THE SIGNIFICANCE FOR, AND IMPACT UPON, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION OF
THE CORRESPONDENCE THEORY OF TRUTH OR VERIDICALITY
by
Derek Ray Slagle
A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of
The College for Design and Social Inquiry
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Florida Atlantic University
Boca Raton, FL
December 2015
Copyright 2015 by Derek Ray Slagle
ii
ABSTRACT
Author: Derek Ray Slagle
Title: The Significance for, and Impact Upon, Public Administration of the Correspondence Theory of Truth or Veridicality
Institution: Florida Atlantic University
Dissertation Advisor: Dr. Hugh Miller
Degree: Doctor of Philosophy
Year: 2015
The dissertation is about the significance for, and impact upon public administration of the correspondence theory of truth or veridicality, and its underlying epistemological assumptions. The underlying thesis is that, unduly influenced by the success of the natural sciences, and naïve in accepting their claims to objectivity, many disciplines have sought to emulate them. There are two principle objections. Firstly, all other considerations aside, the supposedly objectivistic methodologies apparently applied to the explanation and prediction of the behavior of interactions of physical objects, may simply be inappropriate to certain other areas of inquiry; and more specifically objectivist methodologies are indeed inappropriate to understanding of human subjects, and their behavior, relations and interactions, and thus to public administration. The second objection is that it is of course logically impossible for any supposedly empirical discipline, as the natural sciences claim to be, to justify the belief in a supposedly
iv objective realm of things-in-themselves existing outside, beyond, or independently of the changing, interrupted and different ‘appearances’ or experiences, to which an empirical science is qua empirical, necessarily restricted. Correspondence of any empirical observations or appearances (and the consequent or presupposed theoretical explanations) to an objective realm, upon which the claim to objectivity is based, is unverifiable.
In light of the above it becomes evident that far from being objective, the natural sciences themselves, and the empirical observations upon which they are supposedly grounded, are subject to conceptual mediation and subjective interpretation; subjective and inter-subjective coherence replacing objective correspondence as the criterion of veridicality. Consequently it becomes clear that the presuppositions and prejudices of the observers enter, in the forms of concepts and preconceptions, into the very observations, and even more so into the theoretical constructions, or theories, of the natural, and indeed human and social sciences, and their claims to be authoritative and true. Subsequent discussion is then focused on both the coherence of individuals’ experiences and understanding, and their inter-subjective coherence – which both rises from and constitutes, a “community”. The role of language facilitates such coherence.
v THE SIGNIFICANCE FOR, AND IMPACT UPON, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION OF
THE CORRESPONDENCE THEORY OF TRUTH OR VERIDICALITY
FIGURES ...... xi
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION ...... 1
Significance and Contribution ...... 2
CHAPTER 2. EMPIRICISM, CORRESPONDENCE, AND OBJECTIVITY ...... 5
On Scientism and Empiricism ...... 5
On Objectivity ...... 8
Correspondence Theory, or Veridicality ...... 10
Conclusion ...... 12
CHAPTER 3. THE NATURE OF COHERENCE ...... 15
Introduction ...... 15
Defining the Roles of Coherence As Necessary But Not Sufficient Conditions of
Correspondence ...... 15
Subjective and Inter-subjective Coherence ...... 18
Social Constructivism ...... 19
Language: Signifiers and Signified ...... 20
Conceptualization Change and Paradigms ...... 24
CHAPTER 4. DISCOURSE AND RECURSIVE PRACTICES ...... 35
Discourse ...... 35
vi Ideographs and Narratives ...... 35
Discourse Theory ...... 39
Recursive Practices and Institutionalization ...... 43
Ordinary Language and Mathematical Language ...... 47
CHAPTER 5. SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTIONS: ANALYSIS OF HISTORICAL,
SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL PROGRESSION – TOWARDS AUTHORITY ...... 54
Introduction ...... 54
Scientific Institutionalization of Knowledge ...... 55
Toward Cognitive Authority in Discourse: Specialization and Standardization ...... 59
The Historical Development of Professionalization, Institutionalization, and
Standardization in Science: Politics, Economy, and Organization ...... 65
Scientific Institutionalization and Professionalization: Quantification and
Discourse ...... 76
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION ...... 84
Applications for the Human and Social Sciences ...... 85
Supposedly Objectivistic Methodologies Applied to Explanation and Prediction
of Behavior of Physical Objects May Simply Be Inappropriate to Certain Other
Areas of Study; and More Specifically Are Indeed Inappropriate to the
Understanding of Human Subjects ...... 85
Emergentism, Systems, and Structuralism ...... 86
A Linguistic Model ...... 91
Narrative Meaning ...... 91
Narratives ...... 92
vii Political, Social, and Historical Discourse ...... 92
Narrative Action: Human and Social Action ...... 93
Applications for Public Administration ...... 95
Discursive or Communicative Epistemology ...... 96
Rejection of Correspondence Theory ...... 97
The Methodology of Public Administration ...... 97
Authority in Public Administration ...... 98
Beyond Orthodoxy in Public Administration ...... 100
Language of Public Administration ...... 100
Beyond Empiricism - Essentialness of the Post-positivist Perspective ...... 101
Postmodernism ...... 103
Public Administration: Deconstruction of Grand Narratives While
Emphasizing Local Narratives ...... 104
Poststructuralism ...... 106
Systems ...... 107
What Now for the Public Administrator? ...... 108
REFERENCES ...... 114
viii FIGURES
Figure 1. Hegemony in discourse: The standardization, specialization,
professionalization, and institutionalization of science ...... 83
ix CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
The dissertation will focus on the evidence that the natural sciences and the empirical observations upon which they are supposedly grounded are far from being objective and, in fact, subject to subjective interpretation and conceptual mediation; subjective and inter-subjective coherence replace objective correspondence as the criterion of veridicality. Consequently, it becomes clear that the presuppositions and prejudices of the observers enter, in the form of concepts and preconceptions, into the very observations, and even more so into theoretical constructions or theories, of the natural, and indeed the human and social sciences, and their claims to be authoritative and/or objective. The finding that presuppositions of the observer constitutes and mediates observations and theories not only refutes the claims to unbiased objectivity and understanding but also challenges the legitimacy of institutions and practices which while possessing those presuppositions and prejudices claim to be objective or unprejudiced.
The initial presentations examine the reliance of claims of objectivity upon the
Correspondence theory of truth or veridicality, and of the consequent impossibility of ever verifying such objectivity. The discussion then follows the nature of Coherence, and its relation – as a necessary but not sufficient condition of correspondence – to
Correspondence. The discussion then examines the coherence of individual’s experiences and understanding, and their inter-subjective coherence.
1 Inter-subjective coherence both arises from, and/or constitutes a ‘community’. Language
(both ordinary and mathematical) is introduced as essential for establishing such coherence. The dissertation claims that language, both (1) enables communication, and
(2) provides linguistic groups with shared concepts. Any language is after all, a system not only of (spoken, written, or otherwise indicative) signifiers, but a system of the very concepts signified by them – which, in mediating their experiences and understanding, is in both these ways, instrumental in constituting such coherence. In this context, theories of discursive legitimation, the capacities of language to delineate the qualitative and quantitative, and the articulation of linguistic and mathematical language conceptual systems are explored. The implicit acceptance and inter-subjective negotiation of the significance and meaning of both these languages (the numerical no less than the alternative) and the experiences and understanding they mediate and thus delineate, are examined. Further the acceptance and negotiation of such conceptual systems is implicit and often unconscious. The fact that acceptance and negotiation of conceptual systems serve to foster the illusion that a particular, socio-culturally-historically relative, linguistically mediated (and thus constituted) experience and understanding are in fact absolute is further explicated and deconstructed. Additionally, the implications of discursive or communicative epistemology, and the applications to public administration, are then articulated.
Significance and Contribution
While the objections to scientism and critiques of sensory empiricists’ claims to
‘Objectivity’ are not new for public administration or philosophy, the presentation of the relationship between Correspondence and Coherence and the focus on the conceptual
2 apparatus of language as essential for establishing coherence distinguishes this manuscript for the field of public administration. Over the course of the study there were critiques and arguments for the Coherence theory of truth and the Correspondence theory of truth, and this paper is unique in that it generated a discourse that argued for the necessity of, and reliance of an understanding of those theories of truth. The aim of this thesis was not to reinvent the wheel but to instead logically clarify the thought surrounding the constitution and mediation of reality, argue that claims of sensory empiricism and Objective Correspondence to reality are irreconcilable, and to present a coherent progression of ideas about the roles of language in establishing coherence. This manuscript maintains language serves an essential role in the processes and determination of the coherence of claims and experiences because language is a conceptual system. The linkage between a linguistic system and reality is a difficult connection since symbols of conventional and mathematical systems do not refer to an external reality but to a system of signifiers. Additionally, language is a system not only of signifiers, but a system of the very concepts signified by them – which, in mediating the experiences and understanding, is in both these ways, instrumental in constituting such coherence.
With regard to public administration, this paper is distinct in content and scope.
The contributions for the field are the focus on Correspondence theory and the necessity of Coherence theory in light of Correspondence not being achievable. A review of the public administration literature, as a whole, will reveal not only a serious deficit with regards to questions about the epistemic community and epistemic traditions of public administration but also an ostensible unconcern for questions about Correspondence theory of truth, Coherence theory of truth, and the relationship to conceptual systems of
3 language. The applicability of claims for the impossibility of verifying correspondence of experiences and other claims and, subsequently, the roles of Coherence as necessary but not sufficient to Correspondence can be further extended to the understanding and praxis of public administration.
4 CHAPTER 2. EMPIRICISM, CORRESPONDENCE, AND OBJECTIVITY
On Scientism and Empiricism
The belief in scientism has been defined as “the view that the characteristic inductive methods of the natural sciences are the only source of genuine factual knowledge and, in particular, that they alone can yield true knowledge about man and society” (Bullock & Trombley, 1999, p. 775). This has been stated differently elsewhere in the literature, where scientism is belief in ‘science’ as the only reliable or real source of knowledge. Therefore, whatever is not revealed through natural science cannot truly be known. This belief in the reliability of scientific knowledge claims is further “coupled with a conviction that all of our personal and social problems are ‘soluble’ by enough science” (Peacocke, 1993, pp. 7-8). The term, scientism, has also come to represent the dangers of unnecessary reductionist practices applied to all disciplines and understandings of human knowledge (Chargaff, 1997; Collins, 1983; Lears, 2013;
Sawyer, 2000). This essay notes scientism is a long exercise in assimilating humanistic inquiries into scientific ones where the humanities are there to only assist the sciences, and are dependent upon the sciences for advancement and survival (Wieseltier, 2013).
Scientism is a revival of the nineteenth- century positivist faith that a reifying ‘science’ has discovered (or is about to discover) all the important truths about human life. Precise measurement and rigorous calculation, in the scientistic view, are the basis for finally settling enduring metaphysical and moral controversies– explaining consciousness and
5 choice, replacing ambiguity with certainty (Lears, 2013). Because of the inappropriate applications of scientific approaches and methods (or the presupposed notion that those methods and approaches are the only true ways to obtain knowledge concerning the nature and reality of things), the term scientism has come to characterize the critical stance of trying to encompass all grand ideas (e.g. meaning and purpose) and worldviews to adhere to those views of science (Bannister, 1991; Hakfoort, 1992; D. R. Peterson,
2004; G. R. Peterson, 2003). A simple review of the philosophy of science or sociology of scientific knowledge literature quickly reveals that the belief in the superiority of scientific knowledge, methods, and adherence of natural scientific principles to all forms of inquiry have been completely dispelled and refuted on numerous grounds, this thesis will not directly list the numerous objections accompanying the growing body of literature against the hierarchy, methodology, and assumptions of scientific knowledge.
There is a dogma within which sensory empirical sciences, accompanied by scientific approach and method, are viewed as not only universally applicable but also representative of the most authoritative and valuable worldview concerning human knowledge (Sorell, 1991). Not only is sensory empiricism considered the most important element of human learning but is deemed so at the exclusion of other methods, approaches, and worldviews – which has aided in the belief for scientism – where science is seen as the only real and consistent form of knowledge (Peterson, 2003). Empirical evidence is routinely used as justification for the belief in the truth and falsity of scientific claims and the development of absolutist vanities and entrenchment of scientistic beliefs. Empiricism refers to sensory experiences, those experiences verified by sensory observation. Empirical ‘data’ obtained from sensory experiences are
6 distinguished by scientists from the non-sensory – thoughts, experiences, judgments, emotions, values, choices, memories – where sensory is considered objective and non- sensory (or nonsense) is deemed subjective. The natural science distinctions between objective and subjective occur often despite the fact that what natural and physical sciences classify as non-sensory (i.e. subjective) is often empirically superior to current empirical (objective) ‘scientific’ claims. It can be argued that traditional non-sensory thoughts, feelings, values, experiences, choices are empirically superior to the quarks, neutrinos, and atoms of the natural and physical sciences that are not actual sensory experiences. The hypothetical inferences, like antimatter, are comparable to the subjectiveness traditionally rejected by the scientific method; therefore, both the objective and subjective found through empiricism are explanations
inexperiencable in themselves and consequently empirically indistinguishable
from those phenomena for which they are supposed to account. Therefore in
respect of their epistemological status they are no different from consciousness to
which reductionists object so strongly. And consequently all [‘objective’ and
‘subjective’ science] must stand condemned, or reprieved, together. (Glynn, 1987,
p. 112)
The current usage of empiricism presupposes that private sensory experiences of individuals are the same or refer to the same object (or are using words to correspond to the same thing). There is an inter-subjective coherence of descriptions - other people verify the subjective, private experiences in a public and open communal forum– thus, the inter-subjectively verifiable nature of natural sciences is appealing to perceived shared experiences of a cultural group of scientists. The Weltanschauung approach
7 advanced by Quine (1953) proved that sensory experiences are constructions - interactions of cultural conceptual schema, linguistic devices, and cognitive apparatuses – and that experiences which are immediately available cannot be proven or shown to correspond to the world as a thing-in-itself (Polkinghorne, 1983). Weltanschauung is a concept central to epistemological research and is often equated with a particular worldview or perception. The Weltanschauung position refers to the conceptual approach or framework of beliefs and ideas by which cultures, individuals, and societies describe and interpret the world. Not only is there negotiated inter-subjective perspective but prior beliefs and experiences of scientists also impact the perceived outcomes of experimentation.
Even if there was a direct correspondence between sensory experiences and reality there are further issues with empiricism. Scientists must overcome solipsism and communicate their sensory experiences in/or through language. Natural and physical sciences have a hidden subject through presupposed thoughts and judgments, which implicitly rely on other minds as a community of scientists to negotiate ‘objectivity’.
Scientists share organizing structures where experience begins to appear as coherent - which further entrenches scientistic beliefs and presupposed ‘objective’ empirical claims.
On Objectivity
Regardless of the objections to and critiques of scientism and empiricism, the ideologies of both have helped in the progression of the long and slow evolution of an institution, structure, and a habitual repetition of method. The ‘objective’ world of scientific fact becomes an idealized world theoretically conceived to transcend subjective experience. Natural science claims to truly understand the world in an ‘objective’
8 manner; science tries to transcend the ‘relative’, ‘practical’, and ‘subjective’ aspects of the world in an attempt to truly understand things the way that they ‘really’ are by utilizing a mathematical and/or reductionist notion of nature. Thus, the choice to be objective is a subjective choice derived from socio-cultural dimensions of individuals’ lives, which is to say that the ideals, values, aspirations, goals, etc. underlying it are constituted by the very culture from which it arises.
Natural and physical science consist of the conceptual perspectives and theoretical interpretations of a subjective community. In this way, ‘objective’ becomes an ideal world of ‘theoretico-scientific’ thought developed from the lifeworld. Husserl (1965) called the broad cultural frame ‘Lebenswelt’ because the world as immediately lived and experienced is a social and cultural world.
All forms of inquiry within an epistemic community rely on other minds as those communities of inquirers negotiate ‘objectivity’. It is not uncommon for the natural and physical sciences (as well as the human, social sciences) to use empirical evidence as justification for the belief in the truth and falsity of claims. The received view of empiricism finds that descriptions of private sensory experiences of individuals are often similar. The similarities and uniformity or coherence of descriptions insure correspondence to the same thing. There is an inter-subjective coherence of descriptions
- other people verify the subjective, private experiences in a public and open communal forum. Thus, the inter-subjectively verifiable nature of science is appealing to supposed shared experiences of a cultural group of scientists. Thus, sensory empiricism is as subjectively biased as the interpretive practices it often stands opposed to. The
‘objective’ reality of the physical realm (devoid of the qualities also available to sensory
9 experiences) being a purely non-qualitative realm is only a hypothetical concept “whose relations to the actual properties of perceived objects [is] inconceivable” (Leighton, 1910, p. 2).
I propose redefining (or taking back) the word, objective, to a more appropriate usage where reality could be understood as the social world (objective) and the individual world (subjective) in union. Objectivity is constituted by communicable, sharable experiences (which can often be called public). Subjective, too, would require redefinition away from traditional scientistic and positivistic usage. Subjective would reflect the private (not publicly verifiable) experiences. With the redefinition, all primary and secondary qualities that are sensory or perceptually experienced are then deemed subjective. A further reconciliation of ‘subjective’ methods and ‘subjective’ epistemologies is needed so that the methods/ epistemologies traditionally termed
‘subjective’ are now considered as being equally objective as the ‘objective’ methods/epistemologies accompanying the natural sciences.
Correspondence Theory, or Veridicality
Paramount to the growth and embedding of scientific beliefs are the assertions that scientific ‘facts’ are not only “Objective” but also correspondent to reality. The notion of correspondence theory is that truth consists in relation to reality. The scientific community presupposes correspondence. The long and slow evolution of scientific thought and the traditional research model can also be tied to development of a correspondence to reality - where - falsity or truth of representations are determined solely by the relations to reality or whether reality is accurately described in those statements. It is logically impossible for any supposedly empirical discipline, as the
10 natural sciences claim to be, to justify the belief in a supposedly ‘objective’ realm of things-in-themselves existing outside, beyond, or independently of the changing, interrupted and different ‘appearances’ or experiences. Thus, an empirical science is necessarily restricted as qua empirical. In short, the claims of objectivity, based supposedly upon the correspondence of experiences to a world that exists outside, beyond, or independent of experience, are incompatible with empiricism.
Belief in the correspondence of scientific claims to reality developed into other foundational social propositions (objectivity, verification through controlled experimentation, causal relationships, progressive accumulation of knowledge) that legitimized specific research practices. As empiricism and scientism developed, correspondence to truth became contingent upon the pragmatic success and technological developments of science. Pragmatic success was wrongly assumed to guarantee the objective or true nature of scientific claims. Pragmatic success does not equate correspondence to a transcendent reality, just as utility does not indicate underlying objectivity. A pragmatic understanding of science shows that science does not produce truths understood as correspondent. Knowledge in this understanding is not correspondence to transcendent reality but is instead a communal attempt to collectively interpret and explain the world in pragmatic terms. Ogilvy (1977) in ‘Many Dimensional
Man’ argued that there is not a single universal truth correspondent to reality. Rather there are some truths holding within communities of inquirers. The determination of truth claims are designated by a diversity of like-minded inquirers found within communities. There is no way to escape the contexts and limits of knowledge placed on these communities. The standards of reasonableness, and validity of beliefs and ideas
11 differ from community to community. For Rorty (1991), science is a process and method of creating consensus for localized utility (pp. 34-45). Scientific practices have undoubtedly achieved a method and practice that produce a system-specific form of prediction. However prediction does not provide all encompassing universal principles nor is it necessarily based upon a reflection of an objective reality (Rorty, 1979). “The desire for objectivity is not the desire to escape limitations of one’s community, but simply the desire for as much inter-subjective agreement as possible” (Rorty, 1991, p.
23). This is not objectivity as traditionally understood, but based on a coherence, rather than a correspondence notion of truth. “The truthfulness that science can provide is actually a measure of consensus, derived through repeated practice and acceptance”
(Kasdan, 2011, p. 572). Thus science and its methods, practices, and processes are “a model of human solidarity” (Rorty, 1991, p. 39) and any narratives equating natural scientific claims and methods as correspondent to reality are social, cultural creations.
Within the social context of natural and physical scientific research the concepts of truth and objectivity are assuredly intertwined. If a natural or physical scientist knows the truth then there was an agreed about the ‘proper’ method used to gather empirical facts and evaluate presupposed correspondence of theoretical assertions and facts. There is no objective truth correspondent to particular methods because scientific objectivity and truth cannot simultaneously be based upon inter-subjective human standards and processes and also be knowledge of transcendent reality.
Conclusion
Ultimately, there is no way to confirm the objective reference of an observation since the observed cannot occur without a subjective observer who also interprets and
12 understands – in other words, criteria for objective verification cannot be objectively verified. Similarly, claims to “objectivity”, based as they supposedly are, upon the correspondence of experiences to a world existing outside, beyond, or independently of experience, are incompatible with empiricism. The current usage of empiricism presupposes that private sensory experiences of individuals are the same or refer to the same object/ etc. (or are using words to correspond to the same thing). Sensory experiences are constructions - interactions of cultural conceptual schema, linguistic devices, and cognitive apparatuses – and those experiences, which are immediately available, cannot be proven or shown to correspond to the world as a thing-in-itself. The
‘objective’ world of scientific fact becomes an idealized world theoretically conceived trying to transcend subjective experience. The choice to be objective is a subjective choice derived from socio-cultural dimensions of individuals’ lives, which is to say that the ideals, values, aspirations, goals, etc. underlying it are constituted by the very culture from which it arises.
The conception of the truth of scientific claims viz a viz relation to reality further developed as scientism and empiricism gained traction in the scientific community and achieved high levels of predictability and pragmatic utility. As empiricism and scientism developed, the notion of truth became contingent upon the pragmatic success and technological developments of science. If you question the truth of natural science claims then you are often taken to doubt other dimensions related to technological and pragmatic utility. I have argued that pragmatic success does not guarantee correspondence to reality; there is no particular method that can verify or insure correspondence to reality nor indeed ‘reality’ itself as normally understood. Natural
13 scientific claims alleged as correspondent to reality are subject to conceptual mediation and subjective interpretation. Ultimately, correspondence is not achievable and the remainder of this manuscript will emphasize coherence as necessary but not sufficient to such correspondence and argue that subjective and inter-subjective coherence replace objective correspondence as the criterion of veridicality.
14 CHAPTER 3. THE NATURE OF COHERENCE
Introduction
The focus of this section will emphasize the nature of coherence, and its relation – as a necessary but not sufficient condition of correspondence – to Correspondence. The discussion on coherence is followed by examination of individual’s experiences and understanding, and their inter-subjective coherence - which both arises from, and/or constitutes a community. The role of language in facilitating such coherence is then examined.
Defining the Roles of Coherence As Necessary But
Not Sufficient Conditions of Correspondence
Coherence theory maintains that the truth of any proposition consists in coherence with some specific set of propositions where the verification of a reference is attributed by its coherence with other references while by extension the veridicality of any perception is determined by its coherence with other perceptions. This manuscript maintains coherence is necessary but not sufficient for correspondence. Coherence plays a necessary role in the constitution of reality for the individual and inter-subjectively to constitute the community since subjective and inter-subjective coherence replace objective correspondence as the criterion of veridicality. Truth is understood as coherence within a constructed world system and facts are determined by a coherent system of beliefs and/or experiences.
15 Opponents critique coherence as a theory of truth and/ or veridicality because of the production of small-t truths and/or realities and the emphasis on truth and/or reality as changeable (i.e. belief revision). This thesis argues that a coherence theory of truth is central to truth – and should be expanded as central for a Correspondence theory of truth and/or veridicality. Additionally, another critique of the coherence theory of truth and/or veridicality is that there can be a coherent belief system or experiences that are not true or veridical. Coherence of a statement/ belief/ experience with other claims/beliefs/ experiences is not singularly adequate to justify that claims/ belief/ truth as an ultimate truth or reality. Examples can be observed in the sciences and in public administration/ public policy. Previously held beliefs in science, such as spontaneous generation (before being dispelled by the discovery of cells and microorganisms) and vitalism or the vital force that controlled the functions of living things (refuted at the discovery of DNA) were
‘facts’ coherent with scientific belief systems. A contemporary example is the wave- particle duality of quantum-scale objects that maintains two contradictory pictures of reality – a paradoxical observation that those quantum-scale objects (e.g., light) are simultaneously particles on waves. This statement is dependent upon the theoretical and experimental framework and coherence with other claims and ideas (i.e., theoretical), or experiences (i.e., experimental observation). Within public policy and politics there are countless examples of coherent statements and beliefs deemed incoherent. One such example is the United States invasion of Iraq in 2003. Supposedly coherent belief systems of ‘facts’ supported military action. The presented ‘facts’ included the claims that Iraq was harboring terrorists from September 11th attacks; the necessary displacement of a tyrannical and brutally repressive regime; the promotion of democracy
16 for the people of Iraq; hostility from the country towards a previous United States president and defiance from Iraq towards the United Nations; threats to United States national security; and then finally the possession of ‘weapons of mass destruction” by the
Iraqi forces. Those individual ‘facts’/ statements were overlapped with or reliant upon other claims and coherence with subjective and inter-subjective claims and experiences.
However, subsequent information and now coherent arguments maintain that the rationale for invasion was an opportunity for a political party to act in favor of ideological belief systems; was an economic and strategic move for oil; was an opportunity to bring democracy to parts of the Middle East, to establish a long-term military presence; or even divine inspiration. Ultimately, facts or beliefs were deemed coherent with other claims or experiences but those facts were contextual, were facts only in the presence of and in conjunction with other beliefs, and the ensuing belief undermined the initial rationale and challenged the justification of political action and presentations of ‘truth’.
Coherence of experiences plays a role in social and cultural relationships that purport to form shared understandings. Increased coherence is what occurs in the evolution of scientific ideology and knowledge claims – i.e., there is not greater correspondence but a deeper coherent belief system deemed to have greater conceptual consistency. Inter-subjective coherence is to be expanded to emphasize coherence within language systems/ language games where language enables communication and provides linguistic groups with shared systems of concepts. Language, through a system of signified-signifier relationships, mediates those experiences and understanding while being instrumental in constituting coherence. Mathematics requires coherence in formal
17 logic. Qualitative coherence relies on a relative system of meaning – where every word is defined by relationship to other words. Coherence for inter-subjective qualitative entities
(e.g., words) relies on a public forum and abandons universal truth/ falsity claims by focusing on the connotative performance relevant to subjective individuals. Denotative performance or permanence cannot be universally determined or empirically verified.
The coherence of qualitative symbols (e.g., words) can be understood as the public acknowledgement of the coherence of the sign (formed by gathering the signified and signifier). The symbols (i.e., signs) of language can be gathered to perform and interact with other symbols in a structural relationship to construct sentences/ stories/ etc. that form new specific meanings and conceptual tools in a variety of historical and cultural contexts.
Subjective and Inter-subjective Coherence
Description and explanation are subsumed under interpretation and understanding. The claims of empiricism are contextual and conceptually defined. All forms of inquiry occur from a subjective viewpoint working in tandem with inter- subjective substantiations. Science is subjective and occurs in a cultural and historical context.
Individual achievements by scientists are heralded as paramount natural scientific achievements. However, the notion of progress – even individual progress – is socially mediated and constructed. The determinations of natural science are produced through communal training and education; based upon shared ideals and values; determined through appropriated methods and techniques; and negotiated in communal forum based upon shared interpretations and conceptualizations. The knowledge claims that emerge
18 from cultural and historical contexts are limited by conceptual and technical constraints.
Not only is there a cultural and historical specificity, there is nothing outside of subjective experiences. The objectivity of science is negotiated through inter-subjective rituals.
Social Constructivism
The social construction of reality is central to arguments for the conceptual apparatus of language as constitutive. Reflection upon social constructivism
(constructionism) provides a critical stance toward taken-for-granted knowledge; demonstrates a historical and cultural specificity; shows ‘knowledge’ is constituted by social processes; and shows that knowledge and social action go together (Burr, 2003).
Social constructivists deny knowledge as direct perception of reality and instead show it to be a social construct. On this view, scientific law-like generalizations, like all knowledge claims, are bound by time and culture (in which scientific communities serve as a culture) and cannot be taken as once-and-for-all descriptions of nature. Burr (2003) contends that language is an essential component of the construction process in ordering human experiences. Whorf (1956) provided a theory where language systems of people exemplify conceptual systems and shape perceptions of reality and also where the world inhabited by people is primarily a linguistic construct. The importance of a social constructionists orientation is the emphasis that all perception is conceptually mediated.
When approaching inquiry from a perspective beyond the physical realm, the traditional conceptions of objective reality are no longer applicable since people, past and present, shape the understanding of the world with various categories and conceptual frameworks in place. Humans do not happen upon existing categories of thought that fit the
19 expression of experiences; rather language and discourse provides a framework of meaning (Burr, 2003). Categories, conceptions, and means are reproduced over-and-over again through scientific practices and processes, and the use of a language serves as a precondition for those conceptualizations and practices.
Through a social constructivist point of view, therefore not only is the argument made that there are historical, social, and political perspectives impacting ‘knowledge’ but also further questions arise about any sort of absolute truth and any sort of role of any entity in the real world. Social constructivism raises some serious questions and challenges to modern scientific thought where claims regarding scientific notions of reality and truth become problematic. Thus, science evolves as a progress of habits and practices inter-subjectively verified by appealing to experiences of a cultural group of scientists, and the habits of mind that not only are presupposed but negotiated by a community then deemed as objective.
Language: Signifiers and Signified
Saussure (1983) tells us that language is a system of signs and furthermore signs connote concepts and ideas – not facts, not reality, and not objects. The noises of spoken language serve to communicate and express ideas and are only part of a linguistic system when linked to concepts and the use of the linguistic system. The idea is often referred to as the signified in communications and discourse theory whereas the phonem or graphem indicator is called the signifier. Signs are comprise of signifiers and signifieds and the signified derive meaning from their relations and other signifieds. It is only because of the network of signs in a language system that there is a signified, much less a connection between a signifier and signified. Thus, ideas are constituted by signs (the signified and
20 signifiers working together) through initially arbitrary and defined relations to other signs.
Language and its signs are self-contained and presuppose no ostensive link to
“reality”. Lacan (1977) reinterpreted the structural connection for a sign since there is
“an incessant sliding of the signified under the signifier” (p. 154). Lacan argued the signifiers can signify multiple signifieds and signification processes are never finished, there is only ever-increasing chain of signification (White, 1999). The understanding of language advanced by Saussure (1983) is problematic for empiricism and the
Correspondence Theory of Truth presupposed by natural and physical science communities since there is no denotative permanence between facts and words.
For language there is a one-to-many correspondence – interpretations are ongoing and always shifting. Derrida (1973, 1976, 1978) provided an even more critical view of positivism from the linguistic structuralist perspective – concomitantly, Derrida (1973) showed why examination of meaning (and meaning-making), structure, and language are essential to the social sciences. Derrida (1973) noted that signifiers constantly find themselves in new contexts or relations and other signifiers, which potentially change their significance or meaning, i.e., what they signify, the signified. “In language, this means that propositions could have many-to-many correspondence, but it also means that theoretic propositions have no extralinguistic reality at all” (White, 1999, p. 166).
Language incorporates both the material signifier with the ideal signified (as seen in a symbolic language of quantification and qualitative use of words and audible noises).
The signified concepts are derived via relationships and are not therefore necessarily representations of reality; there can be a multiplicity of patterns and relationships of
21 symbols/words and meanings and thus conceptions of ‘reality’. Signs through relative relations constitute ideas. There can be a multiplicity of relational identities and thus
‘realities’ from patterns and relationships of symbols or words and meaning as understood and interpreted by the community and the individual.
Individual biographies and the ability to make sense of the world are constructed around experiences – the retained experiences become recollected entities (e.g. narratives). Individual experiences build up (sediment) (e.g. archival narratives).
Intersubjective sedimentation occurs when multiple individuals share a common
‘biography’ and experiences become part of a shared knowledge (Berger & Luckmann,
1966). However, intersubjective sediment is only social when expressed and retained
(ultimately objectivated because of the sharable intersubjectivity) in a sign system. The reoccurrence of the sign in the future further reinforces the renewed ‘objectivity’ of the sign. The supposedly objective signs (and sign system) detach from the original, individual context/ experience and are placed into a public arena where the sign is shared and knowledge of the experience is supposedly made transferrable. Language appears to make shared experiences objective and obtainable by everyone in the linguistic community (e.g., expert language/ jargon in specialized scientific communities). New experiences can be incorporated into the existing stock of knowledge or, similarly, there can be reinterpretation and/ or incorporation of new meanings into collectivity without necessarily disturbing institutions.
Wittgenstein (1968) argued against a private language. For Wittgenstein, words have meaning because of the context in which they are used. The arguments against a private language are rooted in the notion that the meaning of words is grounded in
22 language that is both public and publicly correct. While directly referring to the communication of language and personal sensory experiences, the applications of
Wittgenstein’s thesis can be applied more broadly to the conceptual and linguistic apparatus and the ways in which it is used – all rules have to be rooted in public practices and cannot be understood in isolation (Trigg, 2001). Meaning is formed in specific contexts and is shared through means accessible by public measures. Thus, words cannot be interpreted separate from their embedded practices, which are in social institutions.
Language not only facilitates coherence but also (i) enables communication, and (ii) provides linguistic groups with shared systems of concepts. Any language is, after all, a system not only of (spoken, written, or otherwise indicative) signifiers, but a system of the very concepts signified by them – which in mediating experiences and understandings, is, in both these ways, instrumental in constituting such coherence.
The endeavors of science are political and linguistic where ‘discovery’ is a retrospective construction. The standardization of claims occur when scientists try to create decontextualized results so that other scientists can then create them as well – i.e. scientists are trying to discern whether they are having similar sensory experiences to their peers. The new contexts are different from the original ones for the findings to count as extension of the ‘original finding’ or independent confirmation. “And the making of these new results, new theories, and new findings also aim at standardization. In this way science is objective. But it is also projective. Or rather, it projects its own ‘objectivity’ through poetic and political practices of standardization that invite inter-subjective confirmations” (Brown, 1993, p. 157). Reality is changed when the procedures of
23 ‘invention’, conceptualization, and discovery change – “reality” is what has emerged from our standardization processes (Rouse, 1987).
Conceptualization Change and Paradigms
The historical examination of the genesis of scientific beliefs is often discussed in relation to Kuhn (1970) as he provided a way to differentiate the ‘revolutionary’ from the
‘normal’ science. Scientific disciplines progressed according to a regular, repeatable pattern – an initial confused period of research lacking aim and organization, followed by the emergence of a paradigm. A paradigm to Kuhn (1970) was defined as a “universally recognized scientific achievement that for a time provides model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners” (p. viii). After a paradigm emerged the mature scientific discipline then entered ‘normal science’. ‘Normal’ science is characterized by development and application of the paradigm to solve problems. However, a ‘crisis’ would occur once anomalies began to amass around the current principles and methods of that particular paradigm – which prevented the further application of the paradigm. The step following the growth of anomalies is characterized by a revolution. A revolution involved the replacement of the current paradigm by a new paradigm, which could only really be accomplished through a transformation in the social organization of the scientific community/ discipline, and alteration of the psychological framework of the members. Kuhn’s account of science focused upon conceptual systems or paradigms; where paradigms may have internal logics not related to other paradigms. When there are discrepancies or an inability to account for inconsistencies in nature there is a shift to an incommensurable paradigm. It should be noted that this paradigmatic shift is less of an
24 evolutionary advancement and more of a ‘discontinuous jump’. The stage of normal science once again resumed after the revolutionary shift.
The term, paradigm, has taken on many definitions and understandings. In the second edition, Kuhn (1970) discerned two accounts of a paradigm: (1) Kuhn’s sociological sense of the word, “the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by members of a given community; and (2) the “philosophically… deeper version”, denoted as “the concrete puzzle solutions which, employed as models or examples, can replace explicit rules as a basis for the solution of the remaining puzzles of normal science” (1970, p. 175). Barnes and Bloor (1982) and Rouse (1987) have offered a version of the term paradigm that combines Kuhn’s (1970) definitions to create a pragmatic notion of Kuhn’s text from a social constructivists’ point of view (which may potentially fall outside of Kuhn’s original intent, definition, or understanding) – the notion of a paradigm as a concrete exemplar. “If paradigms are seen primarily as models, then science appears as an enterprise of practical reasoning governed by accepted conventions rather than by logical deduction from some theoretical structure” (Golinksi,
2005, p. 15)
As a concrete exemplar, a paradigm may comprise a model or pattern upon the basis of which analogical reasoning is used for application. Barnes and Bloor (1982) have labeled the progression of science in this manner as finitism. Bloor (1983) described finitism as “the thesis that the established meaning of a word does not determine its future applications […] Meaning is created by acts of use” (p. 25). Barnes
(1982) added, “finitism denies that inherent properties or meanings attach to concepts and determine their future correct applications; and consequently it denies that truth and
25 falsity are inherent properties of statements” (pp. 30-31). Kuhn (1970) also has drawn parallels between the attachments of meaning to words and the application of a paradigm.
“It was Wittgenstein who had first argued that a word derives its meaning, not from an exhaustive definition that can specify all of its possible references, but by a process of extending its usage by analogy from reference to reference […] As we learn, by trial and error, the range of its conventionally acceptable applications, we learn its meaning”
(Golinksi, 2005, p. 16). Kuhn (1970) said:
Something of the same sort may well hold for the various research problems and
techniques that arise within a single normal-scientific tradition. What these have
in common is not that they satisfy some explicit or even some fully discoverable
set of rules and assumptions that gives the tradition its character and its hold upon
the scientific mind. Instead, they may relate by resemblance and modeling to one
or another part of the scientific corpus which the community in question already
recognizes as among its established accomplishments […] Paradigms may be
prior to, more binding, and more complete than any set of rules for research that
could be unequivocally abstracted from them. (pp. 45-46)
According to Golinski (2005), “The picture we have, then, is one in which exemplary achievements yield a family of techniques, which, in the course of the paradigm’s extension, prove appropriate for solving certain problems” (p. 16). A paradigm is not created by logical deductions from premises nor is it identifiable as methodological stipulations or theoretical premises. Instead, the exemplar is learned as a model problem solution and is applied by analogy to what are judged to be similar phenomena (Golinksi, 2005). In this way then paradigms are to be understood as neither
26 big-O objective nor correspondent to reality but instead subjectively and inter- subjectively coherent – in that they are learned ways of perceiving and acting.
For Kuhn (1970), science (and science education) is an approach to impart interpretive dispositions and unarticulated skills. Kuhn adapted the expression, ‘tacit knowledge’ from Polanyi (1958) to outline the training and education in particular paradigms. “When we accept a certain set of presuppositions and use them as our interpretive framework, we may be said to dwell in them as we do in our own body […]
As they are themselves our ultimate framework, they are essentially inarticulable”
(Polanyi, 1958, p. 60). Science then is both a social and cultural aspect that requires the learning of unspoken skills much like an apprenticeship in traditional craft (Ravetz,
1971). Additionally, as a craft, it is conceivable that scientific beliefs are indoctrinated by the prestige and authority relationships in institutions and then supported by rituals of specific scientific disciplines. Polanyi (1958) said, “to learn by example is to submit to authority” (p. 53); while Barnes (1985) echoed, “paradigms, the core of the culture of science, are transmitted and sustained just as culture generally: scientists accept them and become committed to them as a result of training and socialization, and the commitment is maintained by a developed system of social control” (p. 89).
Another point I wish to make concerns the cognitive/ perceptual constitutive property and circular structuralities of paradigms. Kuhn (1970) noted one of the implicit circularities in paradigms – “A paradigm is what members of the scientific community share, and, conversely a scientific community consists of men [sic] who share a paradigm” (p. 176). The defining of circularities of cultural practice modes, and social groups, each in terms of the other, should not be a vicious cycle – rather it could come
27 close to what Wittgenstein (1968) had meant by a ‘form of life’ or ‘language-games’
(Barnes & Bloor, 1982).
Kuhn’s (1970) work emphasized the constitutive properties in subcultures of science. These subcultures are more local - more narrowly focused - than scientific disciplines and are defined by their allegiance to a particular mode of scientific practice.
Even though these subcultures can be characterized by their locations within a social position in a scientific discipline or institution they are not defined by them – rather the defining principle of these subcultures are unification around a particular practice of
‘doing’ science. Barnes (1982) adds:
Just how profound and pervasive is the significance of the sub-culture in science,
and the communal activity of the organized groups of practitioners who sustain it.
The culture is far more than the setting for scientific research itself. It is not just
problems, techniques and existing findings which are culturally specific; so, too
are the modes of perceiving and conceptualizing reality, the forms of inference
and analogy, and the standards and precedents for judgment and evaluation which
are actually employed in the course of research. (p. 10)
An example of the constitution by subcultures is found in Kuhn’s (1970) discussion of controversies that occur in the shift between paradigms. According to
Golinski (2005),
During scientific revolutions, [Kuhn] claimed, the proponents of competing
paradigms engage in debates that are unsatisfying and ultimately likely to prove
inconclusive. It is rarely possible for upholders of the new paradigm to provide
definitive proof of its superiority to those who defend the old one. This is because
28 the paradigms are themselves the sources of outstanding problems, techniques for
solving them, and the standards for assessing the solutions. The perceptual skills
of scientists are refined to pick out data that are meaningful for their particular
paradigm. (p. 20)
I argue that members of different paradigms are living in different cognitive and perceptual realities or life-worlds (lebenswelt) since adherence to a particular paradigm requires belief in unspoken skills; using different methods, language games, instruments, and techniques, due to educational and professional experiences that are socially and culturally constructed. Commitment to a specific paradigm requires cognitive and perceptual and/or interpretive skills to pick out, make sense of, and communicate meaningful data. Thus, there should not be a set of data and/ or new interpretations in which two disparate paradigms should agree – rather the newer paradigm produces data outside of the realm that the older paradigm considered meaningful.
For Kuhn (1970), there are no standards higher than the assent of the relevant community, “there are no neutral standards, external to the paradigms, against which they can both be measured. This is a situation of incommensurability … When paradigms enter, as they must into a debate about paradigm choice, their role is necessarily circular.
Each group uses its own paradigm to argue in their paradigm’s defense” (p. 94). There is no logical confirmation that would be expected to prove that one paradigm is superior to the other. “To the extent, as significant as it is incomplete, that the two scientific schools disagree about what is a problem and what a solution, they will inevitably talk through each other when debating the relative merits of their respective paradigms” (Kuhn, 1970, p. 109).
29 The important discovery I took from Kuhn (1970) involved the way interpretations are justified, replace existing ideas, and fit into explanations.
Structuration plays a vital role in the ideological shifts of natural science – routinely new concepts (and resulting conceptual revolutions) are the result of adjustments in relationships and hierarchies of concepts. The subjective and inter-subjective conceptual mediation not only facilitates experience and understanding but also constitutes coherence that arises from and constitutes the subjective and inter-subjective relationship, or community.
Examination of the changes of conceptualization lends value to understanding
Kuhnian paradigms, the social context of learning, and structural progression of scientific ideology. Ultimately, revolutionary shifts in science are understandable through interpretive revolutionary conceptual change and constrained by the need for coherence of beliefs.
The most basic conceptual change is when people learn a new concept – the difficult types of conceptual change are when concepts must be altered or reorganized to conform to new information where the conceptual meaning changes in relation to the other concepts of the world. For radical conceptual change, the progression of knowledge requires a fundamental transformation of meaning for important concepts.
When that radical transformation occurs, learning cannot be simply equated with expansion to new concepts and beliefs but there must also be major rearrangements and revisions to mental representations.
Scientific revolutions involve major transformations in conceptual and propositional systems. Conceptual systems are mainly structured through kind-
30 hierarchies and part-hierarchies where new theoretical concepts generally are created by combining concepts. Relations of explanatory coherence generally structure ‘scientific’ propositional systems. New theoretical understandings generally rise by abduction – because theoretical hypotheses incorporate interpretive theoretical concepts. The transition to new conceptual and propositional systems occurs because of greater explanatory coherence of the new propositions that use the new concepts (Thagard, 1992, pp. 7-9).
Concepts serve many cognitive functions (e.g., categorization; learning; deductive inference; memory; explanation; problem-solving; generalization; language comprehension; and language production). Determining what exactly a concept is has inherent difficulties if one defines them solely in relation to their application (Smith,
1989). Concepts can be better understood as structurally organized into hierarchies, or relationships. An example of structural, hierarchical organization comes from G. Miller’s
(1990) work on the structure of the ‘mental lexicon’ (G. Miller, Beckwith, Fellbaum,
Gross, & Miller, 1990; G. Miller & Johnson-Laird, 1976). G. Miller et al. (1990) developed as an electronic lexical system. A concept is represented by the collection of synonyms. Synonyms are organized by kind, part, and antonym relationships.
Hierarchies are generated by kind-relations and part-relations – that generate structure and organization of the lexicon. Kind-hierarchies and part-hierarchies structure most of our conceptual systems by providing foundations to which other conceptual relations are tethered (Thagard, 1992).
Concepts fit into larger conceptual systems, which are organized by hierarchies and linked to one another by a series of rules. Conceptual systems can be understood and
31 analyzed as networks. Networks are comprised of nodes that are connected by linkages with other nodes (e.g., kind links; instance links; rule links; property links; and part links). The structural components of hierarchies include rules and relationships that are used to establish explanations and descriptions. The hierarchies provide a frame to organize and arrange concepts. Changes in the kind-relations and part-relations usually require some form of restructuring of the conceptual system that is qualitatively different from merely adding or deleting nodes. Thagard (1992) adds:
Why are kind-relations and part-relations so fundamental to our conceptual
systems? In addition to the organizing power of the hierarchies they form, these
two sets of relations are important because they specify the constituents of the
world. Ontology is a branch of philosophy that asks what fundamentally exists.
Moreover, given an account of the kinds of things there are which translates
immediately into a hierarchical organization, we naturally want to ask: of what
are the objects of these kinds made? The answer to this question requires
consideration of their properties, generating the part-hierarchy that also organizes
our concepts. Thus the major role that kind-hierarchies and part-hierarchies play
in our conceptual systems is not accidental but reflects fundamental ontological
questions. (pp. 32-33)
There are many degrees of conceptual change that can lead to major conceptual revolutions.
Most scientific revolutions involve the introductions of new concepts, such as
Newton’s gravitational force, Lavoisier’s oxygen, Darwin’s natural selection, and
Wegener’s continental drift. In addition, revolutions usually involve
32 reclassification in which a concept changes its place in the hierarchy of kinds just
as Copernicus reclassified earth as a planet. Darwin reclassified humans as a kind
of animal, and the cognitive revolution in psychology reclassified thinking as a
kind of computation. Even more radically, the principle of classification
sometimes changes, as when Darwin argued that species should be organized into
kinds on the basis of evolutionary history rather than similarity. (Thagard, 2003,
p. 667)
Adequate description of conceptual change must describe mechanisms by which new nodes and linkages are created in a conceptual network – resembling Kuhn’s (1970) account that new theories often have very dissimilar conceptual systems from those replaced. Conceptual revolutions cannot be understood solely by addition or deletion of localized nodes of complex networks but are impacting of an entire conceptual system.
The primary cognitive mechanism for large-scale changes in conception is explanatory coherence – that is where scientists adopt a new theory along with its conceptual system because it provides a better explanation of the evidence and is more coherent with other held beliefs (Thagard, 1992). “Of course, most conceptual change in science does not involve such large-scale shifts in which conceptual systems are substantially altered, but rather the introduction of new concepts that fit in with existing conceptual schemes and theories” (Thagard, 2003, pp. 667-668).
The factors governing the discovery, development, and acceptance of theories are related to the coherence of the conceptual frameworks within which an activity is carried out. The conceptual perspective determines in large part which questions are seen as worthy of investigation and what sort of answers are acceptable. All knowledge
33 statements occur from a standpoint associated with specific social practices. Science is a social institution that constitutes conceptions and notions of reality – where the supposed
“knowledge” of the sciences is a human construct based in the details of social life.
If notions of knowledge and reality are rooted in the public practices of individuals and/or institutions and negotiated through linguistic practices, then “truth” can only be judged by coherence with experiences or other claims rather than correspondence to something external thereto. Wittgenstein (1968) noted that we become what we become mainly due to the institutions and practices in which we are immersed.
Thus, knowledge is not a solitary experience from individual scientists, but a product of activities that are governed by public and social rules.
34 CHAPTER 4. DISCOURSE AND RECURSIVE PRACTICES
Discourse
Knowledge is fundamentally constituted within a language game (Wittgenstein,
1968). There are many different types of knowledge that result from incommensurable language games – of which there is no definitive version. Lyotard (1984) argued that the belief in the superiority of the narrative of science is derived from other forms of narrative knowledge that reinforce belief such as correspondence to truth, an aesthetic beauty and legitimizing institutions. For Jameson (1984, 1985), not only is the narrative the primary epistemological category for all knowledge generation (i.e. narratives are generated to understand the world) but also he emphasized the role of stories as a way for individuals to experience the world. The importance of discourse is in the interpretation for the individual and the understanding that results from ongoing stories between people.
Ideographs and Narratives
Miller (2012) emphasized the usage of the sign but expanded his work into the aggregations of the sign in the form of ideographs and narratives. Miller’s interest is in public policy but an orientation directed towards ideographs and narratives has broader implications for knowledge and research. To understand meaning making in social sciences there should be not just an investigation of signs but a systems/ structure perspective to understand the groupings and movement of signs. Narratives and ideographs are essential because of the reciprocating meaning making functions and dynamic, structural connections.
35 For H. T. Miller (2012) the sign is the base and the ideograph is the connotatively rich sign implicated in discourse:
Signs gather meaning not only from the signifier/-signified connection, but also
from other signs in the language system. Not only do differences generate
meaning, but positive associations also contribute to the meaningfulness of signs.
Positive and negative associations contribute to the meanings of ideographic
formations, which bring feelings and values into context. Connotation depends
on building and establishing differences and similarities – symbolic associations
among feelings, values, and concepts, of both positive and negative valence.
Connotation is an integral part of meaning-building process. Signs that may have
once enjoyed a positive denotative linkage with some aspect of reality gather
connotative baggage as they become familiar through usage. As signs gather in
connotations they also expand meaning. (p. 5)
Ideographs are concepts filled with ideology that extend the range of meaning. At any point in time ideographic meaning is culture bound and determined through contestation (Stuckey, 2008). Stuckey (2008) continued that the ideograph is “full of meaning because it operates over time and acquires a vast array of historical meanings and usages. Yet it is empty because at any given moment the action and commitment to an ideograph is open to rhetorical negotiation. Every instance of concretizing an ideograph adds to the range of meanings associated with it” (p. 75). Ideographs, as signs, perform with other rhetorical terms. The ideograph gains power in discourse through produced associations that function over time and at a single point in time. For H. T.
Miller (2012), “ideographic materials from culture’s historical archives and from local
36 context find their way into story lines and arguments; the narrative arrangement of this connotative material expresses a particular perspective in [...] discourse” (p. 5). H. T.
Miller (2012) continued, “One narrative or another will appropriate signs and symbols, including (and sometimes especially) those replete with emotional and moral resonances.
The process of framing begins in earnest with ideography, where connotation abounds”
(p. 5). Ultimately, the ideograph is constrained by the internal narrative rationality.
Ideographs must cohere to beliefs, values, and be probable. The term probable here refers to a pragmatic definition on the necessary reasonableness of an ideograph that should not challenge generally acknowledged communal standards. Similarly, H. T.
Miller (2012) acknowledged that images are positioned into stories that offer good ‘fit’.
Fit and coherence are important in humans and society since individual and social reactions are not exactly determined and meaning is negotiated. In public discourse, ideographs work to force social control by shaping ideology and political consciousness.
Ideographs work best when they are unnoticed – when their use seems so natural
and so inevitable that the response is not so much persuasion as recognition, an
identification that it is persuasion – audiences do not need to be convinced
because they are already interpellated into the narrative itself. The meaning of the
ideographic narrative is so ‘obvious’ that it can pass unremarked. It is important
to remember, however, that this meaning is not static. It will change over time and
across audiences. (Stuckey, 2008, p. 75)
I am drawn to the assertion that ideographs are connected to myth since myths are narratives reliant on associations of ideographs with other rhetorical terms – ideographic materials are unique components possessing ideological power attributed to the
37 ideographic ability of authorization and periodic substitution of myths. The ideograph as the connotatively rich sign functions through “positive and negative associations [that] contribute to the meaning of ideographic formations, which bring feelings and values into context” (H. T. Miller, 2012, p. 5).
Narratives function by “stitching ideographs together through the use of story lines” (H. T. Miller, 2012, p. 7) – where the “ideograph is a simpler unit of analysis than a [...] narrative, which may additionally interject a story line or two and maybe even introduce a thick plot to convey a more general coherence and complex understanding”
(H. T. Miller, 2012, p. 3). However, narratives do more than just stitch together ideographs. Narratives are used to order experiences into an understandable whole. The whole of narratives are associations that occur between events and human actions. When individual events are grouped into a larger whole, the successive and independent events converge into meaningful episodes. The function and meaning of meaningful events occur through creation of interdependent structural relationships. The linkage of objects, ideas, actions, and etc. produce deepened meaning. Additionally, the organizations of events in a narrative are dynamic, active gatherings constructed in continually operational synthesis. The narrative event does not have to be true or false since narratives have abandoned universal truth and falsity. Narratives are mental models that are socially constructed symbolic meanings embedded in social practices.
Narrative understanding is a type of knowledge found when people understand oral and written communications of others. Narratives fill social and cultural environments where social and cultural narratives are used to inform decisions, order experiences, and develop conceptual interpretations. Narratives are found at the
38 individual level and social level. At the individual level narratives help interpret current, past, and future subjective experiences. The social level of narratives spreads beliefs and ensures cohesion of shared values.
The exchange of information and conceptual apparatuses of narratives lead to structural and organizational operations and characteristics found in habits of mind and experiences of both individuals and society. Language and discourse directly influence social actions, thus narratives play a role in the manifestation and enactment of social change. Hajer (2005) noted the institutionalization process that occurs as narratives embed in the conceptual frameworks of meaning systems. Eventually discourse is linked to practice through established practices found in the normal social/ mental habits and routines. The maintenance of the symbolic narrative forms and human action occur within a cultural framework. Thus, the values, moral and cultural norms, and actions of a society will influence expressions, interpretations, and evaluation of narratives. Within any political, social, or historical discourse there will be various fields of meaning, ideas, interpretations, and symbolizations, all of which through social practices and embedded conceptual ideology can be enacted and diffused as reality, truth, or objectivity.
“Different narratives generate different sets of relevant facts” (H. T. Miller, 2012, p. 7.).
The conceptual apparatus found in narratives (and language in general) shape understanding and the way people interpret the world and themselves. Truth is found in the subjective and inter-subjective coherence of ideas or narratives.
Discourse Theory
Fox and Miller (1996) aimed to challenge orthodoxy through focus on institutions in social processes (where bureaucracies themselves are socially constructed social habits
39 and recursive practices), and argued for discursive orientations where meaning is up for grabs and reality is neither objective nor concrete. A postmodern orientation was assumed because “the mundane language of modernity won’t work” whereas
“postmodernists have developed the best vocabulary we know of to understand this aspect [political discourse and public policy] of public life” (Fox & Miller, 1996, p. 6).
The theoretical underpinnings of Fox and Miller’s (1996) discourse theory are based on ‘excursions’ into phenomenology, constructivism, field theory and structuration theory. Constructivism, as part of discourse theory, reopens the distinctions, as reported in this thesis, between the objective and subjective and examined socially constructed daily life of public administrators in organizations. The excursion into phenomenology underpinned constructivism for Fox and Miller. Discourse theory has prompted movement away from ideas of an external reality, highlighted the essentialness of human perception for inquiry, and rejected neutral science where an objective value-free researcher could formulate authentically verifiable law-like generalizations. Fox and
Miller (1996) generated four phenomenological conceptual tools necessary for discourse theory to arrive at the precategorical world that avoids reified socially constructed categories:
(1) The body-subject is simultaneously both physical and mental. Our bodies
literally incorporate objectivity and subjectivity. And, because all consciousness
occurs in bodies, with significant overlapping capacities with other similar bodies,
we will ultimately be able to foil incorrigible incommensurability. Discourse is
possible, neotribalism need not, in principle, prevail because of this concrete
universal. (2) Intentionality sparks out from body-subjects-in-the-world, not just
40 for idle contemplation or interested observation, but for motility, for the action, of
those body-subjects. This too, gives all bodies an irreducible commonality [...]
(3) Intentionality sparks out from body-subjects bearing the marks of their time,
class, gender, and place. Live-in body-subjects acquire sedimented habitual
comportments, favored styles of living-in-the-world, which taken in aggregate
make up infinitely varied but uniquely authentic selves. (4) Body subjects are
always situated. The Cartesian imagination may wander where it will, but in
cases of competent human actors, consciousness always comes home to the
situated body-subject-in-the-world. (p. 84)
The emphasis on constructivism for discourse theory complements several tenets presented within this thesis. The “constructivist view combines, telescopes, ontology and epistemology” (Fox & Miller, 1996, p. 85) - this presentation is highlighted by the constructivist recognition that people who search for a social reality are themselves the carriers of it. For constructivism there are no external observers to social reality. The social construction of reality thesis (Berger & Luckmann, 1966) proved that conceptions of reality are negotiated. Emphasizing the role of language for generation of meaning in everyday life developed the point further. Fox and Miller’s (1996) focus on constructivism highlighted Husserl’s (1965) lifeworld (lebenswelt) and the relationship to human capacity and tendency for reification. Reification often obscures and runs antagonistic to the lifeworld.
The emphasis on the lifeworld and intentionality are regarded as ‘appropriate (but not exclusive)’ vocabularies to describe the predispositions of individuals – the other approach (or tradition) focused on dynamics of the whole of society/culture/ economies.
41 Fox and Miller (1996) emphasized the work of Giddens’ (1984) in the form of structuration theory. Essential to structuration are recursive practices. Recursive practices guide and limit human potential (while also being the opportunity for its performance); e.g., language is a pattern of recursive practices. Recursive practices, realized, are aggregated as social patterns. Fox and Miller (1996) make the observation that recursivity is essential because it does not reject or deny human instrumentality but recognizes human agency as a typical progression along habitual, known pathways rather than wandering blindly (although pathways can be redirected). Governance (and the discourse process to realize it) is seen as the result of marginal adjustments (rather than random changes) in the recursive practices of the totality of social processes. Gidden
(1984) insists that,
social systems, as reproduced social practices, do not have “structures” but rather
exhibit structural properties” and that structures exists, as space-time presence,
only in its instantiations [manifestations] in such practices and as memory-traces
orienting the conduct of knowledgeable human agents. (p. 17)
Any claim to objectivity by institutions is internal, not external. “Social reality is socially constructed or constantly socially renewed by human behavior patterns regulated by recursive practice” (Fox & Miller, 1996, p. 89). The most deeply embedded structural properties (practices with space-time extensions) are determined as institutions.
Institutions, as social constructions of reality, are malleable recursive practices with variant degree of fixity and embeddings.
42 Recursive Practices and Institutionalization
Institutionalization (of science, academia, bureaucracies) is grounded in habitual actions – where the patterns of all human activity become embedded in the routines of general knowledge (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). Habituation is important for the individual and the group/ society because through habituation there is direction and further specialization of activity. The processes of habituated action help constitute individual meaning as those action are embedded into routines. For Berger and
Luckmann (1966) habituation precedes institutionalization – it is only through mutual, shared typification of actions by specific actors that institutionalization will occur. All
“typification is an institution” (Berger & Luckmann, 1966, p. 54). The typified actions that constitute institutions are available to all members of specific social groups – such as those found in science. Eventually (through possible control mechanisms and habituated actions of members) institutions become ‘crystallized’ or reified. The crystallization of institutions means that those institutions are experienced as possessing their own reality – which appear external and compulsory to individuals (Berger & Luckmann, 1966).
What is now important for science and academia is that through shared shaping processes the world appears as fully apparent and objective to institutional members – because together they understand the world that they have made. This shared understanding deepens and coincidentally seems to become more objective as it is passed from generation to generation. As the newer generation of scientists experience and understand the institutional world they do so as a given reality since they did not have a part in shaping it. The institutions of science appear self-evident, unalterable, and known
(as do the other institutions). The deeply embedded institutionalized world reaches
43 rigidity in consciousness as it becomes ‘real’ and resistant to change (Berger &
Luckmann, 1966). The important takeaway is that the institutionally constituted world
(through the transmission of habituation of social order and reciprocal social constructions) is eventually experienced as an objective reality.
Scientific institutions (and all institutions) require legitimation. Justification is necessary for legitimated institutional reality. Alteration to justifications of institutions occurs due to the necessity for subjective, inter-subjective coherence in social constructions. The deviation from previously developed institutional actions (i.e. paradigmatic or revolutionary conceptual change) is disconnected from the ‘realities’ or original relevance found in the previous social processes. New generations deviate from interpretations of previous generations because of pragmatic problems and thus search for an alteration to the socialized institutional order (or rather there is reinterpretation or reconstruction of the realities of the world). However, deviation from historicized and objective actions of institutions is not easy since actions and ideas are often learned.
Additionally, coercive measures can be applied selectively and economically to reinforce the processes of the institution (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). When the collective, relevant accomplishments are not adequate in certain areas there is necessity for reflection upon alternatives, which may then be imposed on the overall institutional order. The ‘logic’ of the institution is not in the institution but in the coherent reflection about the external functionalities.
“Language provides the fundamental superimposition of logic on the objectivated social world” (Berger & Luckmann, 1966, p. 64). The foundation of a legitimatized institutional social world is based in language. The logic of institutions is a socially
44 available knowledge – this is important because the scientific institution is to be understood through the knowledge that the scientific community has (where the individual meanings are not specific to single participants but are socially shared and expressed). The knowledge of science is a body of normal valid truths that is socially objectivated – any extreme departure from views of scientific reality and institutions is seen as a deviation from objective social reality – or at the very least the constitution of a new reality potentially outside of a socially objective scientific reality. Through linguistic foundations, institutions persist over time and become further embedded; in fact, the persistence of a body of knowledge not only becomes socially objective. Over time, socially objectivated science appears to be objective correspondent (to reality) science. The transmission of scientific knowledge (passed from generation to generation) is then internalized as subjective reality and through socialization regarded as objective truth (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). The internalization and socialization of science shapes the individual and produces specific types of people – scientists – who are signifiable as such only in a universe where science is constituted.
Specific institutions are attached to and transmit certain sedimentations. Actors and participants in those specific institutions must be educated in the ways of the collective experiences and meanings. In order to transmit institutional meanings and to ease the transmission process there is often a requisite simplification process to ensure memorization and recollection by successive generations (Berger & Luckmann, 1966).
Institutional activity may give rise to knowledge. The transmission of knowledge is a social process. Along this line, there is a differentiation between the knower and non- knower of specific social knowledge (e.g., the distinction between those socially deemed
45 as scientists and non-scientists). The transmission of specific knowledge and the designation as a knower (scientist) involves certain control, authority, and legitimation processes. Berger and Luckmann (1966) note that problems with coherence can be associated with competing/ conflicting legitimations or in socialization processes (with competing institutional meanings or difficulties internalizing transmitted meanings).
The knowledge and identification as a scientist or institutional member also requires the actions of ‘doing’ science or performing the roles of the institution. There are socially appropriated (objective) actions that help cement the actors in their respective institutions and self-identified roles. Certain actors have certain roles – the multiplicity of roles is essential for the structure of the whole and is strategically important for society. In other words, even though scientists represent different disciplines (biology, physics, chemistry) all of the institutions gather together to form a whole. The varied roles imply knowledge is socially distributed and necessitates divisions of labor/ knowledge specific to certain roles. Science as an institution is now so structurally organized as to allow for specialization. The role of individuals in specialized disciplines not only requires individual performance/ specific knowledge but there is a necessitated initiation into the direct and indirect scientific body of knowledge. There is a social distribution of scientific knowledge. This is of significance because knowledge is socially constituted between the “macroscopic universes of meaning objectivated in a society and by the ways which these universes are subjectively real to individuals”
(Berger & Luckmann, 1966, p. 79).
Complex social belief systems and meanings are specific to collectivities. In other words, there are specific groups where particular meanings are seen as having
46 objective reality and who continually produce particular sort of meanings. The creation of multiple meaning sub-universes not only create multiple perspectives but also form the total scientific universe – where each scientific discipline (sub-universe) views the total scientific universe from a slightly different viewpoint. The growing autonomy of sub- universes also provides an avenue for separation of the knower from the non-knower.
However, with separation of sub-universes of knowledge there are legitimation issues that arise. Legitimation may be acquired and maintained through exploitation of symbolic prestige, intimidation, mystification, pragmatism, and irrational/ rational propaganda.
Finally, institutionalization processes may undergo social reality reification.
Often the institutionally shared concepts, concepts shared by individuals that collectively author or constitute the human, indeed removes authorship of the human world.
Reification is extreme objectification. Science through this objectification and reification is now understood as having access to the ‘nature of things’. The paradox is that man reifies, interprets, and understands experience and mistakes our understanding of the experience as an objective reality – man produces a reality that denies mans production of reality. Ultimately, reified scientific institutions may mold her/ his present signification and confer a supposed ontological status where human activity appears absent.
Ordinary Language and Mathematical Language
A proposition of the paper is the conceptual apparatuses of language are fundamental for the socially constructed and structured ‘reality’ through subjective and inter-subjective interactions of multiple cultural and sub-cultural groups. I follow
Wittgenstein (1922), where “the limits of language mean the limits of the world” (5.6).
47 The research into meaning is the most basic of all inquiry - where the whole scientific enterprise is grounded eventually in meaning-making and perceptual operations.
Language games and symbolic representations produce meaning through recursive practices and discourse. Peoples’ language systems supply concepts which mediate perceptions of what is then deemed reality – thus, the world people experience is occupying is primarily a linguistically mediated construct. Reality definition is not a matter of equivalence to an underlying and universal reality but instead interpretation within specific context. Science is a sociological endeavor where a community of inquirers share personal interpretations and subjective perceptions in a communal forum founded upon shared traditions, processes, languages, and practices. Everyday language and mathematical language, with their capacities to delineate the qualitative and quantitative, respectively, can, along with the implicit acceptance, and/or inter-subjective negotiation, of the significance and meaning of both these languages (the numerical no less than its alternative) articulate conceptual systems where experiences and understanding are mediated and thus delineated.
The selection of a mode of representation in contemporary society will undoubtedly have accompanying social, political, and historical prejudices and presuppositions. Quantification claimed that some (“primary”) qualities have objective cognitive value while other (“secondary”) qualities do not (Leighton, 1910, p. 2). The distinction between types of qualities is often associated with those qualities being
‘objective’ or ‘subjective’. (The distinction between the objective (quantitative) and subjective (qualitative) were credulously accepted - which proved beneficial for the quantitative aims of physical science. The ‘primary qualities’ – the space-time-mass
48 components of the physical world - proved important for the numerical and calculable accuracy of scientific explanation of our quantitative relations. All the while, sensible qualities (tastes, colors, heat/ cold, tones) are considered more subject to individual biases. In other words, the secondary qualities are deemed subjective because they are purportedly not describable in objective terms and thus perhaps relative to the specificities of a subject. The natural and physical scientists determined that qualities were secondary by virtue of their being, in and of themselves, not measurable or quantifiable. Similarly, objective conditions cannot be objectively verified. Objective claims are best understood as subjective and inter-subjective) substantiations.
The process of representation, through a system of mathematical propositions, aims to signify as fully, simply, and exactly as is achievable. In creation of a physical theory through method and language it is necessary for selection and representation of the simple properties for future combinations and coherence among groupings – or the alleged correspondence of mathematical symbols through methods of measurement.
Duhem (1954) contends,
These mathematical symbols have no connection of an intrinsic nature with the
properties they represent; they bear to the latter only the relation of sign to the
[concept] signified. Through methods of measurement we can make each state of
a physical property correspond to a value of the representative symbol, and vice
versa ...The methods appropriate for defining and measuring these physical
properties are like the vocabulary and key permitting one to make this translation.
These judgments are compared with the experimental laws which the theory is
intended to represent. If they agree with these laws to the degree of approximation
49 corresponding to the measuring procedures employed, the theory has attained its
goal, and is said to be a good theory; if not, it is a bad theory, and it must be
modified or rejected. Thus the true theory is not a theory which gives an
explanation of physical appearances in conformity with reality; it is a theory
which represents in a satisfactory manner a group of experimental laws. A false
theory is not an attempt at an explanation based on assumptions contrary to
reality; it is a group of propositions which do not agree with experimental laws.
Agreement with experiment is the sole criterion for truth in physical theory. (pp.
19-21)
“Quantitative concepts are not given by nature [on the basis of] phenomena
[which] themselves exhibit only qualities we observe” (Carnap, 1966, p. 100). The claims of natural and physical sciences are symbolic constructions whose roles are to summarize analysis of subjective-intersubjective experience and to direct intellectual manipulation and new experimentations through institutional processes. Natural and physical scientists can create fictive symbols and entities – which often have demonstrated utility and service inter-subjective coherence – my basis of criticism is that hypothetical entities are dogmatized, reified, and are taken as objective realities.
Not only is mathematics deemed objective and conceptually coherent but also the inter-subjective agreement of a symbolic language as “objective” is a constitutive conceptual process that is socially and culturally regulated. Language systems of people, by articulating and deploying concepts, mold the perceptions of what is deemed reality - thus the world occupied by people is primarily a linguistic construct. In this way, reality
(and what is “objective” or “true”) becomes a socially, culturally assembled world
50 projected by the sciences. Thus, less and less is left over which was not a scientific construction; more importantly, in such a world, wo/man, too, becomes an artificial entity that is also a product of scientific endeavors and interpretations.
A science using quantification acquires a perceived and socially established degree of perfection that is not only recognizable but also makes it easier to avoid error
(because of the strict fixed roles and structural framework of the abbreviated symbolic system of language), thus making it more able to fit into an existing conceptual structure.
The perfection of a number system allows for ideas to be represented by explicitly defined signs that are part of a particularly abbreviated symbolic language.
The relationships between entities and/ or properties expressed in symbols form a web of meaning then taken to be generalizable laws of nature. Numerical representations of entities begin to increasingly appear as if they are independent, self-sufficient, and are truly representative of physical nature. The scientific examination of nature has created entities linked to formal structures that relate and refer to one another in an attempt to render experiences of nature and the universe as coherent and predictable.
Structuralism in mathematics is broadly concerned with the concept that there are structures in mathematics. My interest is narrower and relates to what C. Parsons (1990) has termed the “structuralist view of mathematical objects” (p. 303). In the structuralist view, mathematical entities (like the other linguistic entities) are constantly found only in the context of a structure, “and that the objects involved have no more to them than can be expressed in terms of the basic relations of the structure” (C. Parsons, 1997, p. 171).
Resnik (1981) expressed similar ideas:
51 In mathematics, I claim, we do not have objects with an ‘internal’ composition
arranged in structures, we have only structures. The objects of mathematics, that
is, the entities which our mathematical constants and quantifiers denote, are
structureless points or positions in structures. As positions in structures, they
have no identity or features outside of a structure. (p. 530)
In essence, Resnik (1981) argued that mathematics is a formal (form) as opposed to content system. Quine (1969) argued similar cases for structural mathematics,
“arithmetic is, in this sense, all there is to number: there is no saying absolutely what the numbers are; there is only arithmetic” (p. 45). For Quine (1960), “we do not learn first what to talk about then what to say about it” (p. 16). Existence in a structure is the only existence for Quine.
The structural components of mathematics deemphasize the occurrence of individual components – and side steps questions about the nature/ truth/ reality of individual constituents – in favor of emphasizing the composition and claims found in the group (C. Parsons, 1997). By focusing on the structures of mathematics there is emphasis on the role of patterns – which results from a quasi-empirical element.
The quantitative entities of the sciences are established through the coherence of our understanding of them with existing and emerging interpretations/ understandings/ explanations. Our understanding of the mathematical entities forms a network that supports certain theories and constitutes our understanding of physical reality. The legitimation, habituation, and social construction of reality through institutionalization ultimately lead to the supposed objectivity of conceptualization. Interference with any value not only has the potential to disrupt the coherence of the prevailing theoretical
52 framework and to challenge our conceptualization of the universe; because of interconnected structuration of many of our concepts and theories even slight adjustments in quantitative values have a cascade effect on the social and conceptual system.
Examination of the conceptual (and ultimately linguistic) systems and the symbolic entities of natural and/or physical sciences underscore the facts and significance of the social construction of reality.
53 CHAPTER 5. SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTIONS: ANALYSIS OF HISTORICAL, SOCIAL,
AND POLITICAL PROGRESSION – TOWARDS AUTHORITY
Introduction
The reliability and credibility of scientific claims are associated with cultural perceptions of objectivity and neutrality. The cultural perceptions are then used as vital social resources to build cohesion and consensus. The empirical and (supposedly) universal qualities of scientific knowledge claims are then necessary for those secular institutions.
Examination of the social histories of science and ethnography of scientific discourse and practice reveal a cognitive, political economic, and institutionalization of modern natural science. Language is undoubtedly the mode by which reality production is made universally available in any societal context. Thus “reality” is created through the hegemonic legitimacy achieved through discourses. The creation of “reality” in the modern world is achieved in the authoritatively legitimated discourse of the natural and physical sciences. The methods, ideas, topics, and modes of representation employed by scientific practitioners require specialized training and access to a specialized discourse.
A scientific discipline then can be understood as the development of the specialized modes of representation, cognitive ideologies, training, and discourse possessed by practitioners as an ongoing conversation. Additionally, the results of that specific discourse realm require specialized knowledge to assess and defend that cognitive niche.
54 Additionally focus will be on the historical progression of scientific institutionalization and progression towards authority in a discourse and/or cognitive realm. Polkinghorne (1983) describes the historical progression of a continual social enterprise as the actual practice of scientific endeavors:
What is seen when attention is given to the practice of science is that it is an
activity undertaken by people who exist within history and culture. The factors
governing the discovery, development, and acceptance of scientific theories are
related to the conceptual frameworks within which a scientific activity is carried
out. The conceptual perspective determines in large part which questions are seen
as worthy of investigating and what sort of answers are acceptable. The
Weltanschauung or world view of scientists conceptually shapes the way in which
the world is experienced, and it is closely tied to the language system which one
uses when one speaks of understanding the world. Science is thus seen as one of
the games played when scientists interact with the world and with other people. It
is a special kind of ordering experience. (p. 113)
In this way then, the achievements of scientific knowledge are not just individual pursuits attempting to discover objective truth but instead are a social, collective pursuit.
Scientific Institutionalization of Knowledge
This subsection examines the relationship between power (political, social, economic, discursive, and cognitive), scientific knowledge, and justification/ credibility – how the development and dispersal of scientific knowledge reaffirms and transmits forms of authority and power, and how power confirms and disseminates forms of knowledge.
The literature has shown that not only does a relationship occur between science and
55 politics but also the two entities are inseparable (Cozzens & Woodhouse, 1995; Frickel &
Moore, 2005; Jasanoff, 2004). However, the exchange between political power and scientific knowledge claims is not simply one of authority shaping knowledge or of knowledge shaping power – there are deep institutional/ organizational, social, and historical conditions impacting cognitive practices in the sciences (as well as those that inhibit distributive political power) (Brown, 1993). Subjective and local cultural components are also important for the cognitive processes of science and for the deployment of political authority. Scientific endeavors occur in participation with society and structuring politics (e.g. Galileo’s Heliocentric view). Science is involved in society and politics through discursive performance in either broad or local conditions. The relationship between cognition in the sciences and the political sphere is then best understood as a relationship that is often dialectical and interactive.
The linkages between political authority and scientific knowledge claims are translated into cultural authority for scientists (Frickel & Moore, 2005; Gieryn, 1999;
Jasanoff, 1990, 2004). In the political arena, the reliability and credibility of scientific claims are associated with cultural perceptions of objectivity and neutrality. The cultural perceptions are then used as vital social resources to build cohesion and consensus in policy arenas that are ideologically polarized (Gauchat, 2012). Thus, the legitimized scientific community leverages technical expertise and credibility to evaluate and confirm social policy and other institutional processes (e.g., expert advisory panels, military and medical technology development). Research has shown that the interests of a variety of institutions and social actors, including scientists, academic departments, universities, professional organizations, regulatory agencies, funding agencies, and policymakers are
56 embodied in scientific knowledge claims (Barnes, 1977; Bloor, 1976; Gieryn, 1999;
Jasanoff, 1990; Knorr Cetina, 1983; Latour & Woolgar, 1979). As a result, individual actors and powerful funding organizations, with their own agendas and political interests, are understood to be part of the creation of scientific knowledge - in essence, science is and has always been politicized (Gauchat, 2012).
Luhmann (1979) contends that trust in science requires an intangible faith, based upon pragmatism and observation, that some third-party has some form of specialized knowledge or vantage point from which to apprehend the complexity of the world.
Shapin (1994) and Luhmann (1979) assert that this form of faith is necessary in differentiated societies, because it rectifies uncertainty associated with the unknown. In a complicated, technologically modern society, coercion alone is not a sufficient way to exercise power – there is also the power and dependence on specialized knowledge that is deployed through trusting relations akin to professional credibility. The social prestige of science is related to the advancement of modern social systems. T. Parsons (1962) proposed that empirical and universal qualities of scientific knowledge claims are necessary for secular institutions. Similarly, Barber (1990) illustrated the “special congruence” (p. 40) of science with rational-legal expertise and modern society. An example of the politics attached to science is through professionalization of the field where there is value conveyed to scientific clients and patrons from the practitioners of science. The practitioners promote their intellectual services (i.e., applications of knowledge, ideas, techniques, topics) in order to maintain support that allows for “the independence and privilege of a self-regulating monopoly guild” (Brown, 1993, p 154).
Thus the patronage and support of science requires delegation to scientists who are able
57 to exercise discretion over the quality of work that is supported by the clients and funders of scientific endeavors. “The patron’s delegation of authority is an act of trust” (Turner, n.d., p. 5). The trust that occurs between the benefactors of science and scientists were guaranteed by compatible ideologies, shared interests, fiscal interdependence, and a performed record of mutually beneficial utility (Barber, 1983; Brown, 1993).
Language is undoubtedly the mode by which reality production is made universally available in any societal context. Thus “reality” is created through the hegemonic legitimacy achieved through discourses (Foucault, 1980). The creation of
“reality” in the modern world is achieved in the authoritatively legitimated discourse of the natural and physical sciences (Brown, 1993). In an inter-subjectively validated lifeworld there is a necessity for reality to be stable, continuous, and intelligible. Thus, the ability to control the “reality” created by a discourse is an invaluable resource.
Science produces a barrier that restricts the control of reality producing discourse to certain individuals and not to others. The privileged barriers are maintained by technical and formalized ideals defined by modes of representation found in discourse.
Brown (1993) identified three preconditions for knowledge discourse to achieve monopoly authority or hegemony in a cognitive domain. There must be perception that knowledge discourse is specialized, believably denoted as useful to dominant groups, and there must be institutionalization. My aim is to demonstrate that scientific knowledge has a rhetorically constructed character and is therefore open to influence from social and political forums.
58 Toward Cognitive Authority in Discourse: Specialization and Standardization
Scientists aim for standardization. Standardization is the rendering of ad hoc practices into what are replicable, reputable public explanations. The techniques and standards of local or provincial standardization were developed historically, particularly configured as being objective and numerical. The standards and techniques used helped to differentiate the legitimate scientists from illegitimate scientists – thus satisfying
Brown’s first condition that successful knowledge discourse must be recognized as specialized. Specialized knowledge produces hegemony of the discourse since it obligates professional practitioners to a greater degree than would be considered
‘ordinary’ socialization. The methods, ideas, topics, and modes of representation employed by scientific practitioners require specialized training and access to a specialized discourse. A scientific discipline then can be understood as the development of the specialized modes of representation, cognitive ideologies, training, and discourse possessed by practitioners as an ongoing conversation. Additionally, the results of that specific discourse realm require specialized knowledge to assess and defend that cognitive niche.
The investigations by Mulkay and Gilbert (1982) and Bloor (1976) lend credibility to the idea that scientific specialization employs standardization. If standardization is the rendering of ad hoc research practices into replicable, reputable public explanations then in the everyday life of scientists, scientists tell stories about their research claims for the purpose of having their knowledge claims accepted. Scientists speak in two incommensurable voices: (1) The publicly available accessible and technical language of scientific items and (2) a personal narrative about the appearance of scientific
59 knowledge. The two distinct and ostensibly disparate voices allow for a communal perception that natural scientists are speaking for nature (or speaking for nature the way it wants to be spoken about), are being objective, and provide an avenue for a privileged language that appears to be not subjective. If there are incompatibilities in the logic of the two discourses there is still a rhetorical cohesion that allows for revisions of scientific conceptions about the world, as well as the possibilities for reinterpretation of subjective and inter-subjective meaning that have been created (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984). A paradox forms – as a discourse becomes more public within a scientific community it also becomes more specialized (Brown, 1993). Once there is supposed movement away from the personal, subjective experience of a scientist to understand to a broader scientific public knowledge forum, the knowledge claim is transformed into an objective explanation of natural facts and laws. The truth in science is the expressive progression from personal enterprise to a social knowledge – which, also is seen in the conceptual and paradigmatic revolutions of science.
Latour and Woolgar (1986) examined the exclusivity of professional knowledge and showed the social constitution of fact and truth in scientific endeavors. When an individual scientist believes that they have a discovery, there is a propensity to reassemble the progression of the work that conceivably led to their current understanding. In essence, the scientist reduced a series of complex contextual actions into logical operations. In other words, there is a progression of how (local and contextual) problems are conceptualized to determined solutions (with broad applicability); at this point a substantial reappraisal occurs of exactly how the natural scientist arrived at point B from point A – concluding that the solution is in fact the
60 answer to the problem which was achieved by a particular method. The ‘technical’ (i.e. realistic) components are separated from social (i.e. unpersuasive) components. For
Latour and Woolgar, the separation and inversion of the social and technical factors are not dictated by technique or data – rather the separation and inversion of factors are the rhetorical (re)constructions of the data and methods themselves.
The systematic study of scientists and the scientific community undermines the foundationalist assertions of the scientific community. An example against foundationalist science is presented in the work of Collins (1985). Collins demonstrated that scientists rarely replicate previous studies – an action that would be expected for a community that was involved in the falsification and verification of claims. Collins focused on several case studies with multiple conclusions. Successful replication was the result of the development of a specific skill set or craft. Additionally, Collins showed that scientists aimed to intentionally destroy or confirm rival statements based on a priori beliefs rooted in the reputations of the rival scientists and the subjective perception of credibility. The initial expectations of an experimenter guide positive and negative results and outcomes and are confirmed as positive or negative criteria for statements – this is not surprising given that there is an uneven distribution of incentives, power, and opportunities to disseminate compelling arguments. It should not be a shock then, that a researcher can design, conduct, and evaluate results for solely argumentative purposes
(Lynch, 1986). The results from experimentation can only be understood in light of contextual factors. “Verdicts on all these [contextual] questions stand or fall together, and an experiment cannot be accorded a decisive outcome independent of such complex, situated judgments. What this implies is that, because any subsequent reenactment will
61 always differ in some respects from the original experiment, there is always room to argue that it differs in some relevant respect, which makes it not a fair comparison with the original” (Golinksi, 2005, p. 29). What this means is that even if there is a successful replication – either confirmation or refutation of results – the original researcher can always contend that the follow-up experiment was incomparable and therefore not a valid replication. The assessments of scientific replication and results are always a judgment call and there can be an indefinite continual dispute on the basis of contextual judgment and bias. The interesting conclusion of Collins’ (1985) work showed that those disputes rarely lasted and that most new claims to knowledge are endorsed without debate.
Collins argued that there are social protocols for aversion and resolution of scientific controversies. Scientists rarely object to other scientists’ claims because they quietly trust the expertise and competence of scientific colleagues. Scientific subcultures are then bound together through necessary circumstances (e.g., prestige, funding) that allow consensual knowledge generation – similar to Kuhn’s assertion that authority relationships are common to ‘normal science’. For the most part scientific communities are maintained by a “matrix of trust” (Golinksi, 2005, p. 29). Despite Collins’ (1985) demonstrations that controversies do not occur often, those disputes are insightful since they show the true relationships of authority and dependence that are collectively ingrained. The revealing of trust networks is additional confirmation that science occurs in social contexts. A significant portion of this chapter focuses on the importance of a formal institution for science. Collins provides another social dimension – the informal connections (network) and communications among the participants of a scientific community surrounding a specific controversy that propels cognition, legitimacy or
62 authority, and standardization. The ‘truth’ claims of science (as elsewhere) are based upon a social constitution. When examining the ethnographies of science there are revelations that modern science is not value-neutral, objective, and the unbiased pursuit of truth – a statement irreconcilable with the current rhetoric and philosophies of science.
Additional work has uncovered and dispelled scientific absolutist vanities by focusing on the locally, ingrained nature of scientific progression (Ashmore, 1989;
Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984; Pickering, 1991). The theme of local specificity is one that will run through the entirety of this chapter. Likewise, notions of the locally specific nature of scientific knowledge are a common theme throughout the sociology of scientific knowledge and social constructivist literature. In my mind, localization of scientific knowledge has come to represent two ideas: (1) The specific place of production of science and (2) the more commonly discussed ideas of Kuhn where communal practitioners share paradigmatic understandings that are comprised of institutional bonds, presuppositions, technical and methodological conditions of agreement structured around the practices of a specific model. Examination of scientific knowledge localization highlights the place of scientific knowledge production, often citing the laboratory
(Golinksi, 2005) as an example for illustrative purposes. The focus on the laboratory allowed for examination of the historical constitution of the laboratory as the site where material and human capital are compiled. By bringing together the human and material resources in a physical setting the laboratory provided an ability to arrange and alter phenomena. Natural science validity claims to occur from no privileged place and also to be universally valid. ,However, there are certain locations that are socially validated as sites of natural knowledge production – a physical setting affiliated with structures of
63 power, a disciplined and regulated interface between material apparatus and personnel that organizes interactions. Critiques of the external context of laboratories emphasized three major concepts: (1) There is a necessity of external capital, material, financial, and cultural resources to sustain the activities that occur inside a laboratory; (2) the laboratory is purposefully isolated from surrounding influences – either physical influences or the influence of the ‘unqualified’; and (3) the knowledge claims derived in the laboratory do not remain solely in the laboratory but are circulated in the public realm in a demonstration to audiences essentially different from the original experimentation
(Collins, 1987, 1988). For this thesis on the conceptual apparatus of science, it is imperative to recognize the role of the laboratory as an advantaged site for the construction of scientific knowledge that is then mobilized in the public realm through discourse, ideology, and experiences. Golinksi (2005) says,
The laboratory has earned its status by the manipulation of relations between
inside and outside, by using representational means to alter the magnitude of
entities, by bringing into proximity objects that are initially distant from one
another, and so on. These practices have made it a privileged place for the
construction of natural knowledge. But it owes its success also to an ability to
make the knowledge constructed in the laboratory travel beyond its walls. And
this ability is connected, in terms of the practices involved, with the success of the
sciences that study the world beyond the laboratory. (p. 102)
Through what is socially deemed as successful work in the laboratory there is extension of scientific credibility to a larger body of scientific work that occurs outside of the laboratory setting.
64 The Historical Development of Professionalization, Institutionalization, and
Standardization in Science: Politics, Economy, and Organization
The contents of this particular subsection build on the current topics of institutionalization and professionalization of scientific knowledge. This subsection begins from a purely historical perspective to a focus on discourse authority through institutionalization/ professionalization. To understand the cognitive authority, political and organizational power, and cultural impact of the academy it is necessary to examine the practice of science in an historical contest.
According to Leff (1968), “the university professionalized knowledge” (p. 2) where
the establishment of the university provided Western culture with an unparalleled
institutional advantage in the subsequent development of the sciences, although
what was at first offered was predominantly professional training in law,
theology, medicine and numerous other vocations from teaching to notarial work,
for which degrees became a prerequisite during the middle ages. Thus, although
the university on the whole did not expound much science, the attitude to
knowledge that it practiced and conveyed was crucial for the development of the
sciences. (Redner, 1987, p. 37)
The institutional status of the university in the ancient sense was not as a school but rather as the
very first autonomous educational corporation in history. Its very name:
universitas, signified its corporate character, for that was the accepted term for all
guilds in the early middle ages, and the university was then simply an instituted
65 guild of masters and students. The guild-like professional character of the
teaching corps of the university has been preserved. […] In the middle ages the
university as a guild had an independent legal status that no previous school could
have enjoyed. (Redner, 1987, p. 37)
The university offered an aggregation of knowledge – political, sacred, and scientific – to its faculties in a manner that was unmatched in any other cultural or social sense. The consolidation of knowledge provided a distinctive scenario – “in the university the organization of knowledge was elevated into an enduring system, which did not depend for its continuance upon any single group of texts; the system of knowledge was more important than the thing known” (Mumford, 1938, p. 34). Essentially, the university guaranteed that there would be a continuous historical progression of scholarly activity.
As an organizational, corporate entity distinct from the students and teachers, the university model was able to separate itself from the ancient model where success was reliant on a succession of great masters. Instead, selection of teachers was recognized by successfully completing a universally recognized curriculum of training and examination.
There was an establishment of a judicial norm across every university – ius ubique docendi – that allowed for an exchange of faculty and students. The migration and shuffle of scholars meant that no university was committed to being the school of a single master. A system was fostered where multiple distinct viewpoints were to be continually debated and disputed. The argumentative style, although not entirely distinct from ancient practices, provided a significantly different content.
The consistency and continuity of the university means that it could make a bid
for universality and claim to incorporate all of Reason within itself. With the
66 backing of the Church this claim could be made to stand for many centuries,
although there were always other groups contesting it. But the university was no
mere instrument of the Church; it always managed to retain a large measure of
political autonomy […] The university was at once local and universal; fixed in a
place but drawing its people from everywhere. (Redner, 1987, p. 38)
The universities at this time were not what we would now consider as scientific, although they would teach topics that would now be considered science. The importance of the early historical development of the university was that it propagated the cognitive norms by teaching an intellectual content throughout academic subjects.
All in all, the university carried out an institutionalization of metaphysics and
theology that was decisive for the imposition of Reason on the intellectual
universe and eventually on the universe as such. Out of the metaphysical Reason
there eventually developed the philosophical Rationalism that laid the
groundwork for the new systems of sciences. (Redner, 1987, p. 39)
Weber (1930) noted that this eventually ushered in a “rational, systematic, and specialized pursuit of science, with training and specialized personnel” (p. 16).
As crucial as the middle ages and the guild system of the academy were to the creation of universities and intellectual bases there were later periods that can be credited with the appearances and practices of modern science. The 17th century and late
Renaissance were periods of ‘reactionary scholasticism’ that barred the ideas of ‘new sciences’. In order to fully develop, the sciences moved outside of the control of the medieval university – though the sciences would eventually return to a reformed modern university in the nineteenth century. The Renaissance period was dominated by large
67 gentlemanly gatherings rooted in a humanistic model that was devoted to philosophy, art, and humanistic scholarship. The humanistic academy was designed to mimic and serve as a revival of the schools of the ancient world. Participants engaged in artistic experimentation that would serve as the foundation of scientific experimentation. In the new artistic academy there was no distinguishing between science and art since both were occult disciplines. The periods of the Renaissance started a further institutionalization of science but it wasn’t until the Scientific Revolution of the 17th century that “invisible colleges” (Purver, 1967, p. 205) - scientific societies and academies - would come to fruition.
As mentioned, there was an externalization of scientific disciplines from the universities that occurred during the Renaissance – this was marked by the creation of scientific societies and royal academies. Wolfgang van den Daele (1977) noted that the royal funding of scientists’ salaries ensured an organizational development and authority of the sciences – “for the first time there developed an infrastructure ensuring relative continuity of scientific work” (p. 29). Van den Daele (1977) continued that the new scientific institutions established new authoritative structures for science since
the incorporation of the Royal Society and the Academies of Science gave birth to
institutions which defined scientific standards and began to exercise control over
the observance of such standards. Science was metropolized and hierarchized.
The academies and Royal Society… functioned as arbiters of the work of other
scientists, repeating their experiments and evaluating their writings. [By
controlling the publication of experimentation] the societies were in control of the
most important publications of the period… The activity of Secretaries and the
68 periodic scientific journals stabilized the flow of information to other scientists
and the public at large. (p. 29)
The regimented control of scientific authority established by the Royal Societies served as the foundation and has been the primary mode by which academic science is divided, work is regulated and evaluated, and results/ data are published and disseminated. Thus, moderators and authorities of political and financial organizations deemed scientific work acceptable. “These organizations provided the structure and authority which transformed the mere printing of scientific work into its publication”
(Merton & Zuckerman, 1973, p. 462). Merton and Zuckerman (1973) cited that editorial positions and publication in the Royal Society served several purposes: (1) It enforced what was to be considered proper scientific work – conceptions and standards - and rejected the deviant. (2) The scientists considered the publication as a vehicle to secure intellectual copyrights of their discoveries. (3) The publications eventually morphed into an authenticating process for scientific procedures. Not only was there control over information and knowledge exchange by the Royal Societies but charters delimited the spheres of operation of claims so that scientific knowledge would not usurp other institutions. The Academies and Royal Societies established a modern scientific authority and structural arrangement, which grew out of a “historical compromise between royal power and the militant claims of the various exponents of the new learning as against the old learning of the universities. As a result a ‘harmless’ and politically innocuous scientific approach was instituted at the expense of rival methods and traditions, which were thereby suppressed and repressed into irrational currents of popular science and the occult” (Redner, 1987, p. 45). The royal academies continued to
69 spread at the expense of the universities since the academies maintained an open discourse and intercourse between the intellectuals and the aristocracy.
The emergence of science in the university occurred in the nineteenth century due to historical adjustments that were motivated to action by politics. The system that thrived during the Royal Society period disconnected research from teaching. The system was disadvantageous to the growth of science because it emphasized a mechanism that did not foster future generations of scientists and it encouraged associations of amateurs to be the basis of research (Ben-David, 1970). The newly established university system established itself as the new center of scientific research – a role absent from the previous university model of the medieval ages. The intellectuals of the century were comprised of humanists, philosophers, teachers, scientists, and scholars with strong political connections.
The re-foundation and reestablishment of universities mean that the members of
this new intellectual ‘class’ (status group really) would be recruited for state
service in ever larger numbers, and thereby socially absorbed, politically
neutralized and made to act ideologically on behalf of the state. This union of
intellectuals and the state in their joint institution, the new university, became the
social and political basis for the extraordinary expansion of the sciences which
has continued ever since. (Redner, 1987, pp. 46-47)
The new university system gravitated away from general philosophical education to more practical disciplines in a specialized science. Ben-David and Zloczower (1972) have detailed the process by which a unitary body of philosophy was dismantled by specific and specialized sciences. Once general philosophy was dismantled by the
70 sciences, there were a variety of new disciplines (e.g., law and medicine) situated into the free framework of academic faculties, “none of which seems to have been averse to incorporating new fields” (Ben-David & Zloczower, 1972, p. 45).
The idealized unity of research and teaching garnered a new scientific state with an academic structure and authority that generated what would become the most productive period of scientific development. At this point in time, the university was increasingly obtaining a monopoly on knowledge that mimicked the state acquisition of power. The acquisition of intellectual ownership would later be described as a parallel process to that of economic production in an established industrial capitalistic society.
Weber (1958) later described the university as a “state capitalist enterprise” (p. 131) and
Weber (1978) would develop work showing that the state and in parallel the university are products of capitalist production and an enterprise. Weber (1958) saw that academic research could not be separated from intellectual and cultural production since the university functioned simultaneously as an exporter of culture and gatekeeper of knowledge production. The university eclipsed private scientists and private scholars.
Scientists became increasingly dependent upon university-owned laboratories, personnel, and equipment while scholars relied on university-owned publications and presses, libraries, and research.
After the nineteenth century the new university system professors transitioned away from “the formerly independent quasi-artisanal producers of knowledge and culture
[and thus] were expropriated and transformed into paid university functionaries” (Redner,
1987, p. 48). Redner continues:
71 Within the new universities the professors emerged as quasi-capitalist
entrepreneurs of knowledge production. Each professor could set up a small
enterprise – an institute, frequently with a laboratory attached to it, or a seminar –
and specialize in an ever more restricted line of scientific ‘goods’, which at first,
before competition built up, he could for a while monopolize […] This
mechanism of seeking monopoly through specialization developed the separate
branches of the sciences and made possible their research in depth; it also helped
to spread the established specialties through competition throughout the world
university system. Like his economic counterpart, the capitalist, the professor
could appropriate for himself the combined organized labors of all those beneath
him in his enterprise. He acted as the authoritative head of a hierarchical team
[…] supervising the research work of a group of doctoral students. These latter
provided an almost inexhaustible and ever-renewed supply of unpaid labor power
– students in the process of being trained but already disciplined to perform tasks
as required. Thus the ideal principle of the unity of teaching and research first
developed for the humanities, really proved itself ‘economically’ and ‘politically’
in the sciences. It made possible large scale research on a continuous and
organized basis with a division of labor and a hierarchy of authority for steering
and directing the research process. (p. 48)
In the nineteenth century, science became not only industrialized but a vital component in modern economic fabrication and production. During this period, science
(authorized by positivism) was tied more closely to the state, industry, and financial institutions. Once knowledge generation became embedded in a market system there
72 were outcomes that influenced the practitioners of the field. Science has been prosperous in its endeavors to penetrate the languages and ideals of the public forum and has positioned itself in an authoritative role in society. Additionally, by embedding science into a market there were alignments of specialized academic professions with specialized professional and administrative roles and responsibilities. Bledstein (1976) provided examples of the scientific hegemony in social and economic administrative spaces:
“Psychiatry was joined with the asylum, and education with the school, economics with the government, and management science with the corporation” (pp. 218-219). By incorporating academics into specific social roles there are further requirements for specialized knowledge, specific professional training and administrative abilities, and a necessity for a separate culture emphasizing certain ways of life related to the possession of uncommon knowledge.
The advancement of scientific credibility and authority necessitated differentiation of science from technology and the practical, conceptual distinction of what are to be considered applied and basic research tracts. The distinctions between applied and basic research served multiple ends – the financial/ proprietary and the cognitive. Political and business elites desired for a way to distinguish between technological advancements and inventions from the “unpatentable basic research”
(Brown, 1993, p. 160). Root-Bernstein (1984) noted that basic-research was geared for open distribution with an emphasis on knowing rather than ‘doing’. This stands in direct contrast to technologies whose interests, processes, and products were to be protected under copyright law and patents that encouraged and emphasized a culture of secrecy.
The business of basic science was expected to take place in public research organizations
73 and academic institutions where the emphasis was on prestige (Nelkin, 1984).
Commercial interests were reflected in the division between the nonproprietary (basic research) and proprietary (applied research) since the applied research led to business- related patents and profits. Technology was privatized and driven by financial incentives while nonspecific applications and nonproprietary basic research was left to the accord of academia that is driven instead by prestige. Technology and science legitimized the other. ‘Pure’ science intellectually sanctioned the extension of knowledge to technology while technology emphasized that scientific research leads to useful results. Cognitive mechanisms and normative standards also accompanied the distinction between the standards of pure research versus that of applied research. Another paradox of science was then formed – in order to actualize the utility of pure science, pure science had to be accomplished without consideration of practical utility. In essence, a useful science in the long run is at first reserved to be a useless science.
The university was able to ensure and realize this requirement better than any
other institution, for in this context the sciences developed in close proximity to
humanistic studies within the general faculty of philosophy. Thus the ideals of
disinterested, theoretical research, with no commercial soil or practical taint,
applied equally to the sciences as to other elevated modes of learning. In this way
the sciences could develop and practice norms of pure research which many
scientists still maintain to this day in their ideal conception of themselves
...Anything that went outside pure research in the required theoretical mode could
be excluded from the university. The authority of the university thus brought
about the ‘political separation of pure from applied research and forced the latter
74 into another institution […] Thus a two-tier system of scientific research arose
which proved efficacious in the growth of science during the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries; […] Thus what is taken to be an intrinsic separation of
science from technology is partly the outcome of this authority structure [i.e. the
transfer of practical application to private enterprises] within which the whole
process of research and its application was conducted. (Redner, 1987, pp. 49-50)
The two-tier system, representing systematic separation of applied and basic research institutions impacted the social sciences and the humanities since the social sciences were not allowed to develop in a manner consistent with the natural sciences because of differences between humans and ‘things’ for basic and applied research. The theories and ideas of the social sciences were constantly being developed; the problem was that the institutions were not fully responsive to their findings.
The new bureaucratic system, representative of a new institution and new academic authority would come to be known as the multiversity. The multiversity is the imitation and combination of older models of previous universities – the merger of “pure intellect and raw pragmatism [that] made an unlikely but successful alliance” (Kerr,
1963, p. 48). The multiversity is differentiated from the university by the negation of the ideals of the university: (1) the unity of research and teaching and (2) separation of learning from examination. The older ideals of the university are still maintained at least for appearances’ sake and to disguise the fact the ‘multiversity’ functions as an institutional site of authority relations. In the multiversity there is a strict segregation of knowledge into compartmentalized departments that demarcates disciplinary boundaries and avenues of publication – with serious implications for how knowledge is produced
75 and portrayed. The authoritative relationships keep knowledge separate and distinct, and maintain a strict separation between specialists regardless of whether there is cooperation between individuals.
Scientific Institutionalization and Professionalization:
Quantification and Discourse
The institutional synthesis of political, economic, and cognitive interests was predominantly established in the late nineteenth century but continued in a modern context. The modern, rationalized corporate power and contemporary, institutionalized, scientific knowledge have become mutually empowering – a dialectical interaction that is constantly evolving in modern society.
Scientific processes require investment capital to continue with intellectual research. In order to obtain capital there was an institutionalization of disciplines and individuals into research universities or specialized centers while scientific practitioners sought to demonstrate utility to patrons and potential clients. In passage, scientific disciplines conformed their concepts, techniques, topics, agency to adhere to the requisites of institutionalization and professionalization. The language of science shifted in accordance with the priorities toward professionalization and institutionalization.
Knowledge production occurs through numerous different formats – publications, professional organizations and associations, etc. The linguistic form of knowledge production is very important to how understanding and interpretation are shaped. The linguistic form is more than an individual refinement – it is a collective enterprise that designates the whole scientific enterprise. In this regard, words shape and are shaped by the discipline’s practice – a constitutive process. This includes
76 its communally developed linguistic resources and expectations; […] its stylized
identification and structuring of realities to be discussed; its literature; its active
producers of reading, evaluating, and using texts; its structured interactions
between reader and writer. The words arise out of activity, procedures and
relationships within the community. (Bazerman, 1988, p. 47)
The rhetorical devices of scientific approach complement the theoretical functions
(Brown, 1989) by also shaping the functional day-to-day behaviors that are responsible for the structure and cohesion of the discipline. The creation of a common language – inclusive of numerical references and measures – is fundamental for the creation of shared concepts and methods that determine the knowledge practices of the scientific disciplines as something distinct and definite. Proficiency of these rhetorical devices, and a working skill to deploy the rhetorical devices, is what certifies someone as a scientific professional. The practitioners of a prospective science must demonstrate that their knowledge is an expert knowledge but that it is distinct and superior to what is known by everyone else (Freidson, 1986; Haskell, 1984). Not only must practitioners establish their own particular cognitive and rhetorical voice but also they should develop and defend a particular niche within the existing assembly for scientific discourse. The alliances and parallels with other disciplines would prove beneficial by allowing for the adoption of established methods to fit new theoretical agendas (Ravetz, 1971).
Ultimately, alliances are formed on a rhetorical, cognitive, and political level. The only limitations for investigation are correspondent to limitations on knowledge production that accompany a particular discipline. Those with sufficient social power to impact the rhetorical, cognitive, and political processes are (1) likely to get “kinds of knowledge
77 products that are compatible with their interests” (Danziger, 1990, p. 182) and (2) infiltrate their scientific vocabulary into productive social domains that serve interests of the dominant discourse. The intellectual agendas of scientific advancement were also highly dependent upon the creation of measurements, codified symbolic languages and methods, and scientific procedures. Through the creation of scientific procedures, there were further elements of professionalization that drove the entitlements to monopolized intellectual domains. Through the processes of institutionalized actions and protocols of cognition and perception the presupposed correspondent things and objectivity of science reveal a historical narrative. The periods of the nineteenth century established scientific criteria and processes as objective through quantification. Quantitative practices and rules allowed for acceptance/ rejection of scientific practices and the perception that
‘personal discrepancies of observers’ could be corrected through equations. The success of the movement is asserted in Lord Kelvin’s quote, “When you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is a meager and unsatisfactory kind” (as cited in Kuhn, 1977, p. 178) The success at institutionalization and standardization/ numeracy/ objectivity of the natural sciences has lead the social sciences to mimic the practices in an effort to institutionalize and justify the study of societies and individuals as parallel to the studies of nature. It should be no surprise then that the social sciences’ standardized methods and measurements came later as the field began to establish independent scientific disciplines (Bannister, 1991; Longino, 1990).
The development of probability based statistical approaches carried quantification
a long step forward because it made the regression framework available to social
scientists. This was crucial because unlike astronomers, social scientists tested
78 their theories with data that were shaped by many factors that were of little
concern to theory. Regression analysis made it possible to locate numerically the
causal roles of factors of theoretical interest. […] Statistical objectivity thus
provided a common language within social science disciplines even while helping
to define them as more scientific and disciplined on the model of astronomy and
physics. (Brown, 1993, p. 158)
The uniformity of measurement was slowly established in the broader context of society in general. The establishment of ‘scientific’ measures allowed for appliance of the scientific context to nonscientific settings – both shared a common language and measure. The calculation and numerical control of science was extended beyond the laboratory to be used in many aspects of daily life (e.g., factory, classroom, production lines, bureaucracy, etc.). The perceived order (i.e., coherence) of mathematical models was thus expanded - ‘Nonscientists’ were able to articulate more and more features of the world through a [presupposed objective and] ‘correspondent’ [to underlying reality] mathematics (Hallyn, 1990). Additionally, Hornstein (1988) noted that the seemingly impartial and impersonal nature of measurement accommodated democratic ideologies of
American institutions. Thus, what began in the Renaissance as an aesthetic ideal – “a mimesis that elucidates principles of Creation as a coherent system of mathematical relations – was realized in modern science as a practice that wills the technical re-creation of the world” (Brown, 1993, pp. 158-159). The cognitive boundaries of scientific knowledge enabled social boundaries. Social boundaries are marked by differences between organizations and disciplines of practitioners into a professional guild system.
By creating and enforcing a professional and intellectual distinction it allowed for
79 ‘product identification’, ‘oligopolization’, and ‘market allocation’ to be secured by social groups. By constantly establishing more precise and exact professional norms and boundaries of scientific principles it becomes easier to delineate which practitioners are
(or are not) scientists. The veil of objectivity and an exact representation of scientific doctrines provide a distinguishing line to determine who are or who are not practitioners of science (or a member of a professional guild) – a sect that has an increasing cultural credibility and ownership over their own cultural brand. The work of Bourdieu (1991) and Bourdieu and Passeron (1970) suggests that not only is scientific credibility professional and lends cognitive authority but that there are singular elements of scientific organization and formal knowledge that manage the indivisible and collective cultural capital of society. Through processes of institutionalization and professionalization, the scientific community determined (1) what is or is not science; (2) who is or isn’t a scientist; (3) what are the correct entities and techniques of measurement; (4) what are the preferred modes of inquiry; and (5) how results are introduced and circulated in the public forum. A historical examination of the sciences, natural and social sciences alike, reveal that even though ideological and institutional means may have varied they served the same purposes – the
provision of apparently rational means for achieving policy goals determined by
others. Intentionally or not, all these fields have adopted their theoretical
language and their research practices to bureaucratic-technological priorities. The
hope appeared to have been either that such restructured knowledge would lead to
power, inside or outside the academy, or that there might as least be some space
for ‘free’ inquiry. The ironic result has been that even the most esoteric inquiry
80 has been carried out in a research style already settled in advance by the
apparatus. (Ash, 1991, p. 54)
The institutionalization of science and the rationalization of power have led to paradoxes and ironies in application. The convergence of power and knowledge was aimed to liberate human potential. The achievement of this type of knowledge paradoxically became a power-over dominion for the manipulation and control of human and physical nature. The obvious paradox that emerged from this discussion on scientific institutionalization is that the actual practice of scientific endeavors (dependent as they are upon economic and political interests) contradicts the ideology of modern science (the positivist philosophy of scientific inquiry that expresses epistemological transparency and accuracy). Scientists are subset to this – conceptual legitimacy, scientific autonomy, prestige from the elites, and instrumental utility – through designing the context of investigation as a simulation of the context of application. “One might even suggest that the very difference between the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of scientific inquiry is exactly what successful laboratories destabilize or undo” (Latour, 1983, p. 143). Thus, the research practices of scientific investigation can develop into supplemental social practices.
Not only has the world become a model of scientific experimentation but also experimentation has become a model for the world. “In order to apply and exploit the inventions of the laboratory, social reality itself has become more of a controlled experiment” (Brown, 1993, p. 166). (The views of scientists become truer as more and more of modern life becomes dependent on science.) In this way then, scientific power and institutionalization are reciprocating, constitutive processes of a social, conceptual realm.
81 Figure 1 outlines not only the institutional synthesis of political, economic, and cognitive interests which provide scientific authority in discourse but also demonstrates the historical and rhetorical processes that led to the development of scientific hegemony for society and conceptualization.
82 lization, lization, The standardization, specialization, professiona specialization, standardization, The
. Hegemony in discourse: in Hegemony . 1 Figure Figure of science institutionalization and
83 CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION
As a result of the fixation on empirical data by scientism and the authority and influence of institutional claims to have access to an objective, empirically verifiable realm of things-in-themselves, the ensuing direction of social science, and thus public administration, research has often been one emphasizing objective, value-free inquiry, neutral practices, and mathematical methods. However, an objective, empirically confirmed correspondence to reality is unachievable. In light of this realization, this manuscript has emphasized the role of context and conceptualization in our understanding and coherence or veridicality of experiences and other claims.
Furthermore, this manuscript has shown the centrality for language and the conceptual apparatus it delineates in determining coherence of experiences or other claims. While the coherence of experiences and consistency of claims arising from language are necessary to our understanding these experiences and claims are objectively verifiable.
The linkage between a linguistic system and reality is a difficult connection since the symbols of conventional and mathematical systems do not refer to an external reality but to a system of signifiers. Additionally, language is a system not only of signifiers, but a system of the very concepts signified by them – which, in mediating experiences and understanding, in both these ways, is instrumental in constituting such coherence.
The following conclusions will focus on potential applications and future directions of research for the human, social sciences and public administration in light of those presentations and insights.
84 Applications for the Human and Social Sciences
Supposedly Objectivistic Methodologies Applied to Explanation and Prediction of
Behavior of Physical Objects May Simply Be Inappropriate to Certain Other Areas of Study; and More Specifically Are Indeed Inappropriate to the Understanding of
Human Subjects
The purported success of natural science’s description of nature and the universe has led the social sciences to either emulate natural scientific method and practices, or defend their qualitative and linguistic methods and the resulting epistemological claims.
Because of methodological assumptions adapted from the natural sciences, the human and social sciences can be divided into reductionist (mirroring the traditional research model adopted from the physical and natural sciences) and non-reductionist (humanistic) modes. The adoption of the natural science methodology and models by the social sciences for the study of human beings are not objective, as they claim to be, and are inappropriate to the understanding of human subjects. Instead of developing more inventive and refined applications of the traditional research model of the natural sciences, there is a need to advance methods and alternatives to reductionist practices, which are specifically sensitive to the unique distinctiveness of human existence – an approach where human subjects, through language, conceptualize primary categories of meaning and significance.
The importance of humanistic methods is that they diverge from the approaches, philosophies, and methods of the natural scientific model. The alternatives are especially appealing when discussing the human and social sciences because interpretation and understanding of the human realm require radically different technique/ methods and
85 conceptual apparatuses - than the studying of things in natural and physical sciences. I propose alternatives and argue for the necessity of those alternative approaches for the human and social sciences.
Emergentism, Systems, and Structuralism
Inquiry in the human and social sciences requires an understanding of systems as the interactions of parts with the whole, and the whole as more than the sum of its parts.
Biological systems are distinct from social systems. The physical and natural sciences examine the constituent parts and focus specifically on physical phenomena through an approach that concludes prior events cause subsequent events. When dealing with living beings there cannot be the same approach as the part-whole relationship in which the parts constitute the whole, which reciprocally determines the behavior of the parts, plays in a larger whole. There are important implications for individuals and society as a whole for an approach emphasizing that “the whole is not the result of the joining together of the discrete and independent parts; it is the pattern which joins the parts together in a particular way” (Polkinghorne, 1983, p. 140). “The organic whole is not a multiple of ultimate units, but is on the contrary, itself one single individuality” (Montgomery, 1880, quoted in Phillips, 1976, p. 28) The emergence of qualitative characteristics is seen in human and social sciences when individual action and collective action influence each other (Kretch, Crutchfield, & Ballachey, 1962; Sanford, 1966). When approaching the study of human and social subjects there should be focus on the emergent characteristics and structural relationships (to be discussed further). There also should be recognition that neither the group nor the individual are the basic entities of human experience and reality. The human realm consists of individuals, the collective social group, and the
86 interactions of the individual and group. Focusing exclusively on the individual or the aggregations has led to problems in the unit-of-analysis. I would propose eschewing typical analysis of the part-and-the-whole in favor of language for the social sciences.
Language analysis is parallel to or analogous of the relationship between the individual and society (in that between word and sentence or sentence and context). The construction of an adequate methodology in the human and social sciences requires an approach concerned with understanding the complexity of objects and systems. Fruitful examination of the human and social sciences necessitate going beyond reductionist notions of analysis only in terms of constituent parts since there should an approach to the whole of complexity through a systems approach (as exemplified in public administration and organization theory literature), or one with whole-and-part interactions – with specific attention to information exchange and/or organizational and structural components. I wish to differentiate the scientific use of whole-part relationships from my use of whole-and-part interactions. Scientific usage of the whole- part relationship refers to the specific whole entities comprised of constituent entities – those solitary entities are often ‘attached to the whole’ and ‘owned’ by the whole. My usage refers to a form of thinking where wholeness is more than the sum of the parts; the individual (or part) is not defined solely by a relationship to the whole; but they are importantly defined by their relationships to each other, which collectively constitute the whole (e.g., a sentence).
The difficulty in constructing a functional analysis and methodology for the human and social sciences depends on whether social systems are thought of merely as an aggregate of individuals or holistically (individualistic methodology or holistic
87 methodology). General systems theory, as related to biological systems and machine systems, can differ from social systems. The biological systems are organized in a manner that only relates fundamental parts in functional relationships to the whole, with the view to understanding how various components function in maintenance of status or in producing efficiency. Social systems are functionally different from the natural in that they may have more or less discernable ends. Social practices and function cannot be thoroughly understood without understanding the meanings which participants attach to them and the role each performs in achieving their perceived ends: meaning being irrelevant to mechanistic systems while neither meaning nor ends are neither relevant for understanding biological systems.
Thus, function as defined by biological or machine systems is straightforward and noted as the role of parts in relation to the whole. However, the word function is ambiguous in social systems since it is often interchangeable with the word purpose
(whereas purpose in the human realm can be conscious and may or may not be functional). Thus, the systems approach in the human and/or social sciences is distinct from that of the mechanistic or biological systems approach, while the systems approach more generally from the atomistic approaches characteristic of so many of the natural sciences.
Research using the system approach suggests that human beings are systemically
organized, that they are not simply aggregates of independent parts. In this
research, the organic or experiential base of the human realm is systemic, and so
are the individual, social, and historical expressions. Individual entities can of
course, be abstracted from their systemic environments and analyzed to discover
88 the lawlike relations which hold among them. Although these procedures allow
for a degree of accuracy and demonstrative logical treatment, they lose the
connectedness which is part of their full characterization in the human realm…
The systems system of inquiry is an effort to grasp an understanding of wholes
while adhering to the principles of disciplined generalization and rigorous
reflection. (Polkinghorne, 1983, p. 167)
When focused on quality and the structural relationships of elements we may become aware of emergent characteristics – qualities not found in the original components themselves but existing among the interactions of the components.
Reduction, often found in the traditional scientific research model, is unable to explain or even recognize emergent properties. Scientific laws, through deduction, are concerned with ‘prediction’ of future events and theoretical explanations are invented, not logically derived. Emergent characteristics do not contain references to deduced premises – i.e.,
“the structure of deductive argument prohibits its use in dealing with radical, deep change, mutation, and discontinuous leaps” (Polkinghorne, 1983, p. 137). The classic example of emergent qualities is illustrated by water, H2O. It is not possible to fully explain the phenomena of water by a simple reduction to two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom. Constituent ‘dry’ atoms cannot explain the resulting wet characteristics associated with water – only through the interaction and structural arrangements of molecules can the emergent characteristics and phenomena be comprehended. I propose that emergent characteristics are also found at the intersection of the constituent individual and the whole of society – through the relationship of the part and the whole there is formation of new qualities and structural contexts which may give rise to
89 meaning in the human realm (in the form of language). The social science analogy would then be the example that society, as a whole, cannot fully explain phenomena by reduction to the individual. The constituent individuals cannot explain fully the characteristics of society – only through the interaction and structural arrangements of the individuals and society can emergent characteristics (e.g., narratives; constitutive language; or institutional (formal) or informal networks) be understood and examined.
The structures of systems theory, according to Laszlo (1972), are generally concerned with material elements. There are other systemic properties of events that are relative and subjective which are valuable for inquiry in the human and social sciences.
Human experiences have structural patterns. Understanding the organizational and structural (part-and-whole relationship) patterns of the relative and subjective (found in language, cognition, consciousness) may lead not only to the formation of coherence but attribution of significance, in the human and social sciences. The realms of cognition and language should be studied through a systems approach to better understand the organizing patterns of human experience and social interaction. A conclusion of this thesis focuses on the necessity to differentiate the events of physical sciences from those of human and social sciences since human and social sciences are concerned with events that have meaning. If there are to be social facts or meaningful events that function in a wide-ranging social framework there must not only be descriptions of physical events
(with space-time coordinates) but concern for the meaningful, and thus contextual, interpretations of such events.
90 A Linguistic Model
An approach focusing upon structure for the social and human sciences is available once it has been acknowledged that there are differences in the series of events occurring in the physical world and the human realm. For authors like Saussure (1983),
Levi-Strauss (1963), and Trubetzkoy (1958/1969) there is awareness that “in the human realm, events have meaning, and discourse about a particular event needs to include, in addition to a physical description with space-time coordinates, the meaningful interpretation that people give to the event” (Polkinghorne, 1983, p. 154). There are associated methodological implications – Trubetzkoy (1958/1969) maintained there must be a distinguishing of the ‘social use of material objects’ from the ‘objects themselves’ and the features of the system which gives rise to a value and meaning. This is to say that social facts or meaningful events are best understood by the functions and underlying meaning given events within a social framework – an endeavor undoubtedly requiring form of inquiry and investigation into non-material meaning and thus distinct from natural and physical sciences.
This thesis argues that meaning is context dependent. Furthermore, human experience and behavior are informed and result from this meaningfulness. Because of this then, the human and social sciences should examine the meaning systems that inform human experience (human actions and events that affect humans and not the relationships among inanimate objects) and the realm of meaning.
Narrative Meaning
According to Polkinghorne (1988), the principal way human experience is made meaningful is an inquiry into narratives since narratives create meaning by citing the
91 contributions of actions and events which make specific outcomes and then configures those pieces into a whole episode. Thus, the human and social sciences need to focus on narrative meaning in particular since narratives relate to the cognitive, mental models that help make sense of the universe through our “conceptual apparatus, which is part reason, part passion, part tradition, part character, part setting, and so on” (H. T. Miller, 2012, p.
7). The study of narratives will also focus on the structural scheme of narratives and how they are potentially different from ‘paradigmatic’ modes of the logico-scientific model.
Narratives. Narratives are often equated with stories, or at least the cognitive scheme of a story. Narratives may be used to order experiences into an understandable whole. The whole of narratives are linkages that occur between distinct narratives. The relation of the event to the narrative does not have to be true or false. Narratives fill social and cultural environments (Polkinghorne, 1988). The social and cultural narratives are used to inform decisions, order experiences, and develop conceptual interpretations.
Narratives are found at the individual level and social level. At the individual level narratives help interpret current, past, and future subjective experiences. The social level of narratives spreads beliefs and promotes cohesion of shared values. Narratives can appear in infinite varieties of form and ideas. The exchange of information and conceptual apparatuses of narratives lead to structural and organizational operations and characteristics found in the habits of mind and experiences of both individuals and society.
Political, social, and historical discourse. The human and social sciences can be divided from the physical and natural science research model since the humanities and social sciences study the expressions and actions of humans, “while implicitly accepting
92 the notion that human beings are free to choose to do various things and that they will, at times, freely produce exceptional and creative expressions” (Polkinghorne, 1983, p. 169).
Human and social action can be contrasted with the physical and natural sciences that presuppose an ordered and causally related universe. The methodology of the human and social sciences should encompass approaches accounting for human and social actions with recognition that they are not necessarily directed by causal agency.
Narrative Action: Human and Social Action
Language and discourse directly influence social actions, thus narratives play a role in the manifestation and enactment of social change. Hajer (2005) noted the institutionalization process that occurs as narratives are embedded in the conceptual frameworks of meaning systems. Eventually discourse may be linked to/ or grow out of established practices found in the normal social/ mental habits and routines. H. T. Miller
(2012) noted, “ingredients of societal change include not only narrative but performance.
Performance can both challenge established practice, and, subsequently, sustain it” (p.
11).
Within any political, social, or historical discourse there will be various fields of meaning, ideas, interpretations, and symbolizations (H. T. Miller, 2012), all of which through social practices and embedded conceptual ideology can be enacted and spread as reality, truth, or objectivity. Facts, even those claiming to be Objective, are to be considered active narratives or a subjective conceptual interpretation. “Different narratives generate different sets of relevant facts” (H. T. Miller, 2012, p. 7.). The conceptual apparatus found in narratives (and language in general) shape understanding and the way people interpret the world and themselves.
93 Narratives are mental models that are socially constructed symbolic meanings embedded in social practices. H. T. Miller (2012) noted:
Social action may evolve into regularized social practice and second-nature
habits... Habituated ways do not change easily… The narrative may change yet
again, challenging the status quo practices and established meanings. New
politics can be generated by new ideas, new practices, and other challenges to the
old ways. At moments of impasse, politics’ potential to unsettle taken-for-granted
practices and ideas becomes evident, even if the institutionalized narrative has
become sedimented in the culture, even as practices become increasingly
ritualized and habitual. And habit itself is not politically neutral; it tends to side
with tradition and status quo. (p. 4)
Polkinghorne (1998) noted, “The concept of human action proposed by a narrative approach is that action is an expression of existence and that its organization manifests the narrative organization of human experience” (p. 142). The narrative organization and action of human experience requires a different interpretation in terms not of deterministic causes but of freely chosen reasons. Reasons are related to interpretations
(seen or heard) of alphabetic and numeric symbols and signs that are interpreted with meaning. Thus actions by an individual to interpret and comprehend audible and visual events (occurring in a competent manner through representation or understanding) are not only an activity but also are the subjective involvement in the world. For an event to be meaningful the event must be understood conceptually and often involves human communication. The narrative is the process of gathering together events into a meaningful story. When individual events are grouped into a larger whole, the
94 successive and independent events converge into meaningful episodes. The meaning of events is derived from the whole or contexts in which they are embedded. The linkage of objects, ideas, actions, and etc. can constitute deepened meaning. Additionally, the organizations of events in a narrative are dynamic and active gatherings constructed in a continually operational synthesis. The maintenance of the symbolic narrative forms and human action occur within a cultural framework. As noted earlier in Wittgenstein (1968) there are no private languages. The expression and significance of symbolic forms may function in a public forum. There are no value neutral public forums. The values, moral and cultural norms, and actions of a society will influence expressions, interpretations, and evaluation of narratives.
Applications for Public Administration
Wittgenstein (1922) noted, “philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity” (4.112); i.e., critical reflective thinking. This dissertation has been an activity that ultimately culminates in applications for public administration. The field of public administration continues to develop as a separate, autonomous discipline from business, political science, economics, organizational theory, and social psychology. The differentiation of the field make it prudent to deconstruct and identify elements related to status quo beliefs and practices when moving forward. I wanted to pursue the topics of this dissertation, which may run alter to the ‘typical’ public administration graduate research, because the logical clarification of thoughts and challenges to orthodox beliefs and presuppositions are necessary for progression and or in demarcation of public administration.
95 A proposition of the paper is the conceptual apparatuses of language are fundamental for the socially constitution and structuring of ‘reality’ through the subjective and inter-subjective interactions of multiple cultural and sub-cultural groups. I follow Wittgenstein (1922), where “the limits of language mean the limits of the world”
(5.6).
It can be argued that the research into meaning is the most basic of all inquiry - where the whole scientific enterprise is grounded eventually in meaning-making and perceptual operations. The paper develops from an emphasis on the traditional research model (and underlying assumptions) to an alternative approach for understanding human experience. Thus, I find it vital for public administration to include an emphasis on the meaning systems mediating or structuring human experience as a way to challenge the orthodoxy of the field and as a way to further understand theory and praxis of governance.
Discursive or Communicative Epistemology
Rorty (1989, 1991) conceived of knowledge development as a continual conversation amidst a community of inquirers – a view parallel to the development of the necessity of narrative theory of knowledge for public administration/ social sciences.
Along postmodern lines, Rorty (1982) rejects any type of foundationalism and developed a pragmatic theory of truth based on ideas focused on linguistic practices, social norms, conversations, and solidarity (Rorty, 1991; White, 1999). For Rorty (1982), solidarity
(not objective reality) is used to determine what truth is based upon shared communal linguistic practices and the publicly available vocabulary. The inter-subjective agreement of inquirers or researchers is of utmost importance to Rorty (1982) and truth (based upon
96 shared cultural norms, common linguistic devices, and shared vocabularies) is preferably rooted in persuasion – rather than force and authoritative dominance. Conversational truths emerge and dissipate as new truths surface – the importance is the continual development of the conversation.
Rejection of Correspondence Theory
If public administration abandons the Correspondence Theory of Truth – as discussed, and for the reasons presented – there is necessary reevaluation of claims of objectivity and the methods for understanding humans and society. Also, much of the authority found within public management is grounded in technical expertise and knowledge claims assumed Objective and correspondent to reality. Challenging presuppositions of the natural sciences, which dominate thinking and practices in the social sciences and public administration, opens exploration of alternative forms of inquiry and research not founded upon ideals of correspondence to a transcendent reality.
The Methodology of Public Administration
Public Administration is constantly confronted with issues related to development, proper research outcomes and methods, and the education of practitioners or theorists. White (1999) argued that there are essentially three modes of research in public administration: explanatory, interpretive, and critical – where each mode of research is a fundamentally different language game. Language forms the foundation for all types of knowledge and thereby influences the basis of the various types of research.
The stories told at the outcome of such language games and in justifying research are meant to convince other scholars or practitioners that the presentations are valuable, useful, or true. Methodology and inquiry in research based upon storytelling and local
97 narratives (language) is often neglected in theory development, research, and the education of practitioners/ theorists for public administration.
Explanatory research is the dominant mode in public administration and is considered mainstream in social sciences based upon efforts to ‘explain’ and ‘predict’.
Interpretive research (closely associated with hermeneutics) strives to understand meaningful events, deliberative human actions, and meaning found in social artifacts
(White, 1999). Critical research follows the logic of self-reflective social sciences.
Ultimately, critical and interpretive research is often deemphasized and devalued in favor of explanatory research. The point I wish to make is that each type of research encompasses distinct routes and levels of interpretation and/or explanation that are then communicated to a community.
Authority in Public Administration
The dissertation argued for more skeptical and critical stance toward scientific authority derived from language games and opposed hegemony in discourse regarding scientific ideals presented as objective facts, and as corresponding to reality. Similarly, I have assumed a perspective characterized by distrust in universal grand narratives – overarching narratives/ mental models dominating methodology, inquiry, and processes - for public administration.
Questions about public administration’s authority and role, or place, or power based upon technical knowledge and expertise is not a new for the field. In fact, “we understand that the concept of authority is central to the theory and practices of public administration. In fact, discussions of the role authority plays have been around long enough that some among us might question why we might pursue a contemporary
98 discussion of authority” (Sementelli, 2007a, p.1). Sementelli (2007a) argued that authority is often invoked by public administration research regarding administrative discretion, legitimacy, etc. but it is not so clear what authority means, and its impact on theory and praxis. My concern and future research will be related to examining authority and hegemony in discourse with respect to positive, scientism and quantifying practices and the implications for public administration theory and praxis. The future research will be examination of the abstraction and depersonalization of bureaucracy through quantification (ultimately (symbolic) language) and scientific practices which prove beneficial and necessary for the future of public administration theory and praxis.
Throughout the thesis the argument regarding scientific authority has been twofold; that the claim to authority of scientific knowledge is social and rhetorical – components not entirely distinct themselves. I examined the relationship between power
(political, social, economic, discursive, and cognitive), scientific knowledge, and justification/ credibility – in essence, how the development and disbursal of scientific knowledge reaffirms and transmits forms of authority and power, and how power confirms and disseminates forms of knowledge. The literature showed that not only does a relationship occur between science and politics but the two entities are inseparable
(Cozzens & Woodhouse, 1995; Frickel & Moore, 2005; Jasanoff, 2004). However, the exchange between political power and scientific knowledge claims is not simply one of authority that counts as knowledge (or knowledge giving rise to power)– there are deep institutional/ organizational, social, and historical conditions impacting cognitive practices in the sciences (as well as, as those that inhibit distributive political power)
99 (Brown, 1993). Subjective and local cultural components are also important for the cognitive processes of science and for the deployment of political authority.
Beyond Orthodoxy in Public Administration
According to White (1992), critiques of “positivism, interconnected problems, and feelings of constrained hopefulness are manifestations of society’s movement into the postmodern era, an era in which institutions such as science and government are losing their legitimacy. Stories about the power of science and government to solve problems are no longer universally believed” (p. 160).
Science, government, and society (and the views of each) have changed from the traditional perspectives to contemporary interpretations – accompanied by shifts in the stories from practitioners and theorists of public administration. By emphasizing themes presented over the course of the thesis – post-structuralism, postmodernism, postpositivism – an emphasis on language (and linguistic entities) and a narrative theory of knowledge is necessary for the development of theory and praxis of public administration in a post modern era.
Language of public administration. The orientation viewing public administration research as a linguistic endeavor is not a new idea for the field. Rein
(1976) introduced the idea of storytelling in policy analysis and research since public policy and decision-making are combinations of facts and values – where “stories provide an interpretation of a complex pattern of events with normative implications for action, and not with a universal law” (p. 266). The ideas have moved beyond just public policy analysis to a broader application to all of public administration inquiry and research.
White (1999) advanced Rein by arguing “all research is fundamentally a matter of
100 storytelling or narration. Any type of knowledge, even scientific knowledge, that we have about public administration is basically a story grounded in language and discourse and expressed in narrative form through conversations” (p. 6). White (1999) argued for centrality of narrative knowledge based on literature from philosophy of science, theories of legal reasoning, social theory and postmodern philosophy, literary criticism theories, and applied and basic social sciences. For White (1999), language is foundational for all knowledge since without language it would impossible to communicate knowledge
(individually and socially) and, even more fundamental, language is constitutive for the individual and society:
Language, not nature, defines us, shapes us, and makes us individuals and social
beings in the world. Language provides us with knowledge of ourselves and
knowledge of ourselves in relation to objects, other persons, and social
constructions like organizations or political parties. Any statement we make,
whether from common sense or from systematic inquiry presupposes the use of
language and is brought forth as a story. (p. 7)
Beyond empiricism – essentialness of the post-positivist perspective. This dissertation contributed to the “growing critique [...] of the dominant neopositivist methodology” (Fischer, 1998, p. 129). Fischer (1998) applied a similar critique to policy inquiry from a postpositivist perspective. Neopositivist public administration and policy sciences have proven inadequate in providing a functional body of predictive generalizations and effective answers to social problems. Fischer noted that social reality has a multidimensional complexity that is failed by the “outmoded epistemological assumptions” drawn from the hard sciences. Moving forward there should be recognition
101 that the traditional concepts of scientific proof and objectivity are not always applicable to social science inquiry. H. T. Miller (2012) made similar observations about (positive) empiricism which urged a particular interpretation from a framework with a specified, obvious signified-signifier relationship (where there is only a singular meaning presupposed factual and objective). “The empiricist insists on a single interpretation – the one that mirrors reality as intended by the makers of the message. Instead, there might be several alternative interpretations from different perspectives that would make sense” (H. T. Miller, 2012, p. 41). Fischer advocated a “discursive orientation grounded in practical reason, the postpositivist approach situated empirical inquiry in a broader interpretive framework. More than just an epistemological alternative, the approach is offered as a better description of what social scientists actually do in practice” (Fischer,
1998, p. 129). The postpositivist orientation recognized the constitutive role in any form of analysis. The alternative is not to deny the role of the individual (and their influence) and then turn to more supposedly rigid empirical methods but instead to acknowledge the centrality of interpretation in the scientific process. Acknowledging and understanding the role of interpretation in the sciences provide not only a route to more accurate descriptions of what is already taken as science but offer a superior empirical explanation. For Fischer (1998), postpositivism:
outlines the beginnings of a new orientation [for public administration and policy
science inquiry]. Not only does it offer a theory of the social sciences that is
identifiable readily in our existing practices, it also constitutes an incorporation of
new methods and approaches rather than a simple rejection of old ones. By
102 giving new life to our methods, it opens the way to a richer and more productive
approach to social inquiry. (p. 143)
Beyond just methodology, the focus on a postpositivism facilitates the discursive model of inquiry. The discursive orientation holds that there is a possibility to realize or redeem a more democratic public administration/ policy science since there are more
“participatory institutions and practices that open spaces for citizen deliberation on contextual assumptions, empirical outcomes, and the social meaning of conclusions”
Fischer, 1998, p. 143). Ultimately, Fischer (1998) realizes that all of the success of a postpositivist public administration and of policy sciences hinges on institutional and political reforms to move forward. Regardless, an orientation beyond the traditional scientific empiricism provides an avenue for more socially relevant methodological approaches and the possibility of more democratic practices for policy inquiry and administration.
Postmodernism. Examination of the postmodern literature, regarding knowledge production and the impact of language, provided several relevant themes applicable for public administration. Similarly, there are several of these postmodern themes that have emerged – directly and indirectly - throughout the progression of this thesis, which argued that they were applicable to public administration. White (1999) identified four relevant postmodern themes: (1) absence of grand narratives to rule practice and theory;
(2) the postmodern linguistic foundation for all knowledge (including scientific knowledge); (3) poststructuralist inquiry into the status of knowledge; (4) and the reconstruction of philosophy and scientific logic by Rorty (1989) as discourse founded on common linguistic processes shared among a community of inquirers. Also, included is a
103 subsection are Fox and Miller’s (1996) discourse theory that enveloped and vastly expanded White’s (1999) postmodern themes through concentration on communication/ language for public administration.
Public administration: Deconstruction of grand narratives while emphasizing local narratives. The first major theme by White (1999) for postmodern public administration is the absence of a grand narrative for theory and praxis - which can lead to legitimacy issues for practitioners and scholars, alike. In traditional society, narratives served a variety of roles: (1) communicate norms and rules; (2) establish bonds; (3) legitimize institutions; (4) dictate or instruct beliefs and actions; and (5) provide criteria for perceiving, interpreting, and communicating about the world. Traditional society and narrative knowledge were replaced by modernity whose alleged positive scientific knowledge claimed correspondence to reality and thus truth. The major feature of modern society was the existence of grand overarching narratives (Lyotard, 1984) – as exemplified by the narrative that scientific power could solve all social and natural problems. Modern public administration exhibited similar features through emphases on technical rationality and bureaucratic administrative states (Berger, Berger, & Kellner,
1973).
Lyotard (1984) characterized postmodernism as the deconstruction of the legitimizing power of overarching, universal narratives – narratives that facilitate meaningless and senses of loss instead of intended direction. The grand narrative of science has lost – in many aspects – a legitimizing function and does not provide an all- encompassing understanding of society or of the individual in it. The positive science claimed to be fundamentally different from other narratives (the myths found in social
104 practices) since adherence to universal rational standards permitted access to correspondent truth, etc. However, as demonstrated in this thesis, science is just another narrative – a form of narration since all knowledge is fundamentally constituted within a language game (Wittgenstein, 1968). Science is not a universal, or a unified or necessarily rational entity (Lyotard, 1984). The standards and rules of science are but the sharing games played through an explicit/ implicit contract by scientists –paralleled by
Kuhnian ideals on localized knowledge production.
There are many different types of knowledge that result from incommensurable language games – of which there is no definitive version. Lyotard (1984) argued that the belief in the superiority of the narrative of science is derived from other forms of narrative knowledge that reinforce belief such as correspondence to truth, an aesthetic beauty, legitimizing institutions, etc. Jameson (1984, 1985) lent more radical position to philosophical conversations. For Jameson, not only is the narrative the primary epistemological category for all knowledge generation (i.e. narratives are generated to understand the world) but also he argued all basic experiences of the world arrive to individuals only through stories. For Jameson, meaning cannot be achieved without making up a story about it - in essence, a sense of the world is only possible through generation of stories which can be lived through and with. Jameson’s argument is important for inquiry into the natural and social sciences since all scientific experience is interpreted and understood only since it is a component of an ongoing story between people.
Instead of emphasizing grand narratives, portions of postmodern literature have cited alternatives focused on pluralistic local narratives (White, 1999) where local groups
105 in society can create their own narratives for derivation of meaning. According to White
(1999),
Local narratives help members of a community make sense of themselves, for
themselves, and for others. They define who the players are, the proper positions
they may take, the roles they may perform, the beliefs they may hold, the feelings
they may have, and ultimately the actions they may take. Nevertheless, they are
legitimating for the interested groups or community. (pp. 3-4)
Within public administration’s academic disciplines and professions, the development of local narratives are exemplified by specialized knowledge that has resulted in language games, which can either prevent meaningful discourse or provide allowance of multiple viewpoints (e.g., both scenarios are well documented by the elephantine problem in organization theory and the study of organizations where different perspectives account for distinctive stories about the role, function, and structure of organizations). There are a plethora of examples from the literature demonstrating both possibilities of communal benefits and consequential end results resultant from dissolution of the grand narrative of science for public administration.
Poststructuralism. I incorporated poststructuralism as a subsection given poststructuralism is often associated with postmodernism. The structuralist approach emphasized various components of specific phenomena in terms of constitutive and encompassing structures. For Giddens (1984), “Social systems, as reproduced social practices, do not have ‘structures’ but rather exhibit ‘structural properties’ and that structure exists, as time-space presence, only in its instantiations [manifestations] in such practices and as memory traces orienting the conduct of knowledgeable human agents”
106 (p. 17). Multiple themes emerged as this thesis progressed that emphasized structure: (1) the concentration on the system as encompassing the part, whole, and more importantly the part-whole relations (2) which focused on the role of language and (3) the necessity of linguistic structure in creating meaning. This parallels (in my mind) the points made by Giddens (1984) where “one of my principle ambitions in the formulation of structuration theory is to put an end to [...] empire-building endeavors. The basic domain of study of the social sciences, according to structural theory, is neither the experience of the individual actor, nor the existence of any form of societal totality, but social practices ordered across space and time” (p.2) social practices that are often linguistic.
Systems. I demonstrated there were differences between natural and social systems. Since social systems are different from natural systems there are undoubtedly necessarily different problems, processes, and ideas that must be understood. Focusing on systems and structures often yields a unit-of-analysis problem for social science inquiry and research by focusing on the whole at the expense of the part, or vice versa.
Broadly, systems in the social sciences are often associated with systems theory – based on the biological/ machine models. The typical applications of systems often associated with public administration are T. Parsons’ (1937) structuralism, and Buckley’s
(1967) systems theory of social organizations. As noted in chapter five, the natural realm and its study are dramatically different from the study of humans and human systems because of the psychological, cultural, and social aspects of humans – which require uniquely distinct approaches.
Critics of structuralism and systems often denounce the loss of the individual/ human subjectivity through the analysis. Habermas (1970) criticized the systems point-
107 of-view because of the inherent detachment from the lebenswelt. However, criticisms of systems orientation in human, social sciences may be moot as further exploration of structuralism proceeded. “Levi-Strauss, a leading structuralist, called the human subject the center of being – the ‘spoilt brat of philosophy,’ He stated that the ultimate goal of human sciences is not to constitute man but to dissolve him. This became the slogan of structuralism” (Sarup, 1989, p.1). Rather than looking at structuralism as the structure of the part (individual) in relation to the whole (society), and vice versa, I propose that social sciences and public administration inquiry and research step away from forms of aggregation and the materialistic components of social systems to focus on emergent linguistic and cognitive models that occur at the intersection of the part (individual)-and- the-whole (system). Poststructuralist thought has placed language as a central theme where language is a precondition, and basis, for understanding and knowledge and precedes both individual and culture (Lacan, 1978). Systems theory from my perspective does not recognize the group or the individual as the basic entity. ‘Counting heads’ or examining a unitary social system in isolation are no longer adequate to understanding complexity and the processes of meaning-making - what is necessary are orientations focused on information exchange (in the form of signs, ideographs, and narratives).
What Now for the Public Administrator?
A goal of the research project is to argue for elements that challenge mainstream suppositions in public administration. For Fox and Miller (1996),
[Orthodoxy] hovers over the study of public administration, insinuating itself in
all theories of governance and in every actual public agency. Orthodoxy now has
the status of legitimizing myth. It is the background assumption of all mainstream
108 reform efforts. The inertial force of orthodoxy is its legitimacy, but this
legitimacy derives from a nostalgia that craves certainty and structure. The
residues of orthodoxy shape the modules and sequencing of academic curricula
and such personnel practices as civil service reform and performance appraisals.
Reform efforts to date seek not to go beyond orthodoxy, but to resuscitate it. (pp.
3-4)
The paper initially focused on deconstruction of scientism and reevaluation of the claims of objectivity and correspondence accompanying empiricism. Quantification and reductionist practices were evaluated in the natural and social sciences. Quantification is neither sufficient nor necessary for capturing complexity and meaning of human and social systems. However, the dominant mode of research in public administration and the social sciences embodies the methods and ideals of positive (explanatory) research – at the expense of interpretive and critical practices and principles. I maintain the focus on quantification, explanation/ prediction, and reliance on principles of objectivity is inappropriate in isolation – without further, complementary approaches that are qualitative and interpretive. Additionally, there should be an awareness and understanding of the role of the epistemic community in negotiating knowledge claims and validating beliefs. The presentation of knowledge as an ongoing conversation by
Rorty is important for practitioners and theorists in public administration as we begin to challenge orthodoxy and recognize that solidarity and coherence (not objective reality) is used for determination of what is truth based upon shared communal linguistic practices and publicly available vocabulary. The importance of consensus and linguistic practices
109 should be more readily emphasized in the education of academic theorists and practitioners and for praxis of governance.
One proposed challenge to orthodoxy in the field of public administration is the reevaluation of grand narratives. The post-modern form of public administration “does not provide ‘how to do it’ information because there is no clear conceptual schema, no single right answer or best approach, if truth and theory are abolished” (Rosenau, 1992, p.
86). The new postmodern public administration should strive for new forms of knowledge, flexibility, sensitivity, foresight, and initiative - that are not procedural, not truth claims, not technological but rather synergistic and interactive (Caldwell, 1975).
Rosenau (1992) argued that this form of public administration searches
for new forms of knowledge and new roles for administration in a post-modern
world without truth. The post-modern administrator will be neither a technician
nor a generalist. S/he will rather conceptualize and present policy alternatives.
This requires competence and an ability to share information (not defined as
knowledge) with the broader public. (p. 87)
Local narratives are then proposed as alternatives or companions to grand narratives. The valuation of local narratives is multifold for theorist and practitioner.
“The postmodern critique of grand narratives points out that within the academy we have multiple and sometimes overlapping local narratives or fields of study, each with its own unique local narrative and linguistic practices” (White, 1999, p. 182). Schön (1983) noted that public administration could leverage local narratives (i.e. contextual knowledge) to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the public. Clarification and expansion of public administrations’ local narratives would allow admittance into numerous language
110 games and provide avenues into multiple conversations (of epistemic communities). The promise and possibility of local narratives for the practitioner (and also for the theorist) provides avenues for more democratic governance and allow for increased reciprocity, responsiveness, transparency, and representation. The promise of local narratives for the practitioner is not only in the local knowledge developed by engagement in local language games but also in the creation of ‘expert’ contextual knowledge. An emphasis on narratives as the entities of representation would allow for avenues into accessing the public forum. Local narratives also allow proliferation of new languages locally - developed in accordance with communal pragmatic utility.
The linguistic turn in philosophy highlights two applications for the public administrator: (i) the notation that tomorrow is always initially based in the language of yesterday and also (ii) the essential role of language in the constitution of reality. I followed Rorty (1991) and emphasized a (pragmatic) theory of truth based on ideas focused on linguistic practices, social norms, conversations, and solidarity. Emphasis for public administrators on culturally mediated processes allowed new possibilities moving forward by proposing new languages and vocabularies (and therefore new systems of description and classification to order the experiences of both humans and physical phenomena).
Narratives have been emphasized in public administration research for use in public policy discourse and emphasized through postmodernism by academics in the field. Continual emphasis and inquiry into the role of narratives in public administration is necessary as public administration challenges orthodoxy. Additionally, academics, practitioners, and educators in public administration (with regards to inquiry and
111 methods) should emphasize the narrative form of knowledge. The essentialness of narratives, and language in general, is often disregarded or deemphasized. Reevaluation of the norms and methods accompanied by a critical stance towards taken-for-granted knowledge, processes are essential for a complex, multifaceted contributions and developments of public administration. The thesis began as a critique and deconstruction of claims of scientism, objectivity accompanying empiricism/ positivism, and the inadequacy of quantification when compared to qualitative in the human, social sciences.
My aims have developed as my research and understanding progressed to realization that upon examination (from a perspective emphasizing language and structure) all research methods and forms of inquiry are built upon similar foundations with unique processes, rationales agreed upon by consenting communities – to varied ends and outcomes. I transitioned from seeking alternatives to natural scientific positivism to realization that once big-T truth, claims of objectivity, and direct correspondence are abandoned then there is a necessary emphasis on complimentary and supplementary endeavors that socially mediated and constituted. Social science and public administration, alike, should not seek definitive alternatives but be made aware of ‘other’ paralleled forms of knowledge.
Future research will be examination of applications of coherence theory of truth in contradistinction to objective correspondence facts and the role language games within discourses and narratives Further research should focus on the performance of language and applications to governance, bureaucracy, and public policy. An emphasis on linguistic apparatus provides new opportunities for theories of social sciences and the
112 existing practices of public administration, while also providing an opportunity for integration of new methods and approaches (rather than simply rejecting old ones).
Often at the completion of research articles similar to this research or at the conclusion of qualitative methods teaching, the end-result is the conclusion that the preferred procedure is a mixed methods approach. While I do agree that ‘mixed methods’ is better than a singular methods orientation I am more concerned with epistemic traditions for public administration. Investigation into methods and techniques of research communities – whether qualitatively or quantitatively based– showed that at base all are symbolic representations - linguistic, whether conventional or mathematical constitutive constructions. For me the qualitative versus quantitative debate is worn-out since both qualitative and quantitative function as analogs predicated on symbolic representations with accompanying social, historical, pragmatic, and structural relationships. The emphasis on meaning, structuration, and social and rhetorical language games proved invaluable for examination of parallels to quantification and dynamic language and will provide avenues for advancement in the field of public administration.
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