18 U.S.C. § 1952

18 U.S.C.A. § 1952 Page 1

Effective: October 5, 2012

United States Code Annotated Currentness Title 18. Crimes and Criminal Procedure (Refs & Annos) Part I. Crimes (Refs & Annos) Chapter 95. Racketeering (Refs & Annos) § 1952. Interstate and foreign travel or transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises

(a) Whoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses the mail or any facility in interstate or foreign commerce, with intent to--

(1) distribute the proceeds of any unlawful activity; or

(2) commit any crime of violence to further any unlawful activity; or

(3) otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on, of any unlawful activity, and thereafter performs or attempts to perform--

(A) an act described in paragraph (1) or (3) shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both; or

(B) an act described in paragraph (2) shall be fined under this title, imprisoned for not more than 20 years, or both, and if death results shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life.

(b) As used in this section (i) “unlawful activity” means (1) any business enterprise involving gambling, liquor on which the Federal excise tax has not been paid, narcotics or controlled substances (as defined in section 102(6) of the Controlled Substances Act), or prostitution offenses in violation of the laws of the State in which they are committed or of the United States, (2) extortion, bribery, or arson in violation of the laws of the State in which committed or of the United States, or (3) any act which is indictable under subchapter II of chapter 53 of title 31, United States Code, or under section 1956 or 1957 of this title and (ii) the term “State” includes a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, and any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States.

(c) Investigations of violations under this section involving liquor shall be conducted under the supervision of the Attorney General.

(d) If the offense under this section involves an act described in paragraph (1) or (3) of subsection (a) and also involves a pre-retail medical product (as defined in section 670), the punishment for the offense shall be the same as the punishment for an offense under section 670 unless the punishment under subsection (a) is greater.

CREDIT(S)

(Added Pub.L. 87-228 § 1(a), Sept. 13, 1961, 75 Stat. 498; amended Pub.L. 89-68, July 7, 1965, 79 Stat. 212; Pub.L. 91-513, Title II, § 701(i) (2), Oct. 27, 1970, 84 Stat. 1282; Pub.L. 99-570, Title XIII, § 1365(a), Oct. 27, 1986, 100 Stat. 3207-35; Pub.L. 101-647, Title XII, § 1205(i), Title XVI, § 1604, Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4831, 4843; Pub.L. 103-322, Title XIV, § 140007(a), Title XXXIII, § 330016(1)(L), Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 2033, 2147; Pub.L. 107-296, Title XI, § 1112(h), Nov. 25, 2002, 116 Stat. 2277; Pub.L. 112-186, § 4(b)(1), Oct. 5, 2012, 126 Stat. 1429.)

HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES

Revision Notes and Legislative Reports

1961 Acts. House Report No. 966, see 1961 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 2664.

1965 Acts. Senate Report No. 351, see 1965 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 1847.

1970 Acts. House Report No. 91-1444 and Conference Report No. 91-1603, see 1970 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 4566.

1986 Acts. Statement by President, see 1986 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 5393.

1990 Acts. House Report Nos. 101-681(Parts I and II) and 101-736, Senate Report No. 101-460, and Statement by President, see 1990 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 6472.

1994 Acts. House Report Nos. 103-324 and 103-489, and House Conference Report No. 103-711, see 1994 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 1801.

2002 Acts. House Report No. 107-609(Part I) and Statement by President, see 2002 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 1352.

References in Text

Section 102(6) of the Controlled Substances Act, referred to in subsec. (b) (1), is classified to section 802(6) of Title 21, Food and Drugs.

Amendments

2012 Amendments. Subsec. (d). Pub.L. 112-186, § 4(b)(1), added subsec. (d).

2002 Amendments. Subsec. (c). Pub.L. 107-296, § 1112(h), struck “Secretary of the Treasury” and inserted “Attorney General”.

1994 Amendments. Subsec. (a). Pub.L. 103-322, § 140007(a), revised the closing provision following par. (3). Prior to revision the provision read as follows: “and thereafter performs or attempts to perform any of the acts specified in subparagraphs (1), (2), and (3) shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.”

Pub.L. 103-322, § 330016(1)(L), directed that “under this title” be substituted for “not more than $10,000”. Amendment could not be executed because the language to be deleted had been stricken earlier pursuant to section 140007(a) of Pub.L. 103-322.

1990 Amendments. Subsec. (a). Pub.L. 101-647, § 1604, inserted “the mail or” after “uses” and struck out “including the mail,” before “with intent”.

Subsec. (b). Pub.L. 101-647 inserted “(i)” after “As used in this section” and added cl. (ii).

1986 Amendments. Subsec. (b)(3). Pub.L. 99-570, § 1365(a), added cl. (3).

1970 Amendments. Subsec. (b)(1). Pub.L. 91-513, § 701(i)(2)(A), inserted “or controlled substances (as defined in section 102(6) of the Controlled Substances Act)”.

Subsec. (c). Pub.L. 91-513, § 701(i)(2)(B), struck out reference to investigations involving narcotics.

1965 Amendments. Subsec. (b)(2). Pub.L. 89-68 made the section applicable to travel in aid of arson.

Effective and Applicability Provisions

2002 Acts. Amendment to this section by Pub.L. 107-296 effective 60 days after Nov. 25, 2002, see Pub.L. 107-296, § 4, set out as a note under 6 U.S.C.A. § 101.

1970 Acts. Amendment by Pub.L. 91-513 effective on the first day of the seventh calendar month that begins after Oct. 26, 1970, see section 704 of Pub.L. 91-513, set out as an Effective Date note under section 801 of Title 21, Food and Drugs.

Savings Provisions

Amendment of this section by Pub.L. 91-513 not to affect or abate any prosecutions for violation of law or any civil seizures or forfeitures and injunctive proceedings commenced prior to the effective date of such amendment, and all administrative proceedings pending before the former Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs on Oct. 27, 1970, were to be continued and brought to final determination in accord with laws and regulations in effect prior to Oct. 27, 1970, see section 702 of Pub.L. 91-513, set out as a Savings Provision note under section 321 of Title 21, Food and Drugs.

Short Title

This section is commonly known as the “Travel Act.”

CROSS REFERENCES

“Specified criminal offense” defined as having same meaning as money laundering as in this section for the purposes of cash received by Criminal Court Clerks, see 26 USCA § 6050I. Wire or oral communications, authorization for interception, to provide evidence of offenses under this section, see 18 USCA § 2516.

FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES

See Federal Sentencing Guidelines § 2E1.2, 18 USCA.

LAW REVIEW COMMENTARIES

Commercial racketeering: What the civil practitioner needs to know and understand. David Berg and Joel Androphy, 22 Hous.Law. 13 (May 1984).

Federalizing fires: The evolving Federal response to arson related crimes. John Panneton, 23 Am.Crim.L.Rev. 151 (1985).

Guarantee clause as a basis for federal prosecutions of state and local officials. Adam H. Kurland, 62 S.Cal.L.Rev. 367 (1989).

Industrial espionage is a crime. F.L. Peter Stone, 7 Del.Law. 50 (1989).

Insider abuse and criminal misconduct in financial institutions: A crisis? Note, 64 Notre Dame L.Rev. 222 (1989).

Selection, analysis, and approval of federal Rico prosecutions. Paul E. Coffey, 65 Notre Dame L.Rev. 1035 (1990).

The Travel Act (18 U.S.C.A. § 1952): Prosecution of interstate acts in aid of racketeering. Barry Breen, 24 Am.Crim.L.Rev. 125 (1986).

Use of state statutes in federal corruption prosecutions. Michael Kendall, 40 Boston B.J. 10 (May/June 1996).

LIBRARY REFERENCES

American Digest System

Commerce 82.10.

Key Number System Topic No. 83.

Gaming 62.

Key Number System Topic No. 188.

Corpus Juris Secundum

CJS Aliens § 1300, Conviction of Drug-Related Offense. CJS Bribery § 3, Nature and Elements of Offenses in General. CJS Commerce § 68, Restriction of Travel; Exclusion of Persons. CJS Commerce § 162, Travel or Transportation in Aid of Racketeering. CJS Conspiracy § 250, Travel Act. CJS Criminal Law § 1900, Multiple Counts--Inconsistency of Verdict. CJS Postal Service & Offenses Against Postal Laws § 76, Racketeering. CJS Prostitution and Related Offenses § 54, Indictment and Prosecution. CJS Prostitution and Related Offenses § 55, Proof; Jury Instructions. CJS Prostitution and Related Offenses § 65, Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence. CJS Threats and Unlawful Communications § 31, Interstate and Foreign Travel in Aid of Extortion.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR Library

51 ALR, Fed. 2nd Series 169, Mandatory Victims Restitution Act--Measure and Elements of Restitution to Which Victim is Entitled.

6 ALR, Fed. 2nd Series 351, Construction and Application of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977.

9 ALR, Fed. 2nd Series 193, Proper Procedure for Determining Whether Alleged Statement or Report of Gov- ernment Witness Should be Produced on Accused's Demand, Under Jencks Act (18 U.S.C.A. § 3500) and Fed. R. Crim. P. 26.2.

37 ALR, Fed. 2nd Series 449, Construction and Application of U.S.S.G. § 2x1.1, Providing Sentencing Guideline for Conspiracy Not Covered by Specific Offense Guideline.

38 ALR, Fed. 2nd Series 147, Construction and Application of “Parsimony Clause” of 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(A), Providing that District Court Shall Impose Sentence Sufficient, But Not Greater Than Necessary, to Comply With...

52 ALR, Fed. 2nd Series 37, Validity, Construction, and Application of Immunity Provisions of Communica- tions Decency Act.

4 ALR, Fed. 881, Elements of Offense Proscribed by the Hobbs Act (18 U.S.C.A. § 1951) Against Racketeering in Interstate or Foreign Commerce.

6 ALR, Fed. 665, Withdrawal of Plea of Guilty or Nolo Contendere, Before Sentence, Under Rule 32(D) of Fed- eral Rules of Criminal Procedure.

20 ALR, Fed. 125, Admissibility in Federal Conspiracy Prosecution of Evidence of Defendant's Similar Prior Criminal Act.

22 ALR, Fed. 379, Determination of Materiality of Allegedly Perjurious Testimony in Prosecution Under 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1621, 1622.

23 ALR, Fed. 480, What Constitutes “Crime Involving Moral Turpitude” Within Meaning of §§ 212(A)(9) and 241(A)(4) of Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1182(A)(9), 1251(A)(4)), and Similar Predecessor Statutes...

29 ALR, Fed. 826, Validity, Construction, and Application of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962, Making Unlawful Certain Acts Involving “Pattern of Racketeering Activity” or “Collection of an Unlawful Debt”.

44 ALR, Fed. 627, Admissibility of Statement by Coconspirator Under Rule 801(D)(2)(E) of Federal Rules of Evidence.

45 ALR, Fed. 732, What Constitutes Such Discriminatory Prosecution or Enforcement of Laws as to Provide Valid Defense in Federal Criminal Proceedings.

57 ALR, Fed. 824, When is Dismissal of Indictment Appropriate Remedy for Misconduct of Government Offi- cial.

62 ALR, Fed. 636, Delay in Sealing or Failure to Seal Tape or Wire Recording as Required by 18 U.S.C.A. §

2518(8)(A) as Ground for Suppression of Such Recording at Trial.

69 ALR, Fed. 251, Interstate Travel as Element of Offense Established by Travel Act (18 U.S.C.A. § 1952).

75 ALR, Fed. 461, When Will Expert Testimony “Assist Trier of Fact” So as to be Admissible at Federal Trial Under Rule 702 of Federal Rules of Evidence.

75 ALR, Fed. 806, Propriety of Denial of Pretrial Bail Under Bail Reform Act (18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3141 et seq.).

76 ALR, Fed. 700, Evidence Offered by Defendant at Federal Criminal Trial as Inadmissible, Under Rule 403 of Federal Rules of Evidence, on Ground that Probative Value is Substantially Outweighed by Danger of Unfair Prejudice, Confusion...

80 ALR, Fed. 397, Sufficiency of Evidence that Possessor of Cocaine Had Intent to Distribute It, So as to Viol- ate 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(A)(1).

89 ALR, Fed. 770, Validity, Construction, and Effect of Domestic Currency Transaction Reporting Requirement Based Upon 31 U.S.C.A. § 5313(a).

100 ALR, Fed. 156, What Constitutes Playing “Mitigating Role” in Offense Allowing Decrease in Offense Level Under United States Sentencing Guideline § 3B1.2, U.S.S.G.

114 ALR, Fed. 355, What Constitutes Unusually “Vulnerable” Victim Under Sentencing Guideline § 3A1.1 Per- mitting Increase in Offense Level.

121 ALR, Fed. 525, Validity, Construction, and Application of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956, Which Criminalizes Money Laundering.

132 ALR, Fed. 525, Test of “Dual Criminality” Where Extradition to or from Foreign Nation is Sought.

135 ALR, Fed. 367, When is Considered Property “Involved In” Money Laundering Offense, and Thus Subject to Civil or Criminal Forfeiture, for Purposes of Money Laundering Control Act (18 U.S.C.A. § 981(A)(1)(A) And...

164 ALR, Fed. 591, When Does Forfeiture of Currency, Bank Account, or Cash Equivalent Violate Excessive Fines Clause of Eighth Amendment.

185 ALR, Fed. 493, Construction and Operation of “Willfulness” Requirement of U.S.S.G., § 3c1.1, Pertaining

to Obstructing or Impeding the Administration of Justice.

188 ALR, Fed. 419, Civil Liability of Antiabortion Protesters Under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiz- ations Act (RICO) in Light of Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1057, R.I.C.O. Bus. Disp. Guide...

2003 ALR, Fed. 1, Construction and Application of Garmon Preemption Doctrine by Federal Courts.

152 ALR, Fed. 459, Attorney-Client Privilege and the Reporting of Cash Transactions in Excess of $10,000, as Required by § 60501 of Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C.A. § 60501).

113 ALR, Fed. 625, Sufficiency of Showing, in Prosecution Under Travel Act (18 U.S.C.A. § 1952), of Act by Accused, Subsequent to Accused's Travel or Use of Facilities in Interstate or Foreign Commerce, Which Fur- thers Unlawful...

114 ALR, Fed. 487, Construction and Application of 18 U.S.C.A. § 215, Punishing Receipt or Offering of Com- missions or Gifts by Bank Officer for Procuring Loans.

108 ALR, Fed. 380, Books, Papers, and Documents Subject to Discovery by Defendant Under Rule 16 of Feder- al Rules of Criminal Procedure.

103 ALR, Fed. 422, Propriety, Under 18 U.S.C.A. § 2517(5), of Interception or Use of Communications Relat- ing to Federal Offenses Which Were Not Specified in Original Wiretap Order.

97 ALR, Fed. 273, What Conduct of Federal Law Enforcement Authorities in Inducing or Co-Operating in Criminal Offense Raises Due Process Defense Distinct from Entrapment.

68 ALR, Fed. 628, Statute of Limitations in Prosecution Under 18 U.S.C.A. § 371 for Conspiracy to Commit Offense Against or to Defraud United States.

47 ALR, Fed. 639, Effect of Rule 801(D)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Evidence Upon the Admissibility of a Witness' Prior Consistent Statement.

41 ALR, Fed. 10, Propriety and Prejudicial Effect of Prosecutor's Argument to Jury Indicating His Belief or Knowledge as to Guilt of Accused--Federal Cases.

44 ALR, Fed. 468, Modern Status of Rule that Court May Instruct Dissenting Jurors in Federal Criminal Case to Give Due Consideration to Opinion of Majority (Allen Charge).

36 ALR, Fed. 371, Sufficiency of United States Attorney General's Appointment of Special Attorney Under 28 U.S.C.A. § 515(a).

39 ALR, Fed. 479, Joinder of Offenses Under Rule 8(A), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

21 ALR, Fed. 708, Validity, Construction, and Application of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1955 Prohibiting Illegal Gambling Businesses.

5 ALR, Fed. 166, Validity and Construction of Federal Statute (18 U.S.C.A. § 1084(A)) Making Transmission of Wagering Information a Criminal Offense.

1 ALR, Fed. 838, Validity, Construction, and Effect of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1952, Making it a Federal Offense to Use Interstate or Foreign Travel or Transportation in Aid of Racketeering Enterprises.

43 ALR 6th 163, Reciprocal Discipline of Attorneys--Criminal Conduct.

94 ALR 5th 537, “English Only” Requirement for Conduct of Public Affairs.

87 ALR 5th 715, Injury to Reputation or Mental Well-Being as Within Penal Extortion Statutes Requiring Threat of “Injury to the Person”.

65 ALR 4th 24, Negligence, Inattention, or Professional Incompetence of Attorney in Handling Client's Affairs in Matters Involving Real-Estate Transactions as Ground for Disciplinary Action--Modern Cases.

53 ALR 4th 801, Validity, Construction, and Application of Statutes or Ordinances Involved in Prosecutions for Transmission of Wagers or Wagering Information Related to Bookmaking.

17 ALR 3rd 1181, Comment Note.--Power of Court to Make or Permit Amendment of Indictment.

18 ALR 3rd 259, Inconsistency of Criminal Verdict as Between Different Counts of Indictment or Information.

77 ALR 3rd 519, Validity and Construction of Statute or Ordinance Proscribing Solicitation for Purposes of Prostitution, Lewdness, or Assignation--Modern Cases.

82 ALR 3rd 245, Antagonistic Defenses as Ground for Separate Trials of Codefendants in Criminal Case.

82 ALR 3rd 366, Right of Defendants in Prosecution for Criminal Conspiracy to Separate Trials.

98 ALR 3rd 357, Attorney's Conviction in Foreign or Federal Jurisdiction as Ground for Disciplinary Action.

1 ALR 3rd 1350, Validity and Construction of Statutes Punishing Commercial Bribery.

54 ALR 2nd 830, Right to Severance Where Codefendant Has Incriminated Himself.

99 ALR 2nd 508, Propriety and Effect of Attack on Opposing Counsel During Trial of a Criminal Case.

91 ALR 2nd 1148, Criminal Conspiracies as to Gambling.

27 ALR 139, Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Before Grand Jury.

39 ALR 236, Harrison Narcotic Act.

48 ALR 746, What Constitutes Offense of Obstructing or Resisting Officer.

74 ALR 311, Constitutionality and Construction of Pandering Acts.

75 ALR 1411, Merger of Conspiracy in Completed Offense.

86 ALR 928, Misconduct of Juror Which Will Authorize or Require Withdrawal of Juror.

113 ALR 1179, What Amounts to Conviction or Satisfies Requirement as to Showing of Conviction, Within Statute Making Conviction a Ground for Refusing to Grant or for Canceling License or Special Privilege.

127 ALR 272, Duty of Secrecy on Part of Members Of, or Witness or Other Persons Present Before, Grand Jury.

131 ALR 917, Right to Severance Where Two or More Persons Are Jointly Accused.

134 ALR 614, Admissibility of Evidence Obtained by Government or Other Public Officer by Intercepting Let- ter or Telegraph or Telephone Message.

135 ALR 104, What Are Games of Chance, Games of Skill, and Mixed Games of Chance and Skill.

169 ALR 315, Comment Note.--Duty in Instructing Jury in Criminal Prosecution to Explain and Define Offense Charged.

169 ALR 1419, Search Incident to One Offense as Justifying Seizure of Instruments of or Articles Connected With Another Offense.

171 ALR 765, Legal Aspects of Radio Communication and Broadcasting.

162 ALR 1188, Possession of Gambling Device as Offense Not Requiring Showing that Device was Used for Gambling or Kept for Gambling Purposes.

156 ALR 971, Construction and Application of the Word “cause” in Provision of White Slave Traffic Act Which Declares that One Who Shall Knowingly Cause a Woman or Girl to be Transported in Interstate Commerce for Purposes Of...

121 ALR 1088, Error in Naming the Offense Covered by Allegations of Specific Facts in Complaint, Indict- ment, or Information.

115 ALR 1263, Criminal Offense of Bribery as Affected by Lack of Legal Qualification of Person Assuming or Alleged to be an Officer.

106 ALR 1453, Right of Action for Damages Because of Methods Used in Attempting to Collect Debts.

108 ALR 331, Criminal Responsibility of One Who Furnishes Instrumentality of a Kind Ordinarily Used for Le- gitimate Purposes, With Knowledge that it is to be Used by Another for Criminal Purposes.

111 ALR 825, Comment Note.--Corroboration by Circumstantial Evidence of Testimony of Single Witness in Prosecution for Perjury.

70 ALR 5, Resort to Constitutional or Legislative Debates, Committee Reports, Journals, Etc., as Aid in Con- struction of Constitution or Statute.

52 ALR 296, Federal Control of Public Utilities.

47 ALR 1135, Constitutionality of Statutes Forbidding or Regulating Dissemination of Betting Odds or Other Gambling Information.

51 ALR 875, Acts in Violation of White Slave Traffic Act as Constituting Single Offense or Separate Offenses.

10 ALR 982, Sufficiency of Indictment as Affected by Bill of Particulars.

13 ALR 1435, Concealment of Pregnancy as Ground for Annulment of Marriage or Divorce.

13 ALR 1446, Burden on State to Show that Crime was Committed Within Limitation Period.

Encyclopedias

10 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 289, “Pattern of Racketeering Activity” Under the Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations Act (RICO).

46 Am. Jur. Trials 441, Defense of the Vietnam Veteran With Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.

70 Am. Jur. Trials 435, The Defense of a Computer Crime Case.

Am. Jur. 2d Abortion and Birth Control § 113, Civil Remedies Against Protestors Under Rico--Use of an Enter- prise to Commit Illegal Acts.

Am. Jur. 2d Aliens and Citizens § 1554, Conviction of Drug-Related Offense.

Am. Jur. 2d Bribery § 2, Federal Statutory Provisions.

Am. Jur. 2d Bribery § 6, Intent; Quid Pro Quo Requirement.

Am. Jur. 2d Bribery § 20, Conspiracy.

Am. Jur. 2d Bribery § 22, Indictment or Information.

Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 470, Offenses Committed in Transit (Common Carrier Exception); Crimes on the High Seas.

Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 1235, Federal Legislation.

Am. Jur. 2d Extortion, Blackmail, and Threats § 69, Number of Acts Required.

Am. Jur. 2d Extortion, Blackmail, and Threats § 74, Intent--General or Specific Intent.

Am. Jur. 2d Extortion, Blackmail, and Threats § 120, Checklist of Acts Which Constitute Racketeering Activity; Federal Law Violations.

Am. Jur. 2d Gambling § 60, Interaction With Other Federal Statutes; Conspiracy and Interstate Travel.

Am. Jur. 2d Gambling § 63, Element of Travel.

Am. Jur. 2d Gambling § 139, Property Used in Violating Tax Laws.

Am. Jur. 2d Prostitution § 27, Construction and Application.

Am. Jur. 2d Prostitution § 30, Violation of Act as Constituting More Than One Offense.

Forms

1A West's Federal Forms § 333, Application for Bail--Federal Court Case.

2B West's Federal Forms § 1776, Extortion, Assault, and Other Illegal Activities.

5A West's Federal Forms § 8592, Application for Authority to Intercept Wire Communication.

Am. Jur. Pl. & Pr. Forms Gambling § 23.70, Complaint in Federal Court--Class Action--To Recover Electronic Gaming Machine Losses--Illegal Gaming Operations at Dog Racing Establishment.

Am. Jur. Pl. & Pr. Forms Products Liability § 314, Complaint in Federal Court--Diversity of Citizenship--By Counties--Against Manufacturers of Cigarettes and Trade Associations--Fraud and Misrepresentation--Breach of Express...

Am. Jur. Pl. & Pr. Forms Searches and Seizures § 6, Application for Authority to Intercept Wire Communica- tions--Federal Wiretap Act.

Treatises and Practice Aids

Eckstrom's Licensing Foreign & Domestic Ops Jt Vent § 6:2, Overview of the Fcpa.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 22:35, What Courts Have Jurisdiction Over Offenses Against Laws of United States, Generally--What Are Offenses Against Laws of United States.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 22:74, Other Particular Offenses.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 22:250, Offenses for Which Interception May be Authorized.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 22:2258, Assertions of Unconstitutionality.

Handbook of Federal Evidence § 404:5, Rule 404(B)(2): Crimes, Wrongs or Other Acts.

Handbook of Federal Evidence § 406:3, Routine Practice of an Organization.

Immigration Law and Crimes § 2:20, “Relating To” a Controlled Substance.

Immigration Law and Crimes § 7:23, Definition of Aggravated Felony.

Immigration Law Service 2d § 13:74, Conviction of Drug-Related Offense.

Securities and Federal Corporate Law App. 20-E, Sample Plea Agreement (Corporate)/Post-Booker.

Securities Crimes § 3:6, Generally--Criminal Referral.

Securities Prac.: Fed. & State Enforcement, 2nd Ed § 7:25, General Rule.

West's Federal Administrative Practice § 1680, Alcohol--Crimes.

Wright & Miller: Federal Prac. & Proc. § 127, Nature and Contents of Indictment or Information--Particular Cases.

Wright & Miller: Federal Prac. & Proc. § 5571, Statutory History.

NOTES OF DECISIONS

I. GENERALLY 1-50 II. ELEMENTS OF OFFENSE 51-120 III. UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY 121-160 IV. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE GENERALLY 161-220 V. INDICTMENT OR INFORMATION 221-270 VI. EVIDENCE AND WITNESSES 271-310 VII. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE 311-360 VIII. INSTRUCTIONS 361-400

I. GENERALLY

Aiding and abetting 22 Commerce clause, constitutionality 2 Conspiracy 23 Constitutionality 1-9 Constitutionality - Generally 1 Constitutionality - Commerce clause 2 Constitutionality - Due process 3 Constitutionality - Equal protection 4 Constitutionality - Ex post facto legislation 5 Constitutionality - Freedom of speech and assembly 6 Constitutionality - Privileges and immunities clause 7 Constitutionality - Reserved powers to states 8 Constitutionality - Vague and indefinite legislation 9 Construction 10, 11 Construction - Generally 10 Construction - Legislative history 11 Construction with other laws 12 Due process, constitutionality 3 Equal protection, constitutionality 4 Ex post facto legislation, constitutionality 5 Freedom of speech and assembly, constitutionality 6 Law governing 16 Legislative history, construction 11 Persons liable 24 Power of Congress 17 Privileges and immunities clause, constitutionality 7 Purpose 13 Reserved powers to states, constitutionality 8 Retroactive effect of court decisions 15 Retroactive effect of section 14 Separate and distinct offenses 21 State regulation or control 18 States 20 Territorial application of section 19 Vague and indefinite legislation, constitutionality 9

1. Constitutionality--Generally

This section was not shown to be unconstitutional. U.S. v. Lookretis, C.A.7 (Ind.) 1970, 422 F.2d 647, certiorari denied 90 S.Ct. 1693, 398 U.S. 904, 26 L.Ed.2d 63.

This section is constitutional. U. S. v. Barnes, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1967, 383 F.2d 287, certiorari denied 88 S.Ct. 780, 389 U.S. 1040, 19 L.Ed.2d 831.

Personal money judgment against defendant in the amount of $3,927,392.40, which was the greatest amount sought for his four convictions, did not violate the excessive fines clause of the Eighth Amendment; forfeiture was well under authorized penalty, was consonant with the harm defendant personally caused, and was not grossly disproportional to gravity of defendant's offenses of conspiracy to use interstate commerce facilities to promote prostitution, violation of Travel Act, inducement of interstate travel to engage in prostitution, and conspiracy to commit money laundering. U.S. v. Reiner, D.Me.2005, 397 F.Supp.2d 101. Fines 1.3; Forfeit- ures 3

This section making interstate travel in aid of racketeering a federal offense is constitutional. U. S. v. Keresty, W.D.Pa.1971, 323 F.Supp. 230, motion denied 334 F.Supp. 461, affirmed 465 F.2d 36, certiorari denied 93 S.Ct. 340, 409 U.S. 991, 34 L.Ed.2d 258. Commerce 82.10

2. ---- Commerce clause, constitutionality

This section was not unconstitutional in application to Pennsylvania gambling casino to which some employees traveled from their New Jersey homes, as involving local activity beyond reach of congressional authority under commerce clause, U.S.C.A.Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. U. S. v. Barrow, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1966, 363 F.2d 62, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 703, 385 U.S. 1001, 17 L.Ed.2d 541. Commerce 82.10

Travel Act constitutes a lawful exercise of Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce. U.S. v. Goldberg, D.Mass.1996, 928 F.Supp. 89. Commerce 82.10

3. ---- Due process, constitutionality

Application of this section to render criminal defendant's travelling from their New Jersey residence to New York to promote prostitution did not violate either U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14 or privileges and immunities clause. U. S. v. Herrera, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1978, 584 F.2d 1137. Constitutional Law 2923; Constitutional Law 3781; Prostitution 14

Fact that this section was based in part on conduct proscribed by state law did not render statute invalid as violative of due process simply because of variations in the law of the several states. U. S. v. Schwartz, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1968, 398 F.2d 464, certiorari denied 89 S.Ct. 714, 393 U.S. 1062, 21 L.Ed.2d 705. See, also, U.S. v. Gerhart, D.C.W.Va.1967, 275 F.Supp. 443. Constitutional Law 4509(11); Extortion 5

This section proscribing interstate travel in aid of racketeering enterprises was not unconstitutional deprivation of due process. U. S. v. Ryan, D.C.Colo.1963, 213 F.Supp. 763. Constitutional Law 4509(6)

4. ---- Equal protection, constitutionality

This section does not violate equal protection principles incorporated by U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5 by virtue of the fact that it operates differently in states where gambling is lawful than it does in those where it is outlawed. U. S. v. Villano, C.A.10 (Colo.) 1976, 529 F.2d 1046, certiorari denied 96 S.Ct. 3180, 426 U.S. 953, 49 L.Ed.2d

1193. Constitutional Law 4509(13); Gaming 63(1)

This section was not unconstitutional denial of equal protection of laws merely because of variation in state laws. Turf Center, Inc. v. U. S., C.A.9 (Wash.) 1963, 325 F.2d 793. Constitutional Law 3781; Gaming 63(1)

5. ---- Ex post facto legislation, constitutionality

Construction of this section to limit its application to the rapid transmission of gambling information was not an unreasonable interpretation of this section which might provide an arguable basis for ex post facto law assertion on ground that such limited construction was not made until after occurrence of conduct giving rise to defendant's prosecution for violation of this section. U. S. v. Cerone, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1971, 452 F.2d 274, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 1168, 405 U.S. 964, 31 L.Ed.2d 240, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 1169, 405 U.S. 964, 31 L.Ed.2d 240. Constitutional Law 2802; Gaming 63(1)

Where defendants, while their application for zoning change was pending, placed check in escrow in bank for attorney and on July 26 zoning board granted application and on August 19 board member deposited check received from attorney and on Aug. 22, 23 and Sept. 9 disbursed shares of money to himself and other officials who accomplished re-zoning, and because initial re-zoning was set aside second application was approved on July 25, federal crime continued until re-zoning was accomplished on July 25, subsequent to enactment on Sept. 13 of this section prohibiting use of interstate facility for unlawful act, and application of this section had no ex post facto effect. U. S. v. Wechsler, C.A.4 (Va.) 1968, 392 F.2d 344, certiorari denied 88 S.Ct. 2283, 392 U.S. 932, 20 L.Ed.2d 1389, rehearing denied 89 S.Ct. 71, 393 U.S. 902, 21 L.Ed.2d 191, rehearing denied 408 F.2d 1184, certiorari denied 89 S.Ct. 2130, 395 U.S. 978, 23 L.Ed.2d 766, certiorari denied 89 S.Ct. 2131, 395 U.S. 978, 23 L.Ed.2d 766, rehearing denied 90 S.Ct. 40, 396 U.S. 870, 24 L.Ed.2d 126, certiorari denied 89 S.Ct. 2150, 395 U.S. 984, 23 L.Ed.2d 773. Bribery 1(1)

6. ---- Freedom of speech and assembly, constitutionality

This section covers those who travel in interstate commerce or use interstate facilities with the intent to promote an unlawful activity and who commit further acts; such conduct is not sheltered by U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 1. U. S. v. Villano, C.A.10 (Colo.) 1976, 529 F.2d 1046, certiorari denied 96 S.Ct. 3180, 426 U.S. 953, 49 L.Ed.2d 1193. Commerce 82.6; Constitutional Law 1280

Since communication of opinions as to outcome of future athletic contests is not protected by U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 1 when made as a part of illegal gambling operation crossing state boundaries, this section does not violate U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 1. U. S. v. Cerone, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1971, 452 F.2d 274, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 1168, 405 U.S. 964, 31 L.Ed.2d 240, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 1169, 405 U.S. 964, 31 L.Ed.2d 240. Constitu- tional Law 1807; Gaming 63(1)

This section was not invalid on theory of protection of freedoms of assembly and speech under U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 1. Spinelli v. U. S., C.A.8 (Mo.) 1967, 382 F.2d 871, certiorari granted 88 S.Ct. 1025, 390 U.S. 942, 19

L.Ed.2d 1130, modified 88 S.Ct. 1834, 391 U.S. 933, 20 L.Ed.2d 853, reversed 89 S.Ct. 584, 393 U.S. 410, 21 L.Ed.2d 637. Constitutional Law 1430; Constitutional Law 1807; Gaming 63(1)

This section does not violate constitutional rights to travel and to speak. U. S. v. Corallo, S.D.N.Y.1968, 281 F.Supp. 24.

Where gambling, except for pari-mutuel betting, was illegal, free speech provision of U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 1 did not invalidate this section making it unlawful to use telephone to carry on any business enterprise involving gambling. U. S. v. Borgese, S.D.N.Y.1964, 235 F.Supp. 286. Constitutional Law 2146; Telecommunica- tions 730

This section does not unconstitutionally restrict freedom of speech. U. S. v. Smith, E.D.Ill.1962, 209 F.Supp. 907.

7. ---- Privileges and immunities clause, constitutionality

This section was not unconstitutionally vague nor unconstitutional as violative of the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the states and the United States. U. S. v. Zizzo, C.A.7 (Ind.) 1964, 338 F.2d 577, certiorari denied 85 S.Ct. 1530, 381 U.S. 915, 14 L.Ed.2d 435, rehearing denied 86 S.Ct. 1856, 384 U.S. 982, 16 L.Ed.2d 693. Constitutional Law 2923; Gaming 63(1); Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 2

8. ---- Reserved powers to states, constitutionality

Federal regulation of gambling through this section is not invalid under U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 10. U. S. v. Villano, C.A.10 (Colo.) 1976, 529 F.2d 1046, certiorari denied 96 S.Ct. 3180, 426 U.S. 953, 49 L.Ed.2d 1193. Gaming 63(1); States 4.16(2)

This section proscribing interstate and foreign travel or transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises was not in excess of power granted under U.S.C.A.Const. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 or invalid as an attempt to enforce state criminal laws. Marshall v. U. S., C.A.9 (Cal.) 1966, 355 F.2d 999, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 34, 385 U.S. 815, 17 L.Ed.2d 54, rehearing denied 87 S.Ct. 388, 385 U.S. 964, 17 L.Ed.2d 309. See, also, U.S. v. Nichols, C.A.Mo.1970, 421 F.2d 570. Commerce 82.10; States 4.16(2)

This section is not unconstitutional on ground that it invades powers reserved to the States by U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 10, since this section deals only with interstate commerce over which Congress has undoubted power derived from U.S.C.A.Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. U. S. v. Corallo, S.D.N.Y.1968, 281 F.Supp. 24.

This section and section 1084 of this title making it offense to use interstate commerce facilities in connection with certain unlawful activities were not unconstitutional as usurping police power reserved to states, with no purpose to regulate interstate commerce. U. S. v. Borgese, S.D.N.Y.1964, 235 F.Supp. 286. Commerce

82.10

This section was not unconstitutional usurpation of powers reserved to states. U. S. v. Ryan, D.C.Colo.1963, 213 F.Supp. 763. See, also, U.S. v. Zirpolo, D.C.N.J.1968, 288 F.Supp. 993; U.S. v. Gerhart, D.C.W.Va.1967, 275 F.Supp. 443. Commerce 8(1); Commerce 82.10

Congress acted in exercise of its power to regulate interstate commerce and did not encroach on right reserved to states when it enacted this section forbidding interstate and foreign travel or transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises. U. S. v. Smith, E.D.Ill.1962, 209 F.Supp. 907. Commerce 82.10

9. ---- Vague and indefinite legislation, constitutionality

Travel Act, prohibiting travel in interstate commerce with the intent of promoting or engaging in extortion in violation of state law, was not unconstitutionally vague; Act gave defendant fair and reasonable warning that conduct of crossing state lines to engage in extortion was illegal. U.S. v. O'Hara, C.A.7 (Wis.) 2002, 301 F.3d 563, certiorari denied 123 S.Ct. 611, 537 U.S. 1049, 154 L.Ed.2d 524. Commerce 82.10; Constitutional Law 4509(11)

Defendant did not lack fair notice that his conduct in traveling from New Jersey to New York to facilitate payment of a commercial bribe in connection with a business transaction between shipping company and stevedoring concern was in violation of this section, despite contention that Supreme Court's decision in Perrin v. United States, which held that bribery of private employees prohibited by state criminal statutes also violates this section, was an unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal statute which, when applied retroactively, operated like an ex post facto law, in that there was nothing vague or indefinite about the term “bribery” was used in this section, and Perrin could not be viewed as nonforeseeable judicial expansion of scope of this section. U. S. v. Seregos, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1981, 655 F.2d 33, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 1431, 455 U.S. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 650. Bribery 2

Fact that there might be some borderline questions to decide under the terminology of this section is not fatal to this section and does not render it unconstitutionally vague. U. S. v. Villano, C.A.10 (Colo.) 1976, 529 F.2d 1046, certiorari denied 96 S.Ct. 3180, 426 U.S. 953, 49 L.Ed.2d 1193. Gaming 63(1)

Provision of this section proscribing travel or transportation in interstate commerce to carry on unlawful activity defined as any business enterprise involving gambling, non-tax-paid liquor, narcotics or prostitution in violation of state or federal laws is not unconstitutional on ground that words “business enterprise” are constitutionally vague. U. S. v. Cozzetti, C.A.9 (Nev.) 1971, 441 F.2d 344, denial of post-conviction relief affirmed 976 F.2d 736. Controlled Substances 6; Gaming 63(1); Intoxicating Liquors 15

This section was not void for vagueness or indefiniteness. Gilstrap v. U. S., C.A.5 (Ga.) 1968, 389 F.2d 6, certiorari denied 88 S.Ct. 1806, 391 U.S. 913, 20 L.Ed.2d 652. See, also, Spinelli v. U.S., C.A.Mo.1967, 382 F.2d 871, reversed on other grounds 89 S.Ct. 584, 393 U.S. 410, 21 L.Ed.2d 637; U.S. v. Barrow, C.A.Pa.1966, 363 F.2d 62, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 703, 385 U.S. 1001, 17 L.Ed.2d 541; Turf Center, Inc. v. U.S.,

C.A.Wash.1963, 325 F.2d 793; U.S. v. Bergdoll, D.C.Del.1976, 412 F.Supp. 1308; U.S. v. Gerhart, D.C.W.Va.1967, 275 F.Supp. 443; U.S. v. Bash, D.C.Ind.1966, 258 F.Supp. 807, affirmed 379 F.2d 483, certiorari denied 88 S.Ct. 291, 389 U.S. 930, 19 L.Ed.2d 281.

This section is not constitutionally questionable for vagueness but embraces commonly understood words and prescribes clear standard. Bass v. U. S., C.A.8 (Ark.) 1963, 324 F.2d 168.

This section and section 1084 of this title making it offense to use interstate commerce facilities in connection with certain unlawful activities were not so vague and uncertain as to violate due process clause of U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5. U. S. v. Borgese, S.D.N.Y.1964, 235 F.Supp. 286. Constitutional Law 4509(13) ; Gaming 63(1)

This section, making interstate and foreign travel or transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises an offense, does not violate U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5 and 6 on ground that acts or conduct which it seeks to make criminal are couched in such nebulous terms and in such vague, ambiguous, and uncertain language, that persons of ordinary intelligence cannot determine in advance what acts or courses of conduct are proscribed. U. S. v. Teemer, N.D.W.Va.1963, 214 F.Supp. 952. Commerce 82.6; Constitutional Law 4509(1); Indictment And In- formation 56

This section forbidding use of facility in interstate commerce in aid of racketeering enterprises is not unconstitutionally vague and void for want of certainty as to standard of conduct. U. S. v. Smith, E.D.Ill.1962, 209 F.Supp. 907. Gaming 63(1); Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 2

10. Construction--Generally

Interpreting the Travel Act broadly, so as to find that intrastate telephone calls made in connection with local prostitution business could violate the Act, did not offend principles of federalism; the Act established only concurrent federal jurisdiction over what were already state or local crimes, the federal government could not usurp state authority via the Act because a state must first decide that the conduct at issue is illegal, and the Act also did not render state or local law enforcement agencies any less able to fight crime but, rather, supplemented their capabilities. U.S. v. Nader, C.A.9 (Mont.) 2008, 542 F.3d 713, certiorari denied 129 S.Ct. 1984, 173 L.Ed.2d 1089. Commerce 82.10; States 4.16(2)

Statute that speaks in terms of an instrumentality “in” interstate commerce rather than an instrumentality “of” interstate commerce is intended to apply to interstate activities only. U.S. v. Barry, C.A.6 (Ohio) 1989, 888 F.2d 1092, rehearing denied. Commerce 14.6

In contrast to the broad interpretation given to section 1951 of this title, this section is to be read in a narrow and more restricted fashion. U. S. v. Hathaway, C.A.1 (Mass.) 1976, 534 F.2d 386, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 64, 429 U.S. 819, 50 L.Ed.2d 79. Commerce 82.6

Although language and scope of this section are not limited to original congressional purpose of combatting organized crime, Congress did not intend broad ranging interpretation of this section. U. S. v. Peskin, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1975, 527 F.2d 71, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 63, 429 U.S. 818, 50 L.Ed.2d 79. Bribery 1(1)

Terms “extortion,” “bribery,” and “arson” contained in Travel Act are to be read more broadly than their strict common law definitions. U.S. v. Parlavecchio, D.N.J.1995, 903 F.Supp. 788. Arson 2; Bribery 1(1); Extortion 19

The word “or” in this section proscribing travel in interstate commerce “or” use of any facility in interstate commerce to promote certain unlawful activity does not create two offenses but merely indicates alternative means for commission of the crime. U. S. v. Anderson, D.C.Md.1973, 368 F.Supp. 1253. Commerce 82.10

Though criminal statutes are to be strictly construed, that does not require court to ignore dictates of common sense and to defeat very purpose of this section by creating unwarranted exceptions to its operation. U. S. v. Bash, N.D.Ind.1966, 258 F.Supp. 807, affirmed 379 F.2d 483, certiorari denied 88 S.Ct. 291, 389 U.S. 930, 19 L.Ed.2d 281. Criminal Law 12.7(2)

This section and section 1084 of this title prohibiting use of interstate wire communication facilities for placing of bets or carrying on illegal activities are criminal statutes and must be strictly construed. U. S. v. Bergland, E.D.Wis.1962, 209 F.Supp. 547, reversed on other grounds 318 F.2d 159, certiorari denied 84 S.Ct. 129, 375 U.S. 861, 11 L.Ed.2d 88. Gaming 63(2); Telecommunications 1012

11. ---- Legislative history, construction

This section and section 1084 of this title relating to offenses of transmission of wagering information and of interstate travel in aid of racketeering enterprises were ambiguous, and, therefore, reference to legislative history was proper to determine whether “past-post betting” came within said sections. U. S. v. Bergland, C.A.7 (Wis.) 1963, 318 F.2d 159, certiorari denied 84 S.Ct. 129, 375 U.S. 861, 11 L.Ed.2d 88. Gaming 63(2)

Neither the history nor the language of the Travel Act would sanction an expansive interpretation that would jeopardize the balance of powers between the state and federal governments when a continuous course of organized criminal conduct is not present and when there is no state enforcement to reinforce. U.S. v. Welch, D.Utah 2001, 248 F.Supp.2d 1048, reversed 327 F.3d 1081. Commerce 82.10

Legislative history of this section demonstrates that its purpose was to combat a problem of uniquely national scope, i.e., organized racketeering and crime. U.S. v. Goldfarb, E.D.Mich.1979, 464 F.Supp. 565. Gaming 63(2)

Consideration of legislative history disclosed that words “uses any facility in interstate or foreign commerce” in this section proscribing the interstate use of mails or telephone to defraud is intended to embrace telephone calls made only in interstate or foreign commerce. U. S. v. De Sapio, S.D.N.Y.1969, 299 F.Supp. 436. Telecommu-

nications 1014(2)

12. Construction with other laws

By interfering with, disrupting, and in some instances “shutting down” clinics that performed abortions, individual and corporate organizers of antiabortion protest network did not “obtain” or attempt to obtain property from women's rights organization or abortion clinics, and so did not commit or attempt to commit extortion in violation of the Travel Act, as required for organization and clinics to establish Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations Act (RICO) predicate offense. Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc., U.S.2003, 123 S.Ct. 1057, 537 U.S. 393, 188 A.L.R. Fed. 741, 154 L.Ed.2d 991, on remand 91 Fed.Appx. 510, 2004 WL 375995. Extortion 19; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 8

Section 1953 of this title, prohibiting interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia, and this section, prohibiting use of any facility in interstate or foreign commerce with intent to carry on unlawful activity, play different roles in dealing with organized criminal activity. Erlenbaugh v. U. S., U.S.Ind.1972, 93 S.Ct. 477, 409 U.S. 239, 34 L.Ed.2d 446. Gaming 63(2)

Alien's racketeering conviction for agreeing to launder illegal drug money constituted crime involving moral turpitude, within meaning of Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) transition- al rule precluding appeal of deportation order; offense was inherently fraudulent. Smalley v. Ashcroft, C.A.5 2003, 354 F.3d 332. Aliens, Immigration, And Citizenship 277; Aliens, Immigration, And Citizenship 385

Substantive offenses of wire fraud [18 U.S.C.A. § 1343] and violation of Travel Act [18 U.S.C.A. § 1952] require different elements of proof than an agreement to commit those crimes; therefore, defendant's acquittal on substantive charges of wire fraud and use of interstate wire facility in violation of the Travel Act did not mandate reversal of his conviction for conspiracy to commit wire fraud. U.S. v. Soteras, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1985, 770 F.2d 641. Conspiracy 28(2); Criminal Law 878(4)

Travel Act convictions were properly predicated upon violations of Nevada state law resulting from the conduct of gambling operations without the necessary licenses and the indirect receipt of gambling monies without the necessary licenses. U.S. v. DeLuna, C.A.8 (Mo.) 1985, 763 F.2d 897, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 382, 474 U.S. 980, 88 L.Ed.2d 336. Gaming 62

Defendants charged with violating and conspiring to violate this section as result of payments made to bank officer for purpose of influencing loans could be convicted for interstate travel with the intent to facilitate the violation of this section by bank official even if defendants as payors could not be convicted of an offense under section 215 of this title prohibiting gifts to bank officers for procuring loans. U. S. v. Pomponio, C.A.4 (Va.) 1975, 511 F.2d 953, certiorari denied 96 S.Ct. 142, 423 U.S. 874, 46 L.Ed.2d 105, certiorari denied 96 S.Ct. 143, 423 U.S. 874, 46 L.Ed.2d 105, rehearing denied 96 S.Ct. 406, 423 U.S. 991, 46 L.Ed.2d 311. Bribery 1(1)

Utah's commercial bribery statute as applied was not valid predicate under Travel Act for prosecution of defendants, whose alleged illegal conduct was offering of inducements and gifts to members of International Olympic Committee (IOC) to persuade them to vote for Salt Lake City as host for 2002 Olympic Winter Games; federal prosecution based upon Utah law in such circumstances did not advance goals of Travel Act, IOC members' votes for Salt Lake City did not pose any disadvantage to IOC, Utah did not view such conduct as crime, and prosecution of defendants threatened balance of power between federal government and State of Utah. U.S. v. Welch, D.Utah 2001, 248 F.Supp.2d 1048, reversed 327 F.3d 1081. Commerce 82.10

Section 1171 et seq. of Title 15 which prohibits interstate transportation of gambling devices and this section which makes unlawful the use of facilities in interstate commerce with the intent to facilitate illegal gambling enterprises are complementary and not in conflict; they are aimed at the eradication of that aspect of organized crime that is nourished on illegal gambling profits. U. S. v. Bally Mfg. Corp., E.D.La.1972, 345 F.Supp. 410. Gaming 63(3)

13. Purpose

This section prohibiting use of any facility in interstate or foreign commerce with intent to carry on unlawful activity constitutes an effort to deny individuals who act for criminal purposes access to channels of commerce. Erlenbaugh v. U. S., U.S.Ind.1972, 93 S.Ct. 477, 409 U.S. 239, 34 L.Ed.2d 446. Gaming 63(2)

This section, prohibiting interstate travel with intent to promote, manage, establish, carry on or facilitate certain kinds of illegal activity, is aimed primarily at organized crime and particularly at persons who reside in one state while operating or managing illegal activities located in another state. Rewis v. U.S., U.S.Fla.1971, 91 S.Ct. 1056, 401 U.S. 808, 28 L.Ed.2d 493. Commerce 82.10

This section is primarily designed to stem the clandestine flow of profits and to be of material assistance to states in combating pernicious undertakings which cross state lines. U. S. v. Nardello, U.S.Pa.1969, 89 S.Ct. 534, 393 U.S. 286, 21 L.Ed.2d 487. Commerce 82.10

In passing Travel Act [18 U.S.C.A. § 1952] Congress clearly did not intend to preempt state law, as act was passed, not as means of punishing violators of state law, but as means of punishing use of interstate commerce to engage in unlawful activity. U.S. v. Teplin, C.A.4 (Va.) 1985, 775 F.2d 1261. Commerce 82.10

This section is not aimed at local criminal activity, but, rather, its purpose is to attack crime that has true interstate aspect. U. S. v. O'Dell, C.A.6 (Ky.) 1982, 671 F.2d 191. Commerce 82.6

Primary purpose of this section is to aid local law enforcement in combatting organized crime figures who could avoid apprehension by local officials by traveling interstate. U. S. v. Wander, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1979, 601 F.2d 1251. Commerce 82.6

This section was enacted for purpose of punishing interstate travel in aid of racketeering enterprises engaged in

by organized crime. U. S. v. Brecht, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1976, 540 F.2d 45, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 1160, 429 U.S. 1123, 51 L.Ed.2d 573. Commerce 82.6

In enacting this section, Congress was seeking to prevent racketeers from engaging in interstate travel to further the purposes of concerted illegal activity. U. S. v. Lightfoot, C.A.D.C.1974, 506 F.2d 238, 165 U.S.App.D.C. 177.

Main purposes of this section are to attack organized crime and to aid local authorities in combating it, and a court should not allow its provisions to be used to extend federal prosecutions far from these purposes. U. S. v. Polizzi, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1974, 500 F.2d 856, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 802, 419 U.S. 1120, 42 L.Ed.2d 820, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 803, 419 U.S. 1120, 42 L.Ed.2d 820. Gaming 63(2)

Congress in enacting this section relating to interstate travel in aid of racketeering enterprises was not concerned with regulating interstate travel or the use of interstate facilities but rather with directly suppressing unlawful local activities from which organized crime drew its sustenance. U. S. v. Colacurcio, C.A.9 (Wash.) 1974, 499 F.2d 1401. Extortion 4

The overriding congressional purpose in relation to enactment of this section was to permit the federal government to act against members of organized crime whose activity crossed state lines when local law enforcement officers were unable or unwilling to do so, and not to extend federal power to deal with corruption in local pro- secutors' offices by affording the corrupters an opportunity to use interstate or foreign telephone facilities in dealing with an undercover agent on a casual and incidental basis. U. S. v. Archer, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1973, 486 F.2d 670. Commerce 82.10

This section, which prohibits travel in interstate commerce or use of interstate facilities to promote or carry on certain unlawful activities, is aimed principally at organized criminal enterprises, whose operations extend across state lines. U. S. v. Gooding, C.A.5 (Fla.) 1973, 473 F.2d 425, certiorari denied 93 S.Ct. 2752, 412 U.S. 928, 37 L.Ed.2d 155.

Purpose of this section prohibiting travel or transportation in commerce in aid of racketeering enterprises is to attack criminal activities extending beyond borders of one state by providing federal assistance in situations in which local law enforcement is ineffective. U. S. v. Altobella, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1971, 442 F.2d 310. Commerce 82.10

This section making it a crime to travel in interstate commerce to further any of the specified unlawful activities is intended to make interstate travel or transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises a crime. U. S. v. Hawthorne, C.A.4 (W.Va.) 1966, 356 F.2d 740, certiorari denied 86 S.Ct. 1344, 384 U.S. 908, 16 L.Ed.2d 360. See, also, U.S. v. Azar, D.C.Mich.1964, 243 F.Supp. 345. Commerce 82.6

This section making it an offense to travel in interstate commerce or use interstate telephone facilities with intent of carrying out unlawful activity involving extortion was aimed primarily at organized crime but its chief

focus is on use of facilities of interstate commerce with intent of furthering unlawful activities. U. S. v. Vespe, D.C.Del.1975, 389 F.Supp. 1359, affirmed 520 F.2d 1369, certiorari denied 96 S.Ct. 779, 423 U.S. 1051, 46 L.Ed.2d 640. Telecommunications 1012

Main purpose in enacting this section prohibiting travel in interstate commerce or use of any facility in interstate commerce with intent to carry on any unlawful activity was to attempt to curb pollution of interstate commerce by elements of organized crime. U. S. v. Zirpolo, D.C.N.J.1968, 288 F.Supp. 993, reversed on other grounds 450 F.2d 424. Commerce 82.10

This section was not intended to reach all participants in dice games but is sufficiently broad to encompass individuals using interstate facility, including the mails, where interstate activity is sufficiently related to subsequent performance or attempted performance of any gambling-business enterprise. U. S. v. Harris, E.D.Va.1967, 275 F.Supp. 161, affirmed 399 F.2d 687. Gaming 62

This section, making interstate and foreign travel or transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises an offense, was designed to attack entrenched operation rather than sporadic poker game or floating crap game, and no act of travel is to be deemed unlawful unless enterprise is a continuing one. U. S. v. Teemer, N.D.W.Va.1963, 214 F.Supp. 952. Gaming 63(2)

14. Retroactive effect of section

Fact that former section 955a of Title 21 [now section 1903 of Title 46] which proscribed drug offense that was charged as predicate crime for Travel Act violations was not enacted until September 1980 did not give rise to violation of due process rights of defendants charged with committing unlawful acts prior to that time, where six of eight specific acts constituting Travel Act violation occurred after enactment of statute. U.S. v. Cortez, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1985, 757 F.2d 1204, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 310, 474 U.S. 945, 88 L.Ed.2d 287. Constitution- al Law 4509(1)

Although plan for payoff for award of contract by city had its origin prior to enactment of this section, upon ad- option of this section, plan contemplating use of interstate facilities and interstate travel became unlawful, membership of defendants in plan was converted into membership in unlawful conspiracy and that conspiracy continued until accomplishment of last of its objects. U. S. v. Kubacki, E.D.Pa.1965, 237 F.Supp. 638. Bribery 1(1); Conspiracy 33(6)

15. Retroactive effect of court decisions

Claim on motion to set aside conviction that introduction of defendant's gambling tax returns in prosecution for traveling in interstate commerce with intent to carry on an illegal gambling enterprise violated defendant's privilege against self-incrimination involved only procedures utilized in procuring a conviction, so that, in collateral proceeding wherein claim was presented, law in effect at time conviction became final and not subsequent decisions recognizing privilege against self-incrimination as a valid defense to prosecution was applicable. Zizzo v. U. S., C.A.7 (Ind.) 1971, 447 F.2d 857, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 714, 404 U.S. 1048, 30 L.Ed.2d 739. Courts

100(1)

16. Law governing

In prosecution for conspiracy to travel in interstate commerce and use interstate facilities with intent to violate specific state bribery statutes, where defendant's conviction may have been based upon transaction with state official who was subsequently held by state's highest court not to be a bribable official, state court decision was binding requiring that conviction be vacated and case remanded for new trial, despite fact that defendant did not raise claim in his direct appeal. U. S. v. Brown, C.A.4 (W.Va.) 1974, 505 F.2d 261. Criminal Law 1189

In prosecution for traveling in interstate or foreign commerce to promote unlawful activity in violation of state law, federal court is required to consider every element of crime and every issue raised under each element; law involved is federal law and all issues raised thereunder become federal issues; if necessary to resolution of case, federal court may interpret state law but it does so as one step in process of properly interpreting federal criminal statute. U. S. v. D'Amato, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1970, 436 F.2d 52. Federal Courts 404

In prosecution for violation of this section, operative distinction was between situations in which federal court “applied” state law and those in which federal court “interpreted” state law, the former situation being the one in which federal court is “bound”; however, due to overriding federal purpose served by this section, federal district court was required to interpret all of laws implicated by instant prosecution, including Nevada laws, and it therefore was not bound by Nevada Supreme Court's Rosenthal decision construing underlying state statute, whatever its constitutional merits or infirmities. U.S. v. Goldfarb, E.D.Mich.1979, 464 F.Supp. 565. Federal Courts 404

17. Power of Congress

Congress, by relying upon state law to supply an element of offense pursuant to this section, had not impermissibly delegated its legislative power to the states, since it is not violation of state law which constitutes an offense under this section, but rather the use of interstate means for that purpose. U.S. v. Hines, C.A.10 (Okla.) 1982, 696 F.2d 722. Commerce 82.10; Constitutional Law 2436

Congress under the commerce clause, U.S.C.A.Const. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3, has power to make it unlawful to travel from one state to another to promote a gambling enterprise illicit by law of the state where the gambling is carried on, and therefore this section was not void as an exercise of power not delegated to the United States. U. S. v. Zizzo, C.A.7 (Ind.) 1964, 338 F.2d 577, certiorari denied 85 S.Ct. 1530, 381 U.S. 915, 14 L.Ed.2d 435, rehearing denied 86 S.Ct. 1856, 384 U.S. 982, 16 L.Ed.2d 693. Commerce 82.10

Conduct that was not susceptible to classification as generic extortion was not actionable under Travel Act. Cintas Corp. v. Unite Here, S.D.N.Y.2009, 601 F.Supp.2d 571, affirmed 355 Fed.Appx. 508, 2009 WL 4577027. Commerce 82.10

This section as applied to defendants charged with conspiring to use facilities in interstate commerce for purpose

of bribing town officials to obtain building permit and easements, is not invalid exercise of congressional power. U. S. v. Zirpolo, D.C.N.J.1968, 288 F.Supp. 993, reversed on other grounds 450 F.2d 424. Indictment And In- formation 125(43.1)

Use of interstate facilities to further commission of illegal activities, whether those activities, be federal or purely state in nature, is within regulatory power of Congress. U. S. v. Kelley, S.D.N.Y.1966, 254 F.Supp. 9. Commerce 82.10

This section proscribing interstate travel in aid of racketeering enterprises was within power of Congress under commerce clause. U. S. v. Ryan, D.C.Colo.1963, 213 F.Supp. 763. Commerce 82.10

18. State regulation or control

Section 1084 of this title prohibiting transmittal of wagering information in interstate commerce by use of wire communications did not so preempt state statute, S.H.A.Ill. ch. 38, § 28-1, prohibiting transmittal by telephone of wagering information as to make impossible conviction of defendant under this section prohibiting use of facility in interstate commerce to carry on gambling activity prohibited under state law. U.S. v. Ruthstein, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1969, 414 F.2d 1079. States 18.81

This section prohibiting use of any facility in interstate commerce with intent to commit any crime of violence to further any unlawful activity embodies congressional determination not to proscribe underlying state substantive offense but rather to prohibit use of interstate facilities with intention of promoting substantive state offense and fact that state courts may have jurisdiction to prosecute defendants for underlying offense does not bar prosecution under this section. McIntosh v. U. S., C.A.8 (Mo.) 1967, 385 F.2d 274. Commerce 82.10

19. Territorial application of section

This section which prohibits interstate and foreign travel or transportation aid of racketeering enterprises is applicable to territories, including Guam. U. S. v. Taitano, C.A.9 (Guam) 1971, 442 F.2d 467, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 92, 404 U.S. 852, 30 L.Ed.2d 92. Territories 18

20. States

Puerto Rico was a “state” for purposes of this section which permitted federal prosecutions based on use of facilities of interstate commerce in furtherance of bribery in violation of laws of state. U. S. v. Steele, C.A.3 (N.J.) 1982, 685 F.2d 793, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 213, 459 U.S. 908, 74 L.Ed.2d 170. Bribery 1(1)

21. Separate and distinct offenses

Each crossing of United States-Mexico border, in course of smuggling illegal drugs from Mexico into United States, constituted separate “act of travel” under Travel Act [18 U.S.C.A. § 1952] which could be charged as separate offense against defendant. U.S. v. Douglass, C.A.9 (Ariz.) 1986, 780 F.2d 1472. Criminal Law

29(8)

The determination of whether a group of acts represents a single, continuing scheme or a set of separate and distinct offenses is a difficult one that must be left at least initially to discretion of prosecution, but this discretion is not without limits. U. S. v. Alsobrook, C.A.6 (Mich.) 1980, 620 F.2d 139, certiorari denied 101 S.Ct. 124, 449 U.S. 843, 66 L.Ed.2d 51. Criminal Law 29(1)

In view of plain import of language of this section, the absence of any contrary indication in the legislative history, and the construction given comparable statutes over the years, conclusion was required that each act of travel could be treated as a separate violation of this section. U. S. v. Polizzi, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1974, 500 F.2d 856, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 802, 419 U.S. 1120, 42 L.Ed.2d 820, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 803, 419 U.S. 1120, 42 L.Ed.2d 820. Gaming 81

“Mail fraud” and “interstate travel in and of racketeering” are separate and distinct offenses. U. S. v. Di Stefano, M.D.Fla.1973, 361 F.Supp. 971. Gaming 62; Postal Service 35(2)

Once continuity of enterprise is established, any act of travel, with requisite intent and subsequent participation, is separate offense under this section making interstate and foreign travel or transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises an offense, even if travel is daily or regular event and thus perhaps continuing activity. U. S. v. Teemer, N.D.W.Va.1963, 214 F.Supp. 952. Gaming 81

22. Aiding and abetting

Defendant who arranged for shipment of marijuana from Indiana to Florida and promised to pay for marijuana was properly convicted under Travel Act of abetting interstate travel in aid of racketeering. U.S. v. Baker, C.A.7 (Ind.) 1990, 905 F.2d 1100, certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 206, 498 U.S. 876, 112 L.Ed.2d 167, certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 270, 498 U.S. 904, 112 L.Ed.2d 226, certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 686, 498 U.S. 1030, 112 L.Ed.2d 677, habeas corpus dismissed 922 F.2d 843, denial of post-conviction relief affirmed 86 F.3d 1158. Commerce 82.10

Government could convict defendant of violation of Travel Act based on theory that he aided and abetted codefendant's interstate travel once it produced adequate proof that codefendant traveled interstate; it was unnecessary for Government to show that defendant induced or even had knowledge of codefendant's interstate travel as part of their criminal activity in drug transaction. U.S. v. Abadie, C.A.5 (Miss.) 1989, 879 F.2d 1260, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 110 S.Ct. 569, 493 U.S. 1005, 107 L.Ed.2d 563. Commerce 82.10

In order for defendants to be convicted as accomplices to a Travel Act violation, the Government was not required to prove that the defendants intended that interstate facilities be used but only that they intended that the illegal activity described in the Travel Act be carried out. U.S. v. Stern, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1988, 858 F.2d 1241. Com- merce 82.6

Defendant's knowledge of or assistance in principals' use of interstate facilities to carry on prostitution enterprise was not prerequisite for conviction as aider and abettor of promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on of prostitution enterprise through use of mails so long as defendant knew nature of substantive offense that he furthered or promoted. U.S. v. Sigalow, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1987, 812 F.2d 783. Prostitution 22

To establish aiding and abetting, government is required to show that defendant associated himself with the unlawful venture, that he participated in it as something he wished to bring about and that he sought by his action to make it succeed. U.S. v. DeLuna, C.A.8 (Mo.) 1985, 763 F.2d 897, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 382, 474 U.S. 980, 88 L.Ed.2d 336. Criminal Law 59(5)

Conviction under this section could not stand absent proof that defendant aided codefendant's violation of the Act or caused codefendant to engage in it. U.S. v. Pepe, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1984, 747 F.2d 632. Commerce 82.6

Where government introduced a large amount of evidence concerning codefendant's intent to dominate gambling activities in county, rational trier of fact could believe beyond reasonable doubt that defendant's conduct in ef- fectuating the return of slot machines to codefendant aided and abetted codefendant in promoting or attempting to promote various gambling activities. U. S. v. Loucas, C.A.4 (W.Va.) 1980, 629 F.2d 989, certiorari denied 101 S.Ct. 1738, 450 U.S. 1030, 68 L.Ed.2d 224. Gaming 98(1)

In order to convict codefendant for aiding and abetting defendant's traveling in interstate commerce with intent to carry on unlawful gambling activity in violation of this section, it was necessary that jury find beyond reasonable doubt that codefendant had actual knowledge of defendant's interstate travel. U. S. v. Alsobrook, C.A.6 (Mich.) 1980, 620 F.2d 139, certiorari denied 101 S.Ct. 124, 449 U.S. 843, 66 L.Ed.2d 51. Gaming 62

Although after start of relationship between owner of Wisconsin sporting goods store and Illinois bookmaker one defendant, a friend of the owner, spoke with the latter at least once a day as to betting one side of particular games and placed substantial bets with the owner and, on occasion, used owner's phone to collect line information, such showing was insufficient to establish that such defendant was the owner's partner or, alternatively, an aider and abettor in transmitting wages or bets interstate, in traveling interstate to facilitate or promote gambling activity and conspiring with owner to transmit wagering information interstate. U. S. v. Anderson, C.A.7 (Wis.) 1976, 542 F.2d 428. Conspiracy 47(7); Gaming 98(1)

In the absence of proof that madame of house of prostitution had knowledge that other persons had violated this section in bringing women to the house, she could not be held for aiding and abetting the violation of this section by the others. U. S. v. Prince, C.A.6 (Ohio) 1976, 529 F.2d 1108, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 108, 429 U.S. 838, 50 L.Ed.2d 105. Prostitution 19(3)

Where government showed that defendants were involved in a gambling operation where the use of telephones was apparent and where interstate telephone calls were not unlikely, government was not required to prove, in order to sustain convictions under this section, that defendants knew that they were causing or aiding and abetting the interstate use of telephone facilities. U. S. v. Villano, C.A.10 (Colo.) 1976, 529 F.2d 1046, certiorari

denied 96 S.Ct. 3180, 426 U.S. 953, 49 L.Ed.2d 1193. Gaming 62

“Telephone girls” who received bets in illegal gambling enterprise could be convicted under this section as aiders and abettors even though they handled no checks and thus did not “use” a facility in interstate commerce. U.S. v. LeFaivre, C.A.4 (Md.) 1974, 507 F.2d 1288, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 1446, 420 U.S. 1004, 43 L.Ed.2d 762. Gaming 79(1)

No constitutional bar existed to conviction for both conspiracy or aiding or abetting, which underlay the conviction of some of the defendants on some of the substantive counts alleged in prosecution for violation of this section. U. S. v. Polizzi, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1974, 500 F.2d 856, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 802, 419 U.S. 1120, 42 L.Ed.2d 820, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 803, 419 U.S. 1120, 42 L.Ed.2d 820. Conspiracy 28(3)

A defendant who furnished employment in Indiana in a gambling enterprise to three employees who resided in Illinois could be found guilty of violation of this section proscribing interstate travel or transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises on basis that such employment of Illinois residents amounted to an aiding or abetting of their interstate travel. U. S. v. Zizzo, C.A.7 (Ind.) 1964, 338 F.2d 577, certiorari denied 85 S.Ct. 1530, 381 U.S. 915, 14 L.Ed.2d 435, rehearing denied 86 S.Ct. 1856, 384 U.S. 982, 16 L.Ed.2d 693. Gaming 62

23. Conspiracy

Defendant who participated in drug distribution conspiracy was properly convicted of causing persons to travel in interstate commerce in furtherance of conspiracy; it was immaterial whether defendant personally caused, or knew of, interstate travel because, as coconspirator, he was liable for other participant's acts in furtherance of conspiracy. U.S. v. Auerbach, C.A.7 (Ind.) 1990, 913 F.2d 407. Commerce 82.10

Defendant's conspiracy conviction did not merge into his conviction for substantive offense under this section proscribing the use of facilities of interstate commerce with intent to commit arson. U. S. v. Nickerson, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1979, 606 F.2d 156, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 528, 444 U.S. 994, 62 L.Ed.2d 424. Conspiracy 37

In a prosecution under this section it is unnecessary to prove that defendant had actual knowledge of the jurisdictional elements, and that he actually agreed and intended to use interstate facilities to commit a crime; hence, to prove a conspiracy to violate this section the government need not establish that the defendants agreed or intended to use facilities of interstate commerce. U. S. v. Herrera, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1978, 584 F.2d 1137. Conspiracy 28(3)

Where conspiracy is shown, conspirators are responsible under this section for interstate acts caused by their coconspirators in furtherance of unlawful activity. U.S. v. Craig, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1977, 573 F.2d 455, certiorari denied 99 S.Ct. 82, 439 U.S. 820, 58 L.Ed.2d 110, certiorari denied 99 S.Ct. 83, 439 U.S. 820, 58 L.Ed.2d 110. Conspiracy 41

Fact that one codefendant wished venture between two other defendants, one of whom was a Wisconsin sporting

goods store owner and other of whom was an Illinois bookmaker, to succeed so that he could place bets with the owner was not enough to make him a participant in conspiracy to, among other things, transmit wagering information by use of interstate facilities. U. S. v. Anderson, C.A.7 (Wis.) 1976, 542 F.2d 428. Conspiracy 40.1

Where acts challenged in substantive counts charging violation of this section and section 1341 of this title amounted to federal crimes, acts could serve as basis for charges of conspiracy to violate those provisions. U. S. v. Rauhoff, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1975, 525 F.2d 1170. Conspiracy 28(3); Conspiracy 32

“Telephone girls” who received bets in illegal gambling operation were properly convicted as willing members of conspiracy in furtherance of which acts constituting substantive violations of this section were committed, whether or not such defendants had knowledge that principals had used interstate facilities by cashing and depositing bettors' checks. U.S. v. LeFaivre, C.A.4 (Md.) 1974, 507 F.2d 1288, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 1446, 420 U.S. 1004, 43 L.Ed.2d 762. Gaming 79(1)

In prosecution for violation of this section and section 371 of this title, intent element of offense required only that the government show that at some time during conspiracy defendants had intent to cause the interstate travel for purposes of extortion, and to convict it was not necessary that jury find that defendants had committed some acts in furtherance of conspiracy following the interstate or foreign travel. U. S. v. Marquez, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1971, 449 F.2d 89, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 1167, 405 U.S. 963, 31 L.Ed.2d 239, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 1173, 405 U.S. 963, 31 L.Ed.2d 239. Conspiracy 28(3)

Provision of this section pertaining to offense of conspiracy to use and actual use of facilities in interstate commerce to carry on an unlawful gambling business is not within exception to prosecution's normal right to charge both a substantive offense and a conspiracy. Nolan v. U. S., C.A.10 (Okla.) 1969, 423 F.2d 1031, certiorari denied 91 S.Ct. 47, 400 U.S. 848, 27 L.Ed.2d 85. Conspiracy 37

In prosecution for conspiring to travel in interstate commerce with intent to carry on unlawful activity involving extortion, government was obliged to prove that there was agreement to commit crime of interstate travel in aid of racketeering and to show at least one overt act toward that end; it was not necessary for government to prove accomplishment of objective of conspiracy; it also was not necessary that prosecutor prove each of overt acts alleged in the indictment. U. S. v. Fellabaum, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1969, 408 F.2d 220, certiorari denied 90 S.Ct. 125, 396 U.S. 858, 24 L.Ed.2d 109, certiorari denied 90 S.Ct. 55, 396 U.S. 818, 24 L.Ed.2d 69. Conspiracy 43(12)

A charge of conspiracy to violate this section prohibiting use of mail to carry on any unlawful activity, including bribery, could be maintained against defendants even though only persons involved were persons who gave and received the bribe involving the vote of a member on board of supervisors in favor of rezoning tract of land to permit its use as shopping center. U. S. v. Parzow, C.A.4 (Va.) 1968, 391 F.2d 240, certiorari denied 89 S.Ct. 82, 393 U.S. 823, 21 L.Ed.2d 94. Conspiracy 28(3)

Proof of a conspiracy to violate federal gambling laws requires at least the degree of criminal intent necessary

for the substantive offenses themselves. U.S. v. Chase, C.A.4 (Va.) 1967, 372 F.2d 453, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 1688, 387 U.S. 907, 18 L.Ed.2d 626, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 1701, 387 U.S. 913, 18 L.Ed.2d 635. Con- spiracy 28(3)

To prove violation of Travel Act [18 U.S.C.A. § 1952(a)] by defendant, Government was not required to prove that defendant himself traveled or participated in interstate telephone call, that defendant specifically authorized another person to do so, or the defendant was even aware that act was taking place, where each call or act of travel was conducted by person acting as coconspirator or aider or abettor of defendant in furtherance of continuing conspiracy to fix criminal cases in defendant's court. U.S. v. Brennan, E.D.N.Y.1986, 629 F.Supp. 283, affirmed 798 F.2d 581, habeas corpus granted 685 F.Supp. 883, affirmed 867 F.2d 111, certiorari denied 109 S.Ct. 1750, 490 U.S. 1022, 104 L.Ed.2d 187. Commerce 82.10

In a prosecution for conspiracy to violate this section, it is required that the aim of the conspiracy be an unlawful activity within the special definitional requirement of this section. U. S. v. Slawik, D.C.Del.1975, 408 F.Supp. 190, affirmed 564 F.2d 90. Conspiracy 28(3)

Defendants who participated with alleged coconspirator in his local gambling operation could not be convicted of conspiracy to use interstate facilities in connection with gambling activities where there was no probative evidence or reasonable inference that defendants knew coconspirator was engaged in interstate activity. U. S. v. Machi, E.D.Wis.1972, 352 F.Supp. 1173. Conspiracy 47(7)

24. Persons liable

As used in this section which prohibits the crossing of state lines or use of interstate facilities to carry out any unlawful activity, including extortion, the term “whoever” includes private persons as well as public officials. U. S. v. Nardello, U.S.Pa.1969, 89 S.Ct. 534, 393 U.S. 286, 21 L.Ed.2d 487. Extortion 21

Interstate travel by others that results in violation of state bribery statutes gives rise to substantive violation of Travel Act by one that ordered travel. U.S. v. Fitzpatrick, C.A.1 (R.I.) 1989, 892 F.2d 162. Commerce 82.10

This section reaches anyone who travels interstate or uses interstate facility with intent to facilitate an unlawful activity and thereafter actually performs or attempts to perform an act in aid thereof; travel and act must be in furtherance of unlawful activity. U. S. v. Jones, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1981, 642 F.2d 909. Commerce 82.6

State law proscribing extortion by public officers could not be used to question federal prosecution for violation of this section where defendant was not public officer but political party functionary. U. S. v. Graham, C.A.9 (Wash.) 1978, 581 F.2d 789. Criminal Law 31

Applicability of this section making it a federal crime to travel in interstate commerce with intent to promote or to carry on extortion in violation of state laws is not limited to activity on part of organized crime but reaches

the unlawful activity of individuals. U. S. v. Phillips, C.A.8 (Mo.) 1970, 433 F.2d 1364, certiorari denied 91 S.Ct. 900, 401 U.S. 917, 27 L.Ed.2d 819. Extortion 19

Evidence was insufficient to show that two defendants, who had crossed state line, were other than customers in placing bets at gaming establishment, and therefore, their convictions under this section as to interstate travel in aid of racketeering enterprises could not stand. Rewis v. U. S., C.A.5 (Fla.) 1969, 418 F.2d 1218, certiorari granted 91 S.Ct. 86, 400 U.S. 818, 27 L.Ed.2d 45, reversed on other grounds 91 S.Ct. 1056, 401 U.S. 808, 28 L.Ed.2d 493. Gaming 98(1)

Proprietors of poolroom who knew that their patrons were posting baseball scores on blackboards from information received by tickertape from another state facilitated operation of baseball pool in violation of state law and were punishable as principals under this section prohibition use of interstate facility to carry on any unlawful activity. U. S. v. Miller, C.A.7 (Ind.) 1967, 379 F.2d 483, certiorari denied 88 S.Ct. 291, 389 U.S. 930, 19 L.Ed.2d 281. Gaming 62; Gaming 76

Federal district court had jurisdiction over indictment charging defendant with interstate travel in aid of racketeering, even though indictment arose out of defendant's alleged commercial bribery of chairman of sovereign In- dian nation, where defendant was not himself an Indian and where alleged unlawful acts took place off the reservation. U.S. v. Tonry, E.D.La.1986, 633 F.Supp. 643. Indians 277

Both giver and taker of bribe may be charged as coconspirators to violate this section. U. S. v. Hall, D.C.Okla.1975, 424 F.Supp. 508, affirmed 536 F.2d 313, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 313, 429 U.S. 919, 50 L.Ed.2d 285. Bribery 3

If Congress had intended this section prohibiting use of a facility in interstate commerce with intent to carry on an unlawful activity to apply only to organized crime, it would of necessity have included a definition of “organized crime” in this section; otherwise, courts would be faced with the insurmountable task of determining exactly to whom this section applies. U. S. v. Archer, S.D.N.Y.1972, 355 F.Supp. 981, reversed 486 F.2d 670. Commerce 82.10

This section entitled “interstate and foreign travel or transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises” was applicable to defendants, one of whom allegedly traveled in interstate commerce to offer bribe to other defendants, city officials, as against defendants' contention that this section could be applied only where organized crime and racketeering are involved. U. S. v. Deardorff, S.D.N.Y.1971, 343 F.Supp. 1033. Bribery 1(1)

Criminal responsibility for causing persons to travel in interstate commerce for purpose of promoting an illegal activity cannot be avoided on basis that the particular agent, which the accused has selected to perform an act essential to the commission of the crime, was devoid of the criminal intent required to render the agent himself culpable. U. S. v. Zirpolo, D.C.N.J.1968, 288 F.Supp. 993, reversed on other grounds 450 F.2d 424. Commerce 82.10

This section prohibiting interstate travel to facilitate unlawful activity, such as gambling, covered gambling activities of defendants including those of supervisor, ladderman, dealer, lugger and doorman. U. S. v. Barrow, E.D.Pa.1964, 229 F.Supp. 722, affirmed in part, reversed in part on other grounds 363 F.2d 62, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 703, 385 U.S. 1001, 17 L.Ed.2d 541. Gaming 62

This section prohibiting use of facilities of interstate commerce to facilitate gambling in violation of state law applies to, but is not limited in application to, individuals who have interests in gambling operations but are not subject to local prosecution because of residence in another state. U. S. v. Barrow, E.D.Pa.1962, 212 F.Supp. 837. Gaming 63(2)

II. ELEMENTS OF OFFENSE

Generally 51 Act within section 53 Actual or attempted performance 52 Advertisements, use of facility in commerce 82 Causation, use of facility in commerce 79 Check deposits, use of facility in commerce 83 Common carriers, use of facility in commerce 84 Connection with unlawful activity, interstate or foreign travel 63 Connection with unlawful activity, use of facility in commerce 80 Credit card charges, use of facility in commerce 85 Cultivation of business or political friendship, intent, knowledge, or purpose 57 Distribution of proceeds 54 Facilitation of unlawful activity 55 Foreseeability, interstate or foreign travel 64 Foreseeability, use of facility in commerce 81 Hotels or motels, use of facility in commerce 86 Intent, knowledge, or purpose 56-61 Intent, knowledge, or purpose - Generally 56 Intent, knowledge, or purpose - Cultivation of business or political friendship 57 Intent, knowledge, or purpose - Interstate or foreign travel 59 Intent, knowledge, or purpose - Number of purposes 58 Intent, knowledge, or purpose - Use of facility in commerce 60 Intent, knowledge, or purpose - Violation of state or federal law 61 Interstate or foreign travel 59, 62-73 Interstate or foreign travel - Generally 62 Interstate or foreign travel - Connection with unlawful activity 63 Interstate or foreign travel - Foreseeability 64 Interstate or foreign travel - Intent, knowledge, or purpose 59 Interstate or foreign travel - Lawfulness of travel or activity 65 Interstate or foreign travel - Miscellaneous cases established 72

Interstate or foreign travel - Miscellaneous cases not established 73 Interstate or foreign travel - Number of activities affecting 66 Interstate or foreign travel - Number of trips 67 Interstate or foreign travel - Patrons 68 Interstate or foreign travel - Prostitutes 69 Interstate or foreign travel - Time of travel 71 Interstate or foreign travel - Victims 70 Joint or concerted action 74 Knowledge 56-61 Lawfulness of travel or activity, interstate or foreign travel 65 Mails, use of facility in commerce 87 Miscellaneous cases established, interstate or foreign travel 72 Miscellaneous cases established, use of facility in commerce 93 Miscellaneous cases not established, interstate or foreign travel 73 Newspapers, use of facility in commerce 88 Number of activities affecting, interstate or foreign travel 66 Number of purposes, intent, knowledge, or purpose 58 Number of trips, interstate or foreign travel 67 Organized crime 77 Patrons, interstate or foreign travel 68 Promotion of unlawful activity 75 Prostitutes, interstate or foreign travel 69 Purpose 56-61 Success of activity 76 Telephone or telegraph use, use of facility in commerce 89 Tickertapes, use of facility in commerce 90 Time of determination, use of facility in commerce 92 Time of travel, interstate or foreign travel 71 Time of use, use of facility in commerce 91 Underworld or organized crime 77 Use of facility in commerce 60, 78-93 Use of facility in commerce - Generally 78 Use of facility in commerce - Advertisements 82 Use of facility in commerce - Causation 79 Use of facility in commerce - Check deposits 83 Use of facility in commerce - Common carriers 84 Use of facility in commerce - Connection with unlawful activity 80 Use of facility in commerce - Credit card charges 85 Use of facility in commerce - Foreseeability 81 Use of facility in commerce - Hotels or motels 86 Use of facility in commerce - Intent, knowledge, or purpose 60 Use of facility in commerce - Mails 87 Use of facility in commerce - Miscellaneous cases established 93 Use of facility in commerce - Newspapers 88 Use of facility in commerce - Telephone or telegraph use 89

Use of facility in commerce - Tickertapes 90 Use of facility in commerce - Time of determination 92 Use of facility in commerce - Time of use 91 Victims, interstate or foreign travel 70 Violation of state or federal law, intent, knowledge, or purpose 61

51. Generally, elements of offense

To establish violation of Travel Act, government must prove that defendants engaged in interstate travel with intent to promote unlawful activity or that they committed overt act in performing or attempting to perform unlawful activity. U.S. v. Fetlow, C.A.8 (Mo.) 1994, 21 F.3d 243, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 456, 513 U.S. 977, 130 L.Ed.2d 365, denial of post-conviction relief affirmed 175 F.3d 1025. Commerce 82.10

In order to convict defendants of interstate travel in aid of racketeering, as charged in indictment alleging scheme to bomb homosexual bar, government was required to prove: travel in or use of facilities of interstate commerce; intent to commit crime of violence; to further arson of building or business; and subsequent overt act in furtherance of arson. U.S. v. Winslow, C.A.9 (Idaho) 1992, 962 F.2d 845, as amended. Commerce 82.10

To establish “Travel Act violation,” proof must show that defendant: traveled or used facilities in interstate commerce; with intent to promote, manage, establish, or carry on prohibited activity; and thereafter attempted to or did in fact engage in one of proscribed activities. U.S. v. Johnson, C.A.10 (Okla.) 1992, 961 F.2d 1488. Com- merce 82.10

Travel Act violation must be supported by proof that defendant traveled or used facilities in interstate commerce with intent to promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on of prohibited activity and thereafter attempted to or did in fact engage one of proscribed activities. U.S. v. Peveto, C.A.10 (Okla.) 1989, 881 F.2d 844, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 110 S.Ct. 348, 493 U.S. 943, 107 L.Ed.2d 336, denial of post-conviction relief affirmed 971 F.2d 506. Commerce 82.10

A defendant may properly be convicted of committing substantive violation of this section in three separate and distinct ways, i.e., by traveling interstate with intent to violate state law, by using interstate facility with intent to violate state law or by causing another to use interstate facility or travel interstate with intent to violate state law, and a criminal defendant violates federal law when he performs any of the above with intent to violate state law. U.S. v. Briggs, C.A.7 (Wis.) 1983, 700 F.2d 408, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 2129, 461 U.S. 947, 77 L.Ed.2d 1307, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 2463, 462 U.S. 1110, 77 L.Ed.2d 1340. Commerce 82.10

Proof of violation of this section requires showing of interstate travel or use of interstate facility, with intent to promote an unlawful activity, and an overt act in furtherance of that unlawful activity. U. S. v. Tavelman, C.A.9 (Nev.) 1981, 650 F.2d 1133, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 1429, 455 U.S. 939, 71 L.Ed.2d 649. Commerce 82.6

Elements of violation of this section are use of facilities of interstate commerce, intent to promote, manage, es-

tablish, carry on or facilitate any unlawful activity, and performance of or attempt to perform such unlawful act. U. S. v. Stevens, C.A.10 (Kan.) 1979, 612 F.2d 1226, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 3011, 447 U.S. 921, 65 L.Ed.2d 1113. Commerce 82.6

A violation of this section occurs when a person travels in interstate commerce or uses any facilities in interstate commerce to promote any unlawful activity as defined by this section. U. S. v. Wander, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1979, 601 F.2d 1251. Commerce 82.6

To conduct a successful prosecution under this section, government must prove that accused voluntarily used facilities of interstate commerce, that accused attempted to or did in fact promote, manage, establish, carry on or facilitate the promotion, management, establishment or carrying on of any one of the statutorily defined activities and that the accused formed a specific intent to manage, establish, carry on or facilitate one of the prohibited activities. U. S. v. Gibson Specialty Co., C.A.9 (Mont.) 1974, 507 F.2d 446.

To successfully prosecute one under provision of this section against using facilities of interstate commerce to promote gambling, United States must prove: that accused voluntarily traveled in interstate commerce or used facilities in interstate commerce, that he attempted to or did in fact promote, manage, establish, carry on or facilitate promotion, management, establishment or carrying on of any one of certain statutorily defined activities and that accused formed specific intent to promote, manage, establish, carry on or facilitate one of the prohibited activities. U. S. v. Gebhart, C.A.6 (Ky.) 1971, 441 F.2d 1261, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 97, 404 U.S. 855, 30 L.Ed.2d 96. Gaming 62

Three basic elements to the crime of interstate travel in aid of racketeering are: interstate travel, intent to promote, direct or manage illegal business, and an overt act in attempting or participating in the illegal business. Spinelli v. U. S., C.A.8 (Mo.) 1967, 382 F.2d 871, certiorari granted 88 S.Ct. 1025, 390 U.S. 942, 19 L.Ed.2d 1130, modified 88 S.Ct. 1834, 391 U.S. 933, 20 L.Ed.2d 853, reversed on other grounds 89 S.Ct. 584, 393 U.S. 410, 21 L.Ed.2d 637. Gaming 62

Person who travels or uses facility in interstate commerce with requisite intent and with the subsequent participation in the unlawful activity lies within the path of this section. U. S. v. Raineri, W.D.Wis.1980, 521 F.Supp. 16 . Commerce 82.6

In prosecution under this section, plain language of this section requires that the defendants be found to have traveled in interstate or foreign commerce or to have used a facility in interstate or foreign commerce with intent to take certain types of actions in pursuit of an unlawful activity. U. S. v. Slawik, D.C.Del.1975, 408 F.Supp. 190, affirmed 564 F.2d 90. Commerce 82

52. Actual or attempted performance, elements of offense

Travel Act does not require that Government establish that accused took substantial step in furtherance of intended unlawful activity. U.S. v. Jenkins, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1991, 943 F.2d 167, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 659, 502 U.S. 1014, 116 L.Ed.2d 751. Commerce 82.10

In prosecution of defendant for interstate travel with intent to promote unlawful activity in relation to scheme to profit from bet on races involving horses drugged by coconspirators of defendant under defendant's direction, government was not required to prove that either actual or attempted drugging actually occurred since as long as interstate travel and subsequent facilitating act make unlawful activity easier, jurisdictional requisites under this section governing interstate and foreign travel or transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises are complete. U.S. v. Griffin, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1983, 699 F.2d 1102. Commerce 82.6

As to nature and essentiality of underlying state law violation, in prosecution for violation under this section, it is not necessary that state crime be actually accomplished, but it is necessary to show that defendants engaged in some form of unlawful activity prohibited by state law. U. S. v. Goldfarb, C.A.6 (Mich.) 1981, 643 F.2d 422, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 117, 454 U.S. 827, 70 L.Ed.2d 101, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 118, 454 U.S. 827, 70 L.Ed.2d 101. Commerce 82.10

Lawyer, prosecuted under this section for bribing village officials to obtain favorable rezoning of land on behalf of land developer, committed “thereafter act” required under this section when, after bribes had been paid to officials, lawyer billed land company and accepted successive payments from it as reimbursement for sums thus advanced and as fees. U. S. v. Peskin, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1975, 527 F.2d 71, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 63, 429 U.S. 818, 50 L.Ed.2d 79. Bribery 1(1)

Act of registering is merely a statement of future intent and is not itself an act which promotes or otherwise facilitates gambling, and act of registering does not complete crime proscribed by this section even when defendant has theretofore traveled in interstate commerce with intent to promote gambling. U. S. v. Cefalu, C.A.7 (Wis.) 1964, 338 F.2d 582. Gaming 62

Evidence establishing actual use of dice found in defendant's home following shipment in interstate commerce was not required under this section, but rather what was necessary was that mails were used with intent to promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the promotion, management, establishment or carrying on of an unlawful activity of promotion of dice games. U. S. v. Harris, E.D.Va.1967, 275 F.Supp. 161, affirmed 399 F.2d 687. Gaming 96

53. Act within section, elements of offense

Utah bribery statute properly served as predicate for Travel Act violations alleged against members of committee bidding to host Winter Olympic Games, even though bribery alleged was not part of a criminal or business enterprise; actual violation of the Utah statute was not an element of the alleged Travel Act violations, and interstate nexus of the case, which involved hosting by Utah and the U.S. of an Olympic Games, was substantial. U.S. v. Welch, C.A.10 (Utah) 2003, 327 F.3d 1081. Commerce 82.10

Possession of object is “act” within meaning of Travel Act if possessor knowingly received object or if he became aware that he possessed it for sufficient period of time to have been able to terminate possession. U.S. v. Sanchez DeFundora, C.A.10 (Okla.) 1990, 893 F.2d 1173, 113 A.L.R. Fed. 873, certiorari denied 110 S.Ct. 2190, 495 U.S. 939, 109 L.Ed.2d 518. Commerce 82.10

A narcotics defendant's acts of deplaning and entering terminal were not sufficiently separable from interstate travel itself to satisfy element of Travel Act offense, that defendant perform or attempt to perform act in furtherance of illegal activity after his interstate travel. U.S. v. Zolicoffer, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1989, 869 F.2d 771, certiorari denied 109 S.Ct. 3172, 490 U.S. 1113, 104 L.Ed.2d 1034, dismissal of post-conviction relief affirmed 950 F.2d 724, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 2951, 504 U.S. 977, 119 L.Ed.2d 574. Commerce 82.10

The same conduct cannot satisfy both the “unlawful activity” and “crime of violence” prongs of Travel Act, and thus, in order to violate provision, defendant must intend to commit a crime of violence for the purpose of furthering some other unlawful activity. U.S. v. O'Hara, E.D.Wis.2001, 143 F.Supp.2d 1039. Commerce 82.10

54. Distribution of proceeds, elements of offense

Term “distribute,” as used in statute prohibiting any party from knowingly distributing proceeds of Travel Act enterprise, refers to more than mere expenditure of proceeds; distribution must be to those entitled to proceeds of enterprise. U.S. v. Corona, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1989, 885 F.2d 766, certiorari denied 110 S.Ct. 1838, 494 U.S. 1091, 108 L.Ed.2d 966. Commerce 82.10

When Western Union handed over money to appellants in Florida, which was wired to them at their direction by women working for them at a brothel in Mississippi, “distribution” occurred, and such distribution took place, as this section requires, after the interstate transfer; the handing over in Florida was no less a distribution because it was triggered by the command of the distributing males themselves, and the result was the same as if the women, at the direction of the men, had physically travelled to Florida and personally delivered the prostitution proceeds. U.S. v. Cole, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1983, 704 F.2d 554. Prostitution 19(2)

In the context of this section, the word “distribute” carries the connotation of distribution of illegal proceeds to persons in organized crime conspiracies and the person receiving them must be entitled to them for reasons other than normal and otherwise lawful purchase and sale of goods at market prices. U. S. v. Lightfoot, C.A.D.C.1974, 506 F.2d 238, 165 U.S.App.D.C. 177. Gaming 63(2)

55. Facilitation of unlawful activity, elements of offense

Travel Act defendant's trip to foreign state to arrange for drug kingpin's bail did not “facilitate” any unlawful activity, within meaning of Travel Act, absent evidence that defendant arranged for bail with intent to permit kingpin to return to narcotics business or to escape from justice. U.S. v. Corona, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1989, 885 F.2d 766, certiorari denied 110 S.Ct. 1838, 494 U.S. 1091, 108 L.Ed.2d 966. Commerce 82.10

“Facilitate”, within this section prohibiting use of facilities of interstate commerce with intent to promote, manage, facilitate, or carry on unlawful activity, means to make easy or less difficult. U. S. v. Judkins, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1970, 428 F.2d 333. See, also, Rewis v. U.S., C.A.Fla.1969, 418 F.2d 1218, reversed on other grounds 91 S.Ct. 1056, 401 U.S. 808, 28 L.Ed.2d 493. See, also, U.S. v. Gibson Specialty Co., C.A.Mont.1974, 507 F.2d 446;

U.S. v. Barrow, D.C.Pa.1962, 212 F.Supp. 837. Commerce 82.10

56. Intent, knowledge, or purpose, elements of offense--Generally

Conviction for aiding and abetting violation of Travel Act did not require proof that defendants knew or intended that interstate facilities were used; rather what had to be proved was not that defendants knew interstate facilities were being ultimately utilized, but only that they knew they were facilitating an unlawful activity. U.S. v. Vaccaro, C.A.9 (Nev.) 1987, 816 F.2d 443, certiorari denied 108 S.Ct. 262, 484 U.S. 914, 98 L.Ed.2d 220, certiorari denied 108 S.Ct. 295, 484 U.S. 928, 98 L.Ed.2d 255. Commerce 82.10

To sustain a conviction under section of the Travel Act [18 U.S.C.A. § 1952(a)(3) ] forbidding traveling in interstate or foreign commerce or use of any facility in interstate or foreign commerce with intent to promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate any unlawful activity, prosecutor need not show that a defendant associated himself in some significant manner with the criminal venture for purpose of its advancement; government need show only that defendant made the unlawful activity easy or less difficult; disagreeing with United States v. Gib- son Specialty Co., 507 F.2d 446 (9th Cir.). U.S. v. Rogers, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1986, 788 F.2d 1472. Commerce 82.10

Since defendant was shown to have actually caused a woman to travel from Ohio to West Virginia for the purpose of engaging in prostitution, it was immaterial for purposes of this section whether he had actual knowledge of the jurisdictional element; the act coupled with the intent was sufficient. U. S. v. Prince, C.A.6 (Ohio) 1976, 529 F.2d 1108, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 108, 429 U.S. 838, 50 L.Ed.2d 105. Prostitution 19(3)

Where this section expressly made intent to facilitate a criminal venture part of the offense, court could not extend this section by holding that proof of a lesser mens rea was sufficient to establish the crime. U. S. v. Gibson Specialty Co., C.A.9 (Mont.) 1974, 507 F.2d 446. Gaming 62

To show that a manufacturer has violated this section by selling punchboards and pulltabs, prosecutor must show that manufacturer in some significant manner associated himself with purchaser's criminal venture for the purpose of its advancement. U. S. v. Gibson Specialty Co., C.A.9 (Mont.) 1974, 507 F.2d 446. Gaming 62

This section prohibiting use of a facility in interstate commerce with intent to carry on an unlawful activity contains no requirement that defendant use an interstate facility on any specific number of occasions, but prohibits any use of an interstate facility to carry out crime charged; accordingly, one such use is sufficient to constitute a violation of this section so long as it is used with intent to carry out an unlawful activity and is followed by an attempt to perform any act prohibited by this section. U. S. v. Archer, S.D.N.Y.1972, 355 F.Supp. 981, reversed 486 F.2d 670. Commerce 82.10

57. ---- Cultivation of business or political friendship, intent, knowledge, or purpose, elements of offense

Payments by lobbyist to legislator for entertainment, lodging, golf, sports events, and the like would not constitute violations of Travel Act, mail fraud statutes, or wire fraud statutes if aim of lobbyist were simply to cultiv-

ate business or political “friendship” with legislator. U.S. v. Sawyer, C.A.1 (Mass.) 1996, 85 F.3d 713. Com- merce 82.10; Postal Service 35(9); Telecommunications 1014(8)

58. ---- Number of purposes, intent, knowledge, or purpose, elements of offense

Promotion of unlawful activity need not be sole or dominant purpose of interstate travel in violation of Travel Act. U.S. v. Schultz, C.A.6 (Mich.) 1988, 855 F.2d 1217, rehearing denied. Commerce 82.10

In order to convict defendant under Travel Act [18 U.S.C.A. § 1952] in connection with his travel to Dallas from Memphis to facilitate marijuana transaction, it was not necessary to prove that defendant's dominant purpose in traveling was to further the marijuana transaction. U.S. v. Stanley, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1985, 765 F.2d 1224, rehearing denied 772 F.2d 904. Commerce 82.10

Where travel is motivated by two or more purposes, some of which lie outside ambit of this section, conviction is still possible if requisite illegal purpose is also present. U.S. v. Walsh, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1983, 700 F.2d 846, certiorari denied 104 S.Ct. 96, 464 U.S. 825, 78 L.Ed.2d 102. Commerce 82.10

Politician who received $5,000 at Washington, D.C., hotel in extortion scheme was not immune from prosecution under this section because corrupt purpose was not only reason for Washington trip. U. S. v. Graham, C.A.9 (Wash.) 1978, 581 F.2d 789. Extortion 19

Fact that travel is motivated by two or more purposes, some of which lie outside the ambit of this section, will not preclude conviction under this section if the requisite intent is also present. U. S. v. Gooding, C.A.5 (Fla.) 1973, 473 F.2d 425, certiorari denied 93 S.Ct. 2752, 412 U.S. 928, 37 L.Ed.2d 155. Commerce 82.10

59. ---- Interstate or foreign travel, intent, knowledge, or purpose, elements of offense

To state violation of Travel Act, government must allege that accused travelled in interstate commerce or used facilities thereof with specific intent to engage in or facilitate certain prohibited conduct in furtherance of criminal business enterprise. U.S. v. Roberson, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1993, 6 F.3d 1088, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 1230, 510 U.S. 1182, 127 L.Ed.2d 574, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 1322, 510 U.S. 1204, 127 L.Ed.2d 671, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 1383, 511 U.S. 1010, 128 L.Ed.2d 58. Commerce 82.10

Government was not required to prove that defendants had actual or constructive knowledge of interstate travel or of the use of interstate facilities to promote alleged bribery scheme in order to make a case under this section. U.S. v. Isaacs, N.D.Ill.1972, 364 F.Supp. 895, affirmed 493 F.2d 1124, certiorari denied 94 S.Ct. 3183, 417 U.S. 976, 41 L.Ed.2d 1146, rehearing denied 94 S.Ct. 3234, 418 U.S. 955, 41 L.Ed.2d 1178, certiorari denied 94 S.Ct. 3184, 417 U.S. 976, 41 L.Ed.2d 1146. Bribery 9

60. ---- Use of facility in commerce, intent, knowledge, or purpose, elements of offense

To establish Travel Act violation, transportation between one state and another state requires proof that indi-

vidual used facility of interstate commerce with sufficient intent to promote, manage, establish or carry on unlawful activity. U.S. v. Smith, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1986, 789 F.2d 196, certiorari denied 107 S.Ct. 668, 479 U.S. 1017, 93 L.Ed.2d 720. Commerce 82.10

This section reaches only those who engage in interstate activities with intent to perform other illegal acts; there is a requirement of a separate intent related to the use of interstate facilities which is different from intent required to commit the underlying state offense. U. S. v. Prince, C.A.6 (Ohio) 1976, 529 F.2d 1108, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 108, 429 U.S. 838, 50 L.Ed.2d 105. Commerce 82

This section condemns the use of an interstate facility with intent to promote any unlawful activity followed by a subsequent required act but it does not impose the additional requirement of intent to use an interstate facility for there to be a direct violation by the defendant's own conduct. U. S. v. Villano, C.A.10 (Colo.) 1976, 529 F.2d 1046, certiorari denied 96 S.Ct. 3180, 426 U.S. 953, 49 L.Ed.2d 1193. Commerce 82.6

That defendant in prosecution under this section was not specifically aware of interstate transfer of funds for alleged bribery was unimportant in determining whether there was federal jurisdiction to bring prosecution under this section. U. S. v. Peskin, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1975, 527 F.2d 71, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 63, 429 U.S. 818, 50 L.Ed.2d 79. Criminal Law 95

Fact that government did not prove that defendant had actual or constructive knowledge that telephone calls he received for purpose of placing bets were interstate calls did not immunize him from effects of this section. U. S. v. Sellaro, C.A.8 (Mo.) 1973, 514 F.2d 114, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 2419, 421 U.S. 1013, 44 L.Ed.2d 681. Gaming 62

Defendants' actual knowledge of the use of interstate facilities in gambling operation was not a prerequisite to criminal liability under this section. U. S. v. Doolittle, C.A.5 (Ga.) 1975, 507 F.2d 1368, on reconsideration 518 F.2d 500, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 1172, 430 U.S. 905, 51 L.Ed.2d 580, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 1173, 430 U.S. 905, 51 L.Ed.2d 580, certiorari dismissed 96 S.Ct. 439, 423 U.S. 1008, 46 L.Ed.2d 380. Gaming 62

Neither knowledge of use of interstate facilities nor specific intent to use such facilities is necessary for conviction of conspiracy to violate this section. U.S. v. LeFaivre, C.A.4 (Md.) 1974, 507 F.2d 1288, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 1446, 420 U.S. 1004, 43 L.Ed.2d 762. Conspiracy 28(3)

Knowing use of interstate facilities is not essential element of proof to establish either the substantive offense of interstate travel in aid of racketeering activities or conspiracy to commit the substantive offense. U. S. v. Colacurcio, C.A.9 (Wash.) 1974, 499 F.2d 1401. Conspiracy 28(3); Gaming 64.1

Knowing interstate travel or knowing use of interstate facilities or knowing interstate transportation are not essential elements of conspiracy to commit offenses of interstate travel and use of interstate facilities in aid of racketeering enterprises and interstate transportation of fraudulently taken securities. U. S. v. Roselli, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1970, 432 F.2d 879, certiorari denied 91 S.Ct. 883, 401 U.S. 924, 27 L.Ed.2d 828, certiorari denied 91

S.Ct. 884, 401 U.S. 924, 27 L.Ed.2d 828, rehearing denied 91 S.Ct. 1366, 402 U.S. 924, 28 L.Ed.2d 665. Con- spiracy 28(3)

Statute proscribing interstate gambling does not require prosecution to prove that the facilities of interstate commerce were used knowingly, willfully and intentionally. U. S. v. Hanon, C.A.8 (Mo.) 1970, 428 F.2d 101, certiorari denied 91 S.Ct. 1608, 402 U.S. 952, 29 L.Ed.2d 122. Gaming 62

Under this section prohibiting use of any facility in interstate commerce to promote or facilitate carrying on of any business enterprise involving gambling offenses in violation of state laws, knowledge of defendants that tickertapes by which gambling information was received on their premises were interstate facilities was sufficient to satisfy jurisdictional portion of this section. U. S. v. Miller, C.A.7 (Ind.) 1967, 379 F.2d 483, certiorari denied 88 S.Ct. 291, 389 U.S. 930, 19 L.Ed.2d 281. Gaming 62

Under this section prohibiting interstate travel or transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises, one may be guilty of a substantive offense without any proof of mens rea with respect to use of an interstate facility. U. S. v. Machi, E.D.Wis.1972, 352 F.Supp. 1173. Gaming 62

Knowing interstate travel or knowing use of an interstate facility is not an essential element of a violation of statute relating to interstate and foreign travel or transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises. U. S. v. Isaacs, N.D.Ill.1972, 347 F.Supp. 743. Commerce 82.10

61. ---- Violation of state or federal law, intent, knowledge, or purpose, elements of offense

Attempt by principal owner of engineering firm to obtain preferential payments from township business administrator to engineering firm as primary consultant on major sewer project satisfied mens rea requirement for bribery under New Jersey law and therefore established requisite intent to commit “unlawful activity” necessary to support violation of this section where engineering firm's payments to township business administrator were clearly intended to influence public employee's performance of official action. U.S. v. Walsh, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1983, 700 F.2d 846, certiorari denied 104 S.Ct. 96, 464 U.S. 825, 78 L.Ed.2d 102. Commerce 82.10

When the unlawful activity charged in an indictment under this section is the violation of state law, the commission of or the intent to commit such a violation is an element of the federal offense. U. S. v. Bertman, C.A.9 (Hawai'i) 1982, 686 F.2d 772. Commerce 82.10

In prosecution under this section based on alleged bribery of Oklahoma public officer, government was required to prove specific intent as element, that accused knowingly acted with intent to promote or to carry on or facilitate promotion and carrying on of activity of bribery of Oklahoma public officer, an activity which accused knew to be unlawful under Oklahoma law, such intent being determined from all facts in case. U. S. v. Hall, C.A.10 (Okla.) 1976, 536 F.2d 313, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 313, 429 U.S. 919, 50 L.Ed.2d 285. Bribery 9

Phrase “to * * * carry on * * * any unlawful activity,” as used in this section, does not require specific intent to

violate state law, but rather refers to a specific intent to facilitate an activity which accused knew to be unlawful under state law. U. S. v. Polizzi, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1974, 500 F.2d 856, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 802, 419 U.S. 1120, 42 L.Ed.2d 820, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 803, 419 U.S. 1120, 42 L.Ed.2d 820. Gaming 62

In federal prosecution for conspiracy to travel and cause travel in interstate commerce with intent to commit extortion in violation of laws of Georgia, it was sufficient for government to prove conspiracy to travel in interstate commerce with intent to commit Georgia crime of extortion. U. S. v. Romano, C.A.5 (Ga.) 1973, 482 F.2d 1183, stay denied 94 S.Ct. 293, 414 U.S. 971, 38 L.Ed.2d 216, certiorari denied 94 S.Ct. 866, 414 U.S. 1129, 38 L.Ed.2d 753. Conspiracy 43(12)

Proof of specific intent to violate federal law was not required to convict of crossing state borders to further unlawful activity and of interstate transportation of gambling paraphernalia. U. S. v. Marquez, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1970, 424 F.2d 236, certiorari denied 91 S.Ct. 56, 400 U.S. 828, 27 L.Ed.2d 58. Gaming 65

Under this section prohibiting use of any facility in interstate commerce to promote or facilitate carrying on of any business enterprise involving gambling offenses in violation of state laws, government need not prove that defendant crossed state line with specific intent to violate federal law. U. S. v. Izzi, C.A.7 (Ind.) 1967, 385 F.2d 412. Gaming 62

Intent to promote, manage, establish, or carry on gambling in violation of laws of Virginia was element of crime created by this section. U.S. v. Chase, C.A.4 (Va.) 1967, 372 F.2d 453, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 1688, 387 U.S. 907, 18 L.Ed.2d 626, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 1701, 387 U.S. 913, 18 L.Ed.2d 635.

To convict defendant of violation of this section prohibiting use of interstate facilities to further unlawful activity it was not necessary to prove that defendant, who had used telegraph facilities to transfer slot machine proceeds from one state to another, knew that he was violating the state law by operating slot machines therein, and it was sufficient that defendant knowingly caused to be transmitted interstate by telegraph money order the proceeds of a gambling enterprise which was unlawful under state statute. U. S. v. Hawthorne, C.A.4 (W.Va.) 1966, 356 F.2d 740, certiorari denied 86 S.Ct. 1344, 384 U.S. 908, 16 L.Ed.2d 360. Gaming 62

Under the Travel Act, it is a federal offense to travel in interstate commerce with the intent to promote or facilitate the promotion of any unlawful activity, including “any business enterprise involving gambling * * * in violation of the laws of the State in which they are committed or of the United States.” U.S. v. Vaccaro, D.C.Nev.1985, 602 F.Supp. 1132. Commerce 82.10

Specific intent to violate is not necessary element of offense under this section making unlawful interstate and foreign travel or transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises. U. S. v. Bash, N.D.Ind.1966, 258 F.Supp. 807, affirmed 379 F.2d 483, certiorari denied 88 S.Ct. 291, 389 U.S. 930, 19 L.Ed.2d 281. Gaming 65

62. Interstate or foreign travel, elements of offense--Generally

The Travel Act does not make purely intrastate use of the mail in furtherance of an unlawful activity a federal crime. U.S. v. Barry, C.A.6 (Ohio) 1989, 888 F.2d 1092, rehearing denied. Commerce 82.10

Proof of interstate travel is required as jurisdictional prerequisite to conviction under Travel Act. U.S. v. Abadie, C.A.5 (Miss.) 1989, 879 F.2d 1260, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 110 S.Ct. 569, 493 U.S. 1005, 107 L.Ed.2d 563. Commerce 82.10

When Congress enacted this section so as to lend the aid of federal law enforcement to local officials in the prosecution of certain crimes, primarily of local concern, where the participants were engaged in interstate activity, it did not mean to include cases where the federal officers themselves supplied the interstate element and acted to insure that an interstate element would be present. U. S. v. Archer, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1973, 486 F.2d 670. Com- merce 82.10

Interstate transportation or use of interstate facilities was necessary element of offense of use of interstate commerce in promoting, establishing or managing an unlawful activity. U. S. v. Brouillette, C.A.5 (La.) 1973, 478 F.2d 1171. Commerce 82.10

Fact that considerable intrastate activity occurred in addition to interstate activity does not alter applicability of this section. U. S. v. Aloi, E.D.N.Y.1977, 449 F.Supp. 698. Commerce 82.6

Two predominant factors bear on question whether interstate activities of unlawful operation bring it within ambit of this section; these factors are significance of role of interstate activity in the unlawful operation and whether use of interstate facilities was matter of happenstance or conscious decision on part of defendant. U. S. v. Vitich, W.D.Wis.1973, 357 F.Supp. 102. Commerce 82.10

63. ---- Connection with unlawful activity, interstate or foreign travel, elements of offense

Requirement for Travel Act prosecution that interstate travel or use must “relate significantly,” rather than incidentally or minimally, to illegal activity does not mean that interstate use must be indispensable to illegal activity; it is enough that use facilitates illegal activity. U.S. v. Muskovsky, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1988, 863 F.2d 1319, certiorari denied 109 S.Ct. 1345, 489 U.S. 1067, 103 L.Ed.2d 813, habeas corpus denied 912 F.2d 467. Commerce 82.10

Although travel must be part of effort to promote continuous enterprise and not merely isolated crime in order to constitute violation of Travel Act, there is no requirement that travel be repeated or systematic if underlying enterprise is proven. U.S. v. Herrera, C.A.4 (N.C.) 1987, 832 F.2d 833, post-conviction relief granted 798 F.Supp. 295, affirmed 960 F.2d 147, denial of post-conviction relief affirmed 23 F.3d 74. Commerce 82.10

Conviction of interstate travel in promotion of unlawful activity of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute was supported by sufficient evidence, where defendant did acts that were necessary for illegal activity, including delivery of $59,000 in cash to two undercover agents from Pennsylvania for purchase of marijuana.

U.S. v. Schocket, C.A.4 (Va.) 1985, 753 F.2d 336. Controlled Substances 76

In prosecution under this section, benefits sought or gained from interstate travel or use need not be essential to illegal activity; however, interstate travel or use must relate significantly, rather than incidentally or minimally, to illegal activity. U. S. v. Raineri, C.A.7 (Wis.) 1982, 670 F.2d 702, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 446, 459 U.S. 1035, 74 L.Ed.2d 601. Commerce 82.6

Where collection of $50,000 bribe fund was essential part of bribery scheme to obtain passage of law providing highway weight relief for ready-mix industry cement trucks, and certain person traveled to and from Indianapol- is to facilitate collection of that fund, such person's interstate travel could not be considered “minimal,” “incidental” or “fortuitous” but rather such person traveled in interstate commerce with intent to facilitate promotion of bribery scheme and thereafter engaged in acts constituting promotion of that scheme within statutory prohibition of this section and thus defendants, as coconspirators, were accountable for such person's actions. U.S. v. Craig, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1977, 573 F.2d 455, certiorari denied 99 S.Ct. 82, 439 U.S. 820, 58 L.Ed.2d 110, certiorari denied 99 S.Ct. 83, 439 U.S. 820, 58 L.Ed.2d 110. Bribery 3

In prosecution of lawyer under this section for alleged bribery of village officials to obtain favorable zoning action, interstate travel of coconspirator could be attributed to defendant despite contention that travel was only incidental to bribery. U. S. v. Peskin, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1975, 527 F.2d 71, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 63, 429 U.S. 818, 50 L.Ed.2d 79. Bribery 1(1)

This section does not proscribe all interstate travel which may incidentally lead to a furthering of unlawful activity; it prohibits only interstate travel “with intent” or purpose to carry on a listed unlawful activity. U. S. v. Gooding, C.A.5 (Fla.) 1973, 473 F.2d 425, certiorari denied 93 S.Ct. 2752, 412 U.S. 928, 37 L.Ed.2d 155. Com- merce 82.10

Federal interdictions of interstate travel require more intimate relationship between trip and performance of wrongful acts than was demonstrated by defendant's threat of extortion made in New Jersey and subsequent return to New York which bore no relationship whatsoever to threat. U. S. v. Botticello, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1970, 422 F.2d 832. Extortion 21

This section is not limited in application to interstate travel essential to unlawful activity. U. S. v. Barrow, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1966, 363 F.2d 62, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 703, 385 U.S. 1001, 17 L.Ed.2d 541. Gaming 62

Defendant's interstate trip which had as its immediate purpose to move defendant's family from Indiana to new home in West Virginia where defendant intended to operate gambling establishment was not sufficiently related to his gambling enterprise to bring it within interdiction of this section making it unlawful to travel in interstate commerce to further any unlawful activity which included gambling and other specified activities. U. S. v. Hawthorne, C.A.4 (W.Va.) 1966, 356 F.2d 740, certiorari denied 86 S.Ct. 1344, 384 U.S. 908, 16 L.Ed.2d 360. Gaming 62

Defendant whose actual change of residence to another state was only incidental to accomplishment of his gambling purposes was guilty of traveling in interstate commerce with intent to manage or facilitate gambling business in violation of this section. U. S. v. Compton, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1966, 355 F.2d 872, certiorari denied 86 S.Ct. 1571, 384 U.S. 951, 16 L.Ed.2d 548. Gaming 98(1)

Defendant could be charged with interstate travel in aid of racketeering, even though the interstate travel that defendant allegedly engaged in was not the essence of his unlawful activity; all that was necessary was that defendant's travel was somehow connected with the unlawful activity so as to facilitate it or assist its success. U.S. v. Tonry, E.D.La.1986, 633 F.Supp. 643. Gaming 62

This section prohibiting interstate travel to facilitate unlawful activity, such as gambling, does not require that the travel facilitate the unlawful activity, but merely requires that person traveling have intent to and actually does facilitate or attempt to facilitate such activity. U. S. v. Barrow, E.D.Pa.1962, 212 F.Supp. 837. Gaming 63(2)

64. ---- Foreseeability, interstate or foreign travel, elements of offense

Involved party who should reasonably have foreseen use of interstate facilities in furtherance of shared criminal scheme can be held under this section. U. S. v. Barbieri, C.A.10 (Okla.) 1980, 614 F.2d 715. Commerce 82.6

Where defendant kept gambling records at his home in New Jersey, and travel was to be reasonably expected as part of gambling enterprise in New York, interstate element was within reach of this section, notwithstanding contention that residence was incidental to gambling conspiracy. U. S. v. Marquez, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1970, 424 F.2d 236, certiorari denied 91 S.Ct. 56, 400 U.S. 828, 27 L.Ed.2d 58. Gaming 62

65. ---- Lawfulness of travel or activity, interstate or foreign travel, elements of offense

Conduct at end of travel need not be unlawful in itself in order to support conviction under Travel Act [18 U.S.C.A. § 1952]. U.S. v. Falcon, C.A.10 (Colo.) 1985, 766 F.2d 1469. Commerce 82.10

In prosecution for traveling in interstate commerce with intent to carry on unlawful gambling activity in violation of this section, in which defendant's principal defense was that he remained resident of Michigan throughout all of 1977, so that his travel from California to Michigan was for purpose of returning home, with result that he did not travel with intent to promote illegal business enterprise, there was sufficient evidence from which jury could have concluded that defendant stayed primarily in California and flew to Michigan on weekends to conduct his bookmaking operation, and under these circumstances, defendant's legal residence was irrelevant. U. S. v. Alsobrook, C.A.6 (Mich.) 1980, 620 F.2d 139, certiorari denied 101 S.Ct. 124, 449 U.S. 843, 66 L.Ed.2d 51. Gaming 98(1)

Return trips of defendant who worked for operators of numbers game in Tennessee and who occasionally traveled to Georgia to be with his son violated this section prohibiting travel in interstate commerce with intent

to promote or engage in illegal gambling activities, even if his trips from Tennessee into Georgia violated no law. U. S. v. Carpenter, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1968, 392 F.2d 205. Gaming 62

To be guilty of traveling in interstate commerce, or using facilities in interstate commerce, for purpose of facilitating illegal activity, it is not necessary that travel or use of facility be otherwise unlawful. U. S. v. Bally Mfg. Corp., E.D.La.1972, 345 F.Supp. 410. Commerce 82.10

Activities of defendants charged with conspiring to travel and cause others to travel in interstate commerce and with using and causing others to use facilities in interstate commerce for purpose of bribing town officials to obtain building permit and easements were not beyond reach of this section prohibiting travel in interstate commerce with intent to carry on any unlawful activity on theory that this section was not intended to reach allegedly unlawful utilization of interstate commerce and facilities in furtherance of legitimate business activities. U. S. v. Zirpolo, D.C.N.J.1968, 288 F.Supp. 993, reversed on other grounds 450 F.2d 424. Bribery 1(1)

66. ---- Number of activities affecting, interstate or foreign travel, elements of offense

For purposes of prosecution for aiding and abetting wire fraud and interstate travel, government is not required to establish an interstate connection with respect to each defendant's activity; rather, the government need only show that the scheme as a whole has substantial interstate connections. U. S. v. Garner, C.A.9 (Nev.) 1981, 663 F.2d 834, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 1750, 456 U.S. 905, 72 L.Ed.2d 161. Commerce 82.6; Telecommu- nications 1014(2)

67. ---- Number of trips, interstate or foreign travel, elements of offense

One instance of interstate travel will suffice to provide a basis for conviction for interstate racketeering if defendant travels to further the illegal activity. U.S. v. Vanichromanee, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1984, 742 F.2d 340. Commerce 82.6

68. ---- Patrons, interstate or foreign travel, elements of offense

Persons who admittedly ran lottery or numbers operation within few miles of state line, but who were not shown to have crossed state lines at any time in connection with the operation of their lottery, could not be convicted of violation of this section, prohibiting interstate travel with intent to promote, manage, establish, carry on or facilitate certain kinds of illegal activity, merely because their gambling operation was frequented by out-of-state bettors. Rewis v. U.S., U.S.Fla.1971, 91 S.Ct. 1056, 401 U.S. 808, 28 L.Ed.2d 493. Lotteries 20

Actual or foreseeable interstate travel by patrons of a gambling operation is not a sufficient basis for applying this section to the illegal activity, but there is a clear distinction between travel by customers and travel by employees of an illegal business; whether that travel is merely commuting across a state line on a daily basis or involves a transcontinental journey to perform a specific illegal mission is immaterial. U. S. v. Lee, C.A.7 (Ind.) 1971, 448 F.2d 604, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 107, 404 U.S. 858, 30 L.Ed.2d 100. Gaming 62

69. ---- Prostitutes, interstate or foreign travel, elements of offense

In prosecution for causing a woman to travel in interstate commerce with intent to further business of prostitution, unlawful under state law, it was legally sufficient for government to establish that interstate travel by woman was the result of a plan made with defendant for woman to work at truck stop as prostitute, in view of evidence that interstate trip was not merely unilaterally motivated journey undertaken for purpose of seeking employment as prostitute followed by employment agreement. U. S. v. Baker, C.A.4 (N.C.) 1979, 611 F.2d 961. Prostitution 19(3)

This section was applicable in view of continuous interstate travel by defendants from their New Jersey homes to the New York prostitution operation, several interstate calls by defendants specifically related to operation of their prostitution business and hundreds of phone calls between the New York facility and each of defendants' three condominiums in New Jersey over a period of several months. U. S. v. Herrera, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1978, 584 F.2d 1137. Prostitution 19(2)

Evidence that defendant drove prostitute across state lines where prostitute had sexual relations with a man with whom defendant was attempting to negotiate a land transaction sustained defendant's conviction of traveling in interstate commerce with intent to carry on an unlawful activity, notwithstanding fact that prostitute was paid no money for her sexual favors. U. S. v. Clemones, C.A.5 (Ga.) 1978, 577 F.2d 1247, modified on other grounds 582 F.2d 1373. Prostitution 28

Evidence that defendant was nothing more than the madame of a house of prostitution in West Virginia was insufficient to permit conviction under this section even though some of the women providing services at the house may have engaged in interstate travel. U. S. v. Prince, C.A.6 (Ohio) 1976, 529 F.2d 1108, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 108, 429 U.S. 838, 50 L.Ed.2d 105. Prostitution 28

70. ---- Victims, interstate or foreign travel, elements of offense

Defendants could be successfully prosecuted for violation of this section and section 371 of this title though neither a defendant nor a coconspirator engaged in the interstate or foreign travel which was undertaken by the victim of extortion scheme. U. S. v. Marquez, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1971, 449 F.2d 89, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 1167, 405 U.S. 963, 31 L.Ed.2d 239, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 1173, 405 U.S. 963, 31 L.Ed.2d 239.

This section which prohibits travel in interstate commerce with intent to promote, carry on or facilitate any unlawful activity is not violated when the interstate travel is by victims of extortion rather than by the alleged ex- torters. U. S. v. De Cavalcante, C.A.3 (N.J.) 1971, 440 F.2d 1264. Extortion 21

71. ---- Time of travel, interstate or foreign travel, elements of offense

This section requires proof of performance or an attempt to perform one or more of the proscribed activities subsequent to the interstate activity. U. S. v. Prince, C.A.6 (Ohio) 1976, 529 F.2d 1108, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 108, 429 U.S. 838, 50 L.Ed.2d 105. Commerce 82

Gambling after vessel had crossed a state line was sufficient to support conviction under this section relating to interstate and foreign travel or transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises, and it was unnecessary that the illegal activity happen after the interstate travel had ceased. U. S. v. Brennan, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1968, 394 F.2d 151, certiorari denied 89 S.Ct. 117, 393 U.S. 839, 21 L.Ed.2d 110. Gaming 62

72. ---- Miscellaneous cases established, interstate or foreign travel, elements of offense

Evidence supported conviction of defendant for violation of Travel Act by flying to Florida to discuss sale of cocaine, even though defendant owned condo in Florida and then booked his flight there before any illegal activity took place; one of defendant's purposes was to complete delivery of cocaine. U.S. v. Schultz, C.A.6 (Mich.) 1988, 855 F.2d 1217, rehearing denied. Commerce 82.10

Defendant violated Travel Act by planning in Arkansas to burn down Missouri church and traveling to Missouri for that purpose. U.S. v. Ellison, C.A.8 (Ark.) 1986, 793 F.2d 942, certiorari denied 107 S.Ct. 415, 479 U.S. 937, 93 L.Ed.2d 366. Commerce 82.10

Out-of-state travel to purchase glassware, equipment, and chemicals necessary for manufacture of methamphetamine violated the Travel Act [18 U.S.C.A. § 1952], although none of the materials were dangerous controlled substances and were all legally possessed and transported, since legality of immediate object for interstate travel is irrelevant to coverage by Act where activities were part of a larger plan to engage in prohibited activity. U.S. v. Davis, C.A.10 (Okla.) 1985, 780 F.2d 838. Commerce 82.10

Convictions of conspiracy to manufacture and distribute amphetamine and phenyl-2-propanone, transportation of chemicals and equipment in interstate commerce, attempted manufacture of P-2-P and manufacture of amphetamine were supported by sufficient evidence, including defendant's participation in remodeling of house and garage to install laboratory, proof that he resided at the residence, chemical bottles and filter papers containing traces of amphetamine in his room and fact that his pickup truck smelled of chemicals used to manufacture amphetamine. U.S. v. Peacock, C.A.9 (Nev.) 1985, 761 F.2d 1313, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 139, 474 U.S. 847, 88 L.Ed.2d 114. Commerce 82.6; Conspiracy 47(12); Controlled Substances 77

Even if defendant charged with conspiracy to violate this section by engaging in interstate travel to promote unlawful, gambling-related activities was not shown to have travelled interstate in furtherance of conspiracy, interstate activities of coconspirators were attributable to defendant, satisfying requirement under subsec. (a) of this section of interstate activity in furtherance of conspiracy. U.S. v. Bowers, C.A.6 (Ky.) 1984, 739 F.2d 1050, certiorari denied 105 S.Ct. 195, 469 U.S. 861, 83 L.Ed.2d 128. Conspiracy 41

Evidence, which established that deal was struck in Peoria, Illinois, whereby other members of conspiracy would take title to airplane which defendants had flown there and that the plane was eventually sold to the other members of the conspiracy, was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for unlawful activities in violation of this section. U. S. v. Burchinal, C.A.8 (Mo.) 1981, 657 F.2d 985, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 646, 454 U.S. 1086, 70 L.Ed.2d 622. Commerce 82.6

Where defendant could not cash checks locally but instead was forced to drive to Texas to collect his funds, and it was only by traveling interstate that he could realize illegal profits from organized gambling, his trip from Ok- lahoma to Texas to cash wagering checks was sufficient to satisfy “facilitation” requirement of interstate travel element under this section. U. S. v. Jones, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1981, 642 F.2d 909. Gaming 62

Scheme to bribe county commissioners in order to secure rezoning was within ambit of this section, where two conspirators traveled in interstate commerce to discuss rezoning with third, money for bribe was transported from California to Nevada, conspirator traveled from California to Nevada to attend county commissioners' hearing, and one conspirator took part in at least two interstate telephone conversations with another. U. S. v. Ryan, C.A.9 (Nev.) 1976, 548 F.2d 782, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 1644, 430 U.S. 965, 52 L.Ed.2d 356, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 354, 429 U.S. 939, 50 L.Ed.2d 308. Commerce 82.10

Evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction of defendants for conspiracy to violate this section by undertaking interstate travel from West Virginia to New York City to promote the distribution of heroin. U. S. v. Quicksey, C.A.4 (W.Va.) 1975, 525 F.2d 337, certiorari denied 96 S.Ct. 878, 423 U.S. 1087, 47 L.Ed.2d 97. Conspiracy 47(12)

Where defendant went from New York to Pennsylvania and agreed upon illegal payments to municipal officials in connection with grant of cable television franchise, defendant arranged for one check to be mailed from New York to Pennsylvania, and mayor and his son went from Pennsylvania to New York on separate occasions to collect payoff checks, there was knowing and intentional use of interstate commerce for illegal activity within proscription of this section. U. S. v. Kahn, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1973, 472 F.2d 272, certiorari denied 93 S.Ct. 2270, 411 U.S. 982, 36 L.Ed.2d 958. Bribery 1(1)

Evidence established that defendants, who allegedly traveled from Colorado to Nebraska to purchase livestock, engaged in interstate travel with primary intent to engage in gambling, as prohibited in this section. U. S. v. Pauldino, C.A.10 (Colo.) 1971, 443 F.2d 1108, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 204, 404 U.S. 882, 30 L.Ed.2d 163, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 212, 404 U.S. 882, 30 L.Ed.2d 163. Gaming 98(1)

Where extortion was a crime under Arizona law, A.R.S. § 13-401 and defendant traveled from California to Ari- zona to attempt to extort money from former girl friend, defendant violated this section. U. S. v. Mahler, C.A.9 (Ariz.) 1971, 442 F.2d 1172, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 541, 404 U.S. 993, 30 L.Ed.2d 545.

Evidence sustained finding that defendant was engaged in unlawful gambling activities in Kansas and that he traveled to Missouri to further such activities, warranting conviction of violating this section prohibiting the use of any facility in interstate commerce with intent to further any unlawful activity. U. S. v. Nichols, C.A.8 (Mo.) 1970, 421 F.2d 570. Gaming 98(1)

Toy manufacturer that sued former design employee, stemming from dispute over rights to fashion dolls purportedly based upon manufacturer's product, alleged sufficient predicate act of Travel Act violation to state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); complaint averred that employee and

others traveled in interstate commerce to commit commercial bribery in violation of California law. Bryant v. Mattel, Inc., C.D.Cal.2007, 573 F.Supp.2d 1254. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Alleged scheme of operator of gambling establishment, who was charged with purposely crossing state lines to bribe a police officer in furtherance of a scheme, fell within terms of this section. U. S. v. Mazzio, E.D.Pa.1980, 501 F.Supp. 340, affirmed 681 F.2d 810, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 2961, 457 U.S. 1134, 73 L.Ed.2d 1351. Gaming 62

Defendant who traveled in interstate commerce with intent to facilitate numbers gambling in Michigan, where such gambling was illegal, and who distributed tip sheets in Michigan was guilty of traveling in interstate commerce with intent to facilitate carrying on of unlawful activity. U.S. v. Azar, E.D.Mich.1964, 243 F.Supp. 345. Gaming 62

73. ---- Miscellaneous cases not established, interstate or foreign travel, elements of offense

Gambling ship's “cruise to nowhere,” on which vessel had no contact with foreign country or waters within jurisdiction of foreign country, and where no such contact was intended, did not involve foreign commerce, and thus did not violate Travel Act or federal gambling statute. U.S. v. Montford, C.A.5 (Miss.) 1994, 27 F.3d 137. Commerce 82.10; Gaming 62

Evidence that defendant bought an automobile from dealer in Maryland and subsequently drove it to the District of Columbia, without any evidence that dealer from whom defendant purchased the automobile was part of, or even privy to knowledge about, illegal activity of defendant, was insufficient to sustain conviction under this section merely because the automobile was purchased with funds which had been derived from prostitution. U. S. v. Lightfoot, C.A.D.C.1974, 506 F.2d 238, 165 U.S.App.D.C. 177. Prostitution 19(2)

74. Joint or concerted action, elements of offense

No concerted action is required to violate this section entitled “interstate and foreign travel or transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises,” regardless of whether the underlying unlawful act usually requires joint action. U. S. v. Deardorff, S.D.N.Y.1971, 343 F.Supp. 1033. Commerce 82.10

75. Promotion of unlawful activity, elements of offense

Use of the term “promote” in this section conveys sufficiently definite warning as to proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices. U. S. v. Villano, C.A.10 (Colo.) 1976, 529 F.2d 1046, certiorari denied 96 S.Ct. 3180, 426 U.S. 953, 49 L.Ed.2d 1193. Commerce 82.6

76. Success of activity, elements of offense

An accused need not be successful at gambling in order to be found guilty of having traveled interstate in the business of gambling. U. S. v. Lisner, C.A.5 (Fla.) 1975, 524 F.2d 1263. Gaming 62

Proof that unlawful objective was accomplished or that the referenced law has actually been violated is not a necessary element of offense defined in this section prohibiting interstate travel with intent to carry on unlawful activity. U. S. v. Pomponio, C.A.4 (Va.) 1975, 511 F.2d 953, certiorari denied 96 S.Ct. 142, 423 U.S. 874, 46 L.Ed.2d 105, certiorari denied 96 S.Ct. 143, 423 U.S. 874, 46 L.Ed.2d 105, rehearing denied 96 S.Ct. 406, 423 U.S. 991, 46 L.Ed.2d 311. Commerce 82.10

Under this section prohibiting use of any facility in interstate commerce with intent to commit any crime of violence to further any unlawful activity, it was sufficient to show that defendants placed telephone call from Mis- souri to Tennessee demanding money for release of person and that defendants acted with intent to commit crime of violence in furtherance of scheme to extort money and it was not prerequisite to conviction that defendants should have procured money from victim of extortion scheme. McIntosh v. U. S., C.A.8 (Mo.) 1967, 385 F.2d 274. Commerce 82.10; Extortion 20; Extortion 21; Extortion 23

77. Underworld or organized crime, elements of offense

Breach of this section prohibiting use of any facility in interstate or foreign commerce with intent to carry on unlawful activity is not limited to instances in which organized criminal activity in one state is managed from another state. Erlenbaugh v. U. S., U.S.Ind.1972, 93 S.Ct. 477, 409 U.S. 239, 34 L.Ed.2d 446. Gaming 62

Application of this section was not intended to be limited only to the top men of organized crime who live far from the scene; this section applied to defendants' travels between New York and New Jersey to carry on prostitution business, notwithstanding that defendants were within the reach of local law enforcement officials. U. S. v. Herrera, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1978, 584 F.2d 1137. Prostitution 19(1)

Although primary impetus for this section in Congress was fight against organized crime, limitation on this section to outlaw only crimes “typically associated with the underworld” would be tantamount to implying additional elements to this section similarly, it is not a requirement of this section that underlying crime be one typically associated with underworld or organized crime. U. S. v. Perrin, C.A.5 (La.) 1978, 580 F.2d 730, rehearing denied 585 F.2d 520, certiorari granted 99 S.Ct. 1496, 440 U.S. 956, 59 L.Ed.2d 769, affirmed 100 S.Ct. 311, 444 U.S. 37, 62 L.Ed.2d 199, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 520, 444 U.S. 990, 62 L.Ed.2d 419. Commerce 82.6

Under this section providing punishment for use of facility in interstate commerce with intent to carry on or facilitate carrying on of unlawful activity and defining “unlawful activity” as including “business enterprise” involving gambling offenses in violation of laws of state wherein committed, government's failure to establish connection between gambling operation and organized crime and racketeering did not preclude conviction. U. S. v. Garramone, E.D.Pa.1974, 380 F.Supp. 590, affirmed 506 F.2d 1050, affirmed 506 F.2d 1051, affirmed 506 F.2d 1052, affirmed 506 F.2d 1053, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 1428, 420 U.S. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 673. Gaming 62

Under this section prohibiting use of a facility in interstate commerce with intent to carry on an unlawful activity, there is no necessity to prove that defendant was associated with an organized crime syndicate; a continuous

course of conduct by a petty hoodlum acting alone is sufficient. U. S. v. Archer, S.D.N.Y.1972, 355 F.Supp. 981 , reversed 486 F.2d 670. Commerce 82.10

78. Use of facility in commerce, elements of offense--Generally

This section plainly requires merely the use of a facility in interstate commerce for purposes of furthering an illegal scheme; it is inessential that scheme itself be interstate in character. U. S. v. Bursten, C.A.7 (Ind.) 1977, 560 F.2d 779. Commerce 82.6

Degree of interstate activity is factor to be considered in determining whether there has been a violation of this section. U. S. v. Rauhoff, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1975, 525 F.2d 1170. Commerce 82.10

Under this section providing that whoever uses any facility in interstate commerce to promote or carry on any unlawful activity shall be fined or imprisoned or both, word “uses” is to be given its ordinary meaning and means to carry out a purpose or action by means of; make instrumental to an end or process; apply to advantage; and is synonymous with employ, utilize, apply and avail. U. S. v. Miller, C.A.7 (Ind.) 1967, 379 F.2d 483, certiorari denied 88 S.Ct. 291, 389 U.S. 930, 19 L.Ed.2d 281. Gaming 62

To obtain conviction under the Travel Act, Government must not only establish the use of a facility in interstate commerce with intent to promote, carry out, or facilitate the unlawful activity, but must also prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant performed an overt act after the interstate transmission was accomplished in furtherance of the unlawful activity; that element is known as the “overt act requirement” or the “thereafter requirement.” U.S. v. Johns, E.D.Pa.1991, 755 F.Supp. 130. Commerce 82.10

This section proscribing interstate transportation in aid of racketeering is not limited in its application to actual physical transportation of wagering paraphernalia, but also denies use, in any way or in any form, of facilities of interstate commerce to persons engaged in racketeering enterprises. U. S. v. Kish, N.D.Ind.1969, 303 F.Supp. 1212. Gaming 62

79. ---- Causation, use of facility in commerce, elements of offense

Where defendant had informed bettors how to get in touch with him if they wished to make a bet and it was reasonable to expect that bettors would make interstate calls, defendant “caused” interstate calls within this section prohibiting the causing the use of interstate commerce in aid of racketeering enterprises. U. S. v. Kelley, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1968, 395 F.2d 727, certiorari denied 89 S.Ct. 391, 393 U.S. 963, 21 L.Ed.2d 376. Gaming 62

80. ---- Connection with unlawful activity, use of facility in commerce, elements of offense

Use of interstate telephone system to obtain credit card approvals in prostitution operation at nude dancing establishment was “significantly related” to prostitution activities, as required for conviction of Travel Act violation; ability of defendants who owned and managed enterprise to get prior approval of credit card transactions

facilitated prostitution activities by ensuring that payment for activities would be forthcoming. U.S. v. Muskovsky, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1988, 863 F.2d 1319, certiorari denied 109 S.Ct. 1345, 489 U.S. 1067, 103 L.Ed.2d 813, habeas corpus denied 912 F.2d 467. Commerce 82.10

Telephone call which provides predicate for violation of this section need not comprise the essence of the illegal activity. U. S. v. Bagnariol, C.A.9 (Wash.) 1981, 665 F.2d 877, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 2040, 456 U.S. 962, 72 L.Ed.2d 487. Commerce 82.6

In order for there to be violation of this section, there must be coincidence between purpose of interstate activity and prohibited objective and interstate means must be used in furtherance or in facilitation of illegal activities; use of interstate means need not be essential to illegal scheme as long as it makes illegal objective less difficult to accomplish. U. S. v. Barbieri, C.A.10 (Okla.) 1980, 614 F.2d 715. Commerce 82.6

Where deposit and interstate clearance of checks of land development company were essential to repayment of attorney, defendant in prosecution under this section, of money allegedly paid by him to village officials to procure favorable rezoning, such use of interstate facilities was not “minimal” or “incidental,” but served as basis for federal jurisdiction over prosecution. U. S. v. Peskin, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1975, 527 F.2d 71, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 63, 429 U.S. 818, 50 L.Ed.2d 79. Criminal Law 95

In prosecution of defendants under this section for their participation in large gambling operation, fact that 14 out-of-state checks and other negotiable instruments which had passed through interstate banking channels in clearing process after being cashed or deposited by defendants, may have had only minimal or incidental involvement with illegal activity in question did not affect fact that such interstate activity gave court jurisdiction over action under this section. U.S. v. LeFaivre, C.A.4 (Md.) 1974, 507 F.2d 1288, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 1446, 420 U.S. 1004, 43 L.Ed.2d 762. Gaming 62

Defendant's guilt of using interstate telephone communications to promote and carry on unlawful gambling business was not dependent upon a showing that information supplied by defendant was essential to the gambling operation, and information which contributes to success of the operation permits jury to find that use of telephone facilitated the carrying on of gambling enterprise. U. S. v. McLeod, C.A.7 (Ind.) 1974, 493 F.2d 1186. Telecommunications 1012

Where lottery activities engaged in by defendant were essentially local, and role played by the interstate mailings of Indianapolis newspaper in which defendant advertised for salesmen to peddle lottery tickets in Indiana was minimal and incidental to the operation of the illegal lottery, no federal crime was committed. U. S. v. Mc- Cormick, C.A.7 (Ind.) 1971, 442 F.2d 316. Lotteries 20

To support conviction under subsec. (a)(3) of this section, there must be some connection between the unlawful activity and use of facility in interstate commerce. U. S. v. Wechsler, C.A.4 (Va.) 1968, 392 F.2d 344, certiorari denied 88 S.Ct. 2283, 392 U.S. 932, 20 L.Ed.2d 1389, rehearing denied 89 S.Ct. 71, 393 U.S. 902, 21 L.Ed.2d 191, rehearing denied 408 F.2d 1184, certiorari denied 89 S.Ct. 2130, 395 U.S. 978, 23 L.Ed.2d 766, certiorari

denied 89 S.Ct. 2131, 395 U.S. 978, 23 L.Ed.2d 766, rehearing denied 90 S.Ct. 40, 396 U.S. 870, 24 L.Ed.2d 126, certiorari denied 89 S.Ct. 2150, 395 U.S. 984, 23 L.Ed.2d 773.

The clearing of checks through federal reserve system was insufficient nexus between use of facility in interstate commerce and the act charged, bribery, to support jurisdiction under Travel Act. U.S. v. Blake, S.D.Miss.1988, 684 F.Supp. 441. Commerce 82.10

If defendants conducted prostitution business in Wisconsin and as part of business used services of linen supply company which took dirty linen to Duluth, Minnesota and supplied fresh linen from Duluth to defendants in Wisconsin, such interstate activity brought defendants within ambit of this section; that defendants could have purchased and laundered their own sheets did not make such activity “merely incidental.” U. S. v. Vitich, W.D.Wis.1973, 357 F.Supp. 102. Prostitution 19(1)

81. ---- Foreseeability, use of facility in commerce, elements of offense

Ample factual basis existed to conclude that defendant convicted of conspiracy was a knowing participant in alleged scheme to defraud and that she should have reasonably foreseen the use of the mails and other interstate facilities. U. S. v. Marino, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1970, 421 F.2d 640. Conspiracy 47(5)

82. ---- Advertisements, use of facility in commerce, elements of offense

Defendants' placing of advertisements for their massage parlors in Louisville newspapers, some copies of which were sent to Indiana, did not provide necessary jurisdictional basis for federal criminal convictions under this section. U. S. v. O'Dell, C.A.6 (Ky.) 1982, 671 F.2d 191. Commerce 82.6

83. ---- Check deposits, use of facility in commerce, elements of offense

Evidence, in prosecution for violation of this section and section 2 of this title by having caused travel and use of facility in interstate commerce to promote business involving illegal prostitution, including evidence that payroll check drawn on Michigan bank account was given in Wisconsin to dancer and prostitute at club as compensation for her nude dancing and that check crossed state line in process of collection was sufficient to support conviction. U. S. v. Raineri, C.A.7 (Wis.) 1982, 670 F.2d 702, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 446, 459 U.S. 1035, 74 L.Ed.2d 601. Prostitution 28

In view of evidence indicating that interstate clearance of payoff checks was essential to carrying on of illegal activity, evidence was sufficient to establish requisite federal jurisdictional elements of this section in prosecution for use of a facility in interstate commerce in furtherance of bribery scheme which violated Indiana law. U. S. v. Bursten, C.A.7 (Ind.) 1977, 560 F.2d 779. Criminal Law 95

Where scheme involved an agreement by Arkansas business man and Illinois public official to engage in bribery for mutual profit by “laundering” apparently legal “commission” checks from Arkansas corporation to Illinois corporation, first step in successful laundering of funds was a deposit of Arkansas checks in Illinois bank with

checks returned to Arkansas via collection process of the Federal Reserve system and nine separate checks were involved in scheme, there was sufficient involvement of interstate facilities for federal prosecution under this section. U. S. v. Rauhoff, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1975, 525 F.2d 1170. Bribery 1(1)

Cashing of out-of-state checks from bookmakers representing gambling debts, followed by transmission of checks in mail to drawee banks in clearing process, fell within this section proscribing “use of any facility in interstate or foreign commerce to promote a gambling enterprise.” U. S. v. Salsbury, C.A.4 (Md.) 1970, 430 F.2d 1045. Gaming 62

Deposit in bank by member of zoning board of check allegedly received in payment for his vote on application for rezoning was “use of facility in interstate or foreign commerce” within meaning of this section prohibiting use of such facility for unlawful activity. U. S. v. Wechsler, C.A.4 (Va.) 1968, 392 F.2d 344, certiorari denied 88 S.Ct. 2283, 392 U.S. 932, 20 L.Ed.2d 1389, rehearing denied 89 S.Ct. 71, 393 U.S. 902, 21 L.Ed.2d 191, rehearing denied 408 F.2d 1184, certiorari denied 89 S.Ct. 2130, 395 U.S. 978, 23 L.Ed.2d 766, certiorari denied 89 S.Ct. 2131, 395 U.S. 978, 23 L.Ed.2d 766, rehearing denied 90 S.Ct. 40, 396 U.S. 870, 24 L.Ed.2d 126, certiorari denied 89 S.Ct. 2150, 395 U.S. 984, 23 L.Ed.2d 773. Bribery 1(1)

Defendant's action in depositing kickback checks into bank accounts after they were received in the mail was an overt act occurring after the interstate transmission of checks was complete, as required for a Travel Act conviction, despite his contention that the interstate transportation of the checks and the act of distributing or depositing that money merged into a single act. U.S. v. Johns, E.D.Pa.1991, 755 F.Supp. 130. Commerce 82.10

Deposit of check in interstate banking channels is a “use of an interstate facility,” within meaning of this section regardless of whether the check crosses state lines. U.S. v. Isaacs, N.D.Ill.1972, 364 F.Supp. 895, affirmed 493 F.2d 1124, certiorari denied 94 S.Ct. 3183, 417 U.S. 976, 41 L.Ed.2d 1146, rehearing denied 94 S.Ct. 3234, 418 U.S. 955, 41 L.Ed.2d 1178, certiorari denied 94 S.Ct. 3184, 417 U.S. 976, 41 L.Ed.2d 1146. Commerce 82.10

Defendant charged with violation of this section could not successfully contend that operation of his club was not within the intended prohibition of this section where record plainly showed that the club catered to many persons who, with defendant's knowledge, came from out-of-state, and several checks arising out of gambling activities by patrons at the club were presented by defendant to bank and were ultimately forwarded through the mail to foreign banks. U. S. v. Gerhart, S.D.W.Va.1967, 275 F.Supp. 443. Gaming 62

84. ---- Common carriers, use of facility in commerce, elements of offense

Where interstate transportation of tip sheets was effected by common carriers and defendants accepted same as consignee of interstate shipment in state where gambling was illegal and thereafter distributed tip sheets in De- troit area, defendants were guilty of having used certain facilities in interstate commerce with intent to facilitate carrying on of unlawful activity. U.S. v. Azar, E.D.Mich.1964, 243 F.Supp. 345. Gaming 79(1)

85. ---- Credit card charges, use of facility in commerce, elements of offense

Credit card charges that were authorized through interstate telephone calls were sufficiently related to specific acts of prostitution charged in indictment to support Travel Act conviction; use of credit cards at defendants' club enabled patrons to buy time during which they could engage in oral sex or sexual intercourse with dancers if they desired, and resulting acts of prostitution were not isolated or sporadic. U.S. v. Campione, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1991, 942 F.2d 429. Commerce 82.10

86. ---- Hotels or motels, use of facility in commerce, elements of offense

By passing this section prohibiting the use of interstate commerce in promoting, establishing or managing an unlawful activity, Congress did not intend to make every conceivable crime that occurs at a motel or hotel into a federal offense punishable in the federal courts. U. S. v. Brouillette, C.A.5 (La.) 1973, 478 F.2d 1171. Com- merce 82.10

87. ---- Mails, use of facility in commerce, elements of offense

Intrastate mailings were sufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction under statute prohibiting using mail in aid of racketeering enterprise. U.S. v. Heacock, C.A.5 (Miss.) 1994, 31 F.3d 249. Postal Service 35(2)

Defendant's repeated and systematic use of the United States mails to facilitate bribery was sufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction under the Travel Act, even though the letters were sent only from Manhattan to Brooklyn. U.S. v. Riccardelli, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1986, 794 F.2d 829. Commerce 82.10

Evidence established that defendant performed acts required to establish a violation of the Travel Act; evidence showed that defendant received heroin by international mail, and quantity and purity of the heroin suggested his intent to distribute it; moreover, requirement that unlawful activity be part of a continuous enterprise was satisfied by evidence concerning presence of triple beam balance scale in defendant's residence, since tool indicated that his receipt of heroin was part of an ongoing enterprise, rather than an isolated instance of criminal conduct. U.S. v. Monu, C.A.4 (N.C.) 1986, 782 F.2d 1209. Commerce 82.10

Use of the mails is sufficient in and of itself for conviction under this section. U. S. v. Hathaway, C.A.1 (Mass.) 1976, 534 F.2d 386, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 64, 429 U.S. 819, 50 L.Ed.2d 79. Commerce 82.6

To sustain convictions for use of mail to carry on any unlawful activity, it was sufficient that defendants took some affirmative action that caused the mails to be utilized. U. S. v. Hedge, C.A.5 (Miss.) 1972, 462 F.2d 220. Postal Service 27

Use of mails by bank through which extortion victim's check, which was drawn in Pennsylvania bank, was cleared after it had been cashed in Illinois and proceeds given to defendants did not give basis for federal jurisdiction under section 371 of this title or this section. U. S. v. Altobella, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1971, 442 F.2d 310. Conspir- acy 28(3); Extortion 21

A gambler cannot with impunity avail himself of interstate mails for clearing checks to finance illegal wagering, even though bank which actually mailed checks commits no crime, nor does it matter that use of interstate facilities is tangential to major part of gambling operation. U. S. v. Salsbury, C.A.4 (Md.) 1970, 430 F.2d 1045. Gaming 62

Defendant, a hospital administrator, used and caused the use of the mails or interstate wires in support of his schemes to commit honest services fraud through bribery of three state legislators, as required to support convictions for conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, where defendant sent checks to two of the legislators, and vendor responsibility certification forms to City and State in which he failed to make required disclosures of his hospital network's purported “consulting” relationship with one of the legislators, through the mails, and all three legislators sent letters through mails in which they advocated to various power brokers on behalf of hospit- als defendant administered, and defendant's e-mails to the three legislators were wired through interstate facilities. U.S. v. Rosen, S.D.N.Y.2011, 809 F.Supp.2d 263, affirmed 716 F.3d 691. Conspiracy 32

Defendant's alleged use of mail to advance his illegal scheme to improperly influence members of Common- wealth legislature was a sufficient use of interstate facilities for purposes of Travel Act, despite defendant's arguments that use of mail was only incidental to scheme. U.S. v. Goldberg, D.Mass.1996, 928 F.Supp. 89. Com- merce 82.10

Interstate commerce requirement for Travel Act conviction was satisfied by evidence that Pennsylvania corporation mailed “kickback” checks to New Jersey corporations. U.S. v. Johns, E.D.Pa.1991, 755 F.Supp. 130. Com- merce 82.10

An intrastate mailing was insufficient to trigger sanctions of this section when there was no other “interstate nexus.” U.S. v. Varbaro, S.D.N.Y.1984, 597 F.Supp. 1173. Commerce 82.6

88. ---- Newspapers, use of facility in commerce, elements of offense

Newspaper or similar publication exempt from operation of section 1953(b) (3) of this title may nevertheless be used as an interstate facility to facilitate the carrying on of unlawful gambling activities under this section. U. S. v. Erlenbaugh, C.A.7 (Ind.) 1971, 452 F.2d 967, certiorari granted 92 S.Ct. 1194, 405 U.S. 973, 31 L.Ed.2d 247, affirmed 93 S.Ct. 477, 409 U.S. 239, 34 L.Ed.2d 446. Gaming 62

89. ---- Telephone or telegraph use, use of facility in commerce, elements of offense

Telephone is a “facility in interstate commerce” and, thus, intrastate telephone calls made with intent to further unlawful activity can violate the section of the Travel Act providing that “[w]hoever . . . uses the mail or any facility in interstate or foreign commerce” with intent to carry on unlawful activity is guilty of a crime; under the Act, the phrase “in interstate or foreign commerce” modifies the noun “facility,” not the verb “uses,” it was con- ceded that the telephone is a facility “of” interstate commerce, and no special significance could be attached to use of the preposition “in” rather than “of” in the Act, as the closely related murder-for-hire statute showed that Congress did not, by using the phrase “in interstate or foreign commerce” in the Travel Act, intend to require ac-

tual interstate activity. U.S. v. Nader, C.A.9 (Mont.) 2008, 542 F.3d 713, certiorari denied 129 S.Ct. 1984, 173 L.Ed.2d 1089. Commerce 82.10

Government satisfied elements of Travel Act by proving at trial that defendant intended to engage in unlawful activity by transporting $150,000 outside the United States without filing “Currency or Money Instrument Re- port,” caused his secretary to use telephone to make travel arrangements to facilitate the unlawful activity, and thereafter performed additional facilitating act by accepting $150,000 in cash from undercover officer. U.S. v. Jenkins, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1991, 943 F.2d 167, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 659, 502 U.S. 1014, 116 L.Ed.2d 751. Commerce 82.10

Single interstate telephone call made by defendant at request of sheriff, whom she allegedly attempted to bribe, was sufficient to establish jurisdiction under this section where ample evidence supported finding that sheriff requested defendant's call before sheriff knew that she was out of state, entire conversation over phone consisted of details involving attempted bribery, and thus phone call facilitated and made easier bribery scheme. U.S. v. Pecora, C.A.5 (La.) 1982, 693 F.2d 421, rehearing denied 697 F.2d 1092, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 3087, 462 U.S. 1119, 77 L.Ed.2d 1348. Bribery 1(1)

Evidence showing that defendant and accomplice flew from Mississippi to Las Vegas via commercial airline to meet third person to try to obtain good price on large heroin buy and that, although parties did not accomplish heroin buy in Las Vegas, accomplice made telephone calls to such third party in attempt to further their conspiracy sufficiently proved violation of this section. U. S. v. Stevens, C.A.10 (Kan.) 1979, 612 F.2d 1226, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 3011, 447 U.S. 921, 65 L.Ed.2d 1113. Conspiracy 47(12)

Evidence including telephone bills of one of defendants' customers which established that the customer had made interstate telephone calls to defendants was sufficient for jury reasonably to conclude that defendants had agreed, in violation of federal law, to use interstate telephone service to facilitate their unlawful bookmaking operation. U. S. v. Wilkinson, C.A.5 (Miss.) 1979, 601 F.2d 791. Telecommunications 1018(4)

One defendant's telephone call to Texas for purpose of ordering corresponding gravity maps to be used to ex- ploit stolen seismic data constituted sufficient use of interstate facilities to support defendants' conviction under count of indictment charging that defendant made such a call; moreover, evidence supported jurisdiction under this section under count charging use of interstate facilities to promote commercial bribery scheme where defendants directed another to make interstate telephone call. U. S. v. Perrin, C.A.5 (La.) 1978, 580 F.2d 730, rehearing denied 585 F.2d 520, certiorari granted 99 S.Ct. 1496, 440 U.S. 956, 59 L.Ed.2d 769, affirmed 100 S.Ct. 311, 444 U.S. 37, 62 L.Ed.2d 199, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 520, 444 U.S. 990, 62 L.Ed.2d 419. Bribery 1(1); Bribery 11

Term “facility” as used in this section covers interstate use of telephones. U. S. v. Villano, C.A.10 (Colo.) 1976, 529 F.2d 1046, certiorari denied 96 S.Ct. 3180, 426 U.S. 953, 49 L.Ed.2d 1193. Commerce 82.6

Evidence was sufficient to sustain convictions for interstate travel for promotion of an illegal gambling enter-

prise and use of interstate telephone facilities in an unlawful gambling enterprise. U. S. v. Burke, C.A.5 (Fla.) 1974, 495 F.2d 1226, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 667, 419 U.S. 1079, 42 L.Ed.2d 673. Extortion 39(2); Gaming 98(1)

In prosecution for violation of this section, telephone calls by defendants from Newark to New York, from New York to Las Vegas, and from Paris to New York, were insufficient to transform an incident of local corruption, which was provoked by actions of federal agents, into a crime against the United States. U. S. v. Archer, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1973, 486 F.2d 670. Commerce 82.10

Evidence that defendant suggested to codefendant's debtor that money be sent from Michigan to Arizona by wire supported conviction on count alleging that defendant and codefendant caused use of interstate facilities to facilitate carrying on extortion from codefendant's debtor. U. S. v. Antonick, C.A.9 (Ariz.) 1973, 481 F.2d 935, certiorari denied 94 S.Ct. 374, 414 U.S. 1010, 38 L.Ed.2d 248. Extortion 39(2)

Evidence of interstate telephone calls made by defendant to prostitutes in his Tennessee house of prostitution, for which “madam” acted as telephone operator, was insufficient to sustain conviction for using facilities of interstate commerce with intent to promote, manage, facilitate, or carry on unlawful activities, for lack of evidence that calls to prostitutes, with whom defendant carried on affairs, were connected with operation of business. U. S. v. Judkins, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1970, 428 F.2d 333. Prostitution 28

That interstate telephone calls placing wagers were made from Illinois to each of defendants in Missouri was a sufficient use of interstate facilities to establish jurisdictional requirement of use of an interstate facility; it was not necessary for government, in prosecution for violating this section proscribing interstate gambling, to prove defendants knew that the calls received from an out-of-state source were in fact out-of-state calls. U. S. v. Han- on, C.A.8 (Mo.) 1970, 428 F.2d 101, certiorari denied 91 S.Ct. 1608, 402 U.S. 952, 29 L.Ed.2d 122. Gaming 62

A telephone is a “facility,” within this section condemning the use of any facility in interstate commerce with intent to carry out any unlawful activity. Menendez v. U. S., C.A.5 (Fla.) 1968, 393 F.2d 312, certiorari denied 89 S.Ct. 639, 393 U.S. 1029, 21 L.Ed.2d 572. See, also, U.S. v. Winston, D.C.N.Y.1967, 267 F.Supp. 555. Tele- communications 1012

Conduct of defendants in assaulting person and placing telephone call from Missouri to Tennessee demanding money from brother of assault victim for release of victim came within terms of this section prohibiting use of any facility in interstate commerce with intent to commit any crime of violence to further any unlawful activity, and prosecution under this section was not barred on theory that defendants and assault victim were engaged merely in drunken brawl and not in organized scheme of extortion and that any effort to punish defendants should have been undertaken by state. McIntosh v. U. S., C.A.8 (Mo.) 1967, 385 F.2d 274. Commerce 82.10; Extortion 19; Extortion 21

Although it appeared that defendant accused of conspiring with Cincinnati cab drivers and others to promote

prostitution in the state of Kentucky had not traveled in interstate commerce, in view of evidence showing that defendant while working in a house of prostitution in Covington, Kentucky had received calls made by Cincin- nati cab drivers to make arrangements to carry dates to Kentucky for purpose of prostitution, defendant's conduct came within this section. U. S. v. Chambers, C.A.6 (Ohio) 1967, 382 F.2d 910. Commerce 82.60

If paper was not within ban of section 1953 of this title proscribing interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia, use of telephone to order its transmittal through mails would not be use of facility to promote unlawful activity, within this section which was contemporaneously enacted. U. S. v. Arnold, C.A.4 (Va.) 1967, 380 F.2d 366. Gaming 62

Defendant's use of telegraph facilities to transfer proceeds from several slot machines owned and operated by defendant and his partner from Indiana to West Virginia did constitute a violation of this section prohibiting use of interstate facilities to further unlawful activity. U. S. v. Hawthorne, C.A.4 (W.Va.) 1966, 356 F.2d 740, certiorari denied 86 S.Ct. 1344, 384 U.S. 908, 16 L.Ed.2d 360. Gaming 62

This section dealing with interstate or foreign travel or transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises was not violated by those who used communication facilities of telephone company and telegraph company to receive and transmit racing and other news to be published in publications sold and distributed to general public. Kelly v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., C.A.7 (Ill.) 1963, 325 F.2d 148. Gaming 62

This section making it offense to use interstate commerce facilities in connection with certain unlawful activities included use of telephone in interstate or foreign commerce. U. S. v. Borgese, S.D.N.Y.1964, 235 F.Supp. 286. Telecommunications 1012

The word “facility” in this section forbidding use of wire communication facility for interstate transportation of wagering information includes the telephone. U. S. v. Smith, E.D.Ill.1962, 209 F.Supp. 907. Gaming 63(2)

90. ---- Tickertapes, use of facility in commerce, elements of offense

Under this section prohibiting use of any facility in interstate commerce to promote or carry on any unlawful activity, where defendants operated poolroom in Indiana in which baseball scores were received from Chicago by tickertape and posted on blackboards so that customers could check winning tickets in illegal baseball pool defendants' activities constituted “use” of interstate facility even though there was no evidence that defendants personally posted scores obtained from tickertape. U. S. v. Miller, C.A.7 (Ind.) 1967, 379 F.2d 483, certiorari denied 88 S.Ct. 291, 389 U.S. 930, 19 L.Ed.2d 281. Gaming 62

91. ---- Time of use, use of facility in commerce, elements of offense

This section requires that illegal acts which form basis of prosecution thereunder be performed after use of facility in interstate or foreign commerce. U. S. v. Eisner, C.A.6 (Ky.) 1976, 533 F.2d 987, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 314, 429 U.S. 919, 50 L.Ed.2d 286. Commerce 82.6

Defendant who conducted an online gambling operation operating out of the Netherlands Antilles did not violate the Travel Act by coming to Georgia to attempt to collect a gambling debt from a Georgia resident; neither defendant nor the Georgia resident violated the Georgia commercial gambling statute underlying the indictment, and defendant's acts did not constitute use of interstate commerce to facilitate the carrying out of an unlawful activity, since the gambling enterprise was no longer ongoing. U.S. v. Corrar, N.D.Ga.2007, 512 F.Supp.2d 1280 . Commerce 82.10

92. ---- Time of determination, use of facility in commerce, elements of offense

Determination of whether the nature and degree of interstate activity in connection with defendant's allegedly unlawful activities was sufficient to bring it within the scope of this section should be made after full evidentiary presentation at trial and not on the basis of a pretrial evidentiary hearing. U. S. v. Raineri, W.D.Wis.1980, 521 F.Supp. 16. Criminal Law 632(5)

93. ---- Miscellaneous cases established, use of facility in commerce, elements of offense

Scheme to cheat at blackjack at casino in Nevada had sufficient interstate connections to sustain conviction of defendant, who participated in blackjack practice sessions, for aiding and abetting wire fraud and interstate travel. U. S. v. Garner, C.A.9 (Nev.) 1981, 663 F.2d 834, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 1750, 456 U.S. 905, 72 L.Ed.2d 161. Commerce 82.6; Telecommunications 1014(8)

This section relating to interstate travel in aid of racketeering enterprises did apply to bingo operation in city notwithstanding claim of defendant that the bingo clubs were local in nature and all of the supplies used in clubs were available from particular company in city. U. S. v. Colacurcio, C.A.9 (Wash.) 1974, 499 F.2d 1401. Extor- tion 21

Use of interstate collection process to collect credit card invoices brought defendant's prostitution activity within the Travel Act; payment for prostitution services with credit cards which are collected through interstate banking facilities constitutes the use of a facility in interstate commerce under the Travel Act. U.S. v. Walton, D.Minn.1986, 633 F.Supp. 1353. Prostitution 19(2)

III. UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY

Arson, violation of state or federal law 126 Barred prosecutions, violation of state or federal law 124 Bombing, violation of state or federal law 127 Bribery, violation of state or federal law 128 Business enterprise 121, 122 Business enterprise - Generally 121 Business enterprise - Continuity of enterprise 122 Continuity of enterprise, business enterprise 122

Duration of unlawful activity 134 Extortion, violation of state or federal law 129 Felony or misdemeanor, violation of state or federal law 125 Gambling, violation of state or federal law 130 Narcotics, violation of state or federal law 131 Prostitution, violation of state or federal law 132 Sexual harassment, violation of state or federal law 133 Violation of state or federal law 123-133 Violation of state or federal law - Generally 123 Violation of state or federal law - Arson 126 Violation of state or federal law - Barred prosecutions 124 Violation of state or federal law - Bombing 127 Violation of state or federal law - Bribery 128 Violation of state or federal law - Extortion 129 Violation of state or federal law - Felony or misdemeanor 125 Violation of state or federal law - Gambling 130 Violation of state or federal law - Narcotics 131 Violation of state or federal law - Prostitution 132 Violation of state or federal law - Sexual harassment 133

121. Business enterprise, unlawful activity--Generally

Single transaction can constitute “business enterprise,” for purposes of provision of Travel Act prohibiting travel in interstate or foreign commerce with intent to engage in unlawful activity, including any business enterprise involving narcotics or controlled substances; court could conclude from even single transaction that defendant's involvement in proscribed activity was more than sporadic or casual. U.S. v. Bernaugh, C.A.10 (Okla.) 1992, 969 F.2d 858. Commerce 82.10

Where violation of this section is charged and underlying offense is extortion, government need not satisfy business enterprise requirement in order to obtain conviction. U. S. v. Wander, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1979, 601 F.2d 1251. Ex- tortion 19

The purpose of “business enterprise” requirement of this section condemning interstate travel or use of interstate facilities in furtherance of “any unlawful activity” was to focus this section upon organized crime; Congress did not intend that the “business enterprise” necessarily be operated by racketeers or that it be of a specific kind in which racketeers very commonly engaged at time this section was enacted. U. S. v. Roselli, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1970, 432 F.2d 879, certiorari denied 91 S.Ct. 883, 401 U.S. 924, 27 L.Ed.2d 828, certiorari denied 91 S.Ct. 884, 401 U.S. 924, 27 L.Ed.2d 828, rehearing denied 91 S.Ct. 1366, 402 U.S. 924, 28 L.Ed.2d 665. Commerce 82.6

Within meaning of this section proscribing interstate and foreign travel or transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises, and defining an unlawful activity as “any business enterprise involving gambling”, evidence supported finding that floating crap game in question, which took place four or five times a week and which was participated in by 10 to 25 ship passengers, was an entrenched operation and a “business enterprise”. U. S. v. Bren- nan, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1968, 394 F.2d 151, certiorari denied 89 S.Ct. 117, 393 U.S. 839, 21 L.Ed.2d 110. Gaming

98(1)

This section proscribing interstate travel in aid of racketeering does not differentiate business enterprise of a national crime syndicate and a petty hoodlum, and as long as it is established that a defendant is engaged in a proscribed gambling activity as a business enterprise, he can be found guilty of a violation of such section. Spinelli v. U. S., C.A.8 (Mo.) 1967, 382 F.2d 871, certiorari granted 88 S.Ct. 1025, 390 U.S. 942, 19 L.Ed.2d 1130, modified 88 S.Ct. 1834, 391 U.S. 933, 20 L.Ed.2d 853, reversed on other grounds 89 S.Ct. 584, 393 U.S. 410, 21 L.Ed.2d 637. Gaming 62

In provision of this section forbidding interstate travel in aid of racketeering enterprises the subsec. (b)(1) of this section defining unlawful activity as (1) any business enterprise involving gambling, liquor on which federal taxes had not been paid, narcotics, or prostitution or (2) extortion, bribery, or arson, “business enterprise” applies only to the offenses listed in subsec. (b)(1) of this section and not to extortion. Marshall v. U. S., C.A.9 (Cal.) 1966, 355 F.2d 999, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 34, 385 U.S. 815, 17 L.Ed.2d 54, rehearing denied 87 S.Ct. 388, 385 U.S. 964, 17 L.Ed.2d 309. Commerce 82.60

Alleged conduct involving active participation in a massive operation to import and distribute marijuana constituted a “business enterprise” within terms of this section. U. S. v. Bergdoll, D.C.Del.1976, 412 F.Supp. 1308. Commerce 82.6

122. ---- Continuity of enterprise, business enterprise, unlawful activity

For purposes of Travel Act, “criminal business enterprise” contemplates continuous course of business, one that already exists at time of overt act or is intended thereafter; evidence of isolated criminal act, or even sporadic acts, will not suffice. U.S. v. Roberson, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1993, 6 F.3d 1088, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 1230, 510 U.S. 1182, 127 L.Ed.2d 574, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 1322, 510 U.S. 1204, 127 L.Ed.2d 671, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 1383, 511 U.S. 1010, 128 L.Ed.2d 58. Commerce 82.10

To support conviction for traveling in interstate commerce in order to aid drug conspiracy, government is not required to prove that defendant personally engaged in continuous course of conduct; rather, government must prove only that there was continuous business enterprise and that defendant participated in the enterprise. U.S. v. Ruiz, C.A.5 (Miss.) 1993, 987 F.2d 243, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 163, 510 U.S. 855, 126 L.Ed.2d 123, denial of post-conviction relief affirmed 46 F.3d 438. Commerce 82.10

Continuous course of drug business activity and aiding and abetting travel in interstate commerce to carry on unlawful drug business enterprise were not established by evidence that defendant had been convicted more than five years earlier for importation of marijuana, possession with intent to distribute, and conspiracy to import marijuana, that rented nature of car had been concealed, and that car carried police-alerting equipment and tools to enable quick repair. U.S. v. Pollock, C.A.11 (Ga.) 1991, 926 F.2d 1044, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 593, 502 U.S. 985, 116 L.Ed.2d 617. Commerce 82.10

Drug “enterprise” upon which Travel Act charge was based continued in existence even after drug kingpin's ar-

rest, while kingpin's associates were liquidating holdings to pay for marijuana previously accepted on consign- ment, and after kingpin's escape, while he was living as fugitive off proceeds of prior illegal activity. U.S. v. Corona, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1989, 885 F.2d 766, certiorari denied 110 S.Ct. 1838, 494 U.S. 1091, 108 L.Ed.2d 966. Commerce 82.10

Although number of customers involved in illegal acts of prostitution at nude dancing establishment owned and managed by defendants was very small compared with total number of customers, activities were not too sporadic to form basis of “business enterprise” required by Travel Act; evidence showed that acts of prostitution took place over span of at least nine years. U.S. v. Muskovsky, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1988, 863 F.2d 1319, certiorari denied 109 S.Ct. 1345, 489 U.S. 1067, 103 L.Ed.2d 813, habeas corpus denied 912 F.2d 467. Commerce 82.10

A single action involving the transportation of narcotics did not constitute the requisite “business enterprise” to support a conviction under the Travel Act. U.S. v. Bates, C.A.11 (Ga.) 1988, 840 F.2d 858. Commerce 82.6

Jackpot rigging scheme which continued for almost three years was “business enterprise” within meaning of Travel Act statute sufficient to allow conviction of defendant who participated in only three jackpot cheating incidents, and even if continuous illegal conduct were required of defendant, defendant's participation in three jackpot cheating incidents was sufficient to show continuous and illegal conduct for Travel Act conviction. U.S. v. Vaccaro, C.A.9 (Nev.) 1987, 816 F.2d 443, certiorari denied 108 S.Ct. 262, 484 U.S. 914, 98 L.Ed.2d 220, certiorari denied 108 S.Ct. 295, 484 U.S. 928, 98 L.Ed.2d 255. Commerce 82.10

One isolated incident of criminal activity, even though involving interstate commerce, is insufficient to sustain a conviction under this section; there must be evidence of a continuous enterprise and at least one act in interstate commerce in furtherance of that enterprise. U.S. v. Perez, C.A.8 (Mo.) 1983, 700 F.2d 1232. Commerce 82.6

Term “business enterprise” as it is used in this section prohibiting traveling in interstate commerce to carry on unlawful business enterprise means continuous course of conduct, rather than sporadic casual involvement in proscribed activity. U. S. v. Davis, C.A.5 (Ga.) 1982, 666 F.2d 195. Commerce 82.6

This section does not reach casual, sporadic involvement in criminal activity. U. S. v. Corbin, C.A.4 (Md.) 1981, 662 F.2d 1066. Commerce 82.6

This section requires only that the business enterprise be continuous, not that the interstate travel be continuous. U. S. v. Kaiser, C.A.9 (Wash.) 1981, 660 F.2d 724, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 1467, 455 U.S. 956, 71 L.Ed.2d 674, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 2935, 457 U.S. 1121, 73 L.Ed.2d 1334. Commerce 82.6

Words “business enterprise,” as used in this section prohibiting transmission in aid of a business enterprise involving gambling offenses, refer to a continuous course of criminal conduct rather than sporadic causal involvement in a proscribed activity. U. S. v. Donaway, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1971, 447 F.2d 940. Gaming 62

Within this section proscribing interstate travel with intent to carry on unlawful activity defined as any business enterprise involving gambling, non-taxpaid liquor, narcotics or prostitution in violation of state or federal laws, “business enterprise” refers to continuous course of conduct rather than sporadic, causal involvement in a proscribed activity. U. S. v. Cozzetti, C.A.9 (Nev.) 1971, 441 F.2d 344, denial of post-conviction relief affirmed 976 F.2d 736. Commerce 82.10

Accomplishment or facilitation of a single act of extortion, rather than a continuous course of business, is sufficient under this section. U. S. v. Feudale, D.C.Conn.1967, 271 F.Supp. 115. Extortion 19

123. Violation of state or federal law, unlawful activity--Generally

Travel Act, which proscribes use of interstate facilities in furtherance of illegal activity, does not require actual commission of underlying state offense for conviction. U.S. v. Davis, C.A.10 (Wyo.) 1992, 965 F.2d 804, certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 1255, 507 U.S. 910, 122 L.Ed.2d 653. Commerce 82.10

As a predicate to Travel Act conviction, absent a distinct violation of a law of the United States, defendant must have engaged in some form of unlawful activity prohibited by state law. U.S. v. DeLuna, C.A.8 (Mo.) 1985, 763 F.2d 897, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 382, 474 U.S. 980, 88 L.Ed.2d 336. Commerce 82.10

Use of interstate commerce to violate or attempt to violate a state statute constituted a federal crime, and the underlying state law merely serves a definitional purpose in characterizing the proscribed conduct. U. S. v. Loucas, C.A.4 (W.Va.) 1980, 629 F.2d 989, certiorari denied 101 S.Ct. 1738, 450 U.S. 1030, 68 L.Ed.2d 224. Commerce 82.10

Congress, in writing this section, did not intend to outlaw only the bribery of public officials while simultaneously prohibiting the disregard of a fiduciary duty in a myriad of other circumstances. U. S. v. Perrin, C.A.5 (La.) 1978, 580 F.2d 730, rehearing denied 585 F.2d 520, certiorari granted 99 S.Ct. 1496, 440 U.S. 956, 59 L.Ed.2d 769, affirmed 100 S.Ct. 311, 444 U.S. 37, 62 L.Ed.2d 199, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 520, 444 U.S. 990, 62 L.Ed.2d 419. Bribery 1(1)

Inquiry into whether state violation committed by defendant comes within scope of this section depends not upon nomenclature used, but upon nature of the violation. U. S. v. Brecht, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1976, 540 F.2d 45, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 1160, 429 U.S. 1123, 51 L.Ed.2d 573. Commerce 82.10

This section, which makes it a federal offense for an individual to utilize facilities of interstate commerce with the intent to further any unlawful activity, does not reach only those state offenses which would have constituted the crimes of “extortion, bribery, or arson” at common law, but all state offenses which can be generically classified under those headings fall within its purview. U. S. v. Dansker, C.A.3 (N.J.) 1976, 537 F.2d 40, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 732, 429 U.S. 1038, 50 L.Ed.2d 748. Commerce 82.10

Existence of a violation of state law is an element of the violation of this section and the court must make a de-

termination of whether the underlying state law has been or could have been violated. U. S. v. Hiatt, C.A.9 (Wash.) 1975, 527 F.2d 1048. Commerce 82.10

This section refers to state law only to identify unlawful activity in which defendant is engaged. U. S. v. Peskin, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1975, 527 F.2d 71, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 63, 429 U.S. 818, 50 L.Ed.2d 79. Bribery 1(1)

There is no need to prove a violation of state law as an essential element of interstate travel or transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises, and therefore the failure to define a generic term according to state law is not error. U. S. v. Prince, C.A.5 (Fla.) 1975, 515 F.2d 564. Commerce 82.6

This section requires that the activity which follows interstate travel violate the law of the jurisdiction in which it occurs in order for conviction to be sustained under this section. U. S. v. Zemater, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1974, 501 F.2d 540. Commerce 82.10

Initial inquiry in case under this section is whether underlying activity violates state law. U. S. v. Kahn, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1973, 472 F.2d 272, certiorari denied 93 S.Ct. 2270, 411 U.S. 982, 36 L.Ed.2d 958. Commerce 82.10

Proper inquiry in determining if defendant has committed “extortion, bribery or arson” under Travel Act is whether acts for which defendant has been indicted fall within generic definitions of those terms rather than within definitions used by state in which acts were committed. U.S. v. Parlavecchio, D.N.J.1995, 903 F.Supp. 788. Arson 2; Bribery 1(1); Extortion 19

In prosecutions under this section state law serves merely a definitional purpose, and there is no need to prove a violation of state law as an essential element of federal crime. U.S. v. Goldfarb, E.D.Mich.1979, 464 F.Supp. 565. Gaming 62

124. ---- Barred prosecutions, violation of state or federal law, unlawful activity

Fact that illegal gambling activity in furtherance of which facilities in interstate commerce had been used could not be prosecuted under state law because barred by state statute of limitations was irrelevant to a prosecution under this section, and since state law served merely a definitional purpose under the federal statute, this section did not enlarge state criminal statute in violation of U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 9. U. S. v. Cerone, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1971, 452 F.2d 274, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 1168, 405 U.S. 964, 31 L.Ed.2d 240, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 1169, 405 U.S. 964, 31 L.Ed.2d 240. Constitutional Law 1071; Gaming 62; Gaming 63(1)

125. ---- Felony or misdemeanor, violation of state or federal law, unlawful activity

Since there is no specific penalty prescribed for violation of N.R.S. 463.360 stating that it is unlawful for any person to receive any compensation for permitting games of chance to be carried on without first having procured all federal, state, county and municipal gaming licenses as required by statute or ordinance, the “catch-all”

provision of N.R.S. 463.160 that violation of any provisions of the chapter will be deemed a gross misdemeanor would apply, which violation would be a criminal infraction for purposes of prosecution under this section. U. S. v. Polizzi, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1974, 500 F.2d 856, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 802, 419 U.S. 1120, 42 L.Ed.2d 820, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 803, 419 U.S. 1120, 42 L.Ed.2d 820. Gaming 4; Gaming 62

This section draws no distinctions between serious and insubstantial state offenses, rather, the test of its application is the nature and degree of interstate activity in furtherance of the state crime. U. S. v. Isaacs, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1974, 493 F.2d 1124, certiorari denied 94 S.Ct. 3183, 417 U.S. 976, 41 L.Ed.2d 1146, rehearing denied 94 S.Ct. 3234, 418 U.S. 955, 41 L.Ed.2d 1178, certiorari denied 94 S.Ct. 3184, 417 U.S. 976, 41 L.Ed.2d 1146. Com- merce 82.10

126. ---- Arson, violation of state or federal law, unlawful activity

Congress did not intend to restrict coverage of this section by defining arson according to state labels, and “arson” was to be taken in its commonly used and understood sense; there was thus no requirement that jury be instructed on Maryland definition of arson though defendant was charged with traveling in interstate commerce with intent to promote unlawful activity of arson in violation of Maryland laws. U. S. v. Conway, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1975, 507 F.2d 1047, rehearing denied 511 F.2d 1192. Arson 41; Commerce 82.10

127. ---- Bombing, violation of state or federal law, unlawful activity

Conviction under Travel Act requires only proof of subsequent overt act in furtherance of the unlawful activity, and did not require proof that defendants performed or attempted to perform the actual bombing they were planning at the time of the travel. U.S. v. Winslow, C.A.9 (Idaho) 1992, 962 F.2d 845, as amended. Commerce 82.10

128. ---- Bribery, violation of state or federal law, unlawful activity

Bribery of private employee prohibited by state criminal statute violates this section which makes it a federal offense to travel or to use any facility in interstate commerce to commit “bribery * * * in violation of the laws of the State in which committed.” Perrin v. U. S., U.S.La.1979, 100 S.Ct. 311, 444 U.S. 37, 62 L.Ed.2d 199. Bribery 1(1)

Defendants could be convicted of interstate travel to facilitate bribery of tribal police chief, in connection with scheme to transport tobacco from Akwesasne Reservation through Passamaquoddy Reservation into Canada without paying Canadian taxes and excise duties, given substantial evidence that defendants were aware of chief's status and concerned with law enforcement activities from first meeting onward, even though enforcement of federal or Canadian law was not included within chief's official duties in the exercise of which he could be “influenced,” within meaning of Maine bribery statute punishing the offer of pecuniary benefit with intention of influencing another's exercise of discretion as a public servant, as evidence supported finding that police chief was responsible for general surveillance on reservation and that defendants selected him with intention that he divert other officers from patrolling areas of smuggling activity, and receiving something of value to turn delib- erate blind eye to federal or foreign criminal violations would limit his discretion in his official capacity as tribal

police chief. U.S. v. Boots, C.A.1 (Me.) 1996, 80 F.3d 580, certiorari denied 117 S.Ct. 263, 519 U.S. 905, 136 L.Ed.2d 188. Bribery 11; Commerce 82.10

In prosecution of insurance underwriter for use of interstate commerce to facilitate bribery of public official, i.e., Wyoming Insurance Commissioner, in violation of Travel Act, government was not required to prove that underwriter needed to relocate to Wyoming, only that underwriter attempted to bribe Commissioner in hopes of obtaining reciprocal benefit, i.e., more favorable regulatory climate. U.S. v. Davis, C.A.10 (Wyo.) 1992, 965 F.2d 804, certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 1255, 507 U.S. 910, 122 L.Ed.2d 653. Commerce 82.10

Louisiana commercial bribery statute does not reach bribery of non-Louisiana public officials and thus defendant was not guilty of violating Travel Act on ground that he bribed elected chairman of Indian tribe. U.S. v. Tonry, C.A.5 (La.) 1988, 837 F.2d 1281. Bribery 1(1)

Bribery of a city official, the unlawful activity underlying use of interstate communication facilities in violation of this section, is within the ambit of this section. U.S. v. Garrett, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1983, 716 F.2d 257, rehearing denied 720 F.2d 1291, certiorari denied 104 S.Ct. 1910, 466 U.S. 937, 80 L.Ed.2d 459. Bribery 1(1)

Bribery in violation of M.G.L.A. c. 268, § 2 was an unlawful activity within meaning of this section and, thus, was a sufficient predicate crime under this section. U.S. v. Arruda, C.A.1 (Mass.) 1983, 715 F.2d 671. Com- merce 82.10

Even assuming that attempt to secure “fair treatment” is not bribery, payments and promises of payments to city mayor by principal owner of engineering firm in exchange for mayor's promise to exercise official influence on engineering firm's behalf were “bribes” in violation of New Jersey law and therefore sufficient to establish “unlawful activity” underlying conviction pursuant to this section, notwithstanding contention that engineering firm was only attempting to secure fair treatment from city's mayor and to placate mayor's anger over failure to receive bribe promised him earlier. U.S. v. Walsh, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1983, 700 F.2d 846, certiorari denied 104 S.Ct. 96, 464 U.S. 825, 78 L.Ed.2d 102. Bribery 1(2)

Kickback transaction between president of stevedoring company and executive of shipping company which defendant facilitated constituted the crime of commercial bribery under McKinney's N.Y.Penal Law §§ 180.03, 180.08 for purposes of this section where monthly kickback made was an integral part of the negotiations resulting in a crane rental agreement, without the knowledge or consent of shipping company executive's employer, in that all the requisite elements of commercial bribing and commercial bribe receiving under New York law were present. U. S. v. Seregos, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1981, 655 F.2d 33, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 1431, 455 U.S. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 650. Bribery 1(1)

Congress in enacting this section, which specifically outlaws extortion, bribery or arson in violation of state laws, intended “bribery” to be used in its generic sense and not to be limited to its common law meaning, and thus violation under this section could be based on commercial bribery in violation of State Commercial Bribery

Statute, LSA-R.S. 14:73. U. S. v. Perrin, C.A.5 (La.) 1978, 580 F.2d 730, rehearing denied 585 F.2d 520, certiorari granted 99 S.Ct. 1496, 440 U.S. 956, 59 L.Ed.2d 769, affirmed 100 S.Ct. 311, 444 U.S. 37, 62 L.Ed.2d 199 , certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 520, 444 U.S. 990, 62 L.Ed.2d 419. Bribery 1(1)

Use of word “bribery” in McKinney's N.Y. Penal Law § 180.05 proscribing commercial bribery did not in itself bring violation of McKinney's N.Y. Penal Law § 180.05 within coverage of this section. U. S. v. Brecht, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1976, 540 F.2d 45, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 1160, 429 U.S. 1123, 51 L.Ed.2d 573. Commerce 82.10

In prosecution for violation of this section by accepting a bribe in violation of laws of New Jersey in connection with gaining approval for shopping center complex, evidence which established nothing more than agreement of defendant, vice chairman of city parking authority, in exchange for money, to withhold his prior opposition to project and publicly advocate its construction in a reduced from was insufficient to establish violation of N.J.S.A. 2A:93-6, in the absence of any suggestion that defendant had agreed to corruptly influence the board of adjustment. U. S. v. Dansker, C.A.3 (N.J.) 1976, 537 F.2d 40, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 732, 429 U.S. 1038, 50 L.Ed.2d 748. Bribery 11

Defendants could properly be convicted under this section on finding that they had engaged in bribery as prohibited by state law without proof of actual extortion even though they were also charged with extortion under section 1951 of this title. U. S. v. Hathaway, C.A.1 (Mass.) 1976, 534 F.2d 386, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 64, 429 U.S. 819, 50 L.Ed.2d 79. Bribery 1(1)

The word “bribery” as used in this section is not limited to the corruption of public officials, and extended to defendant's conduct in making payments to bank officer for purpose of influencing his conduct relative to loans made to corporations owned or controlled by defendants. U. S. v. Pomponio, C.A.4 (Va.) 1975, 511 F.2d 953, certiorari denied 96 S.Ct. 142, 423 U.S. 874, 46 L.Ed.2d 105, certiorari denied 96 S.Ct. 143, 423 U.S. 874, 46 L.Ed.2d 105, rehearing denied 96 S.Ct. 406, 423 U.S. 991, 46 L.Ed.2d 311. Bribery 1(1)

It was sufficient to sustain conviction under this section prohibiting use of interstate facility to promote unlawful activity that bribing of zoning officials was illegal under state law. U. S. v. Wechsler, C.A.4 (Va.) 1969, 408 F.2d 1184. Bribery 1(2)

New Jersey statute criminalizing bribery was ambiguous as to whether offense included bribery of candidates for public office who were never elected, and thus, under rule of lenity, it would be interpreted to exclude bribery of unelected candidates, for purposes of establishing predicate bribery offense in defendant's prosecution under Travel Act for traveling in interstate commerce to solicit, accept, or agree to accept bribes while he was mayoral candidate; statute did not explicitly incorporate unelected candidates in its prohibition against bribery of a public servant, and provision stating that it was no defense that a person the actor sought to influence was not qualified to act in the desired way because he had not yet assumed office appeared to apply to bribe givers, not bribe receivers. U.S. v. Manzo, D.N.J.2012, 851 F.Supp.2d 797. Commerce 82.10

Violation of Meat Inspection Act's prohibition against inspector or federal employee receiving gift given for any purpose is not “bribery” and cannot supply predicate for Travel Act violation. U.S. v. Espy, D.D.C.1998, 23 F.Supp.2d 1. Bribery 1(1)

Violation of Massachusetts bribery statute is valid predicate offense under Travel Act. U.S. v. Ferber, D.Mass.1997, 966 F.Supp. 90. Commerce 82.10

Entertaining customers and prospective customers and giving Christmas gifts was not sufficient to support allegation of “bribery,” in violation of federal law, so as to support Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) action against competitors of plaintiff in trucking industry. Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc. v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware, D.S.C.1992, 805 F.Supp. 1277, affirmed 998 F.2d 1009, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 553, 510 U.S. 993, 126 L.Ed.2d 454. Bribery 1(1)

Reference to bribery in the Travel Act applies to all crimes enumerated under federal statute governing bribery of public officials and witnesses, including crimes requiring only proof that thing of value was given “for or because of” an official act. U.S. v. Biaggi, E.D.N.Y.1987, 674 F.Supp. 86, affirmed 853 F.2d 89, certiorari denied 109 S.Ct. 1312, 489 U.S. 1052, 103 L.Ed.2d 581. Commerce 82.10

Indictment which charged defendant with violation of this section and which alleged that defendant, who was a county official, and another who owned land on which a disposal plant was proposed for construction, discussed the position of the county official's office with respect to the application met the requirements of former Delaware bribery statute prohibiting the solicitation, directly or indirectly, of any benefit as consideration for violation of a legal duty as a public servant, 11 Del.C. § 745. U. S. v. Slawik, D.C.Del.1975, 408 F.Supp. 190, affirmed 564 F.2d 90. Bribery 1(2)

Congress in using term “bribery” in this section did not intend to cover offense known in New York as “commercial” bribery, and this section therefore did not pick up such offense. U. S. v. Niedelman, S.D.N.Y.1973, 356 F.Supp. 979. Bribery 1(1)

129. ---- Extortion, violation of state or federal law, unlawful activity

Activity by private individuals in attempting to obtain money from their victim by threats to expose alleged homosexual activity constituted “extortion” within this section which prohibits crossing state lines or use of interstate facilities to promote unlawful activity, including extortion. U. S. v. Nardello, U.S.Pa.1969, 89 S.Ct. 534, 393 U.S. 286, 21 L.Ed.2d 487. Extortion 22

In prosecution for conspiracy to commit extortion and interstate travel to commit extortion, evidence that defendants agreed to extort $1,500 from victim by threats of vengeance and promise to drop rape charge against victim in exchange for payment was sufficient to sustain conviction. U.S. v. Reed, C.A.5 (La.) 1983, 715 F.2d 870. Commerce 82.10; Conspiracy 47(3.1)

For purposes of this section it is sufficient if act complained of is prohibited by state law which would be generically classified as extortion. U. S. v. Karigiannis, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1970, 430 F.2d 148, certiorari denied 91 S.Ct. 143, 400 U.S. 904, 27 L.Ed.2d 141. Extortion 19

Threat to be made in North Carolina to arrest person for offense of sodomy committed in New York for purpose of extorting money from him was within prohibition of blackmail statute, North Carolina G.S. § 14-118, and constituted extortion within meaning of this section proscribing use of facilities of interstate commerce in furtherance of described unlawful activities. U. S. v. Hughes, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1969, 411 F.2d 461, certiorari denied 90 S.Ct. 145, 396 U.S. 867, 24 L.Ed.2d 120. Extortion 8; Extortion 19

130. ---- Gambling, violation of state or federal law, unlawful activity

Violation of Nevada Gaming Commission regulation could not in and of itself form predicate of state law violation required for a federal prosecution under Travel Act. U.S. v. DeLuna, C.A.8 (Mo.) 1985, 763 F.2d 897, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 382, 474 U.S. 980, 88 L.Ed.2d 336. Gaming 62

For gambling to constitute unlawful activity under this section, it must be conducted as part of an ongoing business enterprise, and thus offense is such that, by definition, proof of illegal acts occurring after interstate travel must be shown; ongoing illegal activity can be proved by evidence of gambling after last date charged in indictment. U. S. v. Jones, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1981, 642 F.2d 909. Gaming 81

“Gambling offenses” in this section condemning interstate travel or the use of interstate facilities in furtherance of “any unlawful activity,” defined as including “any business enterprise involving gambling, liquor on which the federal excise tax has not been paid, narcotics, or prostitution offenses in violation of the laws of the State in which they are committed or of the United States” included organized scheme to cheat for profit in “peeked” gin rummy games played at private social club in California, whose statute prohibits fraud while gambling. U. S. v. Roselli, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1970, 432 F.2d 879, certiorari denied 91 S.Ct. 883, 401 U.S. 924, 27 L.Ed.2d 828, certiorari denied 91 S.Ct. 884, 401 U.S. 924, 27 L.Ed.2d 828, rehearing denied 91 S.Ct. 1366, 402 U.S. 924, 28 L.Ed.2d 665. Gaming 63(2)

Evidence in federal prosecution for use of facility in interstate commerce to carry on gambling activities proscribed by S.H.A.Ill. ch. 38, § 28-1(a), established that activities of defendant, who allegedly operated gambling enterprise in which he, or others acting in his behalf, sold numbers of winning horses of races to customers who would use winning numbers to place bets prior to general knowledge of race results, violated state law prohibiting transmittal by telephone of wagering information. U.S. v. Ruthstein, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1969, 414 F.2d 1079. Gam- ing 98(1)

This section prohibiting use of any facility in interstate commerce to promote or facilitate carrying on of any business enterprise involving gambling offenses in violation of state laws was meant to condemn both use of interstate facility and local gambling activities facilitated by use of interstate facility. U. S. v. Miller, C.A.7 (Ind.) 1967, 379 F.2d 483, certiorari denied 88 S.Ct. 291, 389 U.S. 930, 19 L.Ed.2d 281. Gaming 62

Travel Act is applicable to cheating at gambling and does not only apply to illegal gambling businesses; accordingly, the activity of defendants, who were charged with organizing and participating in an enterprise violative of the anticheating statutes of Nevada, fell squarely within the conduct which, under the Travel Act, is a violation of federal law. U.S. v. Vaccaro, D.C.Nev.1985, 602 F.Supp. 1132. Commerce 82.10

This section incorporates Nevada state law in area of gambling. U.S. v. Goldfarb, E.D.Mich.1979, 464 F.Supp. 565. Gaming 62

Under this section whereby Congress made use of telephone facility in interstate commerce to promote gambling operation a felony, fact that gambling was deemed to be misdemeanor by Pennsylvania, wherein acts were committed, did not preclude conviction for violation of this section as felony. U. S. v. Garramone, E.D.Pa.1974, 380 F.Supp. 590, affirmed 506 F.2d 1050, affirmed 506 F.2d 1051, affirmed 506 F.2d 1052, affirmed 506 F.2d 1053, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 1428, 420 U.S. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 673. Criminal Law 27

Where numbers gambling being facilitated in Detroit area was illegal under laws of Michigan, such gambling was “unlawful activity” within this section relating to interstate and foreign travel or transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises. U.S. v. Azar, E.D.Mich.1964, 243 F.Supp. 345. Gaming 62

Persons who traveled in interstate commerce intending to facilitate gambling in violation of state law are subject to federal prosecution. U. S. v. Barrow, E.D.Pa.1962, 212 F.Supp. 837. Gaming 78

Necessary element of “chance” to constitute gambling was not involved in scheme whereby defendants by use of radio and long distance telephone would place bets with Wisconsin bookmakers on Arkansas horse races after knowing the results, and defendants did not violate this section and section 1084 of this title prohibiting use of interstate wire communication facilities for placing of bets or use of any facility in interstate or foreign commerce for carrying on an unlawful activity. U. S. v. Bergland, E.D.Wis.1962, 209 F.Supp. 547, reversed on other grounds 318 F.2d 159, certiorari denied 84 S.Ct. 129, 375 U.S. 861, 11 L.Ed.2d 88. Gaming 66; Telecom- munications 1012

131. ---- Narcotics, violation of state or federal law, unlawful activity

Evidence permitted convicting defendant for Travel Act violation for interstate travel for purpose of promoting unlawful activity; defendant regularly met with alleged coconspirator to carry on drug transactions, the two traveled from Colorado to Las Vegas on several occasions to meet with and purchase quantities of cocaine from their supplier, the two pooled their money to purchase large quantities of cocaine at favorable price for eventual distribution in Colorado, and records supported inference that the two engaged in continuous course of unlawful conduct, rather than only sporadic casual involvement in proscribed activity. U.S. v. Fox, C.A.10 (Colo.) 1990, 902 F.2d 1508, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 199, 498 U.S. 874, 112 L.Ed.2d 161. Commerce 82.10

Evidence, including proof that one defendant attended meetings concerning marijuana smuggling, located boat captains, was “contact point” for speed boats bringing in drugs, and was only one who could go in and out of

farm where marijuana was held, and including proof that other defendant was involved in search for grounded quaalude boat, assisted in loading quaaludes from one boat to another, and that he never objected to going to Cuba to pick up quaaludes, was sufficient to support conviction of defendants for various narcotics and related Travel Act violations. U.S. v. Cortez, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1985, 757 F.2d 1204, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 310, 474 U.S. 945, 88 L.Ed.2d 287. Commerce 82.10; Controlled Substances 76

132. ---- Prostitution, violation of state or federal law, unlawful activity

In Travel Act prosecution based on defendants' use of interstate phone calls to verify credit cards used to pay for acts of prostitution, proof that use of phones was followed in each instance by act of prostitution was not required; evidence that each credit card charge provided patron at defendant's club with opportunity to engage in acts of oral sex or sexual intercourse was sufficient. U.S. v. Campione, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1991, 942 F.2d 429. Com- merce 82.10

To obtain Travel Act conviction for participation in alleged prostitution business, Government must prove that defendants used facility of interstate commerce with intent to distribute proceeds of, or otherwise promote, unlawful activity and thereafter promoted or attempted to promote unlawful activity, but Government is not required to prove completed violation of underlying state prostitution statutes. U.S. v. Jones, C.A.D.C.1990, 909 F.2d 533, 285 U.S.App.D.C. 294. Prostitution 19(1)

Although prostitution is traditionally left to states to regulate, defendants could be prosecuted under this section for alleged prostitution at massage parlors in Colorado and Idaho. U.S. v. Monaco, C.A.10 (Colo.) 1983, 700 F.2d 577. Commerce 82.10

In prosecution for causing a woman to travel in interstate commerce with intent to further the business of prostitution, unlawful under state law, evidence was sufficient to sustain convictions. U. S. v. Baker, C.A.4 (N.C.) 1979, 611 F.2d 961. Prostitution 28

Within meaning of this section making it unlawful to travel in interstate commerce with intent to carry on an unlawful activity and thereafter to perform an act to carry on said activity, the term “unlawful activity” includes any business enterprise involving prostitution offenses in violation of the laws of the state where committed. U. S. v. Clemones, C.A.5 (Ga.) 1978, 577 F.2d 1247, modified 582 F.2d 1373. Prostitution 19(4)

West Virginia statutes prohibiting prostitution are not discriminatory on the basis of sex so that the statutes may provide predicate for prosecution for violation of this section. U. S. v. Prince, C.A.6 (Ohio) 1976, 529 F.2d 1108 , certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 108, 429 U.S. 838, 50 L.Ed.2d 105. Prostitution 14

Lack of definition of “prostitution” within Code W.Va. 61-8-5(b) prohibiting same did not vitiate convictions for conspiracy to engage in interstate prostitution activities in violation of this section prohibiting interstate travel or transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises inasmuch as term “prostitution” is a generic term and the trial court, sufficiently described the offense as “sexual intercourse for hire.” U. S. v. Prince, C.A.5 (Fla.) 1975, 515 F.2d 564. Prostitution 14; Prostitution 32

In prosecution of defendants for unlawfully using the United States mails with the intent of carrying on an unlawful business enterprise involving prostitution offenses, in violation of various state statutes, prostitution was not an element of any offense charged, but only evidentiary and indicative of the element of intent in the federal offense. U. S. v. Rizzo, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1969, 418 F.2d 71, certiorari denied 90 S.Ct. 1006, 397 U.S. 967, 25 L.Ed.2d 260. Prostitution 19(1)

Alleged actions of defendant in promotion of prostitution business at a bar, including the procuring of dancers for the bar, the doing of book work, and the collecting of prostitution proceeds were within the scope of this section. U. S. v. Raineri, W.D.Wis.1980, 521 F.Supp. 16. Prostitution 19(4)

133. ---- Sexual harassment, violation of state or federal law, unlawful activity

State employee's racketeering complaint that arose out of alleged sexual harassment inadequately alleged effect on interstate commerce and, therefore, failed to allege interference with interstate commerce by threats of violence and travel in interstate commerce in aid of racketeering enterprise. McKinney v. State of Ill., N.D.Ill.1989, 720 F.Supp. 706. Commerce 82.60

134. Duration of unlawful activity

Where woman was transported from Nevada to California for purposes of prostitution in violation of this section proscribing use of interstate facilities with intent to carry on unlawful business enterprise, fact that operation was shortly terminated by prostitute did not take it out of proscription of the statute. U. S. v. Cozzetti, C.A.9 (Nev.) 1971, 441 F.2d 344, denial of post-conviction relief affirmed 976 F.2d 736. Prostitution 19(4)

IV. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE GENERALLY

Acquittal 190 Arrest 164 Assistance of counsel 165 Collateral estoppel, defenses 172 Comments or conduct of counsel 186 Comments or conduct of court 185 Concurrent sentence doctrine, scope of review 195 Constitutionality of state laws, defenses 173 Defenses 171-180 Defenses - Generally 171 Defenses - Collateral estoppel 172 Defenses - Constitutionality of state laws 173 Defenses - Double jeopardy 174 Defenses - Entrapment 175 Defenses - Impossibility 176

Defenses - Limitations 177 Defenses - Mistake of law 178 Defenses - Selective prosecution 179 Defenses - State law defenses 180 Deliberation of jurors 189 Discovery or inspection 183 Double jeopardy, defenses 174 Entrapment, defenses 175 Grand jury 168 Impossibility, defenses 176 Issues reviewable, scope of review 196 Joint or separate trials 170 Jurisdiction 166 Limitations, defenses 177 Mistake of law, defenses 178 New trial 192 Persons entitled to object, search and seizure 163 Pleas 169 Private right of action 199 Probable cause, search and seizure 162 Questions for court 188 Questions for jury 187 Recusal of judge 182 Remand 198 Reversal 197 Scope of review 194-196 Scope of review - Generally 194 Scope of review - Concurrent sentence doctrine 195 Scope of review - Issues reviewable 196 Search and seizure 161-163 Search and seizure - Generally 161 Search and seizure - Persons entitled to object 163 Search and seizure - Probable cause 162 Selection of jurors 181 Selective prosecution, defenses 179 Sentence and punishment 191 State law defenses 180 Subpoenas 184 Vacating or setting aside conviction 193 Venue 167

161. Search and seizure, practice and procedure generally--Generally

Where vessel was boarded for purpose of conducting vessel documentation check which was appropriate and reasonable under circumstances and, incident to that investigative boarding, Coast Guard went to that portion of

vessel necessary to determine main beam number, discovery of marijuana in that area was indirect but lawful consequence of limited inspection and as such its seizure and use as evidence was lawful. U. S. v. Allen, C.A.4 (Va.) 1982, 690 F.2d 409. Criminal Law 392.15(9); Shipping 9

Where agents were seen approaching building in which gambling was in progress by one of the gambling participants who had just emerged from building and who then turned around and reentered the building leaving the door open, and agents entered through the open door and simultaneously announced their presence and the purpose of their visit, and the building in which the incriminating evidence was found was not a “house” but rather a small building with one door and furnished with special gambling table, there was no violation of section 3109 of this title. U. S. v. Johns, C.A.5 (Ga.) 1972, 466 F.2d 1364. Gaming 60

Especially in view of fact that contents of envelope were not offered in evidence in prosecution for conspiracy to violate this section, no error was shown because agents while executing valid search warrants in defendant's office opened one envelope addressed to a third person in care of defendant's firm. U. S. v. Cerone, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1971, 452 F.2d 274, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 1168, 405 U.S. 964, 31 L.Ed.2d 240, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 1169, 405 U.S. 964, 31 L.Ed.2d 240. Gaming 60

Fact that defendants charged with violation of this section conducted more than one business activity on the premises did not invalidate warrant or search where challenged warrant authorized a search of “the premises known as Ray's Lounge, which is a two-story red brick building located at 718-720 North Third Avenue * * *”, where building in question was owned by defendant and his wife, it had three front entrances on North Third Avenue, separately numbered 16, 18, and 20, and where a tenant operated a barbershop in No. 16, since premises described in warrant as those to be searched were specifically limited to Nos. 18 and 20 which were under control of defendants. U. S. v. Lee, C.A.7 (Ind.) 1971, 448 F.2d 604, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 107, 404 U.S. 858, 30 L.Ed.2d 100. Searches And Seizures 126

Although photographs and papers utilized by defendant in attempted extortion could be described as instruments for commission of the offense, search, pursuant to warrant, was not invalidated even if the documents were “mere evidence” of offense of traveling in interstate commerce for purposes of extortion. U. S. v. Mahler, C.A.9 (Ariz.) 1971, 442 F.2d 1172, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 541, 404 U.S. 993, 30 L.Ed.2d 545. Searches And Seizures 148

Seizure of large quantity of dice, observed during a search which was executed under a warrant and which was reasonable as to time, space and intensity, after defendant admitted he used the dice to hold a crap game, and after he was then arrested, was not unlawful. U. S. v. Harris, C.A.4 (Va.) 1968, 399 F.2d 687. Gaming 60

Where defendant provided key to apartment, search by Federal Bureau of Investigation agents was not illegal. U. S. v. Cantor, E.D.Pa.1971, 328 F.Supp. 561, affirmed 470 F.2d 890. Searches And Seizures 172

162. ---- Probable cause, search and seizure, practice and procedure generally

Texas Ranger's affidavit in support of warrant to search trailer, which contained ample factual basis for believ-

ing an informant, even though informant was unnamed, which disclosed that certain informants had seen gambling tables and gambling equipment on at least three occasions while informants were participating in the gambling, which stated that informants had on other occasions given information regarding illicit gambling operations that was found to be accurate, and which related that information related by unnamed informants was corroborated by other sources, was sufficient to support a finding of probable cause. U. S. v. Guinn, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1972, 454 F.2d 29, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 2437, 407 U.S. 911, 32 L.Ed.2d 685. Gaming 60

Federal Bureau of Investigation agent's affidavit which identified informant as special attorney from Department of Justice whose source of hearsay information was sworn testimony by witnesses before federal grand jury together with background information of agent which corroborated informant's conclusions provided probable cause for issuance of search warrant for search and seizure of gambling paraphernalia in home, factory and automobile of gambling equipment manufacturer. James v. U. S., C.A.5 (Miss.) 1969, 416 F.2d 467, certiorari denied 90 S.Ct. 902, 397 U.S. 907, 25 L.Ed.2d 87, certiorari denied 90 S.Ct. 903, 397 U.S. 907, 25 L.Ed.2d 87, certiorari denied 90 S.Ct. 938, 397 U.S. 928, 25 L.Ed.2d 108. Gaming 60

Although paragraphs of affidavit for search warrant reciting information received from informant that defendant had received numbers bets and that certain individuals were associated with defendant in conduct of gambling operations were inadequate to establish probable cause without adequate corroboration, information of association was not so insubstantial that it could not properly have counted in magistrate's determination to issue warrant. U. S. v. Manetti, D.C.Del.1970, 309 F.Supp. 174. Gaming 60

Affidavits relating almost entirely to Federal Wagering Tax laws, section 4401 et seq. of Title 26, and referring to telephone calls without specifying whether calls were interstate did not furnish probable cause of issuance of warrants in connection with alleged violations of this section and section 371 of this title. Silbert v. U. S., D.C.Md.1968, 289 F.Supp. 318. Gaming 60

163. ---- Persons entitled to object, search and seizure, practice and procedure generally

Defendant prosecuted for conspiracy and for substantive violations of this section relating to interstate travel to aid racketeering enterprises did not have standing to challenge legality of search of club which led to incidental seizure of incriminating records where defendant was not charged with possessory crimes so as to have automatic standing, was not on the club premises at time of search and established no proprietary or possessory interest in the property seized. U. S. v. Colacurcio, C.A.9 (Wash.) 1974, 499 F.2d 1401. Searches And Seizures 164

Defendant who was charged with aiding and abetting the crime of possession of heroin with intent to distribute, an offense in which possession was an essential element, had automatic standing to object to introduction of heroin seized from his codefendant and alleged companion; but did not have automatic standing with respect to counts charging conspiracy and interstate transportation with intent to promote unlawful activity, since possession was neither sufficient nor necessary element of such counts. U. S. v. Westerbann-Martinez, E.D.N.Y.1977, 435 F.Supp. 690. Criminal Law 392.41

164. Arrest, practice and procedure generally

The presence of defendant in an illegal house of prostitution in Kentucky together with information concerning his prior participation in the operation of the house that the Federal Bureau of Investigation agents had received from Cincinnati police undercover agents justified a reasonable belief that defendant had violated this section, and hence agents had authority and probable cause to arrest defendant without a warrant. U. S. v. Chambers, C.A.6 (Ohio) 1967, 382 F.2d 910. Arrest 63.4(11)

Law enforcement officers had probable cause to arrest defendant for conspiracy to violate Travel Act, or promoting prostitution in violation of Missouri law; approximately 40,000 phone calls were made or received at defendant's residence in three and one-half month period, trash pick-ups at defendant's residence revealed documents containing women's names, amounts of money, and tips, as well as names from hotels, directions to house or motel, and telephone credit card listed to defendant, and officers were told by clients on several occasions that they had paid with credit card for sex, receipts for which listed merchant as defendant's company. U.S. v. Clarke, W.D.Mo.1996, 925 F.Supp. 1433, reversed 110 F.3d 612. Arrest 63.4(6); Arrest 63.4(7.1)

165. Assistance of counsel, practice and procedure generally

In prosecution under this section, in view of fact that defendant made extensive attack on witness' credibility and her ability accurately to perceive, recall, and relate events, defense counsel's failure to qualify her medical records for admission as an exhibit did not render counsel's representation of defendant ineffective. U. S. v. Rain- eri, C.A.7 (Wis.) 1982, 670 F.2d 702, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 446, 459 U.S. 1035, 74 L.Ed.2d 601. Criminal Law 1933

166. Jurisdiction, practice and procedure generally

Appellate court would presume jury established federal jurisdiction, in convicting defendants of robbery under the Hobbs Act, under “depletion of assets” theory, that by stealing from armored truck company the defendants limited the company's potential as a purchaser of interstate goods, rather than under government's legally insufficient theory, that money stolen traveled in interstate commerce, and therefore defendants' conviction stood; government's legally insufficient theory was just a one-off line in the indictment that government never even mentioned, and the government's evidence at trial and its closing argument focused exclusively on the legally sound depletion of assets theory. U.S. v. Watson, C.A.7 (Ill.) 2008, 525 F.3d 583, certiorari denied 129 S.Ct. 610, 555 U.S. 1037, 172 L.Ed.2d 466, certiorari denied 129 S.Ct. 972, 555 U.S. 1104, 173 L.Ed.2d 117, post- conviction relief denied 2009 WL 3671153. Criminal Law 1144.16

Jurisdiction under this section may be satisfied by an implied, even unrealizable, threat to affect future business operation of victim if extortionate demand is not met. U. S. v. Rindone, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1980, 631 F.2d 491. Extor- tion 19

167. Venue, practice and procedure generally

Trial court did not err by approving venue of a criminal prosecution for involving interstate travel for unlawful

purposes in the Eastern District of North Carolina, based on a defendant living there and storage of drugs in district, even though there was no evidence that trip to acquire drugs, on which interstate travel claim was based, had originated from district. U.S. v. Burns, C.A.4 (N.C.) 1993, 990 F.2d 1426, certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 2949, 508 U.S. 967, 124 L.Ed.2d 696. Criminal Law 113

Evidence giving rise to reasonable inference that defendant traveled from his home in Kansas to Florida to consummate a drug transaction was sufficient to establish venue in Kansas for Travel Act [18 U.S.C.A. § 1952] prosecution. U.S. v. Rinke, C.A.10 (Kan.) 1985, 778 F.2d 581. Criminal Law 564(1)

For purposes of this section, venue lies in any district in which the travel occurred, including the district in which it originated. U.S. v. Pepe, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1984, 747 F.2d 632. Criminal Law 113

In prosecution for having caused travel and use of facility in interstate commerce to promote business involving illegal prostitution and other crimes, there was no abuse of discretion in trial court's denying defendant's motion to transfer trial of case from Madison to Hurley or Superior as trial at either of requested locations would result in greater inconvenience to defendant and witnesses. U. S. v. Raineri, C.A.7 (Wis.) 1982, 670 F.2d 702, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 446, 459 U.S. 1035, 74 L.Ed.2d 601. Criminal Law 121

With respect to count charging that defendant aided and abetted travel in interstate commerce to carry on unlawful business enterprise of possessing with intent to distribute methaqualone, government adequately established venue by proving that, after two other defendants entered into conspiracy to distribute methaqualone, one of those codefendants traveled through Middle District of Georgia to Florida with requisite intent of obtaining drugs from defendant. U. S. v. Davis, C.A.5 (Ga.) 1982, 666 F.2d 195. Criminal Law 113

Where travel involved in prosecution of defendant for violating this section by extortion originated in Colorado and ended in California and was conducted in order to promote and carry on unlawful activity of extortion, venue was properly laid in Colorado. U. S. v. Blitstein, C.A.10 (Colo.) 1980, 626 F.2d 774, certiorari denied 101 S.Ct. 898, 449 U.S. 1102, 66 L.Ed.2d 828. Criminal Law 113

A defendant may be prosecuted for traveling in violation of this section, or for aiding and abetting such travel, in any district in which the travel occurred. U. S. v. Polizzi, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1974, 500 F.2d 856, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 802, 419 U.S. 1120, 42 L.Ed.2d 820, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 803, 419 U.S. 1120, 42 L.Ed.2d 820. Crim- inal Law 108(1)

Evidence, in prosecution for traveling in interstate commerce with intent to carry on a gambling enterprise and also for conspiring to do so, was sufficient to establish venue in the Southern District of Texas. U. S. v. Guinn, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1972, 454 F.2d 29, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 2437, 407 U.S. 911, 32 L.Ed.2d 685. Criminal Law 564(1)

Where defendant charged with conspiring to make interstate trip to consummate extortion deplaned with companion at St. Louis airport after flight from Indianapolis and carried gun into Missouri, and companion met with

victim at St. Louis airport where she took money from victim, basis existed for prosecution being brought in Missouri even though the original threats and intimidation occurred in Indiana. U. S. v. Phillips, C.A.8 (Mo.) 1970, 433 F.2d 1364, certiorari denied 91 S.Ct. 900, 401 U.S. 917, 27 L.Ed.2d 819. Criminal Law 113

This section prohibiting use of any facility in interstate commerce with intent to facilitate carrying on of an unlawful activity including gaming does not require that the gambling occur in the state in which prosecution is brought. U. S. v. Nichols, C.A.8 (Mo.) 1970, 421 F.2d 570. Criminal Law 113

A defendant's right to be tried in the district in which the crime was committed was not violated where defendant was charged with interstate travel in aid of racketeering, and substantive violation of this section proscribing such conduct took place when defendant crossed into Missouri with the requisite intent and thereafter attempted or committed an illegal act in Missouri, and defendant was tried in a district court of Missouri. Spinelli v. U. S., C.A.8 (Mo.) 1967, 382 F.2d 871, certiorari granted 88 S.Ct. 1025, 390 U.S. 942, 19 L.Ed.2d 1130, modified 88 S.Ct. 1834, 391 U.S. 933, 20 L.Ed.2d 853, reversed 89 S.Ct. 584, 393 U.S. 410, 21 L.Ed.2d 637. Criminal Law 113

Under McKinney's N.Y. Penal Law, § 225.05, where defendants' act of persuasion of others to visit gambling ship occurred in New York, offense of persuading another to visit gambling place, in consequence whereof such other person gambled therein, was punishable in New York, even though the other elements of the crime occurred outside the territorial waters of New York. U. S. v. Black, S.D.N.Y.1968, 291 F.Supp. 262. Criminal Law 97(1)

Where it was alleged that defendant within District of Nebraska unlawfully used mail and telephone and interstate commerce from New York to Nebraska with intent to facilitate carrying on of unlawful activity of gambling in violation of laws of Nebraska, venue existed in Nebraska under this section prohibiting interstate transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises as broadened by provisions of section 3237 of this title to effect that any offense against United States begun in one district and completed in another may be prosecuted in any district in which offense was begun, continued or completed. U. S. v. Winston, S.D.N.Y.1967, 267 F.Supp. 555. Criminal Law 113

168. Grand jury, practice and procedure generally

Defendants convicted of conspiracy to bribe public official and using communication facilities in interstate commerce in carrying out their conspiracy failed to carry their burden of proof that grand jury was, in fact, prejudiced by pretrial publicity which spanned a period of more than a decade prior to indictment. U. S. v. Civella, C.A.8 (Mo.) 1981, 648 F.2d 1167, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 330, 454 U.S. 867, 70 L.Ed.2d 168. Indictment And Information 144.2

Practice of calling prospective witnesses before grand jury is not commended; a grand jury should not be used to prepare for pending trial; such use constitute a misuse of the grand jury process; however, where purpose of grand jury proceeding is directed to other offenses, its scope cannot be narrowly circumscribed and any collateral fruits from bona fide inquiries may be utilized by the government. U. S. v. Sellaro, C.A.8 (Mo.) 1973, 514

F.2d 114, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 2419, 421 U.S. 1013, 44 L.Ed.2d 681. Grand Jury 36.2

Defendants who were convicted of violations of this section were not entitled to reversal where they failed to demonstrate a reasonable inference of bias on part of grand jury resulting from comments of prosecutor, who mentioned the “Mafia” in one question and who commented on alleged association of two defendants with “tough guys, Italians, from New York.” U. S. v. Polizzi, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1974, 500 F.2d 856, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 802, 419 U.S. 1120, 42 L.Ed.2d 820, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 803, 419 U.S. 1120, 42 L.Ed.2d 820. In- dictment And Information 10.1(4)

Government failed to demonstrate that evidence it presented to grand jury and proposed to use at trial, in prosecution for conspiracy, interstate travel in aid of racketeering, and bribery concerning programs receiving federal funds, was derived from legitimate source wholly independent from defendant's immunized testimony, and thus defendant was entitled to Kastigar hearing to determine whether government's evidence was derived, directly or indirectly, from that testimony. U.S. v. Bravo-Fernandez, D.Puerto Rico 2010, 756 F.Supp.2d 184. Criminal Law 42.7(3)

In prosecution of former state governor under section 1951 of this title and this section defendant's motion to dismiss on grounds that all grand jury testimony was not transcribed and defendant's request for court to inquire as to why all testimony was not transcribed would be denied since there is no requirement that grand jury testimony be transcribed. U. S. v. Hall, D.C.Okla.1975, 424 F.Supp. 508, affirmed 536 F.2d 313, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 313, 429 U.S. 919, 50 L.Ed.2d 285. Indictment And Information 144.1(1)

In respect to indictment's first count charging that defendant crossed a state line in the process of extorting money from two named individuals, the record failed to disclose any direct or derivative evidentiary use of defendant's compelled testimony given to another grand jury under immunity order, as the only evidence presented to the indicting grand jury relative to count one was a transcript of the testimony given by the two extortion victims before another grand jury more than three months before defendant's compelled testimony. U. S. v. Hender- son, D.C.Del.1975, 406 F.Supp. 417. Indictment And Information 144.2

Evidence established that grand jury investigation of gambling activities was conducted in proper manner in all respects and that there was not prejudicial preindictment publicity, the government did not fail to obtain concur- rence of 12 or more grand jurors on any or all the 16 counts in indictment, that government attorneys were present in grand jury room during deliberation or that the government failed to present any evidence to the grand jury. U. S. v. Bally Mfg. Corp., E.D.La.1972, 345 F.Supp. 410. Indictment And Information 144.1(2)

169. Pleas, practice and procedure generally

There was sufficient factual basis to support defendant's guilty plea on charge of violating Travel Act in connection with drug transaction, even though single transaction was involved; it was clear from quantities of illicit drugs involved and from defendant's admitted past association with codefendant that defendant's interest was more than sporadic or casual involvement associated with one-time participation in drug activity. U.S. v. Bernaugh, C.A.10 (Okla.) 1992, 969 F.2d 858. Criminal Law 273(4.1)

Because examination of transcript of arraignment proceedings showed that district court's explanation of what basic facts must be proved to establish charged crimes of conspiracy to commit gambling offenses and the substantive gambling offense was incomplete and misleading in light of construction placed on statute by United States Supreme Court, record did not show that court correctly stated to defendant or that he truly understood the elements necessary to prove the offenses charged judgment of conviction on plea of nolo contendere must be vacated and defendant allowed to withdraw plea. U. S. v. Cantor, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1972, 469 F.2d 435. Criminal Law 275.5(2)

Where at time defendant entered guilty plea to traveling in interstate commerce with intent to carry on or to facilitate carrying on illegal conduct of gambling, he admitted that he had been a bettor but specifically rejected any further characterization of his participation, and where defendant acted in reliance on trial court's characterization of the offense but controlling law had previously specified that the offense did not include mere participation, plea was not truly voluntary and informed and there was no factual basis therefor, and defendant was entitled to opportunity to plead anew. U. S. v. Tyler, M.D.Fla.1976, 413 F.Supp. 1403. Criminal Law 273(4.1)

170. Joint or separate trials, practice and procedure generally

In prosecution for having caused travel and use of facility in interstate commerce to promote business enterprise involving illegal prostitution, and perjury in causing a witness to be threatened, inasmuch as the expected proof would show offenses under this section and section 2 of this title followed by perjury and a threatening of witness for purpose of escaping prosecution, there was sufficient degree of connection between acts charged to authorize joinder. U. S. v. Raineri, C.A.7 (Wis.) 1982, 670 F.2d 702, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 446, 459 U.S. 1035, 74 L.Ed.2d 601. Indictment And Information 127

Defendant was not prejudiced by denial of his motion for severance, in prosecution for conspiracy to violate this section by using facilities of interstate commerce with intent to commit arson, in view of evidence linking defendant with the conspiracy and absent evidence admitted at joint trial that would not also have been admissible against defendant at a separate trial. U. S. v. Nickerson, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1979, 606 F.2d 156, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 528, 444 U.S. 994, 62 L.Ed.2d 424. Criminal Law 622.7(4); Criminal Law 622.7(8)

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to sever trial of one defendant, who had acted as madame at a house of prostitution from trial of other defendants charged with violating and conspiring to violate this section, and the Mann Act, section 2421 of this title. U. S. v. Prince, C.A.6 (Ohio) 1976, 529 F.2d 1108, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 108, 429 U.S. 838, 50 L.Ed.2d 105. Criminal Law 622.7(4)

Single prosecution of two defendants who were charged in three count indictment with violation of this section for their involvement in bookmaking operation in three consecutive months was proper as were the separate convictions and punishments given upon each defendant's conviction on all three counts. U. S. v. Villano, C.A.10 (Colo.) 1976, 529 F.2d 1046, certiorari denied 96 S.Ct. 3180, 426 U.S. 953, 49 L.Ed.2d 1193. Criminal Law 29(5.5); Criminal Law 622.7(2); Sentencing And Punishment 528

Where government represented, in prosecution for conspiracy and for violation of this section, that defendant who desired a severance, was among the leaders in the unlawful scheme, and furnished court with a summary of the evidence it expected to offer linking defendant to conspiracy, and where, moreover, government stated that a separate trial would be substantially as long as a joined one, since a full exposition of the entire scheme was necessary to establish the significance of defendant's separate conduct, advantages and economy of a joint trial clearly outweighed the remote possibility of unwarranted prejudice. U. S. v. Polizzi, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1974, 500 F.2d 856, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 802, 419 U.S. 1120, 42 L.Ed.2d 820, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 803, 419 U.S. 1120, 42 L.Ed.2d 820. Criminal Law 622.7(2)

Denial of defendants' pretrial motions for severance of their individual cases and of individual counts of indictment charging them with conspiracy to violate this section and section 1951 of this title and extortion from businesses engaged in interstate commerce was within trial court's discretion absent demonstration of bad faith in inclusion in indictment of the conspiracy counts. U. S. v. Somers, C.A.3 (N.J.) 1974, 496 F.2d 723, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 56, 419 U.S. 832, 42 L.Ed.2d 58, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 57, 419 U.S. 832, 42 L.Ed.2d 58. Criminal Law 620(6); Criminal Law 622.7(4)

That particular defendant was in jail while some vehicles were stolen did not disprove his participation in transportation of stolen vehicle in interstate commerce after he was released from jail or his participation after his release in scheme to extort payments for vehicles stolen while he was in jail, and in absence of evidence of prejudice by denial of his motion for severance, it was not abuse of discretion to deny his motion. U. S. v. Romano, C.A.5 (Ga.) 1973, 482 F.2d 1183, stay denied 94 S.Ct. 293, 414 U.S. 971, 38 L.Ed.2d 216, certiorari denied 94 S.Ct. 866, 414 U.S. 1129, 38 L.Ed.2d 753. Criminal Law 622.7(3)

Refusal to grant separate trials to several defendants charged with conspiring to use facilities of interstate commerce to violate state law and conspiring to interfere with interstate commerce was not prejudicial where grant- ing of separate trials would not have significantly benefited complaining defendants, in that they would not have been able to compel self-incriminating testimony of those codefendants who declined to testify and there was some evidence linking each defendant to the conspiracy. U. S. v. Kenny, C.A.3 (N.J.) 1972, 462 F.2d 1205, certiorari denied 93 S.Ct. 233, 409 U.S. 914, 34 L.Ed.2d 176, certiorari denied 93 S.Ct. 234, 409 U.S. 914, 34 L.Ed.2d 176. Criminal Law 1166(6)

District court was not required to grant motion for severance and mistrial once other defendants changed their pleas to guilty during trial on charges of conspiracy and interstate travel in aid of racketeering, where district court's instructions to jury about the unexpected occurrence fully protected defendant. U. S. v. Johnson, C.A.4 (Va.) 1971, 451 F.2d 1321, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 1298, 405 U.S. 1018, 31 L.Ed.2d 480. Criminal Law 622.7(4); Criminal Law 867.9

One of the defendants failed to show sufficient inconsistency in his defense to charge of conspiracy to cause interstate or foreign travel in aid of racketeering enterprises to justify a severance of his trial from that of his codefendants, notwithstanding claim that failure to grant severance precluded his possibility of commenting on the refusal or failure of his codefendants to testify. U. S. v. Marquez, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1971, 449 F.2d 89, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 1167, 405 U.S. 963, 31 L.Ed.2d 239, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 1173, 405 U.S. 963, 31 L.Ed.2d

239. Criminal Law 622.7(6)

Where defendant was charged as a coconspirator in an alleged conspiracy to violate federal bribery provision and provisions prohibiting interstate transmission of wagering information and transmission in aid of gambling, defendant was properly joined in indictment with eight others charging offenses. U. S. v. Donaway, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1971, 447 F.2d 940. Indictment And Information 124(5)

Refusal to grant motion for severance was not abuse of discretion notwithstanding that the government produced extensive testimony concerning one defendant's gambling activities in Canada while codefendant was not involved in those activities where trial court gave cautionary instruction that the evidence was applicable only to defendant and not to codefendant and evidence was presented merely to establish defendant's gambling occupa- tion and to support other evidence that trip from Colorado to Nebraska was for purpose of gambling and not for purpose of buying livestock. U. S. v. Pauldino, C.A.10 (Colo.) 1971, 443 F.2d 1108, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 204, 404 U.S. 882, 30 L.Ed.2d 163, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 212, 404 U.S. 882, 30 L.Ed.2d 163. Criminal Law 622.7(8)

Fact that names of defendant and alleged coparticipants were not deleted from another coparticipant's statements, which tended to implicate defendant and coparticipants, and which were admitted into evidence, in prosecution for violations of this section, and for conspiracy to violate this section, did not render denial of defendant's motion for separate trial error where maker of statements was cross-examined by both defense counsel and counsel for government, and his testimony on cross-examination refuted statements and tended to exculpate defendant. Duggar v. U. S., C.A.10 (Kan.) 1970, 434 F.2d 345. Criminal Law 622.7(9)

Where seven defendants were alleged to have participated in same conspiracy to use interstate facilities to violate Mississippi gambling laws, there was no misjoinder of defendants even though all of defendants were not charged in each of the four counts. James v. U. S., C.A.5 (Miss.) 1969, 416 F.2d 467, certiorari denied 90 S.Ct. 902, 397 U.S. 907, 25 L.Ed.2d 87, certiorari denied 90 S.Ct. 903, 397 U.S. 907, 25 L.Ed.2d 87, certiorari denied 90 S.Ct. 938, 397 U.S. 928, 25 L.Ed.2d 108. Indictment And Information 124(5)

Denial of motion for separate trials of defendants charged with conspiracy and substantive offenses based on use of interstate facilities with intent to carry on a prostitution enterprise was not an abuse of discretion where defendants made no showing of prejudice on their motion. U. S. v. Lyon, C.A.7 (Wis.) 1968, 397 F.2d 505, certiorari denied 89 S.Ct. 131, 393 U.S. 846, 21 L.Ed.2d 117. Criminal Law 622.7(4)

Trial judge committed no abuse of discretion in denying motion for severance filed by defendant who with three others was charged with violating this section by travelling by motor vehicle from St. Louis, Missouri to Nashville, Tennessee with intention of carrying on prostitution in violation of laws of Tennessee and of transporting females interstate from Alabama to Tennessee for purpose of prostitution. U. S. v. Blackburn, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1968, 389 F.2d 93. Criminal Law 622.7(1)

Denial of motions for severance and separate trials was not abuse of discretion in prosecution for conspiracy and

substantive violations of this section. U. S. v. Barrow, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1966, 363 F.2d 62, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 703, 385 U.S. 1001, 17 L.Ed.2d 541. Criminal Law 622.7(4)

Where, in prosecution charging a conspiracy to use a facility in interstate commerce, that is, a telephone, with intent to carry on an unlawful activity, i.e., bribery, government consented to a severance of trial on one defendant from that of other defendants, motion for severance made by each defendant would be granted insofar as consented to by government. U. S. v. Archer, S.D.N.Y.1972, 355 F.Supp. 981, reversed 486 F.2d 670. Criminal Law 622.7(4)

Defendants indicted for conspiring to carry on interstate gambling activities were not entitled to severance, where it appeared from indictment that the conspiracy count was the integral and significant part of the indictment. U. S. v. Machi, E.D.Wis.1971, 324 F.Supp. 153. Criminal Law 620(6)

171. Defenses, practice and procedure generally--Generally

This section contains no exception for casual and incidental occurrences or for “happenstance” ones. U.S. v. Pecora, C.A.5 (La.) 1982, 693 F.2d 421, rehearing denied 697 F.2d 1092, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 3087, 462 U.S. 1119, 77 L.Ed.2d 1348. Commerce 82.6

Fact that alleged activities of union leaders in conspiring to destroy employer's truck in an effort to coerce employer into recognizing the union were purportedly in pursuit of legitimate union objectives did not exempt the leaders from prosecution under this section and sections 844 and 1962 of this title. U.S. v. Thordarson, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1981, 646 F.2d 1323, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 601, 454 U.S. 1055, 70 L.Ed.2d 591. Arson 14; Conspiracy 38; Explosives 5

Lack of knowledge that this section could make an illegal local enterprise a federal offense by mere cashing of an out of state check, whether for food and drink or for gambling would not excuse one who actually committed the overt act or excuse defendant copartners in gambling club who reasonably could be expected to know of commission of forbidden acts by their copartner who was the active manager of club. U. S. v. Barnes, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1967, 383 F.2d 287, certiorari denied 88 S.Ct. 780, 389 U.S. 1040, 19 L.Ed.2d 831. Gaming 62; Gaming 79(1)

Dismissal of indictment was not warranted by allegedly “outrageous” government conduct involving interruption of defendant's conversation by undercover operatives, even though interruption allegedly prevented defendant from explaining basis for his refusal of bribery money, in view of evidence that interruption had been planned before defendant refused the offer of money and in view of fact that defendant was given opportunity to refuse money on videotape and not only did so but also explained why. U. S. v. Williams, E.D.N.Y.1981, 529 F.Supp. 1085, affirmed 705 F.2d 603, certiorari denied 104 S.Ct. 524, 464 U.S. 1007, 78 L.Ed.2d 708, certiorari denied 104 S.Ct. 525, 464 U.S. 1007, 78 L.Ed.2d 708. Indictment And Information 144.1(1)

In prosecution of corporate officer and former state governor under section 1951 of this title and this section fact that count one charged defendant former governor with attempting to extort money from corporate officer did

not provide corporate officer with complete defense to charges in other counts that he schemed to bribe former governor and third party since bribery and extortion as used in section 1951 of this title are not mutually exclus- ive; regardless of whether allegations in subsequent count were treated as extortion or bribery, such counts clearly charged attempt to bribe third party and transactions between two codefendants could not be held to have immunized both for their transgressions against third party. U. S. v. Hall, D.C.Okla.1975, 424 F.Supp. 508, affirmed 536 F.2d 313, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 313, 429 U.S. 919, 50 L.Ed.2d 285. Criminal Law 31

172. ---- Collateral estoppel, defenses, practice and procedure generally

Collateral estoppel barred prosecution of defendant for travelling in foreign commerce with intent to facilitate importation of cocaine following acquittal of defendant at prior trial of conspiracy to import cocaine on basis that government had failed to prove that defendant was knowingly involved in conspiracy; trial court's judgment of acquittal on first trial established defendant's lack of knowing involvement in cocaine conspiracy, and his lack of intent to break law in connection with that conspiracy, at any time during specified period, was inconsistent with guilty knowledge required for Travel Act conviction. U.S. v. Garcia, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1996, 78 F.3d 1517. Judgment 751

Trial of defendant on count charging him with violation of the Travel Act for facilitating an unlawful activity by traveling in interstate commerce with the intent to distribute the proceeds thereof was not barred by the collateral estoppel doctrine; although defendant was previously acquitted on count charging him with possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, or aiding and abetting such possession, jury did not thereby necessarily find that defendant did not engage, in money laundering, i.e., distribution of proceeds. U.S. v. Coldwell, C.A.5 (La.) 1990, 898 F.2d 1005. Judgment 751

Collateral estoppel did not bar defendant's retrial on Travel Act conspiracy count, notwithstanding defendant's claim that he could not be convicted of conspiring to advance an unlawful business enterprise because he was acquitted of membership in underlying cocaine conspiracies; acquittal on cocaine conspiracy charges did not prevent Government from establishing that defendant conspired to distribute proceeds that he knew were derived from unlawful activity, as Government did not have to show that defendant was a principal in underlying cocaine enterprise to sustain Travel Act conviction. U.S. v. Rogers, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1986, 788 F.2d 1472. Judgment 751

173. ---- Constitutionality of state laws, defenses, practice and procedure generally

As against contention that Maine law prohibiting prostitution was unconstitutional and void as violation of asserted federal constitutional right to “privacy,” testimony in prosecution under this section clearly showed that female defendants did not operate discreetly with any pretensions to privacy but publicly solicited potential customers for prostitution, and contention was thus foreclosed by rule that one attacking constitutionality must show that alleged unconstitutional feature injures him. U. S. v. Coran, C.A.1 (Mass.) 1978, 589 F.2d 70. Consti- tutional Law 727

A defense in form of an allegation that Alaska prostitution statute is constitutionally infirm as denying equal protection to females would not be available to males prosecuted for prostitution in absence of a determination

that statute was void in its entirety and, thus, it is doubtful that an individual could utilize alleged infirmity to defeat a prosecution which is brought pursuant to this section and which alleges a violation of Alaska statute as underlying illegal activity. U. S. v. Hiatt, C.A.9 (Wash.) 1975, 527 F.2d 1048. Prostitution 14

Unconstitutionality of underlying state statute would not necessarily be a defense to prosecution under this section. U.S. v. Goldfarb, E.D.Mich.1979, 464 F.Supp. 565. Gaming 62

On motion to dismiss indictment's third count, charging defendants with violations of this section and alleging that defendants moved in interstate commerce for the purpose of committing extortion in violation of Pennsylvania law, it was not appropriate to challenge the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania statute upon which the charges in count three were premised. U. S. v. Keresty, W.D.Pa.1971, 323 F.Supp. 230, motion denied 334 F.Supp. 461, affirmed 465 F.2d 36, certiorari denied 93 S.Ct. 340, 409 U.S. 991, 34 L.Ed.2d 258. Constitu- tional Law 967

174. ---- Double jeopardy, defenses, practice and procedure generally

Defendant's convictions for both violations of Travel Act and conspiracy to import and distribute marijuana did not violate double jeopardy. U.S. v. Sammons, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1990, 918 F.2d 592, rehearing denied , denial of post-conviction relief affirmed 963 F.2d 373, denial of post-conviction relief affirmed 991 F.2d 796, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 126, 510 U.S. 841, 126 L.Ed.2d 90, dismissal of habeas corpus affirmed 9 F.3d 109, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 1322, 510 U.S. 1204, 127 L.Ed.2d 671. Double Jeopardy 151(1)

Count charging defendant with violation of the Travel Act for facilitating an unlawful activity by traveling in interstate commerce with intent to distribute proceeds thereof was not barred by double jeopardy on ground that defendant was previously charged with importation of a controlled substance, or aiding and abetting such importation and with possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, or aiding and abetting such possession; each offense had an element not contained in the other. U.S. v. Coldwell, C.A.5 (La.) 1990, 898 F.2d 1005. Double Jeopardy 146

Defendant's conviction of interstate travel in order to carry on narcotics business did not violate his rights under double jeopardy clause, notwithstanding his prior conviction for possession of narcotics in Canada arising out of same transaction; conviction on interstate travel charge required proof of travel between states of United States, but such travel was not an element of Canadian offense of possession of narcotics, nor was possession of narcotics in Canada or any other activity in Canada, element that Government was required to prove in order to convict defendant of Travel Act count. U.S. v. Fontanez, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1989, 869 F.2d 180. Double Jeopardy 183.1

Interstate travel with intent to promote prostitution and cause acts of prostitution, which required proof of defendant's travel, was not same offense for double jeopardy purposes as transportation of minors in interstate commerce for purpose of prostitution, which required proof of causing others to travel. U.S. v. Barrington, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1986, 806 F.2d 529. Double Jeopardy 148

Count alleging violation of Travel Act [18 U.S.C.A § 1952(a)(3)] and count alleging attempted extortion were

not multiplicious, but charged separate offenses; charge alleging Travel Act violation charged defendant with traveling in interstate commerce with intent to carry on, or facilitate carrying on, extortion, and thereafter committing some overt act or acts to facilitate extortion, while count alleging attempted extortion charged defendant with threatening injury to character, person, or property of another and thereby attempting to extort money, so that each count required proof of at least one element that other did not and thus no double jeopardy violation resulted from defendant's having been charged with both offenses. U.S. v. Teplin, C.A.4 (Va.) 1985, 775 F.2d 1261. Double Jeopardy 139.1; Indictment And Information 130

For double jeopardy purposes, violation of statute governing offense of traveling in or using any facility in interstate or foreign commerce with intent to distribute the proceeds of any unlawful activity, and offense of conspiracy to violate the statute were distinct from violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and conspiracy to violate RICO. U.S. v. Watchmaker, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1985, 761 F.2d 1459, rehearing denied 766 F.2d 1493, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 879, 474 U.S. 1100, 88 L.Ed.2d 917, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 880, 474 U.S. 1100, 88 L.Ed.2d 917, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 880, 474 U.S. 1101, 88 L.Ed.2d 917, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 881, 474 U.S. 1101, 88 L.Ed.2d 917. Double Jeopardy 151(1); Double Jeopardy 151(4)

Prosecution for using telephone in aid of racketeering scheme did not violate defendant's right under U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5 not to be subject to double jeopardy, where earlier conviction for defrauding phone company, although involving common facts, the use of telephone, involved proof of additional facts. U. S. v. Garner, C.A.9 (Nev.) 1980, 632 F.2d 758, certiorari denied 101 S.Ct. 1373, 450 U.S. 923, 67 L.Ed.2d 351. Double Jeop- ardy 151(4)

Conviction for violation of this section with respect to prostitution and conviction for violation of the Mann Act, section 2421 of this title, each require proof of a fact not required for the other so that consecutive sentences imposed upon defendant who was convicted of violating both statutes did not result in his being twice punished for the same acts. U. S. v. Prince, C.A.6 (Ohio) 1976, 529 F.2d 1108, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 108, 429 U.S. 838, 50 L.Ed.2d 105. Sentencing And Punishment 607

Prosecution under this section of defendants by the federal government following their conviction in state courts for gambling violations during the same period covered by the federal indictment did not constitute double jeopardy. U. S. v. Villano, C.A.10 (Colo.) 1976, 529 F.2d 1046, certiorari denied 96 S.Ct. 3180, 426 U.S. 953, 49 L.Ed.2d 1193. Double Jeopardy 186

Fact that defendant had been convicted of conspiracy to engage in interstate prostitution by reason of activities in South Carolina operation did not bar, on double jeopardy principles, prosecution for similar conspiracy involving West Virginia operation where there were numerous parties associated only with the South Carolina operation or the West Virginia operation but not with both and there was no evidence that either of the ventures de- pended for its success on the other. U. S. v. Prince, C.A.5 (Fla.) 1975, 515 F.2d 564. Double Jeopardy 151(2)

Defendants were not subjected to double jeopardy by conviction, with consecutive sentences, for conspiracy and for related substantive offenses with implied accusation of collusion between defendants as aiders and abettors,

although evidence identical to that adduced to establish conspiracy was used to convict on substantive counts. U. S. v. McGowan, C.A.4 (Va.) 1970, 423 F.2d 413. Double Jeopardy 151(3.1)

Where substantive offenses charged in counts required no more than one person for their commission, nor did they require proof of agreement to commit offense against United States, substantive counts and conspiracy count were separate and distinguishable offenses and defendant's sentences for both substantive counts of inducing, procuring and causing giving of unlawful gratuity to public official and aiding and abetting the asking, demanding, exacting, soliciting, taking, accepting, receiving, or agreeing to receive, unlawful gratuity, and conspiracy count were not violative of double jeopardy clause of U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5. U. S. v. Finazzo, E.D.Mich.1981, 520 F.Supp. 1085, affirmed 704 F.2d 300, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 3543, 463 U.S. 1210, 77 L.Ed.2d 1392. Double Jeopardy 151(4)

Charges contained in counts two and three of the indictment, the second count charging defendants with employing extortionate means to collect a debt by threatening the use of violence and other criminal means to cause harm to the person, reputation and property of said debtor and others, and the third count charging defendants with violations of this section and alleging that defendants moved in interstate commerce for the purpose of committing extortion in violation of Pennsylvania law, did not constitute double jeopardy. U. S. v. Keresty, W.D.Pa.1971, 323 F.Supp. 230, motion denied 334 F.Supp. 461, affirmed 465 F.2d 36, certiorari denied 93 S.Ct. 340, 409 U.S. 991, 34 L.Ed.2d 258. Double Jeopardy 139.1

Although corruption of same public official was common to both schemes from which two separate indictments arose, where method varied from simple bribery in one scheme to bribery and extortion in second scheme, where victims varied, and where negotiations out of which two schemes grew were separate and distinct in time and place, it was reasonable to treat schemes as separate transactions involving separate offenses which could legit- imately be divided for trial and, thus, defendant's conviction of substantive offense under second scheme did not place him in double jeopardy notwithstanding his conviction of conspiracy under first scheme. U. S. v. Corallo, S.D.N.Y.1970, 309 F.Supp. 1282. Double Jeopardy 151(4)

175. ---- Entrapment, defenses, practice and procedure generally

Defendant was not entrapped into offering gratuity to government official simply because the official went along with defendant's plan as part of an investigation into his conduct, even though the object which defendant sought to obtain was precluded by government regulation. U.S. v. Patel, C.A.8 (Iowa) 1994, 32 F.3d 340. Criminal Law 37(6.1)

Defendant's actual taking of money did not refute his entrapment defense in prosecution for conspiracy to commit bribery and to defraud the United States, bribery and interstate travel to engage in bribery, but manner in which the money was taken and defendant's demeanor at the time were evidence probative of his state of mind. U.S. v. Kelly, C.A.D.C.1984, 748 F.2d 691, 242 U.S.App.D.C. 1. Bribery 3

Notwithstanding that interstate travel, for purposes of charge under this section, occurred solely because government agent selected, as a meeting place with defendant, a location 100 yards over border of North Carolina into

South Carolina, it could not be presumptively concluded that the interstate travel was improperly “manufactured,” without benefit of any explanation on record as to basis for decision determining location of meeting. U.S. v. Brinkman, C.A.4 (N.C.) 1984, 739 F.2d 977. Commerce 82.6

In prosecution of defendants under this section for aiding and abetting one another in using and causing to be used a facility in interstate commerce with the intent to carry on a bribery scheme, defendants' assertion that they intended to offer money to the city councilman as a political contribution and not as a bribe to obtain favors was not inconsistent with the defense that, whatever the legal characterization of the payment, they were entrapped into making it by government agents, and therefore, the entrapment defense was available to defendants. U.S. v. Garrett, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1983, 716 F.2d 257, rehearing denied 720 F.2d 1291, certiorari denied 104 S.Ct. 1910, 466 U.S. 937, 80 L.Ed.2d 459. Criminal Law 37(6.1)

Fact that some telephone calls, which were allegedly made by defendants in furtherance of conspiracy to use a facility in interstate commerce with intent to carry on an unlawful activity, i.e., bribery, were initiated by a witness for government might have amounted to a jury issue on entrapment but did not justify dismissal of indictment on ground that it was solely witness' presence outside of state which gave telephone calls their interstate character. U. S. v. Archer, S.D.N.Y.1972, 355 F.Supp. 981, reversed 486 F.2d 670. Indictment And Information 144.1(1)

176. ---- Impossibility, defenses, practice and procedure generally

In prosecution for traveling in interstate commerce with intent to promote arson and thereafter performing acts to facilitate such unlawful activity, defenses of legal and factual impossibility were not shown to be applicable. U. S. v. Conway, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1975, 507 F.2d 1047, rehearing denied 511 F.2d 1192. Criminal Law 31

177. ---- Limitations, defenses, practice and procedure generally

Loan officer's participation in conspiracy to violate Travel Act, by accepting bribes in return for approving bank loans that did not meet bank's stated requirements, continued through period that checks were made by fellow coconspirator to pay for work done on loan officer's house as bribe and effective date of payment to loan officer by way of $50,000 check; therefore, conspiracy charge was brought against loan officer within relevant limitations period. U.S. v. Fitzpatrick, C.A.1 (R.I.) 1989, 892 F.2d 162. Criminal Law 150

Statute of limitations applicable to charges of interstate travel in aid of racketeering was the federal five-year statute of limitations, section 3282 of this title, rather than Puerto Rico's three-year period under 33 L.P.R.A. § 4363. U. S. v. Steele, C.A.3 (N.J.) 1982, 685 F.2d 793, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 213, 459 U.S. 908, 74 L.Ed.2d 170. Criminal Law 147

178. ---- Mistake of law, defenses, practice and procedure generally

Rule of lenity would not be applied by the Court of Appeals in construing whether intrastate telephone calls made with intent to further unlawful activity violated the Travel Act; defendants in the case at bar, who were the operators of a prostitution business, were not “forced to speculate,” at peril of indictment, whether their conduct

was prohibited, as they knew that their conduct was illegal, and the court, with the aid of a related statute, had resolved any ambiguity about the portions of the Travel Act at issue. U.S. v. Nader, C.A.9 (Mont.) 2008, 542 F.3d 713, certiorari denied 129 S.Ct. 1984, 173 L.Ed.2d 1089. Commerce 82.10

In prosecution for using and conspiring to use facilities of interstate commerce to promote gambling, in order to assert defense of mistake of law based upon good-faith reliance on representations of public officials, defendants had to demonstrate that they received communications from public officials in a situation in which reliance would have been justified. U. S. v. Gebhart, C.A.6 (Ky.) 1971, 441 F.2d 1261, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 97, 404 U.S. 855, 30 L.Ed.2d 96. Criminal Law 330

179. ---- Selective prosecution, defenses, practice and procedure generally

In prosecution for wire fraud and violation of this section by extortion, claim that totality of circumstances constituted selective prosecution of attorney specializing in criminal defense cases and showed prosecutorial misconduct by way of reprisal and vindictiveness based upon previous history between defendant and federal pro- secutors justifying dismissal of indictment, bordered on frivolous and did not find support in record. U. S. v. Blitstein, C.A.10 (Colo.) 1980, 626 F.2d 774, certiorari denied 101 S.Ct. 898, 449 U.S. 1102, 66 L.Ed.2d 828. Indictment And Information 144.1(1)

Government was not precluded from retrying defendants, whose convictions of violating this section were reversed due to refusal to permit use of certain defense, on theory that prosecutions were invidiously and arbitrar- ily discriminatory, absent showing that decision to prosecute was based on unjustifiable standard or that defendants alone were singled out for prosecution. U. S. v. Stagman, C.A.6 (Ky.) 1971, 446 F.2d 489. Criminal Law 1189

180. ---- State law defenses, practice and procedure generally

When the activity underlying an indictment under this section is a violation of a state law, the government must prove that the defendant has or could have violated the underlying state law and the defendant may assert any relevant substances of state law defenses. U. S. v. Bertman, C.A.9 (Hawai'i) 1982, 686 F.2d 772. Commerce 82.10

Assertion of particular state law defense in prosecution under this section requires determination of whether relevant state recognizes such defense. U. S. v. Kahn, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1973, 472 F.2d 272, certiorari denied 93 S.Ct. 2270, 411 U.S. 982, 36 L.Ed.2d 958. Commerce 82.10

Defendants who were charged with violating this section were entitled to allege good faith compliance with state law as a defense. U. S. v. Stagman, C.A.6 (Ky.) 1971, 446 F.2d 489. Commerce 82.10

If defendant, charged with violating federal law by using interstate facility with intent to promote and facilitate promotion of unlawful activity in violation of state laws, had defense or element of defense grounded on state law, defendant could have raised question and had it considered by federal court even though it required inter-

pretation of Pennsylvania law. U. S. v. D'Amato, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1970, 436 F.2d 52. Federal Courts 404

181. Selection of jurors, practice and procedure generally

In prosecution under this section for aiding and abetting codefendant in promoting or attempting to promote various gambling activities, district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike jurors for cause, even though they had sat on an earlier panel which heard a gambling case. U. S. v. Loucas, C.A.4 (W.Va.) 1980, 629 F.2d 989, certiorari denied 101 S.Ct. 1738, 450 U.S. 1030, 68 L.Ed.2d 224. Jury 95

182. Recusal of judge, practice and procedure generally

In prosecution of union official for violation of this section, defense counsel's motion for recusal was properly denied by the trial judge, even though in 1970 he had presided over a civil trial involving a claim of an unfair labor practice against the union in question, and even though, in that case, the judge had stated it was impossible to reconcile the testimony of defendant and another local union official without finding that one of them had been untruthful; furthermore, defendant's position was undermined by his protracted delay before moving for recusal in the district court, despite his actual knowledge of the prior judicial encounter with the trial judge. U. S. v. Daley, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1977, 564 F.2d 645, certiorari denied 98 S.Ct. 1508, 435 U.S. 933, 55 L.Ed.2d 530. Judges 47(2); Judges 51(2)

183. Discovery or inspection, practice and procedure generally

Under Brady, defendant is entitled to disclosure of information that might be used to impeach government witnesses. U.S. v. Abadie, C.A.5 (Miss.) 1989, 879 F.2d 1260, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 110 S.Ct. 569, 493 U.S. 1005, 107 L.Ed.2d 563. Criminal Law 1999

Lack of pretrial discovery of government's other acts evidence did not so impair defendant's ability to confront and cross-examine witnesses that reversal was required, as defendant made no showing whatsoever of how his right to fair trial or ability to confront and cross-examine witnesses was adversely affected by lack of pretrial discovery, current limitations on use of such evidence afforded defendant sufficient protection against unfairly and unduly prejudicial effect, and pretrial order prohibited government's use of that evidence without prior court approval. U.S. v. Kendall, C.A.10 (Okla.) 1985, 766 F.2d 1426, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 848, 474 U.S. 1081, 88 L.Ed.2d 889. Criminal Law 1166(10.10)

In prosecution for conspiracy and violations of this section, certain evidence was not sufficiently “material” to compel disclosure under Brady. U. S. v. Wander, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1979, 601 F.2d 1251. Criminal Law 1994

In prosecution of former state governor and corporate officer for violation of section 1951 of this title and this section former governor's pretrial motions for discovery of information which would tend to discredit or impeach testimony of named government witness would be denied where information obtained by defendants at prior hearing concerning voluntariness of witness' allowing conversation with defendants to be tape recorded appeared to court to satisfy request of motion in most regards. U. S. v. Hall, D.C.Okla.1975, 424 F.Supp. 508, affirmed 536 F.2d 313, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 313, 429 U.S. 919, 50 L.Ed.2d 285. Criminal Law 627.6(1)

Since indictment had been returned by legally constituted grand jury, court would not, as suggested by defendants, examine grand jury minutes or hold pretrial hearing to ascertain whether or not, as defendants claimed, there was any jurisdictional basis for indictment in view of claim that defendant's travels, alleged to be overt acts in conspiracy indictment, were arranged for by government to create jurisdictional basis. U. S. v. De Sapio, S.D.N.Y.1969, 299 F.Supp. 436. Criminal Law 627.9(1)

Communications between Canadian shipping company and United States government and transcripts of depos- itions taken in civil admiralty suit between that company and a union were not material to proving defendants' innocence of charges arising out of alleged arson and bombing of vessel in Calumet Harbor so that defendants were not entitled to discovery of such memoranda unless government intended to use such documents as evidence at trial, notwithstanding defendants' contention that the company had exerted influence resulting in return of indictment. U. S. v. Tanner, N.D.Ill.1967, 279 F.Supp. 457. Criminal Law 627.6(4)

184. Subpoenas, practice and procedure generally

Taken together with presumption of regularity, affidavit of special attorney for the Department of Justice that subpoenas commanding production of certain business records of corporation before federal grand jury were issued to present to the grand jury evidence of possible violation of federal racketeering and gambling statutes, this section and sections 1953, 1955 of this title, and section 1173 of Title 15 established that there was no irreg- ularity in the issuance of the subpoenas. Universal Mfg. Co. v. U. S., C.A.8 (Mo.) 1975, 508 F.2d 684. Grand Jury 36.9(2)

185. Comments or conduct of court, practice and procedure generally

In prosecution under this section and section 2 of this title for having caused travel and use of facility in interstate commerce to promote business involving illegal prostitution and other crimes, trial judge's comment after defense counsel concluded his summation to effect that whether or not witness was credible or not was entirely up to jury to determine and that it was not proper for lawyer to imply that another side has procured untruthful testimony was proper comment on argument. U. S. v. Raineri, C.A.7 (Wis.) 1982, 670 F.2d 702, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 446, 459 U.S. 1035, 74 L.Ed.2d 601. Criminal Law 1166.22(2)

In prosecution for conspiring with city water commissioner to use telephone as an interstate facility to arrange kickback from codefendant and his construction company if the commissioner awarded emergency contract to codefendant's company, wherein evidence was introduced that tended to show what a fine construction company codefendant's company was, judge's statement that under terms of indictment it would not make very much difference whether one company was more qualified than other was justified and did not amount to prejudicial comment. U. S. v. Corallo, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1969, 413 F.2d 1306, certiorari denied 90 S.Ct. 431, 396 U.S. 958, 24 L.Ed.2d 422, certiorari denied 90 S.Ct. 437, 396 U.S. 958, 24 L.Ed.2d 422, certiorari denied 90 S.Ct. 438, 396 U.S. 963, 24 L.Ed.2d 427. Criminal Law 656(1)

186. Comments or conduct of counsel, practice and procedure generally

Government, in prosecution for conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute, did not err in its clos-

ing argument by referring to aircraft seizure in Mexico as being related to “smuggling,” notwithstanding that witnesses never used that term when describing the aircraft, as there was ample other testimony that the plane was carrying contraband into Mexico illegally, so that use of term “smuggling” was based on sufficient evidentiary foundation in the record. U.S. v. Kendall, C.A.10 (Okla.) 1985, 766 F.2d 1426, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 848, 474 U.S. 1081, 88 L.Ed.2d 889. Criminal Law 2109

In prosecution for bribery, conspiracy and violation of this section, prosecutor's argument making derogatory comments about defense counsel and arguably expressing his opinion of guilt of defendants was not prejudi- cially erroneous, where language employed was not construed by trial judge as actually conveying prosecutor's personal opinion of guilt and curative instructions were given by trial judge. U.S. v. Finazzo, C.A.6 (Mich.) 1983, 704 F.2d 300, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 3543, 463 U.S. 1210, 77 L.Ed.2d 1392. Criminal Law 2204 ; Criminal Law 2205

A “Mafia list” was not shown to have played an impermissible role in trial of defendants for violation of this section, where prosecutor's comment in closing argument that defendants “substituted the corporate resolution for the pistol” did not clearly relate to the “Mafia list,” and where defendants failed to demonstrate that such comments contributed to an unfair trial, since trial judge specifically inquired of each juror in camera, in a postverdict voir dire, as to the influence on jurors of terms such as “Mafia,” with no indication being given that they had influenced the verdict. U. S. v. Polizzi, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1974, 500 F.2d 856, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 802, 419 U.S. 1120, 42 L.Ed.2d 820, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 803, 419 U.S. 1120, 42 L.Ed.2d 820. Criminal Law 2143

Record in prosecution for making extortionate extensions of credit, using extortion as means of collecting debts, interstate travel in furtherance of extortion, interstate travel for promotion of an illegal gambling enterprise and use of interstate telephone facilities in an unlawful gambling enterprise established that argument and actions of prosecutor were not so misleading, inflammatory or prejudicial as to deny defendants a fair trial. U. S. v. Burke, C.A.5 (Fla.) 1974, 495 F.2d 1226, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 667, 419 U.S. 1079, 42 L.Ed.2d 673. Criminal Law 1171.1(1); Criminal Law 1171.1(2.1)

Where grand jury which returned indictment on which one of defendants in conspiracy prosecution was tried was different jury than grand jury which heard prosecutor's improper comment that the defendant's conduct in operating rigged dice game was equivalent of robbery, except that he used an electromagnet rather than a gun, defendant was not prejudiced by the remark. James v. U. S., C.A.5 (Miss.) 1969, 416 F.2d 467, certiorari denied 90 S.Ct. 902, 397 U.S. 907, 25 L.Ed.2d 87, certiorari denied 90 S.Ct. 903, 397 U.S. 907, 25 L.Ed.2d 87, certiorari denied 90 S.Ct. 938, 397 U.S. 928, 25 L.Ed.2d 108. Criminal Law 1166(2)

Final argument of prosecuting attorney in prosecution for conspiracy and substantive charges involving use of interstate facilities to carry on a prostitution enterprise, to the effect that prosecuting attorney had taken an insult from a witness, and that the evidence was cluttered with disgusting and shocking, maybe dirty, disrespectful, dishonest testimony and ideas, did not constitute improper or prejudicial argument. U. S. v. Lyon, C.A.7 (Wis.) 1968, 397 F.2d 505, certiorari denied 89 S.Ct. 131, 393 U.S. 846, 21 L.Ed.2d 117. Criminal Law 2109; Criminal Law 2126

Prosecutor's statement, at trial for conspiring to use facilities of interstate commerce to promote extortion in violation of laws of North Carolina, that defendant was doubly vicious because, knowing he was guilty, he demanded his full constitutional rights, including right to trial, at which victim of apparent homosexual extortion ring was required to testify was improper. U. S. v. Hughes, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1968, 389 F.2d 535. Criminal Law 2143

In prosecution for violation of this section prescribing interstate travel or transportation in aid of racketeering, remarks of government prosecutor that defendant travelled between Illinois and Indiana because defendant took his orders from Chicago did not constitute basis for reversal where objection to statement was sustained and jury was instructed to disregard it. U. S. v. Spino, C.A.7 (Ind.) 1965, 345 F.2d 372, certiorari denied 86 S.Ct. 58, 382 U.S. 825, 15 L.Ed.2d 70. Criminal Law 1171.1(3)

Remarks of attorney for the government in prosecution for violation of this section proscribing interstate travel or transportation in aid of racketeering, that gambling is power and that parasites are stealing from the jurors did not constitute a basis for reversal in view of fact objections to the remarks were sustained and court instructed the jury to disregard remark as to stealing. U. S. v. Zizzo, C.A.7 (Ind.) 1964, 338 F.2d 577, certiorari denied 85 S.Ct. 1530, 381 U.S. 915, 14 L.Ed.2d 435, rehearing denied 86 S.Ct. 1856, 384 U.S. 982, 16 L.Ed.2d 693. Crim- inal Law 2207

Defendants' allegations that prosecutor engaged in misconduct during grand jury proceedings, in prosecution for conspiracy, interstate travel in aid of racketeering, and bribery concerning programs receiving federal funds, by using summary witnesses and hearsay testimony, and by rushing grand jury to judgment because statute of limitations was about to expire, did not meet heavy burden to rebut presumption of regularity afforded to grand jury proceedings, and thus defendants were not entitled to dismissal of indictment on that basis. U.S. v. Bravo- Fernandez, D.Puerto Rico 2010, 756 F.Supp.2d 184. Indictment And Information 144.1(2)

187. Questions for jury, practice and procedure generally

Evidence generated jury questions as to participation by various defendants in conspiracy to obtain property of government contractors by wrongful use of fear and under color of official right and of conspiring to use facilities of interstate commerce to carry on crimes of bribery and extortion in violation of state law by refusing to let county and city business unless recipient kicked back a percentage of contract price. U. S. v. Kenny, C.A.3 (N.J.) 1972, 462 F.2d 1205, certiorari denied 93 S.Ct. 233, 409 U.S. 914, 34 L.Ed.2d 176, certiorari denied 93 S.Ct. 234, 409 U.S. 914, 34 L.Ed.2d 176. Conspiracy 48.1(2.1)

Evidence in prosecution for interstate travel for the purpose of committing extortion warranted submission to jury of question of whether defendant had formed intent to use compromising photographs of his victim for purpose of extortion at time he left California or during his trip to Arizona to see victim. U. S. v. Mahler, C.A.9 (Ariz.) 1971, 442 F.2d 1172, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 541, 404 U.S. 993, 30 L.Ed.2d 545. Extortion 42

Although defendant was actually observed using ticker tape only one time during the four different occasions officers observed activities on premises, such was sufficient to present to jury an issue of whether defendant's use

of ticker tape was with intent to carry on an enterprise involving gambling in prosecution under indictment charging use of facilities in interstate commerce with intent to carry on business enterprise involving gambling. U. S. v. Ippolito, C.A.5 (Fla.) 1971, 438 F.2d 417, certiorari denied 91 S.Ct. 1620, 402 U.S. 953, 29 L.Ed.2d 123. Gaming 101

That defense evidence existed that woman allegedly transported across state lines for purpose of having her engage in prostitution was working in one state at time she was alleged to have been transported to another state merely created issue of fact for resolution by jury and did not of itself preclude conviction for interstate transportation of woman for purpose of having her engage in prostitution. U. S. v. Henderson, C.A.6 (Ohio) 1970, 434 F.2d 84. Prostitution 31

Questions of defendant's knowledge and intent, in prosecution under this section proscribing use of any facility in interstate or foreign commerce with intent to promote a gambling enterprise, were for jury. U. S. v. Salsbury, C.A.4 (Md.) 1970, 430 F.2d 1045. Gaming 101

Whether mails were used with knowledge and at instance of defendant and whether he caused use of mails by bank with intent to facilitate collection of check he received in his gambling business which violated F.S.A. §§ 849.01 and 849.02, were jury questions, in prosecution for willfully causing bank to place in mail for collection a check drawn on bank in another state with intent to facilitate carrying on gambling enterprise. Hanley v. U. S., C.A.5 (Fla.) 1969, 416 F.2d 1160, certiorari denied 90 S.Ct. 908, 397 U.S. 910, 25 L.Ed.2d 91. Postal Service 50

Even if, in prosecution for traveling interstate with intent to commit extortion, there had been direct evidence of fact that defendant had gone from Illinois to Missouri for legitimate purpose, question as to whether defendant at time he traveled had intent to extort money from doctor in Missouri would have been for jury. Leffler v. U. S., C.A.8 (Mo.) 1969, 409 F.2d 44. Extortion 42

In prosecution under this section, evidence existed to present to jury the question of whether defendant had identified himself by telephone and in hotel lobby meeting as same man with whom defendant had dealt under another name. U. S. v. McMenama, C.A.6 (Ky.) 1968, 403 F.2d 969, certiorari denied 89 S.Ct. 1465, 394 U.S. 974, 22 L.Ed.2d 753. Gaming 101

Whether defendant's only purpose in going from his sister's home in Georgia to his place of employment in Ten- nessee was to assist in gambling operation in Tennessee was jury question in prosecution for violation of this section prohibiting travel in interstate commerce with intent to promote or engage in illegal gambling activities. U. S. v. Carpenter, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1968, 392 F.2d 205. Gaming 101

Agreement between government and shipper of alleged gambling materials by which latter consented to cease and desist the shipping of certain of such materials did not constitute entrapment as a matter of law, so that defense of entrapment advanced by shipper's customer charged with causing gambling supplies and equipment to be shipped in interstate commerce with intent of carrying on unlawful gambling business was properly submitted

to jury. U. S. v. Akins, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1967, 372 F.2d 291, certiorari denied 88 S.Ct. 44, 389 U.S. 835, 19 L.Ed.2d 96. Criminal Law 739.1(3)

Whether defendant was professional gambler in violation of Florida law, an essential element necessary to support government's charges that defendant had used interstate commerce, the mails, with intent to promote or facilitate illegal gambling activity was jury question. South v. U. S., C.A.5 (Fla.) 1966, 368 F.2d 202. Gaming 101

Evidence in prosecution for conspiracy to violate this section was insufficient to warrant submission of one defendant's guilt to jury. U. S. v. Barrow, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1966, 363 F.2d 62, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 703, 385 U.S. 1001, 17 L.Ed.2d 541. Conspiracy 48.1(2.1)

Evidence created jury question whether defendant traveled and aided and abetted in travel in interstate commerce to commit crimes of violence and to further unlawful activities of racketeering enterprise connected with gambling; defendant was at service station when guns purchased in another state were turned over to defendant's brother; and one of those guns was found near shootings of detectives. U.S. v. Giovanelli, S.D.N.Y.1989, 747 F.Supp. 897. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 95

Question of whether defendants personally did every act constituting offense charged, or whether such acts were committed through conduct of agents, was for jury in prosecution of former state governor and corporate officer under section 1951 of this title and this section. U. S. v. Hall, D.C.Okla.1975, 424 F.Supp. 508, affirmed 536 F.2d 313, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 313, 429 U.S. 919, 50 L.Ed.2d 285. Criminal Law 80

Whether government could sustain its burden that pinball machines were designed and manufactured primarily for meaning of Louisiana law was question use in connection with gambling within of fact to be submitted to the jury in prosecution for interstate transportation in aid of illegal gambling business and conducting illegal gambling business and conspiracy and did not present basis for dismissal of indictment. U. S. v. Bally Mfg. Corp., E.D.La.1972, 345 F.Supp. 410. Indictment And Information 144.1(3)

That government's star witness, an admitted perjurer, was testifying under grant of immunity and was an unindicted accomplice did not render him incompetent to testify, but presented factors for jury to consider under appropriate cautionary instructions in assessing his credibility. U. S. v. Kubacki, E.D.Pa.1965, 237 F.Supp. 638. Criminal Law 508(1); Criminal Law 785(8); Witnesses 46

188. Questions for court, practice and procedure generally

Whether offense is crime of violence under provision of Travel Act prohibiting travel or use of mail or any facility in interstate or foreign commerce with intent to commit crime of violence is question of law for court, not question of fact for jury. U.S. v. Aragon, C.A.4 (S.C.) 1993, 983 F.2d 1306. Commerce 82.10

Under a substantive charge under this section, it is enough for jury to determine that defendant in fact used inter-

state facilities, and defendants' argument that government improperly obtained jurisdiction was for district court to determine as matter of law. U. S. v. Perrin, C.A.5 (La.) 1978, 580 F.2d 730, rehearing denied 585 F.2d 520, certiorari granted 99 S.Ct. 1496, 440 U.S. 956, 59 L.Ed.2d 769, affirmed 100 S.Ct. 311, 444 U.S. 37, 62 L.Ed.2d 199, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 520, 444 U.S. 990, 62 L.Ed.2d 419. Commerce 82.6

Determination of the applicable state law, in a prosecution for violation of this section, is a question for the court. U. S. v. Polizzi, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1974, 500 F.2d 856, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 802, 419 U.S. 1120, 42 L.Ed.2d 820, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 803, 419 U.S. 1120, 42 L.Ed.2d 820. Criminal Law 734

189. Deliberation of jurors, practice and procedure generally

In prosecution alleging that members of committee bidding for right to host Winter Olympic Games violated Travel Act by bribing members of International Olympic Committee (IOC) during site selection process, whether a principal-agent relationship existed between IOC and its members, and whether defendants were aware of that relationship, were questions to be determined by jury. U.S. v. Welch, C.A.10 (Utah) 2003, 327 F.3d 1081. Commerce 82.10

Permitting jurors in prosecution for violation of this section to read newspapers, with the admonition to avoid stories on the trial after glancing at headlines, did not itself raise enough possibility of prejudice to require reversal; the relevant questions relate to the nature of the headlines and the actions taken by the court to cure any possibility of prejudice from publicity arising during the trial. U. S. v. Polizzi, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1974, 500 F.2d 856, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 802, 419 U.S. 1120, 42 L.Ed.2d 820, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 803, 419 U.S. 1120, 42 L.Ed.2d 820. Criminal Law 1174(2)

Permitting jury, in prosecution for crossing state borders to further unlawful activity, conspiracy to do same, and interstate transportation of gambling paraphernalia, to see entire indictment including name of person, who was listed as codefendant, and such person's pen name, did not prejudice defendant where letter admitted at trial proved that someone had used such pen name. U. S. v. Marquez, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1970, 424 F.2d 236, certiorari denied 91 S.Ct. 56, 400 U.S. 828, 27 L.Ed.2d 58. Criminal Law 1174(6)

Where there was no objection to trial judge's decision to allow jurors, during their deliberations on charges of conspiracy and violations of this section, to separate overnight and return home, court would not, under circumstances, find plain error in trial judge's conduct. U. S. v. Barnes, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1967, 383 F.2d 287, certiorari denied 88 S.Ct. 780, 389 U.S. 1040, 19 L.Ed.2d 831. Criminal Law 1039

Federal district court did not err when midway through trial of prosecution for interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia and for willfully misrepresenting material fact in wagering tax return court dismissed juror who belatedly admitted in chambers that he did not truthfully respond to court's inquiry on voir dire as to whether federal gambling stamp had been issued to him or to a member of his family. U. S. v. Zambito, C.A.4 (W.Va.) 1963, 315 F.2d 266, certiorari denied 83 S.Ct. 1524, 373 U.S. 924, 10 L.Ed.2d 423. Jury 149

190. Acquittal, practice and procedure generally

Jury's acquittal of defendant on drug charges, although inconsistent with their finding of guilt on Travel Act violations involving interstate travel in aid of drug crimes, did not warrant overturning Travel Act convictions. U.S. v. Stott, C.A.7 (Ind.) 2001, 245 F.3d 890, amended on rehearing in part 15 Fed.Appx. 355, 2001 WL 706932, certiorari denied 122 S.Ct. 676, 534 U.S. 1070, 151 L.Ed.2d 589, motion to recall mandate denied 383 F.3d 567, certiorari denied 125 S.Ct. 927, 543 U.S. 1074, 160 L.Ed.2d 813, post-conviction relief denied 2006 WL 2798155, post-conviction relief dismissed 2005 WL 1074601. Criminal Law 878(4)

Acquittal on cocaine conspiracy charges did not preclude defendant's retrial on charge of conspiring to violate section of the Travel Act [18 U.S.C.A. § 1952(a)(3) ] forbidding traveling in interstate or foreign commerce or use of any facility in interstate or foreign commerce with intent to promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate any unlawful activity; establishment of defendant's membership in cocaine conspiracies was not the only manner in which Government might show that defendant conspired to make easy or less difficult the carrying on of unlawful activity. U.S. v. Rogers, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1986, 788 F.2d 1472. Double Jeopardy 151(2)

Potential inconsistency between defendants' acquittal of substantive charges concerning acts that interstate travel was intended to promote could not be asserted as bar to retrial on Travel Act counts. U.S. v. Polowichak, C.A.4 (S.C.) 1986, 783 F.2d 410. Criminal Law 1189

Motion for judgment of acquittal on charges of conspiracy, interstate travel or transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises, and perjury would be denied where the evidence was overwhelming and contentions as to alleged errors were insubstantial. U. S. v. Kahn, S.D.N.Y.1971, 340 F.Supp. 485, affirmed 472 F.2d 272, certiorari denied 93 S.Ct. 2270, 411 U.S. 982, 36 L.Ed.2d 958. Bribery 13; Conspiracy 48.1(2.1); Perjury 36

191. Sentence and punishment, practice and procedure generally

Defendant, who admitted to taking 22 bribes and receiving $48,050 as part of factual basis for guilty plea to using the mail and interstate facilities to promote bribery and filing false tax return, was stuck with consequences of admitting those facts for purposes of sentencing, given contractual nature of plea agreement, even though he might not have foreseen Booker rule allowing court to impose enhanced sentence based on defendant-admitted facts and did not intend to make such admissions for sentencing purposes. U.S. v. Paulus, C.A.7 (Wis.) 2005, 419 F.3d 693. Sentencing And Punishment 947

District court could group counts of filing false tax returns with counts of money laundering and travel in aid of racketeering, and impose concurrent sentence of 22 months' imprisonment on all counts, even though tax convictions had lower offense level than other offenses, where statutory maximum for tax offenses was not less than the minimum guideline range of 21 months, and there was no mandatory minimum term of imprisonment for those offenses. U.S. v. Lee, C.A.3 (N.J.) 2004, 359 F.3d 194, certiorari denied 125 S.Ct. 408, 543 U.S. 955, 160 L.Ed.2d 316. Sentencing And Punishment 771

Prior Travel Act conviction based on guilty plea to interstate travel in furtherance of narcotics trafficking was prior “felony drug offense” within meaning of sentencing statute, in effect prior to 1994, mandating life imprisonment for heroin conviction after two prior drug convictions, regardless of fact that Travel Act also outlawed other forms of criminal interstate travel. U.S. v. Salerno, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1995, 66 F.3d 544, certiorari denied 116 S.Ct. 746, 516 U.S. 1063, 133 L.Ed.2d 694. Sentencing And Punishment 1257

Legitimate debts by victims of conspiracy to commit extortion, attempted extortion, and travel in interstate commerce for purpose of committing extortion could be considered by sentencing court in setting offense level based on amount demanded. U.S. v. Sturman, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1995, 49 F.3d 1275, post-conviction relief denied 1997 WL 264389. Sentencing And Punishment 736

Sentencing of defendant more severely than codefendants for attempting to destroy buildings by means of explosives and interstate travel in aid of racketeering was consistent with Sentencing Guidelines, where one codefendant joined bombing scheme later than defendant and where another codefendant largely, although not entirely, withdrew from scheme before bombings took place. U.S. v. Martinez, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1994, 16 F.3d 202, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 2150, 511 U.S. 1134, 128 L.Ed.2d 877, certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 226, 513 U.S. 886, 130 L.Ed.2d 152, habeas corpus denied 1995 WL 562139, affirmed 108 F.3d 1379, certiorari denied 118 S.Ct. 151, 522 U.S. 855, 139 L.Ed.2d 97. Sentencing And Punishment 56

Absent indication of legislative intent regarding separate punishment for violation of Travel Act and for offense constituting underlying “unlawful activity,” separate sentencing of defendant for obstruction of criminal investigation through bribery, and for interstate travel in aid of racketeering enterprise was proper, in that both statutes contained elements not found in the other; obstruction statute required actual bribery while Travel Act merely required overt act in furtherance of underlying “unlawful activity,” and Travel Act had interstate travel element which was missing from obstruction statute. U.S. v. Stafford, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1987, 831 F.2d 1479. Sentencing And Punishment 536

District court did not abuse its discretion during sentencing of defendant convicted of extortion for accepting bribes while serving as mayor by noting that defendant's prepared statement, which attempted to limit extent of his greed, denied making a confession to FBI, and declared that his real motive in taking bribe was not personal gain but to help provide affordable housing for city's lower income citizens, contained a lot of “hot air” in view of testimony over four weeks of trial directly contradicting defendant's altruistic protests. U.S. v. Matthews, C.A.3 (N.J.) 1985, 773 F.2d 48. Sentencing And Punishment 323

Where sentences imposed by district court following convictions of extortion, conspiracy, impersonation of federal officers, and utilization of interstate travel to promote an extortion were within statutory limits, they were not, absent clear showing of abuse, subject to review. U.S. v. Dorman, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1985, 752 F.2d 595, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 106, 474 U.S. 834, 88 L.Ed.2d 86. Sentencing And Punishment 34

One defendant was properly convicted of three violations of this section, and other defendant of two violations, though their actions were for purpose of committing one single, noncontinuing state crime, i.e., arson, and imposition of consecutive sentences was not improper. U.S. v. Briggs, C.A.7 (Wis.) 1983, 700 F.2d 408, certiorari

denied 103 S.Ct. 2129, 461 U.S. 947, 77 L.Ed.2d 1307, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 2463, 462 U.S. 1110, 77 L.Ed.2d 1340. Sentencing And Punishment 609

In prosecution for various charges including violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, section 1961 et seq. of this title, and importation of controlled substance into United States, trial court's detail- ing, in explanation for sentencing particular defendant, that such defendant was instrumental in setting up what would be referred to as “Colombia connection” in obtaining the marijuana which was loaded on boats involved and was unloaded in area of the court did not demonstrate that court meant that particular defendant was responsible for providing drugs in exporting country, and court was not shown to have relied on erroneous information in sentencing. U. S. v. Hawkins, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1981, 658 F.2d 279. Sentencing And Punishment 67; Sentencing And Punishment 374

Mere fact that defendant in prosecution under this section received multiple concurrent three-year prison sentences, while other participants in transaction, who pleaded guilty, received sentences ranging from six months to two years, did not show that defendant was penalized for exercising his right to jury trial. U. S. v. Peskin, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1975, 527 F.2d 71, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 63, 429 U.S. 818, 50 L.Ed.2d 79. Sentencing And Pun- ishment 56

Imposition of $20,000 fine by way of general sentence on conviction of conspiring to use facilities of interstate commerce to violate state law and conspiring to commit an offense against the United States by interfering with interstate commerce, each of which offenses carries maximum of $10,000 fine, was proper. U. S. v. Kenny, C.A.3 (N.J.) 1972, 462 F.2d 1205, certiorari denied 93 S.Ct. 233, 409 U.S. 914, 34 L.Ed.2d 176, certiorari denied 93 S.Ct. 234, 409 U.S. 914, 34 L.Ed.2d 176. Conspiracy 51

Fact that acts constituting substantive offense of using facilities in interstate commerce to carry on an unlawful gambling business could also be pleaded and proven as acts done in furtherance of conspiracy to commit such offense was not determinative of their identity; accordingly, it was permissible for trial court to impose consecutive sentences for substantive offense and conspiracy without imposing double punishment for a single crime. Nolan v. U. S., C.A.10 (Okla.) 1969, 423 F.2d 1031, certiorari denied 91 S.Ct. 47, 400 U.S. 848, 27 L.Ed.2d 85. Sentencing And Punishment 559(3)

Imprisonment for one year and one day, and fine of $1000, was proper under statutory sentencing factors for 27-year-old female convicted of transportation in aid of unlawful activity, which carried sentence of up to five years' incarceration, notwithstanding advisory Guidelines range of 121-151 months because substance transported was crack cocaine, which would have resulted in imposition of maximum term of five years' imprisonment, where defendant had minimal prior record and otherwise positive background, did not select substance or plan crime, in which she drove her then-boyfriend to another state to distribute crack, and had substantial support in the community; Guideline exaggerated the seriousness of the offense, failed to promote respect for the law, did not provide just punishment for the offense, and resulted in a sentence greater than necessary to protect public from defendant or to deter others. U.S. v. Willis, E.D.Wis.2007, 479 F.Supp.2d 927, motion to amend dismissed 2007 WL 2703019. Commerce 82.10; Sentencing And Punishment 67; Sentencing And Punishment 102

Government was entitled to personal money judgment forfeiture of $3,927,392.40, as the total amount in proceeds under defendant's Travel Act conviction for using interstate commerce facilities to carry on prostitution or aiding and abetting that conduct; Government established by preponderance of the evidence that, at the very least, defendant aided and abetted so-called “health club” in generating its illegal revenue from interstate travel to engage in prostitution. U.S. v. Reiner, D.Me.2005, 397 F.Supp.2d 101. Forfeitures 3; Forfeitures 4

Term of 58 months within sentencing range of 51 to 63 months was appropriate for bribery conviction of elected district attorney based on severity of offense, impact of crime upon public, and need to send message that conduct would not be tolerated, when balanced against lack of threat to public safety posed by defendant, lack of re- habilitative needs that would be fostered by prison structure, absence of prior wrongdoing, and other factors. U.S. v. Paulus, E.D.Wis.2004, 331 F.Supp.2d 727, affirmed 419 F.3d 693. Bribery 16

Punishment of $10,000 fine or imprisonment for not more than five years, or both, provided by this section, was entirely reasonable and did not violate U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 8 prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment by imposing a penalty greater than that which would have been imposed by West Virginia law for the operation of a gambling establishment. U. S. v. Gerhart, S.D.W.Va.1967, 275 F.Supp. 443. Sentencing And Pun- ishment 1487; Sentencing And Punishment 1560

Sentence of 120 months' imprisonment for defendant convicted of interstate travel in aid of drug trafficking was reasonable, even though defendant received maximum possible sentence under his plea bargain; sentencing court explicitly discussed defendant's “rough upbringing,” as well as his extensive criminal history, and discussed guidelines range and necessity of sentence to reflect seriousness of offense and to promote respect for law. U.S. v. Bradley, C.A.3 (Pa.) 2011, 453 Fed.Appx. 142, 2011 WL 2882606, Unreported, certiorari denied 132 S.Ct. 344, 181 L.Ed.2d 216. Controlled Substances 100(2)

Imposition of 57-month sentence for conviction of interstate transportation in aid of racketeering was not unreasonable; the district court indicated that it had considered the correctly calculated advisory guidelines range and sentencing factors, considered defendant's arguments in mitigation, including his post-conviction rehabilita- tion and the disparity between defendant's sentence and the sentences of his co-defendants and concluded that the sentence disparity was warranted given defendant's extensive criminal history. U.S. v. Stevenson, C.A.11 (Ala.) 2006, 206 Fed.Appx. 960, 2006 WL 3392753, Unreported. Commerce 82.10

Booker issue raised by defendant on appeal, regarding right to jury trial on facts which enhanced his sentence for interstate travel in aid of distributing heroin and possession with intent to distribute heroin, was best determined by district court in first instance, and Court of Appeals therefore would remand, even though there was a suggestion that federal sentencing guidelines were not germane to the case, i.e., maximum statutory sentence was less than bottom end of guideline range, where district court, at sentencing, had indicated that it believed it was bound by the guidelines and therefore imposed maximum statutory sentence. U.S. v. Drayton, C.A.3 (Pa.) 2005, 127 Fed.Appx. 604, 2005 WL 846140, Unreported. Criminal Law 1181.5(8)

192. New trial, practice and procedure generally

Variation in actual instruction from proposed instruction in prosecution for violations of this section constituted prejudicial material modification by trial judge in instructions to jury after counsel had closed to jury and required grant of new trial. U. S. v. Wander, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1979, 601 F.2d 1251. Criminal Law 804(9); Crimin- al Law 1189

Where defendant was charged with violating this section by carrying out unlawful activities of larceny by extortion and commercial bribery, the jury may have convicted only on commercial bribery specifications and since this section did not cover that offense, conviction must be reversed, but defendant might be retried on counts of violating this section by committing crime of larceny by extortion. U. S. v. Brecht, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1976, 540 F.2d 45, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 1160, 429 U.S. 1123, 51 L.Ed.2d 573. Criminal Law 1186.1; Criminal Law 1186.7

Where government's initial theory was that defendants had induced four women to travel to Saigon to work as dancers in nightclub and had then forced them to engage in prostitution and where government, during trial, changed its theory to one in which defendants merely arranged for the women who were willing to work as prostitutes to go to Saigon, and where defendants presented affidavits which set forth evidence which might have been sufficient to cause jury to accept defendants' version that there was no discussion between them and the women about working as prostitutes and that there was no forced prostitution in Saigon, defendants were entitled to have the evidence considered by trial court on motion for new trial. U. S. v. Zemater, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1974, 501 F.2d 540. Criminal Law 1181.5(3.1)

Neither evidence of statement by city councilman who allegedly took bribe to unsuccessful bidder on cable television franchise before opening of bids, “this isn't the way to do this, you should have seen me before” nor evidence of large amounts of cash in possession of councilman, not disclosed by government before trial, was of such consequence to extortion defense in prosecution under this section arising from bribery of city officials in connection with grant of franchise as to warrant new trial on ground of newly discovered evidence. U. S. v. Kahn, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1973, 472 F.2d 272, certiorari denied 93 S.Ct. 2270, 411 U.S. 982, 36 L.Ed.2d 958. Crimin- al Law 940

Trial court did not abuse discretion, following conviction under this section, in denying motion for new trial grounded on alleged discovery of new evidence which allegedly would reflect adversely on the credibility of the principal prosecuting witness. U. S. v. Cozzetti, C.A.9 (Nev.) 1972, 469 F.2d 684. Criminal Law 942(1)

Where evidence was sufficient to support conviction on one count of indictment charging defendant with causing victims to travel in interstate commerce for purposes of extortion and evidence was not sufficient to support conviction on another count but the evidence pertaining to each count was not segregated at the trial and probably not in minds of jurors, possibility that jury relied on improper evidence in reaching its verdict on count for which there was sufficient evidence required new trial. U. S. v. De Cavalcante, C.A.3 (N.J.) 1971, 440 F.2d 1264. Criminal Law 1189

Reversal of convictions of two defendants on charges as to wagering stamp tax, on ground that statutes as to such tax were invalid, did not require new trial on charges of conspiracy and overt acts within this section as to

interstate travel in aid of racketeering enterprises, where there was ample proof that such defendants were engaged in business of gaming, and where only evidence admissible on former charges and not on latter was that defendants had not registered or paid tax. Rewis v. U. S., C.A.5 (Fla.) 1969, 418 F.2d 1218, certiorari granted 91 S.Ct. 86, 400 U.S. 818, 27 L.Ed.2d 45, reversed on other grounds 91 S.Ct. 1056, 401 U.S. 808, 28 L.Ed.2d 493. Criminal Law 1189

Refusal to grant a new trial to defendants convicted of conspiring to violate this section because of newly discovered evidence consisting of affidavits which contradicted only a part of the testimony of a government witness on grounds that the testimony sought to be discredited was not material to the issues of the case but only collateral did not constitute an abuse of discretion, under circumstances. Collins v. U. S., C.A.10 (Kan.) 1967, 383 F.2d 296. Criminal Law 938(1)

Government's examination of witnesses, whose counsel had advised court that privilege against self incrimination would be claimed, by inter alia asking one if he had ever stated that he had made money in operation of nightclub other than defendant's alleged gambling club or in liquor store operation and government's reading, under guise of question, of purported statement by witness about opening and operating gambling establishment at which defendant was present on one occasion was plain error necessitating new trial. U. S. v. Compton, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1966, 365 F.2d 1, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 391, 385 U.S. 956, 17 L.Ed.2d 303. Criminal Law 1037.1(3); Criminal Law 1171.8(1)

Jury's question, whether it had to be shown that defendant knew money she had delivered to undercover agent posing as hit man was part of scheme to kill witness in co-conspirator's criminal trial, did not indicate that jury misunderstood instructions, and therefore new trial was not warranted; question could indicate that jury was properly focussed on central issue of defendant's knowledge, and trial court referred jury to relevant conspiracy instructions. U.S. v. Saffold, D.Kan.1996, 915 F.Supp. 260. Criminal Law 928

193. Vacating or setting aside conviction, practice and procedure generally

Even though indictment alleges both travel and use of interstate facilities in connection with violation of this section, conviction can stand if the evidence establishing one of the means is sufficient. U. S. v. Hathaway, C.A.1 (Mass.) 1976, 534 F.2d 386, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 64, 429 U.S. 819, 50 L.Ed.2d 79. Commerce 82.6

Postconviction petitioner, who had been convicted on RICO charges for which wire fraud and Travel Act charges served as predicate acts, was not entitled to have RICO conviction set aside after it was determined that wire fraud convictions were invalid; jury could not have concluded that telephone call which formed basis for wire fraud count was made in furtherance of enterprise, but that same phone call was not connected with enterprise when considered in context of Travel Act. U.S. v. Brennan, E.D.N.Y.1988, 685 F.Supp. 883, affirmed 867 F.2d 111, certiorari denied 109 S.Ct. 1750, 490 U.S. 1022, 104 L.Ed.2d 187. Criminal Law 1556

Failure to prove connection between organized crime and defendant charged with conspiring to violate this section prohibiting traveling in interstate commerce or using interstate telephone facilities with intent to carry on

unlawful activity involving extortion did not require setting aside conviction. U. S. v. Vespe, D.C.Del.1975, 389 F.Supp. 1359, affirmed 520 F.2d 1369, certiorari denied 96 S.Ct. 779, 423 U.S. 1051, 46 L.Ed.2d 640. Criminal Law 977(4)

194. Scope of review, practice and procedure generally--Generally

In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence of entrapment, court of appeals was required to assume that the jury chose to accept the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. U.S. v. Kaminski, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1983, 703 F.2d 1004, opinion clarified 707 F.2d 1013. Criminal Law 1144.13(1)

195. ---- Concurrent sentence doctrine, scope of review, practice and procedure generally

On appeal from defendant's conviction of possession of controlled substance, conspiracy and violation of this section, court of appeals would not rule on defendant's contention that her conviction under this section should be reversed because she was not engaged in a continuing course of conduct amounting to a “business enterprise,” since defendant was given concurrent sentences of five years' probation on each count of her conviction. U. S. v. Vega, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1978, 589 F.2d 1147. Criminal Law 1177.3(1)

196. ---- Issues reviewable, scope of review, practice and procedure generally

District court's express reservation of judgment as to whether portion of count charging conspiracy to violate the Travel Act relating to distribution of proceeds was barred by double jeopardy deprived Court of Appeals of jurisdiction to review issue. U.S. v. Coldwell, C.A.5 (La.) 1990, 898 F.2d 1005. Criminal Law 1023(3)

Where defendant's motions at close of trial included request that charge of violation of this section by means of commercial bribery be withdrawn from jury's consideration, error of trial judge in instructing jury as to commercial bribery was preserved for appellate review. U. S. v. Brecht, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1976, 540 F.2d 45, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 1160, 429 U.S. 1123, 51 L.Ed.2d 573. Criminal Law 1044.2(1)

197. Reversal, practice and procedure generally

Defendant's convictions for traveling in interstate commerce for purpose of carrying on illegal drug activity were required to be reversed where defendant did not obtain drugs, at out-of-state location, and defendant did not perform or attempt to perform any act in furtherance of illegal activity after he arrived. U.S. v. Porter, C.A.4 (N.C.) 1987, 821 F.2d 968, certiorari denied 108 S.Ct. 1108, 485 U.S. 934, 99 L.Ed.2d 269, rehearing denied 108 S.Ct. 1605, 485 U.S. 1042, 99 L.Ed.2d 919. Commerce 82.10

Conviction of codefendant for violating this section was required to be reversed absent evidence that such defendant, as a principal or aider and abettor, met with or transported Illinois bookmaker over Illinois-Wisconsin border for meeting with Wisconsin sporting goods store owner with intent to promote, manage, etc., any unlawful activity. U. S. v. Anderson, C.A.7 (Wis.) 1976, 542 F.2d 428. Gaming 98(1)

In prosecution for violation of this section by bribing city mayor to gain zoning variances and other official approvals to permit construction of shopping center complex, even though court erred in submitting count to jury charging bribery of vice chairman of city parking authority, such error did not taint jury's deliberations requiring reversal of conviction for bribing mayor, since evidence concerning two bribes was of such a nature that it could be easily compartmentalized by jury and, in any event, nearly all of evidence concerning defendants' dealings with vice chairman of parking authority would have been admissible even if such count had not been included in indictment. U. S. v. Dansker, C.A.3 (N.J.) 1976, 537 F.2d 40, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 732, 429 U.S. 1038, 50 L.Ed.2d 748. Criminal Law 1172.1(3)

Reversal of conviction of conspiracy and use of interstate facilities in aid of an illegal gambling, enterprise was not required, despite claim that indictment listed 19 overt acts involving telephone calls none of which was specifically alleged as being interstate, where proof at trial showed that six of the telephone calls in which defendant received the “number” were transmitted within 30 minutes of the availability of the race results from Florida, and, from such evidence, government requested jury to draw inference that calls were interstate, and jury was re- peatedly instructed that they must find an interstate telephone call by a member of conspiracy in order to convict. U. S. v. Cafero, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1973, 473 F.2d 489, certiorari denied 94 S.Ct. 2622, 417 U.S. 918, 41 L.Ed.2d 223. Criminal Law 1167(1)

Conviction for traveling and causing others to travel in interstate commerce for purpose of carrying on gambling operations illegal in state where operations were conducted was required to be reversed where court instructed that interstate travel aspect might be made out by proving either that defendants traveled in interstate commerce or caused patrons of their gambling establishments to travel in interstate commerce and it was impossible to determine upon basis of whose travel jury found violation of this section. U. S. v. Johns, C.A.5 (Ga.) 1971, 444 F.2d 58. Gaming 102

Record on appeal from conviction for traveling interstate with intent to perpetrate crime of violence and unlawful transportation of firearms and ammunition, and conspiracy to commit those offenses, disclosed no ground for reversal of conviction. U. S. v. Goodwin, C.A.4 (Va.) 1968, 405 F.2d 178, certiorari denied 89 S.Ct. 2114, 395 U.S. 967, 23 L.Ed.2d 753. Criminal Law 1182

Where defendant was charged with using United States mails with intent to promote or facilitate illegal gambling activity, admission of defendant's income tax returns from which jury could draw highly likely inference that defendant was an income tax evader and which disclosed nothing connecting defendant with gambling was highly prejudicial and required reversal of conviction. South v. U. S., C.A.5 (Fla.) 1966, 368 F.2d 202. Criminal Law 338(7); Criminal Law 1169.1(10)

198. Remand, practice and procedure generally

Convictions for conspiracy to violate this section which involved possibility, although slim, that jury may have found that defendants engaged in a conspiracy to bribe only one of two named persons, and conviction for bribery of such person had been reversed, required vacation of conspiracy conviction and remand for new trial. U. S. v. Dansker, C.A.3 (N.J.) 1976, 537 F.2d 40, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 732, 429 U.S. 1038, 50 L.Ed.2d 748. Criminal Law 1189

199. Private right of action, practice and procedure generally

Section of Travel Act proscribing interstate and foreign travel or transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises does not carry implied private right of action. Bajorat v. Columbia-Breckenridge Development Corp., N.D.Ill.1996, 944 F.Supp. 1371. Action 5

V. INDICTMENT OR INFORMATION

Generally 221 Acts within section, necessary and requisite allegations 227 Amendment 243 Bill of particulars 240 Business enterprise, necessary and requisite allegations 223 Conjunctive or disjunctive allegations 234 Conspiracy 245 Delay 232 Dismissal 244 Duplicitous allegations 235 Election between counts 231 Fractionated allegations 237 Intent, knowledge, or willfulness, necessary and requisite allegations 224 Interstate or foreign commerce, necessary and requisite allegations 225 Joinder or consolidation of counts 228 Knowledge, necessary and requisite allegations 224 Merger of counts 229 Miscellaneous indictments insufficient 247 Miscellaneous indictments sufficient 246 Multiplicious allegations 236 Necessary and requisite allegations 222-227 Necessary and requisite allegations - Generally 222 Necessary and requisite allegations - Acts within section 227 Necessary and requisite allegations - Business enterprise 223 Necessary and requisite allegations - Intent, knowledge, or willfulness 224 Necessary and requisite allegations - Interstate or foreign commerce 225 Necessary and requisite allegations - Violation of state or federal law 226 Separate counts 230 Specificity or particularity of allegations 239 Statutory language 238 Successive indictments 242 Unconstitutional counts 233 Variance with proof 241 Violation of state or federal law, necessary and requisite allegations 226

221. Generally, indictment or information

A defendant cannot be convicted on basis of an action not charged in the indictment. U. S. v. Botticello, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1970, 422 F.2d 832. Indictment And Information 171

Sufficiency of an indictment under this section is not tested by state law requirements. U. S. v. Slawik, D.C.Del.1975, 408 F.Supp. 190, affirmed 564 F.2d 90. Commerce 82

222. Necessary and requisite allegations, indictment or information--Generally

Indictment under this section was not defective for failing to distinguish unlawful extortion as being either felony or misdemeanor. U. S. v. Karigiannis, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1970, 430 F.2d 148, certiorari denied 91 S.Ct. 143, 400 U.S. 904, 27 L.Ed.2d 141. Indictment And Information 59

Count alleging that defendants paid an Azeri official's medical expenses, in furtherance of their conspiracy to in- duce Azeri officials to allow defendants' investment consortium to participate in the privatization of oil company owned by Republic of Azerbaijan, alleged an overt act occurring within the statute of limitations, as required in indictment charging conspiracy to violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and the Travel Act; whether payment of the official's medical expenses were within the scope of the conspiracy as charged was issue for jury. U.S. v. Kozeny, S.D.N.Y.2007, 493 F.Supp.2d 693, affirmed 541 F.3d 166. Conspiracy 43(5)

Indictment charging defendants with the use of interstate commerce facilities to carry on unlawful activity of bribery and thereafter to perform or attempt to perform any act in carrying on bribery, was not insufficient as a matter of law because of use of phrase “thereafter to perform and to attempt to perform” carrying on bribery, as essential elements of crime were adequately set forth and defendants were adequately informed as to charge they must meet. U. S. v. De Sapio, S.D.N.Y.1969, 299 F.Supp. 436. Conspiracy 43(6)

223. ---- Business enterprise, necessary and requisite allegations, indictment or information

Indictment charging defendant with interstate travel in aid of racketeering did not fail to charge a crime within spirit or intent of this section proscribing such activity on theory that this section did not apply to defendant as a small-time gambler not engaged in interstate business enterprise. Spinelli v. U. S., C.A.8 (Mo.) 1967, 382 F.2d 871, certiorari granted 88 S.Ct. 1025, 390 U.S. 942, 19 L.Ed.2d 1130, modified 88 S.Ct. 1834, 391 U.S. 933, 20 L.Ed.2d 853, reversed 89 S.Ct. 584, 393 U.S. 410, 21 L.Ed.2d 637. Gaming 85(1)

Even though indictment alleged only one isolated act of bribery in charging defendants with conspiring to use a facility in interstate commerce, that is, a telephone, with intent to carry on an unlawful activity, i.e., bribery, indictment was not fatally defective for failure to allege that defendants were involved in a business enterprise of which bribery was an integral part, where this section governing offense defined “unlawful activity” as any business enterprise involving gambling or bribery and thus excluded a business enterprise from proscribed activity. U. S. v. Archer, S.D.N.Y.1972, 355 F.Supp. 981, reversed 486 F.2d 670. Conspiracy 43(6)

224. ---- Intent, knowledge, or willfulness, necessary and requisite allegations, indictment or information

Indictment charging that defendant willfully and knowingly combined, conspired, confederated and agreed together and with other persons unnamed or unknown to distribute heroin sufficiently alleged conspiracy willfully and intentionally to distribute heroin, and charge under this section in such indictment, alleging that defendant did willfully and knowingly travel interstate from Kansas to Las Vegas, Nevada with intent to promote conspiracy to distribute heroin and did promote or attempt to promote said unlawful activity sufficiently alleged that purpose of conspiracy was to knowingly and intentionally distribute heroin. U. S. v. Stevens, C.A.10 (Kan.) 1979, 612 F.2d 1226, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 3011, 447 U.S. 921, 65 L.Ed.2d 1113. Conspiracy 43(6)

Where indictment charged that defendant caused a named individual to travel interstate “with the intent” to promote the unlawful activity of prostitution and that defendant “thereafter * * * did perform * * * acts to promote” the unlawful activity, indictment sufficiently charged defendant with an intentional violation of this section despite fact that indictment did not contain word “willfully.” U. S. v. Maselli, C.A.6 (Ohio) 1976, 534 F.2d 1197. Prostitution 23

225. ---- Interstate or foreign commerce, necessary and requisite allegations, indictment or information

Indictment's allegation that travel was undertaken in violation of this section “from the Middle District of Flor- ida to Oklahoma City, Oklahoma” sufficiently alleged location. U.S. v. Harrell, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1984, 737 F.2d 971, rehearing denied 745 F.2d 72, certiorari denied 105 S.Ct. 923, 469 U.S. 1164, 83 L.Ed.2d 935, certiorari denied 105 S.Ct. 1392, 470 U.S. 1027, 84 L.Ed.2d 781. Commerce 82.10

Indictment under this section requires allegation of interstate commerce for use of interstate facility, with intent to promote unlawful activity, and subsequent overt act in furtherance of that unlawful activity. U. S. v. Tavel- man, C.A.9 (Nev.) 1981, 650 F.2d 1133, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 1429, 455 U.S. 939, 71 L.Ed.2d 649. Com- merce 82.6

Indictment which alleged that defendants had encouraged four women to go to Saigon to work as prostitutes, that the encouragement took place in Illinois, and that the actions engaged in in Saigon were contrary to the Illinois Pandering Act, S.H.A. ch. 38, § 11-16, did not sufficiently allege that defendants traveled in foreign commerce and thereafter violated the law of the state in which illegal activity took place to allege a violation of this section. U. S. v. Zemater, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1974, 501 F.2d 540. Prostitution 23

Indictment alleging that gambling was being conducted in Kansas and that defendant traveled from Kansas to Missouri with intent to facilitate his gambling activity, and that defendant committed acts which facilitated the unlawful activity was sufficient to bring the activities within prohibition of this section prohibiting use of any facility in interstate commerce with intent to further any unlawful activity. U. S. v. Nichols, C.A.8 (Mo.) 1970, 421 F.2d 570. Gaming 85(1)

Indictment adequately provided that defendants violated Travel Act by traveling in interstate commerce; indictment identified unlawful activities as extortion and money laundering for terrorist organization, provided chart

with dates of travel and related overt acts, and tracked language of statute. U.S. v. Al-Arian, M.D.Fla.2004, 308 F.Supp.2d 1322, modification denied 329 F.Supp.2d 1294. Commerce 82.10

Since none of the defendants were alleged to have engaged in interstate travel or to have used interstate facilities, facts were not sufficient to allege predicate act for violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act, section 1961 et seq. of this title, based on violation of this section. Joseph v. Algemene Bank Neder- land, N.V., W.D.Pa.1984, 592 F.Supp. 141. Commerce 82.60

Facts alleged indicated sufficient connection between interstate travel and underlying criminal act alleged in indictment to preclude dismissal of indictment on theory that the interstate travel had been incidental to alleged conspiracy to commit arson. U. S. v. Beeler, D.C.Nev.1980, 500 F.Supp. 426. Indictment And Information 144.1(1)

Counts of indictment charging violation of this section in that defendant caused “the use of a facility in interstate commerce” thus apparently alleging interstate use of an interstate facility were not insufficient on ground that the word “in” in this section proscribing travel in interstate commerce or use of any facility “in” in interstate commerce to promote unlawful activity indicated congressional intent that federal jurisdiction be invoked only where there has been physical travel across state lines or the interstate use of telephone or other wire facilities. U. S. v. Anderson, D.C.Md.1973, 368 F.Supp. 1253. Commerce 82.10

Failure of indictment alleging generally that defendants transported and traveled in interstate commerce with certain proscribed purposes to specifically assert where in commerce such activities occurred did not render indictment defective. U. S. v. Tanner, N.D.Ill.1967, 279 F.Supp. 457. Indictment And Information 86(1)

226. ---- Violation of state or federal law, necessary and requisite allegations, indictment or information

Where Pennsylvania law prohibited private individuals from obtaining money from victim by virtue of fear and threats of exposure although Pennsylvania classified such activity as “blackmail” rather than “extortion”, indictments drawn under this section, alluding to state law in defining “extortion”, charged an offense. U. S. v. Nar- dello, U.S.Pa.1969, 89 S.Ct. 534, 393 U.S. 286, 21 L.Ed.2d 487. Extortion 33

Instruction that permitted jury to convict defendants under Travel Act for participation in alleged prostitution business, without including elements of state prostitution statutes, impermissibly relieved Government of its burden to prove beyond reasonable doubt that defendants had requisite intent as specified in state statutes; instruction implied that jury could convict if activities of escort service violated only some vaguely conceived no- tion of prostitution, as opposed to specific statutes. U.S. v. Jones, C.A.D.C.1990, 909 F.2d 533, 285 U.S.App.D.C. 294. Prostitution 32

Indictment charging defendant with violation of Travel Act by identifying state crimes facilitated by defendant's interstate travel as “bribery and related offenses in violation of New York State Penal Law Article 180” was not impermissibly vague; phrase “unrelated offenses” was taken directly from title of New York statute, and indictment detailed each receipt of cash or services by defendant from victim as well as relationship of those bribes to

contracts granted by defendant's employer to victim. U.S. v. Covino, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1988, 837 F.2d 65. Com- merce 82.10

Where indictment charging defendant with violation of acts proscribing interstate transportation of woman for purpose of having her engage in prostitution set out federal statutes allegedly violated and state to which prostitute was transported, and defendant made no request for bill of particulars, indictment was not defective because it did not set out number and section of state statute which made business of prostitution an unlawful activity. U. S. v. Henderson, C.A.6 (Ohio) 1970, 434 F.2d 84. Prostitution 23

Indictment which charged, in addition to a conspiracy count, that defendants unlawfully used the mails with intent to carry on an unlawful business enterprise involving prostitution offenses, in violation of specified state statutes, was not insufficient by reason of the fact that it failed to set forth the elements of the offenses defined in the several state statutes; nor could the indictment be said to be duplicitous, since defendants were not charged with commission of the substantive offenses under state law and since the allegations as to state law only identified as unlawful the enterprise which the use of interstate facilities was designed to promote. U. S. v. Rizzo, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1969, 418 F.2d 71, certiorari denied 90 S.Ct. 1006, 397 U.S. 967, 25 L.Ed.2d 260. Indictment And Information 125(3); Prostitution 23

Indictment charging that defendants conspired to use freight, telephone and telegraph facilities in interstate commerce with intent to carry on a gambling enterprise in violation of certain laws of Georgia and in violation of this section was not defective for vagueness in that it referred to violation of Georgia law as a violation of the “Code of Georgia Annotated,” a private publication and not to the official Code of Georgia of 1933, in view of fact error, if any, in the citation did not mislead defendants to their prejudice, and, under the circumstances, citation to the Code of Georgia Annotated was sufficient. Gilstrap v. U. S., C.A.5 (Ga.) 1968, 389 F.2d 6, certiorari denied 88 S.Ct. 1806, 391 U.S. 913, 20 L.Ed.2d 652. Indictment And Information 108

Under this section prohibiting use of any facility in interstate commerce with intent to commit any crime of violence to further any unlawful activity, inclusion in indictment of allegation that unlawful activity was in violation of state law does not mean that prosecution must fail in absence of proof that unlawful objective was fully accomplished and reference to state law is necessary only to identify type of unlawful activity in which accused was engaged. McIntosh v. U. S., C.A.8 (Mo.) 1967, 385 F.2d 274. Commerce 82.10

Defendants accused of interstate travel to facilitate location of given individual and extort money from him and conspiracy were not denied right to due process of any theory that they were not given notice of crime charged where indictment charged ten specific acts in one count, six specific acts in another and fifteen overt acts allegedly committed as part of conspiracy and one count charged that extortion was illegal under laws of Nevada and California and another count applied exclusively to acts in Nevada. Marshall v. U. S., C.A.9 (Cal.) 1966, 355 F.2d 999, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 34, 385 U.S. 815, 17 L.Ed.2d 54, rehearing denied 87 S.Ct. 388, 385 U.S. 964, 17 L.Ed.2d 309. Constitutional Law 4581

Indictment stated violation of Travel Act, criminalizing travel for purpose of carrying out unlawful activity, when essentials of state law violation which was unlawful activity were stated elsewhere in indictment, even

though state law was not expressly cited. U.S. v. Norberto, E.D.N.Y.2005, 373 F.Supp.2d 150. Commerce 82.10; Indictment And Information 108

Government must allege, as part of a Travel Act charge, that defendant has or could have violated the underlying state law, and the defendant may assert any relevant substantive state law defense. U.S. v. Vaccaro, D.C.Nev.1985, 602 F.Supp. 1132. Commerce 82.10

Indictment charging defendants with employing facilities in interstate commerce to commit crime of bribery was not rendered insufficient by failure to set forth elements of bribery under New York laws. U. S. v. Aloi, E.D.N.Y.1977, 449 F.Supp. 698. Bribery 6(1)

Indictment did not charge only illegal horse betting where the indictment charged the committing of federal crime of traveling between states in order to further and carry on a bookmaking operation in violation of Pennsylvania law, and two of the sections of Pennsylvania law cited dealt only with illegal lottery. U. S. v. Gatto, E.D.Pa.1969, 299 F.Supp. 697. Indictment And Information 125(12)

An indictment under this section need not plead in detail the state offense; fact that operation being carried on was illegal under state law is an element, but not the essence, of the federal offense. U. S. v. Gerhart, S.D.W.Va.1967, 275 F.Supp. 443. Gaming 85(1)

Fact that, in describing unlawful activity which defendant was charged with facilitating under this section, indictment incorrectly cited Code 1950, §§ 18.1-321 and 18.1-340 allegedly violated did not render indictment defective, where there was no showing that either defendant or his attorney was misled by incorrect citation, indictment correctly referred to this section and specified dice game as unlawful activity involved, and prosecution furnished bill of particulars clearly stating that defendant established, promoted, managed and carried on dice games at locations described therein in violation of Code 1950, § 18.1-316. U. S. v. Harris, E.D.Va.1967, 275 F.Supp. 161, affirmed 399 F.2d 687. Indictment And Information 79

Fact that indictment charging interstate travel in aid of racketeering enterprises alleged that activities were unlawful under state law did not require that indictment comply with all technicalities of state law with reference to sufficiency of indictment charging state offense. U. S. v. Teemer, N.D.W.Va.1963, 214 F.Supp. 952. Com- merce 82.10

227. ---- Acts within section, necessary and requisite allegations, indictment or information

Indictment which listed Travel Act violation as predicate offense for “specified unlawful activity” component of federal money-laundering charges, and in turn alleged that “[defendant's] employees engaged in prostitution services with customers” as predicate offense for Travel Act, was not impermissibly broadened by jury instruction that it was sufficient for government to prove that credit card transaction entitled defendant's customers to engage in sex, rather than proving that every customer actually received sex in exchange for credit card; indictment's allegations of prostitution services merely identified underlying state offense, as required by Travel Act, and did not make completion of services material to Travel Act violation. U.S. v. Baker, C.A.7 (Ill.) 2000, 227

F.3d 955, certiorari denied 121 S.Ct. 1095, 531 U.S. 1151, 148 L.Ed.2d 968, application granted in part 2006 WL 2850029. Criminal Law 814(5)

Travel Act indictment was not fatally defective, even though it did not specifically allege overt criminal act after act of travel; indictment as a whole adequately alleged that defendant imported drugs after having traveled. U.S. v. Hagmann, C.A.5 (La.) 1991, 950 F.2d 175, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 108, 506 U.S. 835, 121 L.Ed.2d 66, rehearing denied 113 S.Ct. 485, 506 U.S. 982, 121 L.Ed.2d 389. Commerce 82.10

Act need not be unlawful in order to satisfy “overt-act” requirement of Travel Act. U.S. v. Sanchez DeFundora, C.A.10 (Okla.) 1990, 893 F.2d 1173, 113 A.L.R. Fed. 873, certiorari denied 110 S.Ct. 2190, 495 U.S. 939, 109 L.Ed.2d 518. Commerce 82.10

Failure to aver a subsequent overt act in furtherance of unlawful activity rendered counts of indictment charging violations of this section defective and compelled dismissal of counts. U. S. v. Wander, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1979, 601 F.2d 1251. Commerce 82.6

Indictment which adequately charged violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) was also sufficient with regard to counts alleging violations of the Travel Act, where claimed deficiencies regarding the Travel Act counts were based on asserted insufficiency of the indictment as to the FCPA counts. U.S. v. Kozeny, S.D.N.Y.2007, 493 F.Supp.2d 693, affirmed 541 F.3d 166. Commerce 82.10

Indictment which detailed unlawful activity and means of promoting such unlawful activity but which failed to allege subsequent performance of any act by defendants in furtherance of the unlawful activity failed to state crime under this section governing offense of interstate travel or transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises. U.S. v. Sanchez Vazquez, N.D.Ga.1984, 585 F.Supp. 990. Gaming 85(1)

228. Joinder or consolidation of counts, indictment or information

Count charging conspiracy to use facilities of interstate commerce to violate state law was properly joined, for purpose of trial, with count charging interference with interstate commerce where evidence on the two conspiracy counts was essentially the same, in that extortions from government contractors were of the same character and grew out of the same overall conspiracy and each involved misuse of instrumentalities of government on which the conspirators had fastened themselves. U. S. v. Kenny, C.A.3 (N.J.) 1972, 462 F.2d 1205, certiorari denied 93 S.Ct. 233, 409 U.S. 914, 34 L.Ed.2d 176, certiorari denied 93 S.Ct. 234, 409 U.S. 914, 34 L.Ed.2d 176. Indictment And Information 129(1)

It was permissible to join charges that defendants participated in scheme to cheat for profit in “peeked” gin rummy games in violation of statutes, and that they conspired to violate statutes and that they made false statements of their spoils from games in their income tax returns, where proof of the cheating at cards and the distribution of the proceeds was a substantial part of proof of both conspiracy charge and substantive charges under the statutes, and it was also a substantial part of the evidence supporting the tax charges; if joinder were improper, the error would be harmless. U. S. v. Roselli, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1970, 432 F.2d 879, certiorari denied 91 S.Ct. 883,

401 U.S. 924, 27 L.Ed.2d 828, certiorari denied 91 S.Ct. 884, 401 U.S. 924, 27 L.Ed.2d 828, rehearing denied 91 S.Ct. 1366, 402 U.S. 924, 28 L.Ed.2d 665. Criminal Law 1167(2); Indictment And Information 130

Charges of conspiring to defraud the United States by impeding collection of tax obligations from two alleged prostitution enterprises and violation of the “Travel Act” through use of interstate facilities to carry on the alleged enterprises were sufficiently related to permit joinder, which would not unfairly prejudice defendant to require severance since evidence regarding alleged prostitution enterprise would be admissible in a separate trial on tax conspiracy charge. U.S. v. Sigalow, S.D.N.Y.1986, 624 F.Supp. 499. Criminal Law 620(6)

Count of indictment which charged two defendants and an unindicted coconspirator with conspiring to violate this section by using and causing others to travel in interstate commerce with the intent to promote the crime of bribery and count which charged one of the defendants with violating this section in that he used and caused to be used a facility in interstate commerce with the intent to promote the crime of bribery alleged the same series of acts or transactions and were properly joined even though the substantive count charged only one defendant. U. S. v. Slawik, D.C.Del.1975, 408 F.Supp. 190, affirmed 564 F.2d 90. Indictment And Information 124(5)

Eight substantive counts of indictment charging use of facilities in interstate commerce for purpose of bribing town officials to obtain building permit and charging use of facilities in interstate commerce for purpose of bribing town officials to obtain easements would not be consolidated into two counts on theory that each alleged bribe originated from but one fresh impulse; the fresh impulse for which defendants were accountable was each impulse which resulted in the alleged unlawful use of interstate commerce or facilities. U. S. v. Zirpolo, D.C.N.J.1968, 288 F.Supp. 993, reversed 450 F.2d 424. Criminal Law 620(1)

229. Merger of counts, indictment or information

Although count charging conspiracy to travel in interstate commerce for purpose of committing arson and count charging interstate travel for purpose of committing arson may have related to single event which was ultimate purpose of conspiracy, where conviction under conspiracy count required proof of an agreement and other count charged interstate travel and causing interstate travel by an arsonist, counts did not merge so as to preclude separate punishment on both counts. U. S. v. Fife, C.A.6 (Ky.) 1976, 573 F.2d 369, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 1555, 430 U.S. 933, 51 L.Ed.2d 777. Sentencing And Punishment 520(2)

230. Separate counts, indictment or information

Single conspiracy, utilizing the facilities of interstate commerce, to obtain kickback from contractors doing business with city and county government violated this section proscribing conspiracies utilizing facilities of interstate commerce as well as section 371 of this title, each of which provisions permits a different range of sentence; thus, it was proper to charge both violations as separate counts of the indictment. U. S. v. Kenny, C.A.3 (N.J.) 1972, 462 F.2d 1205, certiorari denied 93 S.Ct. 233, 409 U.S. 914, 34 L.Ed.2d 176, certiorari denied 93 S.Ct. 234, 409 U.S. 914, 34 L.Ed.2d 176. Indictment And Information 129(1)

231. Election between counts, indictment or information

Under this section, each act of interstate travel and each use of interstate facility constitutes punishable offense, and trial court erroneously compelled prosecution to elect among three counts under this section. U. S. v. Jabara, C.A.6 (Mich.) 1981, 644 F.2d 574. Indictment And Information 132(3)

Defendant charged with conspiring to make interstate trip to consummate extortion was not entitled to require government to elect whether it would try him on the theory that conspiracy as to its aspect of interstate travel had for its intent to “promote” or to “carry on” or to “facilitate the promotion * * * or carrying on” of the alleged extortion. U. S. v. Phillips, C.A.8 (Mo.) 1970, 433 F.2d 1364, certiorari denied 91 S.Ct. 900, 401 U.S. 917, 27 L.Ed.2d 819. Criminal Law 678(1)

Refusal of trial court to require government to narrow its charge or elect as to whether defendant was charged with promoting, or managing, or establishing or carrying on unlawful activity designated in indictment for interstate travel in aid of racketeering was not an abuse of discretion in view of fact indictment adequately informed accused of the charges against him, and slight difficulty of preparing defense to the broadly worded charges did not outweigh difficulty and potential prejudice faced by the government in being forced to limit its presentations to a restricted area of proof. Spinelli v. U. S., C.A.8 (Mo.) 1967, 382 F.2d 871, certiorari granted 88 S.Ct. 1025, 390 U.S. 942, 19 L.Ed.2d 1130, modified 88 S.Ct. 1834, 391 U.S. 933, 20 L.Ed.2d 853, reversed on other grounds 89 S.Ct. 584, 393 U.S. 410, 21 L.Ed.2d 637. Indictment And Information 132(8)

Government would not be required to dismiss or elect among count charging conspiracy and count charging interstate travel in aid of racketeering enterprises. U. S. v. Gaertner, E.D.Wis.1977, 432 F.Supp. 805. Indictment And Information 132(3)

Government would not be compelled to elect, on theory that the illegal scheme rather than an entrance into interstate commerce constitutes the proscribed conduct, between the four counts alleging substantive violations of this section. U. S. v. Isaacs, N.D.Ill.1972, 347 F.Supp. 743. Indictment And Information 132(3)

Motions of defendants to compel the government to elect whether it should go to trial first on conspiracy count of indictment or on substantive offense counts charging violation of this section making interstate travel in aid of racketeering enterprises an offense would be denied by federal district court. U. S. v. Teemer, N.D.W.Va.1963, 214 F.Supp. 952. Indictment And Information 132(5)

232. Delay, indictment or information

Government did not deliberately delay indictment for interstate travel in connection with distribution of cocaine until after defendant had been convicted of interstate travel in connection with distribution of marijuana, to gain tactical advantage; government did not become aware of defendant's involvement with cocaine until after first trial had been completed. U.S. v. Burns, C.A.4 (N.C.) 1993, 990 F.2d 1426, certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 2949, 508 U.S. 967, 124 L.Ed.2d 696. Criminal Law 36.6; Indictment And Information 7

233. Unconstitutional counts, indictment or information

Mere presence of unconstitutional counts in indictment was not prejudicial and was not tantamount to improper comment upon defendant's failure to testify with regard to valid counts of aiding and abetting interstate transmission of wagering information and causing use of interstate commerce in aid of racketeering enterprise. U. S. v. Kelley, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1968, 395 F.2d 727, certiorari denied 89 S.Ct. 391, 393 U.S. 963, 21 L.Ed.2d 376. Crim- inal Law 317; Criminal Law 1166(6)

234. Conjunctive or disjunctive allegations, indictment or information

Where a crime denounced disjunctively in this section is charged in the conjunctive, proof of any one of the allegations will sustain a conviction. U. S. v. Pauldino, C.A.10 (Colo.) 1971, 443 F.2d 1108, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 204, 404 U.S. 882, 30 L.Ed.2d 163, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 212, 404 U.S. 882, 30 L.Ed.2d 163. Indict- ment And Information 168

Allegations that defendant traveled interstate with intent to further unlawful activity and caused others to travel interstate with the same intent did not have to be put conjunctively in order to establish possible disjunctive liability. U.S. v. LaFleur, D.Nev.1987, 669 F.Supp. 1029. Indictment And Information 125(20)

235. Duplicitous allegations, indictment or information

Single count indictment, in which first paragraph alleged that on or about certain date, and continuously thereafter, defendant traveled in interstate commerce with intent to aid unlawful gambling activity, and in which second paragraph listed six dates on which defendant allegedly traveled between California and Michigan as part of and in willful promotion of said unlawful activity, was not duplicitous, so as to be invalid, where government's characterization of facts as a single, continuous scheme was fair one, and none of dangers of duplicity were present in case. U. S. v. Alsobrook, C.A.6 (Mich.) 1980, 620 F.2d 139, certiorari denied 101 S.Ct. 124, 449 U.S. 843, 66 L.Ed.2d 51. Indictment And Information 125(42)

As respected defendant's claim that indictment was duplicitous in that in essence count one, which charged that with reference to first meeting, the defendants caused illegal travel of certain person with intent to extort money from him, and count two, which charged interstate travel with intent to extort with regard to a second meeting, charged subconspiracies already covered in count four, which alleged a conspiracy to commit substantive acts in counts one and two, counts one and two were not conspiracy counts but rather charged substantive offenses which extended beyond an agreement between the defendants, and thus, even though evidence might have over- lapped on substantive and conspiracy counts, the counts alleged separate violations. U. S. v. Catalano, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1971, 439 F.2d 1100, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 56, 404 U.S. 825, 30 L.Ed.2d 53. Indictment And Inform- ation 130

Indictment which charged that defendant “did cause travel and the use of a facility in interstate commerce” in connection with a business enterprise involving prostitution was not duplicitous but merely charged a single offense which could be committed by two means. U. S. v. Raineri, W.D.Wis.1980, 521 F.Supp. 16. Indictment And Information 125(35)

Counts II through IX, charging four defendants with use of interstate commerce with intent to promote and facilitate unlawful activity involving gambling on “bingo” gambling-type pinball machines in violation of Louisiana law were not subject to dismissal on ground of duplicity, vagueness or failure to allege substantive crimes. U. S. v. Bally Mfg. Corp., E.D.La.1972, 345 F.Supp. 410. Indictment And Information 71.4(1); Indictment And Information 125(1); Indictment And Information 144.1(1)

No ruling would presently be made on defendants' objection that there was duplicity between conspiracy count and indictment's second count which charged defendants with conducting, financing and owning an illegal gambling business, since the conspiracy charge took into account not only section 1955 of this title relating to carrying on an illegal gambling business but also that this section proscribing the use of facilities in interstate commerce to carry on gambling activities, and since it would thus serve little purpose to dismiss only part of the conspiracy count when it was uncertain what facts mights be proved with respect to allegedly carrying on an illegal gambling business. U. S. v. Iannelli, W.D.Pa.1972, 339 F.Supp. 171, affirmed 477 F.2d 999, certiorari granted 94 S.Ct. 2602, 417 U.S. 907, 41 L.Ed.2d 211, affirmed 95 S.Ct. 1284, 420 U.S. 770, 43 L.Ed.2d 616, affirmed 480 F.2d 918, affirmed 480 F.2d 919, certiorari denied 94 S.Ct. 2623, 417 U.S. 918, 41 L.Ed.2d 223. In- dictment And Information 144.2

Count of indictment charging conspiracy in one paragraph to violate section 1951 of this title proscribing obstruction of commerce and affecting movement in commerce by extortion and in another paragraph a conspiracy to violate this section proscribing use of interstate commerce facilities with intent to carry on unlawful activity of bribery was not duplicitous where only one agreement was alleged in indictment even though bribery and extortion were two separate crimes. U. S. v. De Sapio, S.D.N.Y.1969, 299 F.Supp. 436. Indictment And Informa- tion 125(5.5)

Counts charging defendants with causing interstate travel of persons for purpose of bribing town officials to obtain building permit and easements were not duplicitous on theory that defendants were charged with causing interstate travel of more than one individual. U. S. v. Zirpolo, D.C.N.J.1968, 288 F.Supp. 993, reversed on other grounds 450 F.2d 424. Indictment And Information 125(43.1)

Indictments for violation of this section were not void for “duplicity” on grounds that each count of indictment charged defendant with both using and causing to be used the interstate facility, since whether defendant himself used or whether he caused another to use, or both, he was answerable only to one substantive offense, that being the use of the mail with intent to promote or facilitate his illicit enterprise. U. S. v. Gerhart, S.D.W.Va.1967, 275 F.Supp. 443. Indictment And Information 125(3)

236. Multiplicious allegations, indictment or information

Counts in indictment under this section were not multiplicious notwithstanding that each count, which used identical language, alleged travel on overlapping dates as each count was supplemented with details to apprise defendants of each separate violation and indictment was structured so that each count followed its related count and bill of particulars minimized danger of surprise. U.S. v. Gullett, C.A.6 (Mich.) 1983, 713 F.2d 1203, certiorari denied 104 S.Ct. 973, 464 U.S. 1069, 79 L.Ed.2d 211. Indictment And Information 130

Indictment which charged use of interstate telephone communications to promote and carry on unlawful gambling business and knowing use of telephone for interstate transmission of information assisting in placing of bets and wagers on sporting events was not multiplicious nor did it infringe upon right under U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5 against double jeopardy. U. S. v. McLeod, C.A.7 (Ind.) 1974, 493 F.2d 1186. Double Jeopardy 139.1; Indictment And Information 129(1)

237. Fractionated allegations, indictment or information

Counts of indictment charging interstate travel in aid of racketeering enterprises by different individuals at different times did not improperly fractionate a continuous course of conduct among several counts. U. S. v. Gaert- ner, E.D.Wis.1977, 432 F.Supp. 805. Indictment And Information 125(42)

238. Statutory language, indictment or information

Because Travel Act [18 U.S.C.A. § 1952] fully and unambiguously sets out essential elements of the offense, indictments drafted substantially in its language are sufficient. U.S. v. Stanley, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1985, 765 F.2d 1224, rehearing denied 772 F.2d 904. Indictment And Information 110(56)

Where indictment under this section was sufficient to inform defendant of offense charged, it was not deficient on theory that, although it was couched in causal language, it failed to cite section 2 of this title providing that whoever willfully causes act to be done which if directly performed by him or another would be offense against United States is punishable as principal. U. S. v. Peskin, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1975, 527 F.2d 71, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 63, 429 U.S. 818, 50 L.Ed.2d 79. Indictment And Information 108

Count which charged that defendants caused interstate travel with intent to promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate promotion, management, establishment and carrying on of business enterprise involving narcotics in violation of specified state statutes was sufficient where it substantially followed wording of statute, delineated elements of the offense charged and apprised accused of what they must be prepared to meet. U. S. v. Levine, C.A.10 (Kan.) 1972, 457 F.2d 1186. Indictment And Information 110(56)

Counts of indictment phrased substantially in words of this section forbidding use of facility in interstate commerce in aid of racketeering enterprises were sufficient to apprise defendant charged with violation of said section of what he had to meet. Turf Center, Inc. v. U. S., C.A.9 (Wash.) 1963, 325 F.2d 793. Indictment And In- formation 110(16)

Indictment charging defendant with violations of the Travel Act sufficiently alleged overt acts; the Travel Act counts of the indictment tracked the exact language of the Travel Act statute, and alleged that defendant used the United States mail and a facility of interstate commerce with intent to promote an unlawful activity and thereafter did perform and attempt to perform an act to promote, manage, establish, and carry on, and to facilitate the promotion, management, establishment, and carrying on of said unlawful activity. U.S. v. Palfrey, D.D.C.2007, 499 F.Supp.2d 34. Commerce 82.10

Mere tracking of language of this section did not render indictment legally insufficient. U. S. v. Aloi, E.D.N.Y.1977, 449 F.Supp. 698.

Defendant's motion to strike the words “and foreign commerce” from count charging violation of this section would be denied as the language of the indictment merely duplicated the statutory language and set forth how the grand jury believed that defendant came within that language. U. S. v. Leo, E.D.Wis.1976, 406 F.Supp. 1174 . Indictment And Information 110(56)

239. Specificity or particularity of allegations, indictment or information

District Court violated Apprendi, in which Supreme Court held that, other than fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increased penalty for a crime beyond prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt, when it sentenced defendants to life imprisonment for offense of interstate travel in aid of racketeering on basis of fact of victims' deaths, where victims' deaths were neither charged in indictment nor submitted to jury. U.S. v. Friedman, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2002, 300 F.3d 111, certiorari denied 123 S.Ct. 1785, 538 U.S. 981, 155 L.Ed.2d 672. Indictment And Information 113; Jury 34(7)

There was no requirement that indictment charging Travel Act violation specify what illegal acts defendants performed or facilitated following use of interstate facilities; indictments which set forth Travel Act offense in statutory language were sufficient despite failure to specify “thereafter” acts. U.S. v. Muskovsky, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1988, 863 F.2d 1319, certiorari denied 109 S.Ct. 1345, 489 U.S. 1067, 103 L.Ed.2d 813, habeas corpus denied 912 F.2d 467. Indictment And Information 110(56); Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 91

Allegation that defendant promoted, managed, carried or facilitated crime of interstate travel with intent to promote bribery provided defendant with sufficient description of Travel Act charges against him. U.S. v. Dadani- an, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1987, 818 F.2d 1443, modified on rehearing on other grounds 856 F.2d 1391. Commerce 82.10

Count alleging that defendant induced codefendants to travel from Dallas through Seattle to Hong Kong stated offense under Travel Act [18 U.S.C.A. § 1952], even if it failed to allege violation of laws of Hong Kong, where defendants' travel did not completely end in Hong Kong and count alleged that they subsequently imported heroin into United States. U.S. v. Brown, C.A.9 (Wash.) 1985, 770 F.2d 768, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 603, 474 U.S. 1036, 88 L.Ed.2d 581, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 822, 474 U.S. 1067, 88 L.Ed.2d 795, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 2896, 476 U.S. 1172, 90 L.Ed.2d 983. Commerce 82.10

In case which involved alleged payment of bribe to Puerto Rican official and in which defendants were charged with wire fraud, mail fraud, interstate travel in aid of racketeering and conspiracy, though language within indictment, which alleged that a corporate defendant “caused the deposit of an additional [sum] to the account of [certain entity] at [specified] Bank from which a bribe was to be paid to a Puerto Rican official” and within indictment, which alleged that a purpose of the scheme was to disguise and conceal the bribe fund to be paid to certain person, was ambiguous, it did not deny reasonable notice to two corporate defendants. U. S. v. Steele, C.A.3 (N.J.) 1982, 685 F.2d 793, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 213, 459 U.S. 908, 74 L.Ed.2d 170. Conspiracy

43(1); Postal Service 48(4.2); Telecommunications 1017

Indictment charging defendant with use of interstate facilities of telegraph company to carry on business enterprise involving gambling offenses under laws of Indiana was not defective as failing to inform defendant of charges against him or as lacking specificity. U.S. v. Lookretis, C.A.7 (Ind.) 1970, 422 F.2d 647, certiorari denied 90 S.Ct. 1693, 398 U.S. 904, 26 L.Ed.2d 63. Indictment And Information 71.4(1)

Indictment charging interstate travel in aid of a racketeering enterprise was sufficient to inform accused of the offense charged so as to permit him to make his defense and was sufficiently specific to meet the needs of any future defense of prior jeopardy. Butler v. U. S., C.A.5 (La.) 1968, 402 F.2d 748. Indictment And Information 71.4(1)

Fact that indictment charging defendants with violation of this section proscribing use of facility in interstate commerce in aid of their racketeering enterprise used conjunctive in each count in pleading violation of state and federal antigambling laws as part of unlawful activity did not render counts so vague as would preclude defendants from pleading former jeopardy in event of subsequent prosecution for same offenses. Turf Center, Inc. v. U. S., C.A.9 (Wash.) 1963, 325 F.2d 793. Indictment And Information 71.4(1)

The indictment charging defendant with Travel Act violations presented sufficient information to ensure that defendant understood the charges and could prepare her defense; indictment set forth essential elements of Travel Act offense, identified three specific dates on which defendant used the United States mail with intent to promote a business enterprise involving prostitution offenses in violation of specified District of Columbia, Mary- land, and Virginia statutes, and described at length the alleged enterprise and defendant's role in operating that enterprise. U.S. v. Palfrey, D.D.C.2007, 499 F.Supp.2d 34. Indictment And Information 71.4(1)

Indictment charging defendants with violations of the Travel Act was sufficient, since indictment tracked language of statute, included substantive counts that detailed specific use by defendants of facilities of interstate commerce to promote, manage, establish, carry on, and facilitate violation of state law prohibiting commercial bribery, and set forth detailed allegations concerning specific subsequent acts in furtherance of the unlawful activity. U.S. v. Rittweger, S.D.N.Y.2003, 259 F.Supp.2d 275. Commerce 82.10; Indictment And Informa- tion 110(56)

Counts of indictment charging violation of this section in commission of bribery and extortion were not dismissible on ground that not enough detail was alleged to identify the checks and the unnamed public official mentioned, so as to permit the government to “roam at large,” since indictment need only identify the transaction sufficiently to permit preparation of a defense and protect against double jeopardy, and need not allege factual detail beyond that which is necessary for those purposes, and all of information relevant to identification of the items had been granted to the defendant in the form of particulars or discovery. U. S. v. Anderson, D.C.Md.1973, 368 F.Supp. 1253. Indictment And Information 71.4(10)

240. Bill of particulars, indictment or information

Trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for bill of particulars in prosecution for conspiracy and violation of this section wherein indictment was sufficiently complete and precise to enable defendant to prepare defense and avoid prejudicial surprise and risk of double jeopardy and where motion appeared to be improper request for evidentiary detail. U. S. v. Barbieri, C.A.10 (Okla.) 1980, 614 F.2d 715. Indictment And Information 121.2(1); Indictment And Information 121.2(3)

Defendant was not prejudiced by the trial court's denial of his motion for a bill of particulars in regard to six bribery charges under this section, four of which charged travel in a specific month and two of which charged travel in a specified two-month period. U. S. v. Barrett, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1974, 505 F.2d 1091, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 1951, 421 U.S. 964, 44 L.Ed.2d 450, rehearing denied 95 S.Ct. 2667, 422 U.S. 1049, 45 L.Ed.2d 702. Criminal Law 1167(1)

Indictment charging a substantive violation of this section which did omit the opposite pole of the use of interstate facility was not insufficient to charge an offense where the additional information desired by defendant was supplied by government in its bill of particulars pursuant to defendant's motion. U. S. v. Cerone, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1971, 452 F.2d 274, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 1168, 405 U.S. 964, 31 L.Ed.2d 240, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 1169, 405 U.S. 964, 31 L.Ed.2d 240. Indictment And Information 121.5

Defendant charged in indictment with transmitting by telephone between Houston and Baton Rouge bets and wagers on football games and information assisting in placing of bets and wagers and interstate use of telephone facilities to carry on unlawful gambling business would not be precluded on retrial from asking court to require government to specify particulars of the offense even though particulars of government's charge was made known by government's evidence in first trial. Nolan v. U.S., C.A.5 (Tex.) 1968, 395 F.2d 283. Indictment And Information 121.2(9)

Motion for a bill of particulars, in prosecution for interstate travel in aid of racketeering was properly granted to extent of ordering government to inform defendant of location, dates, and method of operation of alleged gambling activity, but was properly refused in regard to information sought as to exact nature and details and manner in which the promotion, management, establishment, carrying on, and facilitating of the gambling activity was performed. Spinelli v. U. S., C.A.8 (Mo.) 1967, 382 F.2d 871, certiorari granted 88 S.Ct. 1025, 390 U.S. 942, 19 L.Ed.2d 1130, modified 88 S.Ct. 1834, 391 U.S. 933, 20 L.Ed.2d 853, reversed 89 S.Ct. 584, 393 U.S. 410, 21 L.Ed.2d 637. Indictment And Information 121.2(1)

Premature exposure and unnecessary confinement of the government's case are significant factors in court's consideration of bill of particulars. U. S. v. Anderson, D.C.Md.1973, 368 F.Supp. 1253. Indictment And Informa- tion 121.1(1)

Indictment charging defendants with conspiracy to obtain gambling information and accepting wagers on national sporting events which specified 44 overt acts was sufficient to inform each defendant of nature of charge against him, warranting denial of motion for bill of particulars. U. S. v. Cantor, E.D.Pa.1971, 328 F.Supp. 561, affirmed 470 F.2d 890. Indictment And Information 121.2(3)

Indictment charging, inter alia, that defendants conspired to travel and cause others to travel in interstate commerce and to use and cause others to use facilities in interstate commerce for purpose of bribing town officials to obtain building permit and easements was sufficient to allow for adequate preparation of defense, and motion for bill of particulars would be denied. U. S. v. Zirpolo, D.C.N.J.1968, 288 F.Supp. 993, reversed on other grounds 450 F.2d 424. Indictment And Information 121.2(3)

Government was required, via bill of particulars, to state dates defendants allegedly transported explosives with better approximation than stating that such transportation occurred between June 6 and Sept. 6, 1963, if government, in fact, had more exact information. U. S. v. Tanner, N.D.Ill.1967, 279 F.Supp. 457. Indictment And In- formation 121.2(1)

Indictments for violation of this section were not required to specify in what manner defendant used or caused the mail to be used, or to specify whom defendant caused to use the mail, since it is the fact of use which is essential, the question of the manner of use or identity of persons who placed letter in the mail being merely a matter of proof, which defendant could have supplied in a bill of particulars. U. S. v. Gerhart, S.D.W.Va.1967, 275 F.Supp. 443. Postal Service 48(7.5)

Requests of defendant charged with violations of this section and section 1084 of this title with respect to motion for bill of particulars, as to whether he was alleged to have violated this section and section 1084 of this title as a principal or as an aider and abettor, and in event it was latter for identity of his principal and the manner in which he allegedly aided and abetted the principal, should be denied. U. S. v. Kelley, S.D.N.Y.1966, 254 F.Supp. 9. Indictment And Information 121.2(1)

241. Variance with proof, indictment or information

Government's showing that defendant transported marijuana from Chicago to Georgia, rather than from Chicago to Tampa, and from Chicago to Pittsburgh, as alleged, involved the failure of proof rather than a variance; government did not prove a different incident from that alleged but, rather, failed to prove all that it alleged and defendant could have been considered as a principal in transporting the marijuana from Chicago to Tampa because he transported it from Chicago to Georgia and probably aided in transporting it from Georgia to Tampa and failure to prove personal transportation between the alleged points was immaterial and the matter proved established the requisite predicate act for RICO conviction. U.S. v. Russo, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1986, 796 F.2d 1443. Rack- eteer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 91

There was no variance between indictment and the evidence, which established a single conspiracy to skim money from casino and transport it to persons in other states who had a hidden interest in the casino, rather than establishing multiple conspiracies. U.S. v. DeLuna, C.A.8 (Mo.) 1985, 763 F.2d 897, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 382, 474 U.S. 980, 88 L.Ed.2d 336. Conspiracy 43(12)

Defendants failed to show fatal variance between language of indictment and proof at trial regarding use of facility in interstate commerce to facilitate promotion of an unlawful activity, although one defendant contended there was no evidence that mails were used and the only testimony pointed to delivery company as a facility in

interstate commerce used to transport hashish in that defendant could hardly have charged surprise at that slight variance nor could he claim that it impaired his defense to the charge. U.S. v. Goldman, C.A.4 (W.Va.) 1984, 750 F.2d 1221. Commerce 82.6

Where conspiracy indictment covered all evidence adduced at trial and some that was not, in that evidence adduced at trial showed conspiracy with fewer people, of shorter duration, and in a smaller area than charged, variance between indictment and proof at trial was not prejudicial. U.S. v. Bowers, C.A.6 (Ky.) 1984, 739 F.2d 1050 , certiorari denied 105 S.Ct. 195, 469 U.S. 861, 83 L.Ed.2d 128. Criminal Law 1167(1)

Proof of the acts charged on any date within the statute of limitations and before the return date of the indictment is sufficient to support a conviction under this section if the variance between the date set forth in the indictment and the date actually proved does not expose the defendant to the possibility of a second prosecution for the same offense or cause undue surprise. U. S. v. Phillips, C.A.5 (Fla.) 1981, 664 F.2d 971, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 2965, 457 U.S. 1136, 73 L.Ed.2d 1354, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 208, 459 U.S. 906, 74 L.Ed.2d 166. Indictment And Information 176

In prosecution for substantive offense proscribed by this section and for conspiracy, and on complaint by a defendant of variance between allegations in indictment and evidence, trial court correctly held that its interpretation of state gaming law presented defendants with no new factual charges that they were required to meet nor did it allow either proof or argument of new factual basis for any element of crime, and that allegation as to state offense, was broad enough to include specific crime already explained by the court. U. S. v. Goldfarb, C.A.6 (Mich.) 1981, 643 F.2d 422, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 117, 454 U.S. 827, 70 L.Ed.2d 101, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 118, 454 U.S. 827, 70 L.Ed.2d 101. Gaming 94.1

In prosecution for interstate travel with intent to carry on unlawful narcotics business enterprises, to extent that proof that substance purchased during particular trip was either mescaline or LSD constituted variance from indictment's unqualified allegation that substance was LSD, such variance did not effect defendant's substantial rights and thus did not warrant reversal of conviction, since gist of charge was that defendant traveled in interstate commerce to engage in unlawful business enterprises involving a schedule I controlled substance and both mescaline and LSD are schedule I controlled substances. U. S. v. Dolan, C.A.4 (W.Va.) 1976, 544 F.2d 1219. Criminal Law 1167(1)

There was no variance between indictment under this section which alleged that defendants solicited and received money in return for award of a contract for engineering services with a redevelopment authority and evidence which indicated that the defendants had accepted a bribe. U. S. v. Hathaway, C.A.1 (Mass.) 1976, 534 F.2d 386, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 64, 429 U.S. 819, 50 L.Ed.2d 79. Bribery 7

Where defendant was aware of the proof to be adduced against him and was not prejudiced by any variance between the bill of particulars and the proof, proof of actual travel in interstate commerce by him was not necessary to sustain his conviction for interstate racketeering in aid of prostitution even though defendant contended that government had made an irrevocable election to try defendant as a principal rather than as an aider and abettor. U. S. v. Harris, C.A.10 (Kan.) 1975, 534 F.2d 207, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 359, 429 U.S. 941, 50 L.Ed.2d

311. Prostitution 23

Evidence was sufficient to permit jury to find intent to procure burning of building, as against contention that Government established only intent to travel in interstate commerce to procure bombing of building, and there was thus no fatal variance between evidence and Government's allegations of traveling in interstate commerce with intent to promote arson. U. S. v. Conway, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1975, 507 F.2d 1047, rehearing denied 511 F.2d 1192. Arson 25

Proof of acts charged on any date within statute of limitations and before return date of indictment is sufficient to support conviction of an offense under this section. U. S. v. Somers, C.A.3 (N.J.) 1974, 496 F.2d 723, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 56, 419 U.S. 832, 42 L.Ed.2d 58, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 57, 419 U.S. 832, 42 L.Ed.2d 58. Indictment And Information 176

No fatal variance existed between date of offenses specified in indictment for violation of this section and section 2421 of this title, that date being February 8, and dates proved at trial, where existence of other evidence, dates of arrest in New York City, telephone calls, and wiring of funds to Minneapolis would place the date of travel quite near Feb. 8, 1972, and where it is the fact of interstate travel that is important, not the precise date of that travel. U. S. v. Arradondo, C.A.8 (Minn.) 1973, 483 F.2d 980, certiorari denied 94 S.Ct. 1428, 415 U.S. 924, 39 L.Ed.2d 480. Indictment And Information 176

Where there was evidence of large general ongoing scheme to obtain kickbacks from contractors doing business with city and county government, each defendant was connected by evidence to the large general scheme headed by one defendant and no allegedly separate conspiracies could have operated except for existence of the overall conspiracy charged by the grand jury, indictment properly alleged but one conspiracy and there was no fatal variance between allegation of single conspiracy and proof of multiple subsidiary schemes. U. S. v. Kenny, C.A.3 (N.J.) 1972, 462 F.2d 1205, certiorari denied 93 S.Ct. 233, 409 U.S. 914, 34 L.Ed.2d 176, certiorari denied 93 S.Ct. 234, 409 U.S. 914, 34 L.Ed.2d 176. Conspiracy 43(12)

Giving instruction, in prosecution for interstate transportation of woman for purpose of having her engage in prostitution, that variance between date of travel alleged in indictment and evidence is not fatal to prosecution so long as variance is not too extreme and does not result in actual prejudice to defendant constituted prejudicial error in view of defendant's unimpeached evidence in form of employment records that prostitute allegedly transported was working in one state on date it was contended that defendant conveyed her to other state. U. S. v. Henderson, C.A.6 (Ohio) 1970, 434 F.2d 84. Criminal Law 1172.6; Prostitution 32

Where indictment, on its face, charged only one conspiracy among 14 defendants to violate federal and state gambling laws, it would be incumbent on government to prove beyond reasonable doubt that there was single conspiracy and that the illegal agreement in question had common end or single unified purpose; if evidence produced variance in proof by showing multiple conspiracies which affect the substantial rights of the parties, the defendants would be entitled to an acquittal on conspiracy charge. U. S. v. Bally Mfg. Corp., E.D.La.1972, 345 F.Supp. 410. Conspiracy 43(12); Conspiracy 44.2

No material variance existed between indictment and the proof in prosecution for violation of this section on grounds that the indictment did not charge the defendant with having “wilfully caused” the use of the interstate facility, since statute relating to principals need not be referred to in the indictment. U. S. v. Gerhart, S.D.W.Va.1967, 275 F.Supp. 443. Indictment And Information 174

242. Successive indictments, indictment or information

Indictment for violation of this section and section 2421 of this title was not invalid on grounds that the government earlier had begun proceedings against defendant under a two-count indictment alleging only a violation of this section and that such indictment contained an obviously erroneous reference in charging defendant with causing travel in interstate commerce to New York to carry on unlawful activity, that being violation of particular statutes of Minnesota, rather than laws of New York, where subsequent indictment corrected this error, added charges under section 2421 and where defendant demonstrated no prejudice from issuance of second indictment. U. S. v. Arradondo, C.A.8 (Minn.) 1973, 483 F.2d 980, certiorari denied 94 S.Ct. 1428, 415 U.S. 924, 39 L.Ed.2d 480. Indictment And Information 15(4)

243. Amendment, indictment or information

Federal district court did not commit plain error by constructively amending indictment in prosecution under Travel Act, instructing jury that government could prove that defendant traveled “or used facilities” in interstate commerce as part of narcotics trafficking conspiracy even though indictment charged defendant only with “traveling” in interstate commerce; variance did not seriously affect fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings, since there was overwhelming and essentially uncontroverted evidence of defendant's guilt on closely linked, but uncharged, crime of using facilities in interstate commerce. U.S. v. Gonzalez Edeza, C.A.10 (Okla.) 2004, 359 F.3d 1246, certiorari denied 124 S.Ct. 2436, 541 U.S. 1082, 158 L.Ed.2d 998, post- conviction relief denied 2008 WL 4826313. Criminal Law 1032(1)

Evidence at trial that defendant aided and abetted coconspirator's interstate travel in aid of racketeering nar- rowed elements of offense charged in indictment, which applied to travel in aid of racketeering by either defendant or another, but did not amount to impermissible constructive amendment of indictment because defendant was not prejudiced thereby. U.S. v. Lee, C.A.3 (N.J.) 2004, 359 F.3d 194, certiorari denied 125 S.Ct. 408, 543 U.S. 955, 160 L.Ed.2d 316. Indictment And Information 159(2)

Supplemental instruction, in prosecution for interstate travel in aid of prostitution, that if there was language in the indictment that was not in the initial instruction, which contained no reference to the two women specifically named in the indictment, the jury was to consider the additional language in the indictment to be surplusage and disregard it constituted an impermissible amendment of the indictment, since effect thereof was to permit jury to convict defendant on basis of evidence introduced at trial regarding women other than two named in the indictment. Howard v. Dagget, C.A.9 (Alaska) 1975, 526 F.2d 1388. Indictment And Information 159(1)

Where indictment charged travel from Checotah, Oklahoma to Sealy, Texas, in violation of this section making it unlawful to travel in interstate commerce or use any facility in interstate commerce with intent to carry on any business enterprise involving gambling, instruction that defendants were charged with conspiring to transport a

trailer or cause it to be transported from “Oklahoma to Fort Worth and on to Sealy, Texas” in connection with an unlawful business enterprise involving gambling in Sealy did not have effect of amending the indictment. U. S. v. Guinn, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1972, 454 F.2d 29, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 2437, 407 U.S. 911, 32 L.Ed.2d 685. Crim- inal Law 814(1)

Instruction that jurors might disregard as surplusage the two words “of prostitution” as they appeared for first time in indictment charging use of interstate telephone line for promotion and carrying on of prostitution, an unlawful activity, and thereafter attempting to perform promotion and carrying on of prostitution in violation of Nevada law was not objectionable as amendment of indictment but was intended to clarify charge and avoid interpretation adverse to defendant. Raymond v. U. S., C.A.9 (Cal.) 1967, 376 F.2d 581, certiorari denied 88 S.Ct. 221, 389 U.S. 898, 19 L.Ed.2d 220. Indictment And Information 159(2)

244. Dismissal, indictment or information

Although four counts, standing alone, were defective in failing to charge essential element of offense of using interstate travel in aid of racketeering enterprises, dismissal of indictment, and vacation of convictions was not required, where missing elements of attempt to extort occurring after interstate travel were included in other counts in same indictment and must necessarily have been found beyond reasonable doubt on other counts. U.S. v. Esposito, C.A.7 (Ind.) 1985, 771 F.2d 283, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 1187, 475 U.S. 1011, 89 L.Ed.2d 302. Extortion 33; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 91

Defendant was not entitled to dismissal of counts involving interstate commerce, despite contention that there had been a judgment of acquittal as to one essential element of interstate travel offenses, namely, attempt to manufacture methamphetamine, in that certain unlawful acts did occur after interstate travel. U.S. v. Bourne, C.A.4 (Va.) 1984, 743 F.2d 1026. Double Jeopardy 152

Where indictment charging violation of this section was filed well within the five-year limitation period and there was no showing of excessive delay or prejudice thereafter as trial commenced within four months of 1974 indictment, fact that the Federal Bureau of Investigation had information of a possible violation of this section as early as February 1971 did not require dismissal of the indictment on grounds that preindictment delay had violated due process and speedy trial rights. U. S. v. Villano, C.A.10 (Colo.) 1976, 529 F.2d 1046, certiorari denied 96 S.Ct. 3180, 426 U.S. 953, 49 L.Ed.2d 1193. Constitutional Law 4580; Indictment And Information 7

Dismissal of both substantive counts of interstate travel with intent to aid racketeering would not have necessit- ated dismissal of count charging conspiracy to travel in interstate commerce with intent to aid interstate racketeering. Marshall v. U. S., C.A.9 (Cal.) 1966, 355 F.2d 999, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 34, 385 U.S. 815, 17 L.Ed.2d 54, rehearing denied 87 S.Ct. 388, 385 U.S. 964, 17 L.Ed.2d 309. Conspiracy 28(3)

Where defendant was murdered after his conviction for conspiracy to bribe United States senator, travel in interstate commerce with intent to commit bribery, and nine counts of wire fraud, indictment was dismissed as moot. U.S. v. Williams, N.D.Ill.1983, 565 F.Supp. 353, affirmed 737 F.2d 594, certiorari denied 105 S.Ct. 1354, 470

U.S. 1003, 84 L.Ed.2d 377, certiorari denied 105 S.Ct. 1355, 470 U.S. 1003, 84 L.Ed.2d 377. Criminal Law 303.50

Time for defendant to attempt to produce evidence showing that the business with which he was involved was not a business enterprise involving prostitution and that his involvement with any unlawful activities at the establishment was sporadic and thus not within the scope of this section was at trial; defendant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing in support of motion to dismiss indictment on those grounds. U. S. v. Raineri, W.D.Wis.1980, 521 F.Supp. 16. Indictment And Information 144.2

Counts of indictment charging defendant with aiding and abetting travel in interstate commerce for commission of bribery and extortion were not dismissible on ground that the government must allege commission of an act by a principal to sustain an indictment for aiding and abetting. U. S. v. Anderson, D.C.Md.1973, 368 F.Supp. 1253. Indictment And Information 83

Newspaper serialization of 113-page affidavit filed and signed by Internal Revenue agent concerning alleged gambling activities was not such prejudicial preindictment or pretrial publicity which would warrant dismissal of indictment. U. S. v. Bally Mfg. Corp., E.D.La.1972, 345 F.Supp. 410. Indictment And Information 144.1(1)

245. Conspiracy, indictment or information

Where overt acts were alleged and proved in connection with conspiracy count, it was not necessary to reallege overt acts with respect to conspiracy in count under this section, which fairly met standards set forth in judicial decision. U. S. v. Stevens, C.A.10 (Kan.) 1979, 612 F.2d 1226, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 3011, 447 U.S. 921, 65 L.Ed.2d 1113. Conspiracy 43(5)

Indictment was sufficient to charge defendants with conspiracy to cause victims of alleged extortion to travel in interstate commerce with intent to promote and facilitate extortion. U. S. v. De Cavalcante, C.A.3 (N.J.) 1971, 440 F.2d 1264. Conspiracy 43(6)

Indictment was sufficient to charge defendants with conspiracy to use interstate facilities to violate state gambling laws. James v. U. S., C.A.5 (Miss.) 1969, 416 F.2d 467, certiorari denied 90 S.Ct. 902, 397 U.S. 907, 25 L.Ed.2d 87, certiorari denied 90 S.Ct. 903, 397 U.S. 907, 25 L.Ed.2d 87, certiorari denied 90 S.Ct. 938, 397 U.S. 928, 25 L.Ed.2d 108. Conspiracy 43(6)

Indictment which charged defendants with the conspiracy to violate this section in that they conspired to travel in interstate commerce and use telephone facilities to carry on, promote and facilitate an unlawful activity, to- wit: extortion in violation of Oklahoma statutes, 21 Okl.St.Ann. §§ 1481-1483, and which clearly set forth all elements of offense of conspiracy, as well as those of said Oklahoma statutes, advised defendants of the offense they were called upon to defend. Collins v. U. S., C.A.10 (Kan.) 1967, 383 F.2d 296. Indictment And Informa- tion 71.4(3)

Indictment was sufficient to allege crime of conspiracy to use facilities in interstate commerce with intent to carry out unlawful activity of bribery. U. S. v. De Sapio, S.D.N.Y.1969, 299 F.Supp. 436. Conspiracy 43(6)

Counts charging conspiracy to violate N.J.S.A. 2A:93-6, by use of interstate commerce and facilities were not defective on theory there could not be a conspiracy to commit a joint offense. U. S. v. Zirpolo, D.C.N.J.1968, 288 F.Supp. 993, reversed on other grounds 450 F.2d 424. Conspiracy 28(3)

Indictment charging that defendants for purpose of bribery conspired to violate this section making it an offense to travel in interstate or foreign commerce or to use any facility in that commerce with the intent of furthering an unlawful activity and if there is in fact a furthering of the unlawful activity or an attempt to do so charged an offense over objection that giver and receiver of bribe cannot be prosecuted for conspiracy because crime of bribery requires participation of two parties, since indictment did not charge conspiracy to commit bribery. U. S. v. Corallo, S.D.N.Y.1968, 281 F.Supp. 24. Conspiracy 43(6)

246. Miscellaneous indictments sufficient, indictment or information

Travel Act indictment that defendant engaged in business enterprise involving marijuana and then performed or caused to be performed act to facilitate promotion of unlawful activity, that is, providing means for transportation of 37,000 pounds of marijuana, was sufficient. U.S. v. Rawle, C.A.4 (S.C.) 1988, 845 F.2d 1244, rehearing denied. Commerce 82.10

Indictment alleging an intent to carry on business enterprise involving gambling in violation of laws of United States and laws of Florida, a pleading in the conjunctive, was proper, and proof of either was sufficient to support a verdict of guilty. U. S. v. Ippolito, C.A.5 (Fla.) 1971, 438 F.2d 417, certiorari denied 91 S.Ct. 1620, 402 U.S. 953, 29 L.Ed.2d 123. Indictment And Information 125(20); Indictment And Information 168

Indictments charging defendants with interstate travel with intent to promote a business enterprise involving gambling offenses were sufficient to charge violations of this section and section 1084 of this title relating to offenses of transmission of wagering information and of interstate travel in aid of racketeering enterprises, where defendants were involved in “past-post betting.” U. S. v. Bergland, C.A.7 (Wis.) 1963, 318 F.2d 159, certiorari denied 84 S.Ct. 129, 375 U.S. 861, 11 L.Ed.2d 88. Gaming 85(1)

Indictment charging two attorneys and their client with conspiring to bribe police officer to arrange for dismissal of client's car theft charges stated that long-distance calls allegedly were made for purpose of executing bribery

scheme, and thus sufficiently charged defendants, refuting contention that telephone calls did not relate to any fraud and therefore that indictment failed to set forth any crime. U.S. v. Gervasi, N.D.Ill.1983, 562 F.Supp. 632. Conspiracy 43(6)

Indictment which alleged that defendant's specified activities were with the intent to promote and facilitate the carrying on of a business enterprise involving prostitution in violation of state law, an unlawful activity in connection with a particular business, sufficiently alleged a violation of this section. U. S. v. Raineri, W.D.Wis.1980, 521 F.Supp. 16. Prostitution 23

Count of indictment charging that between specified dates defendants wilfully and knowingly conspired with one another to travel in interstate commerce to obtain moneys from named individual through threats of physical injury and property damage in violation of 11 Del.C. § 846(1, 2), and used a facility in interstate commerce, i.e., a telephone, for such purpose, with performance of eight overt acts in furtherance of conspiracy being alleged, was not subject to objection that it failed to properly charge an offense. U. S. v. Shaffer, D.C.Del.1974, 383 F.Supp. 339. Conspiracy 43(8)

Indictment charging defendants with conspiracy to use extortionate means to collect a loan and use of an interstate facility with intent to commit a crime of violence in furtherance of an unlawful act was sufficient to inform defendants of charges against them, despite failure to name prospective victim of alleged extortion scheme, where there was no danger that prosecutor could fill in any essential elements of crime charged which were not before grand jury. U. S. v. Rizzo, S.D.N.Y.1973, 373 F.Supp. 204, affirmed 493 F.2d 1399, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 133, 419 U.S. 872, 42 L.Ed.2d 112. Conspiracy 43(8)

Indictment charging defendants with conspiring to use interstate facility to promote or carry on bribery and with use of interstate facility to promote or carry on bribery in violation of state law sufficiently alleged facts bringing defendants within terms of this section pertaining to interstate and foreign travel or transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises. U. S. v. Deardorff, S.D.N.Y.1971, 343 F.Supp. 1033. Bribery 6(1)

Counts of indictment charging that defendants traveled and caused others to travel in interstate commerce for purpose of bribing town officials to obtain building permit and easements were not insufficient in failing to allege that persons who traveled in interstate commerce did so with intent to promote illegal activity and that those persons, subsequent to their interstate travel, performed acts promoting the unlawful activity. U. S. v. Zirpolo, D.C.N.J.1968, 288 F.Supp. 993, reversed on other grounds 450 F.2d 424. Bribery 6(1)

Indictment sufficiently charged violation of this section where each count gave date of offense, place where unlawful activities were being carried on, name of establishment in which activities were being carried on, and alleged fact that business enterprise involved gambling, that offense involved keeping and exhibiting gaming tables and other devices, that it was a common law gaming house, and that defendant took part in or facilitated those gambling activities. U. S. v. Gerhart, S.D.W.Va.1967, 275 F.Supp. 443. Gaming 85(1)

Indictments sufficiently charged violation of this section making interstate travel in aid of racketeering enter-

prises an offense, where each count gave date of offense, place where unlawful activities were being carried on, and name of establishment in which activities were being carried on, and alleged fact that business enterprise involved gambling, that offense involved keeping and exhibiting gaming tables and other devices, that it was common law gaming house, and that defendants, after traveling with requisite intent, took part in or facilitated those gambling activities. U. S. v. Teemer, N.D.W.Va.1963, 214 F.Supp. 952. Gaming 85(1)

Indictment charging that defendants traveled in interstate commerce to, and thereafter did, facilitate gambling in violation of Pennsylvania law stated an offense. U. S. v. Barrow, E.D.Pa.1962, 212 F.Supp. 837. Gaming 85(1)

Indictment sufficiently charged violation of this section forbidding transportation and use of facility in interstate commerce in aid of racketeering enterprises. U. S. v. Smith, E.D.Ill.1962, 209 F.Supp. 907. Commerce 82.10; Gaming 85(1)

247. Miscellaneous indictments insufficient, indictment or information

Assuming arguendo that allegations of complaint charging corporate officer and former state governor with bribery of officer and acceptance of bribe were insufficient to establish unlawful activity consisting of bribery of former governor, in that corporate officer's investment proposal, which formed basis for bribe, would never come before governor in his official capacity, such defect was not fatal to indictment where additional allegations concerning former governor's further attempt to bribe third party who was concerned with such investment proposal in his official capacity were sufficient to establish necessary unlawful activity. U. S. v. Hall, D.C.Okla.1975, 424 F.Supp. 508, affirmed 536 F.2d 313, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 313, 429 U.S. 919, 50 L.Ed.2d 285. Bribery 6(1)

VI. EVIDENCE AND WITNESSES

Accomplice testimony, weight and sufficiency of evidence 277 Act within section, weight and sufficiency of evidence 278 Aiding and abetting, weight and sufficiency of evidence 279 Burden of proof 272 Business enterprise, weight and sufficiency of evidence 280 Circumstantial evidence, weight and sufficiency of evidence 281 Conspiracy, weight and sufficiency of evidence 282 Cross-examination of witnesses 287 Expert witnesses 286 Inferences 275 Intent, knowledge, or purpose, weight and sufficiency of evidence 283 Interstate or foreign travel, weight and sufficiency of evidence 284 Judicial notice 274 Knowledge, weight and sufficiency of evidence 283

Physical or mental examination of witnesses 288 Presumptions 271 Purpose, weight and sufficiency of evidence 283 Suppression of evidence 273 Use of facility in commerce, weight and sufficiency of evidence 285 Weight and sufficiency of evidence 276-285 Weight and sufficiency of evidence - Generally 276 Weight and sufficiency of evidence - Accomplice testimony 277 Weight and sufficiency of evidence - Act within section 278 Weight and sufficiency of evidence - Aiding and abetting 279 Weight and sufficiency of evidence - Business enterprise 280 Weight and sufficiency of evidence - Circumstantial evidence 281 Weight and sufficiency of evidence - Conspiracy 282 Weight and sufficiency of evidence - Intent, knowledge, or purpose 283 Weight and sufficiency of evidence - Interstate or foreign travel 284 Weight and sufficiency of evidence - Use of facility in commerce 285

271. Presumptions, evidence and witnesses

In prosecution under this section, defense counsel's failure to qualify medical records for admission as exhibit did not rebut presumption that counsel afforded defendant adequate assistance. U. S. v. Raineri, C.A.7 (Wis.) 1982, 670 F.2d 702, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 446, 459 U.S. 1035, 74 L.Ed.2d 601. Criminal Law 1933

272. Burden of proof, evidence and witnesses

Pinkerton instruction did not create any unconstitutional presumptions and did not modify Government's burden to prove every element of the offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt in prosecution on charges arising out of a casino skimming conspiracy. U.S. v. DeLuna, C.A.8 (Mo.) 1985, 763 F.2d 897, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 382, 474 U.S. 980, 88 L.Ed.2d 336. Conspiracy 48.2(1)

In prosecution under this section, the burden is on the government to prove an intent to facilitate the carrying on of some business enterprise involving gambling in violation of state laws. U. S. v. Gibson Specialty Co., C.A.9 (Mont.) 1974, 507 F.2d 446. Gaming 96

To prove a violation of the Travel Act, government must prove that defendant traveled, or caused another to travel, and in doing so intended to promote a particular unlawful activity; more specifically, government must prove that defendant “specifically intended” to facilitate a particular activity and that he knew it was unlawful. U.S. v. Patriarca, D.Mass.1992, 807 F.Supp. 165, vacated 4 F.3d 70, rehearing and rehearing en banc denied , certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 1644, 511 U.S. 1069, 128 L.Ed.2d 365, on remand 912 F.Supp. 596. Commerce 82.10

273. Suppression of evidence, evidence and witnesses

Two interview memoranda and Federal Bureau of Investigation report were not statements subject to the provi-

sions of the Jencks Act, section 3500 of this title, so that failure to produce such statements for the defense did not require reversal of conviction for violation of this section, where government witness had not signed, adop- ted or approved the written reports. U. S. v. Polizzi, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1974, 500 F.2d 856, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 802, 419 U.S. 1120, 42 L.Ed.2d 820, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 803, 419 U.S. 1120, 42 L.Ed.2d 820. Criminal Law 627.6(4); Criminal Law 627.6(5)

274. Judicial notice, evidence and witnesses

In prosecution for conspiracy to violate this section by using facilities of interstate commerce with intent to commit arson, court did not err by taking judicial notice of state arson statute, notwithstanding that defendants never completed the state offense. U. S. v. Nickerson, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1979, 606 F.2d 156, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 528, 444 U.S. 994, 62 L.Ed.2d 424. Criminal Law 304(9)

Court properly took judicial notice of existence of Wisconsin statutes recited in indictment charging defendant with conspiracy and substantive offenses based on use of interstate facilities to carry on a prostitution enterprise unlawful in the state of Wisconsin, and government was not required to prove existence of such statutes. U. S. v. Lyon, C.A.7 (Wis.) 1968, 397 F.2d 505, certiorari denied 89 S.Ct. 131, 393 U.S. 846, 21 L.Ed.2d 117. Criminal Law 304(9)

275. Inferences, evidence and witnesses

“Continuing course of conduct” needed to show Travel Act violation was satisfied by phone conversations between defendant and confidential informant in which defendant demonstrated familiarity with crack cocaine purchase, packaging and distribution, referred to other individuals who may have been crack cocaine dealers, and indicated that former dealer may have been “scared to get back in.” U.S. v. Johnson, C.A.10 (Okla.) 1992, 961 F.2d 1488. Commerce 82.10

Requisite element of interstate travel for violation of Travel Act could not be inferred from presence of garment bags. U.S. v. Mouzin, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1986, 785 F.2d 682, certiorari denied 107 S.Ct. 574, 479 U.S. 985, 93 L.Ed.2d 577, denial of habeas corpus affirmed 978 F.2d 714. Commerce 82.10

Intent, as element of offense under the Travel Act [18 U.S.C.A. § 1952], may be inferred from objective facts such as a defendant's conduct immediately before and after travel. U.S. v. Stanley, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1985, 765 F.2d 1224, rehearing denied 772 F.2d 904. Commerce 82.10

Government's independent evidence considered as a whole proved by preponderance of the evidence that a conspiracy to skim money from casino and transport that money to persons in other states existed and that defendant was one of the conspirators and evidence was sufficient to infer that defendant had a “slight connection” to the conspiracy and transported stolen money in interstate commerce. U.S. v. DeLuna, C.A.8 (Mo.) 1985, 763 F.2d 897, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 382, 474 U.S. 980, 88 L.Ed.2d 336. Conspiracy 47(7)

Evidence of a substantial course of illegal conduct, occurring a reasonable time before and after an act of inter-

state travel, permits the jury, in a prosecution under this section, to infer that the travel in interstate activity was undertaken with the intent to carry on the unlawful activity. U. S. v. Herrera, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1978, 584 F.2d 1137. Commerce 82.6

Intent, an element of an offense under this section, may be inferred from objective facts, such as defendant's conduct immediately before and after travel; likewise, a conspiracy may be inferred from such conduct. U. S. v. Gooding, C.A.5 (Fla.) 1973, 473 F.2d 425, certiorari denied 93 S.Ct. 2752, 412 U.S. 928, 37 L.Ed.2d 155. Con- spiracy 44.2

Under testimony disclosing that customer had paid defendant $350 for football season's service and that the printed publication defendant distributed cost 25 cents per copy per week, jury was entitled to infer that much of the $350 fee was for the line provided by defendant charged with violating this section and evidence of defendant's guilt was adequate. U. S. v. Cerone, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1971, 452 F.2d 274, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 1168, 405 U.S. 964, 31 L.Ed.2d 240, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 1169, 405 U.S. 964, 31 L.Ed.2d 240. Gaming 98(1)

Where evidence showed that two codefendants of defendants charged with violation of this section had been employed in gambling operation in Evansville, Indiana, for several years, that they resided in Kentucky, and that they regularly commuted to work in a vehicle displaying Kentucky license plates, jury could reasonably infer that defendants had knowledge of their employees' interstate travel. U. S. v. Lee, C.A.7 (Ind.) 1971, 448 F.2d 604, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 107, 404 U.S. 858, 30 L.Ed.2d 100. Gaming 101

Fact that defendant was seen in Chicago on certain evening driving an automobile with Wisconsin license plates, when coupled with additional fact that defendant lived in Wisconsin, was sufficient evidence from which jury could reasonably infer that defendant traveled interstate on or about time specified in indictment charging that defendant traveled from Wisconsin to Chicago with intent to carry on an illegal gambling enterprise in violation of laws of State of Wisconsin. U. S. v. Puntillo, C.A.7 (Wis.) 1971, 440 F.2d 540. Gaming 98(1)

In prosecution under this section proscribing use of any facility in interstate or foreign commerce with intent to promote a gambling enterprise, jury was entitled to infer that one who engages with others in an illegal enterprise cannot reasonably assume that a mere warning will assure that violators of state law will comply with federal law. U. S. v. Salsbury, C.A.4 (Md.) 1970, 430 F.2d 1045. Gaming 96

Where evidence in prosecution for violation of interstate and foreign travel or transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises showed that defendant was a subscriber to publication named in indictment, that he was continuously in business of taking wagers and bets, that he took bets on games in season and that he used the publication for his convenience in his business, the inference, in absence of any contrary evidence was inescapable that he used the document described in the indictment for bowl games of 1964-1965 season. Raymond v. U. S., C.A.9 (Cal.) 1967, 376 F.2d 581, certiorari denied 88 S.Ct. 221, 389 U.S. 898, 19 L.Ed.2d 220.

Evidence of substantial course of illegal conduct, occurring reasonable time before and after act of interstate travel, allows jury to infer that travel was undertaken with intent to carry on unlawful activity. U. S. v. Compton,

C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1966, 355 F.2d 872, certiorari denied 86 S.Ct. 1571, 384 U.S. 951, 16 L.Ed.2d 548. Gaming 98(1)

In prosecution for interstate travel in aid of an unlawful activity under Indiana law and with willfully and knowingly filing false wagering tax return, jury could reasonably have concluded that defendant was in charge of operations in Indiana and that he was being financed by sources in Illinois, and that defendant knew that men other than those listed on wagering tax return were accepting bets for him. U. S. v. Spino, C.A.7 (Ind.) 1965, 345 F.2d 372, certiorari denied 86 S.Ct. 58, 382 U.S. 825, 15 L.Ed.2d 70. Gaming 98(1); Internal Revenue 5295

Evidence of substantial course of illegal conduct, occurring a reasonable time before and after act of interstate travel, permits fact finder to infer that travel or interstate activity was undertaken with intent to carry on unlawful activity. U. S. v. Harris, E.D.Va.1967, 275 F.Supp. 161, affirmed 399 F.2d 687. Commerce 82.10

276. Weight and sufficiency of evidence, evidence and witnesses--Generally

Evidence was sufficient to sustain construction company president's conviction under Travel Act for traveling in interstate commerce with intent to promote money laundering operation involving drug proceeds that were used to finance construction project, notwithstanding his testimony that he was unknowing dupe. U.S. v. Kramer, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1996, 73 F.3d 1067, certiorari denied 117 S.Ct. 516, 519 U.S. 1011, 136 L.Ed.2d 405, denial of post-conviction relief affirmed 139 Fed.Appx. 234, 2005 WL 1562378. Commerce 82.6

Evidence supported conviction of adult entertainment distributor for attempted extortion of adult business owner and travel in interstate commerce to commit extortion, even though owner resisted distributor's attempts to obtain owner's real estate and refused to pay $10 million for films; owner consistently entered into agreements requiring him to pay to distributor sizeable amount of cash, payments bore no rational relation to any service provided by distributor, and owner's token resistance to distributor's more outrageous demands hardly obscured financial deals contrary to owner's interests. U.S. v. Sturman, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1995, 49 F.3d 1275, post-conviction relief denied 1997 WL 264389. Extortion 39(2)

Defendants' convictions under Travel Act were sufficiently supported by evidence, including evidence that they had met with government informant under assumed names and given him drug money to launder for transmission to Columbia. U.S. v. Betancourt, C.A.6 (Ky.) 1988, 838 F.2d 168, certiorari denied 108 S.Ct. 1748, 486 U.S. 1013, 100 L.Ed.2d 210. Commerce 82.10

Evidence of cocaine business which encompassed entire country and spanned several years was sufficient to sustain convictions under this section. U.S. v. McLernon, C.A.6 (Ohio) 1984, 746 F.2d 1098. Commerce 82.6

Through use of gambling records admitted in evidence against defendant and explanation of records by expert witness, government proved every element of offense to establish that such defendant violated section 1955 of this title, and evidence was sufficient also to sustain conviction for making interstate telephone calls in violation of this section to carry on the gambling business. U.S. v. Smith, C.A.4 (N.C.) 1983, 704 F.2d 723, certiorari

denied 104 S.Ct. 76, 464 U.S. 817, 78 L.Ed.2d 88. Gaming 98(1); Telecommunications 1018(4)

Evidence in defendant's prosecution for interstate travel with intent to promote unlawful activity in relation to scheme to profit from bets on races involving horses drugged by coconspirators under defendant's direction, including evidence that defendant sent two horses and his lieutenant to Pennsylvania in furtherance of scheme and that travelers, under defendant's direction attempted to promote or facilitate promotion of scheme, was sufficient to support defendant's conviction. U.S. v. Griffin, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1983, 699 F.2d 1102. Commerce 82.6

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendants' convictions for interstate travel with intent to promote an unlawful activity arising from horse-drugging scheme. U.S. v. Davanzo, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1983, 699 F.2d 1097. Com- merce 82.6

Testimony by person who worked for a bookmaker that he serviced between 20 and 30 customers by code number and that, on receipt of bets, he related them to a woman whose voice he recognized as being that of one defendant, testimony by another that he was employed by second defendant as a telephone operator for a bookmaking operation and that he relayed bets to the first defendant, testimony by a person who lived in Nebraska that he made phone calls to Denver to place bets and evidence that the numbers which he called were those which were used by the first two witnesses was sufficient to sustain defendants' convictions for violation of this section. U. S. v. Villano, C.A.10 (Colo.) 1976, 529 F.2d 1046, certiorari denied 96 S.Ct. 3180, 426 U.S. 953, 49 L.Ed.2d 1193. Gaming 98(1)

Assuming, in prosecution for traveling in interstate commerce with intent to commit crime of extortion, that alleged victim's story, that he thought lock on his apartment door was tampered with after he failed to pay money as ordered by defendant in his extortion threat after victim drove defendant back to New York from New Jersey, carried any probative weight, there was no evidence that, if tampering had occurred, defendant had anything to do with it. U. S. v. Botticello, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1970, 422 F.2d 832. Extortion 39(2)

Evidence supported finding that defendants convicted of using facility in interstate commerce with intent to commit crime of violence to further unlawful activity did commit acts in furtherance of their intent to extort money. McIntosh v. U. S., C.A.8 (Mo.) 1967, 385 F.2d 274. Extortion 39(2)

Fact finder could reasonably have concluded from evidence that accused violated Travel Act; accused received package containing 66 bindles of cocaine shipped via private freight carrier, accused secreted some of bindles in his truck and locked tool box in garage, and accused sought cellmate's assistance in transporting cocaine across country to a few different cities once they were released from jail. U.S. v. Hodges, AFCMR 1988, 27 M.J. 754, review denied 28 M.J. 235. Military Justice 787; Military Justice 793

277. ---- Accomplice testimony, weight and sufficiency of evidence, evidence and witnesses

Evidence that defendant resided for years in New England and had no known Texas residence, together with coconspirator's testimony that he had picked up defendant at airport, and that they had consumed “cocaine and marijuana,” was sufficient to support finding that defendant traveled interstate to promote distribution of drugs.

U.S. v. Williams, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1987, 809 F.2d 1072, rehearing denied 817 F.2d 1136, on rehearing 828 F.2d 1, certiorari denied 108 S.Ct. 228, 484 U.S. 896, 98 L.Ed.2d 187, certiorari denied 108 S.Ct. 229, 484 U.S. 896, 98 L.Ed.2d 187, certiorari denied 108 S.Ct. 259, 484 U.S. 913, 98 L.Ed.2d 216, certiorari denied 108 S.Ct. 506, 484 U.S. 987, 98 L.Ed.2d 504, opinion after remand 859 F.2d 327. Commerce 82.60

Where accomplices' testimony was not incredible or unsubstantial on its face, jury could convict on basis thereof. Bass v. U. S., C.A.8 (Ark.) 1963, 324 F.2d 168. Criminal Law 508(9)

278. ---- Act within section, weight and sufficiency of evidence, evidence and witnesses

Evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant, who participated in narcotics conspiracy, committed a second racketeering act by making an interstate delivery of money as part of a money laundering operation and therefore he could properly be convicted for violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. U.S. v. Casamento, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1989, 887 F.2d 1141, certiorari denied 110 S.Ct. 1138, 493 U.S. 1081, 107 L.Ed.2d 1043, certiorari denied 110 S.Ct. 2175, 495 U.S. 933, 109 L.Ed.2d 504, certiorari denied 110 S.Ct. 2564, 495 U.S. 958, 109 L.Ed.2d 746, post-conviction relief denied 926 F.2d 1311, post-conviction relief dismissed, denial of post-conviction relief affirmed in part, vacated in part 47 F.3d 72, habeas corpus denied , habeas corpus denied 22 F.Supp.2d 60. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 95

Robbery of contraband could support Hobbs Act conviction. U.S. v. Martinez, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2003, 83 Fed.Appx. 384, 2003 WL 22965549, Unreported, certiorari denied 124 S.Ct. 2057, 541 U.S. 1005, 158 L.Ed.2d 521, vacated 125 S.Ct. 135, 543 U.S. 801, 160 L.Ed.2d 2, certiorari denied 125 S.Ct. 293, 543 U.S. 849, 160 L.Ed.2d 81 . Robbery 4

279. ---- Aiding and abetting, weight and sufficiency of evidence, evidence and witnesses

Sufficient evidence supported multiple-count Hobbs Act convictions as to entire series of seven armed robberies committed by defendant's coconspirator, even though defendant did not directly participate in several of the robberies; defendant conspired to commit entire series in continuous sequence and took no affirmative act to withdraw from conspiracy prior to any robbery, and thus came within conspiracy liability doctrine, and furthermore was liable under aiding and abetting theory based on her planning, scouting of potential targets, and acceptance of proceeds after each robbery. U.S. v. Hungerford, C.A.9 (Mont.) 2006, 465 F.3d 1113, certiorari denied 127 S.Ct. 2249, 550 U.S. 938, 167 L.Ed.2d 1097. Robbery 24.10

In prosecution charging defendants with traveling in interstate commerce from Denver, Colorado, to Modesto, California with intent to promote, establish, carry on and facilitate an unlawful business enterprise involving manufacture and distribution of amphetamine, evidence, including testimony revealing defendant's role as partner and eventual successor in operation of California amphetamine business which supplied another defendant with amphetamine sold in Colorado over an extended period of time, plus proof that second defendant called his amphetamine contact in California to apprise him of plan to transport amphetamine, which allowed reasonable inference that the contact was defendant, supported finding that defendant aided and abetted the other defendant's violation of the Travel Act. U.S. v. Swingler, C.A.10 (Colo.) 1985, 758 F.2d 477. Commerce 82.10

Proof of one methaqualone transaction and evidence showing that defendants had for some time engaged in continuous business relationship in illegal drug trafficking was sufficient to sustain one defendant's conviction on count charging aiding and abetting other defendant in traveling in interstate commerce to carry on unlawful business enterprise involving possession with intent to distribute methaqualone. U. S. v. Davis, C.A.5 (Ga.) 1982, 666 F.2d 195. Commerce 82.6

Evidence that defendant participated in blackjack practice sessions in connection with scheme to cheat at blackjack at casino in Nevada was sufficient to sustain her conviction for aiding and abetting wire fraud and interstate travel. U. S. v. Garner, C.A.9 (Nev.) 1981, 663 F.2d 834, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 1750, 456 U.S. 905, 72 L.Ed.2d 161. Telecommunications 1018(4)

Evidence that defendant gave another person money to travel to a particular city to establish an “escort service,” and that defendant fired one of the “escorts” for stealing money from that office and that defendant was aware that the firm for which she worked was a “front” for acts of prostitution was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for aiding and abetting acts of prostitution. U. S. v. Mueller, C.A.8 (Iowa) 1981, 663 F.2d 811. Pros- titution 28

Evidence did not sustain conviction under this section of aiding and abetting in interstate travel. Grimes v. U. S., C.A.5 (Tex.) 1967, 379 F.2d 791, certiorari denied 88 S.Ct. 104, 389 U.S. 846, 19 L.Ed.2d 113. Gaming 98(1)

Evidence on issue of knowledge was sufficient to sustain convictions for interstate travel in aid of gambling and for interstate transportation of gambling paraphernalia. U.S. v. Chase, C.A.4 (Va.) 1967, 372 F.2d 453, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 1688, 387 U.S. 907, 18 L.Ed.2d 626, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 1701, 387 U.S. 913, 18 L.Ed.2d 635. Gaming 98(1)

280. ---- Business enterprise, weight and sufficiency of evidence, evidence and witnesses

Evidence did not sustain convictions for violations of Travel Act, although evidence established beyond reasonable doubt that defendants intended to transport controlled substances; evidence did not establish that any of the defendants were engaged in or intended to commence continuous course of criminal behavior, nor did evidence support finding that they intended to facilitate another's existing criminal business enterprise. U.S. v. Roberson, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1993, 6 F.3d 1088, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 1230, 510 U.S. 1182, 127 L.Ed.2d 574, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 1322, 510 U.S. 1204, 127 L.Ed.2d 671, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 1383, 511 U.S. 1010, 128 L.Ed.2d 58. Commerce 82.10

Evidence that defendant participated in one of two cocaine shipments that constituted continuous business enterprise was sufficient to support conviction for traveling in interstate commerce in order to aid drug conspiracy. U.S. v. Ruiz, C.A.5 (Miss.) 1993, 987 F.2d 243, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 163, 510 U.S. 855, 126 L.Ed.2d 123, denial of post-conviction relief affirmed 46 F.3d 438. Commerce 82.10

Finding that defendant participated in business enterprise to distribute crack cocaine, needed for “Travel Act”

violation, was established by evidence that instant sale was completed after defendant crossed state line, and defendant's communications with confidential informant demonstrated familiarity with crack cocaine purchase, packaging and distribution, even though prosecution arose from single drug transaction. U.S. v. Johnson, C.A.10 (Okla.) 1992, 961 F.2d 1488. Commerce 82.10

Evidence tending to show three deliveries of cocaine and allowing reasonable inference that there was drug distribution enterprise headquarters in California and that three transactions, including that aided and abetted by defendant, were part of that enterprise, sufficiently established continuous course of conduct, for purpose of conviction of Travel Act violation. U.S. v. Carrion, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1987, 809 F.2d 1120. Commerce 82.10

Evidence that defendant, an accountant for business allegedly operating prostitution ring, received one or two telephone calls from Atlanta model and that defendant paid phone bills of business which showed hundreds of calls from Texas to Atlanta was insufficient to support defendant's conviction of violating the Travel Act by making interstate telephone calls to facilitate prostitution; there was no evidence that defendant knew of particular calls or subjects of conversations. U.S. v. Holcomb, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1986, 797 F.2d 1320. Commerce 82.6

Evidence, including proof that coconspirators both testified that they agreed and intended to get into the business of smuggling, they concocted an elaborate scheme by which to obtain an airplane and actively sought out employers for their services, they had already attempted to smuggle marijuana from Mexico only shortly before a meeting with another conspirator to plan their smuggling venture and defendant was told that the two conspirators had discussed three future ventures, supported a finding of a continuing course of unlawful conduct, and not a lone, isolated attempt or casual involvement, so as to support defendant's conviction under section of the Travel Act [18 U.S.C.A. § 1952(b)(1)], which defines unlawful activity to include any business enterprise involving narcotics or controlled substances. U.S. v. Kendall, C.A.10 (Okla.) 1985, 766 F.2d 1426, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 848, 474 U.S. 1081, 88 L.Ed.2d 889. Commerce 82.10

Evidence of past and future plans for distribution of drugs and of an ongoing enterprise involving distribution of drugs established existence of a “business enterprise” within meaning of this section and sustained defendants' conviction for traveling in interstate commerce to facilitate their conspiracy to distribute cocaine. U.S. v. Krevsky, C.A.8 (Iowa) 1984, 741 F.2d 1090, post-conviction relief denied 924 F.2d 770. Commerce 82.6

Although possession of 4,700 quaalude tablets, alone may prove intent to distribute, such number, alone, did not establish continuous course of conduct of business to support finding that suspects promoted business enterprise in violation of this section. U. S. v. Corbin, C.A.4 (Md.) 1981, 662 F.2d 1066. Commerce 82.6

Evidence that defendant placed a bet for another person was insufficient to prove that defendant was engaged in a “business enterprise” within this section proscribing offense of transmission in aid of a business enterprise involving gambling offenses. U. S. v. Donaway, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1971, 447 F.2d 940. Gaming 98(1)

Evidence established that defendants' trip from Colorado to Nebraska was not an isolated gambling incident but was just one more roll of the dice in their continuing effort to fleece the lambs of the land and, therefore, that

gambling was within clear meaning of business enterprise involving gambling as that phrase is used in this section. U. S. v. Pauldino, C.A.10 (Colo.) 1971, 443 F.2d 1108, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 204, 404 U.S. 882, 30 L.Ed.2d 163, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 212, 404 U.S. 882, 30 L.Ed.2d 163. Gaming 98(1)

Evidence in prosecution for violation of this section established beyond reasonable doubt that defendant at least facilitated promotion, management, or carrying on of business enterprise involving gambling at two specific locations and was sufficient to establish defendant's guilt. U. S. v. Harris, E.D.Va.1967, 275 F.Supp. 161, affirmed 399 F.2d 687. Gaming 98(1)

281. ---- Circumstantial evidence, weight and sufficiency of evidence, evidence and witnesses

Circumstantial evidence adduced in prosecution for conspiracy and violation of this section was sufficient to support jury's finding that defendant's interstate trip from Oklahoma City to St. Louis and back was in furtherance of criminal objectives to establish interstate prostitution ring. U. S. v. Barbieri, C.A.10 (Okla.) 1980, 614 F.2d 715. Commerce 82.6

Circumstantial evidence in prosecution under this section was sufficient to support finding that illegal activities took place with knowledge and consent of defendant. U. S. v. Eisner, C.A.6 (Ky.) 1976, 533 F.2d 987, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 314, 429 U.S. 919, 50 L.Ed.2d 286. Commerce 82.6

282. ---- Conspiracy, weight and sufficiency of evidence, evidence and witnesses

Evidence was sufficient to prove that first defendant crossed state lines in furtherance of single conspiracy to distribute marijuana with second defendant, and that killing of co-conspirator was in retaliation for actions within that same conspiracy, as supported convictions for violation of Travel Act resulting in death; defendants were responding to co-conspirator's misappropriation of funds, actions in question occurred in region in which conspiracy distributed drugs, killing was done at family residence of second defendant, and time frame was relat- ively short. U.S. v. Dinwiddie, C.A.8 (Mo.) 2010, 618 F.3d 821, rehearing and rehearing en banc denied , certiorari denied 131 S.Ct. 1547, 179 L.Ed.2d 357, certiorari denied 131 S.Ct. 1586, 179 L.Ed.2d 486. Commerce 82.10

Evidence, which established that defendant traveled from Chicago to New York City and back and that defendant's New York trip was in furtherance of illegal drug conspiracies and was not merely incidental travel and that defendant's return trip to Chicago was an act in furtherance of the alleged conspiracies, was sufficient to support convictions on interstate racketeering counts. U.S. v. Vanichromanee, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1984, 742 F.2d 340. Com- merce 82.6

Evidence was sufficient to support conviction of officer and sales manager of Puerto Rican company for conspiracy to commit arson, mail and wire fraud, for allegedly having conspired to insure company, planned successful destruction of company's warehouse by arson, and made separate interstate communications with insurance company as part of scheme. U. S. v. Benmuhar, C.A.1 (Puerto Rico) 1981, 658 F.2d 14, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 2927, 457 U.S. 1117, 73 L.Ed.2d 1328, rehearing denied 103 S.Ct. 16, 458 U.S. 1132, 73 L.Ed.2d

1402. Conspiracy 47(3.1); Postal Service 49(11); Telecommunications 1018(4)

Evidence in prosecution under this section sufficiently established that three defendants were united in plan or enterprise having as its object commission of unlawful prostitution offenses in Maine and that, in execution of conspiracy, interstate travel and use of interstate facilities was contemplated and in fact took place. U. S. v. Cor- an, C.A.1 (Mass.) 1978, 589 F.2d 70. Conspiracy 47(3.1)

Assuming that one who is acting as a government agent is incapable of being member of a criminal conspiracy, evidence as to defendant's conspiratorial conduct prior to time coconspirator became a government agent was sufficient to sustain conviction against him as a coconspirator in prosecution for conspiring to violate this section. U. S. v. Ryan, C.A.9 (Nev.) 1976, 548 F.2d 782, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 1644, 430 U.S. 965, 52 L.Ed.2d 356, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 354, 429 U.S. 939, 50 L.Ed.2d 308. Conspiracy 47(3.1)

Evidence that one defendant asked woman to prostitute herself and took her to Maryland where they were met by another defendant, who gave money to the first defendant and that the woman was then taken to house of ill repute where she was beaten by one defendant and began prostituting herself, with all monies being divided between two defendants and a third person, was sufficient to sustain defendants' convictions for conspiracy to violate this section. U. S. v. Harris, C.A.10 (Kan.) 1975, 534 F.2d 207, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 359, 429 U.S. 941, 50 L.Ed.2d 311. Conspiracy 47(3.1)

Evidence that defendant had a job in house of prostitution and on occasion caught money as it was thrown down the stairs by prostitutes after they had collected from customers was insufficient to bind defendant to conspiracy to engage in interstate prostitution activities. U. S. v. Prince, C.A.5 (Fla.) 1975, 515 F.2d 564. Conspiracy 47(3.1)

Sequence of events giving rise to reasonable inference that relationship between defendant and individual to whom defendant directed coindictee to give betting “lines” was more than that of bookie-customer was sufficient to support conviction of conspiring to violate provision of this section making it an offense to use facilities of interstate commerce to carry on unlawful activity, to wit, a bookmaking operation in violation of state law. U. S. v. Sellaro, C.A.8 (Mo.) 1973, 514 F.2d 114, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 2419, 421 U.S. 1013, 44 L.Ed.2d 681. Conspiracy 47(7)

Evidence in prosecution for conspiracy and for substantive violations of this section relating to interstate travel in aid of racketeering enterprises was sufficient to support finding that the parties had agreed to order gambling paraphernalia from Colorado for purpose of conducting bingo games in the state of Washington in violation of Washington anti-gambling law. U. S. v. Colacurcio, C.A.9 (Wash.) 1974, 499 F.2d 1401. Conspiracy 47(7) ; Gaming 98(1)

Substantial evidence supported finding that a conspiracy to engage in gambling operations contrary to Missouri law existed between defendant, codefendant, and others. U. S. v. Hanon, C.A.8 (Mo.) 1970, 428 F.2d 101, certiorari denied 91 S.Ct. 1608, 402 U.S. 952, 29 L.Ed.2d 122. Conspiracy 47(7)

Evidence in prosecution for conspiracy and related substantive instances of illicit interstate gambling sustained conviction on substantive counts, although each defendant contended that he was not present at times and places set forth in various substantive counts, there being evidence sufficient to establish conspiracy so as to impute defendants' separate wrongdoings to one another. U. S. v. McGowan, C.A.4 (Va.) 1970, 423 F.2d 413. Gaming 98(1)

Evidence, including disclosures of telephone calls made by defendants to alleged coconspirator concerning measures to enforce collection of a gambling debt, established that there was a conspiracy to collect the gambling debt from a person by placing him and his wife in fear, and that defendant knowingly participated in the conspiracy from the beginning. Collins v. U. S., C.A.10 (Kan.) 1967, 383 F.2d 296. Conspiracy 47(3.1)

Evidence to effect that defendant was manager and promoter of gambling casino and was fully aware of scope of illegal enterprise, including its interstate aspects arising from employees' travel from New Jersey to Pennsylvania, sustained conviction for conspiracy to violate this section. U. S. v. Barrow, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1966, 363 F.2d 62, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 703, 385 U.S. 1001, 17 L.Ed.2d 541. Conspiracy 47(7)

The evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for conspiracy to violate the Travel Act through an unlawful liquor operation; evidence establishing existence of an unregistered, unbonded still on property to which defendant held the title included evidence that agents could smell the distillery, records pertaining to purchase of sugar, the primary raw ingredient for the production of moonshine, and evidence that when the property was searched, the necessary elements needed to make and distribute liquor were discovered, as well as liquor itself and residue of fermented mash, and defendant's false and misleading statements to law enforcement agents and before the grand jury were evidence of her knowledge of the unlawful conspiracy. U.S. v. Smith, W.D.Va.2009, 623 F.Supp.2d 693, affirmed 456 Fed.Appx. 200, 2011 WL 6000561. Conspiracy 47(10)

283. ---- Intent, knowledge, or purpose, weight and sufficiency of evidence, evidence and witnesses

Evidence was insufficient to establish that defendant violated or agreed to violation of Travel Act, as predicate act of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violation, and thus, since there was evidence that defendant committed and agreed to commission of only one other predicate act, evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for substantive RICO violation or RICO conspiracy; member of defendant's motorcycle club testified that he, defendant, and club leader traveled in van from Indiana to Ohio so leader could attend meeting, and there was other testimony that club members regularly distributed drugs and discussed it at meetings, but there was no evidence that defendant traveled to Ohio with intent to promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate that illegal activity. U.S. v. Driver, C.A.6 (Ohio) 2008, 535 F.3d 424, certiorari denied 129 S.Ct. 662, 555 U.S. 1061, 172 L.Ed.2d 637. Commerce 82.10; Conspiracy 47(3.1)

Evidence was sufficient to support conviction for traveling in interstate commerce with intent to further a drug trafficking enterprise; trooper that stopped defendant's van testified that defendant told him that he had traveled from Texas to Tennessee in the days prior to the stop, evidence showed that defendant was aware of the 67 pounds of cocaine found in the van, and that such quantity could only have been intended for distribution. U.S. v. Patterson, C.A.10 (Okla.) 2006, 472 F.3d 767, vacated 129 S.Ct. 989, 555 U.S. 1131, 173 L.Ed.2d 283, on remand 561 F.3d 1170. Commerce 82.10

Evidence was sufficient to show in deportation proceeding that permanent resident alien had specific intent to violate Travel Act, where alien had pleaded guilty to charge that she violated Act, information had charged that alien had intention of distributing proceeds derived from unlawful distribution of narcotics and controlled substances, alien's petition to enter plea of guilty stated that she believed that her boyfriend was going to put money from narcotics in vehicle, and district court could not have entered judgment of guilt against alien without satisfying itself that there was factual basis for intent element. Johnson v. I.N.S., C.A.9 1992, 971 F.2d 340. Aliens, Immigration, And Citizenship 429

Defendant's Travel Act conviction was supported by evidence that he participated in drug conspiracy and that his involvement in interstate trip was intentional, despite claim that he did not have the intent to assist the conspiracy by making the trip. U.S. v. Broadwell, C.A.11 (Ga.) 1989, 870 F.2d 594, certiorari denied 110 S.Ct. 125, 493 U.S. 840, 107 L.Ed.2d 85, dismissal of habeas corpus affirmed 97 F.3d 1451. Commerce 82.6

Evidence, showing more than an isolated, sporadic drug transaction, supported finding that defendant had specific intent to promote business enterprise involving narcotics or controlled substances and, thus, supported conviction under Travel Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1952(a)(3). U.S. v. Gallo, C.A.4 (W.Va.) 1986, 782 F.2d 1191. Com- merce 82.10

Evidence of telephone call by which payoff in extortion scheme was prearranged for “next time” defendant went to Washington was sufficient to prove that defendant's trip to Washington occurring shortly after call was intended to facilitate or carry on unlawful extortion in violation of this section. U. S. v. Graham, C.A.9 (Wash.) 1978, 581 F.2d 789. Extortion 22

Evidence, including evidence that sole purpose of defendant's travel from Illinois to Wisconsin was to introduce an Illinois bookmaker to a Wisconsin sporting goods store owner for purpose of establishing or promoting unlawful activity, i.e., interstate transmission of wagering information, was sufficient to support conviction of violation of this section. U. S. v. Anderson, C.A.7 (Wis.) 1976, 542 F.2d 428. Gaming 98(1)

Mere fact that defendant denied any knowledge of illegal gambling scheme did not preclude jury's finding that he had requisite intent and had knowingly participated in the scheme. U. S. v. Morris, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1976, 532 F.2d 436. Gaming 101

In prosecution for interstate travel with the intent to promote, manage, establish and carry on an unlawful activity, viz., a business enterprise involving gambling in violation of the laws of the state in which committed, the evidence introduced by the government on the issue of intent was sufficient to show the professional nature with which defendants approached the gambling activity, for the purpose of meeting this section's requirement of participation in gambling as a “business enterprise.” U. S. v. Lisner, C.A.5 (Fla.) 1975, 524 F.2d 1263. Gaming 98(1)

Evidence in prosecution for violation of this section prohibiting use of mail to carry on any unlawful activity established that defendants who caused dice to be shipped from Las Vegas to Gulfport intended to promote and

manage the unlawful activity of gambling in Mississippi. U. S. v. Hedge, C.A.5 (Miss.) 1972, 462 F.2d 220. Gaming 98(1)

In prosecution for conspiring to travel in interstate commerce with intent to carry on unlawful activity involving extortion, evidence was sufficient to show that one of the defendants knew that to commit the extortion he, or others, would have to travel in interstate commerce and was sufficient to show that this defendant had, beyond a reasonable doubt, both knowledge and intent necessary to commit the crime. U. S. v. Fellabaum, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1969, 408 F.2d 220, certiorari denied 90 S.Ct. 125, 396 U.S. 858, 24 L.Ed.2d 109, certiorari denied 90 S.Ct. 55, 396 U.S. 818, 24 L.Ed.2d 69. Conspiracy 47(3.1)

Evidence was sufficient to support finding that deposit by member of zoning board of check received from another member of zoning board who, with depositor, had voted favorably on application for re-zoning by payers of bribe was made with requisite intent to violate subsec. (a)(3) of this section. U. S. v. Wechsler, C.A.4 (Va.) 1968, 392 F.2d 344, certiorari denied 88 S.Ct. 2283, 392 U.S. 932, 20 L.Ed.2d 1389, rehearing denied 89 S.Ct. 71, 393 U.S. 902, 21 L.Ed.2d 191, rehearing denied 408 F.2d 1184, certiorari denied 89 S.Ct. 2130, 395 U.S. 978, 23 L.Ed.2d 766, certiorari denied 89 S.Ct. 2131, 395 U.S. 978, 23 L.Ed.2d 766, rehearing denied 90 S.Ct. 40, 396 U.S. 870, 24 L.Ed.2d 126, certiorari denied 89 S.Ct. 2150, 395 U.S. 984, 23 L.Ed.2d 773. Bribery 11

Evidence established element of intent on part of defendant to violate this section by transporting females interstate from Alabama to Tennessee for purpose of prostitution. U. S. v. Blackburn, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1968, 389 F.2d 93. Prostitution 28

Evidence supported finding that defendant who engaged in various gambling operations possessed, at time of his interstate travel, necessary intent to manage or facilitate gambling business in violation of this section. U. S. v. Compton, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1966, 355 F.2d 872, certiorari denied 86 S.Ct. 1571, 384 U.S. 951, 16 L.Ed.2d 548. Gaming 98(1)

284. ---- Interstate or foreign travel, weight and sufficiency of evidence, evidence and witnesses

Evidence was sufficient to support defendants' convictions for interstate travel in aid of a racketeering enterprise; defendants and a girlfriend traveled from San Diego to Kansas City, girlfriend testified to seeing a large quantity of methamphetamine in their home in San Diego prior to trip, and said defendant became upset when she took some of the methamphetamine, saying it had to be a certain amount, and police officers saw defendants leave Kansas City residence that was subject of drug trafficking investigation with occupants of residence after informant told police a methamphetamine shipment had just arrived. U.S. v. Castro-Gaxiola, C.A.8 (Mo.) 2007, 479 F.3d 579, certiorari denied 128 S.Ct. 430, 552 U.S. 971, 169 L.Ed.2d 301, post-conviction relief denied 665 F.Supp.2d 1049. Commerce 82.10

Defendant's conviction for violation of Travel Act was supported by evidence that he went from Arkansas to Iowa to meet with employee of company which held contract with Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) to sell property and that he offered to pay that person $50,000 in order to arrange for defendant's purchase of property.

U.S. v. Patel, C.A.8 (Iowa) 1994, 32 F.3d 340. Commerce 82.10

Convictions under Travel Act arising from attorney's bribery of state court judge were not invalid on ground that government improperly manufactured Act jurisdiction due to undercover FBI agent pretending to be client in case travelling to Chicago to attend hearing before judge; agent's participation was necessary because he had been involved in similar operations and because it was important to use agent who would not be recognized in Chicago legal circles and defendant who bribed judge insisted that client cross state lines. U.S. v. Shields, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1993, 999 F.2d 1090, rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc denied, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 877, 510 U.S. 1071, 127 L.Ed.2d 74, denial of post-conviction relief affirmed 30 F.3d 137, certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 515, 513 U.S. 1002, 130 L.Ed.2d 421. Criminal Law 36.6

Evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction for interstate travel in aid of racketeering, in light of evidence that defendants traveled in interstate commerce with intent to bomb a gay bar. U.S. v. Winslow, C.A.9 (Idaho) 1992, 962 F.2d 845, as amended. Commerce 82.10

Evidence that defendant twice transported conspirator across state lines and that on one trip conspirator delivered cash payment to representative of conspiracy's drug supplier was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of interstate travel in aid of racketeering in violation of Travel Act; trips were not isolated incidents, but were part of continuous course of conduct, an ongoing drug distribution enterprise, as required by Travel Act. U.S. v. Brown, C.A.8 (Mo.) 1992, 956 F.2d 782. Commerce 82.10

Evidence was sufficient to support conviction for traveling in interstate commerce in aid and promotion of drug offenses in violation of the Travel Act; testimony demonstrated that defendant arranged for interstate transportation of chemicals and laboratory supplies to be used in manufacture of amphetamine. U.S. v. Dorrough, C.A.10 (Okla.) 1991, 927 F.2d 498, denial of habeas corpus affirmed in part, reversed in part 46 F.3d 1150, denial of post-conviction relief affirmed 201 F.3d 449. Commerce 82.10

Evidence that defendant wired substantial sum of money to coconspirator in Arizona then traveled to Arizona with another coconspirator, who allegedly picked up shipment of marijuana there, was sufficient to support Travel Act conviction, despite defendant's claim that she took trip solely for recreational purposes. U.S. v. Atter- son, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1991, 926 F.2d 649, certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 2909, 501 U.S. 1259, 115 L.Ed.2d 1072. Com- merce 82.10

Evidence that, when coconspirators were unsuccessful in establishing California source for cocaine, they per- suaded defendant to fly to Los Angeles and that defendant's intervention resulted in coconspirators obtaining required supply of cocaine for continuing large scale operation in St. Louis area was sufficient to establish that defendant traveled in interstate commerce to promote or facilitate promotion of unlawful activity, and thus was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of violating the Travel Act. U.S. v. Hoelscher, C.A.8 (Mo.) 1990, 914 F.2d 1527, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 971, 498 U.S. 1090, 112 L.Ed.2d 1057, rehearing denied 111 S.Ct. 1609, 499 U.S. 970, 113 L.Ed.2d 671, certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 2240, 500 U.S. 943, 114 L.Ed.2d 482. Commerce 82.10

Determination that Ohio car dealer knew about essential objectives of Florida-based drug trafficking conspiracy and knowingly joined conspiracy was supported by sufficient evidence showing that dealer sold at least 11 automobiles that were located in Florida and “flipped” titles on cars so that they would display Ohio tags, that dealer provided false addresses on registration forms and falsified odometer statements, that dealer divided cash payments in order to avoid currency transaction reporting requirements, and that dealer knew that Customs had seized first vehicle she had sold from chop shop where vehicle was being modified to better transport drugs. U.S. v. Frink, C.A.11 (Ga.) 1990, 912 F.2d 1413, rehearing denied 921 F.2d 283. Conspiracy 47(12)

Evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant engaged in interstate travel for purpose of carrying on various illegal activities involved in narcotics conspiracy, thus supporting conviction under Travel Act. U.S. v. Peveto, C.A.10 (Okla.) 1989, 881 F.2d 844, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 110 S.Ct. 348, 493 U.S. 943, 107 L.Ed.2d 336, denial of post-conviction relief affirmed 971 F.2d 506. Commerce 82.10

Evidence in prosecution for violating the Travel Act by traveling in interstate commerce to promote cocaine conspiracy was sufficient to sustain conviction; documents found in defendant's possession upon his arrival at Dallas-Fort Worth airport, together with coconspirator testimony that defendant was responsible for arrangements outside the United States, indicated that his trip from Mexico to Dallas was for purpose of promoting the conspiracy. U.S. v. Fortna, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1986, 796 F.2d 724, certiorari denied 107 S.Ct. 437, 479 U.S. 950, 93 L.Ed.2d 386. Commerce 82.10

Evidence was sufficient to establish illegal business enterprise or continuous course of conduct by defendant who involved in previous drug deal, who was deeply involved in present deal to supply cocaine, and who wanted to be included in future drug trafficking and, therefore, to support conviction for traveling in interstate commerce to promote cocaine distribution conspiracy. U.S. v. Spector, C.A.8 (Mo.) 1986, 793 F.2d 932, certiorari denied 107 S.Ct. 876, 479 U.S. 1031, 93 L.Ed.2d 830, post-conviction relief denied 888 F.2d 583. Commerce 82.10

Evidence that defendant, an assistant vice-president of a bank, had been told that money to be invested at investment firm to which defendant referred client was probably drug proceeds and that defendant responded that he did not care about origin of funds was sufficient to establish that defendant either knew that money would come from drug sales or that he was deliberately indifferent to source of funds, and thus was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of conspiracy to violate the Travel Act, which prohibits transfer in commerce of proceeds of illegal activities. U.S. v. Sanchez, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1986, 790 F.2d 1561. Conspiracy 47(3.1)

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction under Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organization Act and Travel Act; evidence established defendant was member of RICO enterprise and possessed common purpose with other codefendants, and that defendant caused and aided and abetted travel of coconspirator in interstate travel in order to send coconspirator large amounts of methamphetamine for redistribution. U.S. v. Schell, C.A.4 (W.Va.) 1985, 775 F.2d 559, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 1498, 475 U.S. 1098, 89 L.Ed.2d 898. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 95

Causing legitimate business friend to travel from one state to another, allegedly to promote defendant's drug op-

eration by buying friend dinner in hopes of obtaining favorable treatment for defendant's family business, did not establish violation of Travel Act, where evidence failed to establish that defendant caused interstate travel with intent to promote illegal activity. U.S. v. Markowski, C.A.7 (Ind.) 1985, 772 F.2d 358, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 1202, 475 U.S. 1018, 89 L.Ed.2d 316. Commerce 82.10

Evidence was sufficient to sustain jury finding that marijuana transaction played a part in defendant's decision to travel from Memphis to Dallas, and thus sustained his conviction under the Travel Act [18 U.S.C.A. § 1952]. U.S. v. Stanley, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1985, 765 F.2d 1224, rehearing denied 772 F.2d 904. Commerce 82.10

Travel Act conviction was supported by evidence that defendant actually participated in interstate travel for a drug enterprise on at least two occasions, that he was a regular distributor in narcotics operation and that he played a very substantial role as a protector and enforcer of the enterprise. U.S. v. Gallo, C.A.6 (Ohio) 1985, 763 F.2d 1504, on rehearing in part 774 F.2d 106, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 1200, 475 U.S. 1017, 89 L.Ed.2d 314, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 826, 474 U.S. 1068, 88 L.Ed.2d 798, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 828, 474 U.S. 1069, 88 L.Ed.2d 800. Commerce 82.10

Evidence, including proof that defendant procured house in Florida and directed another person to accompany him from Missouri to Florida for stated purpose of acquiring marijuana, and that, during defendant's stay in Florida, person in question and others distributed over 7,000 pounds of marijuana from house in Florida, supported jury's verdict that defendant violated this section. U.S. v. Becton, C.A.8 (Mo.) 1984, 751 F.2d 250, certiorari denied 105 S.Ct. 3480, 472 U.S. 1018, 87 L.Ed.2d 615. Commerce 82.10

Testimony by government witness that he had been told by the defendant that the defendant left from Florida on a trip to recover some marijuana on a grounded vessel and that the vessel was grounded at Bimini was sufficient to show that the defendant traveled in foreign commerce and thus sufficient to support his conviction for violation of this section. U. S. v. Phillips, C.A.5 (Fla.) 1981, 664 F.2d 971, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 2965, 457 U.S. 1136, 73 L.Ed.2d 1354, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 208, 459 U.S. 906, 74 L.Ed.2d 166. Commerce 82.6

In view of testimony of participant in bribery scheme that he was induced to travel in interstate commerce by desire to participate in the scheme, jury had substantial evidence to support conclusion that activities of defendant, a former county judge, in fact caused interstate travel, and thus evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions for violating this section. U. S. v. Clark, C.A.8 (Ark.) 1981, 646 F.2d 1259. Bribery 11

In prosecution for traveling interstate to promote illegal abortion scheme and gambling or lottery, evidence, including motel registration, established the element of interstate travel. U. S. v. Bartello, C.A.10 (Kan.) 1970, 432 F.2d 1030. Commerce 82.10

Evidence authorized finding that defendant, on dates relevant to four of six counts, drove his automobile across state lines to promote gambling enterprise in violation of state law. U. S. v. Izzi, C.A.7 (Ind.) 1967, 385 F.2d 412. Gaming 98(1)

Evidence was sufficient to support finding that defendant concocted and began to execute his corrupt scheme to bribe his co-defendant and a Puerto Rican official well before interstate travel that promoted that scheme took place or predicate Puerto Rico bribery laws were repealed, as required to support conviction for interstate travel in aid of racketeering with an intent to commit bribery in violation of Puerto Rico law; government witness testified that, prior to the repeal of the predicate laws, defendant went to co-defendant's Senate office to present two bills which he supported, and that defendant, co-defendant, and the official later discussed a planned trip. U.S. v. Bravo-Fernandez, D.Puerto Rico 2011, 828 F.Supp.2d 441, reversed in part , vacated in part 722 F.3d 1. Com- merce 82.60; Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 2

285. ---- Use of facility in commerce, weight and sufficiency of evidence, evidence and witnesses

Extortion by police officer, who arranged to release motorist in exchange for money that motorist withdrew from automatic teller machine (ATM), was sufficiently linked to interstate commerce to support officer's conviction under the Travel Act, even though the actual ATM transaction involved two intrastate banks, where ATM was part of interstate network of ATMs, and use of the interstate ATM network was not merely incidental to officer's unlawful activity in that the officer's extortion could only be accomplished at 2:22 a.m. by having motorist access an interstate ATM facility. U.S. v. Baker, C.A.8 (Mo.) 1996, 82 F.3d 273, rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc denied, certiorari denied 117 S.Ct. 538, 519 U.S. 1020, 136 L.Ed.2d 423. Commerce 82.6; Extortion 24(3)

There was sufficient evidence that defendant, after using the mails, committed acts in furtherance of bribing radio station employees to add records to their play lists so as to support “subsequent act” element of Travel Act; there was evidence that defendant called program director for radio station after mailing money in order to give him information about new adds to play list for following week and program director testified that money from defendant influenced his decision to use defendant's promotional list. U.S. v. Goodman, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1991, 945 F.2d 125. Commerce 82.10

Testimony of widespread use of scratch sheets by betting patrons as well as by defendant operators of bookmaking establishment and their employees, importance of early arrival of sheets, drastic decrease in number of sheets sent to location after the bookmaking operations were shut down and clandestine method by which each defendant obtained the sheets without directly subscribing to the publication by sending emissary to railroad station to extract copies and leave money, constituted substantial evidence from which jury could determine that defendants caused use of interstate facility in violation of this section. U. S. v. Erlenbaugh, C.A.7 (Ind.) 1971, 452 F.2d 967, certiorari granted 92 S.Ct. 1194, 405 U.S. 973, 31 L.Ed.2d 247, affirmed 93 S.Ct. 477, 409 U.S. 239, 34 L.Ed.2d 446. Gaming 98(1)

286. Expert witnesses, evidence and witnesses

Permitting Federal Bureau of Investigation agent to be used as expert witness for purpose of informing jury of method of operation of bookmakers and to define various terms used by bookmakers in carrying out out their operations was not abuse of discretion in view of fact that agent had attended three special schools conducted by Bureau for purpose of studying gambling and related matters and had worked in area for Bureau for eight years, notwithstanding that none of schools was taught by bookie or that agent had never placed a bet with a bookie. U.

S. v. Sellaro, C.A.8 (Mo.) 1973, 514 F.2d 114, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 2419, 421 U.S. 1013, 44 L.Ed.2d 681. Criminal Law 478(1)

Federal Bureau of Investigation agent's competency to testify as to mechanics of how numbers game operates was established through fact that he had twenty years experience with the Bureau and had done considerable investigative work on lottery operations including one year devoted almost exclusively thereto. Moore v. U. S., C.A.5 (Ga.) 1968, 394 F.2d 818, certiorari denied 89 S.Ct. 641, 393 U.S. 1030, 21 L.Ed.2d 573. Criminal Law 478(1)

287. Cross-examination of witnesses, evidence and witnesses

Prosecution witness' direct testimony that he had used laundered money for bribes was not required to be stricken when witness successfully asserted privilege U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5 on cross-examination as to names of those bribed as refusal to name bribe recipients did not hinder defense ability to test reliability of witness' direct examination and government did not have to prove an act of commercial bribery to obtain a conviction under this section and section 2314 of this title, and purpose of question was to undermine witness' credibility and such was otherwise adequately attacked. U.S. v. Gullett, C.A.6 (Mich.) 1983, 713 F.2d 1203, certiorari denied 104 S.Ct. 973, 464 U.S. 1069, 79 L.Ed.2d 211. Criminal Law 696(3); Witnesses 309

In absence of showing of overriding prejudice or remoteness, prosecuting attorney in prosecution under this section arising out of alleged bribery by attorney of village officials was properly permitted to cross-examine defendant as to allegations of other payoffs of public officials which supposedly took place two years after transaction in question. U. S. v. Peskin, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1975, 527 F.2d 71, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 63, 429 U.S. 818, 50 L.Ed.2d 79. Witnesses 337(4)

In prosecution for violation of this section, permitting prosecution to cross-examine two defendants on their reputation was well within trial court's wide discretion in controlling cross-examination and in balancing its probative value against possible prejudice since, as to first defendant, general nature of his “problem” in relation to obtaining Nevada gambling license was directly relevant, and where prejudicial Mafia connection was volun- teered by first defendant, while, as to second defendant, the reason that second defendant could not be licensed was not admissible merely to impeach second defendant or his attorney, but was directly relevant to guilt of second defendant. U. S. v. Polizzi, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1974, 500 F.2d 856, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 802, 419 U.S. 1120, 42 L.Ed.2d 820, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 803, 419 U.S. 1120, 42 L.Ed.2d 820. Witnesses 349

In prosecution for offenses including conspiracy to violate gambling or lottery laws of Kansas, trial court did not clearly abuse discretion in refusing to place limitation on extent to which defendant, who had one prior conviction of record, which was for conspiracy to violate gambling laws of Michigan, could be cross-examined relative to his criminal record in event he took stand. U. S. v. Bartello, C.A.10 (Kan.) 1970, 432 F.2d 1030. Witnesses 350

Questions asked of defendant on cross-examination which referred to named person who had not been mentioned in defendant's direct testimony nor referred to in early testimony in a way which would justify manner in

which such name was suddenly thrust into trial were within permissible scope of cross-examination in context of defendant's prior employment by such named person, in prosecution for gambling violations. U.S. v. Chase, C.A.4 (Va.) 1967, 372 F.2d 453, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 1688, 387 U.S. 907, 18 L.Ed.2d 626, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 1701, 387 U.S. 913, 18 L.Ed.2d 635. Witnesses 277(4)

Ruling that cross examination testimony of defendant, charged with traveling in interstate commerce with intent to promote, manage, and establish gambling business, in answer to question concerning operation of a club by defendant's brother was admissible as possibly bearing on question of intent did not constitute abuse of discretion. U. S. v. Compton, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1966, 365 F.2d 1, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 391, 385 U.S. 956, 17 L.Ed.2d 303. Gaming 97(1)

Refusal to allow witness to answer question, in prosecution for violation of this section as to whether odds at dice for or against the player are the same in any legitimate gambling house within a few percentage points at any particular place, was proper where question assumed the existence of a legitimate gambling activity when legitimacy or illegitimacy of defendant's enterprise was one of the important features of the case and where all evidence previously introduced tended to show illegitimacy rather than legitimacy. U. S. v. Gerhart, S.D.W.Va.1967, 275 F.Supp. 443. Witnesses 237(3)

Cross-examination of defendant as to specific instances of alleged solicitation from persons doing business or seeking to do business with city was not prejudicial, where defendant denied that he had done so and court ruled that government's counsel would not be permitted to go into such collateral matters on rebuttal sustained objection to further questioning along that line, ordered that questions and answers already given be stricken and instructed jury to ignore them. U. S. v. Kubacki, E.D.Pa.1965, 237 F.Supp. 638. Criminal Law 919(2)

288. Physical or mental examination of witnesses, evidence and witnesses

In prosecution for violations of this section and perjury, inasmuch as witness' testimony was corroborated by other witnesses or by documents, there was no abuse of discretion in trial court's denying defendant's request to compel psychiatric examination of witness. U. S. v. Raineri, C.A.7 (Wis.) 1982, 670 F.2d 702, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 446, 459 U.S. 1035, 74 L.Ed.2d 601. Witnesses 77

VII. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE

Authentication 311 Business records 319 Conspiracy 330 Course of conduct 334 Cumulative evidence 312 Hearsay 313 Identification of defendant 331

Illegally seized evidence 320 Impeachment of defendant 332 Informer's testimony 321 Intent 333 Knowledge and intent 333 Materiality of evidence 314 Miscellaneous evidence admissible 336 Miscellaneous evidence inadmissible 337 Motive 315 Other acts or transactions 328 Pattern, scheme, or course of conduct 334 Photographs 322 Prior crimes or convictions 323 Prior statements 324 Privileged information 325 Probity of evidence 316 Records and tapes 326 Redundancy of evidence 317 Relevancy of evidence 318 Scheme 334 Silence 327 Tainted evidence 329 Time of ruling 335

311. Authentication, admissibility of evidence

In prosecution for use of interstate facilities of telegraph company to carry on business enterprise involving gambling offenses under laws of Indiana, ticker tape machine and blackboard with inscriptions appearing there- on were properly admitted where ticker was unquestionably that which was seized on defendant's premises and agent testified that blackboard was in same condition at trial as it was when he purchased “baseball tickets” at defendant's establishment. U.S. v. Lookretis, C.A.7 (Ind.) 1970, 422 F.2d 647, certiorari denied 90 S.Ct. 1693, 398 U.S. 904, 26 L.Ed.2d 63. Criminal Law 404.50

312. Cumulative evidence, admissibility of evidence

Any error resulting from district court's admission of packing slip obtained from defendant's pants pocket during officer's search of his person was harmless, in prosecution for drug conspiracy that resulted in murder; packing slip and statements that defendant made after search merely supported existence of drug conspiracy, the evidence of which was overwhelming. U.S. v. Dinwiddie, C.A.8 (Mo.) 2010, 618 F.3d 821, rehearing and rehearing en banc denied , certiorari denied 131 S.Ct. 1547, 179 L.Ed.2d 357, certiorari denied 131 S.Ct. 1586, 179 L.Ed.2d 486. Criminal Law 1169.1(8)

Introduction of pistol and notebook of defendant accused of violating this section by traveling by motor vehicle from St. Louis, Missouri to Nashville, Tennessee with intention of carrying on prostitution in violation of Ten- nessee law and of transporting females interstate from Alabama to Tennessee for purpose of prostitution was

merely cumulative testimony as to facts which were supported by substantial, uncontroverted, extraneous evidence, and introduction of these items, without their having been secured by search warrant was not prejudicial to defendant and did not affect his substantial rights and was harmless. U. S. v. Blackburn, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1968, 389 F.2d 93. Criminal Law 1169.1(8)

313. Hearsay, admissibility of evidence

Co-conspirator's statement to two accomplices during drug run that co-defendant had taken 25 pounds of marijuana from him and that he was displeased with co-defendant was statement by co-conspirator during course and in furtherance of conspiracy, and thus statement was not hearsay and was admissible in defendant's prosecution for drug conspiracy that resulted in murder of co-conspirator; statement was introduced to illuminate dispute between co-defendant and co-conspirator, not to prove that co-defendant actually stole marijuana from coconspirator or that co-conspirator was actually unhappy with co-defendant. U.S. v. Dinwiddie, C.A.8 (Mo.) 2010, 618 F.3d 821, rehearing and rehearing en banc denied , certiorari denied 131 S.Ct. 1547, 179 L.Ed.2d 357, certiorari denied 131 S.Ct. 1586, 179 L.Ed.2d 486. Criminal Law 423(3)

Record, in prosecution for conspiracy to violate this section and section 1084 of this title which prohibits the use of interstate wire and telephone facilities to carry on illegal gambling operations and substantive violation of those provisions established that there was sufficient independent evidence of the existence of a conspiracy to which one defendant was party to warrant the introduction of hearsay coconspirators' conversations against him under the exception to the hearsay rule which applies to statements made by coconspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy. U. S. v. Doolittle, C.A.5 (Ga.) 1975, 507 F.2d 1368, on reconsideration 518 F.2d 500, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 1172, 430 U.S. 905, 51 L.Ed.2d 580, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 1173, 430 U.S. 905, 51 L.Ed.2d 580, certiorari dismissed 96 S.Ct. 439, 423 U.S. 1008, 46 L.Ed.2d 380. Criminal Law 427(5)

Testimony of agents, in prosecution for conspiracy and for using interstate telephone facilities to carry on a gambling operation, as to what was said on telephone by party on whom agents were eavesdropping, was not admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule on grounds that declarations made in furtherance of an illegal joint venture are admissible against the other partners in crime, where defendant was acquitted of conspiracy charge, where no independent evidence established prima facie an illegal joint venture, and where testimony of agents was the basic element in the circumstantial evidence against defendant, so that its prejudicial effect on the substantive charge was unmistakable. U.S. v. Lucido, C.A.6 (Mich.) 1973, 486 F.2d 868. Criminal Law 427(2)

In prosecution for conspiracy to violate this section and two substantive violations on ground that defendant city councilman, mayor and another councilman had accepted bribes from corporation and its president, grand jury testimony of president that he had paid sum only because mayor had threatened him with loss of corporation's contract rights and that his conversations had been with mayor alone and had not included defendant was not against president's penal and pecuniary interest, within exception to hearsay rule, and was not admissible to show that defendant was not present when bribe was arranged. U. S. v. McKee, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1972, 462 F.2d 275. Criminal Law 405.18(2); Criminal Law 539(1)

In view of the independent, nonhearsay admissions with respect to various defendants charged with conspiracy to violate this section, there was sufficient independent proof of the existence, scope and membership of con-

spiracy to admit testimony of government informer as to extrajudicial declarations and acts of defendants. U. S. v. Cerone, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1971, 452 F.2d 274, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 1168, 405 U.S. 964, 31 L.Ed.2d 240, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 1169, 405 U.S. 964, 31 L.Ed.2d 240. Criminal Law 427(5)

In prosecution for conspiracy to use and actual use of facilities in interstate commerce to carry on an unlawful gambling business, evidence consisting of federal wagering tax stamp filings of an alleged coconspirator, where there was evidence tending to show continuing interstate telephone communications between defendant's place of business and that of coconspirator, together with evidence that wagering activities were carried on contemporaneously at both places, was not objectionable hearsay and was competent to prove conspiracy, subject to right of confrontation and cross-examination. Nolan v. U. S., C.A.10 (Okla.) 1969, 423 F.2d 1031, certiorari denied 91 S.Ct. 47, 400 U.S. 848, 27 L.Ed.2d 85. Criminal Law 422(1)

Federal Bureau of Investigation agent's testimony as to mechanics of how numbers game operates was not subject to objection that part of his knowledge had been acquired through what others told him and was therefore hearsay. Moore v. U. S., C.A.5 (Ga.) 1968, 394 F.2d 818, certiorari denied 89 S.Ct. 641, 393 U.S. 1030, 21 L.Ed.2d 573. Criminal Law 419(1.5)

314. Materiality of evidence, admissibility of evidence

Though cardboard box containing cocaine may have been cumulative evidence supportive of defendant's defense that he was unaware of the box' contents, box was not so material that its destruction would have denied a fair trial to defendant, who had entered a conditional guilty plea to charges of possession with intent to distribute cocaine and interstate travel in aid of racketeering. U.S. v. Obregon, C.A.10 (N.M.) 1984, 748 F.2d 1371. Criminal Law 2011

Request that government's principal witness, in prosecution for use of interstate telephone line for promotion and carrying on of prostitution and thereafter attempting to perform promotion and carrying on of prostitution in violation of Nevada law, name the person who first put witness in contact with government agents was not inev- itably and patently material, and sustaining of objection to the question without prejudice to pursuit of the line of inquiry upon demonstration of materiality was not error. Raymond v. U. S., C.A.9 (Cal.) 1967, 376 F.2d 581, certiorari denied 88 S.Ct. 221, 389 U.S. 898, 19 L.Ed.2d 220. Criminal Law 627.10(2.1)

315. Motive, admissibility of evidence

In prosecution for conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute, testimony concerning conversation between witness and defendant concerning an aircraft that defendant owned and that had been seized in Mexico was admissible prior acts evidence under Federal Evidence Rule 404(b) as relevant to show defendant's motive and lack of mistake or accident, and the evidence was not prejudicial so as to bar its admission under Federal Evidence Rule 403. U.S. v. Kendall, C.A.10 (Okla.) 1985, 766 F.2d 1426, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 848, 474 U.S. 1081, 88 L.Ed.2d 889. Criminal Law 371.5; Criminal Law 371.6; Criminal Law 372.6

316. Probity of evidence, admissibility of evidence

Probative value of evidence that coconspirator had not been charged with extortion was outweighed by prejudicial effect in prosecution for conspiracy to violate Travel Act in which defendant claimed that he was victim of coconspirator's extortion; Government's decision not to charge coconspirator with extortion had only slight probative value on question of whether extortion actually occurred, and prejudiced defendant's extortion defense. U.S. v. Werme, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1991, 939 F.2d 108, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 1165, 502 U.S. 1092, 117 L.Ed.2d 412. Criminal Law 338(7)

Evidence, offered to establish extortion defense in prosecution under this section arising from alleged bribery of municipal officials in connection with grant of cable television franchise, purporting to show that mayor was corrupt was clearly collateral and of doubtful probative value where there was no clear link between mayor and person whose “collections” were subject of offered proof, and exclusion of such evidence was not abuse of discretion. U. S. v. Kahn, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1973, 472 F.2d 272, certiorari denied 93 S.Ct. 2270, 411 U.S. 982, 36 L.Ed.2d 958. Criminal Law 338(1)

Remoteness of time and place of previous gambling activity were matters going to weight rather than to the admissibility of such evidence in a prosecution for interstate travel in aid of racketeering. Spinelli v. U. S., C.A.8 (Mo.) 1967, 382 F.2d 871, certiorari granted 88 S.Ct. 1025, 390 U.S. 942, 19 L.Ed.2d 1130, modified 88 S.Ct. 1834, 391 U.S. 933, 20 L.Ed.2d 853, reversed on other grounds 89 S.Ct. 584, 393 U.S. 410, 21 L.Ed.2d 637. Gaming 97(1)

317. Redundancy of evidence, admissibility of evidence

In prosecution under this section, trial court, by striking redundant characterization of defendant's belief as “honest” did not unduly prejudice presentation of his defense. U. S. v. Raineri, C.A.7 (Wis.) 1982, 670 F.2d 702, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 446, 459 U.S. 1035, 74 L.Ed.2d 601. Criminal Law 655(1)

318. Relevancy of evidence, admissibility of evidence

Defendant's underling's testimony that defendant pointed to open field in which they were standing and stated “There's plenty of room out here, you know, for people to disappear and be buried and have lime thrown on top of their bodies” was relevant to prove existence of conspiracy, and district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting such evidence where defendant denied that any illegal drug enterprise existed and accused ex- employees of lying, and testimony about death threats showed lengths to which defendant would go in order to protect secrecy of his enterprise and tended to undercut defendant's credibility as witness. U.S. v. Markowski, C.A.7 (Ind.) 1985, 772 F.2d 358, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 1202, 475 U.S. 1018, 89 L.Ed.2d 316. Conspiracy 45; Witnesses 344(2)

In prosecution of attorney under this section for alleged bribery of village officials in effort to obtain favorable rezoning on behalf of land development company, trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding, as being of only marginal relevance to defendant's so-called extortion defense, proof that developer's project compared favorably to similar developments approved by village. U. S. v. Peskin, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1975, 527 F.2d 71, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 63, 429 U.S. 818, 50 L.Ed.2d 79. Bribery 10

Victims' testimony concerning what codefendant, who organized extortionate gambling scheme, said or did was relevant and was properly admitted in evidence in the trial against remaining defendants. U. S. v. Burke, C.A.5 (Fla.) 1974, 495 F.2d 1226, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 667, 419 U.S. 1079, 42 L.Ed.2d 673. Extortion 37

Evidence that eight other stolen vehicles in addition to one named in indictment had been stolen and delivered to purchasers was relevant in proving defendants' motive and intent in conspiring to cross interstate lines to extort payment for such automobiles from purchasers, and where jury was informed by stipulation that particular defendant had been imprisoned during period in which some of eight vehicles were stolen, he was not prejudiced by prosecutor's opening statement concerning theft of eight vehicles. U. S. v. Romano, C.A.5 (Ga.) 1973, 482 F.2d 1183, stay denied 94 S.Ct. 293, 414 U.S. 971, 38 L.Ed.2d 216, certiorari denied 94 S.Ct. 866, 414 U.S. 1129, 38 L.Ed.2d 753. Criminal Law 2069

Permitting witnesses to testify that during gambling episodes defendants cheated was not prejudicial in prosecution for traveling in interstate commerce with intent to participate in illegal gambling, since when tied in with testimony that during transaction set forth in indictment defendants never bet against each other and always bet against another and his friend, testimony was relevant to show that defendants were professional gamblers and that incident in indictment was just a typical episode in their larger effort to make a livelihood from illegal gambling throughout the country. U. S. v. Pauldino, C.A.10 (Colo.) 1971, 443 F.2d 1108, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 204, 404 U.S. 882, 30 L.Ed.2d 163, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 212, 404 U.S. 882, 30 L.Ed.2d 163. Criminal Law 338(7)

Gun carried by defendant on airline flight from Indianapolis to St. Louis where his companion was to receive money from extortion victim was relevant and competent as probative element on question of intent involved in making the interstate trip to St. Louis and was properly admitted in prosecution for conspiring to make interstate trip to consummate extortion. U. S. v. Phillips, C.A.8 (Mo.) 1970, 433 F.2d 1364, certiorari denied 91 S.Ct. 900, 401 U.S. 917, 27 L.Ed.2d 819. Criminal Law 404.65

In prosecution for traveling interstate to promote illegal activities and for conspiracy, testimony that witness was told by another conspirator that particular defendant's uncle was lieutenant in specified organization in Detroit was relevant to part which such defendant was to play and statement was apparent reference to his qualifica- tions, and in absence of indication that statement was untrue and in view of admonitions to jury, testimony was properly admitted. U. S. v. Bartello, C.A.10 (Kan.) 1970, 432 F.2d 1030. Criminal Law 422(1)

Evidence of gambling which took place at a different location in a city in question some seven months prior to date of defendant's arrest was not too remote to be admissible in prosecution for interstate travel in aid of racketeering in view of fact prior connection of defendant to gambling activity conducted elsewhere tended to prove lack of innocent purpose in his venture at time of arrest, and tended to prove that he was involved in a continuing business enterprise rather than a single incident of gambling. Spinelli v. U. S., C.A.8 (Mo.) 1967, 382 F.2d 871, certiorari granted 88 S.Ct. 1025, 390 U.S. 942, 19 L.Ed.2d 1130, modified 88 S.Ct. 1834, 391 U.S. 933, 20 L.Ed.2d 853, reversed on other grounds 89 S.Ct. 584, 393 U.S. 410, 21 L.Ed.2d 637. Gaming 97(1)

319. Business records, admissibility of evidence

Telephone company records showing calls between telephone numbers assigned to defendants charged with conspiracy and with violation of this section were admissible, even absent direct evidence of who participated or what was said, where proof of their occurrence, especially their timing and frequency, constituted circumstantial evidence tending, with other circumstantial evidence, to show one defendant's participation in the conspiracy, and where exact content of each telephone call was not crucial to conviction. U. S. v. Polizzi, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1974, 500 F.2d 856, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 802, 419 U.S. 1120, 42 L.Ed.2d 820, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 803, 419 U.S. 1120, 42 L.Ed.2d 820. Criminal Law 436(7)

Telephone company toll call records maintained in the ordinary course of business for accounting purposes were properly admitted in prosecution of defendants for conspiracy to violate this section. U. S. v. Cerone, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1971, 452 F.2d 274, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 1168, 405 U.S. 964, 31 L.Ed.2d 240, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 1169, 405 U.S. 964, 31 L.Ed.2d 240. Criminal Law 436(7)

320. Illegally seized evidence, admissibility of evidence

Use of illegally obtained surveillance logs at trial did not taint entire case against defendants, who were charged with conspiracy and with violation of this section, where no evidence from the logs was actually introduced, where government's threat to use log material came only after one defendant testified at least twice to his own lack of Mafia connections, and where threat to use the logs did not form part of the government's case, but related solely to impeachment after defendant had testified to his own lack of Mafia ties. U. S. v. Polizzi, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1974, 500 F.2d 856, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 802, 419 U.S. 1120, 42 L.Ed.2d 820, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 803, 419 U.S. 1120, 42 L.Ed.2d 820. Criminal Law 392.39(1)

Although federal agents conferred with state officers about investigation into gambling operations and were present when state officers searched gamblers' premises, where federal agents did not assist in obtaining warrant to conduct search and did not join in search, seize any evidence, or interrogate any suspects, agents did not participate in search so as to require that it be conducted according to federal standards, and evidence seized under authority of warrant was not subject to suppression on ground that state justice of peace who issued warrant was not a judge of a court of record as required by rule 41, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, this title. U. S. v. Johnson, C.A.4 (Va.) 1971, 451 F.2d 1321, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 1298, 405 U.S. 1018, 31 L.Ed.2d 480. Criminal Law 392.13(6)

Where charges under unenforceable wagering tax statutes, sections 4411 and 4412 of Title 26, were dismissed and defendants were tried only under valid anti-racketeering statutes, this section and section 1084 of this title, evidence seized under authority of search warrants was not subject to exclusion on theory that, since probable cause for issuance of search warrants rested in part on evidence of violations of the wagering tax statutes, decisions holding that a defendant may not be convicted of violation of such statutes if he has properly claimed his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination should be applied retroactively on the issue of probable cause. U. S. v. Armiento, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1971, 445 F.2d 869, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 94, 404 U.S. 853, 30 L.Ed.2d 93. Courts 100(1)

Evidence was not properly suppressed in prosecution for violating and conspiring to violate this section though evidence was seized pursuant to search warrant issued on basis of alleged violation of section 4401 et seq. of

Title 26, and though United States Supreme Court thereafter held that individual invoking U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5 cannot be criminally punished for violation of such laws, where there had been probable cause to believe that valid federal statutes were being violated and where warrants had been properly issued, executed and returned. U. S. v. Tiktin, C.A.6 (Ohio) 1970, 427 F.2d 1027, certiorari denied 91 S.Ct. 1608, 402 U.S. 950, 29 L.Ed.2d 120. Criminal Law 392.34

Where one day delay in arresting defendant on charges of violation of sections 7203, 7262 and 7272 of Title 26, aiding and abetting in transmitting wagering information interstate and causing use of interstate commerce in aid of racketeering enterprises was not used as device to make unlawful search, delay in arresting defendant was not ground for suppressing evidence found on defendant's person at time of arrest. U. S. v. Kelley, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1968, 395 F.2d 727, certiorari denied 89 S.Ct. 391, 393 U.S. 963, 21 L.Ed.2d 376. Arrest 67; Criminal Law 392.17(2)

That affidavits and warrants referred to violations of federal wagering tax laws, sections 4401, 4411, 4412, 4901 , 7203, and 7302 of Title 26, as well as to violations of this section prohibiting use of interstate facilities to carry on gambling did not prevent use of evidence seized under such warrants in prosecutions having no regard to federal wagering tax law which had been held unenforceable as applied to persons asserting privilege under U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5. Silbert v. U. S., D.C.Md.1968, 282 F.Supp. 635. Criminal Law 392.16(2); Criminal Law 392.16(3)

321. Informer's testimony, admissibility of evidence

Informer's comprehensive description of defendant's establishment and his narration of defendant's conversations describing his extensive experience in business and his familiarity with laws of many states on subject was properly admitted, in prosecution under this section, to establish that “business enterprise” rather than sporadic or casual biological urge was involved in interstate travel for purposes of prostitution. U. S. v. Coran, C.A.1 (Mass.) 1978, 589 F.2d 70. Prostitution 27

322. Photographs, admissibility of evidence

Photographs found in album during search of house of ill repute were not of such a nature as to inflame passions and prejudice the jury against defendants who were charged with interstate racketeering. U. S. v. Harris, C.A.10 (Kan.) 1975, 534 F.2d 207, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 359, 429 U.S. 941, 50 L.Ed.2d 311. Criminal Law 438(7)

323. Prior crimes or convictions, admissibility of evidence

In prosecution for conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute, evidence of prior airplane sales by defendant to coconspirator plus testimony concerning defendant's demonstration that the prior aircrafts had been modified to accommodate smuggling was admissible under Federal Evidence Rule 404(b), which prohibits admission of evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts to prove character of person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith, as relevant to show that defendant had dealt with coconspirator before meeting second coconspirator, that defendant knew nature of first coconspirator's business and that plane had been prepared and

could be used for smuggling purposes. U.S. v. Kendall, C.A.10 (Okla.) 1985, 766 F.2d 1426, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 848, 474 U.S. 1081, 88 L.Ed.2d 889. Criminal Law 370.8; Criminal Law 371.58

In prosecution under this section on charge of bribery of city officials in order to gain zoning variances and other official approvals to permit construction of shopping center complex, testimony of an unindicted coconspirat- or concerning prior crimes was admissible to cast light on relationship, if any, existing between witness and defendants, to help establish a modus operandi and to show motive. U. S. v. Dansker, C.A.3 (N.J.) 1976, 537 F.2d 40, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 732, 429 U.S. 1038, 50 L.Ed.2d 748. Criminal Law 371.20; Criminal Law 372.59; Criminal Law 373.15

Admission in evidence, in prosecution for violation of this section and section 2421 of this title, of evidence consisting of police records listing arrest and convictions for prostitution of three women named in the indictments did not constitute reversible error where, while record of arrests of the women did not prove their engagement in prostitution and most probably ought not to have been admitted in evidence, other evidence, including direct testimony, showed such women to have been practicing prostitutes at the relevant time, so that defendant was not prejudiced by introduction of such evidence. U. S. v. Arradondo, C.A.8 (Minn.) 1973, 483 F.2d 980, certiorari denied 94 S.Ct. 1428, 415 U.S. 924, 39 L.Ed.2d 480. Criminal Law 1169.2(2)

324. Prior statements, admissibility of evidence

In prosecution for violation of this section there was no error in permitting introduction of defendant's prior testimony in suit he filed to reinstate telephone service and in which defendant was informed of his privilege under U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5 which he did not exercise. U. S. v. Cerone, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1971, 452 F.2d 274, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 1168, 405 U.S. 964, 31 L.Ed.2d 240, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 1169, 405 U.S. 964, 31 L.Ed.2d 240. Criminal Law 393(1)

325. Privileged information, admissibility of evidence

In prosecution under this section, in view of defense counsel's consent to suggestion to resolve claim of privilege of mental health center's records regarding state's witness and their failure to do so, trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to allow defense counsel to interrupt trial to challenge whether records were privileged. U. S. v. Raineri, C.A.7 (Wis.) 1982, 670 F.2d 702, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 446, 459 U.S. 1035, 74 L.Ed.2d 601. Privileged Communications And Confidentiality 320

Evidence in prosecution under this section failed to support defendant's contention that statements made by him and evidence obtained from his accountants should be suppressed on ground that Internal Revenue Service agents wrongfully failed to warn him of his Miranda rights in course of investigation carried on under guise of civil income tax audits. U. S. v. Peskin, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1975, 527 F.2d 71, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 63, 429 U.S. 818, 50 L.Ed.2d 79. Criminal Law 392.49(4); Criminal Law 392.53; Criminal Law 413.52

Fact that jurors were allowed to witness witness' invocation of his testimonial privilege and to hear his subsequent statement that he had been granted immunity did not warrant a reversal, where prosecution made no

conscious or flagrant attempt to bolster its case as result of invocation by witness of his testimonial privilege and witness, after being granted immunity, took the stand and testified. U. S. v. Puntillo, C.A.7 (Wis.) 1971, 440 F.2d 540. Criminal Law 1170.5(1)

Although oblique references to defendant's federal wagering tax stamp filings were sufficient to entitle defendant to claim his privilege against self-incrimination, in prosecution for conspiracy to use and actual use of facilities in interstate commerce to carry on an unlawful gambling business, it was incumbent on defendant to make a timely and proper assertion of privilege; accordingly, where privilege was not asserted in trial court, defense counsel being aware that availability of privilege was being actively litigated, privilege was waived and could not be asserted for first time on appeal. Nolan v. U. S., C.A.10 (Okla.) 1969, 423 F.2d 1031, certiorari denied 91 S.Ct. 47, 400 U.S. 848, 27 L.Ed.2d 85. Criminal Law 1036.1(3.1)

Testimony of a witness concerning her employment as a prostitute in defendants' establishment and concerning defendants' use of facilities of interstate commerce was properly stricken rather than compelling witness to answer after witness invoked privilege against self-incrimination upon cross-examination as to her residence and employment at time of trial, on basis that her action in taking the witness stand on inducement by agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation that she would not be prosecuted, was not a knowing waiver of her privilege under the circumstances. U. S. v. Lyon, C.A.7 (Wis.) 1968, 397 F.2d 505, certiorari denied 89 S.Ct. 131, 393 U.S. 846, 21 L.Ed.2d 117. Witnesses 305(1)

Admission, in prosecution for interstate transmission by telephone of bets and wagers on football games and information assisting placing of bets and interstate use of telephone facilities to carry on unlawful gambling business, of testimony concerning application by defendant for wagering tax stamp and filing by him of returns showing his wagering income violated defendant's privilege against self-incrimination and was reversible error under U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5. Nolan v. U.S., C.A.5 (Tex.) 1968, 395 F.2d 283. Criminal Law 393(1); Criminal Law 1169.1(2.1)

Notwithstanding this section prohibiting travel in interstate commerce with intent to promote gambling and section 1953 of this title prohibiting interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia, registration and occupa- tional tax provisions did not compel disclosure of incriminating information and thus violate privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5. U. S. v. Cefalu, C.A.7 (Wis.) 1964, 338 F.2d 582. Criminal Law 393(1)

Even though a defendant was required by federal and state law to file certain returns and forms, their use as evidence in prosecution of defendant for violation of this section proscribing interstate travel or transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises did not violate the privilege against self-incrimination. U. S. v. Zizzo, C.A.7 (Ind.) 1964, 338 F.2d 577, certiorari denied 85 S.Ct. 1530, 381 U.S. 915, 14 L.Ed.2d 435, rehearing denied 86 S.Ct. 1856, 384 U.S. 982, 16 L.Ed.2d 693. Criminal Law 393(1)

This section does not compel a defendant to be a witness against himself, since it nowhere makes reference to a

presumption: the course of conduct amounting to a “gambling enterprise” and the commission of “thereafter acts” are all separate elements of the offenses which government must show existed beyond a reasonable doubt. U. S. v. Gerhart, S.D.W.Va.1967, 275 F.Supp. 443. Criminal Law 393(1); Criminal Law 561(2)

Enactment of this section and section 1084 of this title relating to transmission of wagering information and interstate and foreign travel or transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises did not make compliance with sections 4411 and 4412 of Title 26 relating to payment of tax by those engaged in wagering and requiring registration of such persons self-incriminatory under U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5. U. S. v. Kelley, S.D.N.Y.1966, 254 F.Supp. 9.

326. Records and tapes, admissibility of evidence

Even if state law was violated when state police officers recorded defendant's telephone conversations with complaining witness, it would have no effect on admissibility of the recordings in federal court in prosecution for extortion and conspiracy to commit extortion. U. S. v. Shaffer, C.A.3 (Del.) 1975, 520 F.2d 1369, certiorari denied 96 S.Ct. 779, 423 U.S. 1051, 46 L.Ed.2d 640. Criminal Law 392.7

327. Silence, admissibility of evidence

In prosecution for possession of a controlled substance, conspiracy and violation of this section, trial court did not err in determining that probative weight of evidence of defendant's prearrest silence as to her knowledge of presence of heroin in luggage in New York airport was sufficient to warrant its admission, since defense counsel had previously elicited defendant's testimony that she had failed to alert police in Chicago after witnessing drug transaction in Chicago because of her lack of funds and her need to return to New York, and fact that she remained silent when first approached by agents in New York was probative of the credibility of her justification for failing to notify the authorities in Chicago. U. S. v. Vega, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1978, 589 F.2d 1147. Criminal Law 410.33

328. Other acts or transactions, admissibility of evidence

Prior bad acts evidence, which was testimony of defendant's associate that defendant, who was police officer, had been extorting motorists for more than ten years, was admissible where prior bad acts were remarkably similar to acts with which defendant was charged, and court gave limiting instruction to jury that the testimony was to be considered only to determine defendant's state of mind or plan. U.S. v. Baker, C.A.8 (Mo.) 1996, 82 F.3d 273, rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc denied, certiorari denied 117 S.Ct. 538, 519 U.S. 1020, 136 L.Ed.2d 423. Criminal Law 371.37; Criminal Law 373.12; Criminal Law 673(5)

Prejudicial effect of prior bad acts evidence that defendant used to transport marijuana, but eventually relin- quished duties to family and organized marijuana transportation, and evidence that defendant had accumulated much cash from marijuana deals did not outweigh probative value to show knowledge, common scheme or plan, business enterprise, or ill-gotten gains in prosecution for conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to deliver, possession of marijuana, and violation of Travel Act. U.S. v. Rawle, C.A.4 (S.C.) 1988, 845 F.2d 1244, rehearing denied. Criminal Law 370.8; Criminal Law 370.9; Criminal Law 371.58; Criminal Law

371.60; Criminal Law 373.9

In prosecution for conspiracy and violation of this section in attempt to set up interstate prostitution ring, evidence of defendant's earlier attempts to organize prostitution operation was properly admitted to prove intent and plan. U. S. v. Barbieri, C.A.10 (Okla.) 1980, 614 F.2d 715. Criminal Law 370.25; Criminal Law 371.49; Criminal Law 373.12

In prosecution for conspiracy, violation of Mann Act, section 2421 of this title, and violation of this section, evidence that defendant had been engaged in unrelated prostitution activities involving his alleged wife and others two years previously was admissible as bearing on issues of intent, plan, knowledge, absence of mistake, and the like. U. S. v. Ahern, C.A.10 (Okla.) 1980, 612 F.2d 507, certiorari denied 101 S.Ct. 890, 449 U.S. 1093, 66 L.Ed.2d 822. Criminal Law 368.20; Criminal Law 368.37; Criminal Law 373.19

In prosecution for conspiracy to violate this section by using facilities of interstate commerce with intent to commit arson, evidence of one defendant's prior involvement in arson was properly admitted to show his intent on occasion of alleged discussion with codefendant whereby defendant allegedly was merely trying to recover a debt owed to him by codefendant. U. S. v. Nickerson, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1979, 606 F.2d 156, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 528, 444 U.S. 994, 62 L.Ed.2d 424. Criminal Law 371.52

Evidence of bribery of local police officials was properly introduced not to show a mere propensity or disposi- tion to commit a crime, but for purposes of identification and to prove conspiracy in prosecution charging conspiracy and use of interstate facilities in aid of an illegal gambling enterprise. U. S. v. Cafero, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1973, 473 F.2d 489, certiorari denied 94 S.Ct. 2622, 417 U.S. 918, 41 L.Ed.2d 223. Criminal Law 370.8; Crimin- al Law 372.32

In prosecution for conducting organized scheme to cheat for profit in “peeked” gin rummy games, admission of testimony about defendants' participation in other “peeked” operations was not abuse of discretion where much of evidence came in as proper redirect examination after defendants had opened the issue in cross-examination, and evidence was relevant to issues of intent, knowledge and existence of continuing “business enterprise”. U. S. v. Roselli, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1970, 432 F.2d 879, certiorari denied 91 S.Ct. 883, 401 U.S. 924, 27 L.Ed.2d 828, certiorari denied 91 S.Ct. 884, 401 U.S. 924, 27 L.Ed.2d 828, rehearing denied 91 S.Ct. 1366, 402 U.S. 924, 28 L.Ed.2d 665. Criminal Law 371.32; Criminal Law 371.39; Criminal Law 371.58; Criminal Law 371.65; Witnesses 288(2)

Government, to sustain indictment charging that defendant acted as principal in violation of interstate racketeering statute, had to prove existence of activity and its illegality and evidence introduced to prove that defendant was in gambling business, that he controlled gambling in given city and that he collected pay-offs from other dice establishments there was properly admitted. Bass v. U. S., C.A.8 (Ark.) 1963, 324 F.2d 168. Gaming 94; Gaming 97(1)

329. Tainted evidence, admissibility of evidence

In prosecution for facilitating payment of a commercial bribe and conspiracy to commit such offense, evidence against defendant was independently derived from subpoenaed records and documents and the debriefing of government witnesses and was not tainted by defendant's testimony under a grant of immunity before grand jury and as a government witness at another trial, and thus evidence used against defendant was free from the taint of compelled testimony. U. S. v. Seregos, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1981, 655 F.2d 33, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 1431, 455 U.S. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 650. Criminal Law 42.6

330. Conspiracy, admissibility of evidence

Where money and gambling slips seized at time of defendant's arrest were probative as to existence of allegedly prior conspiracy to cross state borders to further unlawful activity, even if conspiracy had terminated prior to such seizure, such items were admissible to show existence of conspiracy. U. S. v. Marquez, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1970, 424 F.2d 236, certiorari denied 91 S.Ct. 56, 400 U.S. 828, 27 L.Ed.2d 58. Conspiracy 45

That court determined that evidence was insufficient to support conviction for substantive offense of travel in interstate commerce with intent to aid racketeering enterprises did not require that it strike and remove from jury consideration on conspiracy count all evidence indicating conspiracy prior to termination of events alleged under substantive count, where there remained substantial evidence from which jury could infer that conspiracy had begun prior to acts averred in substantive counts. Marshall v. U. S., C.A.9 (Cal.) 1966, 355 F.2d 999, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 34, 385 U.S. 815, 17 L.Ed.2d 54, rehearing denied 87 S.Ct. 388, 385 U.S. 964, 17 L.Ed.2d 309. Conspiracy 31

Defendant, charged with conspiring to violate Internal Revenue laws relating to illicit whiskey, was not ag- grieved by proof of an allegedly earlier alliance of defendant with another, where such testimony clearly ante- dated the main plot and those earlier events were integral steps toward the indicted conspiracy. U. S. v. McCle- nny, C.A.4 (Va.) 1965, 346 F.2d 125, certiorari denied 86 S.Ct. 127, 382 U.S. 863, 15 L.Ed.2d 101, certiorari denied 86 S.Ct. 75, 382 U.S. 833, 15 L.Ed.2d 76. Criminal Law 1169.11

331. Identification of defendant, admissibility of evidence

In prosecution under indictment charging that defendant traveled from Wisconsin to Illinois with intent to carry on an illegal gambling enterprise in violation of laws of state of Wisconsin, evidence relating to defendant's arrest in Chicago was admissible to establish identification of defendant and his engagement in business of gambling. U. S. v. Puntillo, C.A.7 (Wis.) 1971, 440 F.2d 540. Gaming 97(1)

332. Impeachment of defendant, admissibility of evidence

Statement of mayor who allegedly took bribe in connection with grant of cable television franchise, “I'll tell you one thing, if I am going to go down, everybody is going to go down with me,” was not such evidence of bias as to warrant its reception in prosecution under this section to impeach testimony of mayor. U. S. v. Kahn, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1973, 472 F.2d 272, certiorari denied 93 S.Ct. 2270, 411 U.S. 982, 36 L.Ed.2d 958. Witnesses 366

333. Knowledge and intent, admissibility of evidence

In prosecution for conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute, evidence that in the past defendant had been concerned with whether plane subsequently used in instant conspiracy was “hot” was admissible, under Federal Evidence Rule 404(b), which governs admission of other acts evidence, as relevant to prove that defendant knew about other coconspirators' smuggling activities and plans and that he aided and assisted them in preparing for and furthering the plans. U.S. v. Kendall, C.A.10 (Okla.) 1985, 766 F.2d 1426, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 848, 474 U.S. 1081, 88 L.Ed.2d 889. Criminal Law 371.59

Evidence that defendant, who was charged with participating in fraudulent and illegal card games in Nevada, had installed a “juice joint” which would enable him to cheat at dice games in his home in San Antonio was admissible on the issue of his intent with respect to charges involving the card games. U. S. v. Morris, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1976, 532 F.2d 436. Criminal Law 371.39

In prosecution of former member of board of county commissioners for causing interstate movement of check drawn by applicant for variances and zoning changes and allegedly used by former member to acquire tractor for use on his farm in violation of this section, evidence concerning former board member's receipt of favor from another who had received favorable zoning rulings was not inadmissible to show evil intention with respect to specific act charged on theory of double jeopardy even though former board member had been tried in state court for acceptance of the favor and charges had been dismissed on ground that evil intent had not been shown. U. S. v. Baggett, C.A.4 (Md.) 1973, 481 F.2d 114, certiorari denied 94 S.Ct. 850, 414 U.S. 1116, 38 L.Ed.2d 744 . Criminal Law 371.37; Criminal Law 373.12; Criminal Law 373.30

Although indictment charging defendants with aiding and abetting another in traveling interstate for purpose of establishing, carrying on, promoting and managing gambling alleged that defendants were guilty of interstate travel for purposes alleged on Mar. 15, 1970, court properly permitted proof of interstate travel on several dates between Dec. 4, 1969, and Mar. 8, 1970, in order to prove criminal intent and motive. U. S. v. Johns, C.A.5 (Ga.) 1972, 466 F.2d 1364. Criminal Law 371.12; Criminal Law 371.39; Criminal Law 373.12

Testimony of an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation that while he was present at defendants' place of business he was approached by a lady who offered her services as a prostitute and that such offer was made in presence of defendant who was charged with conspiracy and substantive offenses of use of interstate facilities to carry on prostitution was admissible to show defendant's knowledge and intent, and existence of continuing course of conduct. U. S. v. Lyon, C.A.7 (Wis.) 1968, 397 F.2d 505, certiorari denied 89 S.Ct. 131, 393 U.S. 846, 21 L.Ed.2d 117. Criminal Law 373.22

334. Pattern, scheme, or course of conduct, admissibility of evidence

Testimony by owner of dice manufacturing company as to orders of dice made by defendants several weeks before date conspiracy to ship dice through the mail began was admissible as evincing a consistent pattern or scheme, as against defendants' contention that testimony constituted evidence of another crime. U. S. v. Hedge, C.A.5 (Miss.) 1972, 462 F.2d 220. Criminal Law 370.8

Testimony of government witness that he had incurred a gambling debt to defendant and had later received a

threatening telephone call from defendant who had told him that to collect the debt he was sending out a man who specialized in “roughing up” people, and testimony of sheriff that witness had reported to him the gambling debt and the threats received was admissible in prosecution for conspiring to violate this section by attempting to collect another gambling debt through use of extortive means for limited purpose of demonstrating a continuing course of conduct on part of defendant to win money in gambling games and then employ threats to collect. Collins v. U. S., C.A.10 (Kan.) 1967, 383 F.2d 296. Criminal Law 373.12

“Other crimes” testimony by former employees of truck brokerage firm concerning drafting of checks, forging of signatures and distribution of proceeds would be admissible against principal of firm as evidence of “common scheme or plan” under Fed.Evid.Rule 404(b) in prosecution for commercial bribery and conspiracy to commit commercial bribery. U.S. v. Hill, D.Del.1986, 629 F.Supp. 493. Criminal Law 370.8; Criminal Law 370.23

335. Time of ruling, admissibility of evidence

Trial judge's refusal to rule before trial on whether evidence of bribe by corporate defendant, not connected with bribe resulting in instant prosecution under this section, would be admitted upon government's cross-examination of individual defendant, who was corporation's president, if he took stand was not abuse of discretion. U. S. v. Kahn, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1973, 472 F.2d 272, certiorari denied 93 S.Ct. 2270, 411 U.S. 982, 36 L.Ed.2d 958. Witnesses 337(31)

336. Miscellaneous evidence admissible, admissibility of evidence

In prosecution for conspiracy to defraud the United States and for violation of this section, trial court did not err in refusing to permit defendants to state that they would have been willing to submit to a pretrial polygraph examination. U. S. v. Bursten, C.A.7 (Ind.) 1977, 560 F.2d 779. Criminal Law 388.5(12)

In prosecution of defendants for unlawfully using the mails with the intent of carrying on an unlawful business enterprise involving prostitution offenses, it was not improper to admit in evidence the testimony of a prostitute as to certain statements made by the madam, outside the presence of the defendants, including testimony that the witness was told by the madam that one of the defendants had become one of the madam's partners. U. S. v. Rizzo, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1969, 418 F.2d 71, certiorari denied 90 S.Ct. 1006, 397 U.S. 967, 25 L.Ed.2d 260. Criminal Law 422(6)

In prosecution under this section for scheme to establish and carry on gambling by lottery (bingo) and bribery, evidence of abortion was material to show what the bribes sought to protect. Dillon v. U. S., C.A.10 (Kan.) 1968, 391 F.2d 433, certiorari denied 89 S.Ct. 208, 393 U.S. 889, 21 L.Ed.2d 168, certiorari denied 89 S.Ct. 87, 393 U.S. 825, 21 L.Ed.2d 96. Criminal Law 368.27; Criminal Law 368.35

Evidence that argument occurred between witness and defendant over the way witness was throwing dice at club defendant operated in Tennessee, that defendant ejected witness, that there was scuffle, and that defendant possibly had chain in his hand was admissible on issue whether defendant charged with traveling in interstate com-

merce with intent to promote, manage, and establish gambling business in Tennessee was operating a gambling club in Tennessee. U. S. v. Compton, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1966, 365 F.2d 1, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 391, 385 U.S. 956, 17 L.Ed.2d 303. Gaming 97(1)

In prosecution on charge of conspiracy to violate this section prohibiting traveling in interstate commerce or using interstate telephone facilities with intent to carry on unlawful activity involving extortion, it was not error to permit witness to testify as to threat made to witness by deceased codefendant. U. S. v. Vespe, D.C.Del.1975, 389 F.Supp. 1359, affirmed 520 F.2d 1369, certiorari denied 96 S.Ct. 779, 423 U.S. 1051, 46 L.Ed.2d 640. Criminal Law 422(1)

In prosecution for violation of this section, evidence as to a transaction which may not have been interstate was properly admissible for purpose of showing that such mailings had been made, thus supporting testimony of federal agent that he had received one in an interstate mailing, and court's instruction was sufficient to dispel the use of such evidence for any other purpose. U. S. v. Gerhart, S.D.W.Va.1967, 275 F.Supp. 443. Criminal Law 673(2)

337. Miscellaneous evidence inadmissible, admissibility of evidence

In prosecution for using and conspiring to use facilities of interstate commerce to promote gambling, where there was no evidence either by offer of proof or by testimony at trial that sheriff ever assured defendants directly or indirectly that charitable bingo was lawful in Kentucky, district court properly excluded evidence as to sheriff's alleged conversations with officer of organization in whose behalf defendants allegedly were to operate bingo games and district court properly admonished jury not to consider defense of good-faith reliance on representations of a public official. U. S. v. Gebhart, C.A.6 (Ky.) 1971, 441 F.2d 1261, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 97, 404 U.S. 855, 30 L.Ed.2d 96. Criminal Law 338(1); Criminal Law 772(6)

VIII. INSTRUCTIONS

Accomplices 361 Admissibility of evidence 362 Aiding and abetting 363 Burden of proof 364 Business enterprise 365 Conspiracy 366 Credibility of witnesses 367 Defenses 368-370 Defenses - Generally 368 Defenses - Entrapment 369 Defenses - Extortion 370 Duplicitous instructions 376 Entrapment, defenses 369

Extortion, defenses 370 Intent, knowledge, or purpose 371 Interstate or foreign travel 372 Knowledge 371 Miscellaneous instructions 379 Purpose 371 Request for instructions 378 Superfluous instructions 377 Use of facility in commerce 373 Violation of state or federal law 374 Weight and sufficiency of evidence 375

361. Accomplices, instructions

Instruction defining an accomplice and stating that petitioner witness was an accomplice of accused in the case was error since it was jury's function to determine whether the unindicted coconspirator was an accomplice of defendant, but instruction did not require reversal of conviction for interstate travel in aid of racketeering enterprises because error did not have substantial influence on the jury. U. S. v. Pritchard, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1972, 458 F.2d 1036, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 2434, 407 U.S. 911, 32 L.Ed.2d 685. Criminal Law 761(2); Criminal Law 1172.3

362. Admissibility of evidence, instructions

In joint prosecution of two defendants for conspiracy and violation of this section, trial court's instructions and cautionary statements to jury concerning prior-crimes evidence admitted as to one codefendant were adequate. U. S. v. Barbieri, C.A.10 (Okla.) 1980, 614 F.2d 715. Criminal Law 783(1)

In prosecution for conspiracy to violate this section and substantive violations, wherein jury, after retiring for deliberation, requested reading of testimony as to defendant's alleged pretrial offer to plead guilty, refusal of defendant's offered instructions that, since defendant had had no indictment before him at time he allegedly made offer, jury could not consider offer as evidence of his knowledge that money paid to him traveled through interstate commerce was not improper, where testimony permitted inference of knowledge of interstate travel and defendant did not request proper limiting instruction. U. S. v. McKee, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1972, 462 F.2d 275. Criminal Law 863(1)

Where court's instruction contemplated possibility that jury might have been improperly influenced by government's accounting evidence which suggested existence of skimming by defendants charged with using and conspiring to use facilities of interstate commerce to promote gambling and court's failure to elaborate more fully on evidence of embezzlement might have reflected its desire not to dwell unduly on possibility of contemporan- eous criminal conduct, district court's charge properly instructed jury with regard to use of evidence related to skimming. U. S. v. Gebhart, C.A.6 (Ky.) 1971, 441 F.2d 1261, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 97, 404 U.S. 855, 30 L.Ed.2d 96. Criminal Law 783(1)

Court properly instructed jury, in prosecution of defendants for conspiring to use the mails with intent of pro-

moting an unlawful business enterprise involving prostitution offenses, that it first had to determine whether the existence of a conspiracy was proved, and then determine from the acts and declarations of each defendant whether he became a participant in that conspiracy; and that, contingent on the jury's finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that both of such facts were proved, then the acts and declarations of each coconspirator were admitted against all whom the jury found to have joined in the conspiracy. U. S. v. Rizzo, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1969, 418 F.2d 71, certiorari denied 90 S.Ct. 1006, 397 U.S. 967, 25 L.Ed.2d 260. Criminal Law 779

Introduction of defendant's income tax returns tending to prove that defendant was guilty of tax evasion but not related to crime charged of use of mails with intent to promote or facilitate illegal gambling was not cured by instructions, to effect that certain evidence was to be considered only for purpose of establishing that defendant was professional gambler, inasmuch as returns did not tend to prove that defendant was professional gambler and instructions were vague and nonspecific as far as returns were concerned. South v. U. S., C.A.5 (Fla.) 1966, 368 F.2d 202. Criminal Law 673(5)

363. Aiding and abetting, instructions

Where there was sufficient evidence for jury to infer that defendant and an unindicted coaccomplice caused another individual to travel in interstate commerce for the purpose of prostitution and also an abundance of evidence that defendant aided and abetted the accomplice in connection with prostitution activities after causing the travel, trial court properly charged jury on contents of both “aiding and abetting” and “causing” subsections of section 2 of this title authorizing the punishment as principals of those who contribute to the commission of offenses. U. S. v. Maselli, C.A.6 (Ohio) 1976, 534 F.2d 1197. Criminal Law 792(2)

364. Burden of proof, instructions

Trial judge's characterization of defense's case, in prosecution for crossing state borders to further unlawful activity, conspiracy to do same, and interstate transportation of gambling paraphernalia, as contending that evidence was consistent with innocence was not error where such characterization was accurate and burden of proof was properly charged in another part of instructions. U. S. v. Marquez, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1970, 424 F.2d 236, certiorari denied 91 S.Ct. 56, 400 U.S. 828, 27 L.Ed.2d 58. Criminal Law 770(3)

Judge's instruction, at trial for conspiring to use facilities of interstate commerce to promote extortion in violation of laws of North Carolina, that gave preponderance of evidence standard was erroneous though court properly defined at length correct burden of proof earlier in the charge and later in charge frequently referred to reasonable doubt requirement. U. S. v. Hughes, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1968, 389 F.2d 535. Criminal Law 782(9); Crim- inal Law 823(10)

365. Business enterprise, instructions

District court's instruction on the Travel Act in prosecution of cocaine conspiracy was not erroneous for failing to include definition of “business enterprise” as being continuous conduct rather than occasional involvement in illegal activity; instruction contained essential elements which constituted violation of the Travel Act and defense did not request definition of “business enterprise.” U.S. v. Smith, C.A.11 (Ga.) 1990, 918 F.2d 1551, re-

hearing denied 929 F.2d 704. Conspiracy 48.2(2)

Failure to instruct on business enterprise aspect of Travel Act charge was not plain error where that concept was indirectly expressed by references to the conspiracy to distribute cocaine and where the jurors convicted the defendant on a conspiracy count which alleged a continuous, vertically integrated, and geographically widespread operation. U.S. v. Tarantino, C.A.D.C.1988, 846 F.2d 1384, 269 U.S.App.D.C. 398, certiorari denied 109 S.Ct. 108, 488 U.S. 840, 102 L.Ed.2d 83, certiorari denied 109 S.Ct. 174, 488 U.S. 867, 102 L.Ed.2d 143. Criminal Law 1038.2

Trial court in prosecution for conspiring to violate and violating the Travel Act by traveling interstate to “launder” cash receipts of drug trafficking did not constructively amend indictment when it instructed jury that business enterprise had to involve marijuana, even though instruction varied from statute which required only that business enterprise be “involved in controlled substances,” as deviation concerned a nonessential element of proof and did not prejudice defendants. U.S. v. Lignarolo, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1985, 770 F.2d 971, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 1948, 476 U.S. 1105, 90 L.Ed.2d 358. Criminal Law 814(5)

It was error to refuse to instruct that jury must find a continuous course of criminal conduct to convict defendants of counts under this section. U. S. v. Kaiser, C.A.9 (Wash.) 1981, 660 F.2d 724, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 1467, 455 U.S. 956, 71 L.Ed.2d 674, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 2935, 457 U.S. 1121, 73 L.Ed.2d 1334. Com- merce 82.6

366. Conspiracy, instructions

Where defendant could have been convicted of conspiracy although acquitted of continuing criminal enterprise but indictment did not so charge defendant, and jury was not instructed that he could be convicted of a conspiracy, Pinkerton liability could not attach to those counts concerning Travel Act [18 U.S.C.A. § 1952] violations that defendant did not know of and did not participate in. U.S. v. Graewe, C.A.6 (Ohio) 1985, 774 F.2d 106, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 1200, 475 U.S. 1017, 89 L.Ed.2d 314. Gaming 79(1)

In prosecution for conspiracy to travel in interstate commerce to facilitate gambling activity and for the substantive offense, instruction stating in effect that co-conspirators might be convicted of the substantive crime was error with respect to the substantive charge as to those defendants who were not involved in interstate travel. U. S. v. Barrow, E.D.Pa.1964, 229 F.Supp. 722, affirmed in part, reversed in part on other grounds 363 F.2d 62, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 703, 385 U.S. 1001, 17 L.Ed.2d 541. Criminal Law 793

367. Credibility of witnesses, instructions

In prosecution for possession of controlled substance, conspiracy and violation of this section, trial court's failure to include in its charge as to defendant's credibility as a witness language indicating that defendant's vital interest in the outcome of trial is not inconsistent with the ability to render truthful testimony did not constitute plain error so as to require reversal in absence of specific objection to the charge on that point, since trial court's charge did state that defendant's testimony is to be judged in the same way as that of any other witness. U. S. v.

Vega, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1978, 589 F.2d 1147. Criminal Law 1043(2)

368. Defenses, instructions--Generally

In prosecution under this section of attorney for allegedly bribing village officials for favorable zoning action, trial court properly instructed jury that unless alleged extortion of payments by village officials in return for fair zoning decision was so overpowering as to negate criminal intent of willfulness, it was not total defense to bribery charges. U. S. v. Peskin, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1975, 527 F.2d 71, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 63, 429 U.S. 818, 50 L.Ed.2d 79. Bribery 14

Instructions on extortion defense in prosecution under this section arising from alleged bribing of municipal officials in connection with grant of cable television franchise were not defective for failing at two points to refer to “official action” where nothing but official action was at issue and other instructions made clear that it was necessary that defendants intended to influence officers “with respect to any official act.” U. S. v. Kahn, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1973, 472 F.2d 272, certiorari denied 93 S.Ct. 2270, 411 U.S. 982, 36 L.Ed.2d 958. Bribery 14

In prosecution for violation of this section of defendant, who was allegedly engaged in business of prostitution, and who was also engaged in lawful trucking business, instruction which contained an illustration of a violation of this section without incorporating defense that transmission of funds were proceeds of defendant's lawful trucking business, was not erroneous where other portions of charge fairly set forth defendant's theory that transmitted funds were proceeds of his lawful trucking business. U. S. v. Wingo, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1968, 394 F.2d 484. Criminal Law 823(1)

369. ---- Entrapment, defenses, instructions

Evidence failed to create jury questions as to lack of predisposition and Government inducement and, therefore, failed to support proposed instruction on entrapment in prosecution of nightclub owner for racketeering conspiracy, conspiracy to commit tax evasion, use of telephone to promote prostitution business, and filing of false income tax returns; owner ran house of prostitution since 1970s, operated booming business after it began accepting credit card payment for prostitution, and expressed no reluctance to accept credit cards; scheme to take credit cards was initially presented by codefendant; evidence of comments made more than two years after com- mencement of credit card activity was too remote; and nothing indicated Government inducement. U.S. v. Mar- ren, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1989, 890 F.2d 924. Criminal Law 772(6)

Evidence, in prosecution for conspiring to use telephone as an interstate facility with intent to violate state bribery laws, was insufficient to authorize instruction on entrapment. U. S. v. Corallo, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1969, 413 F.2d 1306, certiorari denied 90 S.Ct. 431, 396 U.S. 958, 24 L.Ed.2d 422, certiorari denied 90 S.Ct. 437, 396 U.S. 958, 24 L.Ed.2d 422, certiorari denied 90 S.Ct. 438, 396 U.S. 963, 24 L.Ed.2d 427. Criminal Law 772(6)

370. ---- Extortion, defenses, instructions

Instruction to jury in prosecution for interstate travel to promote extortion that “you have to find from the evid-

ence that the object or purpose of the interstate commerce, if you found there was such interstate commerce, interstate transportation, was extortion; not obtaining money under false pretensions or false impersonation of an officer or public official.” did not instruct jury that extortion had been proved as matter of law. U. S. v. Schwartz, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1968, 398 F.2d 464, certiorari denied 89 S.Ct. 714, 393 U.S. 1062, 21 L.Ed.2d 705. Crim- inal Law 763(8)

371. Intent, knowledge, or purpose, instructions

Where difference between lawful and unlawful acts of lobbyist turns primarily on intent, and lobbyist's lawful conduct is itself most unattractive, jury needs to be told specifically that defendant has not violated bribery component of Travel Act, or committed honest-services fraud, if lobbyist's intent was limited to cultivation of business or political friendship; only if instead or in addition, there is intent to cause recipient to alter official acts, may jury find theft of honest services or bribery predicate of Travel Act. U.S. v. Sawyer, C.A.1 (Mass.) 1996, 85 F.3d 713. Commerce 82.10; Lobbying 9

Defendants were entitled to instruction that, to be convicted of violations of the Travel Act [18 U.S.C.A. § 1952(a)(3)] they must have had knowledge that they were carrying marijuana, and failure to give such instruction constituted reversible error. U.S. v. Polowichak, C.A.4 (S.C.) 1986, 783 F.2d 410. Commerce 82.10; Criminal Law 1173.2(2)

Court adequately described and defined for jury elements of Travel Act, and while failure to define “intent” may have confused jury about whether illegality of promoted activity need be present to defendant's mind during travel, the intent requirement did not reach quite this far. U.S. v. Markowski, C.A.7 (Ind.) 1985, 772 F.2d 358, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 1202, 475 U.S. 1018, 89 L.Ed.2d 316. Gaming 102

Instructing jury that it could find codefendant guilty as aider and abettor of defendant's traveling in interstate commerce with intent to carry on unlawful gambling activity in violation of this section, if codefendant knew or reasonably should have known of defendant's interstate travel, was sufficient, even though it would have been better to have instructed that actual knowledge was necessary but that if jury concluded from all facts and circumstances that codefendant reasonably should have had such knowledge, it could conclude that he did have such knowledge, and, in any case, in view of strength of government's proof as to codefendant's knowledge of defendant's interstate travel, alleged error in instruction was harmless. U. S. v. Alsobrook, C.A.6 (Mich.) 1980, 620 F.2d 139, certiorari denied 101 S.Ct. 124, 449 U.S. 843, 66 L.Ed.2d 51. Gaming 102

Although in conspiracy instructions trial court failed to charge that jurors must find that defendants agreed to perform the acts that were prohibited by the substantive statute such error was harmless where all defendants received concurrent sentences and, furthermore, trial court correctly charged concerning the mens rea necessary to support conviction of the substantive offenses. U. S. v. Herrera, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1978, 584 F.2d 1137. Criminal Law 1173.2(2); Criminal Law 1177.3(1)

Under this section, specific intent is required to violate state law but there is no requirement that defendant either have knowledge of use of interstate facilities or specifically intend to use interstate facilities, and thus

there is no necessity to inform jury that defendant had to intend to use interstate facilities. U. S. v. Perrin, C.A.5 (La.) 1978, 580 F.2d 730, rehearing denied 585 F.2d 520, certiorari granted 99 S.Ct. 1496, 440 U.S. 956, 59 L.Ed.2d 769, affirmed 100 S.Ct. 311, 444 U.S. 37, 62 L.Ed.2d 199, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 520, 444 U.S. 990, 62 L.Ed.2d 419. Commerce 82.10

Although instructions on specific intent, viewed alone, could have been more precise in prosecution for violation of this section, the instructions as a whole, included statement that it was not necessary that the government prove that the defendants knew they were violating Nevada law, and that specific intent which the government had to show was intent to facilitate the carrying on of a business enterprise involving gambling in violation of Nevada law, reasonably informed jury that they had to find that defendants knew that what they were facilitating was an unlawful activity under state law. U. S. v. Polizzi, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1974, 500 F.2d 856, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 802, 419 U.S. 1120, 42 L.Ed.2d 820, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 803, 419 U.S. 1120, 42 L.Ed.2d 820. Crim- inal Law 822(7)

Instructions in prosecution for violation of this section were proper in that they clearly required jury to find that defendants had knowledge of their codefendants' interstate travel, and failure of instructions to require finding of knowledge that the activity violated federal law did not constitute error since such a finding was not an essential element of the crime. U. S. v. Lee, C.A.7 (Ind.) 1971, 448 F.2d 604, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 107, 404 U.S. 858, 30 L.Ed.2d 100. Gaming 102

Instruction that defendant could be convicted under this section proscribing use of any facility in interstate or foreign commerce with intent to promote a gambling enterprise if he knew, or could reasonably have been expected to know, that some of checks representing gambling debts were drawn on banks or institutions not located within state was not erroneous on ground that defendant was entitled to a much stricter standard of proof, that is, that he agreed to a scheme in which likelihood of cashing an interstate check was known to be great. U. S. v. Salsbury, C.A.4 (Md.) 1970, 430 F.2d 1045. Gaming 102

Refusal to give and giving of instructions on specific intent required to prove violation of this section forbidding use of facility in interstate commerce in aid of racketeering enterprises was not error, in view of instructions as a whole. Turf Center, Inc. v. U. S., C.A.9 (Wash.) 1963, 325 F.2d 793. Criminal Law 822(7)

372. Interstate or foreign travel, instructions

Court properly instructed jury that if defendants caused or induced person who allegedly paid bribe to the defendants to travel from Philadelphia to New Bedford, Massachusetts or caused him to use the mails, interstate component of this section would be satisfied. U. S. v. Hathaway, C.A.1 (Mass.) 1976, 534 F.2d 386, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 64, 429 U.S. 819, 50 L.Ed.2d 79. Bribery 14

373. Use of facility in commerce, instructions

Instruction which told the jury that if defendants, who were charged with violation of this section by virtue of use of interstate telephone facilities to facilitate a, bookmaking operation, performed an act with the specific in-

tent to further the gambling enterprise in violation of laws of Colorado they ran the risk that their actions would cause or aid and abet in the use of interstate telephone facilities was proper. U. S. v. Villano, C.A.10 (Colo.) 1976, 529 F.2d 1046, certiorari denied 96 S.Ct. 3180, 426 U.S. 953, 49 L.Ed.2d 1193. Gaming 102

In prosecution under this section for participation in gambling operation, court properly refused to permit jury to consider whether use of interstate facilities was “substantial” or “integral” part of activity in question, but instead correctly instructed jury that this section did not require that use of facilities in interstate commerce be essential to the gambling business and that it was necessary only that use of such facilities facilitate the promotion, management, establishment or carrying on of the illegal gambling business. U.S. v. LeFaivre, C.A.4 (Md.) 1974, 507 F.2d 1288, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 1446, 420 U.S. 1004, 43 L.Ed.2d 762. Gaming 102

374. Violation of state or federal law, instructions

It was not error, in prosecution for violation of this section to read to jury sections of Nevada statutes other than the two sections upon which indictment and information was based, where reading of section which was a self- explanatory statement of Nevada legislative policy would have helped the jury to understand the purpose and meaning of the other sections. U. S. v. Polizzi, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1974, 500 F.2d 856, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 802, 419 U.S. 1120, 42 L.Ed.2d 820, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 803, 419 U.S. 1120, 42 L.Ed.2d 820. Criminal Law 808.5

Trial court which gave a detailed conspiracy instruction in prosecution for, among other things, conspiracy to violate this section properly refused defendants' requested instruction which contained virtually every phrase which was in the instruction given by court with the exception that where the court used word “law” defendant used words “federal law” in an apparent attempt to cause jury to confuse conspiracy charge with rejected contention of defendant that under the substantive charge government had to prove a specific intent to violate a federal law. U. S. v. Erlenbaugh, C.A.7 (Ind.) 1971, 452 F.2d 967, certiorari granted 92 S.Ct. 1194, 405 U.S. 973, 31 L.Ed.2d 247, affirmed 93 S.Ct. 477, 409 U.S. 239, 34 L.Ed.2d 446. Criminal Law 829(3)

Instruction, in prosecution for interstate travel in aid of racketeering, to the effect that if jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant engaged in accepting wagers on athletic contests and in furnishing odds or point spreads on athletic contests as a business activity, that such activity violated the law of Missouri, was not erroneous even if Missouri law did not specifically declare illegal the furnishing of odds and point spreads on athletic contests, in view of fact Missouri statute forbid accepting wagers, and a necessary part of accepting wagers might be furnishing of odds and point spreads. Spinelli v. U. S., C.A.8 (Mo.) 1967, 382 F.2d 871, certiorari granted 88 S.Ct. 1025, 390 U.S. 942, 19 L.Ed.2d 1130, modified 88 S.Ct. 1834, 391 U.S. 933, 20 L.Ed.2d 853, reversed on other grounds 89 S.Ct. 584, 393 U.S. 410, 21 L.Ed.2d 637. Gaming 102

Tennessee statutes which were clear and understandable and were read to jury had been sufficiently defined by trial judge in prosecution for traveling in interstate commerce with intent to promote, manage, and establish gambling business in violation of the statutes. U. S. v. Compton, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1966, 365 F.2d 1, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 391, 385 U.S. 956, 17 L.Ed.2d 303. Criminal Law 808.5

Jury was adequately instructed, in prosecution for violation of this section, on West Virginia gaming laws, where such instructions embodied the substance of West Virginia statutes, and defendant did not request that the state offense be delineated with greater particularity. U. S. v. Gerhart, S.D.W.Va.1967, 275 F.Supp. 443. Gam- ing 102

375. Weight and sufficiency of evidence, instructions

General instruction that jury might consider opportunity or lack of opportunity of witness to have seen or heard that which he testified about was sufficient to instruct jury in proper method of weighing testimony as a whole and trial court did not abuse its discretion in not giving defendant's instruction that, in considering what weight was to be given to collection forms identified by vice-president of bank, jury might consider circumstances of making such writings or records including lack of personal knowledge by entrant or maker. Hanley v. U. S., C.A.5 (Fla.) 1969, 416 F.2d 1160, certiorari denied 90 S.Ct. 908, 397 U.S. 910, 25 L.Ed.2d 91. Criminal Law 829(12)

Charge that proof beyond reasonable doubt is established if evidence is such as you would be willing to rely and act upon in the most important of your own affairs was not reversible error in prosecution for conspiracy to use interstate facilities to violate Mississippi gambling laws. James v. U. S., C.A.5 (Miss.) 1969, 416 F.2d 467, certiorari denied 90 S.Ct. 902, 397 U.S. 907, 25 L.Ed.2d 87, certiorari denied 90 S.Ct. 903, 397 U.S. 907, 25 L.Ed.2d 87, certiorari denied 90 S.Ct. 938, 397 U.S. 928, 25 L.Ed.2d 108. Criminal Law 1172.2

There was no error in denial of requested instruction on testimony of accomplices stating that testimony of accomplice should be considered with caution and weighed with great care and must be believed beyond reasonable doubt and to moral certainty and that accomplices' testimony alone must establish guilt and that person cannot be convicted on uncorroborated testimony of accomplice in view of fact that, apart from obvious inconsistency, instructions did not embody correct statement of law. Bass v. U. S., C.A.8 (Ark.) 1963, 324 F.2d 168. Criminal Law 780(3)

376. Duplicitous instructions

Where, in prosecution for substantive offense proscribed by this section, court in instructing jury on elements of unlawful activity required jury to find, in order to find defendant guilty, that defendant either willfully engaged in ownership, operation or conducting or carrying on of gaming operations of hotel and casino without license from Nevada gaming authorities to do so or willfully concealed ownership, operation or conducting or carrying on of gaming operations from such authorities for which he was not licensed, or that defendant did both such elements, instruction was not duplicitous as claimed, since either or both elements constituted offense under Nevada law. U. S. v. Goldfarb, C.A.6 (Mich.) 1981, 643 F.2d 422, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 117, 454 U.S. 827, 70 L.Ed.2d 101, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 118, 454 U.S. 827, 70 L.Ed.2d 101. Gaming 102

377. Superfluous instructions

Where charge in indictment that defendants caused to be shipped 100 pairs of honest dice and 12 pairs of crooked dice by mail from Las Vegas to Gulfport, and evidence eventuating therefrom, was essential to prove

that the dice seized were the same dice that defendants had ordered, the charge was not superfluous on theory that indictment could have just mentioned 112 pairs of dice and, in any event, no specific prejudice flowed from the factual description inasmuch as all gambling was illegal in Mississippi whether done with honest or dishonest paraphernalia. U. S. v. Hedge, C.A.5 (Miss.) 1972, 462 F.2d 220. Indictment And Information 119

378. Request for instructions

Failure to give requested instruction defining term “unlawful activity” constituted reversible error, in prosecution for aiding and abetting and causing travel by individual in interstate commerce with intent to promote, manage, establish, and carry on an unlawful activity. U.S. v. Gallo, C.A.4 (W.Va.) 1986, 782 F.2d 1191. Commerce 82.10; Criminal Law 1173.2(2)

Any error in not specifically defining the type of numbers lottery which was allegedly aided by interstate telephone calls was not plain error where defendants never requested an instruction that the existence of a particular named numbers lottery was an element of the crime charged. Menendez v. U. S., C.A.5 (Fla.) 1968, 393 F.2d 312, certiorari denied 89 S.Ct. 639, 393 U.S. 1029, 21 L.Ed.2d 572. Criminal Law 1038.3

379. Miscellaneous instructions

Conviction of persons under this section who operated lottery near state line, based on fact that their operation was patronized by out-of-state bettors, could not be sustained on theory that they actively encouraged interstate patronage, where jury was not instructed on such theory. Rewis v. U.S., U.S.Fla.1971, 91 S.Ct. 1056, 401 U.S. 808, 28 L.Ed.2d 493. Lotteries 20

Defendants who did not object at trial to court's charge on Travel Act [18 U.S.C.A. § 1952] and specifically requested that judge strike the pattern instruction definition of unlawful activity as meaning a business enterprise and insert language that unlawful activity includes the distribution of marijuana could not complain on appeal that court did not instruct jury that an unlawful activity is a business enterprise under the Act. U.S. v. Stanley, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1985, 765 F.2d 1224, rehearing denied 772 F.2d 904. Criminal Law 1038.1(4); Criminal Law 1137(3)

18 U.S.C.A. § 1952, 18 USCA § 1952

Current through P.L. 113-55 (excluding P.L. 113-54) approved 11-27-13

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