Keiji Nishitani and Karl Rahner: a Response to Nihility

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Keiji Nishitaniand KarlRahner: A Responseto Nihility

HeidiAnn Russell Instituteof Pastoral Studies at LoyolaUniversity Chicago

In his essay"Kenosis and Emptiness,"Buddhist scholar Masao Abe statesthat "the necessityof tackling the Buddhist-Christian dialogue not merelyin termsof interfaith dialogue,but also as an inseparablepart of the wider socioculturalproblem of religion versusirreligion has become moreand morepressing in the past fewdecades." 1 From Keiji Nishitani'sperspective a cultureof self-centerednesshas developed out of the inabilityof many people to move beyond a sense of nihilismin theirlives. Furthermore,technological advances and an increasedunderstanding of the laws of naturehave allowed humans to manipulatethose laws for theirown purposes.In thisdevelopment, Nishitani believes that "the perversion that occurred in the original relationshipof man to the laws of naturehas takenthe shape of a fundamental intertwiningof the mechanizationof man and his transformationinto a subjectin pursuitof its desires,at the groundof whichnihility has opened up as a senseof the meaninglessnessof thewhole business."2 Both Nishitaniand Karl Rahnersee in the developmentof scienceand technology a tendencyto manipulatethe laws of naturefor one's own benefitin a way that increasesthe self-centerednessand self-absorptionof humankindwhile at the same timedevaluing humanity and engenderingan attitudeof meaninglessness.In a world today thatis confrontedwith issues such as war and global warmingand in which religiouscommunities are tryingto make sense out of scientificissues such as stem cell researchand cloning,the abilityto addressa nihilisticstandpoint that sees the surroundingworld as simplybeing at human disposal has neverbeen more crucial. So how does one confrontthis crisisof a nihilisticculture? Abe recommendsthat both Buddhism and Christianityneed "to pursue a fundamentalreorganization in characterizingtheir faith such that the prevailingbasic assumptionsare drastically changed-for example,a revolutionaryreinterpretation of the concept of God in Christianityand the concept of Emptinessin Buddhism-therebyallowing a new paradigmor model of understandingto emerge."3The concept of emptinessor nothingnessin Keiji Nishitani'sReligion and Nothingnessand the concept of God as incomprehensiblemystery in the theologyof Karl Rahner4could allow for the

Buddhist-ChristianStudies 28 (2008). © by Universityof Hawai'i Press.All rightsreserved.

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emergenceof a modelof understandingthat addresses the problem of irreligion or nihilityfrom an interreligiousperspective.' While in no waynegating the very real dissimilaritiesbetween the concepts of Nishitani and Rahneror therespective reli- gioustraditions of whichthey are a part,one neednot thinkof theirconcepts as diametricallyopposed to one anotherin sucha waythat dialogue is impossible.To thateffect, this essay will explore the common ground between Nishitani's concept of sunyatd6(often translated or definedas kulemptinessor mu/nothingness)and Rahner'sincomprehensible God basedon theirinterpretations ofthe human experienceof meaninglessness and the need for a surrenderofthe self that manifests itself in one'sloving relationship with others. Common human experience, such as theexpe- rienceof death or meaninglessness,and theinterpretations ofthat experience found in variousreligions can provideground from which to begininterreligious dialogue. One cansearch for a connectionbetween the religious concepts by looking at the way theymake sense out of a commonaffective experience without requiring an absolute identitybetween the cognitive religious concepts themselves.8 The importantpoint of comparisonis notmanufacturing a false identity between the concepts, but the waythe concepts work within the living communities to moveone to volitive action. In thisway the practical or ethical implications of the concepts and how they are lived out in theworld become the focus. In thework of Nishitani and Rahner,that com- monhuman experience is themeaninglessness encountered in theworld today and thecall fora selflesslove that will transcend such meaninglessness. In their roles as philosopher-theologians,both Nishitani and Rahnerhave probably had moreinflu- enceon individualsor leaderswithin certain Buddhist and Christiancommunities ratherthan by having specific living communities that are founded on or dedicated to theirthought.9 Working out the practical or ethicalimplications of their thought thusshows how they can continue to be relevantto communitiesof faith today.

EMPTINESS IN THE THOUGHT OF KEIJI NISHITANI Nishitani'sunderstanding ofemptiness or absolutenothingness in hisbook Religion and Nothingness1ocan be explicatedby lookingat how Nishitaniunderstands the humanexperience of nihility,how he seesemptiness as a realitythat grounds even theexperience of nihility, and finallythe resultant need for an understandingofthe non-self.Nishitani speaks of theexperience of nihilityas an existentialof human existence.The experienceof nihility is partof what it meansto be human,and it is thepoint at whichone can beginthe religious quest. Nishitani describes nihility as "thatwhich renders meaningless the meaning of life.When we becomea question to ourselvesand whenthe problem of why we existarises, this means that nihility hasemerged from the ground of our existence and that our very existence has turned intoa questionmark." ii Atthis point of meaninglessness one questionsthe purpose oflife and ofhuman existence. Nishitani attributes this experience and thedeepen- ingof awareness that results from the experience to thecommon human experience ofdeath. He statesthat "our life runs up againstdeath at itsevery step; we keepone footplanted in thevale of death at alltimes. Our lifestands poised at thebrink of the

This content downloaded from 147.126.10.37 on Thu, 14 May 2015 18:52:26 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions KEIJINISHITANI AND KARL RAHNER 29 abyssof nihilityto whichit mayreturn at anymoment. Our existenceis an existence at one with non-existence,swinging back and forthover nihility, ceaselessly passing awayand ceaselesslygaining its existence. This is what is called the 'incessantbecom- ing' of existence."12 It is preciselywhen one runs up againstthe frailtyof human existence,the real- ization thatlife can end much more quicklythan it began, thatone beginsto question whetheror not lifeis meaningful.For Nishitani,this experienceof death and finitenesscauses a void or an abyssto appear,in the faceof which "not one of all the thingsthat had made up the stuffof lifeuntil then is of any use." 13Everything that has givenone's lifemeaning up to thatpoint suddenly ceases to be meaningfulas one looks at thegaping hole of nonexistenceon whosebrink one stands.It is at thispoint, Nishitanimaintains, that all thingslose theirnecessity and utility.'"One no longer asks the purpose of thingsfor oneself-that is, in what way are theynecessary and usefulto me-but ratherone beginsto ask what is one's own purpose."5This question thatone is, forNishitani, is the beginningof the religiousquest. To stop at the point of the yawningabyss of meaninglessnessis nihilism,but Nishitaniinsists that one must look to thatwhich groundseven the abyssof nihilism,absolute nothingness or sunyata. In the glossaryof the Englishtranslation of Nishitani'sReligion and Nothingness, JanVan Bragtdefines emptiness or fnyata as follows:"In accordwith the imagesug- gestedby theChinese character,it is said to be 'skylike'and is comparedin thetext to an all-encompassingcosmic sky."16 In Religionand NothingnessNishitani uses both "emptiness"and "absolutenothingness" to referto thisreality. According to Walden- fels,Nishitani eventually comes to replacethe term"absolute nothingness" with the term"emptiness" in his work "in memoryof" Nagarjuna.'7To describeemptiness, it is firstnecessary to understandwhat emptinessis not.On the one hand, Nishitani maintainsthat emptinessis not a nihilistic,positivistic, or materialisticatheism.'8 On the otherhand, he also deniesthat it is theismor pantheism.'9Nishitani objects to the fact that "'nothingness'is generallyforced into a relationshipwith 'being' and made to serveas its negation,leading to its conceptionas somethingthat 'is' nothingnessbecause it 'is not' being."20This understandingof nothingnesswould be nihilistic.Nishitani maintains that "insofaras one stops here,nothingness remains a concept,a nothingnessonly in thought.Absolute nothingness wherein even that is' is negated,is not possibleas a nothingnessthat is thoughtbut onlya nothingness thatis lived."21For Nishitaninothingness must have ethicalimplications. However, despitethese objections to a nothingnessthat is thought,unlike Nagarjuna, Nishitani does givea positivecontent to the understandingof nothingness.Nishitani describes emptinessas encompassingall things,including nihility. He statesthat "it is a cosmic skyenveloping the earthand man and countlesslegions of starsthat move and have theirbeing within it. It lies beneaththe ground we tread,its bottom reaching beneath thevalley's bottom. If theplace wherethe omnipresentGod residesbe called heaven, then heaven would also have to reach beneath the bottomlesspit of hell: heaven would be an abyssfor hell. This is the sense in which emptinessis an abyssfor the abyssof nihility."22Going beyondNishitani's definition, the termemptiness as it is

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describedhere implies the conceptof opennessor space. This emptinessor openness holds all thingswithin it. It is the womb of God thatencompasses and makesroom withinit forthat which is other. Nishitanihimself, in his effortsto build a bridgebetween Eastern and Western thought,connects the idea of emptinessto Christiandoctrine. Nishitani connects this understandingof selflessnessor snyata to the nondifferentiatinglove of God in Christianity.He uses "the biblical analogythat tellsus thereis no such thingas selfishor selectivesunshine"23 to describesuch nondifferentiatinglove. As the sun shineson the good and the bad alike,so too does the love of God. He identifiesthis Christiananalogy with the Great CompassionateHeart of Buddhism.24By reason of this nondifferentiatinglove, Nishitanidoes not call God personalor impersonal but transpersonal,the groundof a personalrelationship with God. He understands God as impersonallypersonal or personallyimpersonal, as an impersonalperson or a personal nonperson.25 The idea of sunyatagrounds the idea of the transpersonalGod. Sunyatais the fieldthat provides the space forrelationships of any kind,including the relationship betweena personand God. He states,"it is onlyon the fieldof thissame emptiness that God and man, and the relationshipsbetween them, are constitutedin a personal Form,and thattheir respective representations are made possible."26Nishitani draws on MeisterEckhart's understanding of God and Godhead in orderto make thisdistinction between God and the representationof God. The emptinessof God allows us to conceiveof God in a personalway and to relateto thatrepresentation of God. Emptinessis thatwhich is the mostnear to us and the mostfar from us, most personaland yetnondifferentiating. Nishitani uses the imageof anglesto describeit as the point whereO0 is at the same time3600, the point at which the absolutenear side is also the absolutefar side.27 The idea of God makingroom forthat which is otheris also seen in Nishitani's understandingof theChristian doctrine of creatioex nihilo.He understandsthis doc- trinein termsof theabsolute distinctness of all thingsfrom God and theirgrounding in nihilum,yet at thesame timebeing sustained in existencethrough God.28 Nishitani explainsthe omnipresenceand absoluteimmanence of God throughthis doctrine of creationfrom nothing as thatwhich makes God absolutelytranscendent.29 Nishitani arguesthat "the God beforewhom all of creationis as nothingmakes himself present throughall of creation.The Christianmust be able to pick up a singlepebble or blade of grassand see the same consumingfire of God and the pillarof fire,hear the same thunderousroar, and feelthe same 'fearand trembling'that Moses experienced."30 The Christiandoes not experiencethis presenceof God in a pantheisticway, as if the pebble or the blade of grassis God, but experiencesGod preciselybecause the pebble or blade ofgrass is notGod, but is createdby God. Nishitaniexplains that "the being of the createdis groundedupon a nothingnessand seen fundamentallyto be a nothingness.At the same time,it is an immanenceof absolute affirmation,for the nothingnessof thecreated is theground of its being.This is theomnipresence of God in all thingsthat have theirbeing as a creatioex nihilo."31The interdependenceof absolutenegation and absoluteaffirmation grounds the Christian'sneed and ability

This content downloaded from 147.126.10.37 on Thu, 14 May 2015 18:52:26 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions KEIJI NISHITANI AND KARL RAHNER 31 to die to selfand live in God.32Such an understandingof the interdependenceof all thingsgrounded in theircreation by God out of nothingshould thenhave an impact on how people treatone anotherand the createdworld in whichwe live. No longer can one see theworld and otherhuman beingsas beingfor one's own subjectionand use; now,in theexperience of God in and throughwhat is other,one mustsee oneself at the serviceof God in and throughservice to God's creation.This conceptwill be developedin the sectionon Rahner'sunderstanding of the unityof love of God and love of neighbor. For Nishitani,however, the realityof theworld is thatmany do not move beyond nihilism,thus causinga crisisof modernculture that results in a rampantself-centeredness.One becomes caught up in a bittercircle in which nihilitybecomes the groundof a self-centerednessthat results in a continualdevaluation of life,and thus increasesthe experienceof meaninglessness.Nishitani notes that "withthe advance of the rationalizationof life,yet standingbehind it, anotherstandpoint continues to gatherstrength: the growingaffirmation of a prereflectivehuman mode of being that is totallynon-rational and non-spiritual,the stance of the subject that locates itselfon nihilityas it pursuesits own desiresunreservedly."33 Nishitani critiques the use of technologyand the abilityto manipulatethe laws of natureas contributing to the self-centerednessof humankind.He extendshis critiqueto the way in which countriesare governed,noting that the communistgovernments maintain a totali- tarianismthat results in the mechanizationof institutionsand of humans,while the liberalistgovernments equate the freedomof individualswith the freedomof a subject to pursueits own desires.34Both systemsare groundedon nihilityand resultin a humanityabsorbed in meaninglessnessand selfishness. Nishitaniconfronts this nihilisticculture with the beliefthat thereis a reality beyondnihility, and thatreality is Sunyata,the emptiness that grounds the experience of nihility.The problemwith nihilismis that it objectifiesnothingness, making it into some "thing."35 Nishitani explains: "nihility comes to be representedas some- thingoutside of the existenceof the selfand all things,as some 'thing'absolutely otherthan existence, some 'thing'called nothingness."36Nishitani advocates a "lived nothingness"that manifests itself in selflessnessor the non-selfinstead of a nihility thatresults in selfishness. The idea of lived nothingnessis a call to conversionin which "the negationof person-centerednessmust amount to an existentialself-negation of man as person."37 But forNishitani, "in thiskind of existentialconversion, the self does not cease being a personal being. What is leftbehind is only the person-centeredmode of being whereinthe personis caughtup in itself.In thatvery conversion the personalmode of being becomes more real,draws closer to the self,and appears in its true suchness.When person-centeredself-prehension is broken down and nothingnessis really actualizedin the self,personal existence also comes reallyand trulyto actualization in the self."38It is only in the negationof the selfas a whollyindependent entity thatone is able to be trulyin relationship.In such a negationof self,one no longer understandsoneself as a subjectover and againstall otherthings, things that are then seen as objects.Rather, one comes to understandthe interrelatedness of all thingsand

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thefact that it is preciselythat interrelatedness that allows one tohave and be a "self." The comingto awarenessof one'sinterrelatedness is intrinsically connected to the experienceof nihilityin whichone realizesthat for friends and strangersalike, one can neverknow where they came from or where they are going, thus both are to the samedegree "unknown." 39 ForNishitani, this nihility occurs with a fieldof emptiness"on which an essentialencounter can take place between entities normally taken to be mostdistantly related, even at enmitywith each other, no lessthan those that aremost closely related."40 In a worldof increasing global conflict, one must come to realizethat one is mostoneself in recognizingone's oneness with all others,even with one'senemies. Thus Nishitani goes on tosay that "we have here an absoluteself-iden- tityin whichthe one and theother are truly themselves, at once absolutely broken apartand absolutelyjoined together. They are an absolutetwo and at thesame time an absoluteone.""4 It is preciselyin our differencesand in thebrokenness of our humanitythat we shouldcome to recognizeour oneness.Note thesimilar ethical implicationsof the Christian teaching to loveone's enemies and theteaching found inthe story of the good Samaritan that one should not differentiate between people in decidingwho is one'sneighbor because all people are one's neighbor. Nishitani asserts that"this lack of selfishness is what is meantby non-ego or 'emptiness'(inyata)." 42 Sznyata,as a responseto thethreat of nihility in ourworld, must be experiencedand lived.Having examined Nisitani's understanding ofthe human experience of nihility as groundedin iSnyataand havingseen that the result of living iunyata should be a self-negationthat allows for a self-givingrelationship with others, the next section turnsto thetheology of Karl Rahner. Nishitani provides a sound dialogue partner for KarlRahner because they both ground their religious concepts in a responseto the humanexperience of meaningless found in theinterdependence ofall creation.

THE INCOMPREHENSIBLE GOD OF KARL RAHNER KarlRahner maintains that the "struggle against atheism is alwaysand foremosta struggleagainst a viewof God whichis in dangerof replacingthe true, incompre- hensibleGod bya humanidol."43 He also pointsout thatan allianceof religions basedon whatthey hold in commondespite their divergences could be employedin thestruggle against atheism.44 His theologymakes an effortto callone backto the incomprehensibilityofGod. This theologyof the incomprehensible God allowsfor a dialoguebetween his thoughtand thethought of Keiji Nishitani.The common groundfor the two respective understandings of reality, as was statedabove, is the humanexperience of meaninglessness and thecall for selflessness and self-surrender in theface of that meaningless. As Nishitanisaw humanexistence as a questionof meaning,so too does Karl Rahner.Rahner, like Nishitani, sees the question that human existence is as aris- ingfrom the existential experience of death and alienation.Rahner responds to the humanexperience of meaninglessness byexplicating an understandingof God that can groundthat experience in absolutemeaning, thus providing the answer to the questionthat is humanexistence.

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Rahnermaintains that "human existenceitself makes man feellonely, as ifplaced into emptiness,as if involvedin an infinitefall." 45 Rahner'sunderstanding of the humanexperience of emptinessechoes Nishitani's understanding of theexperience of nihility.Rahner describes the feeling of emptinessas being"surrounded by an infinite ocean of darknessand an immenseunexplored night-always merelymanaging to survivefrom one contingencyto another."46Like Nishitani,Rahner also associates thisexperience with the human realityand consciousnessof death.The one experience thatevery human mustface is death. Rahnerstates that the human "feelsdeath livingwithin him in the midstof his life.He feelshow deathis the finallimit beyond which he himselfcannot pass."47In the face of death one begins to question the meaningfulnessof human existence. Rahner also notes that the meaninglessnessand selfishnessof human existence can be theconsequence of modernadvances in science.48The questionthat is human existencearises because of the contemporarysituation of livingin a world in which humans put themselvesat the center,seeing all otherthings for their own use and control,even theirfellow human beings.Nishitani argues that this attitudeis pre- ciselywhat leads to dehumanization.Rahner notes that"we live in an age in which man activelymanipulates the world and himself,in which theworld, far from being thoughtof in concreteterms as subjectto the controlof heavenlypowers, becomes the object of rationalresearch and a quarryof arid factsfrom which man drawshis materialsfor the constructionof thatworld which he plans accordingto his own image and likeness,and wherethere seems to be room forwonder only whereman himselfis absentfrom the scene."49The worldthat Rahner describes is one whereit becomesharder to findany meaningbecause humanityis alwaysplaced at the center of realityinstead of God. Communitiesof faithtoday must face a world in environ- mentalcrisis because of the consequencesof placingall of creationat the serviceof humankind.Society at large,as well as faithcommunities, will struggleto balance thegoodness of advancingscientific knowledge with the ethical implications of those advances in science and technology.Humans today have an unparalleledability to manipulatethe world around them and even manipulatehumanity itself through advancesin geneticsand cloning.50Abuses of human rightsin situationsof war and evenin themarket economy abound so thatthe destruction or devaluationof human lifeis too oftensimply understood as collateraldamage. The resultof such a worldis a common human experienceof meaninglessness. Ideally the existentialsituation of meaninglessnessleads to the realizationthat by one's verynature one is a questionto which thereis no answerto be foundother thanthe incomprehensibleGod. As will be explainedbelow, the answer becomes rel- evantin our livedreality when one understandsthat for Rahner the experience of the incomprehensibleGod is mediatedthrough one's relationto and interdependence with the world in which we live. Rahnernotes thatwe can remainin the comfort zone whereGod and realityare comprehensible,but "we can do thisonly with the aid of rationalistictheory and . .. the bitternessof life'sfrustrations bring us up continu- allyagainst this marginal experience, so thatat mostwe maywonder whether what is beyondthis field of clearknowledge and autonomouslypracticable plans amountsto

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a fallinto an abysmalmeaninglessness or to beingcaught up bya shelteringincom- prehensibilityrelieving us purelyand simplyof ourselvesand our question."51In otherwords, a rational,comprehensible idea of God fallsshort in making sense out of theexperience of nihility in life.In theend one must make a choicebetween trusting thatall oflife is headedtoward the ultimate meaning found in theincomprehensible mysteryof God, or giving in to a nihilisticdespair.52 ForRahner, the answer to the question of the meaninglessness ofhuman existence is God. He assertsthat God is meaning,but not meaning as one usuallyunderstands theterm. It is notthat which comes within our grasp, but rather the meaning that, as incomprehensible,grounds all concrete,comprehensible meaning.53 Rahner argues that"it is onlyin fallinginto an unfathomableabyss that we graspthe individual realityto whichwe cancling." 54 In Rahner'slanguage of an abyssthat grounds all of concreteknowledge, one is remindedof Nishitani's understanding ofthe emptiness thatgrounds all distinctions. As Nishitaniexplains lunyatd as absolutenearness and absolutedistance, Rahner describesthe incomprehensible God, seeminglyso distantin thevery fact of God's incomprehensibility,as precisely what is closestbecause it is whatgrounds human existence.One is remindedof Nishitani's image of angles to describelnyata as the placewhere O0 is atthe same time 3600. Rahner believes "the experience that the basis of man'sexistence is theabyss: that God is essentiallythe inconceivable" 55is what groundshuman transcendence. Elsewhere Rahner speaks of the human's "inescapable experienceof the fact that he is groundedin the abyss of the insoluble mystery" 56and thatthis mystery is to be understoodas fulfillingnearness. As absolutenearness, this mysteryof God is notto be consideredimpersonal, even though God as personalis alwaysto be understoodin lightof God's incomprehensibility anddissimilarity from ourselves.57 For Rahner the resultof the experienceof understandinghuman existenceas a questionabout the meaning of life combined with finding the answer in theincom- prehensibleGod is theneed to surrenderoneself to thatmystery. In doingso, one findsoneself in a stancethat is verysimilar to Nishitani's"non-self"--that is,in a stanceof giving up autonomyfor love. For Rahner this stance manifests itself in the loveof one's neighbor, a love that is exemplifiedinJesus Christ. Rahnermaintains that the "actin whichman can allowfor and acceptGod's incomprehensibility. . . is theact of self-surrenderinglovetrusting entirely in this veryincomprehensibility, in which knowledge surpasses itself, rising to its super- nature,and is awareof itselfonly by becominglove." 58 In a worldin whichone is facedwith the threat of meaninglessness,surrendering to the incomprehensible God thatgrounds all existencemeans recognizing the interrelatedness of all things and reachingout to all existencein love.Rahner fully realizes that such a trusting surrenderis not an easytask. In facthe statesthat "it is easierto letoneself fall into one'sown emptiness than into the abyss of the Blessed Mystery. But it is notmore courageousor true."59 In otherwords, nihility is an easierchoice than surrendering to love,but it is preciselythe more difficult task of surrendering to God thatone is calledto as a humanperson. Rahner also notes that one can never be certainif one is

This content downloaded from 147.126.10.37 on Thu, 14 May 2015 18:52:26 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions KEIJINISHITANI AND KARL RAHNER 35 reallyaccepting "this 'blinding' darkness into which we plungeourselves and become incomprehensibleto ourselves" or if"we are ultimately taking refuge in a desperate actof self-assertion."60 Rahnerargues that even in one's"striving to assertoneself as autonomous,"one alwaysknows "the possibility of self-surrenderinglove,"''61 and forthat reason one remainsunhappy in one'sself-autonomy. The moreone assertsoneself in individu- alisticand autonomousways, subjecting the world to one'sown purposes, the more meaninglessone findsthe world to be. It is onlyin "theloving leap intothe one possibility(accepting the incomprehensibility ofGod)" that"the other possibility (of isolatedself-possession) no longer exists." 62 In surrenderingoneself to God,one gives up theself-centeredness ofseeing oneself as separatefrom all others,and precisely in thissurrender to whatis otherone findsoneself. This surrenderto God manifests itselfin thelove of one's neighbor precisely because one nowunderstands oneself as interrelatedto all thingsthrough God. Rahnerexplains that "the experience of life is an experienceof other persons, one in whichmaterial objects are encountered as elementsconnected with, and surroundingconcrete persons and nototherwise.... The 'I' is alwaysrelated to a 'Thou,'arising at thesame moment in the'Thou' as in the'I,' experiencingitself in all casesonly in itsencounter with the other person." 63 In thegiving up ofoneself one is ableto recognizeand realizeone's own subjectivity as wellas thesubjectivity ofone's neighbor-a stance that is humanizinginstead of dehumanizing.64The dangerinherent in thisview remains the possibility of seeing theother simply as a meansto one'sown self-actualization and realizationof one's subjectivity.To do so,however, would be inherentlyself-contradicting andnegate the veryprocess that Rahner is attemptingto describein which one findsoneself only in givingoneself in love. This givingover of oneself to theother in a waythat defies all humanreason is exemplifiedfor Rahner in Jesus Christ. For Rahner the occurrence of this "irrational" lovein themidst of one's everyday life is theplace where "the last renunciation and thelast surrender to God can occur,"which in turn"admits us to a participation in thefinal deed of Jesus on thecross." 65 Rahnerunderstands the surrender to the incomprehensibleGod thatmanifests itself in a selflesslove of one's neighbor to be theground of a personalrelationship with our incomprehensibleGod. He states that

we haveto enterJesus' fate and giveourselves over in faith,hope and loveto hisunconditional love for his fellow men and hisdeath. We haveto liveand die withhim in theempty darkness of his death.We shallthen learn in his Spirithow to associatewith God himselfbeyond the reality of this world, how to fallwithout perishing into this inexpressibly mysterious God, whose judg- mentsare so incomprehensible,and how therefore to discover the ultimate and definitivereality beyond this life. If the Christian has a personaland direct love forJesus and letsJesus' life and fatebecome the inner form and entelechyof hisown life, he willinevitably find that Jesus is theway, the truth, and thelife and thathe willtake him to theFather. He willalso discoverthat he is able to callthe incomprehensible God Father,even though he is namelessand that

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thisGod, who is without a nameand a way,can still be hishome and give him eternallife.66

This admittedlylong citation provides an excellentsummary of Rahner'sposition. One surrendersto theincomprehensibility ofGod byentering into Jesus's uncondi- tionallove for humanity and hisabsolute surrender into God's incomprehensibility thatculminated in his death. In doingso, one finds the meaning of human existence, and theGod thatseemed so distantin God'sincomprehensibility is found to be the mostnear, Abba, the very ground of one's existence. The answerto theexperience of nihilityis to recognizethat our very being is groundedin interconnectedness. Rahner concludesthat "on the one hand the experience of God andthe experience of self are one,and on theother that the experience of self and the encounter with neighbor are one,that all thesethree experiences ultimately constitute a single reality with three aspectsmutually conditioning one another." 67When a faithcommunity is grounded in theoneness of self, other, and God, a counterculturalapproach to issues of individ- ualism,materialism, human exploitation, and the future of the created world emerges thattakes as itsstarting point that one's own well-being, and in factone's very existence,is dependenton thewell-being and existence of the other.

CONCLUSION In lookingat thetheologies of Keiji Nishitaniand KarlRahner, one findsa point of connectionat whicha dialoguecan occurbetween a Buddhistand a Christian. Thispoint of connection is thecommon human experience of contemporary culture thatmakes one questionthe ultimate purpose and meaningof life.Both theolo- giansrespond with an understandingof reality,Sinyata and an incomprehensible God respectively,that grounds human existence and encompasses the emptiness that humanpersons experience. When one acceptseither understanding of reality,the resultis a surrenderof self to thatreality that manifests itself in an interdependence withand a radicallove for all ofhumanity. In lookingat thesesimilarities between Rahner's concept of God and Nishitani's conceptof emptiness, itis important to rememberthat there cannot be a strictidentity betweenthe two concepts of reality. One importantdistinction to maintainbetween Rahnerand Nishitaniis thatwhile Nishitani's primary metaphor is emptinessthat surroundsthe emptiness in thehuman person, Rahner's primary metaphor is abso- lutefullness as thatwhich fills the emptiness in thehuman person. The distinction is important,but not one thatputs the two concepts in oppositionto one another, especiallyconsidering Nishitani's understanding that absolute emptiness is absolute fullness,and Rahner'sdescription of the absolute fullness as an abyss. Interreligiousdialogue should not aim for a uniformconcept of reality. The goal is notthat all religionsbe identical,but rather that all religionsbe respectfulof one another'sdifferences while together seeking to furtherthe common good of humanity.To thatend it is helpful to put Rahner and Nishitani in dialogue with one another in orderto givea responseto theexperience of meaninglessnessin contemporary

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APPENDIX: SUNYATA IN BUDDHISM68 Buddhismis a religionthat has seen not only the development of thought that occurs overtime, but the development that results from the transplantation ofthought into differentcultures. Buddhism has developed both chronologically and geographically. The religionbegan in Indiaduring the 6th century BCE with the man Siddhartha Gautama,a Hinduwho became known as theBuddha or theawakened/enlightened one and who advocated"the middle way" between a lifein theworld and a lifeof asceticism.69'The rootsof the concept of iunyata, or emptiness,can be foundin the earlyBuddhist concepts of anatmanand pratityasamtpda- that is, non-selfand dependentco-origination.70 These two concepts advocate a mutualinterdependence ofall thatexists and a negationof self as an independentsubject. Hans Waldenfels describesthem in correlationas "theidea that there is no suchthing as an indepen- dent,self-supporting world substance; instead all beingsin theworld, in virtueof theirdependency, have their being from and in dependencyon one another."71 The conceptof Sinyata,incorporating the concepts of non-selfand dependent co-origination,is given a centralrole in Buddhistthought and practice by the second centuryCE Mah~yanaBuddhist philosopher Ngarjuna in theMdhyamika school ofBuddhism. Sinyata is understoodin this school as absolutenegation, including the negationof negation. All concepts are empty of meaning in theMadhyamika school includingthe concept of s'unyatd,therefore even to saySunyat is false.It is theidea of"not this, not that." As soonas onethinks one has understood, one has proved the levelof one's misunderstanding. Abraham Vilez de Cea explainsthat for Nagarjuna idnyatahas both a cognitiveand an affectiveintent in which the "cognitive abandon- mentand relinquishingofviews of absolute identity is inseparablefrom the affective cessationof attachment to theabsolute identity of persons and things."72 As Gregory Ornatowskipoints out, for Nagarjuna idnyata has a mainlysotierological function.73 In otherwords, the concept has a practicalintent, which is to negateall conceptsof an "absolutereality" in orderthat his followers might experience absolute reality. Orna- towskistates that "for Nagarjuna 'emptiness' was thus ultimately a soteriological aid towardenlightenment, not a philosophyitself. By denying all pointsof view it was theassertion that only meditation and nonattachmentto any views was theanswer. Anyattempt to constructa philosophy, especially a Western-styleone, based upon emptinessshould be impossibleif one remainstrue to whatseems to be Nagrjuna's originalintent. This is thefundamental contradiction within the thought of these threeKyoto-school philosophers [Nishida, Nishitani, and Abe]." 4 Forthis reason, it is importantto makea distinctionbetween the original concept of idnyat found in thework of Nagarjuna and theway the concept came to be understoodin theKyoto school.75The Kyotoschool, however, is drawingnot simply on theconcept of sunyatd as itwas understood by Ngarjuna, but on theway it hasbeen historically and geo- graphicallydeveloped. Within the Madhyamika school itself"Absolute Reality came

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to be ascribedto suchnotions as tathatd(suchness), tathgatagarbha (womb of Bud- dhahood),and dharmakdya(absolute truth body of theBuddha) and was viewed as what'remained' after the radical 'emptying' of all things'substantive nature,"''76 despitethe fact that Naigarjuna himself never used these terms. One ofthe schools that developed out of the Madhyamika school is theYogacara school(ca. 300 CE).The textsof this school become the focus of the Chinese Ch'an school(Zen in Japan).What is importantto notein thisdevelopment is thatin theYogacara school, Nagarjuna's concept of emptiness becomes identified with pure consciousness.7Along with the Yogicara texts, Zen emphasizesthe older Wisdom Sutrasthat teach the formula form is emptinessand emptiness is form.7"In translat- ingNishitani's work, Van Bragt notes that "form" can be understoodas "thing"in this equationand is relatedto Nishitani'sformula of beingis nothingnessand nothingnessis being.79 Havingtraced the important aspects of the concept of emptiness in theBuddhist lineagedown to theZen school,one arrivesat theKyoto school, to whichNishi- tanibelongs. The Kyotoschool simply designates "a wayof philosophizing-more a philosophicalethos than a unifiedsystem of thought--whichdeveloped in the departmentof philosophyand religionat theState University of Kyotounder the initialinspiration of Kitaro Nishida (1870-1945)." s80 Van Bragt describes the Kyoto school'sbasic characteristics as "a thoroughgoingloyalty to its own traditions, a com- mittedopenness to Westerntraditions, and a deliberateattempt to bringabout a synthesisof East and West." '81 It is in thecontext of this history that one can look at theconcept of emptiness in KeijiNishitani's work Religion and Nothingness.

NOTES 1.Masao Abe, "Kenosis and Emptiness," inBuddhist Emptiness and Christian Trinity: Essays andExplorations, ed.Roger Corless and Paul Knitter (New York: Paulist Press: 1990), 6. 2. KeijiNishitani, Religion and Nothingness, trans. Jan Van Bragt (Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress, 1982), 88. 3. Abe,"Kenosis and Emptiness," 6. 4. ReferencestoRahner's applicable works follow in the notes to section 2. Itis noted here thatany dialogue between Christianity andanother religion must factor in Jesus Christ. While thescope of this article does not address the role of Christ in the Buddhist-Christian dialogue, severalexcellent works have been done relating the concept of emptiness inBuddhism tothe conceptof kenosis as itrelates to Christ in Christianity. SeeBuddhist Emptiness and Christian Trinity,as wellas DivineEmptiness and HistoricalFullness: A BuddhistJewish Christian Con- versationwith Masao Abe, ed. Christopher Ives (Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press International, 1995) and Hans Waldenfels,Absolute Nothingness: Foundations for a Buddhist-ChristianDia- logue,trans, by J. W. Heisig (New York:Paulist Press,1980). For the perspectiveof an evan- gelicalChristian dialogue partner for Nishitani's work, see Russell H. BowersJr., Someone or Nothing?Nishitani's Religion and Nothingness as a Foundationfor Christian-Buddhist Dialogue, Asian Thought and Culture27 (New York:Peter Lang, 1995). 5. It should also be noted thatboth men studiedunder Heideggerand thatthis common philosophicalbackground most likelycontributes to manyof the similaritiesin the way they understandreality and the vocabularythey use to describe that reality.Unfortunately it is beyondthe scope of thisarticle to explorethat connection any further.

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6. Fora briefhistory of the concept of junyata in Buddhismthat provides the background forNishitani's work, see the appendix to thisarticle. 7. Fora morecomprehensive account of the incomprehensibility ofGod in theChristian tradition,see the followingarticles by Karl Rahnerin TheologicalInvestigations, Vol. XVI: Expe- rienceof theSpirit: Source of Theology,trans. David Morland (New York: Crossroad, 1983): "The Hiddennessof God," 227-243, and "AnInvestigation of theIncomprehensibility of God in St.Thomas Aquinas," 244-254. 8. One mustalso notethat the affective experience itself may vary due to thecognitive frameworkwithin which the experience occurs. 9. In theStanford Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy, Brett Davis notesin hisentry on theKyoto schoolthat "the Kyoto School is perhapsbecoming, for better and for worse, more an objectof scholarshipthan a predominantlyliving tradition. However, as withmost schools of philosophy,the line between critical scholarship and creativeappropriation is hardly a clearone, and in practicethe retrospective study of the Kyoto School often blends together with its further developmentas a vibrantschool of thought." Bret W. Davis,"The KyotoSchool," The Stan- fordEncyclopedia ofPhilosophy (spring 2006 ed.), ed. EdwardN. Zalta,http://plato.stanford .edularchives/spr2006/entries/kyoto-school/. 10. See alsoHase Shoto,"Nihilism, Science, and Emptiness in Nishitani,"Buddhist-Chris- tianStudies 19 (1999): 139-154,and theresponse to thatarticle, Ryusei Takeda, "Religion and Science:Nishitani's View of Nihility and Emptiness-APure Land Critique,"Buddhist- ChristianStudies 19 (1999): 155-163. 11. Nishitani,Religion and Nothingness, 4. 12. Ibid. 13. Ibid.,3. 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid.,2. 16. Ibid.,296. 17. Waldenfels,Absolute Nothingness, 16. 18. Nishitani,Religion and Nothingness, 99. 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid.,70. 21. Ibid. 22. Ibid.,98. 23. Ibid.,60. 24. Ibid. 25. Ibid.,40-41. 26. Ibid.,99. 27. Ibid.,105-106. 28. Ibid.,37-38. 29. Ibid.,39. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid.,40. 32. Ibid. 33. Ibid.,86. 34. Ibid.,87. 35. Ibid.,95-96. 36. Ibid.,96. 37. Ibid.,70. 38. Ibid.,71. 39. Ibid.,100-101. 40. Ibid.,102. 41. Ibid.

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42. Ibid., 60. 43. Karl Rahner,"The Church and Atheism,"in TheologicalInvestigations, Vol. 21: Science and ChristianFaith, trans. Hugh Riley(New York:Crossroad, 1988), 148. 44. Ibid. 45. Karl Rahner,"Thoughts on the Possibilityof BeliefToday," in TheologicalInvestiga- tions,Vol. 5: Later Writings,trans. Karl-H. Kruger (Baltimore:Helicon Press, 1966), 5-6. Hereaftercited as TI 5:1. 46. Ibid., 6. 47. Ibid. 48. It mustbe noted herethat Rahner does not see scienceas incompatiblewith religion or as somehowinherently evil. His critiquehere simply regards one way in whichmodern science and technologyhas been used. 49. Karl Rahner,"Christian Living Formerly and Today" in TheologicalInvestigations, Vol. 7: FurtherTheolgogy of theSpiritual Life I, trans.David Bourke (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1971), 12. Hereaftercited as TI 7:1. 50. For example,the news recently carried a storyabout Catholic bishopsin England trying to formulatea responseto possible legislationin the United Kingdom thatwould allow the creationof embryosthat are human chimeras(injecting animal DNA into human embryos to create an animal/humanhybrid) for the purposes of research,so long as theywere not implantedand weredestroyed within two weeks.While standingfirmly against the creationof such beings,the bishopsnonetheless concluded thathaving partial animal geneticmaterial did not negatethe rightto lifeinvolved if the being also had partor mostlyhuman geneticmaterial.Jonathan Petre, "Chimera Embyros Have Rightto Life,Say Catholic Bishops," Telegraph. Co. UK, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/06/26/nchimera126 .xml,accessed June 30, 2007. 51. Karl Rahner,"The Human Question of Meaning in Face of the Absolute Mysteryof God," in TheologicalInvestigations, Vol. 18: God and Revelation,trans. Edward Quinn (New York:Crossroad, 1983), 99. Hereaftercited as TI 18:5. 52. Rahnerdoes not advocatesuch a choice as the resultof blind faith,but rathersees such a leap of faithas alwaysgrounded by human reason. 53. TI 18:5, 92, 94, 98. 54. Ibid., 98. 55. TI7:1, 15. 56. TI 5:1, 7. 57. Karl Rahner,"Justifying Faith in an AgnosticWorld" in TI 21, 134. Hereaftercited as T121:8. 58. TI21:8, 135. 59. TI 5:1, 8. 60. TI21:8, 135. 61. Karl Rahner,"Thomas Aquinas on theIncomprehensibility of God," JournalofReligion 58 supplement(1978): S124. 62. Ibid. 63. Karl Rahner,"The Experienceof Selfand the Experienceof God," in TheologicalInves- tigations,Vol. XIII: Theology,Anthropology, Christology, trans. David Bourke (New York: Sea- bury,1975), 127 (hereaftercited as TI 13:8). 64. Karl Rahner,The Love of esusand theLove ofNeighbor, trans. Robert Barr (New York: Crossroad,1983), 99-100. 65. Ibid., 103-104. Again I referthe readerto the work that has been done relatingthe kenosisof Christto theconcept of "emptiness"in the Kyotoschool of Buddhism.See footnote 4 above. 66. Karl Rahnerand WilhelmThiising, A New Christology,trans. David Smithand Verdant Green (New York:Seabury Press, 1980), 15.

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67. Rahner,TI 13:8, 127. 68. For more information,see FrederickJ. Streng,Emptiness: A Studyin ReligiousMeaning (Nashville,TN: AbingdonPress, 1967) and T. R. V. Murti, The CentralPhilosophy ofBuddhism (London: GeorgeAllen and Unwin, 1960). 69. Theodore de Bary,ed., The BuddhistTradition in India, China and Japan (New York: Random House Vintage Books, 1969), 6. 70. Hans Waldenfels,Absolute Nothingness: Foundations for a Buddhist-ChristianDialogue, trans.J. W. Heisig (New York:Paulist Press, 1980), 8-14. 71. Ibid., 14. 72. AbrahamVdlez de Cea, "A New Direction forComparative Studies of Buddhistsand Christians:Evidence fromNagarjuna and Johnof the Cross," Buddhist-ChristianStudies 26 (2006): 148. 73. GregoryOrnatowski, "Transformations of 'Emptiness':On the Idea of Sunyataand the Thought of Abe and the Kyoto School of Philosophy,"Journal of Ecumenical Studies 34 (1997): 95. 74. Ibid., 103. 75. See Ornatowski,100-103, foran account of fourmajor contrastsbetween the concept as it is used by Nagarjuna and the way it is used in the Kyoto school. 76. Ibid., 95. See also note 12. 77. Waldenfels,25. 78. Ibid., 26. For a moredetailed account of thisdevelopment, especially the development of the Yogacara school of thoughtin China under the influenceof Chi-I and Fa-tsung,see Ornatowski,96-99. 79. Nishitani,Religion and Nothingness,297, 303. Nishitaniuses the Latin sivehere, which could also be expressedas qua and is meantto implya reciprocalrelationship (303). 80. Ibid., "Translator'sIntroduction," xxviii. 81. Ibid.

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