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Bid shading
Pricing Rule in a Clock Auction
Integrating the Structural Auction Approach and Traditional Measures of Market Power
Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions
CONFLICT and COOPERATION WITHIN an ORGANIZATION: a CASE STUDY of the METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT of SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA by DAVID
Countering the Winner's Curse: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model
On the Existence of Equilibrium in Bayesian Games Without Complementarities
ABSTRACT ESSAYS on AUCTION DESIGN Haomin Yan Doctor of Philosophy, 2018 Dissertation Directed By: Professor Lawrence M. Ausubel
Discriminatory Versus Uniform-Price Auctions
Bid Shading by Win-Rate Estimation and Surplus Maximization
Projection and Overbidding in Auctions
Conference Agenda 73Rd Annual Congress of the International Institute of Public Finance
Belief Extraction in Mechanism Design
Bid Shading and Bidder Surplus in the U.S. Treasury Auction System ∗
In Defense of Pay-As-Bid Auctions: a Divisible-Good Perspective
Auction Theory for the New Economy
Types-Of-Auctions-1.Pdf
Second-Chance Offers and Buyer Reputation: Theory and Evidence on Auctions with Default
Bayes–Nash Equilibria of the Generalized Second-Price Auction
Top View
Solving for the Optimal Collusive Mechanism at First-Price Auctions
'The Cost of Simple Bidding in Combinatorial Auctions'
The Unilateralist's Curse
A Multinomial Logit Framework to Estimating Bid Shading in Procurement Auctions, with Application to Cattle Sales in the Texas Panhandle
Bid Shading and Bidder Surplus in the US Treasury Auction System†
Lecturenotesongametheory
Auctions with Endogenous Participation and an Uncertain Number of Bidders: Experimental Evidence 1
Countering the Winner's Curse
Empirical Documentation of Bid Shading in the Discriminatory Auction
[Brunnermeier]Asset Pricing Under Asymmetric Information
(VCG) Mechanism
The Micro Textbook
Quantum Microeconomics
2021 ESA Global Online Around-The-Clock Conference Program (FINAL)
Pay-As-Bid Auctions in Theory and Practice
Bid Shading in the Brave New World of First-Price Auctions
Rationalizable Bidding in First-Price Auctions1
Uniform-Price Auctions: Update of the Treasury Experience
Introduction to Auctions†
Learning to Bid Optimally and Efficiently in Adversarial First-Price Auctions
Strategyproofness in the Large As a Desideratum for Market Design
Game-Theoretic Evaluation of Balancing Power Auctions
On the Existence of Equilibrium in Bayesian Games Without Complementarities By
The Evolution of Bidding Behavior in Private-Values Auctions and Double Auctions
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES BID SHADING and BIDDER SURPLUS in the U.S. TREASURY AUCTION SYSTEM Ali Hortaçsu Jakub Kastl Allen
The Micro Textbook with Calculus
Elicited Bid Functions in (A)Symmetric First-Price Auctions*
A Data-Driven Metric of Incentive Compatibility
Why Do More Experienced Bidders Shade Less?∗
Bidder Behavior in Multi-Unit Auctions Evidence from Swedish Treasury
Strategic Bidding in Product-Mix, Sequential, and Simultaneous Auctions
Behavioral Economic Theory and Experimental Investigation Dissertation
Bidding Behavior in Divisible Good Auctions: Theory and Evidence from the Turkish Treasury Auction Market
Zbwleibniz-Informationszentrum
Auctions and Bid Rigging
Econometrics for Learning Agents (Working Paper)
Number of Bidders and the Winner's Curse
Cheating in Online Auction – Towards Explaining the Popularity of English Auction
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE Informs ® Doi 10.1287/Mnsc.1070.0691Ec © 2007 INFORMS Pp
Strategyproofness in the Large As a Desideratum for Market Design
Scientific Background: Improvements to Auction Theory and Inventions of New Auction Formats
Collusion with a Greedy Centre in Sponsored Search Auctions
Bid Shading and Bidder Surplus in the U.S. Treasury Auction System ∗
Teams and Individuals in Standard Auction Formats: Decisions and Emotions Discussion Paper No
Dealer Information Sharing in Treasury Auctions∗