Modern Japanese Diplomacy Materials
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Japan’s Foreign Policy Lecture Three: Oct. 28 (Fri) 2011 Chapter 3 “After Independence: South East Asia, Soviet Russia, and the Revision of the Security Treaty” *Related chapter in Iokibe’s edited volume, The Diplomatic History of Postwar Japan: Chapter 2 “Conditions of an independent state: Japanese diplomacy in the 1950s” (pp.50-80) *If you have any question on the lecture, email to TA ([email protected]). Outline Changes in Domestic Politics after Independence Waning power of Yoshida Return of prewar politicians Rise of New politicians (e.g. Hayato Ikeda and Eisaku Sato) Yoshida vs. Hatoyama June 1951: First depurge of about 3,000 people Aug 1951: Second depurge of about 14,000 people April 1952 : Last depurge of 6,000 people Ichiro Hatoyama fell of stroke July 1952: Surprise dissolution of the Lower House The fourth Yoshida Cabinet was established. No. 1952: Hayato Ikeda forced to resign because of inappropriate remarks Bakayaro dissolution in May 1953: Non confidence vote was passed Anti-Yoshida group attacked the weak points of Yoshida's policy Exclusively US-oriented policy should be modified. The relations with Beijing and Moscow should be improved. Japan should revise the Constitution and rearm herself for self-defense. Development of Security Policy Keisatsu Yobitai (National Police Reserve) Hoantai (National Security Forces) Sept 1953: Agreement to reorganize Hoantai into Jieitai (Self Defense Forces). 1954 July: SDF were established. Oct. 1953: Ikeda-Robertson meetings 180,000 or 300,000 1 March 1954: MSA Agreement Why did Yoshida deny the rearmament? 1. poor economy. 2. lack of public support.intentions. 3. concern about the Korean war and American strategy. Syngman Rhee (李承晩), strongly anti-Japanese president. The Vandenberg resolution Hatoyama Diplomacy Dec. 1954: The establishment of Hatoyama Cabinet Jan. 10 1955: Willingness to improve the relations both China and USSR Jan. 25: Andrei Domnitsky moves secretly Why was the improvement necessary? 600,000 people in Siberian labor camps. Fisheries issues United Nations Feb. 1955: Hatoyama Cabinet decided to start the negotiations. In June the negotiations were started in London. In the early August, USSR indicated its intention to return two islands US - Japan relations at that time March 1955: Issue of defense contribution August: Shigemitsu proposed the security revision to Dulles Two concerns for the United States: Possible neutralization and free ride Shigemitsu proposed to agree with the Soviet’s proposal Sep 1956: US stated that the four islands were the integral territory of Japan. Hatoyama visited Moscow and Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration was made Dec. 19, 1956: Japan jointed the United Nations. Yoshida’s stance: "We are the emerging power. It is foolish to discuss independence or autonomy. It is the time for collective defense." (In his letter sent to Ikeda in 1954 when he retired) 2 Reparations 1952: The Republic of China renounced its claims for reparations. India renounced the claim for reparations and returned Japanese assets in India Japan decided to pay back its debts to the US, Britain, France etc. GARIOA (Governmental Aid and Relief in Occupied Areas) and EROA (Economic Rehabilitation in Occupied Areas) were paid. About $450 million out of amount of $1.8 – 1.9 billion 1953: The government decided to pay 500 million US dollars to South East Asia. Philippines: Indonesia: Burma= 4:2:1 It was difficult to pay reparations because of huge damages caused by war. Germany after WWI, $ 33 billion; Keynes thought $ 9 billion maximum. Early policy on reparations Pauley Plan: about $2.5 billion (1945) Strike Plan: $1 billion. Johnston Plan: $420 million (April 1948) MacArthur: opposed to reparations. It was already paid by renunciation of facilities in Manchuria, Korea, and Taiwan. (cf. Italy: 340 million dollars) No reparation policy. The US issued a statement in March 1949. Opposition from Philippines and others. Competition among the SEA countries made the decision difficult. Philippines: $8 billion, Indonesia: $17.2 billion, Burma: $6 billion, Vietnam: $2 billion. Alternative plan - Philippines: Indonesia: Burma =4: 2: 1 1953 Phillipines agreed on $400 million tentatively, but was renunciated. Burma agreed on $200 million (increased later) + $50 million as economic assistance. 1954 Yoshida visited the US and proposed an Asian Marshall plan of $4 billion. He wanted to borrow 700-800 million dollars for reparations. 1954 Philippines: 550 million dollars + 250 million dollars as economic assistance. Yoshida collaborated with Hatoyama on the reparation issue. 1958 Indonesia: 223.08 million dollars + 400 million as economic assistance. The debt of 170 million was cancelled. 400 million in total From service to products, then to cash. From 1% of GDP to 0.6% From reparations to economic advance. 3 The funds would return to Japanese companies after all. Tatsunosuke Takasaki, an entrepreneur in Manchuria, was welcomed. Lessons learned from the WWI: Dulles and Yoshida Chronology 1952 (Showa 27) 0428 Japan regains its Independence Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty is signed 0828 Unexpected Dissolution “Nukiuchi Kaisan” 1001 25th General Election 1127 Minister of International Trade and Industry Ikeda / faux pas 1129 Ikeda resigns 1953 (Showa 28) 0314 The “Bakayaro” dissolution 0419 26th General Election 0730 Yoshida and Ashida debate over Defense policies in the Diet 1002 Ikeda-Robertson Talks 1954 (Showa 29) 1207 Resignation of Yoshida Cabinet 1210 Hatoyama becomes Prime Minister 1955 (Showa 30) 0227 27th General Election 0429 Bandung Conference 0829 Foreign Minister Shigemitsu proposes revision of the Security Treaty to U.S. Secretary of State Dulles but is rejected 1115 The Liberal Democratic Party formed 1956 (Showa 31) 0224 Khruschev, speech denouncing Stalin 0509 Japan-Philippines Reparations Agreement is signed 1019 Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration 1218 Japan becomes member of the UN 1220 Resignation of Hatoyama Cabinet 1223 Ishibasi Tanzan becomes Prime Minister 1957 (Showa 32) 0130 Girard incident 4 0225 Kishi Nobusuke becomes Prime Minister 0520 Basic Policy for National Defense is adopted 0520 Kishi visits Asian countries for the first time (~0604) 0619 Kishi visits U.S., first Japan-U.S. Summit 0928 First Diplomatic Blue Book is published 1118 Kishi visits Asia for the second time 1958 (Showa 33) 0522 28th General Election 1227 Three Ministers ( Ikeda, Miki, Nadao) resign over the Policemen's Duty Performance Law 1959 (Showa 34) 0618 Cabinet reshuffle, Ikeda Hayato joins the Cabinet 1960 (Showa 35) 0119 New Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is signed 0519 Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is approved in Lower House of Parliament 0623 Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is enacted 0719 Ikeda Hayato becomes Prime Minister Materials 1. Basic policy for National Defense (May, 20, 1957) The aim of national defense is to prevent direct and indirect aggression and to repel any such aggression with the aim of protecting Japan’s independence and peace, which are founded on democracy. In order to achieve this, the Basic Policy states as follows: (1) To support the U.N. activities and promote international cooperation to achieve world peace. (2) To stabilize the livelihood of the people, promote their patriotism, and establish the foundation required for national security. (3) Within the limits required for self-defense, to progressively establish efficient defense capabilities in accordance with the nation’s strength and situation. (4) To deal with external act of aggression based on the Japan-US Security Arrangement, until the United Nations can provide sufficient functions to effectively prevent such acts in the future. 5 2. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America (January 19, 1960) ARTICLE IV The Parties will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty, and, at the request of either Party, whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened. ARTICLE V Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security. ARTICLE VI For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan. The use of these facilities and areas as well as the status of United States armed forces in Japan shall be governed by a separate agreement, replacing the Administrative Agreement under Article III of the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America, signed at Tokyo on February 28, 1952, as amended, and by such other arrangements as may be agreed upon. ARTICLE VII This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security. 6 ARTICLE IX The Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America signed at the city of San Francisco on September 8, 1951 shall expire upon the entering into force of this Treaty. ARTICLE X This Treaty shall remain in force until in the opinion of the Governments of Japan and the United States of America there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Japan area.