China's Air Defense Identification System

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

China's Air Defense Identification System China’s Air Defense Identification System: The Role of PLA Air Surveillance BY MARK STOKES n the wake of the 18th Central Committee's Taiwan as an Indirect Political Target? Third Plenum in November 2013, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) Ministry of The PLA has a history of using airpower I as an instrument of coercive persuasion against National Defense (MND) announced the establishment of its first air defense Taiwan. The PLAAF began flights over the identification zone (ADIZ). The announcement Taiwan Strait in 1996, and extended operations 3 outlined procedures for aircrafts flying within to the centerline in 1999. Public discussion the ADIZ boundaries off China’s eastern coast. regarding establishment of an ADIZ system Citing PRC national defense and civil aviation began at least as early as 2007. At that time, laws, an MND spokesman added “this airspace, Taiwan’s China Times, citing Republic of China demarcated outside the territorial airspace, (ROC; or Taiwan) MND sources, reported allows a country to identify, monitor, control and deliberations underway in China regarding dispose of entering aircraft. It sets aside time for establishment of an ADIZ over the Taiwan Strait. early warning and helps defend the country's Also addressed was a PRC initiative to open a airspace.” He further noted that, “China will new commercial air route along the centerline of establish other air defense identification zones the Taiwan Strait that could hinder ROC Air 4 at an appropriate time after completing Force training and “squeeze” Taiwan’s airspace. preparations.”1 The announcement naturally heightened …other potential drivers may offer tensions within the region. Highlighting the additional context for the [ADIZ] decision. confrontational nature of the ADIZ, which Among these include coercion of Taiwan, extends over disputed territories with Japan, unprecedented changes in China's Secretary of State John Kerry stated “this national airspace management system, unilateral action constitutes an attempt to and technical advances that have change the status quo in the East China Sea.” He enhanced interoperability between the further noted that the United States “doesn’t People’s Liberation Army Air Force support efforts by any State to apply its ADIZ (PLAAF) and Navy (PLAN). procedures to foreign aircraft not intending to enter its national airspace.”2 Assessments of the ADIZ to date have During a subsequent discussion focused in large part on implications for broadcast on Phoenix TV, Chinese commentators territorial and maritime disputes in region. debated the nature and extent of an ADIZ over However, other potential drivers may offer Taiwan. One retired PLA general questioned the additional context for the decision. Among these necessity of a dedicated zone over the Strait include coercion of Taiwan, unprecedented since an announced ADIZ concerns international changes in China's national airspace airspace, and the “Taiwan problem” is an management system, and technical advances internal issue. However, he argued that an ADIZ that have enhanced interoperability between the should be established over the entire “first island People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and chain” and extend over the South China Sea. In Navy (PLAN). response to a question regarding the potential “squeezing” effect that an ADIZ could have on Mark Stokes is Executive Director of the Project 2049 Institute. This piece was originally published in Thinking Taiwan on May 5, 2014. China’s Air Defense Identification System | 1 STOKES I FUTUREGRAM 14-003 Taiwan, another commentator opined that an November 2013 ADIZ announcement coincided ADIZ would be effective in coercing Taiwan only with another significant PLA announcement if the boundaries extended to well east of the regarding national airspace management. The island.5 For the PRC, diminishing Taiwan’s air PLA has long operated under the principle of space would play into its strategic objectives and “integrated air traffic control and air defense” claims over disputed territories in the region. (空管空防一体化).7 On November 25, 2013, a Shortly after the inauguration of senior GSD Operations Department officer President Ma Ying-jeou in May 2008, Xinhua announced the PRC’s first codification of civil- published an editorial calling for establishment military lines of authority and partial ceding of of air defense identification zones, indicating the PLA military control over low altitude airspace continuation of the PRC’s deliberations over an to civilian authorities. Intended to boost the eventual establishment of an ADIZ. The editorial aviation market, including the purchase and use argued that “if we establish air defense of private jets, the announcement culminated identification zones, the entire Taiwan Strait will years of frustration over economic costs be under our control, and the East and South associated with inefficiencies in air traffic China Sea problems will be easier to resolve.” control.8 The editorial also cited shortcomings in air At the national level, airspace surveillance coordination and highlighted the management policy is under the purview of a need for the Navy and Air Force to work more vice premier and the State Air Traffic Control closely together.6 Commission (SATCC).9 Although nominally under State Council control and with the PLA Concessions on National Airspace participation of the Civil Aviation Administration Management of China (CAAC), the SATCC Office that manages daily airspace management affairs resides within Taiwan may have been an original target the GSD Operations Department.10 The same PLA of the PLA’s ADIZ-related coercion. But the department also is responsible for strategic Figure 1: Radars of Greater Shanghai Area Air Traffic China’s Air Defense Identification System | 2 STOKES I FUTUREGRAM 14-003 planning to support joint air defense operations, flight plans submitted by civil aviation and presumably would have staffed the ADIZ authorities.14 Improvements are necessary in decision for the Chinese Communist Party order for China’s aviation sector to meet the Central Committee Politburo Standing ambitious goals set by the 12th Five Year Plan, Committee.11 specifically a 13 percent annual growth in air A similar structure exists for regional traffic, with a particular focus on low altitude airspace management. Within the East China flights. One PLA Daily article published in region, the PLA Nanjing Military Region’s November 2013 explicitly linked air defense airspace management coordination commission with low altitude air traffic control policies. consists of members from the Nanjing Military Establishment of an ADIZ could be viewed as an Region Operations Department, Nanjing Military offset for the PLA concession to China’s civil Region Air Force, Air Force Shanghai Base (a aviation community on national airspace corps deputy leader-grade air defense management.15 command), PLAAF 26th Air Division (conducts airborne early warning missions), East Sea Fleet Technical Advances in PLA Air Surveillance Naval Air Force, CAAC’s East China Air Traffic Management Bureau, and various city Beyond sovereignty and territorial authorities.12 The PLAAF – presumably the Air interests and policy changes in civil-military Force Shanghai Base (空军上海基地) – has national airspace management, the ADIZ approval authority for all aircraft flying into or announcement culminated years of PLA out of PRC territorial airspace.13 investment into improved joint air surveillance. Controlling more than 80% of China’s The relevance of radar and other sensors can be airspace, the PLAAF has been the target of illustrated through use of the term air defense civilian criticism for its inefficiency in approving identification zone. Cooperative aircraft, such as Figure 2: PLAAF Third Radar Brigade Sijiaoshan Site China’s Air Defense Identification System | 3 STOKES I FUTUREGRAM 14-003 commercial flights, identify themselves to of PLA investment into improved joint air civilian and military air traffic managers through surveillance. filing of flight plans and use of transponders. PLA air surveillance operators who track non- cooperative aircraft within their assigned zone The PLA has made significant advances rely on radar and signals intelligence (SIGINT). in its joint air surveillance system. In the past, An aircraft flying in an ADIZ may be identified as the PLAAF and PLAN appeared to divide air a possible threat, potentially leading to defense responsibilities, with the Navy interception by PLAAF or PLAN fighters. responsible for defense of major naval bases (eg., East and South Sea Fleet homeports).16 Since at Beyond sovereignty and territorial least 2006, authoritative media outlets have interests and policy changes in civil- indicated that the PLAAF has been granted military national airspace management, responsibility for developing and fielding a new the ADIZ announcement culminated years automated joint air surveillance system. The system relies on a network of sensors that Figure 3: PRC Radar Surveillance Infrastructure and the East China Sea ADIZ China’s Air Defense Identification System | 4 STOKES I FUTUREGRAM 14-003 provides data to centralized air command and ground-based air defenses, and electronic control centers.17 countermeasure units. A common tactical Brigade (or regimental)-level radar units picture may also be shared with other corps- are responsible for coverage of defined sectors level commands within and across military of airspace. The Air Force Shanghai Base is likely regions
Recommended publications
  • The Long Shadow of Chinese Censorship: How the Communist Party’S Media Restrictions Affect News Outlets Around the World
    The Long Shadow of Chinese Censorship: How the Communist Party’s Media Restrictions Affect News Outlets Around the World A Report to the Center for International Media Assistance By Sarah Cook October 22, 2013 The Center for International Media Assistance (CIMA), at the National Endowment for Democracy, works to strengthen the support, raise the visibility, and improve the effectiveness of independent media development throughout the world. The Center provides information, builds networks, conducts research, and highlights the indispensable role independent media play in the creation and development of sustainable democracies. An important aspect of CIMA’s work is to research ways to attract additional U.S. private sector interest in and support for international media development. CIMA convenes working groups, discussions, and panels on a variety of topics in the field of media development and assistance. The center also issues reports and recommendations based on working group discussions and other investigations. These reports aim to provide policymakers, as well as donors and practitioners, with ideas for bolstering the effectiveness of media assistance. Don Podesta Interim Senior Director Center for International Media Assistance National Endowment for Democracy 1025 F Street, N.W., 8th Floor Washington, DC 20004 Phone: (202) 378-9700 Fax: (202) 378-9407 Email: [email protected] URL: http://cima.ned.org Design and Layout by Valerie Popper About the Author Sarah Cook Sarah Cook is a senior research analyst for East Asia at Freedom House. She manages the editorial team producing the China Media Bulletin, a biweekly news digest of media freedom developments related to the People’s Republic of China.
    [Show full text]
  • Media Kit 2021
    MEDIA KIT 2021 1 SCMP Advertising’s mission is to help brands and partners SCMP Lighthouse to support our clients with purposeful make an impact with readers who want to understand intelligence that delivers more effective and efficient global issues from an Asian perspective. Its principal focus campaigns with better-targeted audiences. At the same is to deliver effective and efficient marketing solutions time, brand safety is a top priority for us and partners can that engage and activate the right audiences and deliver continue to trust our platform with our publisher-built ROI that matters. brand suitability tool in SCMP Signal. Bringing our news business forward into the digital age has We have a well-established foundation of award-winning advanced our mission to lead the global conversation about expertise and creative experience in Morning Studio that China while broadening our international relevance and bridge our clients to success with bespoke global reach. Through our award-winning journalism, we brand-storytelling solutions. The team is committed to cover China and Asia with depth and unparalleled nuance give voice to your brand and take its unique narrative to for nearly 51 million monthly readers globally. What sets us new heights by connecting with audiences through apart is how we connect thought-leading editorial industry-leading digital tools and services. content with brands across print and digital media platforms, develop marketing solutions and run campaigns Our team operates with a conviction to pave new ways for that deliver results. brands to drive growth and ROI in the digital age of news publishing.
    [Show full text]
  • China's Quest for Global Primacy: an Analysis of Chinese International
    C O R P O R A T I O N TIMOTHY R. HEATH, DEREK GROSSMAN, ASHA CLARK China’s Quest for Global Primacy An Analysis of Chinese International and Defense Strategies to Outcompete the United States For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RRA447-1 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-1-9774-0615-6 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2021 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Cover images: prospective56/iStock/ Getty Images Plus; MF3d/iStock/Getty Images Plus Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface This research explores possible international and defense strategies that China might employ to outcompete the United States and achieve a position of international primacy.
    [Show full text]
  • Beijing's Visible Hand
    China Perspectives 2012/2 | 2012 Mao Today: A Political Icon for an Age of Prosperity Beijing’s Visible Hand Power struggles and media meddling in the Hong Kong chief executive election Karita Kan Electronic version URL: http://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/5896 DOI: 10.4000/chinaperspectives.5896 ISSN: 1996-4617 Publisher Centre d'étude français sur la Chine contemporaine Printed version Date of publication: 4 June 2012 Number of pages: 81-84 ISSN: 2070-3449 Electronic reference Karita Kan, « Beijing’s Visible Hand », China Perspectives [Online], 2012/2 | 2012, Online since 30 June 2012, connection on 15 September 2020. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/ 5896 © All rights reserved Current affairs China perspectives Beijing’s Visible Hand Power struggles and political interventions in the 2012 Hong Kong chief executive election KARITA KAN ong Kong’s next chief executive was revealed on 25 March 2012, reignited frenzied probes into Tang’s extra-marital affairs and added fuel to when the 1,193-member election committee, made up largely of incriminating remarks about his dishonesty, infidelity, and “emotional fault” Hbusiness leaders, professionals, and influential persons loyal to Bei - (ganqing queshi 感情缺失 ). jing, voted in majority for Leung Chun-ying. Leung defeated his main op - Commentator Willy Lam Wo-lap and Open University computing profes - ponent, former chief secretary for administration Henry Tang Ying-yen, by sor Li Tak-shing both raised the alarm that these “black materials” ( hei cailiao garnering 689 votes over the 285 that Tang received. The third candidate, 黑材料 ) might in fact have come from national security and intelligence Democratic Party chairman Albert Ho Chun-yan, secured only 76 votes.
    [Show full text]
  • Post-Corona China: IEG Research Report Vol. 2 | Q1 2020
    CHINA RESEARCH Vol. 2/ Q1 2020 Post-Corona China - Resilient, Strong & Adaptive M&A | Financing | Principal Investments Berlin (HQ) Shanghai | Mumbai | Bengaluru | New York City | Istanbul | Tunis Table of Content CHAPTER 1 Welcome, China 2.0 3 CHAPTER 2 Tech vs. Virus 4 CHAPTER 3 Europe – Collateral Damage? 6 CHAPTER 4 China’s New Focus Abroad 7 CHAPTER 5 What Else is New? 9 CONTACT & DISCLAIMER 10 Welcome, China 2.0 IMPACT OF CORONAVIRUS ON GLOBAL ECONOMY ORIGINATING IN CHINA, THE CORONAVIRUS HAS SPREAD OUT and turned into a global topic – not just regarding growing numbers of daily new infections but also regarding the impact on the world economy. At the end of February, the Coronavirus and its fallout led to a loss of USD 1.7tn on the US stock markets in only two days.1 Finishing on Friday, February 28th, Europe has experienced a historic week of losses: Britain’s FTSE 100 lost 3.7%, France’s CAC 40 index was down 4%, Germany’s DAX fell 4.5% and global stocks are set for their worst week since the financial crisis in 2008.2 The impact of the Coronavirus affects the global supply chain as well as most of the consumer markets.3 However, the outlook is not irreversible as we can already see in China. The outbreak of the Coronavirus in early January this year has been hitting China's economy hard, but this is likely to be only temporary. “The economic impact will be temporary and will not change the positive foundations of China’s economy” Lian Weiliang, Deputy Director of the National Development and Reform Commission4 CHINA WILL BECOME MORE RESILIENT & REINVENT ITSELF DUE TO THE TEMPORARY CLOSING of businesses, factories and manufacturing sites to prevent a further spread of the Coronavirus, we see an impact on nearly all industries; some of which will not be able to recover or even disappear.
    [Show full text]
  • How China's Government, Businesses, and Populace
    Behind the Great Firewall: How China’s Government, Businesses, and Populace Compete to Shape the Chinese Internet An STS Research Paper presented to the faculty of the School of Engineering and Applied Science University of Virginia by James Houghton May 5, 2020 On my honor as a University student, I have neither given nor received unauthorized aid on this assignment as defined by the Honor Guidelines for Thesis-Related Assignments. Signed: _________________________________________________ Approved: ____________________________________________ Date _______________________ Peter Norton, Department of Engineering and Society 1 Behind the Great Firewall: How China’s Government, Businesses, and Populace Compete to Shape the Chinese Internet Introduction Chinese citizens are subject to some of the strictest censorship in the world. The Chinese government blocks nearly all of Google’s services, Facebook, Twitter, and even some academic journals. Even today, political expression is limited, and whistleblowers are silenced (Griffiths, 2020). Although many in China remain complacent due to highly integrated applications like WeChat, a small minority is vocal about combating censorship. The relationship between Chinese authorities and web users is complex and requires investigation. The Communist Party of China (CPC) has built what is now called the Great Firewall of China (GFW), a web traffic monitoring and censorship system. The CPC routinely uses it to scan for and block content it deems sensitive or inappropriate (Zheng, 2017). Although some people working in academia and business may have methods, by exemption or otherwise, of bypassing some of the GFW restrictions, the CPC has plugged many of its holes in recent years, impeding research and business opportunities. However, nearly all Chinese web users including students do not seek to access the uncensored web, and many businesses thrive with the lack of much foreign intervention.
    [Show full text]
  • Political and Social Trust in China
    Political and Social Trust in China Can technology help restore trust in China? Nina Ludviksen Thorsen Master’s Thesis in Chinese Society and Politics KIN4593 (30 credits) Department of Culture Studies and Oriental Languages UNIVERSITY OF OSLO Spring 2020 Abstract Political and social trust in a country is essential to legitimate a regime and for stability in society. This thesis will assume that there is a connection between political and social trust. The state plays an important role in creating values for the citizens and society, to maintain social trust, for instance trustworthiness. Also, whether citizens trust each other is strongly influenced by whether they trust the government that they share or not. Authoritarian China has experienced a high level of political trust, but due to, for instance, food safety scandals and what some has argued is a shift to a “society of strangers” has resulted in a gripping fear of declining social and political trust. The Chinese government has an ambitious plan to use the power of data to change the way it governs, and it has invested in information and communication technology in the hope of restoring political and social trust, and creating a trustworthy society. This thesis examines three systems that the CCP has introduced to the Chinese society: Cameras with facial recognition technology, the Social Credit System and the political propaganda app Xuexi Qiangguo app. Through observations, three individual semi-structured interviews and eleven unstructured interviews, this thesis examined how citizens perceived these technological systems and how increased surveillance may affect the citizens in China. My research suggests that the information about these systems is widely known and that most people are acting as if they are being watched and rated on their behavior.
    [Show full text]
  • Cross-Border Education for Pupils of Kindergartens and Schools: the Case of Hong Kong
    The International Education Journal: Comparative Perspectives Vol. 17, No. 3, 2018, pp. 93-107 https://openjournals.library.sydney.edu.au/index.php/IEJ Cross-border education for pupils of kindergartens and schools: The case of Hong Kong Philip Wing Keung Chan Faculty of Education, Monash University, Australia: [email protected] Cross-border education is defined as the movement of people, knowledge, programs, providers, and curriculums across national or regional jurisdictional borders. Each year, millions of students access better education by crossing their national borders from less developed or newly-industrialized countries to Western, industrialised countries. Most are tertiary education students but the numbers engaged in secondary, primary, and pre-school education are also significant. Under the implementation of “one country two systems” in Hong Kong after the transition of sovereignty from Britain to China in 1997, and a decision of a case in The Court of Final Appeal of Hong Kong in 2011, babies born in Hong Kong to mainland Chinese parents are entitled to the right of abode in Hong Kong. Since then, tens of thousands of such births have occurred. More than 20,000 cross-border students travel from China to attend public schools in Hong Kong every day. This paper explores equality issues faced by these students. The paper evaluates the results of various stakeholders working together to solve important issues; for example, dedicated school zones, immigration clearance services, setting up Hong Kong classes in Chinese schools, and language, communication, and cultural support. The paper argues that inequality is prevalent. Keywords: Cross-border education; educational equality; school education INTRODUCTION International and cross-border student mobility is not a new phenomenon.
    [Show full text]
  • HAVAS CHINA Monthly Market Update
    COVID-19 EDITION #5 Havas Group China 1 April 28th 2020 In this edition 1. COVID-19 situation update 2. Immediate consumption impact 3. Media consumption impact 4. Economic outlook 5. Outlook for key categories 6. Media market implications 7. POV & recommendation 2 More daily life positive picture, this one would have been for the peak not for now COVID-19 situation update 3 Everyday step by step Chinese are discovering and shaping the new normality, different than expected 50%+ 900M Top 1 43% traffic in 77% of Chinese are planning for concern of Chinese is: are optimistic in the recovered stores May 1 holiday traveling not knowing how long it will last China’s economic fast recovery Week of Apr 6th, 2020 Apr 22nd , 2020 Mar 30th, 2020 Mar 30th, 2020 Sources: CHINA COMMERCE ASSOCIATION FOR GENERAL MERCHANDISE , Tencent news, McKinsey 4 Chinese are discovering and shaping the new normality • With continuing imported cases, local infections slightly go up again, but within small scale and certain areas (Beijing, Heilongjiang, Guangzhou, etc.). Until Apr 26st , the national existing infected cases dropped to 801 from the peak ~60,000 in Mid-February, 15 provinces have reported 0 cases. • Chinese are getting used to a new normality. Less worrying about the virus, start to enjoy daily life again but in the meantime doing everything they can for protection. Wearing masks, washing hands, and keeping social distance have become the daily must. • Until mid Apr, China was to 90%-95% back to work - supermarket 96%, farmer’s market 97%, shopping malls 90%. 77% of stores recovered 50%+ traffic in the week of Apr 6, 16% increase vs.
    [Show full text]
  • China Media Bulletin
    CHINA MEDIA BULLETIN A weekly update of press freedom and censorship news related to the People’s Republic of China Issue No. 50: March 15, 2012 Headlines State media follow officials’ lead in covering Bo Xilai’s downfall New law regulates secret detentions State media revive Mao-era propaganda hero China suspected in Facebook-based NATO spying Carnegie Mellon unveils study of microblog deletions BROADCAST / PRINT MEDIA NEWS State media follow officials’ lead in covering Bo Xilai’s downfall In the week leading up to the dramatic March 15 removal of Bo Xilai as the Communist Party chief of Chongqing, Chinese state media began to provide more coverage of the controversy that had surrounded the ambitious Politburo member since one of his subordinates, Wang Lijun, briefly sought refuge in a U.S. consulate in early February (see CMB No. 47). Nevertheless, Chinese outlets continued to trail behind Hong Kong, foreign, and exile media, as well as the blogosphere, in their reporting. Throughout February and into early March, state-run media and Chinese officialdom were conspicuously silent on the story. On March 2, even as a spokesman for the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference—a state advisory body that was preparing to hold its annual session concurrently with a similar session of the National People’s Congress (NPC), the rubber- stamp legislature—made the first official admission that Wang was under investigation, the English- language channel of state-run China Central Television turned its broadcast away to an anchor conducting an interview with a pundit. On March 6, Chongqing’s mayor chose Hong Kong–based Phoenix TV for an interview in which he confirmed having traveled to the U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Rail and the Effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic
    Rail and the Effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic A white paper about how rail is affected during the Covid-19 pandemic and what we can learn from it 1 The Covid-19 pandemic is substantially Ensuring affecting passenger rail traffic, in a short-term perspective with large decrease in traffic. However, it will also have long-term effects. Competitiveness Once the pandemic is over, we can expect changes in travel behaviours, but also new in Rail routines and technology that will continue to be used. Design of both trains and services During and Post will look different. The global nature of the pandemic makes a global outlook highly relevant. Learning from others will be crucial to Pandemic strengthen rail traffic today and in the future. With this white paper, we want to inspire development by learning from others. However, the implementation in other regions of some of the examples presented might be impossible due, in part, to personal integrity reasons. This report focuses on rail passenger traffic: it includes both long-distance passenger rail as well as metro, tram and light rail. The white paper is produced by WSP Sweden Rail Advisory. Investigative research has been carried out in cooperation with WSP India. WSP Rail Advisory strive to strengthen the competitiveness of the rail sector, and this white paper is a contribution in this quest. WSP Rail Advisory strive to strengthen the competitiveness of the rail sector and this white paper is a contribution in this quest. ULF Larsson Head of WSP Rail Advisory 2 Decrease of travels with public transportation in urban areas.
    [Show full text]
  • Fast-Forward China: How COVID-19 Is Accelerating Five Key Trends Shaping the Chinese Economy
    Fast forward China: How COVID-19 is accelerating 5 key trends shaping the Chinese economy Nick Leung, Joe Ngai, Jeongmin Seong, Jonathan Woetzel May 2020 Over the last few months, COVID-19 has spread across the world, uniting humanity in a shared experience that has highlighted the vulnerability of our societies. As the first country to grapple with the crisis, China has been on the frontlines both of post-COVID-19 economic recovery, and of the societal changes the pandemic has precipitated. Efforts to stabilize the domestic economy are already well underway, and though China’s first-quarter gross domestic product declined 6.8 percent over the previous year, according to government statistics, our simulations suggest that economic activity may have bottomed out in the first quarter.1 As that recovery takes shape, several important shifts in the make-up of China’s economic landscape have already become apparent. COVID-19 has accelerated pre-existing trends, ushering in the arrival of a future we were likely already on track to realize. In this report, we discuss five trends shaping the Chinese economy that have been accelerated, or “fast forwarded,” as a result of the onset of the COVID-19 crisis (Exhibit 1). Web 2020 Fast forward China ExhibitExhibit 1 1 of 6 FiveFive accelerating accelerating trends trends in China in Chinasince COVID-19 since COVID-19 Observations from China 1 2 3 4 5 Digitization Declining global Rising competitive Consumers come Private and social Digital tools become exposure intensity of age sectors step up increasingly popular Rising importance Technology and Consumers The private sector solutions, expanding of domestic markets, agility drive winners (especially the young) plays a stronger from B2C to B2B.
    [Show full text]