As the Sole World Superpower and Arguable Global Hegemon, the United States Has Become Increasingly Involved in Nation-Building Efforts Since the End of the Cold War
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The Bush School of Government and Public Service Texas A&M University Capstone Research Project “The Interagency Process in Support & Stability Operations: Integrating and Aligning the Roles and Missions of Military and Civilian Agencies in Conflict and Post-Conflict Environments” By Study Group Members Patrick Baetjer Chris Cline Carlos Hernandorena Brian Polley Kate Rogers Amanda Smith Tyson Voelkel Report Editors Patrick Baetjer Brian Polley Study Director Dr. Joseph R. Cerami Working Papers-please do not reproduce or cite without the written consent of the Study Director, who can be contacted at email: [email protected] or phone: 979-862-8836. Copyright: Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. May 11, 2007 Capstone Research Project “The Interagency Process in Support & Stability Operations: Integrating and Aligning the Roles and Missions of Military and Civilian Agencies in Conflict and Post-Conflict Environments” TABLE OF CONTENTS Foreword 5 I. Executive Summary: Key Findings and Inferences 7 Abstracts 12 II. Selected Case Studies of Counterinsurgency Operations 15 A. The Interagency Process in Reconstruction of Post-WWII Japan 15 Kate Rogers Japan‘s Condition after the War Initial Occupation Policy Organization in Theater Policy in Theater Complications Findings B. US Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan 2003-2006: Obstacles to Interagency Cooperation 43 Carlos Hernandorena Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Development History US PRT Model and Mission Obstacles to Interagency Coordination within US PRTs Recommendations Recent PRT Developments Conclusion C. An Alternative View: Sri Lanka’s Experience with an Enduring Insurgency 82 Patrick Baetjer Sri Lanka: The Legacy of Colonialism The Move Towards Independence, 1900-1948: Societal Fissures Widen Post-Colonial Flashpoints: Disenfranchisement, Misrepresentation, and the Dominance of the Sinhalese 2 The Rise of the Tigers: The Growth of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) The Organization and Operation of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) Major LTTE Attacks and Sri Lankan Counterinsurgency Operations An Opening? The December 2004 Tsunami Major Attacks and Counterinsurgency Operations after the Tsunami Problems with the Sri Lanka‘s Counterinsurgency Efforts Lessons for the US in Support and Stability Operation III. Leadership: Education, Training and Development 128 A. Strategic Communication: Interagency Rhetoric and Consistent Interpretation 128 Amanda Smith Interagency Communication and Decision Processes The United States in Support and Stability Operations: An Historical Perspective Civilian/Military Communication Prior to PDD 56: Lessons from Somalia Communication between Civilian Agencies/Military: The Transfer of Strategic Objectives The Drafting of PDD 56 Key Assumptions and Effort to Limit Military Involvement Focus on Integration and Functional Management Pol-Mil Implementation Plan and Rehearsal NSPD 44: Transformation of Communication PDD 56 v. NSPD 44: A Comparison NSPD 44 and DODD 3000.05 The Way Forward Conclusion B. Counterinsurgency (COIN) Doctrine FM 3-24 and Operation Iraqi Freedom: A Bottom-Up Review 170 Tyson Voelkel Military Strategy and Counterinsurgency Warfare Operation Clean Sweep: 82nd Airborne Division: Best Intentions Gone Bad 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division: Operation Build Democracy: City Councils of al Shurta and al Risala, Baghdad Comparing COIN to 2nd Brigade 82nd Airborne Division Tactical Actions in OIF I COIN as a Panacea for Irregular War Conclusion C. Leadership Education and Training for the Interagency 211 Brian Polley Defining Leadership Training Leaders for Interagency Cooperation Model Practices in Leadership Development 3 Applying the Knowledge to the Interagency Process Conclusion D. The Influence of Stability Operations on the Army Profession and Public Management 244 Chris Cline The Army Profession 2003 Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) Officer Study Report The Role of the Public Manager Implications of DoD Directive 3000 and NSPD-44 The Army Profession and Stability Operations Required Knowledge and Skills Thinking Like a Strategic Leader The Importance of Language and Cross-cultural Savvy Implications of Stability Operations and Considerations Redefining a Culture? NSPD-44 and Army Expertise The Army Taking the Lead Findings, Recommendations and Conclusion IV. Acronyms and Abbreviations 281 V. Bibliography 282 VI. Author Biographies 293 VII. About the Bush School 295 4 Foreword This report is the product of a semester-long graduate Capstone course in the Bush School of Government‘s Masters Program in International Affairs. The course provides a research experience for students in the final semester of the two-year program, as they operate in teams to address an important policy issue (under the direction of a faculty member) and in support of a client. Students draw on the coursework and experiences of their Bush School education to develop specific recommendations for design, implementation and evaluation of this project task for the government client. The client for this project is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations. The project title is ―The Interagency Process in Support & Stability Operations: Integrating and Aligning the Roles and Missions of Military and Civilian Agencies in Conflict and Post-Conflict Environments.‖ This study addressed the topic by focusing originally on ways to provide insights on five key questions:1 1. What are the military and US government agencies roles and missions in stabilization and reconstruction efforts in counterinsurgency warfare (historical background from case studies)? 2. What are the recommended ways to improve leadership (for integrating and aligning roles and missions) in the interagency coordination of military-civilian operations? 3. What are the military and civilian leadership functions, or skill sets, for conflict and post conflict environments? 4. How should military and civilian agencies develop those leadership skills needed in short term and the long term? 5. Does the U.S. government have a means for rating the effectiveness of civil-military coordination? Military veterans of Iraq note that they were not fully prepared with the skills needed for support and stability operations, especially cultural and linguistic skills. In the case of the Army, some believe that the military is adapting fairly rapidly to the demands of counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan and starting to internalize those lessons. The Department of Defense and National Security Council have published directives on counterinsurgency operations that propose an important role for the military in post-conflict reconstruction and support and stability operations. A newly published field manual on counterinsurgency is a sign that the Army and Marine Corps are internalizing and institutionalizing these directives and their learning from wartime operations. Many with experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, however, note that the ―interagency process‖ for coordinating the efforts of military and other U.S. government agencies is inadequate. In sum, what knowledge is there regarding the development of the current constructs delineating the civilian and military roles and missions in support and stability 1 These research questions are adapted from a Creative Associates International, Inc. conference panel and report on ―Stabilization and Reconstruction: Closing the Civilian-Military Gap,‖ held in Washington, DC on June 20, 2006. The conference co-sponsors were the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies of the National Defense University, the Bush School of Government and Public Service, and the Triangle Institute of Security Studies. The questions were refined after discussions with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations. 5 operations? What recommendations are feasible, acceptable and affordable for improving interagency operations as well as the functioning of U.S. government civilian and military agencies? The following papers address these questions. Each section includes research findings, inferences, and recommendations for improving interagency operations in counterinsurgency warfare. These papers reflect the views of the study group‘s individual authors and do not claim to represent the views of any government agency, the Bush School, or Texas A&M University. Dr. Joseph R. Cerami Study Director 6 I. Executive Summary: Key Findings and Inferences Note: the following compilation of ideas and insights are based on a Bush School Capstone seminar, 5/3/2007. Detailed treatments of the questions below are found in the papers below. 1. What are the military and US government agencies roles and missions in stabilization and reconstruction efforts in counterinsurgency warfare (historical background from case studies)? The record from this research reflects varying degrees of agency roles and missions in stabilization and reconstruction. There was no evidence in the cases examined that once the hot war ended there was an immediate transition to civilian leadership and control of post- conflict support, reconstruction, or institution building. For instance, in post World War II Japan, the military ran operations for seven years in a hierarchical structure headed by General Douglas MacArthur. Some thinking about a transition to civilian control was discarded after early successes became institutionalized.