"Show Businessin the Living Room": Management Expectationsfor American Television, 1947-56 JamesL. Baughman• SchoolofJournalism and Mass Communication UniversityoflVisconsin-Madison Tallaluh Bankhead: Radio is mother of television. Questioner:Who is the father? MissBankhead: TV hasno father.[Ace, 1953] When the Americantelevision networks commenced operations in the late1940s, they had two common goals. The firstwas to winwhat critic Gilbert Seldescalled "the greataudience," that is, capturethe largestshare of the national market for mass culture. With limited interest from advertisers,and few homeshaving televisions (less than 1 percentof all householdsin 1948), this meantinvesting ahead of demand.Viewers, sponsors, and profitswere expectedto follow."We are first of all engagedin a capitalistenterprise," an NBC executivetold his staff, "which means we mustmake money, and make it soon"[Weaver memo, November 1949, p. 4]. By the late 1950s,TV hadbecome the nation'smost consumed mass medium,and the networkshad settledupon a "dominantdesign" [Nelson, 1991, p. 70; Klepperand Simons,1996] - a programmingphilosophy that maximizedearnings. After a decadeof experimentingwith live and special telecasts,each of the networksrelied heavily on .filmed weekly series. In 1961, 82 percentof networkprogramming in eveningprime time (7-11Eastern) was on film [Lichtyand Topping,1975, p. 440]. Althoughmost seriesfailed, a successfulshow - that is, one that ran for two or moreyears - couldbe a substantialprofit center. It couldbe rerunin the summers.Then, in industry parlance,it couldbe "stripped"and aired daily during the networks'daytime schedule,and eventually, "syndicated" to individualstations which would rerun them yet again,and again,and again[Balio, 1990, pp. 32-33, 35-36]. This approachwas all the moreattractive to the networksbecause until the early 1970sthey could,and often did, investin the seriesthey carriedon their schedules[U.S. FCC, 1965].

• Part of the researchfor thispaper was supported by the Irwin MaierFaculty DevelopmentFund of theSchool of Joumalism and Mass Communication of the University of Wisconsin-Madison.The authorthanks Brian Deith for hishelp. BUSINESSAND ECONOMIC HISTORY, VolumeTwenty-six, no. 2, Winter 1997. Copyright¸1997 bythe Business History Conference. ISSN 0894-6825.

718 MANAGEMENTEXPECTATIONS FOR AMERICAN TELEVISION, 1947-56/719

Did thoserunning America's networks foresee this outcome? The logic of dependingon filmedseries escaped many if not mostof thoseplanning for televisionin the late 1940sand early1950s. Hal Roach,Jr., one of the first Hollywoodproducers to engagein TV production,recalled imploring the networksto commissionmore filmedseries. "They couldn't understand our argumentthat filmedshows could be usedover and over,"Roach remarked [Mosby,1953]. All in all,ample evidence suggests that the networks and others heldvev/different expectations forthe newest medium. Or theysimply did not know."In the developmentof anynew form of communications,"one NBC executiveconfessed, "there must be an exploratov/period in which procedures arelaid down and patterns are set, before the successful use of themedium can be developed"[Weaver remarks, 1950]. Any discussionof Americanbroadcasting during this periodmust acknowledgeitsduopolistic structure. For a varietyof reasons,including their headstarts and popularity in radioas well as an unequaldistribution of TV channels,CBS and NBC held massiveleads over their two rivals,ABC and Du Mont.Indeed, Du Mont shutdown in 1955.Only a mergerwith cash-rich United Paramount Theatres in 1953 sustained ABC until more TV stations commencedoperations and became available for affiliation.It did not become trulycompetitive for two decades.ABC "wasthe longestrunning joke in networktelevision," wrote one industry observer. "ABC had been congenitally weakfor solong that executives atits rival networks blithely dismissed it as 'the Polandof Broadcasting"'[Bedell, 1981, p. 107]. One otherqualification is in order.Perhaps scholarly confession is the betterword. Only two of the fouroriginal networks, NBC andDu Mont,have depositedrecords with archives. And Du Mont,as already noted, was avev/ marginalplayer. Insights into CBS and ABC maybe gleanedfrom individual andgovernmental collections aswell as published contemporary accounts. Taken together,these sources tend to confirmsome of the work identifiedwith the newinstitutional economics. Few if anynetwork officials foresawthe cost-efficient reliance on filmedprogramming. The "rules"had to evolve[Nelson and Winter, 1982, chs. 3-5; Langlois, 1986]. Personalhistories affected the evolutionav/process. Virtually all of thoseinvolved in televisionplanning had substantial backgrounds in network radioor with advertising agencies overseeing radio programs. This explains why somany of TV's firstprograms and personalities came from radio, and why radioset the expectationsfor manyin the newindustry [Barnouw, 1970, pp. 21-22]. One radiorule concerned live broadcasts. For morethan two decades, thoserunning the networks and advertising agencies assumed that consumers preferredlive "originations."They, after all, justifiednetworks. In the mid- 1950slive telecasts were an argument against potential rivals relying exclusively on filmedprogramming [Boddy, 1990, pp. 136-37;Kepley, 1990, pp. 51-52; "SarnoffWarns TV']. Finally,through live broadcasts, a whole nation shared thesensation of experiencing thesame event simultaneously. Indeed, not until 720/ JAMESL. BAUGHMAN the 1980sand 1990swould Americans accept, most notably in coverageof the Olympics,extensive delays in thetelecasting of certainoccurrences. Technologyalso explainedthe primacyof live broadcasting.The developmentof taperecording came late in the 1940s.Until then, performance "transcriptions"could compare poorly to the originalbroadcast. Television's managerssimilarly had to waituntil the late 1950s before videotape offered an alternativeto livetelecasts. Otherwise, a crude"kinescope" of a programcould be madeor a programcould be filmed.This secondoption presented several problems.One was the cost. Producers could not justifythe expense of filming andediting a programwith no ancillarymarkets in view.They appeared limited before the mid-50s. That said,TV's plannerswere not opposedto film series.From the beginning,all of thenetworks aired some filmed series in eveningprime time, 25 percentin 1952 [Lichtyand Topping, 1975, p. 440].And, as earlyas 1951, Fortunequoted CBS President Frank Stanton predicting that film would become the dominantproduction value. (Revealingly, perhaps, as late as 1958,Stanton wastelling the FCC the opposite)["TV's Time of Trouble,"p. 131;Baughman 1985, pp. 182-83].Nor did the oppositionof most major motion picture studiosto TV productionfigure greatly in the statusof filmedprogramming. For everyMGM and Warner Brothersspuming the networks'overtures, smallercompanies like Roach'swere anxious to work for the newestmedium [Anderson,1994, pp. 1-21].Although NBC hadthe highestlive-to-film ratio, two of thenetwork's biggest hits of the early1950s, 'q2)ragnet" and "You Bet Your Life,"were filmed. All in all,there was no rigidrule regarding film versus live. Indeed, decision-makingwas oppormnisfic.Which productionvalue resultedin the best show?As NBC's chief programmerfor this period, SylvesterL. Weaver,Jr., wrote, "A film showis not betteror worsethan a live show."He evenleft openthe possibilitiesof networksyndicafion of filmed programs[Weaver memo, 1949, pp. 24, 27]. Still, he and othersplainly preferredlive to recordedprogramming. Weaver ordered Milton Berle and Eddie Cantorto performlive; Cantoreventually quit. As late as the 1958-59 season,a majorityof Jack Benny'sCBS programswere live [Humphrey, "Cantor"1955; Baughman, 1994, p. 18]. In otherways, the radiomodel required rethinking. Both CBS'sowner WilliamPaley and NBC's Weaver sought to breakthe powerof advertisers.In the 1930sand 1940s,sponsors often controlledchoice time slotswhile exer- cisingnear-absolute authority over individual programs. Advertisers' "interests andour interests are not the same,"Weaver observed. "They conflict directly" [weavermemo, 16 March 1953; "C.B.S. Steals the Show," p. 80]. Weaverin particulardisdained the radiomodel. Echoing many critics, Weaverconcluded that networkradio in the late 1940shad lost audiences by bankingtoo heavilyon the weeklycomedy series with a setcast of characters. After so manyseasons, regular listeners thoroughly knew the charactersand couldalmost anticipate the jokes and situations. Their very predictability - for example,the inevitablecrash heard after Fibber McGee opened his closet door - mightappeal to thosewho loyallytuned in. Yet theydid not attractwhat MANAGEMENTEXPECTATIONS FOR AMERICAN TELEVISION, 1947-56/721

Weavercalled the "lightlistener" who had eithergrown bored with such schtickor hadavoided such series completely. The sameindictment was made of dramaticseries. Television must be different.While offering popular series, NBC must presentprogramming that wouldattract the light viewer.To Weaver,this meant,among other strategies, investing in what he dubbed "spectaculars,"ninety-minute cultural programming usually aimed at upper- middle-browsensibilities. After all, Weaver argued,television was "show businessin theliving room." This mix of regularand special programming over a four-weekperiod would attract the heavy and light viewers - andgive NBC the largest"cumulative" televison audience. Weaver patterned his four-week strategyafter thoseof massmagazines like /a)q whichbased its circulation claimson fourweeks rather than one. Finally, spectaculars achieved another goal.Because of theirhigh cost, no onesponsor could underwrite and control the program[Weaver memo, 1949, p. 13; Weaverto Denny, p. 5; Weaver, 1954,pp. 5-7;Weaver, 1955, p. 10;Baughman, 1985, p. 186]. The spectacularstrategy served NBC in otherways. Telecast in color, spectacularshelped to justifythe purchaseof color televisionsthat the network'sowner, RCA, hadbegun to market.And airingspecials undermined thecampaign of subscriptiontelevision proponents who assertedthat only pay TV would bring "quality"television [Baughman, 1985, pp. 187-89;Gould, 1955]. CBSby comparisonlargely stood by broadcastingconvention. Paley and CBS PresidentFrank Stantonessentially believed that their new network shouldtake its cuesfrom radio.In the late 1940s,popular weekly series had œmallypermitted the networkto overcomeNBC's popularity.The habitof viewingthe sameseries every week should be cultivated."If it isn'ta regular show,"Stanton declared, "it isn'ttelevision" [Baughman, 1985, p. 186].It was franchise-building-and franchise-preservation.In 1949 and 1950,Paley had signedseveral prominent NBC Radio stars to CBS contracts.He was determinedto seehis investments pay. Adheringto that rulein the newestmedium proved complicated. For one thing,most of CBS'smajor talentresisted doing their programson a weeklybasis. On radiothey could hold a script,not worry about costurning or blocking.And performinglive - andbefore a camera- madeany slips all the more embarrassing.Dancer Donald O'Connor,hosting NBC's "Comedy Hour" in May 1953,complained that he neededa month'spreparation to performhis intricate dance routines live. "In films,"O'Connor explained, "a dancesequence can be shotover and over again until it is perfect.This doesn't holdup in televisionbecause it boilsdown to a one-takeaffair." Not until the 1960-61season did Jack Benny agree to do his programevery week. Up to then,CBS had to airthe shows on analternating basis [Ames, 1953; Baughman, 1994,pp. 21-22]. This talentintransigence worked to the advantageof NBC. One of Weaver'searliest and most successful innovations was to createcomedy variety programson Saturdayand Wednesdaynights with rotatinghosts. This gave performerslike O'Connorand others, "who couldn't or wouldn'twork every 722 / JAMESL. BAUGHMAN

week,"Weaver wrote, the time off theydemanded. (Performers also worried about wearingout their welcomeif they appearedevery week.) Finally, sponsorshipswere rotated, depending on thehost, thus denying any individual advertisersautonomy [Weaver memo, 1953; Weaver, 1993, pp. 193, 219-21; "NBC's 'RotatingComic"']. LucilleBall and Desi Arnaz offeredCBS one, greatexception. Their situationcomedy, "I LoveLucy," was filmed and offered every week. It was, for CBS,the perfectvehicle. "I Love Lucy"proved immensely popular (it is still airedon an Americancable channel). Running six seasonsbeginning in 1951-52,"Lucy" ranked f•rst in the Nielsenratings four times,second once, andthird once. During the 1952-53season, it enioyed an average rating of 67.3 [Brooksand Marsh, app. 3]. True to Stanton'sphilosophy, "Lucy" created a Mondaynight habit: come 9 p.m.(Eastern Time), Americans watched CBS. A January19, 1953episode involving the birth of Lucy'sson distracted some in Washingtonto celebrateDwight Eisenhower's first inauguration. "I Love Lucy"was alsoan industryprecursor. Its hugepopularity demonstratedthat a programdid not haveto be broadcastlive to win a majorityof viewers.Then, too, CBS, after initially only rebroadcasting seven episodesper summerand carrying a replacementprogram, began selectively airingmore reruns [Desilu to CBS,1953;CBS amendment, 1954]. Their strong ratingsstunned many in the industry.Managers of stationsaffiliated with networkshad been especially uneasy that reruns would cost them viewers. In fact,one advertisingagency study indicated reruns had hrger audiences than summerreplacement shows [NBC Television Affiliates Board, 15 April 1958, pp. 3-4; Frey,p. 9; Dunne memo,1955]. Did thesuccess of "I LoveLucy" in settingbroadcast practices for more thana generationconfawn CBS's show business acumen? The network'sinitial plansfor the seriessuggest otherwise. Negotiating with Ball and Arnaz in 1950, CBSproposed that the program originate from New York everyother •vee/• [CBS agreement,1950]. Ball and Amaz, however,like manyperformers who had spentmuch time in Hollywood[Banghman, 1994, pp. 19-20],resisted doing theirshow in NewYork. They and not the network insisted that the program be filmedin California.Ball and Arnaz, and not CBSor the sponsor,would absorbthe addedcost of film whileretaining ownership of the programs themselves.And theywould produce enough episodes to be a weeklyseries [CBSamendment, 1951; Bart Andrews, 1976, pp. 41-42]. In one significantinstance, CBS simplyhedged its bets.In 1950,the networkbegan work on Television City, its $35-million West Coast production facility.The move- togetherwith similar units constructed by NBC andABC - markedthe beginning of theend of NewYork City as the center of television origination.It also acknowledged theunwillingness of most popular performers to abandonsouthern California for New York. The planning of TelevisionCity is tellingin anotherregard. The networksimply did not knowthe futureof televisionproduction./lrchitectural Forum described "some of the uncertainties in detail"besetting the architects, Peteira & Luckman.Among them: "audience participation- would it continueto be animportant factor in TV?"Peteira & MANAGEMENTEXPECTATIONS FOR AMERICAN TELEVISION, 1947-56/723

Luckmansplit the difference,constructing two studioswith audienceseating, twowithout ["CBS TV CityStarts," p. 104;Weaver, 1993, p. 205]. By themid-1950s, each of thenetworks was rerunning filmed series in the summer.In 1954-55,CBS offeredtwenty-six original episodes of the situationcomedy, "Our Miss Brooks," repeating thirteen. The remaining weeks wentto replacementand special programming [Humphrey, '%Vedding Bells"]. But cautionstill reigned. For thesummer of 1956,NBC assuredaffiliates, only 9.5 of 27 primetime hoursper weekwould be reruns[NBC Affiliates,26 January1956]. CBS'smore conservative,tradition-bound strategy appeared to have succeeded.The networkovertook NBC in the ratingsand revenuesin 1953. That April, all of the top ten eveningand daytimeprograms were on CBS ["C.B.S.Steals the Show"].NBC's successes came with earlymorning and late eveningprogramming innovations, Today and Tonight,though both were money-losers.As lateas 1958,NBC contemplatedreducing Today's daily air time fromtwo hoursto one [NBC TelevisionAffliates, 12 August1958, p. 3]. The restof the day andnight, CBS held distinctadvantages. Although both networksaired live programs,NBC's percentage actually rose to 90.0 percent of its entire schedulein March 1956,compared to 81.5 percentfor CBS [BroadcastingYearbook 1963, p. 20]. Againstthis trend stood Weaver's spectacular strategy, an extraordinary breakin networkbroadcasting. Rather than rely on viewerhabit ("Turn on the set,dear. It's nine o'clockand 'Lucy'is on"), NBC gambledthat consumers would have differentexpectations for the home screen.Network planners frequentlyevoked the imageof a theatricalopening. "Every Spectacular will havethe qualityand character of a big Broadwaypremiere," NBC executive RobertSamoff declared, "with all the excitement and audience anticipation that goesalong with a newopening" [Samoff, 1954]. Moreover, the averagecost of a spectacularwas more than three times as great as conventional programming. Airedlive, spectacularsdid not havethe recoverycosts of half-hourseries. Weaverhimself likened them to lossleaders in retailing[Kepley, 1990, p. 53]. In retrospect,the spectacularstrategy carried other risks. Weaver and others,not unlikemany in advertisingand broadcasting, confused themselves with their consumers.Television executives were paid to follow every developmentin their industry.Viewers were not. Would consumersknow enoughabout an upcomingNBC specialto forsaketheir favorite programs on other networks?NBC assuredaffiliates that spectacularswould be heavily promoted.But would newspapersgo alongand publicizeNBC's special programming?Would viewers have (or possess)the timeto readsuch stories? The advantageof habitwas just that. Tired workers and parents, the children finallyput to bed,could turn on theirsets knowing "Our MissBrooks" would appear.No otherinitiative was required. The theatricalanalogy similarly posed problems. New Yorkers - certainlyNBC executiveslike Weaver and Samoff- mightbecome caught up in theexcitement of Broadwayand the latest shows. Weaver's wife hadbeen a stageactress; Robert Sarnoff's was an opera singer. Yet muchof Americahad a 724 / JAMESL. BAUGHMAN differentcultural orientation. Legitimate theater had been decliningacross Americafor morethan a generation,mainly because of the spreadof sound motionpictures. Small town "opera houses," once used by roadshows, had beenconverted into movie palaces. Hollywood, not Broadway, fascinated most Americans[Banghman, 1993]. That said, Weaver'sunorthodoxy momentarily became established religion.After a shakystart, NBC's 1954-55 spectaculars enjoyed some ratings successes.None triumphedmore thoroughlythan the musical"Peter Pan," whoseNielsen victims included, incredibly, "I LoveLucy." Had Weaver in fact rewrittenthe rules?CBS, still ahead in the ratingsand revenues, nonetheless committeditself to morespecials the next season [Gould, 1955; Adams, 1955]. It provedunnecessary mimicry. The spectacularas a programminggenre couldnot sustainitself. Live originationsat 9:30Eastern Time struggledfor ratingson the WestCoast, especially in LosAngeles. At 6:30in the Pacific Time Zone,children were still clamoring to watchTV - andnot Noel Coward or OrsonWelles, each of whomappeared on "FordStar Jubilee" specials on CBS.In April and May 1956,the Cowardand Welles specials ranked below NBC and ABC fare and,in duringone thirty-minuteslot, two independent, non-networkstations [Luce memo, 1956]. Even adults could be disappointed. The demandson writers,producers, directors and talentwere too greattoo meetthe expectationsof critics,advertisers and viewers. For every"Peter Pan" cameseveral that would not fly.After two seasons,concluded two advertising executives,the ratingsfor spectacularsfailed to matchthose for regularseries [Gould,1956; Seymour and Devine, 1956]. Both networks began cutting back on theirspecial telecasts. As oneadvertising executive observed, "the networks havecome to the conclusionthat thereis nothinginherent in the 'Spectacular' idea which makes it better programmingthan regularly scheduled programming"[Haynes, 1956]. Again, the programmingof habit undercutthat of expectation.A successfulweekly series might not conveyWeaver's aspirations for the newest medium.Its verypredictability, however, like that for all standardizedproducts, keptconsumers from being disappointed. Jack Benny, for one,understood this broadcastcommandment. The "king of radio," almost as successfulon television,Benny worked hard editing scripts and perfecting his comic timing. Yet he neverexpected an individualshow to rankover all others."We don't worryabout the showbeing great," he remarkedin 1947,"we justsee that it isn'tlousy" [Graham, 1947]. With Bennyand other standardizedgoods in ample supply,CBS retainedits leadershipin televisionaudiences and advertiserbillings - advantagesit held for nearlytwo decades.Madison Avenue had firmly rejected Weaver'scampaign for cumulativeaudience measurement, and NBC firedhim in August1956. He neverworked for anothernetwork.

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