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Crerar and the Decision to Garrison Hong Kong Canadian Military History Volume 3 Issue 1 Article 12 1994 Crerar and the Decision to Garrison Hong Kong Paul Dickson Wilfrid Laurier University Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh Recommended Citation Dickson, Paul "Crerar and the Decision to Garrison Hong Kong." Canadian Military History 3, 1 (1994) This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Dickson: Crerar and the Decision to Garrison Hong Kong Crerar and the Decision to Garrison Hong Kong Paul Dickson "Always remember that events now long in the past were once in the future." F. W. Maitland crimonious and often virulent debate Despite criticisms based on the A surrounds examinations ofthe Canadian unforgiving perspective provided by hindsight, expeditionary force dispatched to Hong Kong Harry Crerar's role in these decisions has in the fall of 1941. The tragic fate of the Royal been subject to only limited scrutiny. A Rifles of Canada and the Winnipeg Grenadiers closer examination of Crerar's background in the battle for Hong Kong and their and training reveals a carefully constructed horrendous treatment at the hands of the logic in his approach. Placing the decision Japanese following the surrender of the within the framework of Crerar's training and garrison has polarized opinion. Generally, education suggests that the three most historical treatment has ranged from C.P. important elements in his evaluation were a Stacey's and J .L. Granatstein's considered reasoned analysis of the contemporary assessments of the contemporary difficulties strategic situation in the Far East, his long­ facing the political and military leaders to the term objectives for the army, and the reality Valour and the Horror's and Carl Vincent's of the state of the army's training. accusations of negligence among Canada's political and military leadership. 1 * * * * * Major-General H.D.G. "Harry" Crerar rerar had a broad familiarity with the was the Chief of the General Staff, the C political and strategic circumstances of government's chief military advisor and senior Britain's Far Eastern possessions. His army officer, when the British telegram Permanent Force career dated from 1920 and requesting "one or two" Canadian battalions international affairs were prominent among for Hong Kong was received. [See telegram on his interests. Dedicated and ambitious, he page 100.] "[The] Canadian Army," advised held a number of senior staff positions on the Crerar after several days of deliberation with General Staff in the interwar period that his political masters, "should definitely take required a constant analysis of Canada's this on." The accepted historical perception political and strategic position within the has been that his strategic counsel was made Commonwealth and the world. Similarly, the in ignorance of the conditions of the situation interwar educational path that marked him in the Far East. Questions subsequently for higher command brought the specifics of raised on the state of training of the two the Far Eastern strategic situation, and that battalions chosen for the expedition further of Hong Kong in particular, under his purview. enhanced the belief that Crerar's actions were hasty and ill-considered. 97 Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1994 1 Canadian Military History, Vol. 3 [1994], Iss. 1, Art. 12 An attack on Hong Kong and the officers and civilians in the strategic dilemmas implications of an Anglo-Japanese conflict facing Britain as well as to facilitate co­ were prominent imperial defence scenarios operation between the government that served as staff exercises at both of the departments and branches of service involved institutional cornerstones of the Canadian in modern war. army's professional education system- the British Staff College at Camberley and the The third syndicate wargame, in which Imperial Defence College (I DC). Crerar all students participated, was an elaborate attended the Staff College from 1922-24. Like exercise in which the two syndicates, over a his contemporaries, Vice Chief of the General period of eight weeks, examined the relative Staff Major-General Ken Stuart and Assistant political, military and economic strengths Chief of the General Staff Brigadier Maurice and potential of the Japanese and British Pope, Crerar examined Hong Kong as a case Empires from both perspectives. "Exercise study. Ironically, he did not refer to this in No.3," as it was blandly called, reflected the his testimony to the Royal Commission or in 1934 reality of an increasingly aggressive any subsequent recollections. 2 This was likely Japanese policy towards China and Japan's due to the fact that in the early 1920s Hong growing estrangement from the western Kong's position as a strategic bastion was nations. The exercise created a fictional altered as the British reassessed their military scenario set in 1936 in which the Japanese relationship with the Japanese and their naval were forced, through domestic, political and position in the Far East. The decision in June economic pressures created by international 1921 to fortifY Singapore as the main British censure and sanctions, to expand their naval base and the restrictions of the possessions in China and increase pressure Washington Naval Treaty of 1921 forbidding on British colonies in the Far East. This, the Pacific powers from upgrading the according to the scenario, resulted in the defences of their naval bases in the western steady deterioration of relations between the Pacific relegated Hong Kong to secondary British Empire and Japan. It was remarkable status in the British imperial defence scheme how closely the exercise mirrored the actual for the Far East, not least because the development of events through to 1941.5 Standing Defence Sub-Committee of the British Cabinet recognized the garrison's An examination of the defence of Hong vulnerability to a landward assault. The Kong from both an operational and strategic strategic position of the outpost was further perspective was undertaken by the 1934 altered by the establishment of a "period of syndicate members as a necessary element of relief' as an accepted strategic reality in the larger exercise. The assessment, as planning for the defence of British possessions reflected in the 40-page appendix and Crerar's in the Far East. It was, in fact, a recognition personal notes, included a comprehensive of Britain's inability in the 1920s to maintain assessment of the defensive requirements of a two-ocean navy. 3 the garrison and its ability to hold out prior to the arrival of the British Main Fleet, the More influential in Crerar's assessment requisite "period before relief." Hong Kong's of the Far Eastern situation was his precarious position was fully recognized. The examination of Hong Kong in the context of report concluded that "in the final event the imperial strategy when he attended the security of Hong Kong rested with the British Imperial Defence College in 1934. A senior Main Fleet." Further, it was observed that the staff school designed to groom candidates for existing garrison of three battalions was important roles in the strategic and military "inadequate to provide the required degree of planning institutions of Commonwealth security," particularly if its air and ground governments, the IDC was established to forces were left unreinforced and the British correct the perceived inadequacies in strategic Empire was fighting alone, to ensure that the vision that emerged during the First World Main Fleet had time to relieve the garrison. War. 4 A series of exercises, entitled "syndicate The final conclusion with regards to Hong wargames," were used to educate the senior Kong, however, was that "the risks involved 98 https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol3/iss1/12 2 Dickson: Crerar and the Decision to Garrison Hong Kong owing to the weakness of the defences of the base are unjustifiable in view of the serious issues at stake." The "issues" were defined as the necessity of retaining Hong Kong as a forward base of operations to exert pressure on the Japanese and to maintain British prestige in the area. 6 This latter point was particularly important for it revealed the context in which the defence of Hong Kong would continue to be viewed up to the moment of the Japanese attack: a naval base designed to preserve British power, its real fate was determined by Britain's ability to project, or at least present the image that it could project, that power. While all were involved in drafting the final reports, Crerar's notes indicate that he was well aware of the requisite period of relief and vulnerability of the garrison. 7 During the exercise Crerar wrote an appreciation of the course of a Pacific war from the point of view of "a very Senior Staff Officer in the Japanese Lieutenant-General H.D.G. Crerar, CB, DSO From an oil painting by T.R. MacDonald, June 1944 Army." From this position, he examined (CWM 13151) Japan's chances in the face of the combined exchanges with the Canadian foreign policy economic, industrial and financial strength establishment, Crerar's assessment evolved of Great Britain and the Dominions. Another to include a greater emphasis on the United scenario examined the possibility of an States. He had fruitful, if discreet, discussions alliance between the United States and the on Canada and the Far East with a small British Empire in a Pacific conflict. 8 Crerar coterie of academic and civil servants, such concluded that Japan would lose against as Lester Pearson of External Affairs and such a combination. Consequently, Japan's Escott Reid of the Canadian Institute for only rational course was to avert a war with International Affairs.
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