017). Romantic nationalism: History and illusion in Ireland. Modern

Intellectual history, 14(3), 717-745.doi:10.1017/S1479244215000451

Ehman, L. H. (1980). The American School in the Political Socialization Process. Review

of Educational Research, 50(1), 99. https://doi.org/10.2307/1170032 165 el-Issawi, F. (2011). The Arab Spring and the challenge of minority rights: Will the Arab

revolutions overcome the legacy of the past? European View, 10. 249-258.

Emon, A. M. (2012). Religious pluralism and Islamic law: Dhimmis and others in the

empire of law. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Faour, M. (2013). A review of citizenship education in Arab nations. Carnegie

Endowment for International Peace. Retrieved from

http://carnegieendowment.org/files/education_for_citizenship.pdf

Feldman, C., F. (2001) ‘Narratives of national identity as group narratives: Patterns of

interpretive cognition’.In Brockmeier, J. and Carbaugh, D. (eds) Narrative and

Identity: Studies in autobiography, self and culture (pp.129–44) Amsterdam: NT:

John Benjamins Publishing Company.

Ferrari, A., Toronto J. (Eds). (2017). Religions and constitutional transitions in the

Muslim Mediterranean: The pluralist moment. UK, London: Routledge.

Findley, M. G. & Young J. K. (2012). More combatant groups, more terror? Empirical

tests of an outbidding logic. Terrorism and Political Violence, 24(5), 706-721.

Foster, S. (2011). Dominant Traditions in International Textbook Research and Revision.

Education Inquiry, 2(1), 5-20.

Fox, J., & Sandler, S. (2003). Regime types and discrimination against ethnoreligious

minorities: A cross-sectional analysis of the autocracy-democracy continuum.

Political Studies, 51(3), 469-489. doi: 10.1111/1467-9248.00436

Fox, J. (2015). Political secularism, religion, and the state: A time series analysis of

worldwide data. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 166

Fox, J. (2016). The unfree exercise of religion: A world survey of religious discrimination

against religious minorities. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Fuchs, E. and Sammler, S. (2016) Textbooks between Tradition and Innovation: A

journey through the history of the Georg Eckert Institute. Braunschweig: Georg

Eckert Institute.

Fukuyama, F. (1995) Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. New

York: Free Press.

Gellner, E. (1983). Nations and nationalism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Gellner, E. (1996). The coming of nationalism and its interpretations: The myths of

nation and class. In Mapping the nation. G. Balakrishnan (Ed). (pp.98-145). New

York, NY: Verso.

Grever, M., & van der Vlies, T. (2017). Why national narratives are perpetuated: A

literature review on new insights from history textbook research. London Review

of Education, 15(2), 286–301. https://doi.org/10.18546/LRE.15.2.11

Grever, M. (2007b). Plurality, narrative and the historical canon. In Maria Grever and

Siep Stuurman (eds.). Beyond the canon. History for the twenty-first century, 31–

47. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

Grim, B. J. & Finke, R. (2011) The price of freedom denied. New York, NY: Cambridge

University Press.

Haggard, S., & Kaufman, R. R. (2012). Inequality and regime change: Democratic

transitions and the stability of democratic rule. American Political Science

Review, 106(3), 495–516. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055412000287 167

Hahn, C. L. (2010). Comparative civic education research: What we know and what we

need to know. Citizenship Teaching & Learning, 6(1), 5-23. doi:

10.1386/ctl.6.15_1

Hahn, C. L. (1998). Becoming political: Comparative perspectives on citizenship

education. Albany, NY: Suny Press.

Hall, J., ed. (1995) Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison. Cambridge, MA:

Blackwell.

Hammami, W. (2017). Réformer the système education Tunisia: Une priorité negligée.

Nawaat. Retrieved from: https://nawaat.org/portail/2017/10/13/reformer-le-

systeme-educatif-tunisien-une-priorite-negligee/

Hechter, M. (2001). Containing nationalism. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Hirschman, A. (1970). Exit, voice, and loyalty: Responses to decline in firms,

organizations, and states. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Huntington, S. P. (1965). Political development and political decay. World Politics,

17(3), 386-430.080/21565503.2016.1148058

Huyser, K, R., Sanchez, G. B., & Vargas, E. D. (2016). Civic engagement and political

participation among American Indians and Alaska natives in the US, Politics,

Groups, and Identities,5 (4), 642-659.

Ichilov, O. (2005). Pride in one’s country and citizenship orientations in a divided

society: The case of Israeli-Palestinian Arab and Orthodox and non‐orthodox

Jewish Israeli youth. Comparative education review, 49(1), 44-61. doi:

10.1086/426160 168

Issitt, J. (2004). Reflections on the study of textbooks. History of Education, 3 (6), 683–

96.

Jebari, I. (2014). L’histoire et « l’avenir possible »: Laroui, Djaït et la modernité du

Maghreb dans les années 1970. L'Année du Maghreb 10 (1). 189-206. doi:

10.4000/anneemaghreb.2077

Juergensmeyer, M. (2004). Holy orders: Religious opposition to modern states. Harvard

International Review,25(4), 34-38.

Kaufman, S. (2001). Modern hatreds. New York, NY: Cornell University Press.

Kelman, H., C. (1997). “Nationalism, Patriotism, and National Identity: Social-

Psychological Dimensions.” In Patriotism in the Lives of Individuals and Nations,

D. Bar-Tal and E. Staub, (Eds) (pp.165–189). Chicago, IL: Nelson-Hall.

Khater, A. F. (2001). Inventing home: Emigration, gender, and the middle class in

Lebanon, 1870-1920. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Khatib, L. (2012). Political participation and democratic transition in the Arab world. U.

Pa. J. Int'l L., 34, 315.

Korostelina, K. V. (2013). Mapping national identity narratives in Ukraine. Nationalities

Papers, 41(2), 293–315. https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2012.747498

Krauss, M. W., Anderson, C., & Callaghan, B. (2015). The inequality of politics: Social

class rank and political participation (working Paper No.120-15). Retrieved from:

http://irle.berkeley.edu/files/2015/The-Inequality-of-Politics.pdf

Krippendorff, K. (2004). Content analysis: An introduction to its methodology (2nd ed.).

Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 169

Kymlicka, W., & Pfostl, E. (Eds.). (2014.). Multiculturalism and Minority Rights in the

Middle East.Oxford University Press.

Lässig, S. (2009) ‘Textbooks and beyond: Educational media in context(s)’. Journal of

Educational Media, Memory, and Society, 1 (1), 1–20.

Létourneau, J., & Chapman, A. (2017). Negotiating the nation: Young people, national

narratives and history education. London Review of Education, 15(2), 149–151.

https://doi.org/10.18546/LRE.15.2.01

Linz, J. J., & Stepan, A. C. (1996). Problems of democratic transition and consolidation:

Southern Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe. Baltimore, MD:

Johns Hopkins University Press.

Lipset, S. M. (1959). Some social requisites of democracy: Economic development and

political legitimacy. American political science review, 53(1), 69-105.

Longva, A. N., & Roald, A. S. (2012). Introduction: Domination, self-empowerment,

accommodation. In Longya, A. Editor & Roald, A. Editor (Eds.), Religious

minorities in the Middle East: Domination, self-empowerment, accommodation

(pp.1-26). Leiden, NL: Brill.

Machel, G. (1996). Impact of armed conflict on children. New York, United Nations.

Available at: http://dac-

cessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N96/219/55/PDF/N9621955.pdf

Maktabi, R. (2000). State formation and citizenship in Lebanon. Citizen and the state in

the Middle East: Approaches and applications. N. A. Butenschon, U. Davis, and

M. S. Hassassian (ed.) 146-78. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. 170

Mansfield, E.D., & Snyder, J. (2012). Democratization and the Arab Spring.

International Interactions. (38)5. 722-733.

Masri, M., S. (2017). Tunisia: An Arab anomaly. New York, NY: Columbia University

Press.

Ma’oz, M. (1999). Middle Eastern minorities: Between integration and conflict. Policy

Papers 50. Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

Retrieved

from:http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PP_50_MIDD

LE_EASTERN_MINORITIES.pdf

Retrieved .طرد منظمي متحف للهولوكوست في تونس .(Meem Magazine. (2017, December 15

from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-U-TIo4TbHY

Mejri, W. (2015, February 2). Yves Eliahou, gardien du tresor des Juif en

Tunisie. Inkyfada. Retrieved from: https://inkyfada.com/2015/02/yves-eliahou-

gardien-du-tresor-des-juifs-en-tunisie/

Ministry of Justice of Tunisia. (1957). The Personal Status Code. Tunis, Tunisia: The

Official Gazette of the Tunisian Republic.

Nasser, R. (2004). Exclusion and the making of Jordanian national identity: An analysis

of school textbooks. Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 10(2), 221-249.

Nossett, J. M. (2014) Free exercise after the Arab Spring: Protecting Egypt’s religious

Minorities under the country’s new Constitution," Indiana Law Journal, (89)4.

Retrieved from:

http://www.iiste.org/Journals/index.php/IAGS/article/viewFile/30455/31293 171

Olssen M., Codd, J. & O’Neill, A. (2004) Education Policy: Globalization, Citizenship,

and Democracy. London, UK: Sage.

O’Donnell, G. A., Schmitter, P. C. (1986). Transitions from authoritarian rule. L.

Whitehead (Ed). Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Pandey, G. (2006). Routine violence: Nations, fragments, histories. Stanford, CA:

Stanford University Press.

Perliger, A., Canetti-Nisim, D., & Pedahzur, A. (2006). Democratic attitudes among

high-school pupils: The role played by perceptions of class climate. School

Effectiveness and School Improvement, 17(1), 119-140. doi:

10.1080/09243450500405217

Pew Research Center (2009). Global restrictions on religion. Retrieved from

http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2009/12/29/global-restrictions-on-religion/

Pew Research Center (2013). Arab Spring adds to global restrictions on religion.

Retrieved from http://www.pewforum.org/2013/06/20/arab-spring-restrictions-on-

religion-findings/

Pföstl, E., & Kymlicka, W. (2015). Minority politics in the Middle East and North Africa:

The prospects for transformative change. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 38(14),

2489–2498. doi: 10.1080/01419870.2015.1061132

Philpott, D. (2007). Explaining the political ambivalence of religion. American Political

Science Review 101(3), 505 – 525.

Picard, E. (2012). Nation-building and minority rights in the Middle East. In Longya, A.

Editor & Roald, A. Editor (Eds.), Religious Minorities in the Middle East: 172

Domination, Self- Empowerment, Accommodation (pp. 325-351). Leiden, NL:

Brill.

Pingel, F. (2008) Can truth be negotiated? History textbook revision as a means to

reconciliation. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,

617 (1), 181–98.

Podeh, E (2011). The Politics of national celebrations in the Arab Middle East.

Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Porat, D. (2001). A contemporary past: History textbooks as sites of national memory. In

Dickinson, A., Gordon, P. and Lee, P. (eds) Raising Standards in History

Education (pp. 36–55). International Review of History Education 3. London,

UK: Woburn Press.

Przeworski, A., & Limongi, F. (1997). Modernization: Theories and Facts. World

Politics, 49(2), 155-183.

Putnam, R. (1993) Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy.

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Quaynor, L. J. (2012). Citizenship education in post-conflict contexts: A review of the

literature. Education, Citizenship, and Social Justice, 7(1), 33-57. doi:

10.1177/1746197911432593

Raphael, R. (2004) Founding myths: Stories that hide our patriotic past. New York, NY:

New Press.

Repoussi, M. and Tutiaux-Guillon, N. (2010) ‘New trends in history textbook research:

Issues and methodologies toward a school historiography’. Journal of 173

Educational Media, Memory, and Society, 2(1), 154–70.

Reynolds, K. J., Haslam, S. A., & Turner, J. C. (2012) Social identity, prejudice and

social change: Beyond the Allportian problematic. In J. Dixon & M Levin

(Eds), Beyond prejudice: Extending the social psychology of conflict, inequality

and social change (pp. 48-69). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rieffer-Flanagan, B. (2016). Statism, tolerance and religious freedom in Egypt. Muslim

World Journal of Human Rights, 13(1): 1-24. doi:10.1515/mwjhr-2015-0013

Romdhani, O. (2013). The next revolution: A call for reconciliation in the Arab World.

World Affairs, 176 (4): 89-96.

Rowe, S. P. (2007). Neo-millet systems and transnational religious movements: The

Humayun decrees and Church construction in Egypt. Journal of Church and

State, (49)2, 329–350. https://doi.org/10.1093/jcs/49.2.329

Sandal, N. A. (2013). Public theologies of Human Rights and citizenship: The case of

Turkey’s Christians. Human Rights Quarterly, 35(3), 631–650.

doi:10.1353/hrq.2013.0037

Sarkissian, A. (2009). Religious reestablishment in Post-Communist polities. Journal of

Church and State. 51(3): 472-501.

Schulz, W., Ainley, J., Fraillon, J., Kerr, D., & Losito, B. (2010). Initial findings from the

IEA international civic and citizenship education study. Retrieved from

http://research.acer.edu.au/civics/5/

إيلي الطرابلسي: تجريم التطبيع يخدم إسرائيل ويهود تونس موجودون منذ .(Selman, H. (2018, March 18

AlQuds Al Arabi. Retreived from: http://www.alquds.co.uk/?p=898930 .2500 عام 174

Seiwert, H. (2003). Freedom and control in the unified Germany: Governmental

approaches to alternative religions since 1989, Sociology of Religion. 64(3).367-

375.

Shachar, A., & Hirschl, R. (2007). Citizenship as Inherited Property. Political Theory,

35(3), 253-287.

Sisk, T. D. (1996). Power sharing and international mediation in ethnic conflicts.

Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.

Smith, A., D. (2001). National identity. Reno, NV: University of Nevada Press.

Smith, A., D. (2009). Ethno-symbolism and nationalism. New York, NY: Routledge.

Snyder, J. (2000). From voting to violence: Democratization and nationalist conflict. NY,

New York: W.W Norton.

Starrett, G. (1998). Putting Islam to work: education, politics, and religious

transformation in Egypt (Vol. 25). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Stuurman, S. (2007). Integration, assimilation and exclusion in the making of modern

nations. Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis, 120, 446–59.

Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G.

Austin, & S. Worchel (Eds.), The social psychology of intergroup relations (pp.

33-37). Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.

Toft, M. D. (2007) Getting religion? The puzzling case of Islam and civil wars.

International Security, 31(04), 97-13.

Toft, M.D. (2013). The politics of religious outbidding. The Review of Faith and

International Affairs, (11)3, 10-19. 175

Torney-Purta, J., Lehmann, R., Oswald H., Schulz, W. (2001) Citizenship and Education

in Twenty-Eight Countries: Civic Knowledge and Engagement at Age Fourteen.

Delft: IEA.

Tunisian Ministry of Education, (2002). Guiding Law for Education and Pedagogy for

the Ministry of Education. Guiding on Education. (Arabic).

Tun. Const. 2014, title1, art. 1

Tun. Const. 2014, title 4, art. 47

Tun. Const. 1959, title 1, art.1

Turner, B. S. (Ed.). (1993). Citizenship and Social Theory. London: SAGE Publications.

UNHCR “Figures at a Glance”. Retrieved September 11, 2016, from

http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/figuresat-a-glance.html

Urry, J. (2000). Sociology beyond societies. London, UK: Routledge.

Verba, S., Schlozman, K. L., & Brady, H. E. (1995). Voice and equality: Civic

voluntarism in American politics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Vural, Y., & Özuyanık, E. (2008). Redefining identity in the Turkish-Cypriot school

history textbooks: a step towards a united federal Cyprus. South European Society

and Politics, 13(2), 133-154.

Wretch, J., V. (2002). Voices of collective remembering. Cambridge, UK; Cambridge

University Press.

Wrangham, G.D. (eds) From Historical Research to School History: Problems, relations,

challenges (Yearbook of the International Society for History Didactics).

Schwalbach: Wochenschau Verlag, 125–44. 176

Yadgar, Y. (2002). From the particularistic to universalistic: National narratives in

Israel’s mainstream Press, 1967-97. Nations and Nationalism 8(1), 55-72.

Zajda, J. (2009). Nation-building, identity and citizenship education: Introduction. In

Nation-Building, Identity and Citizenship Education (pp. 1-11). Springer

Netherlands.

Zhao, Z. (2014). Pedagogisation of nation identity through textbook narratives in China:

1902–1948. Citizenship Studies, 18(1), 99-112. ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !

Thesis and Dissertation Services ! !