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Arunava Sen
CURRICULUM VITAE Sarvesh Bandhu
WPS7259.Pdf
Implementation Theory*
(Eds.) Foundations in Microeconomic Theory Hugo F
Ex Post Implementation in Environments with Private Goods
Implementation Via Rights Structures∗
Studies in Economic Design
Workshop on Advancements in Social Choice
Soumendu Sarkar
Curriculum Vitae
Swaprava Nath: Curriculum Vitae
Gopakumar Achuthankutty
Intermediation in Network Economics: Theory and Applications
The Theory of Mechanism Design: an Overview
Curriculum Vitae
Social Sciences – Economics 2012
Curriculum Vita Arunava
Public Lecture on Engineering in Economics: an Introduction to Mechanism Design By
Top View
A Characterization of Single-Peaked Preferences Via Random Social Choice Functions
Nash Implementation with Partially Honest Individuals∗
Bhaskar Dutta
View, 415–440
Curriculum Vitae Debasis Mishra Updated: March 2021
Notes on Social Choice Theory
Partial Strategyproofness: Relaxing Strategy- Proofness for the Random Assignment Problem∗
Prof. A.L.Nagar Memorial Meeting
Swaprava Nath
Automated Reasoning in Social Choice Theory-Some Remarks
Annual Report 2016-17 of the Indian Statistical Institute
An Interview with Salvador Barberà
“Fair and Lovely”: Some Theoretical Considerations in the Equitable Allocation of Resources
Paper Teplate
Strategyproofness in the Large As a Desideratum for Market Design
A Characterization of Single-Peaked Preferences Via Random Social Choice Functions
Mechanism Design: How to Implement Social Goals*
Local Global Equivalence in Voting Models: a Characterization and Applications∗
Robust Mechanism Design and Dominant Strategy Voting Rules
Lecture Notes in Mechanism Design Theory
Eric S. Maskin2 School of Social Science, Institute for Advanced Study, Einstein Drive, Princeton, NJ 0850, USA
Ex-Post Implementation with Interdependent Values Arxiv
A (Very) Brief Introducion to Mechanism Design
Social Choice Theory: a Neglected Path to Possibility
Anup Pramanik
Incentive-Compatible Voting Rules with Positively Correlated Beliefs
A Solution to the Two-Person Implementation Problem Jean-François Laslier, Matias Nunez, M Remzi Sanver
Game Theory Course Code: MPE 147 No