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- Laws, Ceteris Paribus Conditions, and the Dynamics of Belief
- Permissivism, Underdetermination, and Evidence Elizabeth Jackson (Australian National University/Ryerson University) and Margaret Greta Turnbull (Gonzaga University)
- How to Be an Epistemic Permissivist1
- The Ontological Importance of Being a Perceptual Attitude
- 300310 Carl-Johan Palmqvist
- Toward a Synthesis of Reliabilism and Evidentialism? Or: Evidentialism’S Troubles, Reliabilism’S Rescue Package Alvin I
- Reasoning One's Way out of Skepticism
- Lehrer on Belief and Acceptance
- 1 Oxford Bibliographies Online SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY
- 1 Belief and Credence
- Epistemic Norms and the Normativity of Belief
- Reasoning with Doxastic Attitudes in Multi-Agent Domains
- Belief, Evidence, and Knowledge: a Response to Cling
- Into Question: an Account of Inquiry
- Systems-Oriented Social Epistemology*
- The Debate on Testimony in Social Epistemology and Its Role in the Game of “Giving and Asking for Reasons”
- Aristotle Ethical Epistemology and UT
- Knowledge, Warrant & Foundationalism (W15)
- Beliefs and Degrees of Belief
- Formal Representations of Suspended Judgment
- Two Distinct Doxastic Attitudes 23 2.1 the Notion ‘Doxastic Attitude’
- DEONTOLOGICAL EPISTEMOLOGY by SEAN MESLAR
- Inquiry and the Doxastic Attitudes
- Knowledge, Perception, and Memory
- Epistemic Responsibility, Classical Epistemology and Inferentialism
- Epistemic Benefits of the Material Theory of Induction Job De Grefte
- 1 Believing Badly: Doxastic Duties Are Not Epistemic Duties Miriam Schleifer Mccormick Draft of Paper Forthcoming in Epistemic D