DOES PROLIFERATION BEGET PROLIFERATION? WHY NUCLEAR DOMINOES RARELY FALL A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Government By Philipp C. Bleek, A.B., M.P.P., M.A. Washington, DC July 27, 2010 Copyright 2010 by Philipp C. Bleek All Rights Reserved ii DOES PROLIFERATION BEGET PROLIFERATION? WHY NUCLEAR DOMINOES RARELY FALL Philipp C. Bleek, A.B., M.P.P., M.A. Thesis Advisor: Daniel L. Byman, Ph.D. ABSTRACT If Iran acquires nuclear weapons, or merely the capacity to do so on short notice, will other regional states attempt to acquire them as well? If North Korea does not give up, enlarges, or further weaponizes the modest nuclear arsenal it appears to have already acquired, will others follow suit? More broadly, is the conventional wisdom that “proliferation begets proliferation” correct? And if so, under what conditions is such “reactive proliferation” more or less likely, and therefore what tools might policymakers in Washington and elsewhere have to forestall further proliferation? This dissertation examines these questions using both quantitative and qualitative approaches. Hazard analysis, a statistical method of examining risk over time and its relationship to various factors, is employed on a new dataset of the proliferation behavior of all states throughout the nuclear age. Quantitative findings are further explored qualitatively, via in-depth case studies of two states that both had very intense rivals proliferate, Pakistan and Egypt. The analysis finds that states whose security rivals proliferate consequently experience modest increases in proliferation motivation. These modest increases are sufficient to push many over the low thresholds to exploring nuclear weapons options. But, sharply contra conventional wisdom, they are not sufficient to push most over the far higher thresholds to launching nuclear weapons programs or seeing such programs through to acquisition. iii Variation in reactive proliferation outcomes is explained in part by three sets of intervening variables. These also highlight conditions under which greater reactive proliferation can be expected and therefore levers policymakers in third party states may be able to employ to make reactive proliferation even less likely. First, policymakers perceive nuclear weapons in rival hands as primarily defense dominant and status quo-reinforcing, although somewhat less so when exceptionally intense rivals proliferate. Second, because states derive only a modest proliferation impulse from rival proliferation, states facing lesser economic costs and technological challenges are more likely to reactively proliferate. Third, while some states have powerful allies that both resist their proliferation and can extend security guarantees to them, others are more independent and hence more likely to reactively proliferate. iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS My father described writing one of his books as akin to performing a piano concerto; he played the piano, but the orchestra was crucial to the process. Taking the metaphor a step further, I’ve been exceptionally fortunate to have an outstanding conductor. My advisor, Dan Byman, was supportive when I needed it, prodded me when I needed it, and was consistently remarkably responsive, generous with his time, and substantively helpful. Matt Kroenig joined my committee shortly after coming on board at Georgetown, and has been exceptionally engaged and helpful on this project and as an academic mentor more broadly. I could not have pulled this project together without him. I’m grateful for both our professional relationship and his friendship. Andy Bennett served as my qualitative and mixed methods guru, both in his courses and on the dissertation itself, and I’m grateful for his help. Also at Georgetown, David Edelstein and Dan Nexon at Georgetown were both consistently generous with their time and helpful in their comments. Steve Miller did not serve on the committee, but might as well have for all the assistance he rendered, bringing me back to Harvard as a pre-doctoral fellow to write this dissertation after having previously served as my master’s thesis advisor, supporting me in my academic job search and pursuit of various other opportunities, and bringing me back to Harvard as a post-doctoral fellow. Graham Allison, Matthew Bunn, Marty Malin, Monica Toft, and Steve Walt at Harvard also deserve warm thanks for their engagement and support. My colleagues at Harvard deserve similar thanks. Richard Danzig has been a mentor, a wonderful interlocutor on issues ranging from bioweapons to Bach, very much including the dissertation, and a friend. Laura Holgate has similarly been an exceptional mentor, co-author, institutional supporter, and friend over the years. Kris Mastronardi has been a friend, fellow adventurer, and interlocutor on all things professional and personal since our college days. Meghan Giulino has been a colleague, friend, fellow food enthusiast, and a role model for getting the dissertation done through sheer force of will. Anika Binnendijk, now seeing the world on the U.S. taxpayer’s dime while working for the Obama administration, has been a friend, climbing buddy, and role model for getting the project done. Krzysztof Pelc has been a friend, climbing buddy, and consistently offered incisive feedback on this and other academic projects. Josh Marcuse has been a friend, fellow Washington traveler, and perhaps most importantly, fellow gourmand. Ethan Wais has been a friend, and deserves special thanks for being such a gracious host during various visits to DC as this project wrapped up. Leah Gilbert and Enrique Bravo were both great colleagues, roommates, and friends, and I wish them both luck in finishing their own projects. During my graduate studies and the writing of this dissertation, I benefited from institutional support from the Government Department at Georgetown, the Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Kennedy School at Harvard, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), the Nuclear Threat Initiative, the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) in Berlin, and the JFK Institut of the Freie Universitaet, also in Berlin. v Many of those who made these affiliations possible have already been thanked. In addition, Clark Murdock deserves thanks for many opportunities to engage with policymakers and non-governmental analysts in the U.S., U.K., and India through his Project on Nuclear Issues at CSIS. Michele Flournoy deserves thanks for helping me come on board at CSIS and subsequently extending an affiliation at CNAS. Thorsten Benner deserves thanks for hosting me at GPPi, and Ulla Lehmkuhl for arranging an affiliation at the Freie Universitaet. I benefited from opportunities to present this work to academic and policy audiences at conferences and seminars organized by the American Political Science Association, International Studies Association, Center for Strategic and International Studies Project on Nuclear Issues, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, Council on Foreign Relations, German Bundestag, Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, Global Public Policy Institute, and Stiftung Neue Verantwortung in Berlin. Finally, my father Wilhelm Bleek’s passion for scholarship and teaching inspired this project. His support, alongside that of my mother, Margaret, and sister, Emily, were crucial. This dissertation is dedicated to them. PHILIPP C. BLEEK vi TABLE OF CONTENTS Table Index……………………………………………………………………………...viii Epigraph………………………………………………………………………………….ix Introduction………………………………………………………………………………1 Chapter 1: When and Why States Reactively Proliferate………………………………..14 Chapter 2: Quantitatively Modeling Reactive Proliferation……………………………..54 Chapter 3: Quantitative Modeling, Part 2: Why Not More Reactive Proliferation?.........83 Chapter 4: Egypt’s Response to Israeli Proliferation, 1949-1979………………….......102 Chapter 5: Pakistan’s Response to Indian Proliferation, 1948-1987…………………...153 Conclusion: Why Nuclear Dominoes Rarely Fall……………………………………...207 Tables…………………………………………………………………………………...229 Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………241 Appendix A: When Did (and Didn’t) States Proliferate?................................................263 vii TABLE INDEX Table 1: Proliferation behavior over time………………………………………………229 Table 2: States that had rivals proliferate or engaged in proliferation behavior………..230 Table 2A: Potential case universe………………………………………………………232 Table 3: Hazard modeling results (only significance levels)…...………………………232 Table 3A: Lagged and led results (only significance levels)…………………………...234 Table 4: Hazard modeling results, full model, complete……………………………….235 Table 5: Hazard ratios to assess substantive importance……………………………….236 Table 6A: Interaction coefficients (latent nuclear capacity)……………………………237 Table 6B: Interaction coefficients (superpower dependency)….………………………238 Table 6C: Interaction coefficients (security guarantees)…….…………………………239 viii EPIGRAPH First we got the bomb, and that was good, ‘Cause we love peace and motherhood. Then Russia got the bomb, but that’s okay, ‘Cause the balance of power’s maintained that way. Who’s next? France got the bomb, but don’t you grieve, ‘Cause they’re on our side (I