The Micro Textbook

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

The Micro Textbook Stand-Up Economics: The Micro Textbook Version 5.01 July 2010 Available with and without calculus at http://www.standupeconomist.com/books Email contact: [email protected] This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Unported License. To view a copy of this license, visit Creative Commons online at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/. ii Contents README.TXT vii I The optimizing individual 11 1 Introduction 13 2 Decision trees 17 2.1 Decision trees ............................. 17 2.2 Example: Monopoly ......................... 18 3 Time 23 3.1 Lump sums .............................. 24 3.2 Annuities and perpetuities ...................... 25 3.3 Capital theory ............................ 27 3.4 Algebra: Budget constraints ..................... 30 3.5 Algebra: Continuous compounding ................. 31 4 Risk 43 4.1 Reducing risk with diversification .................. 44 4.2 Algebra: Indifference curves ..................... 47 5 From one to some 55 5.1 No arbitrage ............................. 55 5.2 Rush-hour arbitrage ......................... 56 5.3 Financial arbitrage .......................... 57 II Strategic interactions 63 6 Cake cutting 65 6.1 Some applications of game theory .................. 66 6.2 Cake-cutting: The problem of fair division ............. 67 6.3 The importance of trade ....................... 70 iii iv CONTENTS 7 Pareto efficiency 75 7.1 Cost-benefit analysis ......................... 76 7.2 Pareto ................................. 77 7.3 Example: Taxes ............................ 78 8 Simultaneous-move games 83 8.1 Strictly dominant strategies ..................... 84 8.2 The Prisoners’ Dilemma ....................... 84 9 Auctions 91 9.1 Kinds of auctions ........................... 92 9.2 Bid-shading and truth-revelation .................. 93 9.3 Auction equivalences ......................... 94 9.4 Auction miscellany .......................... 96 10 From some to many 105 10.1 Monopolies in the long run .....................106 10.2 Barriers to entry ...........................107 III Market interactions 109 11 Supply and demand 111 11.1 The story of supply and demand ..................112 11.2 Shifts in supply and demand ....................113 11.3 Algebra: The algebra of markets ..................115 12 Taxes 121 12.1 Per-unit taxes on the sellers .....................121 12.2 Per-unit taxes on the buyers .....................123 12.3 Tax equivalence ............................125 12.4 Tax incidence .............................125 12.5 Algebra: The algebra of taxes ....................126 13 Margins 137 13.1 Reinterpreting the supply curve ...................137 13.2 Reinterpreting the demand curve ..................139 13.3 Conclusion: Carrots and sticks ...................141 14 Elasticity 143 14.1 The price elasticity of demand ...................143 14.2 Beyond the price elasticity of demand ...............145 14.3 Applications ..............................147 15 Transition: Welfare economics 151 15.1 From theory to reality ........................153 CONTENTS v IV Supplemental chapters 155 16 Inflation 157 16.1 Nominal and real interest rates ...................157 16.2 Inflation ................................158 16.3 Mathematics .............................160 17 Fisheries 167 17.1 An economic perspective .......................168 17.2 A brief look at government intervention ..............168 17.3 ITQs to the rescue? .........................171 18 Sequential-move games 173 18.1 Backward induction .........................174 19 Iterated dominance and Nash equilibrium 189 19.1 Iterated dominance ..........................189 19.2 Nash equilibrium ...........................192 19.3 Infinitely repeated games ......................194 19.4 Mixed strategies ...........................196 20 Supply and demand details 203 20.1 Deconstructing supply and demand .................203 20.2 Math: The algebra of markets ....................204 20.3 On the shape of the demand curve .................206 20.4 On the shape of the supply curve ..................207 20.5 Comparing supply and demand ...................208 Glossary 213 Index 221 vi CONTENTS README.TXT Jay Leno says that anybody can become a successful stand-up comic if they give it seven years. and the same thing is true about getting an undergraduate degree in economics! This textbook is a companion to The Cartoon Introduction to Economics: Vol- ume One, Microeconomics, by Grady Klein and Yoram Bauman, which you can buy from amazon.com. The first three parts of this textbook cover the same material as the three parts of the cartoon book; the fourth part covers supple- mental material not covered in the cartoon book. Both books try to apply three lessons from stand-up comedy to the world of economics: Make it short Most of the work of stand-up comedy involves boiling down 10 minutes of material that has promise into 2 minutes of material that kills. This book is short, and the Cartoon Introduction is even shorter. Make it funny Look, this book is not a laugh riot—the Cartoon Introduction is funnier, and the videos at http://www.standupeconomist.com are much funnier—but it tries. Tell a story Stand-up comedy is less about one-liners and more about stories. The story in this book is about the big question in microeconomics: “Under what circumstances does individual self-interest lead to good outcomes for the group as a whole?” In looking at this question, we’ll follow a path that is not unlike a hiking trip. We start out by putting our boots on and getting our gear together: in Part I we study the optimizing individual. Then we set out on our path and immediately find ourselves hacking through some pretty thick jungle: even simple interactions between just two people (Part II) can be very compli- cated! As we add even more people (in studying auctions, for example), things get even more complicated, and the jungle gets even thicker. Then a miracle occurs: we add even more people, and a complex situation suddenly becomes simple. After hacking through thick jungle, we find ourselves in a beautiful clearing: competitive markets (Part III) are remarkably easy to analyze and understand. vii viii README.TXT Part I The optimizing individual 11 Chapter 1 Introduction Two monks walking through a garden stroll onto a small bridge over a goldfish pond and stop to lean their elbows on the railing and look contemplatively down at the fish. One monk turns to the other and says, “I wish I were a fish; they are so happy and content.” The second monk scoffs: “How do you know fish are happy? You’re not a fish!” The reply of the first monk: “Ah, but how do you know what I know, since you are not me?” (Adapted from a story told by the Chinese philosopher Zhuangzi in the 4th century BCE.) Economics is a social science, and as such tries to explain human behavior. Different disciplines—psychology, sociology, political science, anthropology— take different approaches, each with their own strengths and weaknesses; but all try to shed some light on human behavior and (as the joke suggests) all have to make assumptions about how people work. The basic assumption of economics is that decisions are made by optimizing individuals. Decisions Economics studies the act and implications of choosing. Without choice, there is nothing to study. As Mancur Olson put it in The Logic of Collective Action: “To say a situation is ‘lost’ or hopeless is in one sense equivalent to saying it is perfect, for in both cases efforts at improvement can bring no positive results.” Individuals Economics assumes that the power to make choices resides in the hands of individuals. The approach that economists take in studying the behavior of groups of individuals (consumers, businesses, countries, etc.) is to study the incentives and behaviors of each individual in that group. The key question in economics is whether—and under what circumstances— individual decision-making leads to results that are good for the group as a 13 14 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION whole. For a pessimistic view on this issue, see the Prisoners’ Dilemma game in Chapter 8. For an optimistic view, see Chapter 15 or consider the words of Adam Smith, who wrote in 1776 that “[man is] led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it.” Optimization Economics assumes that individuals try to do the best they can. Although economics is unwavering in the assumption that individuals are optimizing— i.e., that each has some objective—there is flexibility in determining exactly what those objectives are. In particular, economics does not need to assume that individuals are selfish or greedy; their objectives may well involve friends or family, or people they’ve never met, or even plants and animals. Economics also does not make value judgments about different types of in- dividuals; for example, economists do not say that people who avoid risk are better or worse than people who seek out risk. We simply note that, given identical choices, different people act in different ways. In all cases, we assume that each individual is making the decision that is in their best interest. An aside about individual firms Economists often treat companies as opti- mizing individuals with a goal of profit maximization. (For our purposes, profit is simply money in minus money out.1) Although the assumption of profit max- imization is useful, it does have some problems.
Recommended publications
  • Pricing Rule in a Clock Auction
    Decision Analysis informs ® Vol. 7, No. 1, March 2010, pp. 40–57 issn 1545-8490 eissn 1545-8504 10 0701 0040 doi 10.1287/deca.1090.0161 © 2010 INFORMS Pricing Rule in a Clock Auction Peter Cramton, Pacharasut Sujarittanonta Department of Economics, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland 20742 {[email protected], [email protected]} e analyze a discrete clock auction with lowest-accepted-bid (LAB) pricing and provisional winners, as Wadopted by India for its 3G spectrum auction. In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the provisional winner shades her bid, whereas provisional losers do not. Such differential shading leads to inefficiency. An auction with highest-rejected-bid (HRB) pricing and exit bids is strategically simple, has no bid shading, and is fully efficient. In addition, it has higher revenues than the LAB auction, assuming profit-maximizing bidders. The bid shading in the LAB auction exposes a bidder to the possibility of losing the auction at a price below the bidder’s value. Thus, a fear of losing at profitable prices may cause bidders in the LAB auction to bid more aggressively than predicted, assuming profit-maximizing bidders. We extend the model by adding an anticipated loser’s regret to the payoff function. Revenue from the LAB auction yields higher expected revenue than the HRB auction when bidders’ fear of losing at profitable prices is sufficiently strong. This would provide one explanation why India, with an expressed objective of revenue maximization, adopted the LAB auction for its upcoming 3G spectrum auction, rather than the seemingly superior HRB auction. Key words: auctions; clock auctions; spectrum auctions; behavioral economics; market design History: Received on April 16, 2009.
    [Show full text]
  • Integrating the Structural Auction Approach and Traditional Measures of Market Power
    Integrating the Structural Auction Approach and Traditional Measures of Market Power Emílio Tostão Department of Agricultural Economics Oklahoma State University 535 Ag. Hall, Stillwater, OK 74078-6026 Email: [email protected] Chanjin Chung Department of Agricultural Economics Oklahoma State University 322 Ag. Hall, Stillwater, OK 74078-6026 Email: [email protected] B. Wade Brorsen Department of Agricultural Economics Oklahoma State University 414 Ag. Hall, Stillwater, OK 74078-6026 Email: [email protected] Selected Paper prepared for presentation at the American Agricultural Economics Association Annual Meeting, Long Beach, California, July 23-26, 2006. Copyright by Emílio Tostão , Chanjin Chung, and B . Wade Brorsen . All rights reserved . Readers may make verbatim copies of this document for non commercial purposes by any means , provided that this copyright notice appears on all such copies . 1 Integrating the Structural Auction Approach and Traditional Measures of Market Power Abstract This study asks the question, what is the relationship between traditional models of market power and structural auction models? An encompassing model is derived that considers both price markdowns due to bid shading during an auction and price markdowns at the industry-level due to imperfect competition. Data from a cattle procurement experimental market is used to compare the appropriateness of the two alternative theories. Regression results show that while the number of firms is more important than the number of bidders on lot of cattle in explaining pricing behavior in the game, the number of bidders does contain some unique information and should be included in the model. Both the traditional NEIO and structural auction approaches overestimated the true markdowns possibly due to failure to account for the winners curse.
    [Show full text]
  • Preview Guide
    ContentsNOT FOR SALE Preface xiii CHAPTER 3 The Behavior of Consumers 45 3.1 Tastes 45 CHAPTER 1 Indifference Curves 45 Supply, Demand, Marginal Values 48 and Equilibrium 1 More on Indifference Curves 53 1.1 Demand 1 3.2 The Budget Line and the Demand versus Quantity Consumer’s Choice 53 Demanded 1 The Budget Line 54 Demand Curves 2 The Consumer’s Choice 56 Changes in Demand 3 Market Demand 7 3.3 Applications of Indifference The Shape of the Demand Curve 7 Curves 59 The Wide Scope of Economics 10 Standards of Living 59 The Least Bad Tax 64 1.2 Supply 10 Summary 69 Supply versus Quantity Supplied 10 Author Commentary 69 1.3 Equilibrium 13 Review Questions 70 The Equilibrium Point 13 Numerical Exercises 70 Changes in the Equilibrium Point 15 Problem Set 71 Summary 23 Appendix to Chapter 3 77 Author Commentary 24 Cardinal Utility 77 Review Questions 25 The Consumer’s Optimum 79 Numerical Exercises 25 Problem Set 26 CHAPTER 4 Consumers in the Marketplace 81 CHAPTER 2 4.1 Changes in Income 81 Prices, Costs, and the Gains Changes in Income and Changes in the from Trade 31 Budget Line 81 Changes in Income and Changes in the 2.1 Prices 31 Optimum Point 82 Absolute versus Relative Prices 32 The Engel Curve 84 Some Applications 34 4.2 Changes in Price 85 2.2 Costs, Efficiency, and Gains from Changes in Price and Changes in the Trade 35 Budget Line 85 Costs and Efficiency 35 Changes in Price and Changes in the Optimum Point 86 Specialization and the Gains from Trade 37 The Demand Curve 88 Why People Trade 39 4.3 Income and Substitution Summary 41
    [Show full text]
  • Decisions and Games
    DECISIONS AND GAMES. PART I 1. Preference and choice 2. Demand theory 3. Uncertainty 4. Intertemporal decision making 5. Behavioral decision theory DECISIONS AND GAMES. PART II 6. Static Games of complete information 7. Dynamic games of complete information 8. Static games of incomplete information 9. Dynamic games of incomplete information 10. Behavioral game theory References Gibbons, R. 1992. Game theory for applied economists. Princeton University Press. Princeton, New Jersey. Varian, H.1992. Microeconomic analysis. Norton & Company. New York. Chapters 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 19. Camerer, C. , Loewenstein, G. , and Rabin, M. 2004. Advances in Behavioral Economics. Princeton University Press. Mas-Colell, A., Whinston, M., and Green, J. 1995. Microeconomic theory. Oxford University Press. Chapters 1, 2, 3, 4, 6. 1 Two approaches to analyze behavior of decision makers. 1. From an abstract construction generate choices that satisfy rationality restrictions. 2. Directly from choice, ask for some structure to these choices and derive properties. Relation between the two approaches. 2 1. Preference and choice Consider a set of alternatives (mutually exclusives) X and we consider a preference relation on X. Preferences The preference relation “at least as good as” is a binary relation − over the set of alternatives X. Preferences express the ordering between alternatives resulting from the objectives of the decision maker. Properties: Rational Preference Relation (or Weak order, or Complete preorder) if -Completeness, Transitivity (and Reflexivity) A relation is complete if ∀∈x,,yXxy or yx. A relation is transitive if and only if ∀∈x,yz, X, if x≺≺y and y z, then x≺z. 3 Transitiveness is more delicate than completeness.
    [Show full text]
  • Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions
    The Review of Economic Studies Advance Access published July 28, 2014 Review of Economic Studies (2014) 0, 1–35 doi:10.1093/restud/rdu023 © The Author 2014. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Review of Economic Studies Limited. Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions Downloaded from LAWRENCE M. AUSUBEL University of Maryland http://restud.oxfordjournals.org/ PETER CRAMTON University of Maryland MAREK PYCIA UCLA MARZENA ROSTEK University of Wisconsin-Madison at University of Wisconsin-Madison Libraries on October 27, 2014 and MAREK WERETKA University of Wisconsin-Madison First version received July 2010; final version accepted April 2014 (Eds.) Auctions often involve the sale of many related goods: Treasury, spectrum, and electricity auctions are examples. In multi-unit auctions, bids for marginal units may affect payments for inframarginal units, giving rise to “demand reduction” and furthermore to incentives for shading bids differently across units. We establish that such differential bid shading results generically in ex post inefficient allocations in the uniform-price and pay-as-bid auctions. We also show that, in general, the efficiency and revenue rankings of the two formats are ambiguous. However, in settings with symmetric bidders, the pay-as-bid auction often outperforms. In particular, with diminishing marginal utility, symmetric information and linearity, it yields greater expected revenues. We explain the rankings through multi-unit effects, which have no counterparts in auctions with unit demands. We attribute the new incentives separately to multi-unit (but constant) marginal utility and to diminishing marginal utility. We also provide comparisons with the Vickrey auction. Key words: Multi-Unit Auctions, Demand Reduction, Treasury Auctions, Electricity Auctions JEL Codes: D44, D82, D47, L13, L94 1.
    [Show full text]
  • CONFLICT and COOPERATION WITHIN an ORGANIZATION: a CASE STUDY of the METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT of SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA by DAVID
    CONFLICT AND COOPERATION WITHIN AN ORGANIZATION: A CASE STUDY OF THE METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA by DAVID JASON ZETLAND B.A. (University of California, Los Angeles) 1991 M.S. (University of California, Davis) 2003 DISSERTATION Submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in Agricultural and Resource Economics in the OFFICE OF GRADUATE STUDIES of the UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA DAVIS Committee in Charge 2008 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1129046 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1129046 Abstract Back in 1995, one member of a water co- did not change to reflect this scarcity, wa- operative announced it was going to buy wa- ter continued to be treated as a club good ter from an “outside” source. Other mem- when it should have been treated as a pri- bers of the cooperative did not like this idea, vate good. Because MET did not change its and a dispute broke out. After lawsuits, lob- policies for allocating water (take as much as bying and lopsided votes, peace of a sort was you need, at a fixed price, no matter where bought with 235 million dollars of taxpayer it is delivered), inefficiency increased. Argu- money and intense political pressure. Why ments over the policies increased inefficiency did this dispute happen? Was it exceptional even further. or typical? Is it possible that cooperative According to Hart and Moore (1996), members are not cooperative? These ques- cooperatives are efficient (relative to firms) tions are intrinsically interesting to students when members have reasonably homoge- of collective action, but they are more signif- nous preferences.
    [Show full text]
  • Countering the Winner's Curse: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model
    Theoretical Economics 15 (2020), 1399–1434 1555-7561/20201399 Countering the winner’s curse: Optimal auction design in a common value model Dirk Bergemann Department of Economics, Yale University Benjamin Brooks Department of Economics, University of Chicago Stephen Morris Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology We characterize revenue maximizing mechanisms in a common value environ- ment where the value of the object is equal to the highest of the bidders’ indepen- dent signals. If the revenue maximizing solution is to sell the object with proba- bility 1, then an optimal mechanism is simply a posted price, namely, the highest price such that every type of every bidder is willing to buy the object. If the object is optimally sold with probability less than 1, then optimal mechanisms skew the allocation toward bidders with lower signals. The resulting allocation induces a “winner’s blessing,” whereby the expected value conditional on winning is higher than the unconditional expectation. By contrast, standard auctions that allocate to the bidder with the highest signal (e.g., the first-price, second-price, or English auctions) deliver lower revenue because of the winner’s curse generated by the allocation. Our qualitative results extend to more general common value envi- ronments with a strong winner’s curse. Keywords. Optimal auction, common values, maximum game, posted price, re- serve price, revenue equivalence. JEL classification. C72, D44, D82, D83. 1. Introduction Whenever there is interdependence in bidders’ willingness to pay for a good, each bid- der must carefully account for that interdependence in determining how they should bid. A classic motivating example concerns wildcatters competing for an oil tract in a Dirk Bergemann: [email protected] Benjamin Brooks: [email protected] Stephen Morris: [email protected] We acknowledge financial support through National Science Foundation Grants SES 1459899 and SES 2001208.
    [Show full text]
  • On the Existence of Equilibrium in Bayesian Games Without Complementarities
    ON THE EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIUM IN BAYESIAN GAMES WITHOUT COMPLEMENTARITIES By Idione Meneghel and Rabee Tourky August 2019 Revised November 2019 COWLES FOUNDATION DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 2190R COWLES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS YALE UNIVERSITY Box 208281 New Haven, Connecticut 06520-8281 http://cowles.yale.edu/ ON THE EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIUM IN BAYESIAN GAMES WITHOUT COMPLEMENTARITIES IDIONE MENEGHEL Australian National University RABEE TOURKY Australian National University Abstract. This paper presents new results on the existence of pure-strategy Bayesian equilibria in specified functional forms. These results broaden the scope of methods developed by Reny (2011) well beyond monotone pure strate- gies. Applications include natural models of first-price and all-pay auctions not covered by previous existence results. To illustrate the scope of our results, we provide an analysis of three auctions: (i) a first-price auction of objects that are heterogeneous and imperfect substitutes; (ii) a first-price auction in which bidders’ payoffs have a very general interdependence structure; and (iii) an all-pay auction with non-monotone equilibrium. Keywords: Bayesian games, monotone strategies, pure-strategy equilibrium, auctions. 1. Introduction Equilibrium behavior in general Bayesian games is not well understood. While there is an extensive literature on equilibrium existence, that literature imposes sub- stantive restrictions on the structure of the Bayesian game. In particular, previous existence results require some version of the following assumptions: (1) “weak quasi-supermodularity:” informally, the coordinates of a a player’s own action vector need to be complementary; and (2) “weak single-crossing:” informally, a player’s incremental returns of actions are nondecreasing in her types.
    [Show full text]
  • Giffen Behaviour and Asymmetric Substitutability*
    Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute Utrecht School of Economics Utrecht University Janskerkhof 12 3512 BL Utrecht The Netherlands telephone +31 30 253 9800 fax +31 30 253 7373 website www.koopmansinstitute.uu.nl The Tjalling C. Koopmans Institute is the research institute and research school of Utrecht School of Economics. It was founded in 2003, and named after Professor Tjalling C. Koopmans, Dutch-born Nobel Prize laureate in economics of 1975. In the discussion papers series the Koopmans Institute publishes results of ongoing research for early dissemination of research results, and to enhance discussion with colleagues. Please send any comments and suggestions on the Koopmans institute, or this series to [email protected] ontwerp voorblad: WRIK Utrecht How to reach the authors Please direct all correspondence to the first author. Kris De Jaegher Utrecht University Utrecht School of Economics Janskerkhof 12 3512 BL Utrecht The Netherlands. E-mail: [email protected] This paper can be downloaded at: http:// www.uu.nl/rebo/economie/discussionpapers Utrecht School of Economics Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute Discussion Paper Series 10-16 Giffen Behaviour and Asymmetric * Substitutability Kris De Jaeghera aUtrecht School of Economics Utrecht University September 2010 Abstract Let a consumer consume two goods, and let good 1 be a Giffen good. Then a well- known necessary condition for such behaviour is that good 1 is an inferior good. This paper shows that an additional necessary for such behaviour is that good 1 is a gross substitute for good 2, and that good 2 is a gross complement to good 1 (strong asymmetric gross substitutability).
    [Show full text]
  • Illustrating the Difference Between Emissions Fees and Abatement Subsidies Using Isoquant and Isocost Geometry
    Illustrating the Difference between Emissions Fees and Abatement Subsidies Using Isoquant and Isocost Geometry Emissions fees (taxes) and abatement subsidies are common policy solutions when negative externalities, such as pollution generated from production, impact market transactions. Textbook treatment of these two policies vary in exposition and detail and are generally more descriptive than analytical. This can leave students with limited insights regarding behavioral differences that arise with these policies. In illustrating unintended policy consequences, this graphical analysis illustrates that a subsidy policy is, paradoxically, more likely to generate more pollution than a fee policy, a result consistent with Metcalf’s (2009) empirical work and a result often not well articulated in textbooks. Christopher S Decker† †University of Nebraska at Omaha © 2020 Journal of Economics Teaching. All rights reserved. Decker / Journal of Economics Teaching (2020) 1. Introduction Since its inception, researchers in the field of environmental economics have developed a menu of policies for addressing the negative externality resulting when pollution results from production. Emissions fees (taxes) and abatement subsidies are some of the most common policy solutions discussed in most environmental economics courses. Textbook treatment of these two policies, however, vary in exposition and detail (e.g. Callan and Thomas, 2010; Field and Field, 2009; Kalstad, 2011; Perman, Ma, McGilvray, and Common, 2011; Tietenberg, 2003). However, it is fair to say that this approach, at least at the undergraduate level, is descriptive.1 Textbooks tend to offer examples of each policy as well as an overview of those states or countries that have implemented each. They correctly point out that emission fees tend to be more common in Europe than the United States.
    [Show full text]
  • ABSTRACT ESSAYS on AUCTION DESIGN Haomin Yan Doctor of Philosophy, 2018 Dissertation Directed By: Professor Lawrence M. Ausubel
    ABSTRACT Title of dissertation: ESSAYS ON AUCTION DESIGN Haomin Yan Doctor of Philosophy, 2018 Dissertation directed by: Professor Lawrence M. Ausubel Department of Economics This dissertation studies the design of auction markets where bidders are un- certain of their own values at the time of bidding. A bidder's value may depend on other bidders' private information, on total quantity of items allocated in the auction, or on the auctioneer's private information. Chapter 1 provides a brief introduction to auction theory and summarizes the main contribution of each following chapter. Chapter 2 of this dissertation ex- tends the theoretical study of position auctions to an interdependent values model in which each bidder's value depends on its opponents' information as well as its own information. I characterize the equilibria of three standard position auctions under this information structure, including the Generalized Second Price (GSP) auctions, Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auctions, and the Generalized English Auc- tions (GEA). I first show that both GSP and VCG auctions are neither efficient nor optimal under interdependent values. Then I propose a modification of these two auctions by allowing bidders to condition their bids on positions to implement ef- ficiency. I show that the modified auctions proposed in this chapter are not only efficient, but also maximize the search engine's revenue. While the uncertainty of each bidder about its own value comes from the presence of common component in bidders ex-post values in an interdependent values model, bidders can be uncertain about their values when their values depend on the entire allocation of the auction and when their values depend on the auctioneer's private information.
    [Show full text]
  • Title: Rice Consumption: Giffen Behavior in Rural Bangladesh
    Lekhe, Islam, Islam and Akter, International Journal of Applied Economics, 11(1), 48-59 48 Giffen Behavior for Rice Consumption in Rural Bangladesh Fatima S. Lekhe1, Lamya B. Islam1, Silvia Z. Islam2 and Aysha Akter2 Eastern University1 and RMIT University2 Abstract: Rice is the staple food in Bangladesh. Thus, the price of rice is an important economic factor in Bangladesh especially for poor people. In Bangladesh, during the price hike of 2008-09, rice price increased by 40% on an average across the country. Interestingly, the consumption of rice in some rural parts of Bangladesh also increased during that period. Thus, the focus of this paper is to examine the practical evidence of this positive relationship between the consumption of rice and increasing price which is addressed as Giffen behavior (inverse of normal behavior) for rice consumption in Bangladesh. By analyzing secondary data obtained from some specific rural parts namely Patharghata (Barguna), Chaddagham (Comilla), Sadar (Jamalpur), Kaligang (Jhenaidaha), Sreemangal (Moulvibazar) and Sadar (Naogaon) of Bangladesh, we have found a new insight in this context. We find that the price elasticity of staple food for the poor people depends significantly and nonlinearly on the severity of their poverty. In order to have an effective design of welfare for the poor people, we need to understand this heterogeneity of their consumption behavior. Keywords: Rice, Price, Bangladesh, Giffen behavior, Elasticity JEL Classification: D01, D12, I30, O12 1. Introduction Alfred Marshall first established the concept of Giffen good in the 1895 edition of his Principles of Economics. He pointed out that a poor consumer facing a price rise in a staple food, has to cut back the consumption of the protein or fancy food to increase the consumption of the staple item.
    [Show full text]