What the World Owes to Laos

research article IUCJ 34 What the World Owes to Laos

Laura Navarro[1] [1] Laura is a junior undergraduate at Duke Kunshan University majoring in political economy with tracks in economics.

Abstract During the Vietnam War, the United States justifed a military intervention in Published online Southeast Asia as a means to contain the expansion of communism and consolidate their January 2021 power and credibility. Although the war offcially took place in North and South Vietnam, Citation Laos PDR became the most Navarro, Laura. 2020. “What heavily bombed country in the world during this period. This paper examines these bombing the World Owes to Laos.” IUCJ missions and their repercussions. Ultimately, the goal is to determine the level of responsi- 1, no. 1 (Winter 2021), 34-39. bility that the U.S. government and the international community hold in fostering cooperation to provide an effective remedy to the victims in Laos and, in doing so, supporting the sustainable development of the country.

Keywords: Vietnam War; Secret War; UXO; U.S.-Lao relations; reparations

Introduction future efforts.

uring the Vietnam War, the United States justifed a mili- The Secret War Dtary intervention in Southeast Asia as a means to contain the expansion of communism and to consolidate their power On paper, the Vietnam War took place in Vietnam and Cam- and credibility (Rotondi 2020). While the war offcially took bodia between 1965 and 1973. Although the confict offcially place in North and South Vietnam, it is now recognized that the ended in 1973 after the Paris Peace Accords, it is now known United States also intervened militarily in Cambodia and Laos. that the fghting continued until 1975 (Rotondi 2020). Laos In fact, Laos PDR became the most heavily bombed country was a strategic target for the United States to disrupt the supply in the world during this period (COPE Laos 2016). However, chain to Vietnam on the Ho Chi Minh Trail; thus, despite being the war actions in Laos were not disclosed to the public as a signatory party of the International Agreements on the Neu- they directly violated the 1962 International Agreement on the trality of Laos, the United States began to bomb Laos as early Neutrality of Laos, and, as they pertained to a secret mission as 1964 and continued to do so until 1975 (Convery 2018). It of the CIA, these events were not offcially acknowledged by is estimated that, by the end of the war, 10% of the population the U.S. government for more than 40 years after the end of of Laos had been killed, over 20% had been severely wounded, the war (Shenoy 2016). The secrecy shrouding the situation in and approximately 25% had become refugees (Kurlantzick Laos earned it the name of the “Secret War.” 2017, 245-255).

Although the United States has acknowledged it possesses War Crimes some level of responsibility in Vietnam and, to a lesser extent, Cambodia, it wasn’t until 2016 that former President Barack In order to provide a basis to assign responsibility, sanctions, Obama became the frst U.S. president to publicly admit that and reparations, it is necessary to defne the nature of the the United States dropped over a million tons of bombs in crime and its extent. In the case of the Vietnam War, this can Laos. Additionally, his administration doubled U.S. funding to be evaluated according to the framework of the international remove the unexploded ordnance that kill and maim people on humanitarian law. As will be discussed later, the crimes related a daily base (Shenoy 2016). Despite this, Laos’ fund is compar- to the bombing of Laos are not limited to war crimes nor to atively insignifcant to that provided to Vietnam, and, conse- the timeframe of the Vietnam War; however, this section will quently, it has been suggested that the United States has failed focus on the events of the Vietnam War and how they relate to to take full responsibility for their actions in Laos (Sisavatdy relevant international laws. 2018). War Crimes are generally defned as any act that violates the However, it is also essential to note that Laos’ government, in IHL. Some of the violations specifed include willful killing, some cases, has refused U.S. aid due to internal suspicions of torture and inhuman treatment, willfully causing great suffer- the American agenda in Southeast Asia (Andelman 1975, 3). ing, appropriation and destruction of property, and unlawful This paper will examine the bombing missions of the United deportation and confnement (United Nations 2020). Since the States in Laos during the 20th century and their repercussions. Geneva Conventions in 1949, all member states of the United The goal is to determine the level of responsibility that the U.S. Nations are required to abide by this law and any violations are government and the international community hold in fostering sanctioned by the International Criminal Court (International international cooperation to compensate war victims, impose Committee of the Red Cross 1949). sanctions, mitigate the effects of war remnants, and support the sustainable development of the country. To do so, the concepts In 1967, the International War Crimes Tribunal found the Unit- of war crime, foreign aid, responsibility, and reparations will ed States to be “guilty of all charges” for incurring war crimes be reviewed, and the relevant events, agents, and laws will such as genocide, use of forbidden weapons, maltreatment and be identifed. Ultimately, there will be an assessment of the killing of prisoners, and forceful displacement of civilians in reparatory progress in Laos and possible recommendations for Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Notably, there was a strong 35 icUJ research article

emphasis on the use of advanced weaponry in large areas populated by civilians (Foster 2017). For instance, cluster bombs UXO has also acted as a direct barrier to the development of were extensively used by the United States throughout the war. Laos. Frequent UXO-related injuries have severely impact- This type of weaponry has been prohibited since 2008 under ed the workforce. Victims of UXO who are lucky enough to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, as they have been found survive often face abundant obstacles to enter the work market to be extremely ineffective when fghting adversary troops but as their productivity is perceived to be greatly diminished. fatal to the civilian population. While cluster bombs cannot This is also true for young UXO victims who have to face be directed towards a narrow target or group and cause little signifcant emotional distress and social stigma in their schools damage to concrete and steel structures and weaponry, they do and communities (United Nations 2018). Moreover, heavily affect largely populated areas and are designed to “tear through contaminated areas usually correspond to rural provinces with the fesh of human bodies” (Foster 2020). It is estimated that, higher levels of poverty. This exacerbates the social gap due to from 1964 to 1973, the United States dropped over 7.5 million UXO-related obstacles to livelihood activity and its contribu- tons of bombs on Southeast Asia (Hikosaka 2019). As a result, tion to food insecurity (Soulineyadeth 2014, 2-4). the territories of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos were devastated and their people had to face long-lasting psychological, physi- Similarly, the contaminated land cannot be safely used for cal, and societal consequences (Hart 2020). industrial purposes, tourism, infrastructure, transportation, or education. This has hindered the development of all industrial In light of these facts and in accordance with the Tribunal’s and productive sectors of the economy as well as impeding ruling, in 1972, the United States agreed to give 4.5 and 3.5 proper technical and educational outreach to respond to UXO billion (U.S.) dollars to North and South Vietnam, respective- discoveries and accidents in rural areas (United Nations 2018). ly. By 1973, however, the fgure was down to less than half of what it was initially. Additionally, this compensation was con- In 1996, the Laotian government established “UXO Lao,” a ditioned on the maintenance of the peace agreement between national program that coordinates the clearance of contaminat- North and South Vietnam; therefore, when the North took over ed areas for agriculture and community purposes. Since then, the South, the United States seized the opportunity to back off more regulatory entities have been established and the efforts to entirely from its commitment to reparations (Langguth 2000). destroy UXO have dramatically increased.

No similar reparation was agreed upon to compensate for the In 2016, Laos launched a unique national Sustainable Devel- damage of the war and support the victims in Cambodia and opment Goal: SDG 18 “Lives safe from UXO.” The project Laos. pursues a programmatic support and oversight of the national efforts to identify UXO contamination, clear the land, and re- Remnants of the war spond to civilian discoveries. The initiatives of the last decade have reduced the annual UXO casualties by almost 85%; how- Although the war has been offcially over for more than 40 ever, from the end of the war to the present, less than 1% of the years, its repercussions continue to affect Laos’ political, UXO has been destroyed (Legacies of War 2011). Undoubtedly, economic, and social development. This is particularly relevant that means that people will continue to suffer due to this cause in the context of the long-lasting consequences of the bombing for many years to come. missions of the United States. For that reason, it is crucial to assess the developmental effects of UXO and Agent Orange, Agent Orange as well as their direct implications on the well-being of past, present, and future victims. Apart from cluster bombs, the United States also dropped chemical bombs and herbicides over Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Namely, from 1961 to 1971, the USA dropped more than Unexploded Ordnance 75 million liters of the chemical defoliant “Agent Orange” over Southeast Asia. This is known as the “scorched-earth policy,” Throughout the war period, Laos was the target of about which attempted to destroy crops, forest areas, and other food 580,000 bombing missions and more than 270 million cluster supplies of the Viet Cong (Lin 2018). bombs were dropped over its territory. However, over a third of the bombs did not detonate at the time (Swiss Agency for In 1966, the United Nations delegate from Hungary criticized Development and Cooperation 2014). As a result, about 40% the use of herbicides in Vietnam as a deliberate violation of the of Laos’ territory is contaminated with hazardous explosive Geneva Protocol. As a result, in 1968, President Nixon ratifed units, known as “bombies” (Yinglun 2019). Bombies lie on the the protocol and renounced the use of lethal chemicals. By this ground, oftentimes undetected, but are still active and can be time, studies had already suggested that chemicals in Agent detonated by subtle changes in pressure and movement (Lega- Orange were highly toxic to animal fetuses (Biggs 2017). In cies of War 2020). 1970, due to the escalating international pressure, the White House and the Defense Department banned the use of Agent In Laos, 75% of the population relies on agricultural activities, Orange and all its related military missions in Vietnam (Aspen which makes them more vulnerable to UXO-related accidents. Institute 2012). It is estimated that, in the post-war period, over 20,000 Lao people have been victims of UXO, with 60% of In 1991, former U.S. Senator Tom Daschle sponsored a study these incidences resulting in death.. Of these victims, 98% are to uncover the link between diseases and exposure to chemi- civilians and 40% are children. This accounts for more than cals found in herbicides, such as Agent Orange. It is now clear half of the confrmed UXO casualties in the world (Legacies of that the dioxins in Agent Orange cause genetic mutations that War 2020). result in severe birth defects. Additionally, the dioxins in Agent research article IUCJ 36

Orange persist in the environment contaminating the soil, water Between 1993 and 2016, the United States provided on average sources, and food chains. Therefore, new generations in South- 4.9 million U.S. dollars per year for the removal of UXO in east Asia will continue to suffer from the deadly effects of the Laos. Nonetheless, Laos has never been a priority to the United herbicide (Lin 2018). As a result, in 2015, the U.S. Department States. In fact, the average yearly fnancial aid received by of Veterans Affairs paid 24 billion (U.S.) dollars in compensa- Laos corresponds to about 1/3 of what the United States spent tions to American Vietnam War veterans (Fisher 2018). Howev- per day bombing Laos throughout the war period4 (Legacies er, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia have yet to receive compen- of War 2011). Moreover, the aid packages received were never sation for similar damages. given as a form of reparation nor were they accompanied by an offcial acknowledgment of the U.S. military intervention and For that reason, Vietnam has on various occasions sought its repercussions in Laos. assistance and fled lawsuits to seek compensation for those impacted by Agent Orange. While there have been successful In 2016, President Barack Obama became the frst U.S. pres- individual lawsuits against Monsanto, Dow Chemical, and ident in offce to acknowledge the bombing of Laos, visit the other American frms responsible for the production of the country, and double the fnancial aid to support the removal herbicide, there has not been a large-scale compensation for the of UXO. While this event was a sign of great progress in their victims in Southeast Asia (Lynh 2019). bilateral relationship, neither Obama nor the U.S. government ever offered an apology for the military missions undertaken in Encouragingly, starting in 2012, the United States joined Laos (BBC News 2016). Vietnam’s efforts to reduce the contamination levels in Viet- namese territory. Still, Laos and Cambodia were once over- Non-U.S. Foreign Assistance looked (Lin 2018). Although Laos has received U.S. funding to aid victims of UXO, disabilities resulting from the exposure Since the 1980s, Laos has also been the recipient of Offcial to Agent Orange remain largely unaddressed (Chagnon 2016). Development Assistance from various countries other than the Studies from the War Legacies Project have concluded that United States. The assistance received has also signifcantly in- there is a signifcant number of people with congenital birth creased throughout the years, from 10.5 U.S. dollars per capita defects and disabilities in Agent Orange sprayed zones in Laos. in 1984 to 70.62 in 2014 (RSBTWS 2017). Currently, the pri- Moreover, Agent Orange has also posed serious developmental mary sources of ODA to Laos are China, Japan, South Korea, challenges. Families living in contaminated areas, previously the United States, and the European Union. Undoubtedly, ODA subsistence farmers, now suffer from extreme poverty, hunger, has helped the country fnance important infrastructural, devel- and other health problems resulting from the chemical contami- opment, and humanitarian projects like dams, special economic nation of their farmland (Chagnon 2016). It was also suggested zones, and programs for the removal of UXO (Dolven and Lum that, due to the lack of outreach to rural communities, Lao 2018, 1-2). citizens were signifcantly less aware of Agent Orange and its effects than Vietnamese citizens (War Legacies Project 2016). Nevertheless, it is important to note that foreign development Nonetheless, their lack of awareness on this issue should not assistance and fnancing can take many forms such as grants, belittle the environmental and public health threat that Agent concessional loans, private investment, and bank lending. Orange represents or the urgency to tackle it. External debt and borrowing constitute a large portion of Laos’ government fnancing. This form of assistance is subject to year Diplomatic Relations and Foreign Aid by year variability and has increasingly involved tax revenue and lower concessionality levels. For instance, Laos’ debt to The aforementioned repercussions of the war have yet to be China corresponds to about 45% of the country’s GDP. Since fully addressed, and most progress has been achieved as a re- Laos’ government will most likely not be able to meet its debt sult of Laos’ national institutional efforts. However, the effects payments, it has been suggested that lenders will offer debt of the war in Laos have gained international visibility overtime. relief in exchange for advancing other geopolitical interests This has brought signifcant foreign aid into the country and (VOA News 2020). Furthermore, both Laos’ government as ameliorated its political relationship with the United States. well as foreign development partners have recognized that the Therefore, understanding Laos’ political international ties is social development in Laos as a result of ODA has not been vital to better assess past interactions and propose a sound path nearly as successful as the quantitative economic growth (Min- for future international cooperation and appropriate reparations. istry of Planning and Investment 2016). This suggests that there is an imbalance between Laos’ social and development goals U.S.-Lao political relationships and the interests of foreign investors.

After the end of the war, the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party Victims and the Right to Reparations gained power and offcially established the Lao People’s Dem- ocratic Republic in 1975. The relationship between Laos and While Laos has been the recipient of signifcant fnancial aid the United States, which had already deteriorated throughout from the United States and other governmental and non-gov- the war, faded when the United States Agency for International ernmental organizations, this cannot be equated or confused Development and the United States Information Agency with- with adequate reparation. Laos development challenges, in drew from the country (Thayer 2005, 6-7). Their diplomatic great part, are a direct consequence of the military missions relations were not restored until 1992 when they engaged in undertaken during the Secret War. Thus, reparation programs bilateral cooperation to investigate missing in action American should not only focus on fnancial compensations but also seek soldiers and prisoners of war (Thayer 2010, 443-449). justice through recognition, civil trust, and social solidarity (De Greiff 2006, 453). Arguably, Laos has not received suffcient 37 icUJ research article

reparations on any of these grounds, which has obstructed an (De Greiff 2006, 454). This obligation is not only a duty ac- appropriate resolution to the confict. Thus, it is necessary to cording to international law, but has also been deemed neces- further explore the historical background of reparations, its sary within the United States. Notably, in 1973, Henry Kissing- categories, and the degree to which they have been and should er, President Nixon’s chief foreign policy aide at the time, be implemented in Laos. stated that “together with healing the wounds in Indochina, we can begin to heal the wounds in America” (Gwertzman 1973). Historical Background of Reparations Nonetheless, to apply the UN guidelines for reparations, it is Reparations have a long history in post-war instances. For necessary to defne what a victim should receive in fairness. example, after the German victory over France in the Fran- Currently, there is no unambiguous way to defne fair co-Prussian War, Germany received 5 billion francs as “in- reparations. The leading principle to deal with such challenges demnity”. Later, following World War I, Germany initially is “resitutio in integrum,” which is understood as a full resto- settled on giving the Allies 30 billion U.S. dollars in reparations ration of the pre-confict individual and state circumstances (De (Turgeon 1973, 112-115). However, it wasn’t until the end of Greiff 2006, 456-457). Still, setting preexisting conditions as World War II, after the establishment of the UN, that a legal a goal is oftentimes unrealizable and, in retroactive cases like framework of cooperation, rather than coexistence, was set. seeking reparations for the Secret War, it would be somewhat The emergence of human rights in international law trans- undesirable. This ambiguity has been used as a basis for the formed the concept of state responsibility under the premise United States to dodge their responsibility of reparations. that reparations are due not only to states but also to individual victims and groups (OCHCHR 2008). Accordingly, for the frst Additionally, the international community has engaged in little time, Germany signed a treaty to pay reparations to individual action to aid the reparation process following the Vietnam War. survivors of the Holocaust, as well as State reparations to Israel While the United States has a big portion of the responsibility (De Greiff 2006, 392). to pay reparations, the international community could play an important role in supporting reparation efforts, providing Since then, the United Nations has set a guideline to respond technical assistance, and pressuring multilateral institutions to mass violations of human rights and the IHL. The fve main to adopt the necessary conditions to attend the needs of the components of the guidelines are restitution, compensation, victims (OCHCHR 2008). Since the current international rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees of non-repetition framework for reparations does not assign a concrete role to the (OCHCHR 2008). Under these guidelines, the main objective international community, this has often been used as an excuse of a reparation program is to do justice to the victims (De for inaction. For that reason, the UN has recommended to re- Greiff 2006, 453). Remarkably, of these fve main categories, evaluate the role and responsibility of the international commu- only compensations can be addressed in economic terms. nity to guide, strengthen, and legitimize reparation processes. Moreover, even compensations aim to provide for damages that (De Greiff 2005). go beyond economic loss; including any mental, physical, and moral harm. Conclusion

Nonetheless, there are very few, if any, successful examples of After reviewing the historical and legislative background of comprehensive mass reparation programs. This is in part due to the military missions in Laos, it is possible to assert that no due the broad and ambiguous language of the UN guidelines, and reparations have been paid. Future efforts must recognize the also to its subjectivity to the willingness of States to cooperate. multidimensional extent of the damages and the different indi- In the context of the Vietnam War, international cooperation vidual and national components of a comprehensive reparation was undermined throughout the Cold War and transitional program. For this purpose, the reparatory progress in Laos will justice shifted towards regime stabilization. Due to politi- be assessed according to the fve main components of the UN cal constraints, Vietnam had to settle for promises of minor reparation guidelines. Some fnal considerations and recom- economic compensations that were never fulflled (2-3). On mendations are also provided. the other hand, by the time that the events of the Secret War in Laos gained recognition, a policy of forgiveness and oblivion Restitution had already been internationally accepted. According to the UN, restitution can be understood as the Justice and The Right to Reparations restoration of liberty, enjoyment of human rights, identity, fam- ily life and citizenship, place of residence, employment, and According to the Permanent Court of Justice, established after property (OCHCHR 2008). In Laos, progress on these grounds World War I, any violation of international law entails respon- has been greatly hindered by the presence of UXO. The United sibility, which is a second obligation to the primary obligation States and international organizations have already joined Laos’ to repair the violation (OCHCHR 2008). Since the United efforts to tackle this problem; however, national and interna- States has been found guilty of violating IHL and committing tional efforts must be strengthened to accelerate the clearance war crimes in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, it follows that it process and avoid future victims. should provide “effective remedy” to the three states as well as to individual victims. Under this international legislative Compensation framework, the United States is responsible for: economically compensating Laos for the adverse consequences of their acts; While Laos has received substantial foreign aid, it has never making up for moral, emotional, and mental injuries; reestab- been paid appropriate economic compensations proportional lishing the victims status quo; offering apologies; and accepting to the damage. The Court of International Justice, the UN, and judicial and administrative sanctions that ensure nonrecurrence research article IUCJ 38 individual nations play a vital role in compelling the United reparations. However, these guidelines cannot be confused with States to readdress its war crimes and commit to paying com- a guarantee of State compliance. The International Commu- pensations to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. nity must reevaluate its role and responsibility in facilitating, supporting, and legitimizing mass reparation and reconciliation Rehabilitation processes as well as instances of litigation and imposition of sanctions. Laos has extensive programs to provide rehabilitation to victims of UXO, which are signifcantly funded by foreign References aid, particularly from the United States (COPE Laos 2016). However, other vestiges of the war have been largely neglected. 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