Holdups and Overinvestment in Capital Markets"
Holdups and Overinvestment in Capital Markets André Kurmann Federal Reserve Board February 10, 2012 Abstract This paper analyzes the problem of …rms that need to make investment decisions in capi- tal markets characterized by trading frictions and ex-post bargaining. Trading frictions make switching from one capital supplier to another costly, thus implying that the match between …rms and suppliers generates surplus. Ex-post bargaining implies that suppliers can appro- priate part of this surplus. Firms react strategically to the resulting holdup problem by overinvesting so as to reduce their marginal productivity and thus the negotiated price of cap- ital. In a multifactor setting, the holdup problem in capital markets interacts with holdup problems in labor markets that typically lead to underinvestment and overemployment. This presents …rms with a trade-o¤ that has non-trivial equilibrium e¤ects and that – depending on the substitutability of capital and labor and the …rm’s bargaining power in each market – can neutralize or exacerbate the distortionary e¤ects each of the holdup problems has on its own. Keywords: Holdup problems, Trading frictions, Bargaining, Investment. JEL Codes: D23, D24, E22, The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily represent the views of the Federal Reserve System or the Federal Open Market Committee. I thank Randy Wright for encouraging me to explore the topic and Stan Rabinovich for outstanding research assistance. I also thank three anonymous referees, David Arseneau, Gabriele Camera, Sanjay Chugh, Guido Menzio, Adriano Rampini, Michael Reiter, Eric Smith, Etienne Wasmer as well as seminar participants at CERGE-EI, the University of Maryland, Wharton, the SED, the Vienna Macro workshop, the CMSG and the Federal Reserve Banks of Atlanta, Cleveland, Philadelphia and St.
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