World Polit Sci 2016; 12(2): 175–194

Yuko Sato* Criticising Einstein: Science, Politics, and International Relations during the Chinese

DOI 10.1515/wps-2016-0008

Abstract: In during the Cultural Revolution (CR), physicist became one of the main targets of criticism. Why did China criticise him, while it was developing nuclear weapons based on his theories? This article argues that basic research in China then was entangled in power struggle which con- tained a controversy over China’s handling of intellectuals and its conception of the West. Even during the CR, however, scientists’ struggle for building a high- energy accelerator continued. supported it for his own power struggle as well as China’s nuclear development. The incident and the Sino-US rapprochement provided Zhou and his group opportunities to undermine the CR’s logic. Thus, this article argues that rebuilding of basic research in China was intertwined with both domestic and international politics.

Keywords: Albert Einstein; China; China’s nuclear development; high-energy accelerator; the Lin Biao incident; the Sino-US rapprochement.

Original reference: Sato, Yuko (2015). “Bunkadaikakumeiki Chugoku ni okeru Ainshutain hihan – kagaku, seiji, kokusaikankei,” Kokusai Seiji, 179:126–41.

1 Introduction

During the Cultural Revolution (CR) in China, a wave of criticism of physicist Albert Einstein and his Theory of Relativity (TR) as ‘bourgeois, reactionary, aca- demic, and authoritarian’ rapidly spread in both and . Einstein had been a revered scientist in China since his theories were intro- duced. After the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet alliance in 1950, however, follow- ing the Soviet Communist Party, China began to criticise Einstein and his theory as ‘spiritualism’. Even though criticism was temporarily slowed when Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated in the early 1960s, it became revitalised during the CR,

*Corresponding author: Yuko Sato, Project Research Associate, Graduate School for Law and Politics, University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan, e-mail: [email protected] 176 Yuko Sato which began in 1966. In the period of the CR, criticism of Einstein was given another meaning in the context of two interweaving power struggles in domestic politics: the struggle over the reconstruction of the theoretical study of natural science and the struggle over the CR itself. How could theoretical study be an issue in a power struggle? The CR denounced the value of Western science and professionals trained in the West. However, China’s nuclear development was based on Einstein’s theory, and the promotion of basic theoretical study was needed for improving China’s existing nuclear weapons. Thus that led to a dilemma for political leaders. Among the literature on Einstein criticism during the CR, the article by Ju Zuoshi and must come first.1 Ju and Xu used the neibu (limited to the insiders) documents of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), precisely describ- ing the ups and downs of the criticism in Beijing and Shanghai from 1968 to 1976. Xu himself had been forced to join the criticism, and he critically described what was written and said for the duration of the criticism. Danian Hu traced how China received Einstein’s theories by way of Japan and began criticising him.2 Hu’s book precisely described contemporary Chinese scientists welcoming the new theories in the 1910s and 1920s; however, China drastically changed its attitude toward Einstein in the 1950s. With regard to the period of the CR, Hu’s book mainly based on Ju and Xu’s article and the interviews with Xu and its main focus is on the words and actions of the critical groups. Present literature precisely describes the contents of the criticism. Con- versely, it obscures the huge changes in both domestic and international politi- cal settings. For example, within almost a year after Boda, who played a central role in the criticism of Einstein in Beijing, fell out of favour with the party leadership, the Sino-US rapprochement and the Lin Biao incident occurred. The Sino-US rapprochement enabled scientists of both countries to communicate with each other. It meant the end of the criticism of ‘bourgeois academicism’. Moreover, Lin Biao’s alleged attempt at coup d’état made people sceptical of the CR. This article argues that both domestic and diplomatic political upheaval played a crucial role in the rise and fall of the criticism of Einstein. That enabled

1 Ju, Zuoshi and Xu, Liangying (1984). “Guangyu woguo ‘Wenhuadageming’ shiqi pipan Aiyinsi- tan he xiangduilun yundong de chubu kaozha”, Ziran Bianzhengfa Tongxun 6:6 December, 32–41 [hereafter ‘Ju and Xu (1984)]; Ju and Xu (1985). “Guanyu woguo ‘Wenhuadageming’ shiqi pipan Aiyinsitan he xiangduilun yundong de chubu kaocha (xuwan)”, Ziran Bianzhengfa Tongxun 7:1 February, 36–42 [hereafter ‘Ju and Xu (1985)]. 2 Hu, Danian (2006). China and Albert Einstein: the reception of the physicist and his theory in China, 1917–1979 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press). Criticising Einstein 177

Zhou Enlai to move on to rebuild theoretical study of science and to allow ­scientists to build a high-energy accelerator. This article uses the diaries of Zhu Kezhen, a vice president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), meteorologist and educator, to incorporate the per- spectives of his and his fellow scientists who were engaged in building nuclear weapons and a high-energy accelerator.

2 Prelude to the Criticism – Permeation of ‘Two Sciences’, and Zhou Enlai

After signing the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance in February 1950, China began insisting on the existence of classes in the fields of the natural sci- ences. The Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) published a translation of an article entitled ‘Bourgeois Science and Proletarian Science’ on its second issue in 1951.3 This piece insisted that natural science had two classes: ‘bourgeois science’ was not compatible with ‘proletarian science’. In 1953, an article by Stalin’s son-in-law, Yuri Zhdanov, which also criticised Einstein, was translated into Chinese by Gong Yuzhi and appeared in The People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao).4 Thus, criticism of Einstein in China began in the form of an import from the . On the other hand, China lacked human capital, particularly in the field of the natural sciences. Most scholars there had returned from studying in the United States or Europe. The most famous example was Zhou Peiyuan, a physi- cist who had joined Einstein’s lab at the Institute for Advanced Studies (IAS) in Princeton in the United States. Zhou was born in 1902 in Yixing, Province. He first entered Qinghua School (later Qinghua University) and then transferred to the , where he got a master’s degree. He obtained his Ph.D. summa cum laude at the California Institute of Technology (Caltech). He then studied quantum mechanics in both Germany and Switzerland, returning to China to assume a professorship at Qinghua University at the age of 27. During a 1-year sabbatical in 1936–1937, he joined a team researching the theory of relativ- ity led by Einstein at the IAS. During the Sino-Japanese War and the , he stayed in the United States from 1943 to October 1946, and conducted

3 Desandi Daxier Fansaiyi (Xu Jizeng trans.) (1951). “Zichan jieji kexue yu wuchan jieji kexue”, Kexue Tongbao 2: 2, 120–128. 4 Hu, op. cit., 143. 178 Yuko Sato research on turbulence at Caltech.5 He taught many distinguished students, such as Peng Huanwu, Yang Zhenning, Sanqiang, and Hu Ning.6 In PRC, Zhou Peiyuan formed a patron-client relationship with Premier Zhou Enlai who was in charge of intellectual policy. Zhou was selected by Zhou Enlai to visit Britain in 1950. Zhou, on returning, reported to Zhou Enlai.7 In November 1956, on Zhou Enlai’s initiative, he was elevated to the vice-presidency of Beijing University.8 Three days after the death of Albert Einstein on April 18, 1955, Zhou Peiyuan published an obituary in The People’s Daily, upon Zhou Enlai’s request.9 Zhou Enlai also made a comment on Einstein’s death, describing it as ‘very sad’.10 In January 1956, Zhou Enlai made a speech titled ‘A report on the question of the intellectuals’, claiming that intellectuals were already a part of the working class and those who had studied in Western Europe and the United States should be utilised in building science and technology.11 , the Head of the Depart- ment of Propaganda of the Communist Party, noted that Einstein’s physics could not be described as ‘capitalistic’ in April, and in May, Lu further commented that natural science itself had no class.12 Thus the notion of ‘two sciences’ was clearly negated. This revaluation of scientific policy was slowed down with the Anti-Right- ist movement that began in summer 1957, but around the early 1960s, with the aggravating Sino-Soviet relations and the failure of the (GLF) policy, the revaluation resumed. Articles appeared in The People’s Daily which showed the change. For example, Hu Ning, who had studied the TR at the IAS, described Einstein as a ‘great physicist’.13 Zhou Peiyuan wrote an article entitled ‘The meaning of the Theory of Relativity in natural science’

5 Guoji liuti lixue he lilun wuli kexue taolunhui zuzhi weiyuanhui ed. (1992). Kexue Jujiang ­Shibiao Liufang (Beijing: Zhongguo kexue jishu chubanshe.)(hereafter Kexue Jujiang), 1–21. 6 Li, Linglan ed. (1996). Zhou Peiyuan (Beijing: Zhongguo heping chubanshe), 40. 7 Ibid., 72–73. 8 Ibid., 77. In the early 1950s, the departments for natural sciences at Qinghua University were transferred into Beijing University. Zhou Peiyuan was also transferred into Beijing University. Yu Guangyuan, “Enshi he zhanyou”, in Kexue Jujiang, 82. 9 Renmin Ribao (RMRB), April 21, 1955. 10 Zhonggong Zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi ed. (1997). Zhou Enlai Nianpu (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe), vol.1, 467. 11 Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian bianji weiyuanhui ed. (1980). Zhou Enlai Xuanji, vol.2 (­Beijing: Renmin chubanshe), 158–189. 12 Lu Dingyi Wenji Bianjizu (1992). Lu Dingyi Wenji (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe), 496 for the April remark, and 510 for the May remark. 13 Hu, Ning. “Xiangduilun de shijian gainian”, Renmin Ribao, August 16, 1962. Criticising Einstein 179 which praised the TR.14 Gong Yuzhi, a propagandist at the Propaganda Depart- ment who had translated the Zhdanov article and had played an integral part in importing Soviet’s criticism on the TR, claimed that the worldviews of natural scientists including Einstein should be studied from various angles and that people should freely translate and publish the writings of Western scientists.15 Those just rehabilitated from the label of being ‘rightists’, such as Xu Liangying, were selected as the translators.

3 The Cultural Revolution – Zhou Enlai, Chen Boda, and the CAS

This relatively modest environment for scientific research did not last long. The CR began in 1966. In August, the Central Committee of the (CCPCC) issued ‘CCPCC Decision on the Proletarian Great Cultural Revolu- tion’ which demanded that ‘bourgeois reactionary academic authority’ and ‘reac- tionary viewpoints on natural scientific theory’ be totally criticised. The CR shocked the CAS. Its 1967 budget dropped to only 16% of that of 1965.16 The stole top secret materials from the CAS and trafficked CAS sci- entists. Zhou Enlai, with ’s approval, demanded scientists not be trafficked nor put on trial.17 Zhou himself intervened to rescue Zhou Peiyuan,18 and in August 1966 he sent Liu Xiyao, who then belonged to the Second Ministry of Machine-Building Industry (SMMBI) of the State Council,19 to the CAS as his contact.20 Despite Zhou’s efforts, most of the presidents or vice-presidents of the institutes of the CAS were criticised as ‘reactionary academic bourgeois’; some of them were put to death.21

14 RMRB, September 18, 1962. 15 Gong, Yuzhi, “Dui ziran bianzhengfa yanjiu de yidian yijian”, RMRB, September 9, 1962. Fan, Dainian (2013). Kexue, zhexue, shehui he lishi (Beijing: Kexue chubanshe), 42. 16 Zhongguo kexueyuan ed. (1989). Zhongguo Kexueyuan fazhanshi (advance copy) (limited to the insiders), 69. 17 Fu, Chongbi (1999). Fu Chongbi Huiyilu (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe), 204. 18 Li, op. cit., 81. 19 The Ministry was established in 1953 as the Third Ministry of Machine-Building Industry which oversaw nuclear development. It was renamed as the SMMBI in 1958. 20 Liu, Xiyao (1987). “Wo dang zongli lianluoyuan qianhou”. In Zhonggong zhongyang wenx- ian chubanshe yanjiushi ed., Bujin de sinian (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe)(hereafter Bujin de sinian), 336. 21 Zhu, Kezhen (2011). Zhu Kezhen quanji, vol. 19 (Shanghai: Shanghai keji jiaoyu chubanshe) (hereafter Zhu, vol. 19), 210 and 214. Fan, op. cit., 179–180. 180 Yuko Sato

Against Zhou’s effort to keep the CR out of the CAS, Chen Boda promoted it. Chen was a political secretary of Mao Zedong at Yan’an during the Sino-Japanese War, and promoted himself as an ideologue. Upon the establishment of the CAS in 1949, Chen assumed a vice-presidency along with four scientists. Chen did not commit himself to the CAS until the CR.22 He committed himself to the Party’s propaganda work and established the party journal Hong Qi (Red Flag) in 1958 to publicise successful GLF policy. It was highly praised by Mao Zedong; thus Chen was elevated to the head of the CCP’s Central Cultural Revolution Small Group (CCRSG), which was newly created at the outset of the CR. Chen began to seize power in the CAS. In 1967, the Party Secretary of the CAS, Zhang Jingfu,was purged due to his opposition to Chen. On July 30, 1967, the CAS’s revolutionary committee was set up to replace the Party committee.23 One reason for criticising Zhang was that Zhang had neglected Chen’s letter of October 1964.24 In the letter, Chen claimed that the CAS had become too large, due to the Soviet influence, and that it should be smaller to match the reality of China. At the beginning the CAS had only 22 institutes and some 200 researchers.25 In 1965 it became a gigantic organisation of 106 institutes and some 24,000 persons.26 In the letter, Chen further commented that Marie Curie, Isaac Newton, Charles Darwin and other great scientists had made huge contributions in very simple settings.27 Chen proposed to publish biographies of those Western scientists, and CAS scientists wrote on Pierre and Marie Curie, Alfred Wegener, Jean Lamarck and others. Chen’s those words and deeds were scrutinised by Delin from the CAS Institute for Mathematics in September 1967.28 In the latter half of 1968, the Workers and PLA’s Mao Zedong Thought Propa- ganda Team took control of academic institutions in Beijing. The team entered the CAS in the fall of 1968 and Beijing University in late 1968. The team insisted that it intended to restore order that had been lost during the CR, but it labelled people, using justification of the ‘purification of classes’. Zhou Peiyuan was also labelled as ‘a true US spy’ and was gaoled, but he was soon released at the direc- tion of Zhou Enlai.29

22 Zhongguo kexueyuan ed., op. cit., 68. 23 Zhu, Kezhen (2011). Zhu Kezhen quanji, vol. 18 (Shanghai: Shanghai keji jiaoyu chubanshe) (hereafter Zhu, vol. 18), 548–550. 24 Zhu, vol. 18, 583. 25 Nie, Rongzhen (2005). yuanshuai huiyilu (Beijing: Jiefanjun chubanshe), 608. 26 Chen, Jianxin et al. ed. (1994). Dangdai Zhongguo kexue jishu fazhanshi (Wuhan: Hubei jiaoyu chubanshe), 232; Zhongguo kexueyuan ed., op. cit., 69. 27 Zhu, Kezhen (2011). Zhu Kezhen Quanji, vol. 17 (Shanghai: Shanghai keji jiaoyu chubanshe), 373. 28 Zhu, vol. 18, 592. 29 Li, op. cit., 82. Zhou Ruling, “Fuqin”, in Kexue Jujiang, 281–282. Criticising Einstein 181

4 Criticism on Einstein during the CR

4.1 Writing “Criticism on the Theory of Relativity” and its Publication

The above-described confusion during the CR damaged the CAS. It was then, in late 1967, that a middle-school teacher from Hunan province, Zhou Youhua, visited Beijing to promote his article entitled ‘A study on the of the field and its con- version by observing contradictory movements of matter’. Zhou claimed he had dis- proved Einstein’s TR by experiment. The experiment was that he had hung a weight on a wall of the library of his office and tracked the records of the locations of its tip. Zhou claimed that he had found that the locations varied by season and by time, saying that this was due to the constant of gravitation varying by temperature.30 In February 1968, Zhou presented his article at the Institute of Physics of the CAS. Scientists there stated that the variation was due to thermal contraction and thermal expansion and that this could not be a disproof of the TR. But the revolutionary committee decided to support the article because it was written by an obscure school teacher and was a politically correct ‘newly born thing’. The next month, the committee organised a ‘Critical Study Group on the Theory of Relativity (Xiangduilun Pipan Xuexi Ban)’, circulating a manuscript of an article ‘Criticism on the Theory of Relativity’ based on Zhou’s article. The members were young scholars from the CAS and universities in Beijing, and none of them were at a level above assistant professor.31 Chen Boda sent an editor from Hong Qi to the study group to help with editing the article. He distributed the edited article to Mao Zedong, Lin Biao, the Central Politburo of the CCPCC and the CCRSG in July 1968. It claimed that the TR was ‘true subjectivism’ and ‘spiritualism and relativism’ and that the principle of light speed constancy was ‘a clear reflection of Western bourgeois thought that regards capitalism as the final society of human beings’.32 From the winter of 1968, Chen convened a series of conferences in the CAS for criticising the theory. At first the participants were from the Institutes of Physics and , but because the number of participants decreased, Chen claimed that an anonymous person XX33 supported him. He selected seven youths

30 Hao, Bailin (2009). Fuji yinxiaolu: yige qianyan zhanshi dui Zhongguo kexue de ganhuai (­Singapore: Bafang wenhua chuangzuoshi), 121. 31 Hu (2006), op. cit., 153. 32 Ju and Xu (1984), op. cit., 33–34. 33 Here the name of the person is hidden. But Chen himself suggested, at least to Liu Xiyao, that Mao Zedong supported his criticism on Einstein. Hao, op. cit., 126. 182 Yuko Sato and made them committed to criticism, forming a ‘Small Group on Criticising the Theory of Relativity’.34

4.2 Deteriorating International Settings and the Symposium on the TR

Around that time the international environment surrounding China was dete- riorating. In March 1969, the Zhenbao dao (Damansky) incident occurred, and armed conflict on the Sino-Soviet border forced Sino-Soviet relations to fall just short of the use of nuclear weapons. The following month, Lin Biao’s name was written down on the Party’s Covenant as Mao’s successor at the Ninth Party Con- gress. Thus the order changed to, from highest to lowest, Mao Zedong, Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai and Chen Boda. With the tension between the Soviets and China, the policy of ‘sent down’ (xiafang) was also strengthened, and from April, most of CAS’s officials and cadres were sent to the CAS’s ‘May 7th Cadre School’ in Hubei Province. At the peak, from late 1969 to early 1970, there were as many as 2400 people assigned to labour.35 Many professors, officials and students from Beijing University and other universities were also forced to work on farms in Shaanxi and Provinces. The Soviet threat also deteriorated relationship between Mao and Lin. On October 17, 1969, Lin, as Vice President of the Communist Party’s Central Mili- tary Commission issued an emergent direction to strengthen preparation for war and to prevent assault. The next day, General Chief of Staff Huang Yongsheng dispatched it as ‘Vice President Lin’s first order’, ordering an emergent alert to prepare against Soviet assault. This made it clear that Lin could be a possible threat to Mao and the Party because Lin’s order could, even only temporarily, move the entire PLA army.36 In this situation, Chen Boda, the head of the CCRSG, left other members of the group and took shelter with Lin.37 Chen tried to have CAS scientists join the criti- cism of the TR. On September 6, Zhu Kezhen, Vice President of the CAS, received a letter from the CAS revolutionary committee, which demanded that Zhu convene a meeting for scrutiny in the CAS to purge ‘the poison of Einstein’s spiritualism’

34 Zhu, vol. 19, 505. 35 Zhongguo kexueyuan ed., op. cit., 68 and 74. 36 MacFarquhar. Roderick and Shoenhals, Michael(trans. by Kazuko Asakura) (2010). Mo ­Takuto saigo no kakumei, vol. 2 (Tokyo: Seitosha), 112–116. 37 Ibid., 91. Criticising Einstein 183 and that Zhu write his opinion on the manuscript of ‘The Criticism of the Theory of Relativity’ by the end of the month.38 Zhu sought out original texts and studies on the theory to compare with the manuscript. As a result, Zhu found that it criticised points which were not Ein- stein’s original ideas. In particular, he found that it misunderstood the original text: it concentrated on criticising both the principles of the constancy of the speed of light and the simultaneity of two different points.39 Wang Rong, who was in charge of nuclear development atSMMBI, pointed out that the manuscript was empty.40 Jiang Shuomin, a physicist who had attended Max Born’s classes was also sceptical about the manuscript’s points.41 Chen directed the CAS Capital Workers and PLA Propaganda Team, as well as the CAS Revolutionary Committee, to convene a meeting at the CAS. On October 23, 1969, Zhu Kezhen, , Zhou Peiyuan, , Zhu Hongyuan, Wang Rong, He Zuoxiu, and other physicists at the CAS Institute for Physics attended the meeting, as did some editors from the Hong Qi.42 At the meeting, Zhou Peiyuan put forward his complaints about the manu- script, saying ‘I have not read this’.43 Another attending scholar, Qian Xuesen, a well-respected missile engineer, also pointed out that Einstein had a huge influ- ence on international society. Though he had become excited reading the manu- script the night before, Qian said, the matter of Einstein should be treated with care, not hastily publicised.44 Thus, Chen’s idea was frustrated, since he intended to publish it with appraisal of renowned scientists.

4.3 Scientists’ Resistance and Chen Boda

On November 10, 1969, Zhou Enlai gave an address for institutions related to science and technology and the worker-PLA propaganda teams stationed there. In this address, Zhou stated that those institutions had wasted the last 3 years and needed to exert themselves to catch up with developed countries. He also

38 Zhu, vol. 19, 496. 39 Zhu, vol. 19, 509, 520, 523–25. 40 Zhu, vol. 19, 506. Wang’s career was referred to Zhang Jingfu, “Qing lishi jizhu women: guanyu Zhongguo kexueyuan yu ‘liangdanyixing’ de huiyi”, RMRB, May 6, 1999. Wang was Zhu’s broth- er’s grandson-in-law and then research associate at the Institute for Atomic Energy at the CAS. 41 Zhu, vol. 19, 515. Jiang was also Zhu’s distant relative and a faculty in the physics department at the Beijing Normal University. 42 Hu (2006), op. cit., 159. Zhu, vol. 19, 529. 43 Hu, Ibid., 160. 44 Hao, op. cit., 123. 184 Yuko Sato spoke of the need to be prepared for war and directed the teams to withdraw. The teams disbanded at the end of the month.45 Thus the CAS was to recover from the disorder of the CR, but Chen Boda still had hopes to fight the TR. On April 3, 1970, Chen held a meeting at Beijing University to call for collapse of Einstein’s ‘bourgeois academic authority’. Zhou Peiyuan was also taken there. He saw many PLA soldiers around him.46 It sug- gests that Lin Biao gave Chen some assistance, because Chen himself had no career at the PLA. Chen made a speech arguing that both Newton’s and Einstein’s old theories should be discarded, insisting that schoolchildren be brought to join a meeting of ten thousand people to criticise the theories.47 As we have seen before, Chen came under scrutiny during the CR, because he had once praised Newton and other Western scientists and had had Chinese scientists publish their biographies in the early 1960s. In order to evade further scrutiny, Chen had no choice but to be critical of Western scientists. Chen wanted to have Zhou take his side. However, Zhou said, ‘Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity, as proved by fact, cannot fall, however we try to criti- cise it. As for the General Theory of Relativity, there is still room to discuss’, thus rejecting Chen’s request.48 Facing opposition from the scientists, Chen concentrated on mobilising the masses. Zhu Rengwang, Zhu Kezhen’s eldest brother’s grandson, told Zhu that Chen had again delivered a speech at the end of April, insisting once more that he would hold a meeting of ten thousand people to criticise Einstein.49 Zhu Qing, Zhe Kezhen’s second brother’s grandson, said that even middle-school children engaged in criticising Einstein.50 In June 1970, the CAS published the first volume of ‘Discussion on the problem of the Theory of Relativity’.51 This included six articles. One of them entitled ‘Criti- cising the Theory of Relativity’ still contained many misunderstandings and mis- quotations.52 But not all the articles were written to criticise the theory. An article entitled ‘Speaking of the Special Theory of Relativity’ concluded that the Special

45 Zhonggong Zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi ed. (1997). Zhou Enlai Nianpu, vol. 3 (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe), 333. Zhu, vol. 19, 552, 557, 560. 46 Li, op. cit., 84. 47 Sun, Xiaoli. “Weizhe kexue weizhe jiaoyu weizhe he ping”, in Kexue Jujiang, 169. 48 Li, op. cit., 84–85. 49 Zhu, Kezhen (2011). Zhu Kezhen Quanji, vol. 20 (Shanghai: Shanghai keji jiaoyu chubanshe) (hereafter Zhu, vol. 20), 106. 50 Zhu, vol. 20, 178. 51 Chen et al., op. cit., 241. 52 Zhu, vol. 20, 139. Criticising Einstein 185

Theory of Relativity (STR) was reliable, after the group tested the 23 experiments that had been done by the STR.53

4.4 The Fall of Chen Boda and the End of Criticism in Beijing

Thus, in Beijing, while people were repeating criticism, Chen Boda met his down- fall. In August 1970, at the (CCP 2nd Plenum of the 9th con- gress), Chen used the ‘genius theory’ to praise Mao Zedong. Mao suspected that Chen aimed to promote Lin Biao to the Chairman of the State. Mao issued a docu- ment entitled ‘On my small opinion’ which showed his anxiety concerning Chen; it was circulated among the attendees of the conference.54 This ignited criticism of Chen, leading to his fall from power. After Chen disappeared from the centre of criticism of the TR, there were only the unnamed young scientists left. They had no power to change the CAS’s decision, and the CAS had no intention of continuing its criticism. In October, the second volume of ‘Discussion on the problem of the Theory of Relativity’ was published, but there was no article by the small group; instead an article appeared entitled ‘Introduction of studies on the gravitational wave’ by the State Scientific Committee Information Bureau. The article announced that the criti- cism on the theory was being reduced.55 In the same month, the study group was disbanded and the members were moved to the 13th laboratory of the CAS Insti- tute for Physics, which studied gravity and basic particle theory.56 The CAS’s Great Criticism Group was also abolished.57 At the beginning of 1971, Shi Huang, the representative of the military control committee of the CAS, issued a notice that thereafter the CAS would not lead the criticism on the TR and that each institute would be responsible for criticism.58 In April, it was decided that the publication of the third volume of the ‘Discussion on the problem of the Theory of Relativity’ would be indefinitely delayed.59 Thus the criticism in Beijing ended. On the other hand, the group in Shanghai, led by

53 Ju and Xu (1984), op. cit., 36. 54 Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi ed. (1998). Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, vol. 13 (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe), 114–115. 55 Ju and Xu (1984), op. cit., 37. Chen et al., op. cit., 241. 56 Ju and Xu (1984), op. cit., 37. 57 Zhu, vol. 20, 228. 58 Hao, op. cit., 125. 59 Zhu, vol. 20, 354. 186 Yuko Sato

Zhang Chunqiao and , still continued the criticism until their arrest as members of “the ” in 1976.60

5 The Sino–US Rapprochement, the Lin Biao Incident and the Changing Environment ­Surrounding Science in China

After Chen Boda disappeared from the political scene in the summer 1970, a huge change occurred in China’s international environment. In July 1971, Henry Kissinger, then Nixon’s National Security Advisor, visited China. For Chinese sci- entists, the Sino-US rapprochement meant the opening of a window of oppor- tunity to communicate with US scientists, who had advanced technologies and knowledge. On the US side, there was a need to probe China’s development of science and technology, which had been behind a closed curtain during the CR. In the February 5th issue of Science magazine, a remark by Secretary of State William Rogers was reported, from the Aerospace Science Committee of the US House of Representatives. Rogers took up the problem that the US had had no com- munication with China over scientific information after 1965, and he demanded that the US communicate with China.61 This was because the US had an acute interest in China’s steady development of nuclear weapons behind the chaos of the CR. In April 1971, on the way home after the table tennis world championship in Japan, the US team visited China. Following this, many US private organisa- tions hoped to visit China. The Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory (FNAL), equipped with the largest accelerator in the US, also invited Chinese scientists to visit them.62 At the end of July 1971, soon after Kissinger’s visit, Frank Yang (Yang Zhen- ning) visited China for the first time since 1949. Yang was a Chinese-American scientist and the Nobel laureate in physics for 1957. According to Wu Youxun, a vice president of the CAS and physicist, the purpose of Yang’s visit was to discuss with the CAS the launch of a project of Sino-US scientific exchange.63 On August 4, Yang met with Zhou Enlai. Zhou Peiyuan and Zhu Kezhen were present.64

60 Ju and Xu (1984), op. cit., 38–41. 61 Zhu, vol. 20, 443–444. 62 Zhu, vol. 20, 363. 63 Zhu, vol. 20, 444. 64 Zhu, vol. 20, 445. Criticising Einstein 187

Thus, the rapprochement opened communication between Chinese and US scientists. On February 10, 1972, the office for foreign affairs of the CAS decided to accept the US proposal for Sino-US scientific exchange. Zhou Peiyuan insisted that academic journals that were suppressed during the CR should be restored, in order to show them to American scientists. His opinion was accepted.65 As a by-product of the rapprochement, an academic journal Wuli (Physics) was created. In Wuli, there appeared many articles supporting the TR. The journal served as a stronghold against the criticism which was still ongoing in Shang- hai.66 In the first volume of the journal, an article entitled ‘Scholar-Tensol’s type III gravitational wave’ appeared. The authors were Lu Chigeng (CAS institute for mathematics), Liu Yufen (CAS institute for physics), Zou Zhen- long (Astronomical Observatory of Beijing) and Guo Hanying (CAS institute for atomic energy studies). Liu and Zou had been the members of the CAS Great Criticism Group for criticising the TR. Guo was a son of , the President of the CAS. With the end of the criticism in Beijing, they switched to supporting the TR and wrote an article that supported Einstein’s theory on gravitational waves.67 In addition to such a change, there occurred another incident which helped Zhou Enlai. This became known as the Lin Biao incident. On September 13, 1971, Lin Biao, the Vice President of the CCP, reportedly died in Mongolia on his way to the Soviet Union after his alleged aborted attempt at the assassination of Mao Zedong. The incident harmed Mao Zedong’s and the Party’s dignity. After the incident, Mao left day-to-day operations to Zhou Enlai. He became critically ill in the middle of January 1972, never to become healthy again.68 Seizing this opportunity, Zhou alleged that Lin had made an ‘error of extreme leftism’, and he proposed to criticise ‘extreme leftist thought’. The criticism placed priority on releasing many cadres, and Zhou enabled it by creating a mood, conducting research on abuses of political prisoners and making lists of cadres for release.69 This also enabled CAS personnel in local labour camps to return to Beijing.70 Thus

65 Zhu, Kezhen (2011). Zhu Kezhen Quanji, vol. 21 (Shanghai: Shanghai keji jiaoyu chubanshe, 2011) (hereafter Zhu, vol. 21), 32. 66 Ju and Xu (1985), op. cit.,36. 67 Lu, Chigeng et al. (1972). “Biaoliang-Zhangliang de III xing yinlibo”, Wuli, 1: 1, June, 45–47. 68 Wu, Qingtong (2013). Zhou Enlai zai “wenhuadageming” zhong: huiyi Zhou zongli tong Lin Biao, liangge fangeming jituan de touzheng (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe), 148–149. 69 Gao, Wenqian (trans. by Koji Kamimura) (2007). Shu Onrai hiroku: To kimitsu bunsho ha ka- taru, vol. 2 (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju sha), 98–100. 70 Zhongguo kexueyuan ed., op. cit., 68. 188 Yuko Sato

Zhou corrected the policy of criticising professionals in the name of criticising Lin Biao.

6 The Controversy over Building of a High-energy Accelerator

The criticism of Einstein during the CR was mostly conceptual. But the Sino-US rapprochement allowed Chinese scientists to regard the theory as right. There emerged a controversy over building a high-energy accelerator based on the theory. Zhou Enlai and the physicists in the 401 Institute at the Second Ministry of Machine-Building Industry (SMMBI) of the State Council played a central role in the controversy. The SMMBI was established in November 1956 as the Third Ministry of Machine-Building Industry, which oversaw nuclear development. In 1958, the Ministry was renamed the SMMBI. The CAS Institute for Physics was also renamed the Institute for Atomic Energy and was given to the SMMBI under the double leadership of the CAS and the SMMBI. The institute built a heavy water reactor and a cyclotron having a diameter of 1.2 metres with the assistance of the Soviet Union. The head of the institute was , who had studied at Jean Frederic Joliot-Curie, and the deputy heads were Zhao Zhongxiao, and Peng Huanwu. Subsequently, in Lanzhou, Gansu Province, an Institute for Modern Physics was built, where the biggest cyclotron in China was built, having a diameter of 1.5metres. A factory for uranium enrichment was also built there. From the Department, Zhang Wenyu, Wang Ganchang, Hu Ning, Zhu Hongyuan, He Zuoxiu and some 130 scientists studied at the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research in , a ‘science town’ (‘naukograd’ in Russian) in Oblast, in the Soviet Union.71 From 1955 to 1958, the Soviet Union provided support to China for nuclear development, based on their six agreements. After Sino-Soviet relations deterio- rated, in July 1959, the Soviet Union refused to provide China with the materials for nuclear technologies, and Chinese scholars in the Soviet Union were forced to return to China. In 1960, Khrushchev withdrew Soviet experts and technicians from China. After this, the CAS sent more than 1000 scientists and technicians to the SMMBI. Only from the Institute of Metal Research, around 100 nuclear fuel technicians including Zhang Peilin, the deputy director and uranium-processing

71 Zhang, op. cit.. Qian Sanqiang, “Xin zhongguo yuanzihe kexue jishu shiye de lingdaozhe”, in Bujin de sinian, 301–302. Chen et al., op. cit., 191–192. Criticising Einstein 189 technician, were sent to the SMMBI.72 Wang Ganchang, who had just returned from Dubna, wished to build an accelerator. He was moved to the nuclear weapon research institute of the SMMBI which was also known as China Academy of Engi- neering Physics in March 1961, due to a central decision.73 With this concentration of resources, China successfully conducted its first nuclear bomb test in October 1964. During the Cultural Revolution, China also successfully launched a missile with a nuclear warhead in October 1966, tested a thermonuclear bomb in June 1967, conducted an underground nuclear test in September 1969, launched an artificial satellite capable of mounting nuclear war- heads and engaged in developing a nuclear submarine. In 1968, the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and 65 other coun- tries signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It went into effect in March 1970, and after this, the status of China as a nuclear power was protected. Then China needed basic research to improve the capability of its nuclear weapons. To produce nuclear fuel, more attention was paid to high-energy physics, and as late as early 1968, it became a controversy as to whether China should build a high energy accelerator.74 Research itself stagnated between the SMMBI and the CAS, and the Institute for Atomic Energy could not afford necessary equipment.75 The stagnation continued for several years until Guo Moruo convened a small core group conference, including Zhang Wenyu and Zhou Peiyuan, which decided that the CAS, Beijing University and the Commission of Science and Technology for National Defence would together engage in developing high-energy physics.76 Zhou Enlai then tried to rebuild basic research, including that in high-energy physics. On July 14, 1972, Zhou held a meeting with a group of 12 Chinese-Ameri- can scientists visiting China, led by Ren Zhigong, a professor from John Hopkins University, and Lin Jiachi, a professor from the Massachusetts Institute of Tech- nology. Both Ren and Lin were physicists and had been Zhou Peiyuan’s junior and colleague, respectively at Qinghua University.77 At the meeting, Zhou Enlai directed Zhou Peiyuan to endeavour to improve the level of research at all costs. Following this, Zhou Peiyuan wrote a letter insist- ing on the necessity of basic research, submitting it to Zhou Enlai on July 20. Zhou Enlai authorised and delivered it to the Ministry for Science and Education

72 Zhang, Ibid. Zhongguo kexueyuan ed., op. cit., 56. 73 Fan, Dainian (2006). Kexuezhexue yu kexueshi yanjiu (Beijing: Kexue chubanshe), 371. 74 Zhu, vol. 19, 28. Zhu, vol. 20, 12. 75 Zhu, vol. 20, 236 and 542. 76 Zhu, vol. 21, 35. 77 Ren, Zhigong. “Zhuhe Zhou Peiyuan xiansheng jiushi gaoshou”, Kexue Jujiang, 46. Qian, Weizhang. “Yijiushi zhu Zhou laoshi jiushi shouzhen”, Kexue Jujiang, 61. 190 Yuko Sato of the State Council and the CAS at the end of July and to the others concerned in September.78 The letter pointed out that it was Zhou Enlai that gave the direction to add an article entitled ‘Basic Theoretical Research’ to the final draught of the 12-Year Programme of Development of Science and Technology. The programme was stipulated in 1956, with the article as the 56th and last article. In addition, the letter stated that the critical point in following Zhou’s direction was whether the CAS could uniformly lead scientific research work to unify views on the impor- tance of basic theory.79 Thus Zhou Peiyuan emphasised that Zhou Enlai supported basic research, and Zhou Enlai manoeuvred to disseminate his own views by the letter. Basic research was such a critical issue due to Einstein criticism. In 1905, Ein- stein published his article on the STR, which led to the Einstein’s mass–energy relation E = mc2. Based on the formula, many experiments on an atomic nucleus had been done, and atomic energy technologies had been produced. Semi-con- ductor technology and technology are also based on quantum mechanics.80 Indeed, no development in basic theory can fail to lead to development in tech- nology. However, basic theory was criticised as ‘spiritualism’, ‘professionalism’, and ‘slave of a foreign master’. Einstein became the central target of those criti- cisms, because of his fame both internationally and within China. The signifi- cance of his STR in developing nuclear weapons played a part in choosing him as the target. Thus, protection of basic theoretical research was seen as the negation of the Cultural Revolution. Moreover, the huge estimated cost for building an accelera- tor was criticised as ‘waste’. However, after the Sino-US rapprochement and the Lin Biao incident, the year 1972 saw a golden opportunity to overturn the logic of the CR. In August, led by Zhang Wenyu, Zhu Hongyuan, Wang Rong, He Zuoxiu and 14 other individuals, scientists of the 401 Institute of the SMMBI sent Zhou Enlai a letter insisting on the building of a high-energy accelerator. The letter complained that the institute was not guided by the SMMBI, that it did not have adequate budget and laboratories and that its only task after the return of the scientists from Dubna was cosmic-ray observation. It demanded that the CAS and not the SMMBI should establish a high-energy physics institute.81

78 Kexue Jujiang, 32–33. Zhou, Peiyuan (trans.). “Kiso riron kenkyu wo hakai shita ‘yonin gumi’ no shita gokoro ha dokoni arunoka”, Ajia keizai junpou, vol. 1035 (Feb. 1979), 18. 79 Zhu, vol. 21, 203. Kexue Jujiang, 32. 80 Zhou, Peiyuan. “Nuli ba jichu lilun gaoshangqu”, Zhou Peiyuan wenji (Beijing, Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2002), 76. 81 Zhu, vol. 21, 199. Criticising Einstein 191

After Zhou Enlai received the letter, on September 5, he complained to Abdus Salam, a theoretical physicist and adviser to the Pakistani president, that China’s level of theoretical research was stagnating.82 On September 11, Zhou replied to Zhang. In his reply, he admitted the 401 Institute should improve its research on high-energy accelerators under the guidance of the CAS.83 The letter is well-known as showing the Premier’s own decision and the picture of the original text is among the materials compiled from the CAS.84 However, the central part of the decision on developing high-energy physics had already been decided by Guo Moruo in February 1972, as has been dis- cussed. The importance of the letter was not the content itself but the fact that the content was propagated under Zhou’s own name. Zhou seized the oppor- tunity offered by foreign visitors who made it clear that Chinese science was backward. On October 6, Zhou Peiyuan published an article entitled ‘A view on revolu- tion in science education at universities’ in Guangming Ribao, which was based on his letter to Zhou Enlai. This paper was originally planned to be published in The People’s Daily, but due to harassment by , Director of Shang- hai Municipal Revolutionary Committee, the timing was delayed and the venue was changed.85 As soon as it was published, Zhang said that Zhou Peiyuan was being manipulated by someone else and that this person should be criticised. Zhang forced the Shanghai newspaper Wenhui Bao to criticise Zhou, although Zhang knew that Zhou spoke for Zhou Enlai.86 Responding to this, Zhou Enlai revealed his policy at a meeting with Chi- nese-American scientists. On October 14 and 15, Zhou met with Li Zhengdao, a renowned Nobel laureate physicist. Zhou Peiyuan, Wu Youxun and other scien- tists attended, and Zhou Enlai directed them to train researchers. Zhou also told Li that China was planning to send a party of graduate students to the United States.87 China had closed the door to studying in the United States in the 1950s. Zhou declared his intention to reopen it. In December 1972, a delegation of CAS scientists led by Zhang Wenyu visited the Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory in the suburbs of Chicago, seeing the reactor where Enrico Fermi succeeded for the first time in making a nuclear

82 Zhonggong Zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi ed., op. cit., vol. 3, 548–549. 83 Ibid, vol. 3, 549. Zhu, vol. 21, 199. 84 Zhonguo kexueyuan liushinian bianji weiyuanhui eds. (2009). Zhongguo kexueyuan liushin- ian(1949~2009) (Beijing: Kexue chubanshe), 99. 85 Yan, Jiaqi and Gao, Gao (trans.) (1996). Bunka daikakumei junenshi, vol. 2 (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten), 65–68. Zhou Ruling, “Fuqin”, Kexue Jujiang, 283–284. 86 Li, op. cit., 19–20. Gao, op. cit., 104. 87 Zhonggong Zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi ed., op. cit., vol. 3, 558. Zhu, vol. 21, 218. 192 Yuko Sato fission chain reaction in 1942.88 In February 1973, under Zhou’s direction, the 401 Institute of the SMMBI was reorganised under the direct control of the CAS. It merged with the Institute for Modern Physics in Lanzhou, and was renamed the Institute for High-Energy Physics, with Zhang Wenyu as the president.89 At the end of the month, the Preliminary Research Work Conference for the Develop- ment of a High-Energy Accelerator (the Xiangshan Conference) was held, with about 100 participants.90 Although the research for the accelerator planned by Zhou Enlai was delayed by Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, and Zhou himself fell ill and died in January 1976, Zhou’s decision to develop a high-energy accelerator based on Ein- stein’s theory meant a de facto end to the CR in the field of science.

7 Conclusion

As shown above, Zhu Kezhen, Zhou Peiyuan and other renowned scientists did not welcome the criticism of Einstein. This can be explained by the fact that the theoretical basis of the criticism was empty; it was employed for a power struggle. It was the Lin Biao incident and the Sino-US rapprochement that provided the opportunity for Zhou Enlai to rebuild basic research in natural science. Con- sequent to those factors, the political ideology that negated professionalism in scientific research was weakened. At that moment, Zhou decided to build a high- energy accelerator. Accelerator research based on Einstein’s theory was a politi- cally fragile field. However, rapprochement made it clear that China’s level of research was backward. This, in turn, led to a movement in the field of science to undermine the rhetoric of the CR. At critical moments of Chinese politics, there often appear controversies over policies on the development in the field of science, including intellectual policy. One central question was the following: whether it was better to offer opportuni- ties to intellectuals and promote scientific research. Some argued so; the others argued it would lead China to corruption. Each side had its own leaders, and the controversy was related to the power struggle. Another issue of the controversy was the question of international affairs: whether China was better off improving ties with the West in order to advance scientific research or whether China could develop it by itself as it had once done.

88 RMRB, December 11, 1972. 89 Zhonggong Zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi ed, op. cit., vol. 3, 574. Zhu, vol. 21, 532. 90 Zhu, vol. 21, 532. Criticising Einstein 193

Zhou Enlai accorded great importance to utilising those who had studied in the West and supporting communication between Chinese and US scientists. In con- trast, Chen Boda denounced the values of the Western science. The twentieth century was a period when human beings achieved great things through the combination of state, science and technology, which was symbolised by nuclear development led by Einstein’s theories. The negation of Western science and technology was akin to swimming against the tide of the global trend. Zhou Enlai and like-minded scientists tried to overthrow the logic that repeatedly appeared not only in the CR but in modern history of China and that disregarded knowledge and professionals, negating the importance of rela- tions with the West.

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