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Methods for a Critical Graphic Design Practice
Title Design as criticism: methods for a critical graphic design p r a c tic e Type The sis URL https://ualresearchonline.arts.ac.uk/id/eprint/12027/ Dat e 2 0 1 7 Citation Laranjo, Francisco Miguel (2017) Design as criticism: methods for a critical graphic design practice. PhD thesis, University of the Arts London. Cr e a to rs Laranjo, Francisco Miguel Usage Guidelines Please refer to usage guidelines at http://ualresearchonline.arts.ac.uk/policies.html or alternatively contact [email protected] . License: Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives Unless otherwise stated, copyright owned by the author Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) University of the Arts London – London College of Communication February 2017 First submission: October 2015 2 Abstract This practice-led research is the result of an interest in graphic design as a specific critical activity. Existing in the context of the 2008 financial and subsequent political crisis, both this thesis and my work are situated in an expanded field of graphic design. This research examines the emergence of the terms critical design and critical practice, and aims to develop methods that use criticism during the design process from a practitioner’s perspective. Central aims of this research are to address a gap in design discourse in relation to this terminology and impact designers operating under the banner of such terms, as well as challenging practitioners to develop a more critical design practice. The central argument of this thesis is that in order to develop a critical practice, a designer must approach design as criticism. -
Book Proposal Title Rod Clark A). Philosophy of Design an Index Of
Book Proposal Title Rod Clark a). philosophy of design an index of possibilities Draft Version 1 Dec 2014 Not for circulation a). philosophy of design: an index of possibilities 1 a). philosophy of design: an index of possibilities 2 Contents List Genesis of the project 1 Background 1 Background - Function of Design Philosophy; An Index of Possiblities was begun in 2010 as a WP blog under Don’t explain your philosophy. Function of Philosophy in relation to design Philosophy in relation to Design the title Design Philosophy and its posts were concerned with ideas of values in Embody it. Epicetus naming and language around design, ‘design-time’ (multiple-speed periodicity) Most academic subjects have a philosophy about them. Science, medicine, politics 2 Overview, Approach, Organisation innovation and systems. A somewhat oblique look at design posts were about the all have underpinnings of thoughtful direction. They are complex and important and Coverage biro, design ‘classics’, British military vehicles, the iPod/iTunes system and the history subjects and need ethical and theoretical understandings for them to function. of the record player. From this beginning the project has grown organically into a very Design, as a much more recent, but as I try to point out, a just as important 3 Rationale thorough and structured investigation of design as a central human activity; themes discipline, coming as it does from craft roots does lack the intellectual basis that include how values initiate and are embedded in design as a cultural force, the other fields of activity have accrued over millennia. 4 Contents/ Section sequence importance of technology, the social role design has and how design performs in and over time and the nature of multiple interpretations. -
Part 1: the Ecology of the Image
PART 1: THE ECOLOGY OF THE IMAGE Figure 1: Figure-ground reversal: the face-vase illusion (original design by Edgar Rubin). Ian E. Gordon, Theories of Visual Perception (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1989) 53. 2 PART 1: THE ECOLOGY OF THE IMAGE …no denser or more tacit form of communication, no shaping or organising force more comprehensive or more insidiously embedded in our lifeworld than images. They make up the true lingua franca of commerce, politics, and psyche; they are the ‘cloaking devices’ par excellence of the human social world. (Sanford Kwinter)1 One must see, at first sight, what does not let itself be seen. And this is invisibility itself. For what first sight misses is the invisible. The flaw, the error of first sight is to see, and to not notice the invisible. (Jacques Derrida)2 …nothing seems more important than to debate the ecological role and character of images. (Andrew Ross)3 Don’t worry sweetheart — it’s just a movie. (Anon) INTRODUCTION 4 SNAP SHOT: AN ACCIDENT IN SLOW MOTION I am sitting in a Holden car designed in 1966, travelling down a highway on an extremely hot day at fifty miles per hour. The luxurious design of the interior (beautifully preserved by the car’s owner) speaks of a familiar car culture even though the detailing has changed. Something is, nonetheless, 1 Sanford Kwinter in his introduction to Bruce Mau, Life Style (London: Phaidon, 2000) 36. 2 Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: the state of the debt, the work of mourning, and the New International, trans. -
Philosophy of Design: a Meta- Theoretical Structure for Design Theory
Philosophy of design: a meta- theoretical structure for design theory Terence Love, Praxis Education, 21 Spiers Rd, Quinns Rocks, Western Australia This paper focuses on the structure and dynamic of theory in design research. Problems with existing theory are explored, and a new meta- theoretical method is suggested for assisting the critical analysis, comparison and formulation of design theories and concepts. This meta- theoretical method contributes to building a simplifying paradigm of design research by providing a means to clarify the existing state of design theory in the field, to assist with the establishment of coherence and compatibility between concepts in disparate theories, to validate theory and concepts, and to uncover ‘hidden’ aspects of design theories. 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved Keywords: philosophy of design, design theory, epistemology, ontology, design philosophy his paper is a contribution to the study of Philosophy of Design. In it, a critical overview is taken of the structure and dynamic of Tdesign theory. This overview leads to a method to assist with the critical analysis of design theories and their associated concepts. If we consider ‘design theory’ as an artefact to be designed, this paper’s role is in the part of the design process often called ‘problem analysis’. Under- pinning what is presented in this paper is an assumption that the act of designing by human agents is central to the academic study of design. This theoretical standpoint, that what is described as design always implicates humans, together with the understanding that any theories, theorising or theory interpretation has meaning only in a human context, is the basis for the analyses presented below. -
The Epistemology of Testimony
Pergamon Stud. His. Phil. Sci., Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 1-31, 1998 0 1998 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved Printed in Great Britain 0039-3681/98 $19.004-0.00 The Epistemology of Testimony Peter Lipton * 1. Introduction Is there anything you know entirely off your own bat? Your knowledge depends pervasively on the word of others. Knowledge of events before you were born or outside your immediate neighborhood are the obvious cases, but your epistemic dependence on testimony goes far deeper that this. Mundane beliefs-such as that the earth is round or that you think with your brain-almost invariably depend on testimony, and even quite personal facts-such as your birthday or the identity of your biological parents--can only be known with the help of others. Science is no refuge from the ubiquity of testimony. At least most of the theories that a scientist accepts, she accepts because of what others say. The same goes for almost all the data, since she didn’t perform those experiments herself. Even in those experiments she did perform, she relied on testimony hand over fist: just think of all those labels on the chemicals. Even her personal observations may have depended on testimony, if observation is theory-laden, since those theories with which it is laden were themselves accepted on testimony. Even if observation were not theory-laden, the testimony-ladenness of knowledge should be beyond dispute. We live in a sea of assertions and little if any of our knowledge would exist without it. If the role of testimony in knowledge is so vast, why is its role in the history of epistemology so slight? Why doesn’t the philosophical canon sparkle with titles such as Meditations on Testimony, A Treatise Concerning Human Testimony, and Language, Truth and Testimony? The answer is unclear. -
Book Review: the Philosophy of Design by Glenn Parsons
blogs.lse.ac.uk http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/lsereviewofbooks/2016/04/27/book-review-the-philosophy-of-design-by-glenn-parsons/ Book Review: The Philosophy of Design by Glenn Parsons In The Philosophy of Design, Glenn Parsons provides a well-structured discussion of the philosophy of design, drawing upon his extensive work on beauty, aesthetics and nature. The book shows design as a valid and important area of philosophical inquiry, covering a range of social, epistemological and ethical issues. Mona Sloane finds this an essential read for anyone looking for an engaging and accessible mapping of existing philosophical scholarship on design. The Philosophy of Design. Glenn Parsons. Polity. 2015. In recent years, the term ‘design’ has attracted increasing attention among academics and practitioners alike. While new sub-disciplines such as ‘design anthropology’ and ‘innovation design’ have emerged on the scholarly horizon, paradigms like ‘design thinking’ continue to conquer the business world. However, despite this growing presence of ‘design’ as both a mode of practice and scholarly focus, there has been little philosophical investigation and commentary on the phenomenon. The single-authored book, The Philosophy of Design, by Glenn Parsons, Associate Professor in Philosophy at Ryerson University, Toronto, sets out to change that. It provides a well-structured discussion of the term ‘design’ from a philosophical standpoint, rooted in Parsons’s extensive work on beauty, aesthetics and nature. It aims to demonstrate the significance of design as a relevant area of philosophical inquiry and therefore to map out the philosophical issues and questions that arise from contemporary design practice. The book consists of seven chapters, starting with a brief introduction and ending with an epilogue (including a quite helpful page on suggested further reading). -
Undesign. the Un-Designability of the Virtual. Design from Problem-Solving to Problem-Finding
UnDesign. The Un-designability of the Virtual Betti Marenko PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE In UnDesign Gavin Sade, Gretchen Coombs, Andrew McNamara (eds.) Urban Modernities Research group, Brisbane. London: Continuum (2015) UnDesign. The Un-designability of the Virtual. Design from Problem-solving to Problem-finding. Abstract Drawing on Deleuze (1991) this essay investigates the virtual as what problematizes the possible by inserting contingency in the process of emergence of the new. The tension between the virtual as what is uniquely placed to engender true innovation, and its aleatory and unforeseeable nature mirrors the tension existing in design between form-making and the need to acknowledge contingency. In embracing the un-designability of the virtual design takes contingency and material variability as forces impinging on the process of emergence of the new. I suggest a new model for design research from problem- solving to problem-finding based upon the undesigned at the core of design itself. This points to a further shift: the role of designer from creator to facilitator, teasing form out of the formless, engaged with manifold forces expressed through material variation. Examples from design current engagement with smart and synthetic biomaterials are assessed through this theoretical paradigm. Keywords Virtual, problem, contingency, Deleuze, undesigned, material variability, morphogenesis, smart and synthetic biomaterials. 1 UnDesign. The Un-designability of the Virtual Betti Marenko We are the product of contingent events, material histories, webs and networks of anonymous forces. Robin Mackay 2011 3 Introduction This chapter aims at positioning itself as a speculative proposal for a new theoretical framework in design research based around notions of material morphogenesis and the virtual, as what problematizes the possible by inserting contingency in the process of emergence of the new. -
Truth, Existence, and the Best Explanation Formulate an Inductive, Argujnent for Scientific Realism on the Basis of Empirical Facts
Anthony A. Derksen ism has already been successfully defended.] HarrB's essential and almost disrespectful insight is to have tried to Truth, existence, and the best explanation formulate an inductive, argujnent for scientific realism on the basis of empirical facts. My conclusion was that we do need these empirical facts, and we do need an induqtive argument, but not the direct one HarrB relied on, but the inverse one !based on epistemic relevance of the Normal Thing Peter Lipton and the Rare Event. As long as this style of arguing is used in every-day life, science and philosophy I do not feel too worried that I have not pres- ented a defence of this style of arguing in this paper. 1 Introduction References When Oxford offered me a place to read for the B.Phil. in Philosophy some twenty years ago, the decision to accept seemed obvious. It was only Harre, R. (1961). Thebrie~,and Things. London/New York: Sheed and some time after arrival that I realised what a chance I had taken. Unlike Ward. the other universities to which I had applied, instruction at Oxford is based Had, R. (1970). ~h;Principles of Scientific Thinking. London: almost exclusively on individual supervisions. The tutorial system has Macmillan. obvious advantages, but it is also risky. Unlucky students with supervisors Harr6, R. (1985). 'Theories Families, Plausibility, and the Defense of who were uninterested, uncooperative, or just uninspiring faced fortnight- Modest realism'. In: N. Rescher (ed.), Reason and Rationality in Natu- long stints of solitary work, punctuated by unremunerative tutorials. Many ral Science. -
Psychologism: a Case Study in the Sociology of Philosophical Knowledge/Martin Kusch
PSYCHOLOGISM For most of this century, Western philosophy has been resolutely antinaturalist, and until recently the sharp distinction between the empirical sciences and philosophy seemed almost self-evident: the questions of why they should be separate, and of how they came to be separate, were never asked. These questions are at the heart of Martin Kusch’s groundbreaking study. Antinaturalism rose to dominance in the debate on psychologism among German academic philosophers at the turn of the century. Psychologism, according to received opinion, was decisively refuted by Frege and Husserl. Kusch therefore examines their arguments and, crucially, relates them to the context that shaped that debate and gave those arguments their persuasive force. Drawing on perspectives pioneered by the sociology of scientific knowledge, he reconstructs the dynamics of the psychologism debate; he uncovers its causes and weighs the factors that determined its outcome. What emerges is the fascinating picture of a struggle, between ‘pure’ philosophy and the newly emerging experimental psychology, for academic status, social influence and institutional power. The triumph of antinaturalism, far from being the only logical conclusion, was dependent on historical contingency. Introducing forms of analysis new to the history of philosophy, Psychologism will make fascinating reading for lecturers and students of philosophy, psychology, sociology and cognitive science; it will also stimulate renewed debate on the prospects of antinaturalism at the close of this century. Martin Kusch is Lecturer at the Science Studies Unit of the University of Edinburgh. He is the author of Language as Calculus vs. Language as Universal Medium (1989), and Foucault’s Strata and Fields (1991). -
Lipton a a University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK Available Online: 24 Jun 2010
This article was downloaded by: [University of Chicago] On: 30 December 2011, At: 13:50 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Social Epistemology Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tsep20 Kant on wheels Peter Lipton a a University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK Available online: 24 Jun 2010 To cite this article: Peter Lipton (2003): Kant on wheels, Social Epistemology, 17:2-3, 215-219 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0269172032000144499 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae, and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material. SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY, 2003, VOL. 17, NOS. 2 & 3, 215–219 Kant on wheels* PETER LIPTON At a New York cocktail party shortly after the war, a young and insecure physics postgraduate was heard to blurt out to a woman he had met there: ‘I just want to know what Truth is!’ This was Thomas Kuhn and what he meant was that specific truths such as those of physics mattered less to him than acquiring metaphysical knowledge of the nature of truth. -
Inference to the Best Explanation (Article)
W.H. Newton-Smith (ed) A Companion to the Philosophy of Science (Blackwell, 2000) 184-193. Inference to the Best Explanation PETER LIPTON Science depends on judgments of the bearing of evidence on theory. Scientists must judge whether an observation or the result of an experiment supports, disconfirms, or is simply irrelevant to a given hypothesis. Similarly, scientists may judge that, given all the available evidence, a hypothesis ought to be accepted as correct or nearly so, rejected as false, or neither. Occasionally, these evidential judgements can be make on deductive grounds. If an experimental result strictly contradicts an hypothesis, then the truth of the evidence deductively entails the falsity of the hypothesis. In the great majority of cases, however, the connection between evidence and hypothesis is non-demonstrative or inductive. In particular, this is so whenever a general hypothesis is inferred to be correct on the basis of the available data, since the truth of the data will not deductively entail the truth of the hypothesis. It always remains possible that the hypothesis is false even though the data are correct. One of the central aims of the philosophy of science is to give a principled account of these judgements and inferences connecting evidence to theory. In the deductive case, this project is well-advanced, thanks to a productive stream of research into the structure of deductive argument that stretches back to antiquity. The same cannot be said for inductive inferences. Although some of the central problems were presented incisively by David HUME in the eighteenth century, our current understanding of inductive reasoning remains remarkably poor, in spite of the intense efforts of numerous epistemologists and philosophers of science. -
A Cautious Prometheus? a Few Steps Toward a Philosophy of Design (With Special Attention to Peter Sloterdijk)
A Cautious Prometheus? A Few Steps Toward a Philosophy of Design (with Special Attention to Peter Sloterdijk) Keynote lecture for the Networks of Design* meeting of the Design History Society Falmouth, Cornwall, 3rd September 2008 Bruno Latour, Sciences-Po It came to me at a launching party for a Networks of Design meeting – I was struggling to grasp the extent to which the word “design” has been expanded when we were invited to visit an exhibition called “Re-imagining Cornwall”! I was aware that corporations had to be reengineered, natural ecosystems reclaimed, that cities had to be remodelled and wastelands redeveloped. I knew that neighbourhoods had to be beautified and political platforms scripted, and that interiors had to be redecorated and journal layouts restyled. The Cornwall exhibit confirmed that I was indeed on the right track: if entire provinces can be redesigned then the term no longer has any limit. When I was young, the word design (imported to French from English) meant no more than what we now call “relooking” in French (a good English word that, unfortunately, does not exist in English). To “relook” means to give a new and better “look” or shape to something – a chair, a knife, a car, a package, a lamp, an interior – which would otherwise remain too clumsy, too severe or too bared if it were left only to its naked function. “Design” in this old and limited meaning was a way to redress the efficient but somewhat boring emphasis of engineers and commercial staff. Design occurred by adding a veneer of form to their creations, some superficial feature that could make a difference in taste and fashion.