Decision-Making in the Val Di Susa Case: Too Rigid Or Too Soft?

7 DECISION-MAKING IN THE VAL DI SUSA CASE: TOO RIGID OR TOO SOFT? Luigi Bobbio In the space of little over a month, between 31 October and 6 December 2005, the proposed Turin-Lyon high-speed train (Treno Alta Velocità, or TAV) line became a national news story following the dramatic protests that marked initial attempts to open exploratory survey sites. On 31 October, the “Battle of Rocciamelone” took place between police and demonstrators who were blocking access to the Seghino site, where drilling was due to commence. In the ensuing days, protests were held across the valley, culminating on 16 November in a general strike and “the march of the 80,000” from Bussoleno to Susa. On 30 November and 1 December, protestors gathered at Venaus—where another, far more important construction site for a long exploratory tunnel was planned—and set up a camp, which was then dismantled by police during the night of 5–6 December. For the next two days, thousands of protestors retaliated by blocking both the railway and the motorway running through the valley.1 The effect of the protests was to bring work to a complete standstill. Indeed, for the entire next year, the construction sites would remain idle, despite the fact that they were now once more under police control. The year 2006 was thus a year of stalemate. While most Italians became aware of the Val di Susa dispute only following the protests, this turn of events was actually rather predict- able. It was always highly likely that once work got underway, it would be met by a massive and concerted response. It was similarly Notes for this chapter begin on page 186. 172 Luigi Bobbio obvious for some time that the politicians, engineers, and managers promoting the high-speed line were heading toward an impasse that would not be easily overcome. In fact, we can trace the history of the events that occurred at the end of 2005 back over the previous 15 years. Or, rather, as we shall see, we can trace two parallel histories that hardly ever came into contact until 2005: first, the history of institutional decisions regarding the high-speed line, and, second, the history of the NO TAV (No to the High-Speed Train) movement, which had grown year by year in response to those decisions. Institutional Decisions The idea of establishing a high-speed rail line between Italy and France by means of a 50-km tunnel through the Alps was first opened to discussion at the beginning of the 1980s. The project was offi- cially launched at the 1991 Franco-Italian summit in Viterbo and was designated one of the 14 Trans-European transport (TEN-T) priority projects at the 1994 Essen European Council. At the same time, Italy and France established a decision-making structure that was headed by an intergovernmental conference and, at the operational level, by the company Alpetunnel, which was formed in 1994 by the national railways of the two countries. Alpetunnel, which was given the responsibility of conducting the necessary planning studies, was then transformed in 2001 into Lyon Turin Ferroviaire (LTF). While its cornerstone (i.e., the 50-km tunnel) was never called into question, other aspects of the project did change over the course of the 1990s. Originally, the line had been conceived as a “high-speed” service for railway passengers (like the French Train Grande Vitesse, or TGV). Later, it was decided instead to create a “high-capacity” (i.e., mixed-goods and passengers) line in order to help transfer freight traf- fic from road to rail. On the Italian side, it had originally been envisaged that the line would run out in the open along the valley floor up until the entrance to the main tunnel. However, to avoid objections, it was decided instead to move it nearer to the mountains, with much of the route consisting of a 23-km tunnel through Mount Musinè. Other difficulties emerged regarding the junction with Turin. While the Italian national railways company’s project envisaged the line running north of the Turin metropolitan area, well away from the city, at the end of the 1990s the province of Turin proposed an alternative route that would encompass the intermodal freight center in Orbassano and arrive at the main tunnel entrance via the Val Sangone and the south side of the Val di Susa. This latter proposal, however, was not accepted. Decision-Making in the Val di Susa Case 173 January 2001 saw the Franco-Italian agreement in Turin and the division of the project into three parts: the Réseau Ferré de France would be responsible for the French section from Montmélian to Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne, the Italian state railways company (Rete Ferroviaria Italiana) for the Italian section from the Turin junction to Bruzolo, and the Franco-Italian company LTF for the international section between Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne and Bruzolo. This last part of the line would wind for 72.5 km through the main 53-km tunnel and a second 12-km tunnel near Bussoleno. In 2003, the preliminary plans for the three sections were finalized and sent for approval in the two countries.2 In the meantime, however, French enthusiasm for the project had appeared to wane. While there was strong lobbying from the region (Rhônes-Alpes) directly involved, in general, France seemed reluctant to give strategic priority to the Turin-Lyon line, especially as a number of government-commissioned studies had questioned the value of the project, given its high costs. The considerable pressure applied by the Italian government, however, proved successful and resulted in the two sides signing an agreement at the Berlusconi-Raffarin summit in 2004, at which Italy was saddled with 63 percent of the costs for the international section of the line. The total project expenditure was estimated to be around Ð13 billion, which broke down into Ð4 billion for the French part of the line, Ð6.7 billion for the international one (of which Italy would provide 63 percent) and Ð2.3 billion for the Italian section. The European Union (EU), which had included the Turin-Lyon line within priority project no. 6 (Lyon-Budapest) of the Trans-European networks, agreed to fund 20 percent of the international tract and appointed the late Ignacia de Loyola de Palacio to oversee the project. The Turin-Lyon line is without doubt the largest of all major public works planned in Italy. Based on the 2004 agreement, the Italian outlay will amount to Ð7 billion—one and a half times the cost of constructing the bridge from the mainland to Sicily across the Strait of Messina (although, according to some analysts, Italy’s expenditure on the Turin-Lyon line could in fact exceed Ð10 billion).3 Work on the project will take between 10 to 15 years. Indeed, de Palacio estimated in a report that the line could not be finished before 2019–2020.4 Between 2002 and 2005, France began work on exploratory tunnels in Modane and La Praz. In Italy, however, work on a similar tunnel in Venaus gave rise to the 2005 protests in the Val di Susa. Although only exploratory, this phase of the project involves the construction of a 10- km-long and 6-meter-wide tunnel. Nonetheless, it was exempted from undergoing an official environmental impact assessment by special law no. 443/2001. 174 Luigi Bobbio In the 15 years that have passed since the Turin-Lyon line was offi- cially launched, Italy’s institutions and political actors have been strik- ingly united in their support for the project. The doubts and second thoughts seen in France have been absent on the Italian side. Central government has taken on the main responsibility for pushing the project forward in Italy, with the Ministry of Public Works (renamed the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport) and the office of the prime minister playing particularly important roles. These have nominated their own representatives to the Franco-Italian intergovernmental conference and have worked hard (and successfully) to overcome prob- lems raised by their French counterparts. At the national level, the state railway company, serving as the government’s operating arm, has directly managed all planning phases of both the Italian and, through its role in the LTF company, the international sections of the line. The strongest support and pressure for the high-speed line in Italy has come from the North-West, and Piedmont in particular, where the new rail connection is seen by business, political, and institutional actors as essential in order to obtain greater access to Europe. The Piedmont region and the province and city councils of Turin have therefore provided constant, unanimous, and resolute support for a project over the planning of which, however, they have had little influ- ence, given that it is managed nationally by the state railways. The major industrialists in Turin also sought to promote the rail line by set- ting up the Transpadana Committee, headed first by Umberto Agnelli and then Sergio Pininfarina (currently its honorary president), which over time secured support from across the whole of the Po Valley and established itself as the main lobby backing the new line. Finally, it is important to note that political support for the Turin-Lyon line has been completely bipartisan, with the result that changes in power at national, regional, and local levels have not affected the commitment of the various government institutions to the project. Opposition in the Valley Opposition to the TAV in the Val di Susa began to emerge in the early 1990s on two fronts that, although distinct, cooperated and were in contact with one another.

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