Prof. A.L.Nagar Memorial Meeting
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CURRICULUM VITAE Sarvesh Bandhu
CURRICULUM VITAE Sarvesh Bandhu ACADEMIC EDUCATION Ph.D. Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi. Degree Awarded: August, 2020. Topic : Essays in Behavioral Voting Mechanisms Post-graduation Delhi School of Economics, University of Delhi. Graduation Shri Ram College of Commerce, University of Delhi. RESEARCH Ph.D. Supervisor Prof. Arunava Sen, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi. Areas of Game Theory Interest Behavioral and Experimental Economics Political Economy Mechanism Design Publication Bandhu, Sarvesh, Abhinaba Lahiri, and Anup Pramanik. \A characterization of status- quo rules in the binary social choice model." Economics Letters (2020): 109154. Working Papers Voting with Lying Costs: A Behavioral Approach to Overcome Gibbard-Satterthwaite The- orem. Random Strategy-Proof Voting with Lexicographic Extension. Easy is Hard: Two Stronger Implications of Obvious Strategy-Proofness Bounded Stochastic Response in Random Voting Models. [Joint Work] Work-in- Bottom non-manipulability: Relaxing incentive compatibility. [Joint Work] (A preliminary progress draft is available) Positive Result for Two-sided Matching with Minimum and Maximum Quotas under Di- chotomous Domain. [Joint work] (A preliminary draft is available) A New Solidarity Axiom for Binary Voting Model and its Characterization. (A preliminary draft is available) TEACHING EXPERIENCE Visiting Department of Economics, Ashoka University. Faculty January−April 2021. Course Taught at B.A. Hons. Economics: Introduction to Economics. Assistant Delhi School of Economics, Delhi University Professor August 2014−May 2016; February−May 2020 and November−December 2020 Courses Taught at M.A. Economics: Microeconomic Theory, Game Theory, Mathematical Economics. Teaching EPU, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi. Assistant July 2016−June 2018. Courses Taught at M.S. Quantative Economics: Game Theory, Mathematical Programming, Environmental Economics Assistant Shri Ram College of Commerce, Delhi University. -
Daily GA Updates
Daily GA Updates COVID-19 vaccine could be 90% effective: Pfizer A vaccine jointly developed by Pfizer and BioNTech was 90% effective in preventing Covid-19 infections in ongoing Phase 3 trials, the companies announced. According to preliminary findings, protection in patients was achieved seven days after the second of two doses, and 28 days after the first. The companies said they expect to supply up to 50 million vaccine doses globally in 2020, and up to 1.3 billion doses in 2021. While the Pfizer-BioNTech trial has yet to be peer-reviewed by experts, scientists reacted positively -- if cautiously to the results. India welcomes removal of Sudan from list of State Sponsors of Terrorism India has welcomed the removal of Sudan from the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism and Sudan’s normalisation of relations with Israel. The Indian External Affairs Ministry said in a statement that India’s relations with Sudan are historic and special, and forged on the basis of shared values and close people-to-people contacts. Daily GA Updates Nepal President Bidhya Devi Bhandari releases special anthology on Mahatma Gandhi Nepal President Bidhya Devi Bhandari has released a special anthology on Mahatma Gandhi- 'My understanding about Gandhi' - during a ceremony at Kathmandu in the presence of Indian Ambassador Vinay Mohan Kwatra. The book has been brought out by the Embassy of India along with the BP Koirala India-Nepal Foundation to cherish the values of the Mahatma's universal teachings with Nepali friends. The pictorial anthology in Nepalese has been released to celebrate 151st Birth Anniversary of Mahatma Gandhi and to mark the culmination of the two years long celebrations of '150 years of Mahatma'. -
Accidental Prime Minister
THE ACCIDENTAL PRIME MINISTER THE ACCIDENTAL PRIME MINISTER THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF MANMOHAN SINGH SANJAYA BARU VIKING Published by the Penguin Group Penguin Books India Pvt. Ltd, 11 Community Centre, Panchsheel Park, New Delhi 110 017, India Penguin Group (USA) Inc., 375 Hudson Street, New York, New York 10014, USA Penguin Group (Canada), 90 Eglinton Avenue East, Suite 700, Toronto, Ontario, M4P 2Y3, Canada (a division of Pearson Penguin Canada Inc.) Penguin Books Ltd, 80 Strand, London WC2R 0RL, England Penguin Ireland, 25 St Stephen’s Green, Dublin 2, Ireland (a division of Penguin Books Ltd) Penguin Group (Australia), 707 Collins Street, Melbourne, Victoria 3008, Australia (a division of Pearson Australia Group Pty Ltd) Penguin Group (NZ), 67 Apollo Drive, Rosedale, Auckland 0632, New Zealand (a division of Pearson New Zealand Ltd) Penguin Group (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd, Block D, Rosebank Offi ce Park, 181 Jan Smuts Avenue, Parktown North, Johannesburg 2193, South Africa Penguin Books Ltd, Registered Offi ces: 80 Strand, London WC2R 0RL, England First published in Viking by Penguin Books India 2014 Copyright © Sanjaya Baru 2014 All rights reserved 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 The views and opinions expressed in this book are the author’s own and the facts are as reported by him which have been verifi ed to the extent possible, and the publishers are not in any way liable for the same. ISBN 9780670086740 Typeset in Bembo by R. Ajith Kumar, New Delhi Printed at Thomson Press India Ltd, New Delhi This book is sold subject to the condition that -
Implementation Theory*
Chapter 5 IMPLEMENTATION THEORY* ERIC MASKIN Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, NJ, USA TOMAS SJOSTROM Department of Economics, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA, USA Contents Abstract 238 Keywords 238 1. Introduction 239 2. Definitions 245 3. Nash implementation 247 3.1. Definitions 248 3.2. Monotonicity and no veto power 248 3.3. Necessary and sufficient conditions 250 3.4. Weak implementation 254 3.5. Strategy-proofness and rich domains of preferences 254 3.6. Unrestricted domain of strict preferences 256 3.7. Economic environments 257 3.8. Two agent implementation 259 4. Implementation with complete information: further topics 260 4.1. Refinements of Nash equilibrium 260 4.2. Virtual implementation 264 4.3. Mixed strategies 265 4.4. Extensive form mechanisms 267 4.5. Renegotiation 269 4.6. The planner as a player 275 5. Bayesian implementation 276 5.1. Definitions 276 5.2. Closure 277 5.3. Incentive compatibility 278 5.4. Bayesian monotonicity 279 * We are grateful to Sandeep Baliga, Luis Corch6n, Matt Jackson, Byungchae Rhee, Ariel Rubinstein, Ilya Segal, Hannu Vartiainen, Masahiro Watabe, and two referees, for helpful comments. Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Volume 1, Edited by K.J Arrow, A.K. Sen and K. Suzumura ( 2002 Elsevier Science B. V All rights reserved 238 E. Maskin and T: Sj'str6m 5.5. Non-parametric, robust and fault tolerant implementation 281 6. Concluding remarks 281 References 282 Abstract The implementation problem is the problem of designing a mechanism (game form) such that the equilibrium outcomes satisfy a criterion of social optimality embodied in a social choice rule. -
Political Economy of India's Fiscal and Financial Reform*
Working Paper No. 105 Political Economy of India’s Fiscal and Financial Reform by John Echeverri-Gent* August 2001 Stanford University John A. and Cynthia Fry Gunn Building 366 Galvez Street | Stanford, CA | 94305-6015 * Associate Professor, Department of Government and Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia 1 Although economic liberalization may involve curtailing state economic intervention, it does not diminish the state’s importance in economic development. In addition to its crucial role in maintaining macroeconomic stability, the state continues to play a vital, if more subtle, role in creating incentives that shape economic activity. States create these incentives in a variety of ways including their authorization of property rights and market microstructures, their creation of regulatory agencies, and the manner in which they structure fiscal federalism. While the incentives established by the state have pervasive economic consequences, they are created and re-created through political processes, and politics is a key factor in explaining the extent to which state institutions promote efficient and equitable behavior in markets. India has experienced two important changes that fundamentally have shaped the course of its economic reform. India’s party system has been transformed from a single party dominant system into a distinctive form of coalitional politics where single-state parties play a pivotal role in making and breaking governments. At the same time economic liberalization has progressively curtailed central government dirigisme and increased the autonomy of market institutions, private sector actors, and state governments. In this essay I will analyze how these changes have shaped the politics of fiscal and financial sector reform. -
Tamil Nadu Government Gazette
© [Regd. No. TN/CCN/467/2012-14. GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL NADU [R. Dis. No. 197/2009. 2017 [Price: Rs. 1.60 Paise. TAMIL NADU GOVERNMENT GAZETTE PUBLISHED BY AUTHORITY No. 51] CHENNAI, WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 20, 2017 Margazhi 5, Hevilambi, Thiruvalluvar Aandu–2048 Part II—Section 1 Notifications or Orders of specific character or of particular interest to the public issued by Secretariat Departments. NOTIFICATIONS BY GOVERNMENT CONTENTS Pages. FINANCE DEPARTMENT Constitution of Fifteenth Finance Commission 184-185 DTP—II-1(51) [ 183 ] 184 TAMIL NADU GOVERNMENT GAZETTE [ Part II—Sec.1 NOTIFICATIONS BY GOVERNMENT FINANCE DEPARTMENT Constitution of Fifteenth Finance Commission [G.O. No. 363, 12th December 2017, Karthigai 26, Hevilambi, Thiruvalluvar Aandu-2048.] No.II(1)/FIN/36/2017.—The following Order of the Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs, New Delhi, dated 27th November 2017 is republished:- In pursuance of clause (1) of article 280 of the Constitution, read with the provisions of the Finance Commission (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1951 (33 of 1951), the President is pleased to constitute a Finance Commission consisting of Shri N.K. Singh, Member of Parliament and former Secretary to the Government of India, as the Chairman and the following four other members, namely:- 1. Shri Shaktikanta Das, Member Former Secretary to the Government of India 2. Dr. Anoop Singh, Member Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University 3. Dr. Ashok Lahiri, Member (Part time) Chairman (Non-executive, part time) Bandhan Bank 4. Dr. Ramesh Chand, Member, NITI Aayog Member (Part time) 2. Shri Arvind Mehta shall be the Secretary to the Commission. -
(Eds.) Foundations in Microeconomic Theory Hugo F
Matthew O. Jackson • Andrew McLennan (Eds.) Foundations in Microeconomic Theory Hugo F. Sonnenschein Matthew O. Jackson • Andrew McLennan (Eds.) Foundations in Microeconomic Theory A Volume in Honor of Hugo F. Sonnenschein ^ Springer Professor Matthew O. Jackson Professor Andrew McLennan Stanford University School of Economics Department of Economics University of Queensland Stanford, CA 94305-6072 Rm. 520, Colin Clark Building USA The University of Queensland [email protected] NSW 4072 Australia [email protected] ISBN: 978-3-540-74056-8 e-ISBN: 978-3"540-74057-5 Library of Congress Control Number: 2007941253 © 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilm or in any other way, and storage in data banks. Duplication of this publication or parts thereof is permitted only under the provisions of the German Copyright Law of September 9,1965, in its current version, and permission for use must always be obtained from Springer. Violations are liable to prosecution under the German Copyright Law. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. Cover design: WMX Design GmbH, Heidelberg Printed on acid-free paper 987654321 spnnger.com Contents Introduction 1 A Brief Biographical Sketch of Hugo F. Sonnenschein 5 1 Kevin C. Sontheimer on Hugo F. -
Annual Report 1 Start
21st Annual Report MADRAS SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS Chennai 01. Introduction ……. 01 02. Review of Major Developments ……. 02 03. Research Projects ……. 05 04. Workshops / Training Programmes …….. 08 05. Publications …….. 09 06. Invited Lectures / Seminars …….. 18 07. Cultural Events, Student Activities, Infrastructure Development …….. 20 08. Academic Activities 2012-13 …….. 24 09. Annexures ……... 56 10. Accounts 2012 – 13 ……… 74 MADRAS SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS Chennai Introduction TWENTY FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 2013-2014 1. INTRODUCTION With able guidance and leadership of our Chairman Dr. C. Rangarajan and other Board of Governors of Madras School of Economics (MSE), MSE completes its 21 years as on September 23, 2014. During these 21 years, MSE reached many mile stones and emerged as a leading centre of higher learning in Economics. It is the only center in the country offering five specialized Masters Courses in Economics namely M.Sc. General Economics, M.Sc. Financial Economics, M.Sc. Applied Quantitative Finance, M.Sc. Environmental Economics and M.Sc. Actuarial Economics. It also offers a 5 year Integrated M.Sc. Programme in Economics in collaboration with Central University of Tamil Nadu (CUTN). It has been affiliated with University of Madras and Central University of Tamil Nadu for Ph.D. programme. So far twelve Ph.Ds. and 640 M.Sc. students have been awarded. Currently six students are pursuing Ph.D. degree. The core areas of research of MSE are: Macro Econometric Modeling, Public Finance, Trade and Environment, Corporate Finance, Development, Insurance and Industrial Economics. MSE has been conducting research projects sponsored by leading national and international agencies. It has successfully completed more than 110 projects and currently undertakes more than 20 projects. -
World Bank Document
THE WorldBank IN INDIA Public Disclosure Authorized VOL 4 / NO 1 JULY 2005 Two successive World Bank-assisted Leprosy Elimination Projects have helped India reduce its Public Disclosure Authorized leprosy prevalence rate from 2.4 cases per 1,000 people in 1993 to 1.34 per 10,000 in April 2005 Public Disclosure Authorized I N S I D E World Bank helps India fight leprosy 1-4 Bank helps India move towards What is holding back India’s growth 4-5 a leprosy-free future World Bank helps tsunami-hit fishermen welve-year-old Firoze Mohammad is visibly scared as he holds in AP 6-7 Tout his arm for Dr. H. K. Kar to examine. The boy, the son of an Events 8-13 ironsmith from West Delhi, has just had a biopsy done to examine a Recent Project Approvals 14 lesion and is now at the Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital’s Leprosy Clinic New Additions to the for treatment. Dr. Kar is at pains to assure the boy and his mother Public Disclosure Authorized Public Information Center 15 that Firoze will soon be back at boisterous play after a six-month Contact Information 24 medication regimen. Firoze is among the few residual cases afflicted with leprosy that the About the Photograph: national leprosy screening process throws up today. Two successive Young Firoze Mohammed with World Bank-assisted Leprosy Elimination Projects have helped India his mother at a leprosy clinic reduce its leprosy prevalence rate from 2.4 cases per 1,000 people in in Delhi’s Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital 1993 to 1.34 per 10,000 in April 2005. -
India Policy Forum July 13–16, 2020
Authors, Chair, and Discussants India Policy Forum July 13–16, 2020 NCAER | National Council of Applied Economic Research NCAER India Centre, 11 Indraprastha Estate, New Delhi 110002 Tel: +91-11-23452698, www.ncaer.org NCAER | Quality . Relevance . Impact Authors, Chair, and Discussants 2 Shankar Acharya is an Honorary Professor at the Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER). He has served as a Member on the 12th Finance Commission, the Prime Minister’s Economic Advisory Council, and on the Securities and Exchange Board of India. During his previous assignment as Chief Economic Adviser to the Government of India, he was closely associated with the Government’s programme of economic reforms as well as with the macroeconomic management of the economy. Apart from being the principal author of the World Development Report, 2017, and several World Bank country reports, he has published numerous books and scholarly papers mainly on topics related to macroeconomic policy, growth, international economics, and public finance. Some of his recent books on the Indian economy are Towards Economic Crisis (2012-14) (2015), India and the Global Crisis (2012), and India’s Economy: Performance and Challenges (2010). He has a Bachelor’s degree in Economics from Oxford University and a PhD in Economics from Harvard University. Junaid Ahmad is the India Country Director for the World Bank. He was earlier the Chief of Staff to the President of the World Bank Group,and before that, the Senior Director for the Bank’s Water Global Practice, where he championed the Practice’s focus on water and the economy and resilience in water management. -
Committee on Pricing and Taxation of Petroleum Products
Report of the Committee on Pricing and Taxation of Petroleum Products February 2006 Composition of the Committee 1. Dr. C. Rangarajan Chairman Chairman, PM’s Economic Advisory Council 2. Dr. Kirit S. Parikh Member Member, Planning Commission 3. Shri Saumitra Chaudhuri Member Member, PM’s Economic Advisory Council & Chief Economist, ICRA, New Delhi 4. Dr. Ashok Lahiri Member Chief Economic Adviser Ministry of Finance 5. Prof Bakul H. Dholakia Member Director, IIM, Ahmedabad 6. Shri M.S. Srinivasan Member Secretary Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas 7. Shri S.C. Tripathi Member Former Secretary until retirement on Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas 31.12.2005 ii Contents Page No. Main Report 1. Context - Need for Urgent Adjustment of Prices and Taxes 1 2. Principles 2 3. Analysis and Recommendations 4 Pricing of Petrol & Diesel 4 Trade Parity Pricing - What is it and Why? 5 Freight Equalization 5 Rationalization of Customs Duties 6 Restructuring of Excise Duties 7 Restructuring Sales Tax 8 Petrol and Diesel - Required Price adjustment 8 Impact of Suggested measures on Prices of Petrol and 9 Diesel Adjustment of Subsidy on Kerosene 10 Rationalizing Price of Domestic LPG 11 Revised Burden of Subsidy 11 Burden Sharing 12 Impact of Burden Sharing 13 Medium Term Issues 14 Summing Up 15 4. Attachments Attachment 1: Impact of Withdrawal of Inland Freight 16 Equalization Arrangement on Prices at Locations Across the Country Attachment 2: Shifting Excise Duty to Pure Specific 17 Levy – Price Build Up 5. Acknowledgements 18 iii ANNEXURES Page No. Annexure I: Terms of Reference and Meetings of the Committee 20 Annexure II: Structure of the Petroleum Sector 22 Annexure III: Recent Changes in Pricing and Taxation of 26 Petroleum Products Annexure IV: Evolution of the Pricing Mechanism 31 Annexure V: Subsidies on PDS Kerosene and Domestic LPG 34 Annexure VI: Subsidies on PDS Kerosene and Domestic LPG – 36 Findings of Recent Studies Annexure VII: Duty Structure on Crude Oil and Petroleum 39 Products iv Acronyms AOD Assam Oil Division, Indian Oil Corp. -
Ex Post Implementation in Environments with Private Goods
Theoretical Economics 1 (2006), 369–393 1555-7561/20060369 Ex post implementation in environments with private goods SUSHIL BIKHCHANDANI Anderson School of Management, University of California, Los Angeles We prove by construction that ex post incentive compatible mechanisms exist in a private goods setting with multi-dimensional signals and interdependent val- ues. The mechanism shares features with the generalized Vickrey auction of one- dimensional signal models. The construction implies that for environments with private goods, informational externalities (i.e., interdependent values) are com- patible with ex post equilibrium in the presence of multi-dimensional signals. KEYWORDS. Ex post incentive compatibility, multi-dimensional information, in- terdependent values. JEL CLASSIFICATION. D44. 1. INTRODUCTION In models of mechanism design with interdependent values, each player’s information is usually one dimensional. While this is convenient, it might not capture a significant element of the setting. For instance, suppose that agent A’s reservation value for an ob- ject is the sum of a private value, which is idiosyncratic to this agent, and a common value, which is the same for all agents in the model. Agent A’s private information con- sists of an estimate of the common value and a separate estimate of his private value. As other agents care only about A’s estimate of the common value, a one-dimensional statistic does not capture all of A’s private information that is relevant to every agent (including A).1 Therefore, it is important to test whether insights from the literature are robust to re- laxing the assumption that an agent’s private information is one dimensional.