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2021 ESA Global Online Around-The-Clock Conference Program (FINAL)

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2021 ESA Global Online Around-The-Clock Conference Program (FINAL) 2021 ESA Global Online Around-the-Clock Conference Program (FINAL) July 7- 9, 2021 Economic Science Association Last Revised 17:21:44 PDT, 2021.07.08 All time in PDT, Los Angeles Time (NY+3, France+9, China+15, and Melbourne+17) Program Overview Wednesday, July 7, 2021 00:00-8:00am PDT (Los Angeles Time): EU Cycle 1 00:00-1:00: Plenary-- Michal Bauer, Zoom Link Title: Triggers of Inter-group Hostility Host: Michele Belot 1:00-2:40: EU Sessions 1 3:00-4:40: EU Sessions 2 5:00-6:00: Social Event-- Off-topic session: The ESA Ethical Guidelines Discussion (I) Hosts: Ben Greiner, Michal Krawczyk, Dorothea Kuebler, Jeroen van de Ven, and Marie-Claire Villeval 6:00-7:00: Social Events: Topic session The Future of Experimental Economics Hosts: Friederike Mengel 7:00-8:00: EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING (Committee Member Only) 8:00-16:00 PDT (Los Angeles Time): NA Cycle 1 8:00-9:00: Plenary-- Rachel Kranton, Zoom Link Title: Deconstructing experimental findings of group bias Host: Yan Chen 9:00-10:40: NA Sessions 1 11:00-12:40: NA Sessions 2 13:00-14:00: Plenary-- Ragan Petrie, Zoom Link Title: Do charities know what triggers donations? Host: Laura Gee 14:00-15:00: Social Events: Off-topic Sessions The ESA Ethical Guidelines Discussion (II) Hosts: Catherine Eckel 15:00-16:00: Social Events: Off-topic Sessions Faculty vs Non-faculty Classic Economic Game Challenge Hosts: Walter Yuan, MobLab & Joseph Wang, National Taiwan University Two teams, faculty vs non-faculty, going head to head on classic economic games! The top performer on the winning team (with the higher per capita earnings) gets to choose autographed books by Al Roth and Matt Jackson or an Amazon gift card of 100 USD, with other members entering a lottery for the rest. Secure your slot, pre-registration available at this Google signup sheet. (Walk-ins welcome, though you may miss the first few rounds registering on the spot.) 16:00-23:59 PDT (Los Angeles Time): AP Cycle 1 16:00-17:00: Plenary-- Erte Xiao, Zoom Link Title: Incentives to Persevere Host: Shirley Wang 17:00-18:40: AP Sessions 1 19:00-20:40: AP Sessions 2 21:00-22:00: Social Events: Off-topic Sessions The ESA Ethical Guidelines Discussion (III) Hosts: Lata Gangadharan 22:00-22:59: Social Events: Topic Sessions Cross Country Online Game Challenge Hosts: Shirley Wang, Remin University, Nathanael Berger MobLab, & Phil Limberg, MobLab You join the team from your block (Asia-Pacific, Europe, Americas) to play classic economic games. The block team with the highest per capita earnings will be eligible for exciting prizes: The top performer gets to choose autographed books by Al Roth and Matt Jackson or an Amazon gift card of 100 USD, with other members entering a lottery for the rest. Secure your slot, pre- registration available at this Google signup sheet. (Walk-ins welcome, though you may miss the first few rounds registering on the spot.) 23:00-23:59: Social Events: Hang-out! Interaction with Presenters Hosts: GSH Thursday, July 8, 2021 00:00-8:00am PDT (Los Angeles Time): EU Cycle 2 1:00-2:40: EU Sessions 3 3:00-4:40: EU Sessions 4 5:00-6:00: Plenary-- Ingvild Almas, Zoom Link Title: Gender and Decision Making Host: Roel van Veldhuizen 6:00-7:00: Social Events: Hang-out! Interaction with Presenters Hosts: GSH 7:00-8:00: Members Meeting, Zoom Link Summary: Business and Information for all ESA members -- please join the conversation! Newly elected officers, upcoming conference sites, new replication policy, mentoring, ESA's budget, the new ESA ethical guidelines and the new contract for ESA journals will be announced, along with ideas to improve visibility and publication opportunities for your research. 8:00-16:00 PDT (Los Angeles Time): NA Cycle 2 8:00-9:00: Plenary-- Dan Friedman, Zoom Link Title: Market Mysteries, Old and New Host: Tim Cason 9:00-10:40: NA Sessions 3 11:00-12:40: NA Sessions 4 13:00-14:00: Social Events: Hang-out! Interaction with Presenters Hosts: GSH 14:00-15:00: Social Events: Hang-out! Interaction with Presenters Hosts: GSH 16:00-23:59 PDT (Los Angeles Time): AP Cycle 2 16:00-17:00: Plenary-- Nobuyuki Hanaki, Zoom Link Title: An experiment on the Nash program: Comparing two bargaining implementations of the Shapley value Host: Lata Gangadharan 17:00-18:40: AP Sessions 3 19:00-20:40: AP Sessions 4 21:00-22:00: Social Events: Topic Sessions Cross Country Studies Hosts: Shirley Wang, Remin University & Stefan Trautmann, University of Heidelberg During this social event we want to discuss cross-country studies with student or maybe broader population samples. We want to talk about what insights we can expect to gain from such cross-country comparison of economic behavior and attitudes, and what methods and tools can be used to implement cross-country research. We also want to consider which pitfalls to avoid when it comes to design and implementation, but also with respect to the interpretation of experimental results. 22:00-23:00: Social Events-- Topic Sessions Nudges and Policy Hosts: Lionel Page 23:00-0:00: Social Events: Hang-out! Interaction with Presenters Hosts: GSH Friday, July 9, 2021 00:00-8:00am PDT (Los Angeles Time): EU Cycle 3 1:00-2:40: EU Sessions 5 3:00-4:40: EU Sessions 6 5:00-6:00: Plenary-- Ernst Fehr, Zoom Link Title: Framing and Attention - The Attentional Foundations of Framing Effects Host: Marie-Claire Villeval 7:00-8:00: Social Events: Hang-out! Interaction with Presenters Hosts: GSH ESA 2021 Global Around-the-Clock Conference Program Presentation Recordings Plenary talks will be available at the ESA YouTube Channel after the conference. ESA 2021 Global Around-the-Clock Conference Program Details Wednesday, July 7, 0:00am - 1:00am PDT (Los Angeles Time) Plenary Talk: Triggers of Inter-group Hostility-- Michal Bauer. Zoom Link ESA Support Staff: Eldar Dadon Wednesday, July 7, 1:00am - 2:40am PDT (Los Angeles Time) Session 1, Advice. Zoom Link ESA Support Staff: Laura Manukyan Marie-Pierre Dargnies, : Trust in an expert depending on the expert's gender and the individual's characteristics: An experiment Julia Rose, Burgundy School of Business: Client-Advisor Matching in the Finance Industry Session 2, Asset Markets 1. Zoom Link ESA Support Staff: Philip Melnikov Edward Halim, Nanyang Technological University: Delegated Portfolio Management and Incentive Contract in Social Trading Networks: An Experiment Prachi Hejib, University of East Anglia: The effects of information provision on decisions over risky assets Xiaoyu Zhou, FAU Erlangen-- Nuernberg: Information aggregation over separated markets. An experiment Thomas Stoeckl, Management Center Innsbruck, Department Business & Management: Regulation of insider trading and short selling. Evaluating the joint effects of two market interventions. Session 3, Biases 1. Zoom Link ESA Support Staff: Silvia F. Castro Paolo Crosetto, INRA - GAEL: The rise and fall of context effects Katharina Momsen, University of Innsbr: Information Search and Default Bias Yigit Oezcelik, University of Liverpool: Non-numerical and social anchoring in a ratings Session 4, Contests, Conflicts, and Losses. Zoom Link ESA Support Staff: Dominik Bruckner Biljana Meiske, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance: Productivity Shock and Conflict: The Role of Loss Aversion Simeon Schudy, LMU Munich: The Efficacy of Tournaments for Non-Routine Team Tasks Ayse Gul Mermer, University of Amsterdam, CREED: Fierce Competitors and Drop-Outs: Contests with Loss-Averse Agents Session 5, Fairness and Reciprocity. Zoom Link ESA Support Staff: Manela Karunadasa Simon Siegenthaler, University of Texas, Dallas: Leading-by-example: legitimizing pay disparity through risk Christian Koch, University of Vienna: Anti-migration sentiments and fairness perceptions Jan Schmitz, Radboud University: Reciprocity in multi player interactions - Evidence from the lab and the field Session 6, Games 1. Zoom Link ESA Support Staff: Hovo Manukyan Daehong Min, New York University Abu Dhabi: Viable Nash Equilibria: An Experiment Evan Friedman, University of Essex: Stochastic Choice and Noisy Beliefs in Games: an Experiment ZAFER Akin, American University in Dubai: Asymmetric Guessing Games Session 7, Industrial Organization 1. Zoom Link ESA Support Staff: Satarupa Mitra Francois Cochard, UNIVERSITE DE FRANCHE-COMTE: How to Fight Multi-market Cartels: An Experimental Comparison between the American and the European Leniency Programs Matthew Walker, Durham University Business School, UK: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation into the Welfare Consequences of Late Payments Felix Holzmeister, University of Innsbruck, Department of Economics: The Economics of Label Credence Goods Session 8, Nudging. Zoom Link ESA Support Staff: Eldar Dadon Ivan Soraperra, University of Amsterdam: Behavioral Nudges to Curb OTC Sales of Antibiotics: A RCT study in Ethiopia Abigail Hurwitz, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem: Enhancing Longevity Awareness to Improve Retirement Security Taisuke Imai, LMU Munich: CO2 emissions and consumption behavior: The role of beliefs, information, and attitudes Session 9, Social Norms 1. Zoom Link ESA Support Staff: Haoran Yang Daniele Nosenzo, Aarhus University: The Coordinating Power of Social Norms Eugenio Verrina, GATE-Lyon: Personal norms - and not only social norms - shape economic behavior Caroline Graf, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam: Social Norms Offer Explanation for Inconsistent Effects of Incentives on Prosocial Behavior Anouk Schippers, University of Groningen: Sharing with minimal regulation? Evidence from neighborhood book exchange Session 10, Voting. Zoom Link ESA Support Staff: Monika Pompeo Moumita Deb, University of Birmingham: Experiments in Information Acquisition and Voting Joao Ferreira, University of Southampton: The Expressive Power of Voting Rules Francesco Capozza, Erasmus University Rotterdam: Political Competition, Cognitive Dissonance and Political Beliefs Wednesday, July 7, 3:00am - 4:40am PDT (Los Angeles Time) Session 1, Artificial Intelligence.
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