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Studies in Economic Design Studies in Economic Design Series Editors Jean-François Laslier Paris School of Economics, Paris, France Hervé Moulin University of Glasgow, Glasgow, United Kingdom M. Remzi Sanver Université Paris-Dauphine, Paris, France William S. Zwicker Union College, Schenectady, NY, USA Economic Design comprises the creative art and science of inventing, analyzing and testing economic as well as social and political institutions and mechanisms aimed at achieving individual objectives and social goals. The accumulated traditions and wealth of knowledge in normative and positive economics and the strategic analysis of Game Theory are applied with novel ideas in the creative tasks of designing and assembling diverse legal-economic instruments. These include constitutions and other assignments of rights, mechanisms for allocation or regulation, tax and incentive schemes, contract forms, voting and other choice aggregation procedures, markets, auctions, organizational forms such as partnerships and networks, together with supporting membership and other property rights, and information systems, including computational aspects. The series was initially started in 2002 and with its relaunch in 2017 seeks to incorporate recent developments in the field and highlight topics for future research in Economic Design. More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/4734 Walter Trockel Editor Social Design Essays in Memory of Leonid Hurwicz 123 Editor Walter Trockel Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW) Bielefeld University Bielefeld, Germany ISSN 2510-3970 ISSN 2510-3989 (electronic) Studies in Economic Design ISBN 978-3-319-93808-0 ISBN 978-3-319-93809-7 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93809-7 © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland Leonid Hurwicz and Walter Trockel at Bielefeld University on December 4th, 2004 Foreword Take the 1969 paper in the American Economic Review and the 1972 chapter in the Decision and Organization book as two critical moments in the broadcasting of Leo Hurwicz’s message to the economic profession (they were earlier ones, but to many young researchers in those days, like myself, this is where we discovered his work) and consider their intellectual context. The field then called “Mathematical Economics” is booming and only a few years away from bursting into the main stream of our profession. This is happening around three main themes. First, the successful formalization of the competitive equilibrium by Arrow and Debreu (not to forget Allais and McKenzie) provides rock-solid logical foundations to the central concept of economic analysis, going much beyond Walras’ ideas by elucidating precisely which mathematical assumptions, on preferences and feasible transactions, ensure its existence and stability, or not. Second, von Neumann and Morgenstern’s early intuition that the behavior of economic agents in the small, e.g., face-to-face, is logically related, perhaps even isomorphic, to that of players in strategic games like chess or poker is slowly developing into the next paradigm of economic modeling, through the pioneer work of Shubik (Strategy and Market Structure, 1959), Debreu and Scarf (Equivalence of the Core and Competitive Equilibrium, 1963), Shapley and Shubik (Market Games, 1969, and Assignment Games, 1971), and Gale and Shapley (Stable Matching, 1962: still a mathematical curiosity at this point). Third, the spectacular entrance of the axiomatic methodology in the social sciences, in Arrow’s Social Choice Model (1951), states the first genuine mechanism design question in the language of economics. It promptly initiates much research on the meaning and design of “good” voting rules; a particularly challenging conjecture is the nonexistence of reasonable and strongly incentive-compatible (strategyproof) voting rules for more than two candidates (Dummett and Farquharson, 1961). It is about to be proved by Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1974). Thus, the key modeling tools for economics as we know it today are already present in these critical two decades of the 1950s and 1960s. But they are mostly developing, so to speak, in parallel universes. To my mind, Leo Hurwicz’s vii viii Foreword fundamental contribution was to set for his fellow economists a goal of a higher order, a “theory of everything” that has been the mechanism design program ever since: we need to understand what high-level goals can be implemented in possibly yet to be built economic institutions, once we take into account informational constraints and strategic incentives (what Myerson aptly calls adverse selection and moral hazard constraints). This volume offers a contemporary snapshot of Leo Hurwicz’s influence, captured in the work of a small set of scholars who may or may not have been in personal contact with him, but all acknowledge their intellectual debt to him by contributing to this Festschrift. For the reader unfamiliar with Hurwicz’s specific contributions, I recommend Postlewaite and Schmeidler’ effective review of his approach to the implementation problem and the difficulties still ahead. Then Myerson explains Hurwicz’s own inspiration in the historical debate on the feasibility of socialism and goes on to develop a rich interpretation of his 1998 “But who will guard the guardians?” paper. Finally, the reprinted 1995 chapter by Hurwicz, Maskin, and Postlewaite is not a comment on his work but the real thing. Classic implementation theory, the one that starts in a straight line from Hurwicz to Maskin and beyond, accounts, appropriately, for one-third of the volume, authored by some of the main actors in the field then and now. Edelman and Weymark discuss an extension of Rochet’s theorem about implementation by cash transfers. Dutta explains how the small twist of endowing agents with a costless preference for honesty turns the theory upside down. Peleg and Peters find new relations between implementation in strong equilibrium and elimination voting procedures. D’Aspremont and Cremer explain why implementation in the Bayesian context may or may not align incentives and full efficiency. Roy, Sadhukhan, and Sen extend and qualify the results of Barbera, Sonnenschein, and Zhou on the strategyproof formation of a committee when the voting rule is random. Barbera, Berga, and Moreno explore the incentives of experts in Condorcet’s celebrated jury problem and uncover relevant properties of the information structure. Finally, Hammond, in the only nontechnical paper of this batch, reinterprets mechanism design a la Hurwicz as a way to avoid “institutional externalities.” The next third is a bouquet of mainstream research in economic theory. Ledyard discusses an important informational aspect of the cap and trade mechanism for the provision of a public bad. Kannai and Raimondo offer a very general existence result for financial markets. Marschak and Wei show that in the simplest format of the principal agent problem, the welfare consequences of an improvement of the monitoring technology are not straightforward. Thomson deploys the axiomatic methodology to evaluate a simple rationing rule between two agents. La Mura shows that correlating strategies by quantum bits can improve cooperation in auctions. And two papers report on experiments testing new mechanisms to solve traditional social dilemmas: Van Essen and Walker for the public good provision problem and Saijo for the prisoners’ dilemma. Finally, three papers suggest new questions for the mechanism design of tomorrow. Demange discusses common misinterpretations of the algorithms that Foreword ix surround us in the age of Internet and derives new challenges for the designer. Vega Redondo proposes network design as a new research direction: e.g., the proactive design of financial networks can insure banks optimally against both small frequent shocks and large unfrequent ones. Chiu and Koeppl explain why blockchain systems are not immune to tampering, a difficulty that mechanism design should work to alleviate. Glasgow, UK Hervé Moulin May 2018 Contents In Lieu of an Introduction: How I Remember Leonid Hurwicz ............ 1 Walter Trockel Part I Institution Design Technical Change and the Decentralization
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