Governing a Pandemic: Centre-Regional Relations and ’s

COVID-19 Response

2020

November

RESEARCH BRIEF BRIEF RESEARCH AUTHOR:

Chris Morris

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Governing a Pandemic: a Governing Centre ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: The author would like to thank Marcus Mietzner for comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

DISCLAIMER:

- Regional Relations and Indonesia’ s COVID s Indonesia’ Regionaland Relations This article is part of a New Mandala series related to the Supporting the Rules-Based Order in Southeast Asia (SEARBO) project. This project is run by the Department of Political and Social Change at the Australian National University and THE AUTHOR: funded by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. The opinions expressed here Chris Morris is a PhD Candidate in the are the authors' own and are not meant to Department of Political and Social Change, represent those of the ANU or DFAT. Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, Australian National University.

COVER IMAGE:

“Location of reported COVID-19_cases_in -

19 Response 19 as of 2 April 2020” by Poci.wasiats is licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0

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possible expense of speed of response and

Governing a Pandemic: a Governing Centre L eadership, state capacity the risk of all eggs being in one basket if and societal trust in central authorities get it wrong. government are three Decentralisation, on the other hand, may variables likely to influence tend to produce the inverse of these the extent to which characteristics. countries are willing and This focus of this paper is Indonesia, a able to put in place unitary state that in 2001 transitioned to a effective measures to largely decentralised system of governance, contain COVID-19 and based upon the principle of regional

mitigate its impacts.1 And if -

Regional Relations and Indonesia’ s COVID s Indonesia’ Regionaland Relations autonomy. Indonesia faces undeniably leadership and state formidable challenges from COVID-19. capacity matter, then so too While it remains too early to assess the may the distribution of long-term appropriateness of Indonesia’s authority for decision- COVID-19 strategy, the effectiveness of its making and initial public health response compares

Introduction implementation between unfavourably with many of its Southeast and within levels of Asian peers (notably Vietnam, Thailand and government. Malaysia).4 Initial analyses of the pandemic responses The central government was slow to react of unitary and federal states2—and those to the latent threat posed by the virus, and with more or less centralised health has since taken a somewhat half-hearted systems3—suggest that while neither is and fragmented approach to halting its inherently superior, each comes with 5 - spread. By late October 2020, Indonesia 19 Response 19 advantages and disadvantages. had over 400,000 confirmed cases of Centralisation, for example, may aid COVID-19 and over 13,600 deaths.6 Low coordination and consistency, but at the

1 Fukuyama, Francis. ‘The Pandemic and Political https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14 Order: It Takes a State’. Foreign Affairs, July/August 494035.2020.1783788?src=recsys 2020. Available at: 3 Heitmueller, Axel and Roemheld, Lars. ‘Covid-19 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/202 and the false dichotomy between centralised and 0-06-09/pandemic-and-political-order decentralised healthcare systems’. BMJ Opinion, 5 2 Gaskell, Jen and Stoker, Gerry. ‘Centralised or multi- August 2020. Available at: level: which governance systems are having a ‘good’ https://blogs.bmj.com/bmj/2020/08/05/covid-19- pandemic?’. British Politics and Policy at LSE, 16 and-the-false-dichotomy-between-centralised-and- April 2020. Available at: decentralised-healthcare-systems/ https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/governanc 4 CSIS Southeast Asia Covid-19 Tracker, 10 October e-systems-covid19/ ; Rocco, Philip, Béland, Daniel 2020. Available at: and Waddan, Alex, 2020. ‘Stuck in neutral? https://www.csis.org/programs/southeast-asia- Federalism, policy instruments, and counter-cyclical program/southeast-asia-covid-19-tracker-0 responses to COVID-19 in the ’. Policy 5 ‘Endless first wave: how Indonesia failed to control and Society 39(3): 458-477. Available at: coronavirus’. Reuters, 20 August 2020. Available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health- 494035.2020.1783793?src=recsys ; Migone, Andrea coronavirus-indonesia-insight-idUSKCN25G02J (2020). ‘Trust, but customize: federalism’s impact on 6 Worldometer Indonesia Coronavirus Cases, 28 the Canadian COVID-19 response’. Policy and Society October 2020. Available at: 39(3): 382-402. Available at:

3 testing rates mean the true number of The second section turns to events during

7 Governing a Pandemic: a Governing Centre infections is likely much higher. the period January—June 2020, and particularly the critical months of March One explanation for Indonesia’s apparent and April. By tracing how the actions of the reluctance to act—and the nature of its central government and regional response when it did—rests on particular governments have been respectively characteristics of its recent democratic enabled and constrained by the framework, decline: populist aversion to science, rising it draws attention to key points of friction religious conservatism and polarisation, and decision-making bottlenecks. It shows 8 together with persistent corruption. In that greatest impact of the current

contrast, this paper approaches Indonesia’s arrangements has arguably been to slow the - Regional Relations and Indonesia’ s COVID s Indonesia’ Regionaland Relations COVID-19 response from a governance speed of initial local responses to the perspective. It examines how Indonesia’s pandemic without a corresponding payoff framework for centre-regional relations— in terms of better national coordination particularly as it relates to the management than might otherwise have been the case. of public health emergencies—has facilitated or hindered timely and The third and final section briefly considers coordinated action to mitigate the impact of two other aspects of Indonesia’s COVID-19 the pandemic. response of relevance to centre-regional relations. First, it highlights areas in which Outline of the paper administrative coordination between levels The paper is divided into three sections. of government (and between national The first describes the interlocking web of ministries) is hampering effective and laws and regulations that define the scope timely action, despite the locus of decision- of public health and emergency making authority being clear. Additionally,

- management measures available to 19 Response 19 it describes how the central government is Indonesian policymakers and assign attempting to use the inter-governmental authority to impose those measures fiscal framework—and in particular between different levels of government. As regional incentive funds—to encourage

will be seen, decision-making authority regional governments to combat the spread under this framework for pandemic of the virus. response is skewed heavily in favour of the central government, with regions largely responsible for implementation.

https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/count 8 Mietzner, Marcus (2020). ‘Populist Anti-Scientism, ry/indonesia/ Religious Polarisation, and Institutionalised 7 World Health Organization, Indonesia. ‘Coronavirus Corruption: How Indonesia’s Democratic Decline Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Situation Report 23’. 2 Shaped Its COVID-19 Response’. Journal of Current September 2020, p. 11. Available at: Southeast Asian Affairs 39(2): 227-249. Available at: https://www.who.int/docs/default- https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/186 source/searo/indonesia/covid19/external- 8103420935561 situation-report-23- 02september2020.pdf?sfvrsn=7ed23646_2

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Governing a Pandemic: a Governing Centre 1. Indonesia’s framework for pandemic response

Indonesia’s COVID-19 response has been assignment at the most basic level across shaped by two legal frameworks: one key policy areas. general and pre-existing, the other specific and enacted in response to the pandemic. In practice—and with health being no The former has its roots in the current exception—this means the central

iteration of Indonesia’s decentralisation law government generally sets policy and plays - Regional Relations and Indonesia’ s COVID s Indonesia’ Regionaland Relations and the basis on which it divides authority a coordinating function between provinces. between the centre and the regions, with Provinces manage a limited range of service the detail set out in a series of health and delivery and regulatory functions disaster management laws and themselves, but primarily guide and implementing regulations. The latter supervise the districts/municipalities comprises a range of additional measures within their jurisdiction. Although put in place to deal with the unique districts/municipalities are not directly challenges of COVID-19. accountable to provinces in their own right, provincial governors are empowered to 1.1 The 2014 Law on Regional Governance play this role in their alternative capacity as Apart from six ‘absolute’ governance the representative of the central functions (such as foreign affairs and government in their province.12 The bulk of defence) which remain under the exclusive basic service delivery is then actually

control of the central government,9 the carried out by districts/municipalities, -

19 Response 19 2014 Law on Regional Governance financed through their budgets but designates almost everything else — primarily in reliance on central government including health — as a ‘concurrent’ transfers. While in theory they enjoy a governance function over which authority is significant level of autonomy in how they do

to be shared with regional governments.10 It this, they remain subject to policy directions articulates a set of principles including and standards set by the central efficiency, accountability and national government. strategic interest as the basis for which elements of each concurrent governance 1.2 The 2009 Health Law function are to be assigned between levels The 2009 Health Law undertakes a basic of government.11 A lengthy matrix inter-governmental allocation of appended to the Law undertakes this responsibility for the prevention, control and eradication of communicable diseases such as COVID-19. Regional governments

9 Arts. 9(2) and 10(1) Law No. 23/2014 regarding 11 Art. 13 Law No. 23/2014 regarding Regional Regional Governance. Governance. 10 Chapter 4, Section 3 Law No. 23/2014 regarding 12 Art. 8(2) Law No. 23/2014 regarding Regional Regional Governance. Governance.

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are obliged to monitor and publicise the such a disease.15 The Minister is responsible

Governing a Pandemic: a Governing Centre spread of communicable diseases and for determining the technical measures determine whether, for how long and where needed to mitigate an outbreak, but confirmed cases must be quarantined.13 operational responsibility for implementing Only the central government, however, can those measures rests with a district head or declare an ‘outbreak, epidemic or mayor.16 In doing so, he or she reports to extraordinary event’, which opens the door the Governor of the province, who also to imposing a range of public health plays a coordinating role in the case of an measures to help manage and contain it. outbreak in more than one This must be done in accordance with the district/municipality within that province.17

‘applicable law’.14 -

Regional Relations and Indonesia’ s COVID s Indonesia’ Regionaland Relations After a disease is declared under the Law as The applicable law includes the 1984 Law being capable of causing an outbreak, but on Communicable Disease Outbreaks, the prior to an outbreak being declared by the 2018 Health Quarantine Law and the 2007 Minister, regional heads of government Disaster Management Law. The general enjoy a degree of discretion. Upon becoming regime they establish is one of centralised aware of a suspected outbreak or the decision-making and regional presence of an infected person that could implementation, although precise spark an outbreak, a regional head ‘must arrangements vary from law to law. Key immediately take all necessary steps to provisions of each are outlined below. address it’.18 That discretion, however, is subject to the provisions of other laws — 1.3 The 1984 Law on Communicable including the Health Quarantine Law. Disease Outbreaks The Law on Communicable Disease 1.4 The 2018 Health Quarantine Law

- Outbreaks provides a broad framework for The Health Quarantine Law is narrower in 19 Response 19 regulating all aspects of communicable scope than the Law on Communicable disease outbreak prevention and Disease Outbreaks, dealing with only one management (albeit with nearly all of the aspect of the management of communicable

detail delegated to government regulation). diseases. It too establishes a system of Predating decentralisation by 17 years, the centralised decision-making, but with Law establishes a centralised system of responsibility for implementation shared decision-making with regions responsible for implementation.

Only the Minister of Health can declare a disease to be one capable of causing an outbreak or declare an actual outbreak of

13 Art. 155 Law No. 36/2009 regarding Health. Government Regulation No. 40/1991 regarding the 14 Art. 156(4) Law No. 36/2009 regarding Health. Management of Communicable Disease Outbreaks. 15 Arts. 3 and 4 Law No. 4/1984 regarding 16 Arts. 6 and 7 Government Regulation No. 40/1991. Communicable Disease Outbreaks. The 17 Art. 8 Government Regulation No. 40/1991. administrative unit to which a declaration applies is 18 Art. 12(1) Law No. 4/1984 regarding a district or municipality (not a province): Art 3 Communicable Disease Outbreaks.

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between the central government and for providing the basic necessities of life for

Governing a Pandemic: a Governing Centre regional governments. both people and livestock within the affected region.25 It must, however, ‘involve’ The Law enables the President to declare a the relevant regional government and other ‘public health emergency’,19 defined as ‘an stakeholders in this task. Further details extraordinary public health event regarding these measures are delegated to characterised by the spread of a government regulation, but none had been communicable disease…that endangers issued by the time the threat posed by health and has the potential to cross COVID-19 crystallised. 26 domestic or international borders’.20 Upon 1.5 The 2007 Disaster Management Law

such a declaration being made, the central -

Regional Relations and Indonesia’ s COVID s Indonesia’ Regionaland Relations The Disaster Management Law government is charged with managing complements the two health-focussed laws health quarantine in a ‘rapid and by seeking to promote more effective appropriate’ way, with reference to factors whole-of-government responses to including the scale of the threat, available communicable diseases outbreaks or resources, and economic, security and social epidemics, recognised as ‘non–natural considerations.21 Regions may be involved disasters’ under the Law. 27 In contrast to at the central government’s discretion,22 the centralised nature of the Communicable and are required to contribute resources for Disease Outbreak and Health Quarantine this purpose.23 laws, the Disaster Management Law allows The power to authorise a range of for the declaration of a state of disaster by quarantine measures in response to a public the level of government commensurate with health emergency—including hard the scale of the occurrence.28 lockdowns of specific regions or the

- Once a state of disaster is declared, national 19 Response 19 introduction of large-scale social and regional disaster management agencies restrictions (PSBB) such as the closure of (established under the Law) are granted a schools and workplaces—rests solely with range of enhanced powers to facilitate more the Minister of Health.24 In the case of a 29

timely and effective action. Prior to that, a hard lockdown of a region (whereby ‘certain state of disaster emergency’ may be movement of people into and out of that declared by the head of the National region is forcibly restricted) the central Disaster Management Agency (BNPB) with government bears primary responsibility

19 Art. 10(1) Law No. 6/2018 regarding Health 25 Art. 55 Law No. 6/2018 regarding Health Quarantine. Quarantine. 20 Art. 1(2) Law No. 6/2018 regarding Health 26 Art. 60 Law No. 6/2018 regarding Health Quarantine. Quarantine. 21 Art. 11(1) Law No. 6/2018 regarding Health 27 Art. 1(3) Law No. 24/2007 regarding Disaster Quarantine. Management. 22 Art. 5 Law No. 6/2018 regarding Health 28 Art. 51 Law No. 24/2007 regarding Disaster Quarantine. Management. 23 Art. 6 Law No. 6/2018 regarding Health 29 Arts. 10(1) and 18(1) Law No. 24/2007 regarding Quarantine. Disaster Management. 24 Art. 49(3) Law No. 6/2018 regarding Health Quarantine.

7 the agreement of a wide range of central Diseases, Global Pandemics and Nuclear,

30 32 Governing a Pandemic: a Governing Centre government ministries and agencies. This Biological and Chemical Emergencies. It enables certain preventative or preparatory directs ministers, agency heads, governors steps to be taken before a disaster is and district heads/mayors to take a range of formally declared (or to mitigate the impact ‘coordinated and integrated’ actions for the of a disaster after a declaration lapses or is purposes referred to in its title. withdrawn). Unfortunately, it does so in such a general way as to be of questionable practical value 1.6 Administrative arrangements between beyond serving to strengthen arguments for ministries and levels of government making appropriate budget allocations and The laws outlined above create a basic

establishing a framework for reporting on -

Regional Relations and Indonesia’ s COVID s Indonesia’ Regionaland Relations framework for pandemic response. progress. However, they do not descend to the level of administrative detail required to promote Nevertheless, as Indonesia was confronted coordinated decision-making and action with its first confirmed cases of COVID-19, between levels of government and amongst the President’s Chief of Staff, Moeldoko, was sectoral agencies at each level. The World confident the Instruction would provide a Health Organization identified this as a key sufficient foundation for coordinating area for improvement in a 2017 evaluation Indonesia’s response and that no additional of Indonesia’s capacity to implement the legal instruments would be necessary.33 But 2005 International Health Regulations (a that assessment soon proved overly legal framework setting out the rights and optimistic. Less than two weeks later, the obligations of WHO member states in central government moved to put in place a handling public health events and number of additional arrangements specific emergencies with the potential to cross to COVID-19.

- 31 19 Response 19 borders). 1.7 Arrangements specific to COVID-19 In what appears in hindsight to have been a The first was a National COVID-19 fortuitously–timed attempt to address this Taskforce, established by Presidential

deficiency, in July 2019 the President issued Decree on 13 March. The Taskforce was Presidential Instruction No. 4/2019 under the day-to-day leadership of the Head regarding Increasing Capacity to Prevent, of the National Disaster Management Detect and Respond to Outbreaks of Agency (BNPB), former 3-star Army general

30 Art. 7 National Disaster Management Agency 32 ‘Inpres Penanganan Pandemi Perkuat Koordinasi Regulation No. 5/2018 regarding Conditions and Antar-Instansi’. Media Indonesia, 11 July 2019. Procedures for the Administration of Disaster Available at: Management in Certain Circumstances, pursuant to https://mediaindonesia.com/read/detail/246438- Art. 3(4) Presidential Regulation No. 17/2018 inpres-penanganan-pandemi-perkuat-koordinasi- regarding the Administration of Disaster antar-instansi Management in Certain Circumstances. 33 ‘Soal PenangananVirus Corona, Moeldoko: Inpres 31 World Health Organization (2018). ‘Joint External 4 Tahun 2019 Sudah Cukup’. DetikNews, 4 March Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of 2020. Available at: https://news.detik.com/berita/d- Indonesia: Mission Report 20-24 November 2017’ p. 4925638/soal-penanganan-virus-corona-moeldoko- 2. Available at: inpres-4-tahun-2019-sudah-cukup https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jee ta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2018.9-eng.pdf

8 Doni Monardo, and directed by a number of law—subsequently ratified by the DPR—

34 Governing a Pandemic: a Governing Centre key ministers. Its purpose was to containing a range of measures aimed at coordinate Indonesia’s COVID-19 response, promoting economic and financial stability including promoting ‘synergy’ between during the crisis, including the reallocation ministries, agencies and regional of national and regional budgets for COVID- governments and in the making of 19 response.39 Numerous other regulations, operational policy. On 29 March Home decrees and instructions have also been Affairs Minister Tito Karnavian issued a issued to address particular regulatory circular requiring all regional governments needs. Notably, in July, the National COVID- to establish their own COVID-19 taskforces, 19 Taskforce was disbanded and replaced

headed directly by the governor, district with a Committee for COVID-19 Mitigation - Regional Relations and Indonesia’ s COVID s Indonesia’ Regionaland Relations head or mayor.35 and National Economic Recovery. The Committee consists of a Policy Committee On 31 March, the government hurriedly chaired by the Coordinating Minister for the issued a regulation on PSBB under the Economy, a reconstituted COVID-19 Health Quarantine Law as the need to apply Taskforce led by the Head of BNPB, and a 36 such measures became increasingly clear. Taskforce for National Economic Recovery Regional heads of government wishing to and Transformation led by the Vice- apply PSSB must first request approval Minister for State-Owned Enterprises. from the Minister of Health, who must consult with the Head of the National COVID-19 Taskforce in deciding whether or

not to approve the request.37 The Head of the Taskforce can also request that the

Minister impose PSBB on a particular - 19 Response 19 region. The procedure for making such requests was subsequently outlined in a

ministerial regulation issued on 3 April.38

On the economic front, the Government issued a government regulation in lieu of

34 Art. 8, Presidential Decree No. 7/2020 regarding 36 Government Regulation No. 21/2020 regarding the Covid-19 Taskforce. Four ministers were initially Large Scale Social Restrictions to Accelerate the appointed to direct the Taskforce: the Coordinating Management of Corona Virus Disease 2019 (COVID- Minister for Human Development and Culture, the 19). Minister of Health, the Coordinating Minister for 37 Arts. 6(1) and 6(2) Government Regulation No. Political, Legal and Security Affairs and the Minister 21/2020. of Finance. Ministerial representation was increased 38 Minister of Health Regulation No. 9/2020 on 20 March through Presidential Decree No. regarding Guidelines on Large Scale Social 9/2020. Restrictions for Accelerating the Response to COVID- 35 ‘Mendagri Keluarkan Surat Edaran soal 19. Pembentukan Gugus Tugas Penanganan Covid-19 di 39 Government Regulation in lieu of Law No. 1/2020 Daerah’. .com, 30 March 2020. Available at: regarding Policy on State Finances and Financial https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2020/03/30/11 System Stability for the Management of COVID-19 234971/mendagri-keluarkan-surat-edaran-soal- and/or in order to Address Threats that Endanger pembentukan-gugus-tugas-penanganan?page=all the National Economy and/or Financial System Stability.

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Governing a Pandemic: a Governing Centre 2. Centre-regional relations in the fight against COVID-19 A framework for pandemic response that for what might be to come, although this centralises decision-making authority is was not widely publicised at the time.41 naturally dependent on both the ability and Shortly thereafter, on 4 February, the willingness of the central government to Minister of Health made a declaration under lead. Yet in the weeks leading up to the Law on Infectious Disease Outbreaks

Indonesia recording its first cases of COVID- that COVID-19 was a disease capable of - Regional Relations and Indonesia’ s COVID s Indonesia’ Regionaland Relations 19, the attitudes of President causing an outbreak.42 and his senior ministers were characterised by a distinct lack of urgency and The declaration instructed all levels of increasingly implausible denials that the government to prepare medical and virus could have reached Indonesia.40 From laboratory facilities to deal with a possible that starting point, this section describes outbreak, and to build public awareness of how the central government has exercised the risks posed by COVID-19 and how to its power over regional governments in prevent its transmission (although the forbidding and authorising, respectively, extent to which this was acted upon is two particular forms of public health unclear). Publicly, however, the central response to the virus—‘lockdowns’ and government remained deliberately low-key PSBB. until the confirmation of Indonesia’s first cases on 2 March forced its hand and

2.1 The centre’s initial COVID-19 response: resulted in the appointment of Achmad - 19 Response 19 leading from behind Yurianto, the Director–General for Disease While senior Indonesian leaders Prevention and Control at the Ministry of downplayed the threat of the virus, behind Health, as its official COVID-19 the scenes the central bureaucracy had spokesperson.43 Thereafter, a bureaucratic begun taking at least some preparatory tussle ensued to determine which agency steps. On 28 January the Head of BNPB would lead Indonesia’s COVID-19 response. declared a ‘certain state of disaster This reportedly shifted from the Ministry of emergency’ to facilitate initial preparations Health, to the Office of the President, to the

40 ‘Health Minister: 0 Coronavirus Cases Due to 42 Decree of the Minister of Health No. Prayers and Action’. Tempo.co, 28 February 2020. HK.01.07/MENKES/104/2020 regarding the Available at: Declaration of the Novel Coronavirus Disease (2019- https://en.tempo.co/read/1313237/health- nCoV Disease) as a Disease Capable of Causing minister-0-coronavirus-cases-due-to-prayers-and- Outbreaks and Procedures for its Management. action 43 ‘Pemerintah Tunjuk Achman Yurianto Jadi Jubir 41 Decree of the Head of the National Disaster Resmi Terkait Virus Corona’. Kompas.com, 3 March Management Agency No. 9A/2020 regarding the 2020. Available at: Declaration of a Certain State of Disaster Emergency https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2020/03/03/10 for Coronavirus Disease Outbreaks in Indonesia. This 572411/pemerintah-tunjuk-achmad-yurianto-jadi- was only uploaded to the BNPB website on 17 jubir-resmi-terkait-virus-corona March; a Google search indicates media reporting of it commences on that date.

10 Coordinating Ministry for Human 2.2 ‘Lockdowns’: a point of tension between

Development and Culture until finally BNPB the centre and the regions

Governing a Pandemic: a Governing Centre was nominated to lead the National COVID- Up until mid-March, the main point of 19 Taskforce on 13 March.44 friction between the central government and regional governments related to Two days later (on 15 March) the President regions announcing cases of COVID-19 prior asked regional heads of government to to their verification and announcement by monitor conditions in their regions and the Ministry of Health.48 In response, consult with BNPB about the possible need Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal to declare a state of alert or emergency. He and Security Affairs, Mahfud MD, also requested that they make admonished regional leaders not to

arrangements for students to learn from ‘dramatize’ the issue or use it as a political - Regional Relations and Indonesia’ s COVID s Indonesia’ Regionaland Relations home and for public servants to work from soapbox, advising that they should instead home,45 despite the legal foundations for focus on calming their citizens and not such action (a declaration by the Minister of inducing undue fear of the virus.49 Beyond Health under the Health Quarantine Law) that, however, the central government had not yet being in place. generally not obstructed regions from undertaking whatever preparations they However, it was not until 31 March that the deemed necessary to deal with the likely President activated the Health Quarantine public health challenges posed by COVID- Law by declaring COVID-19 to be a ‘public 19. health emergency’.46 It would then be a further two weeks until the Disaster But as March wore on and more cases Management Law was activated with the started to emerge, many regions wanted to President’s declaration of COVID-19 as a go further and impose some form of 47

‘national disaster’ on 13 April. ‘lockdown’. While never precisely defined, - 19 Response 19 this was generally understood to mean a

restriction on the movement of people into, out of and within regions. On this point, the President stood firm. Justifiably concerned about the economic impact of that course of

44 ‘Anggota DPR Kritik Keras Penanganan Corona, Ini (COVID-19) Non-Natural Disaster as a National Kata Pemerintah’. DetikFinance, 20 March 2020. Disaster. Available at: https://finance.detik.com/berita- 48 ‘Cita Rasa Politik dalam Komunikasi Jokowi-Anies ekonomi-bisnis/d-4947605/anggota-dpr-kritik- soal Corona’. CNN Indonesia, 5 March 2020. keras-penanganan-corona-ini-kata-pemerintah. Available at: 45 ‘Presiden Perintahkan Gubernur, Bupati, dan Wali https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/2020030 Kota Monitor Kondisi Daerah’. Sekretariat Kabinet 4113444-32-480391/cita-rasa-politik-dalam- Republik Indonesia, 15 March 2020. Available at: komunikasi-jokowi-anies-soal-corona https://setkab.go.id/presiden-perintahkan- 49 ‘Soal Virus Corona, Kemendagri Ingatkan Kepala gubernur-bupati-dan-wali-kota-monitor-kondisi- Daerah Tak Cari Panggung’. Kompas.com, 4 March daerah/ 2020. Available at: 46 Presidential Decree No. 11/2020 regarding the https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2020/03/04/16 Declaration of a Public Health Emergency for Corona 025711/soal-virus-corona-kemendagri-ingatkan- Virus Disease 2019 (COVID-19). kepala-daerah-tak-cari-panggung?page=all 47 Presidential Decree No. 12/2020 regarding the Declaration of the Corona Virus Disease 2019

11 action,50 and perhaps—like leaders the wishes of the Governor, Lukas

elsewhere—still coming to grips with the Enembe.54 The sentiment of the Regent of

Governing a Pandemic: a Governing Centre gravity of the public health challenge, he Mimika, Eltinus Omaleng, was illustrative: stated: ‘[We’re going] straight to lockdown, ‘Imposing a lockdown, whether at I don’t care. Regions are the national or regional level, is the responsible for the regions; the authority of the central central government can worry government. Regional governments about the centre. But in the regions are not permitted to adopt this we have a responsibility.’55 policy, and we are not thinking at all about imposing a lockdown.’51 As Mahfud asserted, there was almost

- certainly a degree of political posturing in Regional Relations and Indonesia’ s COVID s Indonesia’ Regionaland Relations Recalling the provisions of the Law on such statements. But it is also entirely Communicable Disease Outbreaks and the plausible that the views expressed were Health Quarantine Law, he was, from a nonetheless sincerely held. Fear of the virus strictly legal perspective, correct. But not and its consequences in the early stages of everyone heeded the message. In open the pandemic may explain the impulse of defiance of the President, on 26 March regional leaders to focus on protecting their province closed the main airport in immediate communities, compounded by Jayapura to all but essential goods and an ingrained sense that decision-makers in patient transport. On 30 March the Jakarta often lack an adequately nuanced municipality of Tegal in Central became understanding of local conditions and the first region to impose a ‘local lockdown’ preferences. by blockading roads into the city.52 It was followed a day later by the municipality of While doubtless irritating to Widodo,

- 53 isolated taunts from small-time local 19 Response 19 Tasikmalaya in . Several districts in Papua also imposed some form of politicians were not a serious affront to his lockdown on their own initiative, against authority. However, the same could not be said for what had been happening right

50 ‘Jokowi Akhirnya Blak-blakan soal Alasan Tak Mau 53 ‘Daftar Wilayah di Indonesia yang Terapkan “Local Lockdown…’. Kompas.com, 2 April 2020. Available Lockdown”’. Kompas.com, 29 March 2020. Available at: at: https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2020/04/02/05 https://www.kompas.com/tren/read/2020/03/29/ 405561/jokowi-akhirnya-blak-blakan-soal-alasan- 083900665/daftar-wilayah-di-indonesia-yang- tak-mau-lockdown?page=all terapkan-local-lockdown-?page=all 51 ‘Jokowi Larang Pemerintah Daerah Lakukan 54 ‘Gubernur Papua Barat Imbau Bupati Cabut Status Lockdown Terkait Covid-19’. Kompas.com, 16 March Lockdown’. PapuaKini, 27 March 2020. Available at: 2020. Available at: https://papuakini.co/2020/03/27/gubernur-papua- https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2020/03/16/15 barat-imbau-bupati-cabut-status-lockdown/ 420291/jokowi-larang-pemerintah-daerah-lakukan- 55 ‘Bupati Mimika Ngotot Lockdown Wilayah jika lockdown-terkait-covid-19?page=all Temukan Kasus Positif Corona’. Kompas.com, 19 52 ‘Cegah Virus Corona Masuk, Akses Keluar-Masuk March 2020. Available at: Kota Tegal Ditutup’. Kompas.com, 23 March 2020. https://regional.kompas.com/read/2020/03/19/21 Available at: 411301/bupati-mimika-ngotot-lockdown-wilayah- https://regional.kompas.com/read/2020/03/23/13 jika-temukan-kasus-positif-corona 260131/cegah-virus-corona-masuk-akses-keluar- masuk-kota-tegal-ditutup?page=1

12 under his nose in the capital Jakarta, a January, it’s all recorded, [Jakarta]

sprawling, densely–populated mega–city of began raising public awareness,

Governing a Pandemic: a Governing Centre 10.5 million under the leadership of preparing hospitals, informing Governor (and possible 2024 presidential them of symptoms of what was aspirant) . As the initial then still known as ‘Wuhan epicentre of the pandemic in Indonesia, pneumonia’...’56 Jakarta provides one of the clearest illustrations of how Indonesia’s framework And the record does indeed bear that out. for pandemic response mediated the On 29 January, the day after BNPB declared actions of the central government and a ‘certain state of disaster emergency’ (and regional governments in their early six days before the Minister of Health

responses to COVID-19. declared COVID-19 as a disease capable of - Regional Relations and Indonesia’ s COVID s Indonesia’ Regionaland Relations causing an outbreak), the Jakarta Health 2.3 Jakarta: ahead of the curve Office issued its first circular on COVID-19. In contrast to the central government, Companies and building managers in the Jakarta was decidedly more proactive in its city were advised of the possible threat of approach. Implicitly criticising the central ‘novel coronavirus pneumonia’ and basic government’s ‘relaxed’ attitude, on 22 April public health measures they should take to Baswedan framed the issue in the following combat it.57 This was followed up just under terms: a month later on 25 February with a Gubernatorial Instruction to all agencies of ‘The problem here is not about the the Jakarta administration calling for division of authority [between the ‘increased vigilance’ towards the risk of central and regional governments]. transmission of COVID-19.58 This is a question of whether or not

this is an external threat that we On 6 March, Baswedan established a COVID- -

19 Response 19 need to address. If we don’t address 19 response team, a week before the it, well then we wait until the threat President established a national manifests here and only then begin equivalent.59 On 14 March, he closed all putting the pieces in place to take schools in the capital for two weeks,60 a day

action. But not us. Ladies and before the President gave all regional heads gentlemen, you can check the entire licence to consider that option.61 This was record. From the beginning of

56 ‘Webinar Relasi Pemerintah Pusat dan Daerah 59 Gubernatorial Decree No. 291/2020 regarding a Dalam Mengatasi Covid 19’. Pusat Penelitian Politik - COVID-19 Response Team for DKI Jakarta. Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (LIPI), 22 60 ‘Cegah Corona, Gubernur Anies Liburkan Sekolah April 2020. Available at: di DKI Selama 2 Pekan’. Kompas.com, 14 March https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HIY-ru4a7TA 2020. Available at: at 47:50 - 48:30. https://megapolitan.kompas.com/read/2020/03/1 57 Health Office Circular No. 21/SE/2020 regarding 4/14110331/cegah-corona-gubernur-anies- Vigilance towards Novel Coronavirus Pneumonia liburkan-sekolah-di-dki-selama-2-pekan (nCoV), 29 January 2020. 61 ‘Presiden Perintahkan Gubernur, Bupati, dan Wali 58 Gubernatorial Instruction No. 16/2020 regarding Kota Monitor Kondisi Daerah’. Sekretariat Kabinet Increased Vigilance towards the Risk of Republik Indonesia, 15 March 2020. Available at: Transmission of Infections of COVID-19, 25 February https://setkab.go.id/presiden-perintahkan- 2020.

13 followed on 19 March with a formal (but transport services. Baswedan complied the

unenforceable) appeal for houses of next day, while continuing to require social

Governing a Pandemic: a Governing Centre worship to close and for the faithful to carry distancing.66 out religious observances at home.62 The next day, the Governor issued a similar Tensions escalated around 28 March, as appeal for all offices in Jakarta that could to Baswedan sent a letter to the President close, and for those that couldn’t to reduce requesting permission to lock down 67 the number of staff working in their Jakarta. Rejecting his request two days offices.63 This coincided with a declaration later, Widodo instead decided on a strategy of a state of emergency by Gubernatorial of large-scale social restrictions (PSBB) 68 Decree.64 under the Health Quarantine Law. The

government regulation on PSBB was issued - Regional Relations and Indonesia’ s COVID s Indonesia’ Regionaland Relations 2.4 Central government ‘speedhumps’ the following day (31 March), but without constrain and delay Jakarta’s response detailing the process for an application to Up until this point, direct public be made to the Minister. disagreement between the Governor and the President had been minimal. But that Wasting no time, Baswedan wrote to the was to end on 16 March, when Baswedan Minister on 2 April requesting approval to restricted the operational hours of the MRT, impose PSBB. But this too was rejected on 5 LRT and TransJakarta buses from 6am to April for not having complied with the 6pm with the unintended (albeit largely provisions of a ministerial regulation predictable) consequence of causing long requiring applications to presented in a queues at stations as peak demand was certain format, which was issued the day 69 squeezed into a compressed window.65 after Baswedan made his request. Widodo immediately responded with a Venting his obvious frustration the statement that all regional governments

- following day (6 April), Baswedan accused 19 Response 19 should continue to provide normal public

gubernur-bupati-dan-wali-kota-monitor-kondisi- at: daerah/ https://www.tribunnews.com/nasional/2020/03/1 62 Gubernatorial Advice No. 5/2020 regarding the 6/anies-baswedan-kembalikan-jam-operasional- Temporary Suspension of Worship and Religious transjakarta-mrt-dan-lrt-sesuai-perintah-pak-jokowi Observances at Houses of Worship to Prevent the 67 ‘Begini Skema Lockdown Jakarta yang Diusulkan Transmission of COVID-19. Gubernur Anies’. Gatra.com, 30 March 2020. 63 Gubernatorial Advice No. 6/2020 regarding the Available at: Temporary Suspension of Office Activities to Prevent https://www.gatra.com/detail/news/473825/kebe the Transmission of COVID-19. ncanaan/begini-skema-lockdown-jakarta-yang- 64 Gubernatorial Decree No. 337/2020 regarding the diusulkan-gubernur-anies Declaration of a State of Disaster Emergency in 68 ‘Istana: Permintaan Anies soal Karantina Wilayah relation to COVID-19 in the region of DKI Jakarta. Jakarta Ditolak’. DetikNews, 31 March 2020. 65 ‘MRT Evaluasi Penumpukan Penumpang di Stasiun Available at: https://news.detik.com/berita/d- akibat Pembatasan Operasional’. Kompas.com, 16 4959167/istana-permintaan-anies-soal-karantina- March 2020. Available at: wilayah-jakarta-ditolak https://megapolitan.kompas.com/read/2020/03/1 69 ‘Terawan Minta Anies Lengkapi Dokumen 6/14181351/mrt-evaluasi-penumpukan- Pengajuan PSBB Jakarta’. CNN Indonesia, 6 April penumpang-di-stasiun-akibat-pembatasan 2020. Available at: 66 ‘Anies Baswedan Kembalikan Jam Operasional https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/2020040 Transjakarta, MRT, dan LRT: Sesuai Perintah Pak 6190100-20-490932/terawan-minta-anies- Jokowi’. TribunNews.com, 16 March 2020. Available lengkapi-dokumen-pengajuan-psbb-jakarta

14 the Ministry of Health of ‘show[ing] no Instead, those cities (or their respective

sense of urgency’ and it being ‘as if we are provinces) were required to request

Governing a Pandemic: a Governing Centre proposing a project that needs a feasibility permission to apply PSBB on their own study. Can’t the ministry see we are facing a behalf, which they subsequently did. rising death toll?’70 Nevertheless, the Requests from Depok, Bogor (municipality Jakarta administration resubmitted its and district) and Bekasi (municipality and request in the stipulated format, and later district) were channelled through the West that evening the Minister finally approved Java provincial government73 and PSBB was the imposition of PSBB in Jakarta for an approved by the Minister to commence on initial period of 14 days effective from 10 15 April. 74 Tangerang (municipality and April—almost two weeks after Baswedan district) and Tangerang Selatan followed a

made his first request to the President.71 similar process and were granted approval - Regional Relations and Indonesia’ s COVID s Indonesia’ Regionaland Relations to apply PSBB on 18 April—eight days after An added complication arises from the fact PSBB commenced in neighbouring that Jakarta is bounded by the satellite cities Jakarta.75 of Depok, Bogor and Bekasi (in West Java) and Tangerang and South Tangerang (in 2.5 PSBB beyond Jakarta ). For the most part, the distinction Despite the initial enthusiasm for regional between the component parts of this urban lockdowns apparent in March, the agglomeration is imperceptible but for lines imposition of PSBB outside of Jakarta has so on a map. To reflect this reality, Baswedan far remained the exception rather than the also requested that the entirety of greater norm. At the time of writing, the peak Jakarta be treated as a single region for the appears to have been in mid-May, when purposes of PSBB.72 However, this was four of 34 provinces (Jakarta, West Java, rejected by the Health Minister on the West and ) plus an

grounds that one region (Jakarta) could not additional 15 municipalities and 12 districts - 19 Response 19 seek the imposition of PSBB on another. were applying PSBB.76 Governor of , , had

70 ‘Anies slams red tape in pandemic fight’. The bekasi-resmi-diajukan-pemprov-jabar-ke-menkes- Jakarta Post, 6 April 2020. Available at: eLTn https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/04/0 74 ‘Bodebek Terapkan PSBB per 15 April 2020, 6/anies-slams-red-tape-in-pandemic-fight.html Warga Diimbau Patuh’. Kompas.com, 16 April 2020. 71 ‘Anies Resmi Terapkan PSBB di DKI Jakarta Jumat Available at: 10 April 2020’. CNN Indonesia, 7 April 2020. https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2020/04/16/11 Available at: 054781/bodebek-terapkan-psbb-per-15-april-2020- https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/2020040 warga-diimbau-patuh 7152446-20-491265/anies-resmi-terapkan-psbb-di- 75 ‘PSBB di Tangerang dan Tangsel mulai 18 April dki-jakarta-jumat-10-april-2020 2020’. Kompas.com, 13 April 2020. Available at: 72 ‘Anies Baswedan Minta Kebijakan PSBB https://regional.kompas.com/read/2020/04/13/16 Terintegrasi di Jabodetabek’. Tempo.co, 2 April 2020. 381841/psbb-di-tangerang-dan-tangsel-mulai-18- Available at: april-2020 https://metro.tempo.co/read/1327077/anies- 76 ‘Sebaran PSBB di 4 Provinsi dan 27 baswedan-minta-kebijakan-psbb-terintegrasi-di- Kabupaten/Kota Indonesia per 13 Mei 2020’. jabodetabek Liputan6.com, 14 May 2020. Available at: 73 ‘PSBB Bogor Depok dan Bekasi Resmi Diajukan https://www.liputan6.com/health/read/4253269/s Pemprov Jabar ke Menkes’. Tirto.id, 8 April 2020. ebaran-psbb-di-4-provinsi-dan-27-kabupatenkota- Available at: https://tirto.id/psbb-bogor-depok-dan- indonesia-per-13-mei-2020

15 considered requesting a province-wide , greeted that decision with

imposition of PSBB after the entirety of her incredulity:

Governing a Pandemic: a Governing Centre province was declared a high risk ‘red zone’ around that time,77 but ultimately decided ‘So we have to wait until we have a to defer the decision to individual districts large number of victims and only and municipalities.78 Governor of Central then we act. Look at Italy and Java, , adopted a similar America, they can’t keep up with position, remaining open to a province-wide burying the corpses. Do we have to 82 application of PSBB if the central wait for that to happen?’ government requested, but otherwise Although at the time Gorontalo ranked 32nd preferring a ‘persuasive’ rather than out of 34 provinces in terms of total (albeit regulatory approach.79

- not per capita) cases, Habibie appealed for Regional Relations and Indonesia’ s COVID s Indonesia’ Regionaland Relations But not all regions who wanted to apply his province to not be compared to Java: PSBB were permitted to do so. By 20 April, ‘In Java, there are plenty of the Minister had rejected requests from hospitals. Lots of specialists, and seven regions for either not meeting sophisticated equipment. But for us epidemiological criteria or for not allocating in Gorontalo, Aloei Saboe hospital sufficient budget to cover the expected costs in Gorontalo City is almost full. And 80 of PSBB. Those regions were three we have only two lung specialists.’ districts in (Fak Fak, Mimika 83 and the municipality of Sorong), one district in each of NTT and North (Rote He resubmitted his request and threatened Ndao and Bolaang Mongondow), one to impose PSBB regardless if he was municipality in Central rejected again.84 It was subsequently

(Palangka Raya) and the province of approved by the Health Minister on 28 - 19 Response 19 Gorontalo.81 The Governor of Gorontalo,

77 ‘Semua Wilayah Zona Merah, Gubernur Kaji Available at: Penerapan PSBB Seluruh Jatim’. Radar Surabaya, 15 https://kumparan.com/kumparannews/daftar-7-

May 2020. Available at: wilayah-yang-pengajuan-psbb-nya-ditolak-terawan- https://radarsurabaya.jawapos.com/read/2020/05 1tG78hjwvrv/full /15/194324/semua-wilayah-zona-merah-gubernur- 81 ‘Daftar 7 Wilayah yang Pengajuan PSBB-nya kaji-penerapan-psbb-seluruh-jatim Ditolak Terawan’. Kumparan.com, 20 April 2020. 78 ‘Pemprov Jatim Serahkan Penerapan Kembali 82 ‘Gubernur Gorontalo Kecewa Usulan PSBB Ditolak PSBB kepada Pemda’. Liputan6.com, 19 June 2020. Pemerintah Pusat’. Kompas.com, 27 April 2020. Available at: Available at: https://surabaya.liputan6.com/read/4283292/pem https://regional.kompas.com/read/2020/04/27/18 prov-jatim-serahkan-penerapan-kembali-psbb- 445841/gubernur-gorontalo-kecewa-usulan-psbb- kepada-pemda ditolak-pemerintah-pusat 79 ‘Tak Terapkan PSBB di Jawa Tengah, Apa Alasan 83 ‘Pengajuan PSBB Ditolak, Gubernur Gorontalo: Ganjar Pranowo? Upaya Ini sebagai Kunci Hadapi Jangan Samakan Dengan Jawa’. Suara.com, 28 April Covid-19’. TribunPalu.com, 19 May 2020. Available 2020. Available at: at: https://palu.tribunnews.com/2020/05/19/tak- https://www.suara.com/news/2020/04/28/04400 terapkan-psbb-di-jawa-tengah-apa-alasan-ganjar- 0/pengajuan-psbb-ditolak-gubernur-gorontalo- pranowo-upaya-ini-sebagai-kunci-hadapi-covid- jangan-samakan-dengan-jawa?page=1 19?page=3 84 ‘Pengajuan PSBB Ditolak, Gubernur Gorontalo: 80 ‘Daftar 7 Wilayah yang Pengajuan PSBB-nya Jangan Samakan Dengan Jawa’. Suara.com, 28 April Ditolak Terawan’. Kumparan.com, 20 April 2020. 2020.

16 April.85 But as Indonesia transitioned to its missing in action—or at least late to the

‘new normal’ in June, enthusiasm for PSBB party—when the exercise of its authority

Governing a Pandemic: a Governing Centre was waning. 86 By 1 September, the number would have been beneficial. For example, of regions applying PSSB had dropped to imposing PSBB on the greater Jakarta area only 2 provinces and 5 seems to be a textbook case for where the districts/municipalities, even as the number central government—under the principles of cases continued its steady rise.87 articulated in the 2014 Regional Governance Law—should have played a 2.6 What did Indonesia gain and lose from a coordinating role across provinces in centralised framework? relation to an issue of national strategic In a country like Indonesia, where importance. Despite having that power government capacity varies significantly

under the Health Quarantine Law, the -

Regional Relations and Indonesia’ s COVID s Indonesia’ Regionaland Relations across the archipelago, there is good reason central government instead stood back and for the central government to retain left it to the individual provinces to make ultimate authority over the imposition of their applications. Not only did this result in public health measures such as quarantine a significant delay, it also begs the question and PSBB. Communicable diseases such as of what would have happened had those COVID-19 are not constrained by provinces not taken action? administrative boundaries, meaning idiosyncratic or reckless decision-making The answer, it seems, is very little: the by any of Indonesia’s 514 districts and central government subsequently made municipalities has the potential to trigger clear that it will not require sub-national significant national consequences from both governments to apply PSSB if they do not a public health and economic perspective. It want to.88 While the heavy-handed exercise therefore makes sense that the central of such authority would doubtless be

government can, at the least, function as a unwise, so too is the decision to completely - 19 Response 19 circuit-breaker if and when regional abdicate responsibility in that domain. And governments fail to act. Ideally, of course, it while the central government has blocked should also go one step further and actively regions from imposing PSBB, once they

lead and coordinate a truly integrated have, it has given those regions complete

national response. discretion over when and what to reopen if they have achieved ‘green’ status In the early stages of the pandemic, (indicating low risk).89 The logic, however, the central government was often

85 ‘Sempat Ditolak, PSBB Provinsi Gorontalo 87 ‘Infografis COVID-19’. Satuan Tugas Penanganan Akhirnya Disetujui Kemenkes’. Kompas.com, 28 April COVID-19, 27 September 2020. Available at: 2020. https://covid19.go.id/p/berita/infografis-covid-19- https://regional.kompas.com/read/2020/04/28/20 27-september-2020 463211/sempat-ditolak-psbb-provinsi-gorontalo- 88 ‘Gugus Tugas: Pemerintah Pusat Tak Paksa Daerah akhirnya-disetujui-kemenkes Terapkan PSBB’. DetikNews, 12 May 2020. Available 86 ‘New Normal di Indonesia, Apa yang Akan at: https://news.detik.com/berita/d- Terjadi?’. Kompas.com, 27 May 2020. Available at: 5011488/gugus-tugas-pemerintah-pusat-tak-paksa- https://www.kompas.com/tren/read/2020/05/27/ daerah-terapkan-psbb 082007465/new-normal-di-indonesia-apa-yang- 89 ‘Gugus Tugas: Kepala Daerah Berwenang Putuskan akan-terjadi?page=all Pelonggaran PSBB di Zona Hijau’. Kompas.com, 5 June 2020. Available at:

17 presumably, is that regional governments centre and the regions—is not yet clear.

have sufficient economic incentives not to What does seem clear is that rapid and

Governing a Pandemic: a Governing Centre prolong the application of PSBB for any decisive action is a common characteristic longer than is necessary. And this has been of countries that have been successful in borne out in practice. containing the spread of the virus.92

However, that logic should also apply at the Were Indonesia to grant regions greater front end, serving as a natural brake on the discretion in applying PSBB or other public unnecessary application of PSBB. Which health measures, it could facilitate quicker leads to the question of why the central regional responses while still enabling government insisted on a process of active central government intervention if approval, rather than simply vetoing PSBB

required. This small adjustment to - Regional Relations and Indonesia’ s COVID s Indonesia’ Regionaland Relations in circumstances where it was clearly Indonesia’s framework for pandemic unjustified. As the case of Jakarta response has significant potential upside at demonstrates, potentially valuable time was relatively little cost. At a minimum, it would lost through the Ministry of Health’s provide cheap insurance against the central requirement that the Jakarta administration government failing to demonstrate strong present to it various epidemiological data, leadership at a time when early action is all of which (at that stage) was ultimately critical (assuming, of course, that regional sourced from the Ministry itself. Indeed, the governments do not do the same). Ministry routinely chastised regional governments for using data that had not

been sourced from the Ministry, arguing that it could not rely on it because it didn’t

know where it had come from.90 Even more

baffling is the fact that the Ministry would -

19 Response 19 have (or should have) been analysing that data itself to be ready to impose PSBB had

the Jakarta administration failed to act.91

The extent to which the trajectory of COVID-19 in Indonesia has been materially altered by delays in applying PSBB—in particular those arising from the way in which authority is divided between the

https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2020/06/05/06 https://pshk.or.id/publikasi/permenkes-nomor-9- 270441/gugus-tugas-kepala-daerah-berwenang- tahun-2020-menambah-birokrasi-memperlambat- putuskan-pelonggaran-psbb-di-zona-hijau?page=all aksi/ 90 ‘Kemenkes Larang Pemda Umumkan Status 92 ‘The early days of a global pandemic: a timeline of Corona COVID-19’. Tirto.id, 3 March 2020. COVID-19 spread and government interventions’. https://tirto.id/kemenkes-larang-pemda-umumkan- Brookings, 2 April 2020. Available at: status-corona-covid-19-eCCo https://www.brookings.edu/2020/04/02/the- 91 ‘Permenkes Nomor 9 Tahun 2020: Menambah early-days-of-a-global-pandemic-a-timeline-of- Birokrasi Memperlambat Aksi’. Pusat Studi Hukum covid-19-spread-and-government-interventions/ dan Kebijakan (PSHK), 5 April 2020. Available at:

18

3. Administrative coordination and Governing a Pandemic: a Governing Centre financial incentives

Up until this point, the focus has been potentially compromising the effectiveness primarily on decision-making authority for of measures to contain the spread of the major public health measures—in other virus. words, who gets to decide what to do and when. But once those decisions are made, A persistent problem has been equally if not more important is ensuring discrepancies in COVID-19 case numbers

that each level of government acts in a recorded by the centre and the regions. - Regional Relations and Indonesia’ s COVID s Indonesia’ Regionaland Relations complementary and coordinated way. These are crucial for planning and implementing public health responses. In describing what he felt to be the failure of As this section shows, Indonesia’s COVID-19 regional governments to follow central response has not been immune from some guidance, then COVID-19 Taskforce of the country’s more general governance spokesperson Achmad Yurianto said: problems: actions by one level of government that are at cross-purposes with ‘Regarding coordination with the those of another, overlapping technical regions, there have been several guidance and inconsistent data for targeting circulars issued by the Minister of social assistance. It also describes how the Health, by Directors-General [of the central government is attempting—albeit Ministry of Health]. We’ve even somewhat ineffectually—to use the system made manuals. We ask our for intergovernmental fiscal transfers to colleagues in the regions if they’ve incentivise regional governments to take

- received the circular, [they say] yes. 19 Response 19 action to combat COVID-19. Have they understood it, [they say] yes. But then why do they respond 3.1 Coordinating action by central and 93

regional governments like this?’

Ensuring that governments at all levels are It is not hard to imagine that Yurianto’s pulling in the same direction is a frustration has some basis in fact. Yet longstanding challenge of Indonesian regional irritation with the central governance. Indonesia’s initial response to government is equally easy to understand. COVID-19 has proved no exception. Both For example, Governor of the central government and regional complained in May that governments have at times been left central government policy was ‘messing up’ exasperated by the actions of the other, steps that regional governments had been leading to mutual finger-pointing and taking to prevent COVID-19 transmission

93 ‘Cita Rasa Politik dalam Komunikasi Jokowi-Anies 4113444-32-480391/cita-rasa-politik-dalam- soal Corona’. CNN Indonesia, 5 March 2020. komunikasi-jokowi-anies-soal-corona Available at: https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/2020030

19 and asked for greater central government legitimately within the policy remit of

support of regional initiatives.94 Animating the Ministry (for example, the

Governing a Pandemic: a Governing Centre his concern was the closing and then rapid consequences of COVID-19 for re-opening of flight routes between Jakarta upcoming regional elections and and Makassar, and the repatriation of village preparedness for the impacts migrant workers direct to his province of COVID-19). However, the preceding without first undergoing a period of six chapters deal almost entirely with quarantine in Jakarta. Both arguably the medical aspects of the crisis, increased the containment challenge faced including clinical diagnosis and by provincial authorities. infection control — areas in which the Ministry has no formal authority or 3.2 Technical guidance

expertise. - Regional Relations and Indonesia’ s COVID s Indonesia’ Regionaland Relations One method by which national ministries and agencies seek to promote consistent Although the medical guidance in action by regional governments is through those six chapters is said to be based issuing technical guidance. An avalanche of on ‘Guidelines for the Prevention and such guidance has been (and continues to Control of COVID-19’ published by the be) issued in relation to addressing COVID- Ministry of Health, 96 there are no 19 and its impacts in various contexts. The cross-references to specific sections of quantity, quality and consistency of that that guidance. Indeed, it is unclear guidance, however, may go at least some why it was deemed necessary to way to explaining any confusion on the part publish an abridged and slightly of regional governments. different version of that guidance rather than simply refer regional For example, in late March the governments to the original Ministry Ministry of Home Affairs released

of Health guidance.97 Compounding -

19 Response 19 ‘General Guidelines for Regional the situation, approximately one Governments for Dealing with the month later Home Affairs published COVID-19 Pandemic: Prevention, additional ‘Management Guidelines for Control, Diagnosis and Management.’95 Regional Governments in Handling At 206 pages including annexes, the COVID-19 and its Impacts’.98 Oddly, final two chapters deal with matters

94 ‘Gubernur: Sejumlah Kebijakan Pusat Kacaukan General of Disease Prevention and Control, Ministry Skenario Daerah’. Republika, 20 May 2020. Available of Health, 27 March 2020. Available at: at: https://www.kemkes.go.id/resources/download/inf https://republika.co.id/berita/qal8pc377/gubernur o-terkini/COVID-19 dokumen resmi/REV- -sejumlah-kebijakan-pusat-kacaukan-skenario- 04_Pedoman_P2_COVID-19_ 27 Maret2020_Tanpa daerah TTD.pdf.pdf 95 ‘Pedoman Umum Menghadapi COVID-19 Bagi 97 ‘Pedoman Umum Menghadapi COVID-19 Bagi Pemerintah Daerah: Pencegahan, Pengendalian, Pemerintah Daerah: Pencegahan, Pengendalian, Diagnosis dan Manajemen’. Ministry of Home Affairs, Diagnosis dan Manajemen’. Ministry of Home Affairs, March 2020. Available at: March 2020, p. 9. https://covid19.go.id/p/panduan/kemendagripedo 98 ‘Pedoman Manajemen Bagi Pemerintah Daerah man-umum-menghadapi-pandemi-covid-19-bagi- Dalam Penanganan COVID-19 dan Dampaknya’. pemerintah-daerah Ministry of Home Affairs, undated. Available at: 96 ‘Pedoman Pencegahan dan Pengendalian http://binapemdes.kemendagri.go.id/uploads/galler Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19)’. Directorate y/Final_Pedoman_Manajemen_COVID-19.pdf

20 this makes no reference to the preaches the need for coordination to

Ministry’s previous guidelines, or the regions.

Governing a Pandemic: a Governing Centre indeed the Ministry of Health guidelines, despite including chapters on boosting immunity and health 3.3 Targeting of social assistance system strengthening. To mitigate the economic impacts of COVID- 19 on households, all levels of government Recognising the need to try to impose have unleashed what Minister of Social a degree of order, the Ministry of Affairs Juliari Batubara has referred to as a Health subsequently convened an ‘tsunami’ of social assistance.100 But its online seminar to work towards the rollout has generally been regarded as ‘convergence’ of the two sets of

- chaotic and slow, with numerous instances Regional Relations and Indonesia’ s COVID s Indonesia’ Regionaland Relations guidelines, as well as further guidance of those eligible missing out and vice-versa. for villages issued by the Ministry of In a particularly notable case, a member of Villages, Development of the Jakarta regional parliament was listed Disadvantaged Regions and as eligible to receive a package of basic Transmigration.99 This, however, supplies that should have been targeted at consisted primarily of officials talking the poor. As he put it: through their respective guides over a period of three hours with little ‘How could I receive that? Now this attempt at reconciling them. is a warning for the municipal government, when they’re Whether or not this actually matters is providing data to the central hard to gauge. If regional governments government or to the provincial simply follow Ministry of Health government, they need to be guidelines for clinical and public

careful. It can’t just be random, they -

19 Response 19 health matters and ignore any need to take it seriously.’101 inconsistencies in the Ministry of Home Affairs guidelines, then the To target centrally funded social assistance, impact may be more symbolic than the Ministry of Social Affairs has been real. At the least, however, it does little relying on data that was last updated in to enhance the credibility of a central 2017.102 Even assuming that it was government that consistently

99 ‘Koordinasi Kegiatan Promosi Kesehatan https://www.tribunnews.com/corona/2020/05/07 Masyarakat dan Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Pusat /banyaknya-jenis-bansos-yang-disalurkan- serta Daerah dalam Pencegahan COVID-19’. pemerintah-mensos-ini-namanya-tsunami-bansos Directorate of Health Promotion and Community 101‘Data Kacau, Anggota DPRD DKI Jakarta Justru Empowerment, Ministry of Health, 20 May 2020. Masuk Daftar Penerima Bansos’. Kompas.com, 22 Available at: April 2020. Available at: http://promkes.kemkes.go.id/koordinasi-kegiatan- https://megapolitan.kompas.com/read/2020/04/2 promosi-kesehatan-masyarakat-dan-pemberdayaan- 2/19224701/data-kacau-anggota-dprd-dki-jakarta- masyarakat-pusat-serta-daerah-dalam-pencegahan- justru-masuk-daftar-penerima-bansos covid-19 102 ‘Kemensos Ungkap Alasan Data Penerima Bansos 100 ‘Banyak Jenis Bansos yang Disalurkan Semrawut’. CNN Indonesia, 14 May 2020. Available Pemerintah, Mensos: Ini Namanya Tsunami Bansos’. at: TribunNews, 7 May 2020. Available at: https://www.cnnindonesia.com/ekonomi/2020051

21 accurate then, that means it does not take Multiple sources of social assistance can

into account subsequent changes in also cause headaches for regional

Governing a Pandemic: a Governing Centre circumstances, particularly those recently governments when things go wrong. thrown into poverty by the pandemic. But Governor of West Java to update that data, the central government related his experience of receiving is largely reliant on regional governments. complaints from village heads about eligible As Batubara explained: community members missing out on centrally funded social assistance, not ‘Like it or not, you can say that we realising that he only had control over rely almost 100 per cent on data social assistance funded from the provincial that’s sent by the regions. The budget.105

appropriateness or - Regional Relations and Indonesia’ s COVID s Indonesia’ Regionaland Relations inappropriateness of the In addition, upcoming regional elections prospective social assistance have been associated with confirmed recipients that we receive is not our misuse of COVID-19 social assistance for responsibility.’103 political purposes in at least 23 regions. This includes placing photos of regional Complicating matters—and causing further heads or symbols of political parties on delays—is the fact that many districts and state-funded aid packages, providing municipalities subsequently withdrew data financial aid from regional budgets in the that they had sent to the Ministry. This name of the regional head, and corruption occurred after villages and wards of social assistance funds.106 complained that the data they provided to district and municipality social affairs 3.4 COVID-19 and intergovernmental fiscal offices was different to the data those arrangements

offices subsequently sent to the Ministry.104 The economic impact of the COVID-19 crisis -

19 Response 19 While acknowledging the competing is providing ammunition for Finance demands of speed, accuracy and Minister Sri Mulyani to renew arguments accountability, the Ministry ultimately drew for reforming the framework for a line in the sand and restricted the ability intergovernmental fiscal relations to

of districts and municipalities to correct generate greater ‘fiscal synergy’ between data in the interests of getting money out the spending programs of central and the door.

4132828-532-503333/kemensos-ungkap-alasan- 105 ‘Semrawut Data Bansos Corona, Saling Serang data-penerima-bansos-semrawut Pusat-Daerah’. CNN Indonesia, 12 May 2020. 103 ‘Mensos: Sekarang Banyak Orang yang Tiba-tiba Available at: Jadi Ahli Data’. DetikNews, 6 May 2020. Available at: https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/2020051 https://news.detik.com/berita/d-5005189/mensos- 2093741-32-502340/semrawut-data-bansos- sekarang-banyak-orang-yang-tiba-tiba-jadi-ahli-data corona-saling-serang-pusat-daerah 104 ‘Alasan Penyaluran Bansos Tunai Molor Versi 106 ‘Bawaslu Ungkap Politisasi Bansos Corona di 23 Mensos’. DetikNews, 19 May 2020. Available at: Daerah’. CNN Indonesia, 20 July 2020. Available at: https://finance.detik.com/berita-ekonomi-bisnis/d- https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/2020072 5020950/alasan-penyaluran-bansos-tunai-molor- 0155659-20-526763/bawaslu-ungkap-politisasi- versi-mensos/1 bansos-corona-di-23-daerah

22 regional governments.107 A bill to revise the level) COVID-19 risk status that are entirely

2004 Fiscal Balance Law in the Parliament’s surrounded by other green

Governing a Pandemic: a Governing Centre list of ‘priority bills’ for 2020, but districts/municipalities are not eligible to considering it has languished in the receive funds under the scheme, National Legislative Program (Prolegnas) presumably because of a view that they do for over a decade, the likelihood of progress not require additional incentives to this year remains unclear.108 maintain that status.

In the immediate term, a component of the The first funding allocations were made in system of intergovernmental fiscal the ministerial regulation establishing the transfers—the regional incentive fund—is scheme, with 1.918 trillion IDR shared

being used to encourage regions to take amongst 171 regions. Grants ranged - Regional Relations and Indonesia’ s COVID s Indonesia’ Regionaland Relations effective action to slow the spread of between approximately IDR 8 – 15 billion COVID-19 (or at least reward those that do). (USD 0.57 – 1.06 million), with most in the An additional IDR 5 trillion (340 million range IDR 11 –14 billion (USD 0.78 – 0.99 USD or 466 million AUD) has been allocated million).111 While future funding allocations for this purpose for 2020, spread over three might (theoretically) have an incentive funding rounds. Funds may be used to effect, this first round can only be support economic recovery as well as for understood as a reward given regions had the provision of COVID-19 related health no prior knowledge of its existence. services and social assistance.109 The extent to which an incentive effect is A region’s eligibility for a grant and its generated in the future depends in large quantum is determined by compliance with part on whether an amount of IDR 8 – 15 administrative preconditions (submission billion (or recognition of good performance

of a budget reallocation together with by the central government) is meaningful to -

19 Response 19 reports on COVID-19 public health and a region and thereby encourages its social assistance measures) and an government to do something it would not assessment of its performance in otherwise have done. Any effect is likely to responding to COVID-19. This is done by be marginal, given regions already have

reference to either change over time in strong public health and economic epidemiological scores or ‘risk mapping’ by incentives to slow the spread of the virus. unspecified means.110 Districts/municipalities with ‘green’ (low This is even more so for large regions, given the formula for determining the amount of

107 ‘Introduction and Explanation of the Government 333341/daftar-37-ruu-prolegnas-prioritas-2020- in relation to the Macroeconomic Framework and salah-satunya-ruu-haluan-ideologi?page=all Key Aspects of Fiscal Policy for 2021’. Speech of the 109 Art. 2 Minister of Finance Regulation No. Minister of Finance to the Plenary Session of the 87/PMK.07/2020 regarding the Management of DPR, Jakarta, 12 May 2020, p. 9. Available at: Supplementary Regional Incentive Funds for the https://fiskal.kemenkeu.go.id/data/document/papa 2020 Financial Year. ran/2020/PidatoMenkeuKEMPPKF2021.pdf 110 Arts. 7-10 Minister of Finance Regulation No. 108 ‘Daftar 37 RUU Prolegnas Prioritas 2020, Salah 87/PMK.07/2020. Satunya RUU Haluan Ideologi Pancasila’. 111 Annex to Minister of Finance Regulation No. Kompas.com, 16 July 2020. Available at: 87/PMK.07/2020. https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2020/07/16/17

23 the financial ‘reward’ for good performance

does not take into account a region’s size. Conclusion

Governing a Pandemic: a Governing Centre For example, the districts of Cilacap in The policy and programmatic challenges and Kepulauan Sulu in North presented by COVID-19 are testing each received the same incentive Indonesia’s system of governance on grant of Rp 13.45 billion (USD 0.95 million), multiple fronts. The virus has inevitably presumably for similar performance (the exposed areas of weakness in the system, actual calculations are not made public). such as administrative coordination 112 But Cilacap (population 1.9 million) had between levels of government and data a pre–Covid 2020 budget almost 4.5 times collection and management. However, the larger than that of Kepulauan Sulu macro level division of authority for (population 105,000),113 meaning that for

- decision-making and implementation Regional Relations and Indonesia’ s COVID s Indonesia’ Regionaland Relations it, the relative magnitude of the incentive is between the centre and the regions under 114 4.5 times less than for Kepulauan Sulu. Indonesia’s framework for pandemic Rethinking this aspect of the scheme could response was arguably not predestined to in theory improve effectiveness, although at be one of them. risk of diverting funds to regions that least need it. But the relatively small amount of A more proactive central government funds available suggests that real world should have been able to work within that impact would likely remain limited. framework (or make subtle adjustments to it) to minimise delays in approving certain public health measures such as PSBB. It might even have encouraged or required regions to move faster in applying them—a

strength of the framework, given the

consequences that could result from an

- 19 Response 19 individual region’s failure or refusal to act. Instead, however, in the early stages of the pandemic the central government showed a curious knack for inserting itself into the

process where greater regional discretion may have been more appropriate, while absenting itself where a more active

112 BPS Kabupaten Cilacap. Kabupaten Cilacap Dalam 114 ‘APBD Kepsul Disahkan Rp 791,93 Miliar’. Angka 2020, p. 25. Available at: PoskoMalut.com, 2 December 2019. Available at: https://cilacapkab.bps.go.id/publication/2020/04/2 https://poskomalut.com/apbd-kepsul-disahkan-rp- 7/1e02f145fbfec456db06c6e6/kabupaten-cilacap- 79193-miliar/ ; ‘APBD Cilacap 2020 Prioritaskan dalam-angka-2020.html Prioritaskan Infrastruktur Daerah Pinggir’. 113 BPS Kabupaten Kepulauan Sula. Kabupaten Gatra.com, 10 January 2020. Available at: Kepulauan Sula Dalam Angka 2020 p. 42 Available https://www.gatra.com/detail/news/465262/politi at: k/apbd-cilacap-2020-prioritaskan-infrastruktur- https://kepsulkab.bps.go.id/publication/2020/04/2 daerah-pinggir 7/0f337da83572810184c8c3f7/kabupaten- kepulauan-sula-dalam-angka-2020.html

24 coordinating role would have been from them? There is at least partial

beneficial. evidence to that effect.

Governing a Pandemic: a Governing Centre When that occurred, it revealed the trade- When rapidly rising cases of COVID-19 in off involved in a framework that grants the Jakarta led Anies Baswedan to reimpose central government ultimate decision- ‘full’ PSBB in September, he did not warn making authority over the imposition of the central government prior to his many public health measures. Regions were announcement, likely calculating that his left with limited legal means to circumvent options would be significantly constrained the barriers to action erected by the centre if he was expressly advised not to do so.116 (although ’s early success in containing And indeed, although President Widodo had

the virus without any public health moderated his view of public health and the - Regional Relations and Indonesia’ s COVID s Indonesia’ Regionaland Relations measures requiring central approval economy as competing interests,117 he demonstrated that regional creativity could implicitly criticised what he viewed as go at least some way to overcoming Baswedan’s heavy-handed approach.118 His them).115 key ministers made the point in much more direct terms,119 leading Baswedan to make A low cost means of mitigating this risk concessions on the degree to which non- would be for regions to be granted greater essential businesses could continue to discretion over the implementation of operate.120 public health measures, with the central government retaining the ability to override Thereafter, however, the process was if necessary. This would not solve the somewhat smoother than it had been in problem of a central government intent on March. There were no delays associated preventing regions from taking action, but with the Ministry of Health, although that

would at least serve as a fail-safe in the case was primarily due to the original -

19 Response 19 of central government inaction. authorisation for PSBB remaining in place rather than any change in procedures.121 Of course, mistakes and missteps are There was better coordination between the inevitable in a crisis. Is Indonesia learning

115 ‘Ini Strategi Bali Berhasil Lawan Corona Tanpa Available at: PSBB’. DetikNews, 13 May 2020. Available at: https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2020/09/15/09 https://news.detik.com/berita/d-5012616/ini- 192201/sikap-jokowi-soal-pengetatan-kembali- strategi-bali-berhasil-lawan-corona-tanpa-psbb psbb-dki-jakarta?page=all 116 ‘Satgas Covid-19 Sebut Anies Belum Koordinasi 119 ‘Deretan Kritik Menteri Jokowi soal PSBB Total Saat Umumkan Pengetatan PSBB’. Kompas.com, 12 Anies Baswedan’. Tempo.co, 13 September 2020. September 2020. Available at: Available at: https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2020/09/12/12 https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1385618/deretan- 270131/satgas-covid-19-sebut-anies-belum- kritik-menteri-jokowi-soal-psbb-total-anies- koordinasi-saat-umumkan-pengetatan-psbb baswedan/full&view=ok 117 ‘Jokowi Ingatkan Bahaya jika Dahulukan Ekonomi 120 ‘Anies Izinkan Kantor Terisi 25% Saat PSBB, PD: ketimbang Kesehatan’. Kompas.com, 7 September Bentuk Toleransi ke Pusat’. DetikNews, 14 2020. Available at: September 2020. Available at: https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2020/09/07/10 https://news.detik.com/berita/d-5171811/anies- 514071/jokowi-ingatkan-bahaya-jika-dahulukan- izinkan-kantor-terisi-25-saat-psbb-pd-bentuk- ekonomi-ketimbang-kesehatan toleransi-ke-pusat 118 ‘Sikap Jokowi soal Pengetatan Kembali PSBB DKI 121 ‘Kemenkes: PSBB Jakarta Total Tak Pelu Izin Lagi’. Jakarta…’. Kompas.com, 15 September 2020. DetikNews, 10 September 2020. Available at:

25 Jakarta administration and the leaders of its

satellite cities and neighbouring provinces,

Governing a Pandemic: a Governing Centre where many of those who work in Jakarta live.122 And while there remained differences in preferred approach between the central government and the Jakarta administration, there appeared to be more negotiation and coordination and a reduced level of open conflict. A low bar perhaps, but progress nonetheless.

Viewed more broadly, the Indonesian case - Regional Relations and Indonesia’ s COVID s Indonesia’ Regionaland Relations reinforces the point about how systems of governance—unitary, federal, centralised and decentralised—influence national responses to COVID-19. It demonstrates that while the locus of macro level decision- making authority may not of itself determine how effectively a nation takes action to contain the virus and mitigate its impacts, neither is it without consequence.

In Indonesia’s case, the way in which authority is divided between the centre and the regions did introduce delays at critical

moments. But, perhaps more importantly, - 19 Response 19 the system determined who had their hands

on key public health policy levers as the virus silently spread across the archipelago

in March. Widodo and Baswedan occupy

offices on opposing sides of Merdeka Square in central Jakarta. It is worth contemplating what Indonesia’s COVID-19 response might have looked like had the two swapped places.

https://news.detik.com/berita/d- September 2020. Available at: 5166988/kemenkes-psbb-jakarta-total-tak-perlu- https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/202009101 izin-lagi 81004-4-185975/anies-kumpul-bareng-kepala- 122 ‘Anies Kumpul Bareng Kepala Daerah daerah-jabodetabek-ini-hasilnya Jabodetabek, Ini Hasilnya’. CNBC Indonesia, 10