71-7442

EDWARDS, John David, 1943- RESISTANCE TO ATTITUDE CHANGE: APPLICATIONS OF THE VALUE BONDING MODEL TO INTERPERSONAL ATTITUDES.

The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1970 Psychology, general

University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan RESISTANCE TO ATTITUDE CHANGE: APPLICATIONS OP THE VALUE BONDING MODEL TO INTERPERSONAL ATTITUDES

DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosohpy in the Graduate School of the Ohio State University

by John David Edwards, B.S., M.A. * * # # #

The Ohio State University 1970

Approved by

Adviser Department of Psychology ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

There is no doubt that my interests and competence as a psychologist which are partly reflected in this thesis have been formed by five well-spent years of association with my adviser, colleague, and friend, Thomas M. Ostrom, To Dr, Ostrom I give special thanks for his guidance and support throughout my graduate career. His unique combination of scholarship and fraternity has made our association doubly rewarding. I also thank the other members of the dissertation reading committee, Drs. Timothy C. Brock, Milton D. Hakel and Dean H. Owen for the time and interest they invested on behalf of this work and for their sugges­ tions which improved it. Many people have participated in various stages of the research reported here. David Poor, Lome Rosenblood and Robert Welles lent their computer skills which greatly facilitated data analysis. The clerical assistance of Rebecca Edwards, Susan Rieger and Eileen Timmerman is also gratefully acknowledged. Thanks are due to Joyce Decker for typing the final manuscript. I owe an immeasureable debt to my friends and family ii whose expressions of interest and confidence have been motivating and reinforcing. Most especially, X wish to thank my wife, Carol, for her material help in numerous aspects of this thesis and, more importantly, for her understanding and encouragement which have sustained me through the darkness. In small return for her dedication to me, I dedicate this thesis to her. J • D. E .

iii VITA

July 1 2 , 1 9 ^ 3 • • * Bom- Columfcus, Ohio

1 9 6 ^ 1 9 6 5 « • « • • Research Technician, Department of Psychology, Ohio State University 1965 • . • • • . • B.S., Ohio State University 1965-1966 • • . . . Research Assistant, Department of Pharmacy, Ohio State University

1 9 6 6 . . . • • • • Test Design Specialist, Evaluation Center, Ohio State University

1966-1967 ...... Research Assistant, Department of Psychology, Ohio State University

1967 ...... M.A., Ohio State University

1967-1968 ...... Teaching Assistant, Department of Psychology, Ohio State University

1969 ...... Lecturer, Department of Psychol­ ogy, Ohio Northern University

1968-1970 ...... Research Assistant and Associate, Department of Psychology, Ohio State University

PUBLICATIONS

Cognitive structure of neutral attitudes. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. In prestH (with Thomas M* Ostrom) The null effect of value bonding on attitude formation. Proceedings of the 78th Annual Convention. Miami: American Psychological Association, 1970, Pp. k01~k0Z» (with T. M. Ostrom) The effects of value importance and relatedness on resistance to change of value bonded attitudes, Psvchonomic Science. In Press. Value bonded attitudes: changes in attitude formation as a function of value bonding and type of communication discrepancy. Proceedings of the 77th Annual Convention. Washington: American Psychological Association, 19^9# Pp* 4-13-^1^ • (with Thomas M. Ostrom) The pharmacist as perceived by doctors, customers, and other pharmacists. Journal of the American Pharma­ ceutical Association. 1969. NS9. 80-8^. (with Deanne E. Knapp and David A. Knapp)

FIELDS OF STUDY Social Psychology: Professors Timothy C. Brock, Anthony G. Greenwald, Charles A. Kiesler, Bibb Latane and Thomas M. Ostrom Experimental Psychology: Professors Neal F. Johnson and Reed Lawson Measurement and Statistics: Professors James R. Erickson, Reed Lawson, James C. Naylor, Thomas M. Ostrom and Robert J. Wherry

v TABLE OP CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS i i VITA...... iv LIST OF TABLES...... vii LIST OF FIGURES...... x CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION...... 1 The Reason for Concern Persuasion Resistance to Persuasion 2. THE EFFECTS OF VALUE CENTRALITY AND RELATEDNESS ON THE RESISTANCE TO CHANGE OF VALUE BONDED ATTITUDES ..... 46 3. THE EFFECTS OF NUMBER OF BONDED VALUES ON RESISTANCE TO ATTITUDECHANGE ...... 85 4. THE EFFECTS OF VALUE BONDING ON THE FUNCTION RELATING COMMUNICATION DISCREPANCY TO ATTITUDE CHANGE...... 114 5. SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS...... 146 APPENDIX A ...... 158 180 220 D ...... 246 REFERENCES...... 262

vi LIST OP TABLES Page Chapter 2 1. Weighted average attitude as a function of value importance and relatedness and task motivation...... 60 2 Mean belief certainty as a function of belief favorability and importance of bonded values...... 65 3. Mean belief certainty as a function of belief favorability and related­ ness of bonded values...... 65 4. Mean belief certainty as a function of belief favorability and value bonding motivation...... * 66 5. Mean belief certainty as a function of belief favorability, and value importance and relatedness ...... 67 6, Mean belief certainty as a function of belief favorability, value importance {I vs, UX), value related­ ness (H vs. Ur77 and value bonding motivation...... 69 Chapter 3 1, Post-bonding, pre-discrepancy favorability self-ratings as a function of number and value importance...... 9^ 2. Weighted average post­ discrepancy attitude as a function of number and value importance...... *..... 95

vii LIST OP TABLES (continued) 3. Belief certainty as a function of belief favorability and the number and importance of bonded values...... 98 Chapter 4 1.Mean favorability of initial and discrepant traits for replications 1 and 2...... 122 2.Individual comparisons of I and UI conditions at each discrepancy level ...... 127

3. Belief certainty as a function of belief favorability, value importance, and degree of discrepancy,...... 133 4. Relative contribution of initial and discrepant information as a function of value importance and discrepancy level...... 140 Appendix D 1. Cell means and analysis summary of initial attitude as a function of value importance and relatedness, and task motivation...... 24? 2. Analysis summary of post­ discrepancy attitude as a function of value importance and relatedness, and task motivation...... 248

3. Analysis summary of post­ discrepancy attitude as a function of value importance and relatedness in the low motivation condition, reanalysis covarying initial attitude, and adjusted cell-means...... 249 viii LIST OF TABLES (continued) Multivariate analysis of variance summary of belief certainty as a function of favorability groups, value importance and relatedness and task motivation...... Analysis summary of post-discrepancy attitude as a function of value importance and number, reanalysis covarying initial attitude, and adjusted means ...... Multivariate analysis of variance summary of belief certainty as a function of favorability groups, value importance and number...... Cell means and analysis summary of initial attitude as a function of value importance, degree of discrepancy and stimulus replications ...... Analysis summary of post­ discrepancy attitude as a function of value importance, degree of discrepancy, and stimulus replications, reanalysis covarying initial attitude, and adjusted means...... Multivariate analysis of variance summary of belief certainty as a function of favorability groups, value importance, degree of discrepancy, and stimulus replications ...... LIST OF FIGURES Page 1. Weighted average attitude as a function of value importance and degree of discrepancy...... 125 2. Belief certainty as a function of "belief favorability and value importance ...... 130 3. Belief certainty as a function of belief favorability and degree of discrepancy ...... 132

x Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION

The Reason for Concern We have been warned that someday soon the individ­ ual human mind will be totally under external control. In prophetic novels such as Huxley's Brave New World and Orwell's 1984-. the thought and behavior of whole pop­ ulations are portrayed as the planned products of imper­ sonal Machiavellian forces. Control is maintained in these envisioned societies through massive and continual propaganda. Other popular writers have not regarded these bizarre and repugnant conditions as fiction, but as present and growing reality. In The Hidden Persuaders. Packard drew attention to "large scale efforts being made, often with impressive success, to channel our unthinking habits. . ., our thought processes by the use of insights gleaned from psychiatry and the social sciences • • .. The result is that many of us are being influ­ enced and manipulated, far more than we realize, in the patterns of our everyday lives." (1957» P* 1) The frightening message in works of this genre is that social scientists, particularly psychologists, have gained and are refining techniques of mass persuasion so subtle and powerful that individuals and whole societies 1 2 will soon be denied all of what little remains of their conscious self-determination. But are the fears instilled by this specter of willful manipulation (short of biological intervention) really justified in terras of the status of our present and forseeable persuasion capabilities? An answer to this question can be formulated by reviewing the history of persuasion and persuasion resistance as topics of theoretical and empirical analysis. Persuasion We know that throughout recorded history a few men have been able to attain preeminence in their fields by their ability to persuade others to adopt a common opinion. From the writings by and about these men and their times, some knowledge can be gained about their techniques of persuasion. Such diverse works as The New Testament and Mein Kanrof contain insights on how to persuade others. What is lacking in such literary and historical accounts, however, is a clear separation of the persuader and his techniques. There is no assurance that one man's successful devices would work for another man, in another time, or on another topic of social concern. Aristotle (195*0 was perhaps the first prominent figure to attempt the formulation of a set of principles of persuasion that could be universally applied. However, the systematic analysis of persuasion using the methods of science did not begin until after the start of the 20th century. By that time the early psychologists such as Ebbinghaus, Fechner, and Wundt had shown that certain nonsocial human behaviors were measurable and, in some cases, lawful. Consecutively, sociologists were engaging in the observational study of societies. The wedding of these two sciences produced the new discipline of social psychology whose purpose became the study of the individual as a social being. Since its inception as a separate division among the sciences of behavior, social psychology has taken as one of its major substantive problems the discovery and testing of the principles of persuasion. Indeed, as McGuire (1968b) has noted, • • • "A half century ago , • • theorists as varied as Thomas and Znaniecki (1918) and J, B. Watson (1925) regarded attitude so as central a concept for the field that they equated social psychology with the study of attitudes." Following Allportfs (1935) important chapter on attitudes in the first Handbook of Social Psychology, the study of persuasion or attitude change has been almost exclusively identified as the special province of social psychologists. A problem which had for so long received only desultory attention from wise but speculative practitioners became the focal topic of rigorous theoretical and empirical analysis by several generations of social scientists.1 Research on persuasion advanced in many ways during and after World War II due largely to the efforts and ingenuity of Carl Hovland and his colleagues in the War Department and later in the Yale Communication Research Project, These research programs along with the work of other pioneering social psychologists lead to the speci­ fication and examination of a set of independent variables thought to be critical in the attitude change process. It is far beyond the scope and intention of this paper to discuss the literature on attitude change except to note that it is considerable and expanding. Literally hundreds of empirical and theoretical papers are published each year on this topic. It seems inevitable, then, both in terms of the popular concern regarding the development of possibly threatening persuasion techniques and in

1. In fairness, it should be noted that the research of social psychologists differs from the work of the historical orators and philosophers more in methodology than in content. Aristotle wrote, "Of the modes of persuasion. . • there are three kinds. The first kind depends on the personal character of the speaker; the second on putting the audience into a certain frame of mind; the third on the proof, or apparent proof, provided by the speech itself." (195^, P» 24) Likewise, Hovland and his colleagues (Hovland, Janis & Kelley, 1953) identified three main classes of persuasion variables: communicator, audience, and communication. This common­ ality of content applies to specific variables as well. One communicator variable that has received continuing attention is credibility (e.g., Hovland & Weiss, 1951; Johnson & Izzet, 1969)* Some years earlier Aristotle stated, "Persuasion is achieved by the speaker's personal character when the speech is spoken so as to make us think him credible." (1954, p. 25) The point here is not so much to celebrate Aristotle's sagacity or foresight, but to demonstrate the universality of the variables currently under study. terms of the propensity of scientists to swing from one point of view to its opposite, that resistance to per­ suasion will be a major topic area in social psychology. The following discussion shows that this concentration is already underway* Resistance to Persuasion It is reasonable to maintain, based on the sizable literature alluded to above, that social psychologists know a great deal about the critical variables involved in attitude change. Given this knowledge, psychologists can also speak with some authority on resistance to persuasion to the extent that the same principles are involved. In discussing the gloomy prospect of a world in which men's minds are manipulated Cohen (i96 0) wrote, "On the positive side, let us hope that any principles derived . • • are equally applicable for developing resis­ tance to persuasive inducement." Later, the same author wrote, "In considering the problem of resistance to attitude change, all the factors assumed to be related to decreasing the acceptance of influence are relevant. Thus, if the reverse of everything we have seen to be productive of attitude change were invoked, , . , we should expect greater resistance to attempts at persuasion, (Cohen, 1 9 6 ^, p. 121). However, as Cohen noted later in the same passage, 11 • • • resistance may not be a mere mirror image of acceptance, and the explicit study of how it is built up may highlight novel phenomena in the whole field of attitude change.” Thus, for example, knowing that a highly credible communicator is more persuasive than a non-credible source, does not necessarily imply that resistance to persuasion can be guaranteed by using low credibility communicators* The distinction between persuasion and resistance may be more than a difference in the degree of change associated with different levels of a variable. Situational Effectiveness of Attitude Change Variables As a preface to the discussion of research and theory on resistance it is appropriate to consider the basic effectiveness and generalizability of attitude change techniques. The evaluation of attitude change variables has been carried out for the most part in laboratory settings. The effects of critical variables in such controlled situations are reliable and predictable. However, several common phenomena call their validity into question. First, ambient attitudes do not always change in the face of well-conceived counter-attitudinal communications. Second, even when an attitude is changed, the change is often of only modest size and rarely from one pole to its opposite. Third, in many cases, the new attitude is only a temporary, situation-bound condition which is followed by a partial or complete reversion to the original attitude. Finally, persons holding apparently the same attitude are differently affected by the same persuasive appeal. Evidence for these phenomena derives not so much from specific experiments (the exigencies of research usually preclude their observation), but from the import of the attitude change literature as

a whole (Hovland, 1959)* from the conclusions of those who have examined the everyday problems of effecting attitude change (Klapper, i960), and from the author's own experience.

As Hovland (1959) noted, the reports on the effect­ iveness of public opinion campaigns (e.g., Hyman &

Sheatsley, 1958; Lazarfeld, Berelson & Gaudet, 19^8 ; Lipset, Lazarfeld & Barton, 195*0 indicate that the attitudes of less than 5% of the population are swayed by opinion messages from the mass media. Even such drastic and comprehensive programs as "brainwashing" of prisoners of war produces a sizable degree of resistance among some recipients (Schein, 1956), On the other hand, surveys of laboratory studies (Hovland,

195*0 Klapper, i960) show that the attitudes of up to 50# of experimental subjects are changed. One factor apparently contributing tc the lessened resistance of laboratory subjects is the experimental situation itself. Becent research on the social psychology of the psychological experiment (e.g., Kintz, 19^5; Masling,

1966; Orne, 1962; Bosenthal & Rosnow, 1969; Silverman, 1968) 8 implies that subjects, via conscious or unconscious role playing and other devices, comply with cues inadvertently provided by the setting, the experimental materials, and by the experimenter himself. These studies suggest that the degree of attitude change obtained in the laboratory may be deceptively large* This bias does not necessarily mean that the principles of persuasion derived from lab­ oratory research are wrong, as long as their effects do not interact significantly with the observational setting. It is doubtful that the processes which produce this bias could be brought fully to bear in overcoming resistance in natural environments. Further evidence of the important consequences of an audience*s freedom outside the laboratory is given in the following section.

Selective Exposure The factor differentiating laboratory and field results which Hovland (1959) thought was "undoubtedly the most critical and interesting," was the difference in the exposure to persuasive communications. In the laboratory situation, subjects are fully exposed to those and only those communications which the experimenter provides. In natural settings, however, it has been generally assumed that people "expose themselves most of the time to the kind of material with which they agree to begin with" (Lipset, et al., 195*0• Attitudes would not be expected to change if they were never challenged by the reception of discrepant information. In their review of research on selective exposure, Freedman and Sears (1965) concluded that there is a kind of "de facto selectivity" in which people because of their interests, locations, occupations and so on, are indeed exposed to only a limited diversity of opinions. However, Freedman and Sears argue on the basis of their own researoh that this selectivity is not deliberate. In some conditions people actually seek out counterattitudinal information for the sake of novelty or the joy of refutation. As long as people are free to choose what communications they will and will not attend to, mass psrsuaslon campaigns will face this type of resistance.

Perceptual Factors Even when people are exposed to a communication-t there is the further possibility that their perceptions of it will be distorted by their own biases (Kelley, 1957)* This type of distortion has been found both in natural settings in reports of political behavior

(Berelson, Lazarfeld & McPhee, 1958) and of the famous

"invasion from Mars" broadcast, (Cantril, 1958), and in the laboratory (Cooper & Dinerman, 1951; Cooper & Jahoda,

19*17; Hamilton, 1969* Johnson, 1966). The perceptual distortion of attitudinal material is also demonstrated in other bodies of literature. Several current models of attitude change, e.g., 10 assimilation-contrast theory (Sherif & Hovland, 1961) are based on a notion of perceptual distortion* In addition, research in the field of social judgment has shown that the evaluation of attitude statements varies with the subjectfs attitude toward the issue (Atkins, 1966; Hovland & Sherif, 1952; Manis, 1961; Ward, 1965; Zavalloni & Cook, 1965)» although this may not always be the case (Segall, 1959; Upshaw, 1962)* These and other data indicate that a person*s own attitude guides his perceptions of other attitudinal positions. Selective exposure and perceptual misinterpretation help to account for the differences in observed resistance to persuasion between laboratory and field research. In addition, there are numerous other variables such as differences in subject sample, media of communication, latency between communication and measurement, and so on which probably also contribute to the difference. These important differences coupled with the research on the misrepresentative tractability of laboratory subjects could lead to the conclusion that present persuasion technologies operated through the communication media do not pose an overly serious threat to freedom of opinion. Such a conclusion could be both socially dangerous and intellectually stifling. The danger stems from accepting post hoc explanations of observed resistance based on, at best, correlational evidence and from accepting the assumption that persuasion techniques will not become more effective in the future. Such a conclusion might also discourage future research on resistance in -which new resistance factors are examined as independent variables. The utility of this latter approach is demonstrated in the following review of research and theory in which independent variables associated with resistance have been examined. It should be noted that McGuire's (1964) review of techniques for inducing resistance guided the present discussion. Commitment

It has been suggested (e.g., Kiesler & Sakumura, 1966) that when a person takes some action on behalf of a belief, that belief becomes less changeable. Any factor which influences the degree of commitment to a belief will in turn directly affect the degree of resistance to changing the belief. Theoretically, the least power­ ful form of commitment is a private decision to adopt a particular position. Prom his observations of group dynamics, Lewin (1958) concluded that a private decision could have a "freezing" effect on beliefs, making them resistant to social influence. However, it is not clear that the private acceptance of a belief confers sig­ nificant resistance in all situations. Bennett (1955) found that subjects who made an anonymous decision were more persistent in their beliefs than subjects in a no 12 decision condition. On the other hand, Lana (1969) reviewing his own and others' research comparing pre­ post and after-only designs did not find any strength­ ening effects of prior, private decision when subjects were presented with a single, one-sided communication. Lana reports other data showing that a pretest can act as a form of commitment which produces significant resistance in the case of two-sided communications. The degree of resistance and the conditions under which it is aroused by private commitment have yet to be fully determined. There seems to be little question that public commitment does reliably arouse greater acceptance of announced stand (Lewin, 1958) and greater resistance to change (e. g., Cohen, Brehm & LatanS, 1959; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Hovland, Campbell & Brock, 1957)* Presumably, under these conditions the anticipated pangs of inconsistency coupled with possible public embarrassment make the announced stand resistant to change• One form of commitment that has been extensively examined involves active participation on behalf or in defense of one's beliefs. This type usually includes either private acceptance or public announcement or both. The study of active participation has been approached from several theoretical positions. As a derivation from innoculation theory (which will be discussed more fully later) active defenses in the form of essay writing have been found to produce more resistance than passive defenses in the form of reading defensive arguments (McGuire, 1961a; 1961b; McGuire & Papageorgis, 1961). Even so, some quite passive forms of commitment can increase persuasion. In research on external commitment, Rosenbaum and Franc (i9 6 0 ) and Rosenbaum and Zimmerman (1959) found that when subjects learned that others attributed opinions to them which were congruent with their beliefs, those beliefs became more resistant to change. In studies based on or relevant to the theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 195?) the effects of commitment as affected by active participation have been extensively examined. In current versions of dissonance theory (e. g., Brehm & Cohen, 1962) commitment as an independent variable has become a central concept. According to dissonance theory, the greater the commitment to a belief, the greater its resistance to change. Typical dissonance arous­ ing conditions such as high perceived choice (Freedman & Steinbrunner, 1965) and low magnitude of reward (Kiesler & Sakumura, 1966) for taking a position have been shown to increase resistance to change. Other research on overt compliance and role playing in which beliefs are rehearsed (e. g., Cohen, Brehm & Fleming, 1959; Kelman, 1953; King & Janis, 1956) as well as the relevant studies of forced compliance (e. g., Brehm, I960; Raven & Fishbein, 1961; Smith, 1961) all support the rather tautological notion that overt commiting acts increase resistance to persuasion relative to the change observed in appropriate control conditions. The commitment variable is similar in many respects to another well studied factor, ego-involvement, which will be discussed in detail in a later section.

Group Effects As the classic conformity studies of Asch (1951» 1956) and the extensive research which followed there­ from showed, group pressure from even a fairly small collection of strangers can produce dramatic effects on individual judgment on a variety of tasks, including attitudinal expressions. These studies reveal that for many persons the forced public expression of judgments can be readily swayed by the unanimous counterattitudinal judgments of others. This type of compliance does not necessarily imply private 15 agreement, but the commitment research reported above suggests that compliance can lead to acceptance. Schulraan (1968) found that people holding an unpop­ ular view on a controversial issue are resistant to change. However, this resistance may derive from other variables such as degree of identification with the group. A number of other authors (Charters & Newcomb, 1958; Dittes & Kelley, 1956; Kelley & Woodruff, 1956; Newcomb, 1961) have demonstrated the powerful effects of groups on the formation, change, and resistance to change of the attitudes of group members. Group effects on resistance also have been found in cases where the target person is not a group member (Bennett, 1955; Schachter & Hall, 1952). Also related to group effects on resistance are studies (e. g., Kelman & Hoviand, 1953; Tannenbaum, 1956) showing the effects of varying the valence of the source of a communication on remem­ bering and accepting the communications. In summary, the effects of groups and the interaction of group effects with other resistance variables (e. g., Anderson & McGuire, 1965) depend on the direction and unanimity of group pressure. People who receive unanimous, consistent support for their attitudes from positive reference groups and those receiving challenges from negative groups should both show high resistance to change • 16 Varieties of Preparation and Forewarning A quite direct tactic for inducing resistance to persuasion is to provide some training in handling persuasive messages or at least some warning that they are forthcoming, A number of studies (Allport & Lepkin, 1945; Citron, 1955; Collier, 1944; Das, Rath & Das, 1955) suggested that training in critical ability helped subjects resist persuasion attempts that came later. This same notion that resistance can be produced by providing some form of pre-experience with counterattitudinal arguments is inherent to innoculation theory (McGuire, 196*1-) as will be shown later. Following the Korean War, this type of preexposure to anti-American philosophies was advocated as a means of arousing the resistance of potential American prisoners of war to the Chinese indoctrination programs which at the time had seemed so amazingly successful. A related line of research developed out of the hypothesis that merely warning a person that a counter­ attitudinal message was forthcoming and/or that a communicator had persuasive intentions would arouse resistance to the message, A number of experiments (Allyn & Festinger, I96I; Festinger & Maccoby, 1964; Freedman & Sears, 1965; Janis, Lumsdaine & Gladstone, 1951; Kiesler & Kiesler, 1964; Sears, Freedman & 0*Connor, 1964) have supported this hypothesis. However, other studies (e. g., Apsler & Sears, 1968; Mills, 1966; Mills & Aronson, 1965) have found that forewarning facilitates attitude change under certain conditions. Another experiment (McGuire & Papageorgis, 1962) found that forewarning had no effect on attitude change, but did produce attitude change in the direction of the expected communication prior to its reception. This finding of anticipatory attitude change has been replicated several times in research examining the interaction of forewarning with other variables in testing several different theoretical interpretations (cf., Cooper & Jones, 1970; Deutsch, Krauss & Rosenau, 1962,* Fisher, Rubenstein & Freeman, 1956; McGuire & Millman, 1965; Papageorgis, 1967). This research stimulated an interest in the processes that take place during the anticipatory period (e. g., Brock, 1967; Deaux, 1968). Brock found that counterarguing during this period significantly increased resistance to the subsequent communication. It has been noted (e.g., Apsler & Sears, 1968) that forewarning has taken two general forms: a warning that a particular countersttitudinal message will soon be given, and an indication that the experiment is concerned with attitude change. On the basis of his review of this rather complicated set of findings, Papageorgis (1968) concluded that neither type is crucial in attitude change, but in some cases, persuasion may begin following a warning and before the communication. He further argued that resistance to persuasion will occur only when both types of forewarning are negative; i.e., when subjects expect a specific message which they know has been designed to change their attitudes. Another controversy which stemmed directly from the forewarning research has to do with the effects of distraction during the presentation of counterattitudinal information. Festinger and Maccoby (196*0, in a reinter­ pretation of Allyn and Festinger's (196X ) forewarning study, suggested that when a person's attention is distracted by an irrelevant task during exposure to a persuasive message, attitude change should be enhanced. Their prediction was based on the assumption that distraction interferes with counterarguing. Recall that

Brock (1967) later found that counterarguing helped

mediate resistance. McGuire (1966), among others, noted that a 1earring theory approach would predict the opposite, to the extent that attention to and recall of a message leads to its acceptance. Several studies lent some support to this intriguing hypothesis (Freedman & Sears,

1965; Festinger & Maccoby, 196*0 , but other research

(e. g., Haaland & Venkatesan, I968J clearly supports the more plausible learning theory derivation. Freedman and Sears (1965) manipulated both forewarning and distraction and failed to confirm the hypothesis that 19 the latter would lower the resistance conferring effects of the former. They concluded that the active rehearsal of supporting arguments is the major process by which resistance is increased in the forewarning condition. It seems clear, then, that resistance can be aroused by forewarning, but probably only when there is an interval between forewarning and attack during which the undistracted subject can bolster his own position by some form of arguing against the expected attack, Rogers and Thistlethwaite (1969)» on the other hand, maintained that the function of the interval was to allow time for subjects to regain self-confidence and self-esteem following their impotent response to the forewarning. The appearance of a warning no doubt introduces a whole new set of cognitions for the subject beyond those involved with the attitude object. In a recent paper Levy and House (1970) posited two levels of beliefs in the attitude change situation: beliefs about the issue, and superordinate beliefs about the relative changeability of attitudinal beliefs. They found that superordinate cognitions operate as a dispositional factor mediating the resistance of specific beliefs. The type of super­ ordinate beliefs that emerge in the forewarning situation might well determine whether resistance or anticipatory attitude change will occur. 20 Personality Variables One of the earliest and still quite active cam­ paigns in the attitude change literature has been the search for consistent individual differences which com­ prise the persuadable personality type# Common experience leads to the belief that some people are simply more easily influenced than others, or in terms of the present context, some people are simply more difficult to influence than others# Some personality variables are, almost by definition, correlated with resistance to persuasion. For example, Eokeach {i960) showed that dogmatic or closed-minded people, as identified by their responses to a dogmatism scale, are less persuadable than open-minded people. More recent research (Ehrlich & Lee, 1969) has uncovered a large number of other variables which are involved with dogmatism and alter its straightforward effects. The following discussion of individual difference factors makes it quite apparent that the relationship between personality and persuasibility is not simple. Cognitive complexity. Related to the concept of dogmatism, rigidity, or closed-mindedness are such vari­ ables as concreteness-abstractness (Harvey, personal communication) and cognitive complexity-simplicity. This latter term stands for the variety of ways in which individual cognitive structures can differ (Zajonc, i960), 21 and has been the object of some study with regard to its effects on attitude formation and change. It can be assumed that cognitively complex persons are more predisposed to integrating new information and, therefore, less resistant to change than cognitively simple persons. Some support has been collected for this conclusion (e. g., Cohen, 1961; Lundy & Berkowitz, 1957; Zajonc, i960). On the other hand, it can be just as easily assumed that greater cognitive complexity enhances resistance to attitude change by permitting other avenues of inconsistency reduction. Thus, several other authors have found greater resistance among people with complex cognitive structures (e. g., Mayo & Crockett, 196^; Rosenkrantz, 1961). Still others find no clear- cut relationship between complexity and change (Leventhal & Singer, 196^), or find that the effects of complexity depend on other independent variables (Eisenman, 1968). One tenable reason for the lack of consistent findings here, aside from potentially important methodological differences, is the generally low correlations among the various measures of complexity (Vannoy, 1965). Self-esteem. Self-esteem has been defined (Cohen, 1959b) as the degree of correspondence between an individual's ideal and actual concepts of himself. In nature, this factor varies across individuals, and in the laboratory it is usually manipulated by contriving a series of either success or failure experiences. It has been repeatedly demonstrated that people with high self-esteem are generally more resistant to social influence than people of low self-esteem (DiVesta, 1959; Hockbaum, 1954; Hovland & Janis, 1959; Janis, 1954; Janis & Field, 1959; Janis & Rife, 1959; Kelman, 1950; Lesser & Abelson, 1959; Levonian, 1968; Linton & Graham, 1959; Mausner, 1954; Samelson, 1957). However, other research has shown a direct relationship between self­ esteem and persuasibility (Cohen, 1959b; Gollob & Dittes, 1965; Leventhal & Perloe, 1962; Silverman, 1964a, 1964b), while others have found that persuasibility is maximum at moderate levels of self-esteem (Cox & Bauer, 1964; Gelfand, 1965; Gergen & Bauer, 1967; Nisbett & Gordon, 1967; Lehman, 1970; Zellner, 1970). The rather imposing body of literature on self-esteem, which is only partly represented by the foregoing citations, discourages any broad generalizations about the relationship of this variable to attitude change. At the very least, it is clear that a researcher must proceed with caution before employing a manipulation of self-esteem to alter resis­ tance . Authoritarianism. One of the characteristics of the authoritarian personality (Adorno, et al., 1950) is a predispositional receptivity to the admonitions of authority figures. Several experiments (Linton & Graham, 1959? Nadler, 1959; Rohrer & Sherif, 1951; Vaughn & White, 196 6 ; Wells, Weinert & Rubel, 1956) have found a direct relationship between this variable and conformity in a variety of situations. Other writers (Gorfein, 1961; Hardy, 1957; Weiner & McGinnes, 1961) failed to find any significant relationship. And other writers (Berkowitz & Lundy, 1956; Johnson & Izzet, 1969; Johnson, Torcivia & Poprick, 1968; Steiner & Johnson, 1963) have found a relationship only under certain conditions of interaction with other variables. As a whole, this literature fore­ tells a vicious spiral of increasing authoritarianism and decreasing resistance to authority figures. That is, a person gaining an increasing body of followers increases in his standing as an authority figure. Of course, a source regarded as an authority by one person or group may arouse resistance among other people who believe in some different hero. Aggressiveness. Janis and Field (1959) failed to find any support for the hypothesis that people characterized by a high level of interpersonal aggres­ siveness, as measured by a personality test, would be less susceptible to persuasion, Quite the contrary, Weiss and Fine (1956) found that induced aggressiveness heightened susceptibility to influence, at least for communications taking an aggressive stand. The growing visibility and concern with human aggression will no doubt zk provoke future research on this variable as it relates to persuasion. Anxiety. As has been the case with other variables, research on the effects of anxiety on persuasion has produced mixed results. Studies conducted for the most part in the 1950's (e. g., Goldstein, 1959; Janis & Feshback, 1953; Moltz & Thistlethwaite, 1955; Nunnally & Bobren, 1959) found an inverse relationship between anxiety and persuasion, while more recent studies have found a direct (e.g., Leventhal, Singer & Jones, 1966; Leventhal & Watts, 1966) or a nonmonotonic (e.g. Lehman, 1970) relationship. Any induction of fear or anxiety as a technique of arousing resistance must take account of the nuances of setting and interacting variables which produced these inconsistent results. There are many other important dimensions of individual difference such as intelligence, age, and sex which have been shown to differentially affect persuasibility. There is probably little to be gained by pursuing the personality variable approach to resistance arousal any further at this point. We are already faced with a seemingly overwhelming variety of outcomes. Several reasons have been offered for the repeated lack of consistent relationship between personality and persuasion. However, differences in sample, design, methodology and so on, cannot alone 25 account for all the inconsistencies. One possible explanation is that messages are most effective in overcoming resistance if their format and position coincide with the normal levels of factors making up the recipients personality. For example, an author­ itarian person would be most persuaded by an authoritarian message, an intelligent person would be less affected by an emotional, illogical message, and so on. McGuire (1968a)has recently provided an elegant model relating personality variables to susceptibility to social influence. He viewed attitude change as a multi-stage process which for convenience can be broken down into two major aspects: reception of the persuasive message, and yielding to the message. McGuire argues that some personality variables may operate in opposing fashions during the two stages. For example, some variables such as intelligence and self-esteem, are thought to be positively related to reception and negatively related to yielding. Other variables such as anxiety, dogmatism, and authoritarianism are thought to be negatively related to reception and positively related to yielding. By taking into account both ^he chronic and induced levels of these variables, one can determine the optimum level of personality variables for producing maximum change or maximum resistance. In most cases this optimum level should be at some intermediate degree of a 26 personality variable* Therefore, the relationship between personality variables and persuasion should be curvilinear. McGuire's model helps disentangle many of the apparently contradictory findings cited above and has begun to stimulate new research by others (e* g*, Lehman, 1970). The modest observation that some personality types are more persuadable than others has encouraged the production of a large corpus of empirical data, and lead to the formulation of sophisticated theories. In order to arouse persuasion resistance by appealing to indi­ vidual difference characteristics, one must simultaneously consider the chronic and acute levels of the variables, the levels of critical interaction variables, and the direction, facilitative or inhibitive, of the effect of each variable. The current Btate of research and theory of personality, and persuasibility is no doubt only suggestive of the complexity of this relationship. Innoculation Theory The most deliberate and comprehensive approach to persuasion resistance is embodied in the literature on innoculation theory. Adopting a biological analogy, McGuire (1961b) hypothesized that subjects could be immunized against persuasion by a form of pre-treatment which would both motivate the person to defend his beliefs and provide practice in constructing defenses. This pre- 27 treatment takes the form of a mild counterattitudinal message given prior to the persuasive communication. Just as a mild dose of a disease agent arouses one's defenses against a possibly debilitating massive exposure later, a mild counterattitudinal message should stimulate defenses against subsequent persuasion attempts. The type of attitudes which McGuire felt were par­ ticularly susceptable to change and therefore most in need of immunization were attitudes which are rarely if ever challenged. These "cultural truisms" involved medical practices that are nearly universally accepted. The series of empirical tests and theoretical extensions of this basic notion are masterfully reviewed elsewhere (McGuire, 196*0. Briefly,the main findings of this research program are that messages which contain a mild threat that can be refuted ("refutational defense") confer greater subsequent resistance than messages which contain only information which supports the original attitude, active participation in the con­ struction of defensive arguments is more effective than passive reading of defensive materials, refutational defense generalizes to attacks using novel arguments, the combined effects of refutational and supportive defenses are greater than the sum of their individual effects, and finally, the effects of active defenses increase over a short time period while the effects of 28 passive defenses decline over time. As McGuire (196*0 noted, generalizations from this research on cultural truisms is not warranted, since the variables may operate differently on more controversial issues. In a related study on biases in selection of messages, Hay (1968) found that for both controversial and non-controversial issues, subjects preferred supportive over refutational messages despite the latter's known superiority in con­ ferring resistance. Future research will no doubt continue to extend.the applicability of innoculation theory. Congruitv A second major theory-based approach to the topic of resistance to persuasion has recently been developed on the basis of the congruity principle (Tannenbaum, 196?; Tannenbaura, Macaulay & Norris, 1966; Tannenbaum & Norris, 1965). In Tannenbaum's words, This work has dealt with a basic communication setting in which the main attack on the belief consists of a favorably evaluated source making a strongly negative assertion against a favor­ ably evaluated concept, Thjs is an intrinsically incongruous situation, and the theory predicts, among other’things, a resultant negative shift in attitude toward the concept. The problem posed, then, is how to eliminate, or at least significantly reduce, this unfavorable attitude change. Application of the principle of congruity to such a situation stems from its central postulate that the existence of an incongruity directly generates the pressure toward change, and that such pressure is absent when the situation is a congruous one. Accordingly, any means of reducing the prevailing degree of incongruity 29 should render the situation more congruous and thus serve to reduce the degree of attitude change. (1967, p. 277) Pour strategies for reducing the degree of persuasion have been derived from congruity theory: a) denial, i, e,, severing the negative linkage between the source and concept, b) derogation of the source, c) refutation, i. e., rebut the arguments used by the source, thereby weakening his assertion, and d) concept boost, i. e., making the initial attitude toward the concept more intensely favorable. Research testing each strategy alone and in com­ bination offers fairly strong support for the congruity theory approach, Congruity theory supplements McGuire's innoculation research by providing additional mechanisms of inducing persuasion resistance. It remains to be determined whether the applicability of the congruity model extends beyond the limited variety of persuasion situations tested so far.

A Final Remark A full understanding of the persuasion situation requires knowledge about three broad classes of variables: the source of the communication, the form and content of the communication itself, and the recipient. The focus of the foregoing review of research and theory on resis­ tance to persuasion was on these latter recipient var­ iables. It has been shown that resistance can take place 30 at various stages of a persuasion situation. The most promising lines of research on resistance, especially in terms of their practical applicability, seem to be those which examine procedures that arouse resistance within a recipient sometime prior to the persuasion attempt rather than during or after the attempt. All of the resistance devices mentioned above could be applied to this strategy, although some areas such as forewarning, commitment, and varieties of preparation including innoculation and training in critical ability are more directly relevant than others such as selective exposure, perceptual distortion, individual differences, group pressure, and the congruity theory approach. The following section describes another model of persuasion resistance and outlines related previous findings. This model deals with a method of establishing resistance which occurs prior to a persuasion attempt and unlike many of the above approaches is potentially applicable to any attitudinal domain. The Value Bonding Model The underlying assumption of the theoretical position to be outlined here is that resistance to attitude change is determined by the type and degree of relationships between the focal attitude and other elements of cognitive structure. Among these cognitive elements are other attitudes, beliefs, and values. Cognitive interconnect­ 31 edness is assumed to vary across individuals, situations, and attitude topics while being susceptible to experimental alteration. Several lines of research stemming from the various consistency theories now in vogue (see, Abelson, ®iSl«» 1968) have supported'the notion that sensitizing a person to the logical relationships of a given belief to other beliefs in his cognitive structure will cause that belief to be held more strongly (cf., Abelson & Rosenberg, 1958; Harary, 1959; McGuire, i960; Rosenberg & Hovland, i960). The present approach accepts the many overlapping assumptions of current consistency theories. In these theories, the components of a stable attitude are presumed to be relatively homogeneous with respect to their evaluative character, and are arranged in balanced cognitive structures. Any attitude containing or encountering inconsistency in the form of evaluatively discrepant information is potentially unstable and there­ fore susceptible to change. Ostrom and Brook (1968) have formulated a model of attitude change resistance which is based on a non­ consistency characteristic of cognitive structure, i.e., the personal importance of the cognitions to which an attitude is bonded. The cognitive elements which have personal importance as their primary property are referred to in this model as values. 32 The identification of values as a mediating variable in resistance to attitude change has a precedent in the theory of ego-involvement (Sherif & Cantril, 19^7). According to this theory: . . . the content of any single individual's ego, what he regards as himself, is a rather distinct constellation of social and personal values. • • And when any stimulus or situation is consciously or unconsciously related to them /values/ by the individual, we can say there is ego-involvement. (Sherif & Cantril, 19^7» P« 117)• In more recent publications Sherif and his colleagues (e. g., Sherif, Sherif & Nebergall, 19&5) kave reiterated the position that an attitude bonded to values is an ego-involved attitude. The consequences of value bonding for the' individual are described by Sherif and Cantril as follows: "This degree of ego-involvement • . . will determine in large part which attitude he will cling to, how annoyed or frustrated he will feel when his attitudes are opposed, what action . . . he will take to further his point of view." (19^7» p. 131) The Ostrom and Brock formulation focuses on the first of these consequences, i. e., how strongly the individual resists changing his attitudes. Since the Ostrom and Brook model serves as the theoretical basis for the research reported later in this paper, it will be described in detail. Prior to that discussion, however, two lines of research intimately related to the model and the reported experiments will be examined. The 33 first concerns the controversy surrounding the effects of involvement on attitude change; the second deals with the general relationship of attitudes to values. Ostrom and Brock (1968) reviewed the studies in which the degree of involvement was manipulated. Some experiments (Greenwald, 1965; Zimbardo, i960) indicated that low involvement conferred greater resistance to attitude change than high involvement, while other studies (Freedman, 196*1*; Greenwald, 1965; Hardycke, 1966; Johnson & Scileppi, 1969; Miller, 1965) showed that high involvement conferred greater resistance. The Greenwald study suggested that a resolution of the conflicting results was possible by positing two types of involvement. In those studies where the manipulated involvement corresponded to the cognitive bonding model's definition, high involvement, as predicted, produced greater resistance. Pilisuk (1962) maintained that there exists a dimension of resistance to change among attitudes. At the extreme end of this dimension, he argued, were the positive attitudes toward oneself. Pilisuk*s and other research (Eagly, 196?; Eagly & Manis, 1966) has shown that attitude-discrepant messages which are directed toward self-referring attitudes (and therefore highly involving) are less effective in bringing about change than messages directed toward other-referring attitudes. On the whole, research on ego—involvement and related y *- studies are supportive of the Ostrom and Brock model. However, the work reviewed above was not addressed to the mediating process of value bonding. Independent of the ego-involvement model, the relationship between values and attitudes has been examined from the vantage point of several other theoretical positions. Katz and his associates (Katz, 1968; Katz & Stotland, 1959; Samoff & Katz, 1954) have suggested a number of functions which attitudes serve for the individual, all of which involve to some degree their relationship to values, e. g., "They /attitudes/ can be ego-defensive in allaying anxieties generated by internal conflict . • • /ego-defensive attitudes/ are highly resistant to change and require some modification of the personality before they can be extinguished." (Katz, 1968; p. 180) Other functional theories of attitudes (e.g., Smith, 1947; Smith, Bruner & White, 1956) feature similar descriptions of the value functions which attitudes serve. A number of theorists (Cartwright, 1949; Chein, 1948; French, 1947; Heider, 1946; Smith, 1949; Tolman, 1951; Woodruff, 1942) have argued that attitudes are instru- mentally related to values. The need-instrumentality theory of attitude formation (Peak, 1955) maintains that the direction and degree of attitudes are determined by the perceived instrumentality of the attitude for attaining 3 5 desirable goals and the degree of satisfaction derived from that attainment. Support for this theory is provided by the work of Carlson (1956), Constantinople (1967), and Rosenberg (1956). In the latter study, for example, overall attitude was shown to be reliably predictable from the sum of the products of perceived instrumentality and value importance. Other studies (e, g., G. H, Smith, 19^6; Woodruff & DiVesta, 19^8) have also found high correlations between level of value importance and the favorability of related attitudes. Representing yet another paradigm relating values to attitudes, Snyder, Mischel and Lott (I960) and Vaughan and Mangan (1963) have found greater resistance to persuasion in topic areas known to be prominent in their subjects' value systems (according to the Allport-Vemon- Lindzey scale) than in value areas of less importance. In a recent book, Rokeach (1968) formulated a structural model in which beliefs, attitudes and values are arranged in a pyramidal hierarchy. In this model, a few critical values representing desired end states are given a governing role over the attitudes which are related to them. Nelson (1968) used the bonding of attitudes to values as a pretreatment method of immunizing against persuasion. His procedures and hypotheses were derived from the need- instrumental ity theory described above. Similar procedures 36 have been used for testing the cognitive bonding model. This review of the background of the cognitive bonding model and its relationship with other areas of research has shown that values and attitudes, as cognitive elements, can be highly interconnected and that this relationship has definite consequences for resistance to attitude change. It is appropriate at this point to describe those special properties of value-attitude structure identified by Ostrom and Brock which were examined in the present research program. The Ostrom-Brock model (1968) retained the fundamental definition of ego-involvement set forth by Sherif and his colleagues. The elements of the model are the personal and social values which comprise the individual's ego, and the particular attitudes held by the individual. Three properties of value structure are posited which determine the level of involvement and consequently the degree of attitude change resistance: a) The centrality of a value is defined as the extent to which the value is integral to the individual's self-definition cr ego. Operationally, value centrality is determined by its rated position on a dimension of personal importance,* b) The degree of

2, The terms central and peripheral, and the corresponding terms important and unimportant, will be used interchange­ ably, It is recognized, however, that the phenomenal impression of importance has additional determinants, and that centrality entails dimensions in addition to importance. 37 relatedness of an attitude to a value refers to the amount of similarity, relevance, associative dependency, or cognitive implication between them, c) The third structural property is the number of values which are engaged by the attitude. All three of these value structure properties are postulated to influence the degree of ego-involvement directly. The greater the centrality and relatedness of values bonded to an attitude, and the greater the number of such values so bonded, the greater the ego-involvement. Centrality and relatedness combine multiplicatively so that a value of zero level of either property would not contribute to ego-involvement. The magnitude of involvement is formally defined as the sum over values of the products of value centrality and relatedness. It should be noted that the elements and postulates of this model are similar to those of a model formulated by Rosenberg (1956) based on the need- instrumental ity theory discussed above. The models differ, however, in their assumptions about how value bonding affects attitudes. While Rosenberg maintained that the particular values to which an attitude was bonded determine its degree and direction, the Ostrom- Brock model implies that any attitudinal position, including neutrality, can be value bonded. The Rosenberg model speaks to the issue of attitude formation, while the Ostrom-Brock model is concerned with resistance to 38 attitude change. At present, not all of the predictions of the Ostrom- Brock model have been confirmed. In the following section a series of experiments on value bonding conducted at the Ohio State laboratory are reviewed. These studies provided the foundation and set the direction for the research program reported in the later chapters of this paper, Besearch Completed One important aspect of all the value bonding research to be reported which distinguishes it from the value- attitude studies and some of the ego-involvement studies reported above is that initial attitudes, value-attitude bonds, and counter-attitudinal communications have all been under the manipulative control of the experimenters. This has not been true in other value research in which attitudes, values, and their connections are taken as they naturally occur, or in the involvement studies where involvement levels were assumed. The experimental control of these factors poses some technological problems, but it helps eliminate unspecified variables which may be confounded with value bonding, Ostrom and Brock (1968, 196 9 ) offered the first experimental support for the value bonding model. Their independent variables of interest here were centrality, relatedness, and degree of discrepancy. The experiment dealt with a ficticious attitudinal issue on which their Ss could have no preconceptions. The initial information about the issue was negative and was followed by a suggested unfavorable policy orientation with regard to the attitude object. This was followed by a bonding task in which Ss linked key words from either normatively important or unimportant value statements to key words from statements about the attitude object. The value bonding task was described either as a good test of personality or as a poor test with little meaning. This instructional variation was intended to induce different degrees of attention and therefore differential search for sources of relatedness between the values and the attitude object. After the bonding task, Ss received a discrepant communication which advocated either a partial or complete reversal of the original policy stand. The post-discrepancy attitude scores indicated that an attitude bonded to central values did not change as a function of discrepancy level, while attitudes bonded to peripheral values changed more under conditions of high than under low discrepancy. These results supported the predictions of the cognitive bonding model regarding centrality. The relatedness manipulation did not succeed in producing different levels of this factor, so no test of relatedness effects was possible. Following this initial research, the present author in collaboration with Ostrom has conducted several studies aimed at the application of the value bonding model to the domain of interpersonal attitudes. The hypothesis tested in this first experiment (Edwards & Ostrom, 1969) was that an attitude bonded to normatively important values would be more resistant to change provoked by discrepant information than an attitude bonded to normatively unim­ portant values. The Ss were 4*7 introductory psychology students at Ohio State University who were run in two group sessions. The independent variables were level of value importance (central vs. peripheral) and type of discrepancy (new information vs. new belief weights for the old information). All materials were presented in booklets. The first booklet contained practice materials which provided Ss with experience in forming interpersonal attitudes and bonding them to value statements. The attitude object was a hypothetical person described by a set of five favorable adjectival traits. Favorability of the adjectives was determined from the ratingB of 160 undergraduates (Edwards, 1967b). The mean rating of the five traits was 6.4*3 on a 1 (low favorability) to 7 (high favorability) scale. These traits comprised the nominal cognitive elements of the initial attitude of all Ss. Adopting procedures innovated by Asch (1946), Ss each wrote a paragraph describing his overall impression of the person described by the traits. Next Ss wrote a second paragraph relating their impression to one of two sets of values which differed in importance. Importance scale values were based on the prior ratings of 50 under­ graduates (Edwards, 1967a), The mean scale value of the central values was 9 ,6 ; for the peripheral values, the mean was ^,5* on a 1 to 11 scale. After reading the values, Ss were instructed to write an essay: "describing the relationship you perceive between your impression of X /the target person/ and these ideas /values*/•" The cognitive bonds between their initial attitude and the values were established by the Ss in these essays. After completing the essays, Ss rated how appropriate each value was to their impression. Then they completed the measure of initial attitude which was an 8 category scale ranging from "highly favorable" to "highly unfavorable." The discrepant information was presented as a second description of the target person. In one condition, the same traits used in the initial description were repeated, but the person was said to possess them to only a moderate degree. In the other condition the person was described by a new set of five traits which were all moderately unfavorable. The mean scale value of these traits was,.. 3.17 on the 1-7 scale. Ss in both conditions were asked to consider the new information in light of the fact that "people may or may not change an Initial attitude after receiving additional information," but Ss were not 42 required to write a paragraph in response to the discrepant information. Two tests were given to measure final attitude. The first was Fishbein and Raven's (1962) A scale, a form of the semantic differential known to measure affect. The second was composed of a list of 17 adjectives approximately equally spaced across the favorability dimension. None of these items had appeared previously in the experiment. To the right of each item was a 0 through 10 scale with 0 labeled, "certain trait is absent," 5 labeled, "uncer­ tain, " and 10 labeled, "certain trait is present." This instrument measures belief certainty as a function of the evaluative characteristics of the beliefs. Data from this measure are reflective of cognitive-affective structure and can be used to derive several indices of overall attitude (Edwards & Ostrom, In press). The Ss' final tasks were to complete several items designed to check the manipulations and to write a review of all their thoughts and feelings during the experiment. Analysis of two indices of overall attitude derived from the cognitive structure measure supported the hypothesis that attitudes bonded to central values are more resistant to change than attitudes bonded to periph­ eral values (]2 <.01). Data from the A scale were in the same direction but were non-significant. Analysis of the prediscrepancy attitude scale data indicated that value importance did not differentially affect the extremity of initial attitude. The attitude indicators revealed that value bonding, while not affecting the degree of initial attitudes, did affect resistance to attitude change, a finding which has been repeatedly replicated (Edwards & Ostrom, 1970)# The analysis of the appropriateness ratings indica­ ted that central values were regarded as significantly more appropriate to the initial impression than were peripheral values. When these ratings were used as a covariate in a reanalysis of the attitude data, the effect of centrality washed out. One interpretation of this finding is that the centrality and relatedness properties were confounded. This confounding, however, does not impune the validity of the model which states that centrality and relatedness combine to determine the degree of resistance conferred. The manipulation checks which were designed to be sensitive to differences in ego-involvement were unaffected by the value bonding manipulation. In order to gain some insight into the cognitive bonding process in the present paradigm, the value bonding essays were analyzed independently by three judges according to the type and direction of each bond. There were very few cases of disagreement, but in such cases, the judges conferred until a majority concurred 44 on the placement of a bond. Nearly all (95$) of the bonds were of the attribution type. That is, the value statement was either positively or negatively ascribed to the target person as a characteristic way of thinking or behaving. This content analysis revealed that the type of value bond which is likely to occur with interpersonal attitudes in this setting is attributive. It should be noted that the type of bond required by the value bonding model for bonding effects to occur is not specified. In the Ostrom and Brock study, which produced results similar to the present data, the type of bonds formed was not described in cognitive terms. Although several theories relating attitudes to values (e. g., Katz, 1968; Peak, 1955) stipulate that bonds are of a particular type, such as instrumental, the Ostrom and Brock model requires only that the attitude be cognitively related to the values. The main conclusion drawn from this experiment was that the cognitive bonding of important values to inter­ personal attitudes does confer resistance to attitude change as predicted by the value bonding model, although perhaps not by a strictly interpreted process of ego- involvement. The process involved in the present paradigm appears to be one of value attribution. It is reasonable, then, to set aside the construct of ego-involvement as a serious contender for the explanation of these early results. The following chapters report on a series of recent studies which tested the previously unverified predic­ tions of the value bonding model and explored the effects of value bonding on other attitudinal phenomena. Chapter 2

THE EFFECTS OF VALUE CENTBALITY AND RELATEDNESS ON THE RESISTANCE TO CHANGE OF VALUE BONDED ATTITUDES

According to the cognitive bonding model, the two value structure properties of centrality and relatedness combine in a multiplicative manner to determine the level of resistance to attitude change of a value bonded attitude* In the Ostrom and Brock (1969) study, relatedness was manipulated indirectly by instructions designed to create different degrees of attention to sources of relatedness between value statements and information about the attitude object* Manipulation checks andanalysiB of attitude change scores Indicated that this manipulation was unsuccessful. In a recent study by the present author (Edwards, In press), value relatedness was manipulated by presenting values for bonding which differed in relevance to the attitude issue as determined by pre-scaling* Analyses indicated that this manipulation of relatedness based on normative ratings was also unsuccessful in producing the predicted effect* Value centrality was also manip­ ulated in that study and produced the predicted results. 46 ^7 Internal analyses showed that centrality and relatedness were confounded, i. e., values which were normatively most important were rated as most relevant despite the fact that the different relatedness conditions were matched for normative importance, and different importance conditions were matched for normative relatedness. There are a number of possible reasons for the failure of the relatedness manipulation in the latter study. The ratings were made by only 10 judges and were obtained in a session in which relevance judgments were made on several other issues. Judges were given only minimal instructions for placing the values into only two categories: relevant or irrelevant. Also, the judgments were made in reference to a general issue, rather than in terms of the specific attitude object later employed in the experiment. Any or all of these factors could have contributed to the apparent invalidity of the scaling. This chapter reports the most recent attempt to isolate the effects of relatedness and importance in the domain of interpersonal attitudes. The first task was to obtain relatedness ratings of value statements while avoiding the deficiencies of the previous scaling procedure. The basic purpose of the scaling was to obtain ratings for specific attitude objects rather than for a general issue. The objects were hypothetical persons described by a set of adjectival 48 traits. In order to determine the relationship between relatedness and the evaluative and denotative character!s- l tics of specific traits, twelve trait sets were assembled. Ninety-five introductory psychology students were recruited as judges. Each subject was randomly assigned to deal with one of the twelve stimulus persons. The number of subjects assigned to a particular object varied from 7 to 9 . Subjects were informed that they would receive some information about a person and on the basis of that information they were to make predictions about how the person described would respond to a variety of ideas and situations. To orient them to the task, subjects were given a practice person and practice values. The sample person was described by five traits whose mean favorability value was neutral. Then subjects rated whether or not the person described would favor or oppose three ideas, e. g., "listening to popular music." After completing this practice task, subjects received one of the 12 sets of traits described earlier. (See Footnote 1). To insure that subjects attended to the traits and formed a

1. There were two sets of all highly favorable traits, two sets of 4 favorable and 1 neutral trait, one set of traits ranging from highly favorable to highly unfavorable, one set of all neutral traits, one set of 4 neutral and 1 positive, one set of 4 neutral and 1 negative, two sets of 4 negative and 1 neutral, and two sets of all negative traits. Many traits appeared in more than one set. thoughtful attitude, they were asked to write a brief paragraph describing their impression of the person described. Then subjects rated how they thought the person would feel about each of 90 value statements which had been previously scaled for importance (Edwards, 1967a). Ratings were made on 7 point scales ranging from 1 ("very much opposed’1)# through k ("indifferent"), to 7 ("very much in favor”). The instructions and scale labels were designed to create judgments of attributional relatedness which previous research had shown to be appropriate for interpersonal attitudes. The 90 values were arranged on six pages, 15 per page. Values on each page were random with respect to normative importance. The order of pages was varied so that no two subjects in any of the 12 conditions received the pages in the same order. The mean and standard deviation of the relatedness ratings of each value were computed separately for each of the 12 conditions. The intercorrelations across values of these means showed that the relatedness ratings of stimulus objects within the same evaluative level were significantly positively related (intercorrelations were higher among extreme sets than among neutral sets), while relatedness ratings of objects of opposite evaluative levels were negatively correlated. The intercorrelations of ratings of the neutral stimuli with the extreme stimuli ratings varied unsystematically from moderately positive to slightly negative* It was also found that the relatedness ratings of 3 of 4 objects containing all or nearly all favorable traits were significantly positively correlated with normative importance, while the relatedness ratings of neutral and negative objects were not correlated with importance. These interesting data provide some insight into the value attribution process, i* e.t people tend to attribute personally important values to likeable others but not to neutral or dislikeable others. It is probably also the case that negatively valenced ideas would be attributed to dislikeable persons. However, the present set of values contained few, if any, really negative ideas• One of the moderately positive stimulus persons was selected as the attitude object for the experiment reported below. The relatedness ratings for this object, and the other objects whose ratings were highly correla­ ted with them, were used as the basis for selecting the values employed in this experiment. As noted previously, Ostrom and Brock (1968) manipulated relatedness, not by presenting values known to differ in relatedness to the object, but by telling Ss that the experimental task was either a good or bad indicator of "personality and basic social competence." It was assumed that these instructions would affect Ss* 51 attention and motivation to do well on the experimental tasks* In view of the past failure of normative relatedness procedures, it was decided to bolster the present manipula­ tion by a form of this motivational induction* A descrip­ tion of how this was accomplished will be given in the method section* Purpose and Hypothesis The purpose of this experiment was to examine the sep­ arate and combined effects of value importance and related­ ness, Both normative importance and relatedness were predicted to produce significant main effects in such a way that important-related values would confer the most resist­ ance and unimportant-unrelated values the least resistance to attitude change* The effects were predicted to hold under conditions of both high and low motivation to do well, but were expected to be enhanced in the former condition. Design The three independent variables of importance, relatedness and motivation, each at two levels, were combined in a 2x2x2 completely randomized design* The dependent variables were pre- and post-discrepancy attitude measures and several manipulation checks. Subjects Eighty-two male and female introductory psychology students at Ohio State University volunteered to partic­ ipate in partial fulfillment of a course requirement* 52 Data were obtained in three sessions. In the first two groups seventy-two Ss were randomly assigned to conditions so that there were nine Ss per cell. Data for two of these Ss were discarded for incomplete responses to the dependent measures. In the third session ten Ss were assigned to conditions in such a way to make the sample size equal ten in all. cells of the design.

Method All experimental materials were contained in a single booklet. (An example of each page used in the study is given in Appendix A.) The experimental method can best be described by discussing each page of the booklet in turn. On the cover page Ss reported some personal information (name, class rank, age, and sex). This information was requested solely to arouse a minimal level of involvement in the experiment. Next Ss read a page of instructions which introduced them to the impression formation and value bonding tasks that were to follow. On the next page Ss were presented with a sample personality description in the form of four neutral traits, followed by a sample impression paragraph written by the present author. Directly beneath this illustration was a list of four value statements followed by a sample value bonding paragraph. This second par­ agraph, also prepared by the author, discussed how the described person might feel about each idea and was 53 intended to establish a set for the formation of attrib- utional bonds* Following these examples, Ss read a brief paragraph urging them to clear their minds and prepare to receive information about a particular individual called "Person X." Induction of Initial Attitude* "Person X" was the experimental attitude object. This person was described by the five following characteristics whose favorability scale values (Edwards, 1967b) are shown in parentheses: friendly (6.55), open-minded (6.40), interesting (6.14), inexperienced (3*60J, and warm-hearted (6 .3 0 ). This set was one of the 12 employed in the relatedness scaling procedure discussed above and was intended to create a moderately positive, plausibly heterogeneous initial attitude. After reading the trait list, Ss were asked to form an overall impression of Person X and to relate their feelings in a paragraph. Motivation Manipulation. On the page following the personality description and their written impressions, Ss encountered one of two messages designed to differen­ tially motivate them for the value bonding task. As part of his research on hypnotic suggestibility, T. X. Barber has developed a set of instructions that have been shown to increase task motivation. The main points of these instructions (Barber & Calverley, 1962) were adapted by the author to the value bonding task. Ss in the high motivation condition were told that the value bonding process required sensitivity and understanding, and re­ vealed one's capacity for meaningful interpersonal relations. They were further told that the accuracy of their interpersonal predictions made in the essays could be determined and would reflect how thoughtfully they had responded. They were encouraged to be conscientious and to exert their maximum effort on the task which was described as important and worthwhile both to them and to scientific research. In the low motivation condition these points were reversed or deemphasized to give the impression that the task did not require any special personal qualities nor any great effort or concentration. Importance and Helatedness Manipulations. After reading the motivational instructions, Ss received one of four sets of value statements which embodied the manip­ ulations of value importance and relatedness. The mean importance and relatedness values, respectively, of the four conditions are given in the parenthesesImportant- Belated (9,^7» 6 ,32), Important-Unrelated (9*^5» 5*07), Unimportant-Related (5»6^, 5*10), and Unimportant-Unrelated (5«66, 3«78), There were five statements in each set. As shown by these normative ratings, the level of importance

2. The range of importance scale values was 1 (unimportant) to 11 (important). The range of relatedness scale values was 1 (negatively related) to 7 (positively related). 55 was constant across relatedness conditions, but with the present sample of values it was not possible to also match relatedness levels across importance conditions. Immediately below the value list Ss were to write a paragraph describing the relationships they perceived between their impression of "Person X" and each value statement. On the next page Ss completed scales designed to check the relatedness and importance manipulations, For relatedness, Ss rated each value on a seven point scale according to whether they thought Person X would favor or oppose the value. The scale end points were labeled, "oppose strongly" (-3), and "favor strongly" (3). For importance, Ss rated each value on a seven point scale according to their degree of personal impor­ tance to the S, The scale end points were labeled, "very unimportant" (-3), and "very important" (3). Pre-discrenancv Attitude. On the following page Ss responded to an eight category self-rating scale of post­ bonding, pre-discrepancy attitude. Each category was labeled favorable or unfavorable with highly, considerably, moderately, and slightly as modifiers. Ss were instructed to summarize their feelings toward Person X by checking one of the categories. Discrepant Information. Next Ss were informed that the traits comprising the initial information were only part of Person X's known characteristics, and that the remaining traits would appear on the next page. The five discrepant traits and their favorability scale values were: showy (2.81), careless (2 .69), inattentive (2.?4), untrustworthy (1 .2 9 ), and conforming (4.05). These traits are moderately negative and therefore evaluatively discrepant from the initial set. All traits in both sets are relatively unambiguous (as indicated by low values) and no traits between or within sets are denotatively inconsistent. After reading these new traits, Ss wrote a final paragraph about Person X based on all of the information. Dependent measures. Post-discrepancy attitudes were measured by a form of the affective-cognitive structure instrument described in Chapter 1. This device was an equal-appearing intervals adjective scale consisting of 18 traits which had not previously appeared in the booklet. These adjectives were approximately equally spaced across the favorability scale and ranged from very favorable traits (e. g., "truthful") to very unfavorable traits (e. g., "phony"). Location of traits in the list was random with respect to favorability and was constant for all Ss, As in the earlier research, Ss responded to each item on an eleven point scale according to how certain they were that Person X possessed or did not possess each trait. The scale was labeled at the ends and middle as 57 follows: "very certain trait absent" (0), "uncertain" (5), and "very certain trait present" (10). On the final two pages Ss responded to ten debriefing type questions. For seven of the questions Ss responded on seven point scales with end anchors appropriate to the question. These seven items asked how personally important it was for Ss to do well on the bonding task, how much time and effort they spent on it, how much effort they thought was expected, how satisfied they were with their efforts, what effect the bonding essay had on their initial impression, and how likeable the initial and second sets of information were. The first five items mentioned were designed to be sensitive to the effects of the motivational manipulation; the latter two were checks on perceived discrepancy. The other three questions were openended and asked Ss a) to describe what they thought was the purpose of the bonding essay, b) to describe what they thought was the purpose of presenting Person X !s traits in two separate sets and c) to list any other thoughts that occurred to them during the experiment. This latter listing was the Ssf final task. After all booklets were collected, interested Ss were given a full explanation of the purposes of the study. Results and Discussion^

3. Analysis summaries and tables of means not shown in the text are given in Appendix D. 58 Initial Attitude. A three way analysis of variance^ of the pre-discrepancy favorability self-ratings yielded no significant effects. The importance by relatedness interaction was marginal (F=3«^I 1»72; £ <.068) and was due to the Important-Related and Unimportant-Unrelated conditions being slightly more favorable than the other two. (See Table 1, Appendix D) The overall mean for the eight conditions was 6.73 which most closely corresponded to the scale label, "considerably favorable*" This analysis showed that the first information had the desired effect of inducing a favorable, but not extremely polar­ ized, initial attitude. The finding that initial attitudes are not differentially affected by variations in the importance and relatedness of bonded values replicates earlier findings by the present author (Edwards & Ostrom, 1970). The present data extend these earlier results in showing that extremity of initial attitude is relatively unaffected by Ss1 task motivation during the attitude formation process. There was a tendency for high motivation Ss to be more favorable than low motivation Ss, but this did not hold in all four comparisons and the motivation main effect was not significant, (F=2.01; df 1,72; £ <.l6l).

4*, All analyses were conducted on Ohio State University's IBM 360 computer using the BMD-02V multivariate analysis of variance program. 59 Post-Discrepancy Attitude. Single Score. A weighted average index of attitude was calculated from the certainty ratings given on the attitude structure measure. Several authors (e. g., Anderson, 1968; Manis, Gleason & Dawes, 1966) have concluded that a person!s attitude is equal to the sum over beliefs of the product of each attitudinal belief times its weight, all divided by the sum of the weights. This statement is summarized in Equation 1.

Attitude=2 wi Bi (1) 2 w^ Where is belief favorability of i, and w^ is the degree of belief. In terms of the present data, overall attitude was defined as the sum over the 18 traits of the product of the favorability value of a trait times the certainty rating given it by the S, divided by the sum of the certainty ratings.5 It was predicted that both importance and relatedness would confer significant resistance especially under conditions of high task motivation. A three way analysis of variance^ of the weighted average attitude scores, 5. The author thanks Robert Welles for writing a computer program which translated trait favorability values and certainty ratings into weighted average attitude scores. 6. The analysis of variance summary is shown in Table 2, Appendix D. 60 however, yielded only one significant effect. Subjects in the high motivation condition had a slightly but significantly more favorable attitude than Ss in the low motivation condition (F=9*89; df 1,72; jd <.002). The means for high and low motivation were 3*88 anti 3*6.5* respectively. The cell means for all eight conditions are shown in Table 1. Table 1 Weighted average attitude as a function of value importance and relatedness, and task motivation* Motivation High Low Important Unimportant Important Unimportant Related 3.89 3*90 3*85 3*54 Unrelated 3*87 3*85 3-52 3*69 *Note:- The range of possible scores equals the range of scale values in the list, i. e., 1.25 to 6 .61. High scores indicate more favorable attitudes. All n's=10. The three way interaction approached significance (P=3.08; df 1,72; £ <.084). Under high motivation all four value conditions were approximately equal. Under low motivation, the Important-Related condition was quite similar to the four high motivation conditions, while the other three low motivation cells were all less favorable. The findings in Table 1 fail to support the experimental hypothesis, but suggest an intersting idea for future study. It appears that under high motivation, variations 61

in value properties do not differentially affect resist­ ance of value bonded attitudes. However, under the present low motivation set, which is probably closer to the situation in earlier studies^ Important-Related values conferred more resistance than any of the other three combinations. Several findings indicate that this tendency cannot be attributed to differences in initial attitude. The within cells correlation between initial and post discrepancy attitude was .22 which, with 78 degrees of freedom, is not significant. Also, covarying out initial attitude does not change the outcome of the weighted average attitude analysis of variance. Since differences due to value properties were observed in the low motivation condition, the data from that condition were analyzed separately. In that analysis the importance by relatedness interaction was significant (£*=5.^13; df 1,36; £ <,026). Covarying out initial attitude slightly attenuated this effect due to a slight lowering of favorability in the Unimportant-Unrelated condition* (See Table 3» Appendix D for these analyses and adjested cell means.) Post discrepancy attitude. Cognitive Structure. Besides providing data for the weighted average index, the main dependent measure permits the examination of belief certainty as a function of the evaluative level of belief. For this analysis the 18 traits of the equal- 62 appearing intervals scale were collapsed according to their scale values into six ordered favorability groups. Six certainty scores were computed for each S by calculating the mean certainty rating given the three traits within each group. Adopting a procedure proposed by Bock (1963) and operationalized by Finn (1969) in the form of a computer program, the certainty data were analyzed according to a multivariate model for repeated measures data. This model avoids the objectional assumptions regarding the correlations and homogeneity of variance amcng repeated measurements that are inherent in traditional repeated measures designs (cf, Winer, 1962; p, 116 ff,).^ The main distinguishing feature of this model is that it considers levels of the repeated factor as input variables in a multivariate analysis of variance. The program partitions the factor into its orthogonal components and tests each component alone and in inter­ action with other factors.® In the present case the six 7. The author thanks David Poor and Lome Rosenblood for making this analysis a part of Ohio State's computer program library and providing instructions for its use, 8, Each within subjects effect is tested overall using Wilk's lambda criterion. The program continues to extract the roots of an effect in a step-down fashion until it exhausts the degrees of freedom. Associated with each significant root is a set of standardized discriminate function coefficients. Within each set is a coefficient for each orthogonal component of the effect. The values can vary from positive to negative and, along with the uni’fra^iate F ratios for each component, can be used to determine which components contributed most significantly to the effect, how the components are related to each other, and how these relationships vary in each significant effect. levels of the groups factor permitted examination of five orthogonal components. Thus, any interaction of the between subjects factors (importance, relatedness, and motivation) with the favorability groups factor can be examined to determine whether any differences over groups among levels of the between subjects factors were due to linear, quadratic, cubic, quartic, or quintic divergence. The results of this analysis indicated no significant differences in certainty due to between subjects effects, (The analysis of variance summary table is shown in Table 4, Appendix D.) This showed that, over favorability groups, the mean certainty ratings of the eight exper­ imental conditions did not differ. Since no predictions were made about overall certainty, this result warrants no comment. The interesting aspects of this analysis, of course, are the interactions of the between subjects variables with favorability groups. The experimental hypothesis was that Ss in the high importance and high relatedness conditions should show less change from their initially favorable attitude than Ss in the low importance and relatedness conditions. For this to be the case, Ss in the high conditions should show greater certainty about the presence of favorable traits and absence of unfavorable traits in Person X than Ss in the corresponding low 6k conditions. These effects were expected to he enhanced hy the high motivation instructions. The expected results would be indicated by significant interactions of these variables (and their interactions) with favorability groups. First of all it should be noted that the main effect of favorability groups was highly significant as indicated by the multivariate test using Wilk's lambda criterion (F=20,^3; df 5,68; £ <.001), Univariate F tests on the five orthogonal components showed that all except the cubic were significant (all £*s <.001). Examination of the standardized discriminant function coefficients for each component indicated that the quartic and quintic components contributed more heavily to the groups main effect than the others. The reason for this finding is apparent in the tables which follow and will be discussed later. The multivariate test of the importance by groups interaction was not significant, nor were any of the univariate tests of the five components. This finding is consistent with the single score data in showing that levels of value importance did not differentially affect the favorability of post-discrepancy attitude. The pattern of means of this interaction, given in Table 2, show a slight trend for Ss in the important condition to be more certain about the presence of favorable traits and more certain about the absence of unfavorable traits than Ss in the unimportant condition. This trend is in the direction predicted by the value bonding model. Table 2 Mean belief certainty as a function of belief favorability and importance of bonded values Belief Favorability High Low Important 4.50 5.76 3-18 4.70 5.62 5*38 Unimportant 4.44 5.49 3.28 5.18 6,20 5.78 The relatedness by groups interaction was similarly non-significant. Ss who bonded values which were nor- matively related to the attitude object showed a cognitive structure profile that did not differ greatly from that of Ss who bonded normatively unrelated values. This finding, too, coincides with the single-score outcome and was likewise unsupportive of the experimental hypoth­ esis. However, the pattern of means of this interaction, shown in Table 3, corresponds to expectations. Table 3 Mean belief certainty as a function of belief favorability and relatedness of bonded values Belief Favorability High Low Related 4.82 5.82 3.14 4.87 5.9^ 5.34 Unrelated 4.11 5.44 3.32 5.00 5.87 5.82 66

Ss who bonded their initial attitude to related values tended to show a more favorable attitude than Ss who bonded to unrelated values. The motivation by groups interaction was significant according to Wilk*s lambda criterion (FK3.41; .3 0 ). The interpretation of these interactions with groups depends upon the form of the other two significant inter­ actions revealed in this analysis; the importance by relatedness by groups interaction and the four way interaction of all the factors. The pattern of means for the former is shown in Table 5* Table 5 Mean belief certainty as a function of belief favorability and value importance and relatedness Belief Favorability High Low

I - R 5.08 6.42 2.79 4.33 5.62 5.10 I - UR 3.91 5.11 3.56 5.07 5.61 5.65 UI - R 4.56 5.22 3.^8 5.41 6.26 5.57 UI - UR 4*31 5.76 3.08 4.94 6.13 5.98 According to the value bonding model, important values should confer more resistance than unimportant values particularly under conditions of high relatedness. This hypothesis would be reflected in a significant inter­ action between importance and relatedness. In the present analysis this interaction, in interaction with favorability groups, was significant overall according to Wilk's 68 lambda criterion (F=3»0^; df 5» 68; jg <,015). Inspection of Table 5 shows that under high relatedness, important values were associated with a more favorable attitude than unimportant values, but this was not the case under low relatedness. The primary difference between the importance conditions occurs at the favorable end of the belief fa­ vorability scale; i. e., in the same evaluative area as the initial information to which the values were bonded. That is, under high relatedness, Ss who bonded their ini­ tial favorable attitude to important values were more certain about the presence of other favorable traits than Ss who bonded their initial attitude to unimportant values. This finding was slightly reversed under low relatedness. The bonding model also predicts that related values will confer more resistance than unrelated values, part­ icularly if they are important. Inspection of Table 5 supports this prediction in that, for important values, high relatedness is associated with a more favorable attitude than low relatedness, but this is not the case for unimportant values. Again the difference occured mainly in the two highest favorability groups. People who bonded their initially favorable attitudes to important values were more certain about the presence of others favorable traits if the values were normatively related to the attitude object than if they were unrelated. These data from cognitive structure profile do support the 69 predictions of the bonding model. In addition to showing differences in attitude due to importance and relatedness, they indicate the location in cognitive structure of their effects. It appears that in this case value bonding most affected those cognitions which were evaluatively similar to the initial information. Other studies (Edwards & Ostrom, 1969) have found effects which are more pervasive throughout cognitive structure. The interaction of all four factors, presented in Table 6, was also significant according to the multivariate analysis (F=2.4l; df 5, 68; £ <.045). Table 6 Mean belief certainty as a function of belief favorability, value importance (I vs. UI), value relatedness (R vs. UR), and value bonding motivation Belief Favorability High Low

I-R 5.33 5.90 3.^0 4.37 5.23 5.33 High I-UR 5.27 5.30 4.30 5.00' 5.50 5.03 Motivation UI-R 5.67 5.50 4.30 5.10 5.77 5.30 UI-UR 4.50 5.83 2.97 5.60 5.23 4.83

I-R 4.47 5.93 2.63 4.30 5.47 5.33 Low I-UR 2.90 4.47 3.13 5.23 6.20 6.10 Motivation UI-R 3.00 4.90 2.30 6.10 7.00 6.27

UI-UR ^•37 6.13 3.43 4.23 6.63 6.67 79 It is apparent in Table 6 that, as was suggested by the single score data, high motivation significantly atten­ uated the differential effects of importance and relatedness. As noted above, in the high relatedness condition, Ss who bonded to important values were more favorable than those who bonded to unimportant values. Inspection of Table 6 shows that this effect occurred only in the low motivation condition. Likewise, the greater favorability in the related compared to unrelated conditions when both are highly important, is apparent only for low motivation. Another indication of the attenuating effects of the present motivational conditions is that in the low motivation conditions the belief certainty cell means range from 2.30 to 7.00, whereas in the high motivation conditions the range was only 2.97 to 5-90. The former range is more similar to that observed in previous research (Edwards & Ostrom, 1969) using this instrument and implies that the low motivation induction used here provided a more natural set than the high motivation induction. If so, then the effects observed under low motivation are the more critical for testing the value bonding model. It was under these conditions that the strongest support for the model was found. One feature of the data in Table 6 merits special consideration. Mean certainty in the third favorability group was markedly lower than in any other condition. This anomaly in the curve contributed to the many sig­ nificant higher order orthogonal components effects reported above. The three traits comprjsing this group in the belief favorability scale were: subtle, methodical, and shy. Apparently, several of the traits used in the initial and discrepant information sets were inconsistent with these three response items. For example, the initial traits, friendly and interesting, may have seemed incon­ sistent with shy; and the discrepant traits, careless and inattentive, are inconsistent with methodical; and the discrepant trait, showy, may have been regarded as inconsistent with subtle. With the present data, it was not possible to specify which stimulus traits negatively implied which response traits. It was possible, however, to examine the mean certainty ratings of each trait in the anomalous set. The mean ratings of subtle and methodical were 3.74 and 3.71» respectively, while the mean for shy was 2.52. Thus all three traits received lower weights than would be expected on the basis of their evaluative level alone. The latter trait, shy, obviously was most responsible for the low group mean, probably because of its negative denotative relationship with the stimulus traits mentioned above. It is appropriate here to point out that items for the cognitive structure measure were selected on the basis of three criteria: they fell into a particular interval on the evaluative scale, they were all relatively unambiguous (low £ value) and their scale values did not differ as a function of the sex of the judges, as many traits do (Edwards, 1967b). Thus, any Idiosyncratic denotative relationships with stimulus items were left to chance. The aberrations in the function relating belief favorability to belief certainty observed in this study are apparently attributable to such denotative relationships. However, the anomalous group did not greatly interfere with the interpretation of the data as a whole. The fact that value bonding effects were observed demonstrates the vigor of the measure, and more importantly, demonstrates that value bonding predictions based solely on the evaluative character of the experi­ mental materials, are obtainable despite uncontrolled variations in other characteristics of the materials. Other analyses. Manipulation checks. Immediately after the value bonding task, Ss rated how strongly Person X would favor or oppose each value (attribution rating), and how personally Important each idea was to the S. These scales had the dual purpose of encouraging the Ss to reflect on the relatedness and importance of the values, and checking the validity of the normative manipulations. A three way analysis of variance of the attribution ratings summed over the five values revealed two significant sources of variability. The main effect of importance was significant (P=^6,88; df 1, 72; £ <.001); Person X was thought to more strongly favor important values (x =1.82)9 than unimportant ones (x=.^5)- The critical main effect of relatedness was also significant

(P=19,06; df 1, 72; £ <.001); Person X was thought to more strongly favor the normatively related values (x=1.58) than the unrelated ones (x*s.70). Examination of attrib­ ution ratings of each value showed that for four of the five values, the mean rating was greater in the normatively high relatedness condition, and among those four, the differences were significant (all £*s <.025) for three of the values. Thus, the values selected for the different relatedness conditions were, on the whole, differentially related to the attitude object, but the difference was not maximal. Analysis of the summed importance ratings yielded a similar pattern of significant effects. Normatively important values (x-2 .1 5 ) were rated as more personally important to these Ss than unimportant values (x=.30) (F=ll4,4-1; df 1, 72; £ <.001). This overall effect held for all individual value importance comparisons (all £*s <•001). The main effect of relatedness was also 9. Values in parentheses are the mean ratings within a condition summed over the 5 values and then converted back to the -3 to +3 scale. The higher the mean, the more strongly Person X is seen to favor the value, or the greater the personal importance. 74 significant for the summed importance ratings (F=6.58; df 1, 72; jd <.012) and indicated that normatively related values (x=1.44) were regarded as more personally impor­ tant than unrelated values (x=sl.OO). This result, along with the corresponding high perceived relatedness of important values cited above, is probably largely due to the significant positive correlation between impor­ tance scale values and the normative relatedness values of the present value sets. These data suggest that the manipulations of importance and relatedness were successful in producing different levels of these factors. They also provide evidence of a partial confounding of these two factors in the present case; i- e., values which were seen as related were also important, and vice versa. Since the bonding model predicts that resistance is a multiplicative function of importance and related­ ness, a resistance index could be calculated for each subject from the importance and relatedness scales. This index was computed by summing over values the products of the two ratings of each value. Therefore, positively attributed important values and negatively attributed unimportant values both contributed to increased resistance. Greater resistance should be correlated with a more favorable final attitude. However, the correlation of this index with post-discrepancy 75 attitude was .109, which is not significant. Ss within each experimental condition were divided into two groups according to the magnitude of their resistance indices. Tied Ss at the median were randomly assigned to high or low resistance conditions. The posttest data were reanalyzed using resistance (high vs. low) as an additional factor. The results indicated final attitudes did tend to he higher in the high resistance condition, but the effect was not significant (p <.5 0 ). Five items presented following the cognitive structure measure were used to tap the various possible consequences of the task motivation factor. On the first item, Ss indicated on a seven point scale how personally important it was for them to do their best on the value bonding task. The end points were labeled, "of no impor­ tance" (1) and "of great importance" (7)* It was expected that Ss in the high motivation condition would show higher scores on this scale. Analysis of variance of these data did not reveal any significant sources of variance; the F for the motivation main effect was zero. The importance by relatedness interaction approached significance (F*3.77, M I» 72; £ <.056) in that Ss in the important-related condition reported lower motivation than Ss in the other three value conditions. The mean for all eight conditions was 5*3, indicating that doing well on the value bonding task was only moderately important. The lack of difference 76 between motivation conditions on this scale cannot be attributed to a ceiling effect. The second item asked how much time and effort Ss actually spent on the bonding task. The scale end points were labeled, "very little" (1) and "very much" (7)* Only the three way interaction was significant, (P=12.01; df 1, 72; £ <.003)« The importance by relatedness interaction approached significance (F=3«51* df 1, 72; £ <.065)* Under high motivation the degree of reported effort was about the same in all four value conditions, but under low motivation, the important-related and unimportant-unrelated means were lower than the other two. The overall mean for eight conditions was 5 »1 indicating only a moderate level of expended effort. As an additional check on effort, the number of words in the value bonding essays were counted for each S. Analysis of these data yielded a significant relatedness by motivation interaction (1^5 *86; df 1, 72; £ <.018). The pattern of means indicated that Ss in the high motivation condition wrote more about related values than Ss in the low motivation condition, but with unrelated values there was no difference due to motivation. In general, high motivation Ss wrote more than low motivation Ss (F=4*°3i £L£ 72; £ <.0^9). The third scale asked Ss to estimate how much effort they thought was expected of them on the bonding paragraph. 77 Again the scale end points ranged from "very little" (1) to "very much"(7). Analysis of these data yielded a significant main effect of motivation (F=7.73l 1» 72; £ <*007); high motivation Ss thought that greater effort was expected of them (x=6,2) than did low motivation Ss (x=5»^)* The three way interaction approached significance (F-3.44; M 72; £ <*068) but no interpretable trends were apparent. The fourth item asked Ss to indicate how satisfied they were with their -performance on the bonding task. The scale end labels were "very dissatisfied" (1) and "very satisfied" (7). There were no significant effects, but high motivation Ss (x=4.7) tended to be more satisfied than low motivation Ss (x=3.1) {F«2.90; df 1, 72; £ <.093)• Apparently, few people were very satisfied. The fifth item was a very general question asking Ss to indicate what effect the value bonding task had on their impression of Person X on a scale from "no effect at all" (1) to "considerable effect" (7). No significant effects emerged from the analysis of variance, however the importance by relatedness interaction was marginal (F=3.88; df 1, 72; £ <.053) indicating less effect in the important-related and unimportant-unrelated conditions than in the other two. The five scales and the word count data do not 78 present a clear or consistent picture. The expected effects of motivation occurred only for the number of words in the bonding paragraph and for the Ss1 self- reports of expected effort. Several interpretations of these mixed outcomes are conceivable but perhaps the most realistic is that Ss were being honest with the experimenter. In the high motivation condition, Ss realized that much was expected and so they expended more effort on the bonding essay. Because greater effort was expected, it was not emphasized, but it may have led to greater satisfaction. As for the other items it may be supposed that, although Ss knew how the experimenter wanted them to feel, they really did not feel that way. Several higher order interactions involving impor­ tance and relatedness have been reported. These interactions are of little assistance in interpreting these mixed results since the pattern of cell means in these interactions varies across items. There was a tendency for Ss in the important-related condition to be least affected by the motivation induction. The only general statement that seems warranted from these interactions is that value properties of impor­ tance and relatedness have little systematic effect on reports of task motivation. The attitude data showed that high motivation to do well on the bonding 79 task increased resistance to change. The present indices of motivation and the open-ended question provide only sparse information about how this effect was mediated. Perceived discrepancy. Subjects were asked to rate the overall likeability of both sets of stimulus traits on scales ranging from "very dislikeable" (1) to "very likeable" (7). The overall mean rating for the initial set was 6.5; high motivation Ss tended to give higher ratings than low motivation Ss (F=2.96; df 1, 72; £ <.090), This is consistent with the attitude change data. For the discrepant set, the overall mean rating was 1.6; and there were no significant sources of variance. These findings indicate that the evaluative location of the two sets was correctly perceived in all conditions. For each S the likeability rating of the discrepant set was subtracted from the likeability rating of the first set. Analysis of these difference scores did not yield any significant effects. Perceived discrepancy was uncorrelated (rs=,o66) with final attitude. These findings indirectly imply that the observed differences in final attitude are probably not attributable to perceptual distortion of the stimulus sets or to differences in perceived discrepancy. 80 Conclusions The results of this experiment are generally consistent with predictions based on the value bonding model. The manipulated value properties of importance and relatedness did affect resistance to change but not in the predicted manner. The induction of high task motivation which was expected to enhance the related­ ness effect was found to virtually eliminate the differences among the four value conditions. It was under low or normal motivational circumstances that significant bonding effects were observed. Both importance and relatedness were expected to produce main effects and, since these factors are hypothesized to combine multiplicatively, an interaction was also predicted. Since only the interaction was significant, it can be concluded that the importance and relatedness of the present values were sufficient for conferring resistance only when both factors were combined at their higher levels. Further research examining the value properties of importance and relatedness should begin by constructing sets of values which are more uniquely important and related than thoBe employed in the present study. The lack of consistent findings among measures of motivation makes tenuous any interpretation of the significant resistance conferring qualities of this 81 factor, The present indicators were apparently insensitive to the actual mediators of the motivation effect. It is tempting to attribute these findings to some form of commitment or ego-involvement in the initial attitude, which were shown in Chapter 1 to arouse resistance to persuasion. However, in the present study the intention was to involve Ss in the task, not in their initial attitudes. The former type of involvement is more likely to reduce rather than increase resistance (Greenwald, 1965). Furthermore, there were no independent indications that Ss were more involved in their initial attitudes because of the high motivation set. One major question that was not dealt with directly in this study was how Ss who were relatively unmoved by the persuasion attempt dealt with the inconsistency wrought by the discrepant information. There is evidence showing that differences in final attitudes are probably not attributable to differences in Initial attitude or in the perception of the discrepant informa­ tion. The favored conclusion is that value bonding, while not affecting the extremity of initial attitude or the interpretation of inconsistent information, did affect Ss1 treatment of the attitude-discrepant informa­ tion. The cognitive structure measure suggested that discrepant information was relatively less accepted as 82 part of the final attitude when the initial attitude was bonded to important-related values. It may be that bonding of important values increases cognitive differen­ tiation which allows incorporation of inconsistent elements without their affecting initial favorability. Resistance to change was particularly evident in the area of cognitive-affective structure that was eval- uatively most similar to the original value bonded attitude. The value bonding model provides a plausible explanation for the present findings. New information is resisted because of its inconsistency with an existing attitude that is highly related to personally important beliefs. However, the model may not be the only explanation for these data. It was observed that t’he Ss1 ratings of how Person X would feel about the values and the self ratings of value importance were positively correlated (r=.44; df 78; £ <.01). An index of perceived value similarity between Person X and the S was calculated for each S, This index was the sum over the five values of the absolute value of the difference between the Ss* attributional rating for Person X and the self rating of importance. Smaller values of this sum indicated greater value similarity. This index was not significantly correlated with post­ discrepancy attitude (r= -.076) but the direction of 83 relationship implied that greater perceived similarity was associated with more favorable final attitudes. Analysis of these similarity data produced a main effect of importance (F=11.52; df 1, 72; £ <.001); a main effect of relatedness (F=5«38; df 1, 72; £ <.023) and a marginal importance-relatedness interaction (F=3.07; df 1, 72; £ <.084-). Inspection of the cell means showed that Ss who attributed important-related values to Person X saw themselves as more similar to X than did Ss who attributed any of the other three value sets. As a further check on the value similarity hypoth­ esis, Ss were divided into four ordered groups on the basis of their value similarity indices. The posttest attitude data were reanalyzed using value similarity as the single \ factor. The results showed a tendency toward decreasing final attitude with decreasing value similarity, but the effect was not significant (£ <*3 0 ). Finally, the value similarity scores were used as a covariate in a reanalysis of the posttest data. All the effects became slightly less significant with the variance due to similarity parceled out. All of these data, though correlational and con­ founded with the uncontrolled degree and direction of attribution, suggest that the new information was resisted in the important-related condition because it disparaged a person whom Ss saw as similar to themselves. It has been shown (e. g., Byrne & Clore, 196?) that belief similarity is a determinant of interpersonal attraction. It may also be the case that belief similarity mediates resistance to changing the level of attraction. The value similarity hypothesis, while pertinent to the present data, would not account for value bonding effects in other attitudinal domains. The data reported in this chapter extend earlier findings regarding the utility of value bonding as a technique for producing resistance to persuasion. New information has been gained regarding the interaction of value relatedness and importance and the motivational conditions under which they best operate, and further support for the value model has been obtained. The next chapter reports a recent investigation on another basic postulate of the model. Chapter 3 THE EFFECTS OF THE NUMBER OF BONDED VALUES ON RESISTANCE TO ATTITUDE CHANGE

The third property of value-attitude structure hypothesized by Ostrom and Brock (1968) to affect resistance to attitude change is the number of values that are bonded to the focal attitude. According to their cognitive bonding model, if all other factors are held constant, increasing the number of bonded values will directly increase resistance. Research on value bonding has not always employed the same number of values. In the Ostrom and Brock study, the number of bonded values was nine. In the earlier research by the present author (Edwards, In press Edwards & Ostrom, 1969) the number of values was four. The experiment reported in Chapter 2 employed sets containing five values. In all of these studies, the connected values produced resistance to persuasion regardless of their number. Because of differences in issues, discrepancy levels, and so on, it would not be proper or useful to compare the degree of resistance observed in these studies as a test of the number effect. Only one experiment has featured a manipulation of 86 number of related values. Nelson (1968) had Ss construct instrumental relationships between their attitudes and either 3 or 9 values. This variation did not differ­ entially affect subsequent resistance. To date, evidence for the number hypothesis is sparse and apparently unsupportive. While a nominal variation of number is obvious and easy, a pure manipulation in which only number is varied may be difficult for several reasons. First, the values in each condition must be matched in terms of their mean and variance along the dimensions of importance and relatedness. Such a procedure is necessary to reduce confounding of number with these other critical value properties. Second, Ss in the lower number conditions could conceivably invest less time and energy in the value bonding task. Any subsequent effects of number would be susceptible to an alternative explanation based on an effort principle derived from dissonance theory (Aronson, 1961). According to this notion, greater effort on behalf of an attitude object will enhance its eval­ uation and perhaps make one*s evaluation of the object less vulnerable to change. Recent studies (Fromkin, 1968; Zimbardo, 1965) bave found moderate support for the effort hypothesis, but only under certain conditions. The first consideration mentioned above precludes the possibility of controlling for- effort by presenting all 87

Sb with sets of values of the same number but with

different proportions of important and unimportant

values* Having all Ss form the same number of bonds

but with differing numbers of values would control for

effort, but would possibly induce differential related­

ness*

The value bonding model predicts that resistance

to attitude change is an additive function of number

of bonded values. This prediction directly implies

that number will have a multiplicative effect when

important values are compared with unimportant ones.

Increasing the number of values produces a more rapid

acceleration of resistance as a function of number if

the values are important than if unimportant. The

difference in the slopes of the function relating

number to resistance between important and unimportant

conditions will be directly related to the ratio of

the Importance scale values of the two conditions. This

difference in slope, if large enough, could produce an

interaction between importance and number.

Purpose and Hypotheses

The purpose of this experiment was to test the prediction that increasing the number of bonded values, while controlling possible confounding variables,

increases resistance to attitude change. In particular,

the study examined the relationship between number and value importance. The design permitted a comparison of two competing hypotheses. The effort principle can be interpreted as implying that increasing the number of values to be bonded will enhance attitudinal favorability. This would be reflected by a significant main effect of number both before and after receiving discrepant information. No predictions about value importance can be directly derived from the effort principle. The cognitive bonding model makes no pre­ dictions about initial attitude. However, past research suggests that value importance levels will not differ­ entially affect initial attitude. For post-discrepancy attitude, the bonding model predicts main effects for both importance and number and an interaction between these two factors. Design The independent variables were number of values (2, 4, or 8) presented for bonding, and Important (I) vs. Unimportant (UI) values. These two factors were arranged in a 3x2 completely randomized design. The dependent variables were pre- and post-discrepancy attitude measures, ratings of value importance and relatedness, and several post-experimental debriefing questions• An additional feature of the design was that the same eight values of a given importance level were used in all three number conditions. In the 8 condition Ss received all the values. In the k condition, one- half of the Ss received one set of four values and the other half of the Ss received the remaining four. In the 2 condition, each one-fourth of the Ss received an exclusive subset of two values from the eight value set. By using this procedure, mean importance level was constant across number conditions. Subjects A total of 130 male and female introductory psych­ ology students at Ohio State University volunteered to participate. One S in the 1-2 condition was deleted from the sample for failure to complete all experimental requirements. Data were collected in four group sessions. Approximately forty Ss participated in each of the first three sessions which were all held on the same day. Data from the remaining 10 Ss were collected several days later In the fourth session. Within sessions Ss were randomly assigned to the six conditions. Sample sizes per cell ranged from 20 to 25. Method This experiment also dealt with the formation and change of interpersonal attitudes. The experimental paradigm was similar to that employed in the experiment discussed in Chapter 2. All experimental materials were contained in a booklet. The first five pages were 90 exactly the same as those employed in the previous study except for some minor wording changes. Thus, the cover page, general instructions, sample impression and value bonding paragraphs, transition from orientation to the actual experiment, and the five initial traits of Person X were nearly identical in these two experiments. (Examples of each page used in the present study are given in Appendix B,) Number and importance manipulations. After writing their initial impressions, Ss received either 2, 4, or 8 value statements and were asked to describe in a para­ graph the relationship they perceived between Person X and each value. The values were either high or low in normative importance (Edwards, 1967a). The mean im­ portance scale value of the I group was 9.6^ on the 1-11 scale. These eight values were also high in normative relatedness (see Chapter 2, p. ty); the mean relatedness to Person X for these eight values was 6.20 on the 1-7 scale. The mean importance scale value for the UI group was 5*63* These values were likewise low in relatedness; their mean rating was 3*99* As explained in the Design section, all eight values within an importance condition were used in all number conditions. Values were assigned to sets of 2 or 4 on a random basis except for the restriction that there be minimum overlap of value content within a set. 91 For example, the valueB, "Getting along with different types of people" and "Having many good friends" did not appear in the same set in the 2 or 4 value conditions* After completing their value bonding paragraphs, Ss rated their particular set of values on two scales: how strongly Person X would favor or oppose each idea, and how important or unimportant each idea was to the S. These scales permitted a check on the value properties and caused Ss to reconsider each value in terms of Person X and themselves. Pre-discrepancy attitude. After completing their responses to the attribution and importance scales, Ss were asked to summarize their feelings toward Person X by checking one of eight labeled categories ranging from "highly unfavorable" to "highly favorable." This provided a measure of pre-discrepancy attitude and encouraged Ss to commit themselves to a particular attitudinal position. Discrepant information. The same introduction to discrepant information used in the previous experiment was employed here. Ss were told that additional informa­ tion about Person X was available and would appear on the next page. Discrepant information was in the form of five traits which had not been used before. The traits and their favorability scale values were: unpoised (2.76), nervous (2.98), incompetent (2.57)» passive (3.62), and untidy (2.65). These traits are all moderately 92 unfavorable and were selected for their relative unambiguity, and scale value consistency over sex of the judges (Edwards, 1967b). As a set these traits were intended to be somewhat highly, but not incredibly or denotatively discrepant from the initial set. After reading and thinking about the new information, Ss were to write a paragraph describing their impression based on all the information. Post-discrepancy attitude. After completing their paragraphs, Ss responded to the 18 item measure of affective-cognitive structure. The format and most of the items were identical to those of the instrument described in Chapter 2. Three traits in the former list were replaced because of possible denotative overlaps with items in the present stimulus sets. Most notably, the word "shy" was replaced by "ordinary." Finally, Ss responded to a series of questions designed to elicit some of their impressions about various aspects of the study. The first question asked Ss to indicate how much effort they spent on the value bonding task. This item provided information relevant to the effortprinciple. The next two items asked about the purpose and effects of the bonding task. The next four questions asked about the relative favorability of the initial and discrepant traits, how mutually consistent they were, and whioh set counted more in the Ss' final 93 attitude. At the end of the booklet Ss were asked to list any other thoughts that occurred to them during their participation in the experiment. After finishing all the tasks, Ss turned in their booklets and were given the option of leaving or remaining for an explanation of the experiment. Less than half of the students remained, Besults and Discussion Pre-discrenancy attitude. For the attitude score analyses the data from nine Ss were deselected to make the sample size equal 20 in all conditions.l This was necessary so as to not over weight any number condition. Data from the four sets in the 2 value condition were combined for analysis as were the data from the two sets in the ^ value condition. Thus the values were the same in all number conditions, and the sample sizes were equal in all cells. A two way analysis of variance of the favorability self-ratings yielded no significant effects. The overall means for the I and UI conditions were virtually equal. Table 1 shows the group means.

1. The number of Ss and the conditions from which they were removed were: Important 2 (5 Ss), Important k (2 Ss), Important 8 (IS), and Unimportant 8 (1 S). 94 Table 1 Post-bonding, pre-discrepancy favorability self-ratings as a function of number and value importance* Number of Values 2 4 8 Mean

Important 7.10 7.15 6.60 6.95 Unimportant 7.25 6.80 6.60 6.88 Mean 7.18 6.98 6,60 *Note:-A high score indicates a favorable attitude, Hange of possible scores was 1-8, All n's®20. These data again support earlier findings that value importance does not affect the extremity of initial attitude. The overall mean of 6,92 was somewhat higher than the average initial attitude of 6,73 obtained in the experiment of Chapter 2 using the same set of traits. As table 1 shows, mean favorability declined directly as a function of number. This trend, although not signifi­ cant (F=0..9 0 ; df 2, 114; p <.154) was directly opposite to the predictions of the effort principle, A more sensitive test of the effort hypothesis was made by dividing the two degree of freedom number effect into its linear and quadratic components. The linear component approached significance (F=3-80 df 1,114; p <,054) providing stronger evidence contrary to the dissonance theory derivation. 95 Post-discrepancy attitude. Single-score. As in the previous study, a single-score index of attitude was calculated from the certainty ratings on the cognitive structure measure using the weighted average formula. The value bonding model predicted significant main effects of importance and number and an interaction such that the difference between importance conditions increased with number. The cell means for the six conditions are shown in Table 2. Table 2 Weighted average post-discrepancy attitude as a function of number and value importance Number of Values 2 A 8 Mean Important 4.04 A .13 A .32 4.16

Unimportant 4.17 A.08 4.15 4.13 Mean A.10 A.10 4.24 Since the number main effect and the importance by number interaction were expected to produce linear effects, the orthogonal components were tested separately. The linear component of number was not significant (IJ=2 .52; df 1 , 114; £ <.115) but was in the predicted direction. The quadratic component was negligible (£ >.70). The linear component of the importance by number interaction was not significant (P»2.60; df 1, 114; £ <.110). In the I condition, attitude favorability increased with number; in the UI condition, favorability did not vary systematically with number. Except for the overly high UI 2 condition, the pattern of results was as predicted. Table 1 showed that Ss in the UI 2 condi­ tion were most favorable on the pretest. The posttest data were reanalyzed covarying out initial attitude. The correlation between pre- and post­ discrepancy attitude was significant (r = ,^1 3 ; elf 118; p c.Ol). After parceling out initial attitude, the linear component of the number effect on the posttest was significant (F - 6,6l; df 1,113; p <,Cll) and the linear component of the importance by number interaction was marginally significant (F = 2,71; df 1,113; £ <*103)• The quadratic components of these effects were not sig­ nificant in the reanalysis. These results show that resistance to. change increased with increasing number of bonded values and that the difference between I and UI conditions tended to increase linearly with number when initial attitude differences are removed.^ As such, these findings support the value bonding model. The predicted main effect of importance was not significant either with or without removing initial attitude variance (both p's >,70), This

2, The analysis of variance of the posttest data, the analysis of covariance with the pretest parceled out, and the adjusted means for the importance by number inter­ action are shown in Table 5» Appendix D, 97 result was contrary to prediction. Since significant differences were expected due to importance particularly with 4 and 8 values, individual comparisons of the I and UI groups were made at each number level. All Ss were included in these analyses. UI 2 tended to be larger than I 2 (F=1.42; df 1,43; £ <.240), I and UI were not different at level 4 (F=.402; df 1,40; £ <«530); and. I 8 tended to be greater than UI 8 (F==l,68; df 1,40; £ <.202). The overall mean post­ discrepancy attitude was slightly higher in this than in the previous experiment. This difference is probably due to the slightly more favorable initial attitude and the slightly more favorable discrepant information in the present study. Post-discrepancy attitude. Cognitive structure. The data analysis procedure for the certainty ratings was the same as reported for the corresponding data in Chapter 2. Six certainty scores were obtained for each S by calculating the mean certainty rating of the three traits within each favorability group. Again, these data were analyzed according to Finn's (1969) multivariate model for repeated measures. A total of nine Ss were randomly eliminated from four of the conditions in order to obtain equal cell frequencies necessary for thfe analysis. The analysis of variance summary is given in Table 6, Appendix 0. 98 As expected, none of the between subjects effects were significant (all £*s >.470). The main effect of favor­ ability groups was significant according to the multi­ variate test of significance using Wilk's lambda criterion (F=46.58; df 5* HOj £ <.001), Univariate F tests of the five orthogonal components indicated that three were sig­ nificant: linear (jfc=47.18; df 1,114; £ <.001), quadratic (F=17.07; df 1,114; jd <.001) and cubic (F=139.30; df 1,114; £ <,001). These findings indicate that certainty generally changed over groups but the change was irregular; particularly due to two important inflection points. The multivariate tests of the interactions of groups with importance, number, and importance by number were all non­ significant as were all the univariate tests of the components of each interaction. The means for the 36 cells in this analysis are given in Table 3« Table 3 Belief certainty as a function of belief favorability and the number and importance of bonded values Belief Favorability Groups High Low

Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 2 5.70 3.57 4.15 5.70 5.32 2.97 Important 4 5.73 4.05 4.88 4.68 5.03 2.58 8 6.87 4.58 4=J0 5.25 4.47 2.35 Mean 6.10 4.07 4.44 5.21 4.94 2.63 99 Table 3.continued High Belief Favorability Groups Low

Number 1 2 3 4- 5 6 2 6.4-5 4-,4-2 4*.25 5.27 5.30 2.50 Unimportant 4 5.92 3.75 4-.52 5.88 5.08 2.80

8 5.83 4.63 4-.4-5 . Ol O O O O TO TO to Mean 6.07 Kid kM m 4,94 . Inspection of this table shows that, summed over number conditions, the I and UI belief profiles are quite similar. However, in the I condition as the number of bonded values increased, certainty about the presence of favorable traits and absence of unfavorable traits increased. In the UI condition certainty was not systematically related to number. These findings, although not significant (F=1 .32; df 10, 220; £ <.223) are consistent with a minimal expectation based on the bonding model. The significant linear component of the groups main effect is a reflection of the general change from "certain present" to "certain absent" in certainty ratings from belief favorability group 1 to favorability group 6. The other significant components reflect the two anomalous inflection points. Mean certainty in group 2 was lower than would be expected on the basis of trait favorability alone. The three traits comprising this group were: productive, skillful, and convincing. All of these are somewhat denotatively inconsistent with some of the stimulus traits such as inexperienced, passive, unpoised, incompetent and nervous. Such semantic discrepancies no doubt account for the low certainty ratings of these three response traits. Mean certainty in group 4, on the other hand, Is somewhat higher than the eval­ uative character of the traits in thatgwup would command* The traits in that group were: naive, with­ drawing, and compulsive. The former two traits were probably strongly implied by words in' the stimulus sets such as inexperienced, incompetent, and passive. Since the patterns of belief certainty were similar across belief favorability groups for the I and UI conditions, the lack of an effect due to importance cannot reasonably be attributed to these denotative artifacts in the measuring device. Other analyses. After completing their bonding paragraphs, Ss rated each value according to how much they thought Person X would favor or oppose it, and how important it was to them personally. Combining over number conditions, the important-related values were rated as more important

The combination of all of these findings leads to

the conclusion that the importance-relatedness of all

values was for the most part, correctly perceived in all

conditions. The present data, therefore, provide a valid

test of the bonding model. The importance and relatedness ratings were used as in Chapter 2 to compute an index of resistance according to the bonding model formula. Within each experimental condition, Ss were divided into two groups according to the magnitude of thte index. Hesistance level (high vs. low) was employed as an additional factor in a reanalysis of the post-discrepancy attitude scores. Although no significant effects were observed, final attitude tended to be more favorable among high resistance Ss (F=1.64; df 1,108; £ <.203)* Average resistance tended to increase with number (F=1.36» df 2,108; jo <.261), but more so in the I than in the UI condition (F=1.4l; df 2,108; jo <.248). These trends are all supportive of bonding model predictions. 103 Effort. At the end of the experiment Ss were asked to indicate how much time and effort they spent in relating Person X to the ideas. Responses were made on a seven point scale with end labels “very little" (1) and "very mueh"(7)» Surprisingly, the analysis of this data did not yield a main effect of number. The importance by number interaction was significant (F=3»H» df 2, 123; E <.048); reported effort fluctuated across number in the I condition and increased with number in the UI condition. The overall mean was 4.3f or slightly above neutral. Two unobtrusive indices of effort were also obtained. Ss were instructed to turn in their booklets as soon as they had completed all required tasks. As booklets were turned in, they were assigned a number from 1 to 4 according to how early Ss completed the experiment. < Although there were many other intervening time-consuming tasks, it was expected that Ss in the 2 value condition would finish earliest and Ss in the 8 value condition would finish latest. Analysis of this data confirmed this expectation in the I condition, but the reverse occurred in the UI condition. This interaction was significant {B^3*08; df 2, 123; p <,050). The number and importance main effects were not significant. The other index of thoroughness was the number of words written in the value bonding essays. Analysis 104- of this word count data showed a tendency toward more writing in the UI than in the I condition (F=3»32; df 1 , 123; JB <.071). A similar non-significant verbosity of UI Ss was observed in the experiment in Chapter 2. As expected, the number of words increased directly with the number of values (F=8.85; d£ 2,123; £ <.001). However, the increase in verbage was not proportional to the increase in the number of values to be discussed. The mean number of words in the number conditions were 63 (2 values), 75 (4- values) and 92 (8 values). Thus, the number of words per value dropped from over 30 to less than 1 2 . There are several plausible reasons for the dis- proportionality, such as the constraints of time and writing space. The point of emphasis here is that the impact of increasing number may have been rather dras­ tically" attenuated because of a procedural artifact. All of the effort indicators reported here support the view that proportionately less consideration was given to each value as their number increased, especially in the I condition. These tendencies would have the consequence of attenuating the predicted effects of value number and importance. The second post-experimental question was directed at the effect of the bonding task on the extremity of initial attitude. Ss responded on a seven point scale 105 labeled "made me like X less" (1), "no effect" W, and "made me like X more" (?), Although there were no significant effects, there was a tendency toward liking more with increasing number in the I condition. This trend does not correspond to the initial favorability self-ratings. The overall mean was ^.8 which could be interpreted as indicating a slight enhancement of initial attitude due to bonding. However, these data and the favorability ratings discussed above show that value characteristics did not differentially enhance initial attitude. Perceived discrepancy. 3n the next two questions Ss rated the likeability of the two sets of information on seven point scales ranging from "very dlslikeable" (1) to "very likeable"(7)• For the initial set there was a significant main effect of number (F=4-.63; df 2, 123; jd <.012); and a marginal interaction (^=1.99; df 2, 123; £ <»142). I 2 and I 8 were higher than I 4, and UI 2 was higher than Ul^and UI 8. These data, strange in themselves, are inconsistent with the pre­ discrepancy self ratings. The overall mean likeability was 6.2 which was somewhat lower than the corresponding figure (6.5) from the previous experiment based on the same trait set. The direction of this difference is baffling because on the pretest, the direction of difference between the two studies was just the opposite. 106

These findings suggest that in the present study there was some distortion in memory regarding the favorability of the initial information. There were no clues in the data or in Ss* written remarks that help explain these findings. Analysis of the likeability ratings of the discre­ pant set produced no significant effects (all ja's >.2 5 )« The overall mean was 2.3* which is fairly dislikeable. Apparently the evaluative level of the discrepant infor­ mation was appropriately perceived in all conditions. As a further check on the possibility of differences in perceived discrepancy, the rating of the second set was subtracted from the rating of the first set for each S* Analysis of these difference scores produced no sig­ nificant effects. For both I and UI conditions, the difference in likeability of the two sets was greatest in the 2 and least in the 4 value condition. The inter­ action of importance and number on the attitude data, therefore, cannot be attributed to corresponding differences in perceived discrepancy. The next question asked Ss to rate how well the two sets of information went together. The scale end points were labeled "very inconsistent" (1) and "very consistent" (7)• There were no significant sources of variance in this measure (all jd*s >.60). The overall mean was 2,9 indicating that Ss in all conditions exper- 10? ienced moderate inconsistency.

The final question asked which of the two sets of information counted more in the Ss' feelings about Person

X at that point. The scale ranged from "first set counts more" (1), through "about equal" (4), to "second set counts more" (7). The main effect of importance was significant df 1,123; p <.034). Ss in the I condition said the two sets counted equally (x-4.00) while Ss in the UI condition favored the first set

(x«3.31), This finding is contradictory to the expec­ tation based on the value bonding model that Ss who bond their initial attitude to important values should cling to it more strongly. Hatings on this scale were negatively correlated (r= -.383; Ilf 127; £ <.01) with weighted average attitude, i. e., Ss who said the first set counted more had more favorable attitudes. This finding indicates that these ratings have some validity.

Value Similarity. In the conclusion section of the preceding chapter, it was suggested that resis­ tance to change in the domain of interpersonal attitudes might be due to Ss1 perceived similarity to the target person. Value similarity data were also obtained in the present study. An average absolute difference between attribution and importance ratings across values was calculated for each S. Analysis of these data yielded only a main effect of importance (Ijfc=l6.87; df 1,123; 108 £ <.001)* Value similarity was greater in the I than in the UI condition. This finding is consistent with the results of the value similarity analysis in Chapter 2. Ss were then arranged into numerical order according to value similarity regardless of experimental condition. The 129 Ss were divided into four ordered groups with 32 or 33 per group. The weighted average attitude scores were then reanalyzed in a one-.way analysis of variance with value similarity as the only factor. Attitude scores increased directly as a function of value similarity (from 4.05 in the lowest similarity group to 4.24 in the highest), but the trend failed to reach significance (P =1.66; df 3> 125; £ <.179)♦ Conclusions At the beginning of this chapter it was noted that research testing the effect of value number on resistance to change was sparse and unsupportive of the value bonding model. The experiment reported here provided a reasonable test of the hypothesis, and did confirm the prediction regarding the main effect of number and the interaction of number with importance. No direct support was obtained for the effort hypothesis derived from dissonance theory. Number was significant after parceling out initial attitude. One possible inhibitor of the number main effect suggested above was the relatively low level of investrheat in the bonding task especially in the two 109 highest number conditions. For example, in the previous experiment which employed five values, the number of words in the bonding essays averaged above 98 over all conditions. This figure is slightly larger than that of the 8 value condition of the present study and considerably greater than the present ^ value condition. In terms of the several measures of effort analyzed, the present 2 value condition elicited slightly more, and the 8 value condition elicited slightly less, cognitive work per value than would be expected on the basis of previous research* A related possible reason for a low number* effect is that the nominal number level, i. e., the number of values provided by the experimenter, was not the same as the actual level which occurred to the Ss. In the pre-experimental orientation there were four values and 89 words in the example paragraph. These examples no doubt established some expectancy about what was required on the experimental task. Ss in the 2 value condition may have elaborated their bonding paragraphs by introduc­ ing or at least considering additional values, while Ss in the 8 value condition may have played down or discounted some of the values in their list. There are indications in the present data that the functional manipulation of number was not totally successful*

It was noted at the beginning of this chapter that a pure 110 manipulation of number is difficult. The present manipulation, while avoiding some sources of confounding, was clearly not ideal. Future research on the number hypothesis must be designed to insure that the amount of consideration given to each value be equated across number conditions. Furthermore, the present findings suggest that, although effort per se does not affect resistance to change, some effort must be expended in the bonding task in order for value bonding to be an effective resistance arousing device. More disturbing than the marginal importance- number interaction was the absence of a significance importance main effect on final attitude. The checks on this manipulation, which occurred immediately after the bonding task, showed that the importance-related­ ness of the values was correctly perceived in the I and UI conditions. The direction of difference in the 4 and 8 value conditions was as predicted by the bonding model. The finding of no significant difference, while not contradictory to prediction or past findings, is certainly inconsistent with all expectation. Importance did, however, interact with number in the predicted fashion. The various ancillary analyses hinted that less attention may have been devoted to important values in this study. Several alternative interpretations of the results of this experiment deserve consideration. As in the previous Ill study there was an indication that value similarity between Ss and Person X was associated with resistance to change. Similarity was significantly correlated with final attitude. Ss whose value attribution ratings were most like their ratings of personal importance had the most favorable final attitudes. This finding is interesting in that the attrib­ ution ratings were apparently not guided by the extremity of initial attitude. Value similarity was significantly correlated with initial attitude but in the opposite direction to its correlation with final attitude. Thus, Ss who saw themselves as similar to Person X were less favorable initially and more favorable following the discrepant information than were Ss who saw themselves as dissimilar to Person X. In other words, high similarity Ss changed less than low similarity Ss. These data provide some insight into how value bonding operates in the realm of interpersonal attitudes. Another possible explanation of value bonding effects holds that the bonding of an initially favorable attitude to important values is more consistent than bonding unimportant values. This interpretation assumes that the initial traits were as favorable as the values were important. The attributed important values, being considered as additional traits of the person, should produce an enhancement of initial attitude and less change following discrepancy, especially with increasing number 112 of values. Enhancement of initial attitude was not observed in this experiment, contrary to the consistency expectation. However, the attribution ratings and inspection of the value bonding essays indicated that a consistency motive was operating, Ss were less likely to positively attribute unimportant values to likeable Person X than to positively attribute important values. Giving Ss the opportunity to control the direction of the value bond, allowed them to form consistent cognitive structures in both importance conditions. Future research should compare the competing hypotheses of value bonding and consistency models when important values are positively bonded to a dislikeable person and when unimportant values are positively bonded to a likeable person. The value similarity and consistency interpretations, while applicable to the present data, would not have generated all the predictions based on the bonding model that lead to this experiment, nor did they receive as much support as did the bonding model from these results. The purposes of this paper stated in Chapter 1 were to test the predictions of the cognitive bonding model regarding three basic value properties and to examine the effects of value bonding on a basic attitude change phenom­ enon. Chapters 2 and 3 reported recent research addressed to the former purpose. The properties of importance, relatedness, and number have all been tested in the same attitudinal domain using the same general paradigm. The following chapter is addressed to the latter purpose. An experiment is reported which investigated the effects of value bonding on the function relating communication discrepancy to attitude change. Chapter 4 THE EFFECTS OF VALUE BONDING ON THE FUNCTION RELATING COMMUNICATION DISCREPANCY TO ATTITUDE CHANGE

One currently controversial issue in the attitude change literature concerns the function relating degree of discrepancy and attitude change* Some authors (Cohen, 1959a) have found an inverse relation while many others (see Bochner & Insko, 1966) have found a direct relation­ ship. As in other cases of conflicting data, the res­ olution offered for these findings is that the under­ lying function is curvilinear (Sherif & Hovland, 1961; Aronson, Turner, & Carlsmith, 1963)* At low discrepancy levels attitude change increases with discrepancy, but beyond a critical point, other cognitive processes such as denial or derogation begin to operate and attitude change decreases with increasing discrepancy even to the point of producing a "boomerang effect." Among the several variables thought to influence the point of inflection Is ego-involvement. Sherif, Sherif and Nebergall (1965) argued that ego-involvement is inversely related to the level of discrepancy at which this turning point occurs. More specifically, the greater the degree of ego-involvement, the lesser 115 the degree of discrepancy required before attitude change begins to be an inverse function of discrepancy. To the extent that it arouses ego-involvement or similar processes, value bonding may produce a curvilinear relation between discrepancy and attitude change. It is assumed that the cognitive consequences of receiving discrepant information increase directly with the degree of discrepancy. Under certain circumstances at high levels of discrepancy, attitude change ceases to be the prevalent consequence and other forms of response come into play. Ego-involvement in the initial attitude has been shown to be one circumstance which affects the mode of reaction to discrepancy. The Ostrom and Brock cognitive model does not predict that value bonding will produce a changing response mode at different discrepancy levels. The model predicts only that value bonding arouses resistance to attitude change. The greater the importance of the bonded values, the less effect discrepancy will have, but curvilinearity is not predicted. Most of the research on the value bonding model in the realm of interpersonal attitudes employed only one level of discrepancy (Edwards, In press; Edwards & Ostrom, 1969; Chapters 2 and 3, this work). The Ostrom and Brock (1968) experiment compared moderate and extreme discre­ pancy levels and found the predicted value bonding effects only in the latter condition. Their experiment did not 116 deal with interpersonal attitudes. An unpublished experiment by the present author compared the effects of important and unimportant values under conditions of high and low discrepancy using the impression formation paradigm. Significant main effects of both factors were obtained from the analysis of attitude change scores. Although the interaction effect was not significant, the difference in attitude change due to importance tended to be greater in the high discrepancy condition. Since only two discrepancy levels were employed in this study, the effects of value bonding on the entire discrepancy function could not be ascertained. An experiment recently completed at the Ohio State laboratory (Ostrom, Edwards & Rosenblood, 1970) invest­ igated the competing hypotheses of two sets of literature involving discrepancy. A model derived from impression formation studies (Anderson, 1968) predicts that attitude change will be a linear function of degree of discrepancy. A model derived from the attitude change literature (Sherif & Hovland, 1961) predicts that attitude change will first increase and then, beyond a certain level, begin to decrease as a function of discrepancy level. The Ostrom et al. experiment dealt with the change of interpersonal attitudes and, as such, bridged the competing bodies of literature. Seven levels of discrep­ 117 ancy were employed as a between subjects factor. The results showed that the discrepancy function was linear with a slight flattening at both ends. Attitude change did not differ between the two lowest or between the two highest levels. Value bonding was not a feature of the study. It can be assumed on the basis of this experiment that, in the domain of interpersonal attitudes using the impression formation paradigm, the discrepancy function is linear. Any significant deviations from linearity due to discrepancy, when the initial attitude is value bonded, can reasonably be attributed to bonding. Purpose and Hypotheses The purpose of this experiment was to examine the effects of discrepancy level on attitude change when initial attitudes are bonded to either important (I) or unimportant (UI) values. Past research by the author and colleagues suggested that attitude change will be a linear function of discrepancy level, but that the bonding of important values will attenuate this effect at all discrepancy levels. The present study investigated this hypothesis. It was expected that importance and discre­ pancy would both significantly affect final attitude and that they migit produce a significant interaction. The degree of difference between I and UI conditions was predicted to increase with increasing discrepancy. A second purpose of this experiment was to assess 118 the generalizability of value bonding and discrepancy effects. This was accomplished by employing two rep­ lications of the initial and discrepant information sets. The Ostrom et al. study used three stimulus replications. Although the replications factor contributed to several significant sources of variance, all replications produced the same generally linear discrepancy function. In the present experiment, replications were not expected to interact with importance or discrepancy. Design The independent variables were value importance (I vs. UI), degree of discrepancy (0 through 4), and replications of the stimulus traits. The I and UI values were the same across replications and discrepancy levels. These three factors were arranged in a 2x5x2 completely randomized design. The dependent variables were pre- and post-discrepancy attitude measures, ratings of value attribution, and several post-exper­ imental debriefing questions. Subjects Two hundred male and female introductory psychology students at Ohio State University volunteered in partial fulfillment of a course requirement. Data from 193 Ss were obtained in five sessions held on the same day with approximately 40 Ss per session. Ss were randomly assigned to the 20 experimental conditions with 9 or 10 119 per cell. Data from 7 additional Ss were obtained about two weeks later in order to have the sample size equal 10 in all cells of the design. Method The experimental procedures were generally the same as in the previously reported studies. This experiment also dealt with the formation and change of interpersonal attitudes using an impression formation paradigm. Again all experimental materials were presented in booklet format, (Examples of all pages used in this experiment are available in Appendix C.) After filling out the personal information on the cover page and reading the general- instructions, Ss encountered two practice stimulus persons. Practice Person #1 was described by three favorable traits: honorable, clean, and sympathetic. Ss were asked to form an impression of this person and to describe their feelings in a paragraph. A sample Impression paragraph, composed by the present author, was provided. After completing their own paragraphs, Ss read a list of four value statements and were asked to write a paragraph relating their impression of the practice person to each value. A sample value bonding paragraph was also provided. On the next page Ss were engaged in similar tasks in response to Practice Person #2. This person was described by three unfavorable traits: underhanded, 120 vulgar, and belligerant. The values presented for bonding were the same as for the first practice person. Again Ss wrote their own impression and bonding paragraphs after reading those prepared by the author for that person. Thus the practice procedure’was different from the studies reported in Chapters 2 and 3. Two polarized stimulus persons were employed in an attempt to instill a common reference scale for Ss in all discrepancy conditions. Written practice was included to give Ss more experience in impression formation and value bonding than was afforded by reading prepared examples. Following the practice pages, Ss read a statement preparing them to receive information about the actual experimental issue, Person X. Initial Information. Two sets of five initial traits were used and arbitrarily designated as Replication 1 (HI) or Replication 2 (R2). The traits comprising R1 and their favorability scale values were: honest (6,4-8), interesting (6.14*), mature (6.52), conforming (4.05), and reliable (6.10). The initial traits of H2 were the same five adjectives used in the two experiments reported in Chapters 2 and 3* The two initial trait sets were as evaluatively similar as possible using the available pool of items. The mean and variance of their scale values were nearly the same. All traits in both sets were relatively unambiguous and did not differ in 121 favorability across sex of the judges. On the basis of their particular set of traits, Ss formed an initial impression of Person X and described their feelings in a written paragraph. Importance Manipulation. Next Ss read a list of four value statements which were either highly important and related to both initial sets (hereinafter designated I) or unimportant and unrelated to both stimuli (herein­ after designated UI). The mean importance and related­ ness ratings, respectively, for the I group were: 9*80 and 6.27. For the UI condition, the mean importance and relatedness ratings were 6 .0? and 3 .01, respectively. Ss were to read each statement carefully and write a par­ agraph relating the values to Person X. Next Ss rated how strongly Person X would oppose or favor each value. Ratings were made on the same type scales as in the pre­ vious studies. Value importance ratings were not obtained. Ss then summarized their feelings toward Person X on an 8 category favorability self-rating scale. Discrepant information. After rating their initial attitudes, Ss were told that additional information about Person X was available and would appear on the following page. The mean favorability of the initial set and the discrepant sets at each discrepancy (D) level for both replications are shown in Table 1, 122 Table 1 Mean favorability of initial and discrepant traits for replications 1 and 2

Initial Discrepancy Level 0 1 2 3 4

R1 5.86 5.83 4.81 3.78 2.64 1.59 R2 5.80 5.89 4.81 3.79 2.64 1.59 The mean favorability of the zero discrepancy condition (D—0 ) was approximately equal to the mean for the initial traits. In fact, four of the five traits in the D-0 set of one replication were taken from the initial set of the other replication. The difference between adjacent discrepancy levels was not equal, but increased slightly with discrepancy. This was not deliberate, but occurred as a natural consequence of item selection procedures. Except for the D->0 condition, traits were chosen from a range of items one scale unit from the preceding set, plus or minus one-third s6ale unit. Items within a given range were selected on the basis of low Q value and absence of denotative connections with items in the initial set. Pairs of items of approximately the same scale value were assigned to separate replica­ tions, Therefore the mean favorability as shown in Table 1 and the standard deviation of favorability were nearly equal across replications at each discrepancy level. No trait appeared in both replications. After reading the 123 new information about Person X, Ss wrote another par­ agraph based on all of the traits. Post discrepancy attitude. The major dependent variable was the 18 adjective measure of affective- cognitive structure employed in the experiment of Chapter 2. After completing this scale, Ss answered six open- ended questions designed to allow them to reveal their impressions of various aspects of the study. The questions asked about the purpose of the study, the effects of the practice section on their feelings about Person X, the personal importance of the ideas (values) which they related to X, their perceptions about how well the two sets of information about Person X went together, which of the sets counted more in their final attitude, and finally, any other thoughts that occurred to them during their participation. Results and Discussion Initial attitude. A three-way analysis of variance1 of the favorability self-rating produced a main effect of replications (F=6 .68; df 1 , 180; £ <.011), a main effect of importance (P=5 «6l; df 1 , 180; £ <.019), and a rep­ lications by discrepancy interaction (5-3.30; df 5 » 180; £ <.012). Since the discrepant information had not been introduced at that point, the latter interaction is best 1. The analysis summary and cell means are shown in Table 7, Appendix D. attributed, to error and discounted at this point. Initial attitudes were more favorable in R2 (x=6,99) than in HI

(x =6.^9) despite the fact that individual items in the two replications were matched for favorability scale value. The mean for R2 was slightly higher than the means reported in Chapters 2 and 3 based on the same set of traits. Across the three experiments initial attitude has varied approximately one quarter of a scale unit. The greater favorability of R2 over HI in the present study may be due to greater internal consistency among its components or to shifts in meaning among some or all of the traits due to the presence of other traits. For the first time in any experiment in the program of research on value bonding, the important value condition was associated with a more favorable initial attitude (cf, Edwards & Ostrom, 1970). The mean for the I condition was 6.95; for the UI condition, it was 6.53* This finding will be discussed in more detail below. Post-discre'panov Attitude. Single Score. As in the earlier studies, a weighted average index of final attitude was computed from the belief favorability scale values and certainty ratings. The main effects of importance and discrepancy and their interaction were expected to be significant. Analysis of variance con­ firmed these predictions. The overall final attitude of the I condition was more favorable than in the UI 125 condition (F=6.54; df 1, 180; £ <.011). Final attitude decreased with increasing discrepancy (F=34.13l df 4, 180; £ <.001), but this decrease was smaller in the I condition than in UI (F=3.26; df 4, 180; £ <.013). The importance by discrepancy interaction is shown in Figure 1. Figure 1 Weighted average attitude as a function of value importance and degree of discrepancy

4.9

ui,

<1)

•P •rl -P -P *aj bOCD sa> 5 -d a> p 13) •rl §

3.9 UI

Degree of Discrepancy

Since the shape of the discrepancy function was of theoretical interest in this paper, the main and inter­ action effects involving discrepancy were divided into 126 their orthogonal components. This permitted the testing of whether the discrepancy function was primarily linear as predicted by the weighted average model or curvilinear (quadratic) as predicted by ego-involvement and commit­ ment models. The analysis revealed that the discrepancy function was mainly linear (F=132,77; df 1 , 180; p c.OOl). No other componets were significant although the cubic was marginal (F=3«52; df 1 , 180; p <,062) indicating a slight leveling off at both ends of the discrepancy continuum. For the importance by discrepancy interaction the quartic was significant (F=8,^2, df 1, 180; p <,00^) and the quadratic was marginal (F=3.18; df 1, 180; p <,076), Thus, contrary to prediction the difference over dis­ crepancy levels between I and UI was not linear, but varied at each discrepancy level. None of the interactions with replications was significant. As noted above, initial attitude was not equal in all conditions. The correlation between pre- and posttest attitude scores was significant (r=,2?3 ; df 198; p <,0 1 ). The post discrepancy attitude scores were reanalyzed covarying but initial attitude variance. This procedure lowered the main effect of importance (F=3«81; df 1* 3-79 J p<.053); the cubic component of the discrepancy main effect was enhanced (F=5«15; df 1,179; £ <.024); but no other effects were markedly changed. Removal of initial attitude differences reduced the difference between I and 127 UI conditions at all discrepancy levels, particularly at D-0* These analyses and adjusted means are sum­ marized in Table 8 , Appendix D. Except for D-2, Ss in the I condition had a more favorable post-discrepancy attitude than Ss in the UI condition. Since value importance effects were expected at all discrepancy levels, the I and UI conditions were individually compared at each level* The results of these analyses are summarized in Table 2. Table 2 Individual comparisons of I and UI conditions at each discrepancy level* Discrepancy Level Direction of Difference P £<

0 I > UI 2*31 .137 1 I > UI 1*74 .195 2 I < UI 3.86 .0 57

3 I > UI 7.50 .009 4 I > UI 3.28 .078 *Note: Degrees of freedom for each comparison were 1,38* At the two lowest discrepancy levels the direction of difference was as expected but insufficiently large to reach significance* Only at D-3 did the expected difference reach accepted levels. At D-4 the difference approached significance. The marginally significant reversal of direction at D-2, while unexpected, is 128 reminiscent of a similar finding by Ostrom and Brock (1968). Why attitude change should be greater with I than UI values at moderate discrepancy levels remains unexplained. The analysis of final attitude scores also yielded a main effect of replications (F=5»97; df 1, 180; p <.015). The mean for Rl was Jj-.^l; for R2, it was ^.27. Since R2 was more favorable than Rl on the pretest, it appears that greater attitude change occurred in R2, The covariate analysis removing initial attitude differences confirmed the finding in that the replications effect was enhanced (F=10.29; df 1, 179; £ <.002) in the reanalysis. The difference in change was apparently uniform across conditions since replications did not contribute to any interactions (all p's >.28). Post-discrepancv attitude. Affective-cognitive structure. The belief certainty ratings were analyzed in the same way as in the previous studies. Again the 18 items were collapsed into six ordered favorability groups and treated according to the multivariate model for repeated measures. There were two significant sources of between subjects variability: the discrepancy main effect (P= 5*57; d£ 180; p <.001) and the replications by discrepancy interaction (P= 2.52; df 4, 180; p <,0^3 ), The level of certainty generally 129 increased with increasing discrepancy except for D-3 which was lower than D-2 and D-4. The pattern of increasing certainty was not the same in both rep­ lications, Since the degree of belief certainty is important only as a function of belief favorability, these effects in themselves are uninteresting. Their cause and interpretation became apparent in the inter­ actions with favorability groups to be discussed later. The main effect of groups, as indicated by the test of the grand mean of the multiple input variables was significant according to Wilk's lambda criterion (F= 65.^5; d£ 5, 176; £ <,001), Univariate tests of the orthogonal components yielded these results: linear (P*= 299.82; df 1, 180; £ <.001), quadratic (F <1.0), cubic (F= 5.5^; d£ 1» 180; £ <.020), quartic (F« 5*65; df 1 , 180; p <.018), and quintic (F= 25 .6^; df 1 , 180; £ <,001), Thus, the change in certainty across favorability groups can best be viewed as a straight line with a slight bend at each favorability group. A main effect of groups, of course, is virtually guaranteed by the very nature of the dependent variable and the way it is analyzed. The replications by groups

interaction was significant in this analysis (F=7 .l6 ; df 5, 1?6; £ <.001). The pattern of certainty ratings indicated a more favorable final attitude in Rl than in R2. The major effects of interest were the interaction with groups of importance, discrepancy, and importance 130 by discrepancy* The importance by groups interaction was marginally significant (Ife2.01; df 5* 176; £<*079)* Of the five components of this interaction, only the linear was sig­ nificant (F=8.87; d£ 1, 180; £ <*003). This indicates that the difference between I and UI could best be described by a straight line. It was predicted that Ss in the I condi­ tion would retain more of their initially favorable at­ titude. This would be manifested by greater certainty about the presence of favorable traits and absence of unfa­ vorable traits in Person X. That this was the case is illustrated in Figure 2 which portrays the importance by groups interaction. Figure 2 .Belief certainty as a function of belief / favorability and value importance n / T

-UI

I >v t — High Favorability Favo i Low 131 The discrepancy by groups interaction was also sig­ nificant. Four roots were extracted and three were sig­ nificant (all J31s <.001). All of the orthogonal compo­ nents of the discrepancy by groups interaction were significant (all jg's <,01). Inspection of the F ratios and the discriminant function coefficients of the first significant root indicated that the difference between discrepancy conditions was, for the most part, linear. This interaction is shown in Figure 3* The summary of this belief certainty analysis is given in Table 9» Appendix D,

As the graph makes clear, certainty about the presence of favorable traits and absence of unfavorable traits decreased directly with increasing discrepancy, D-0 and D-l, and to a lesser extent, D-2 show patterns reflecting fairly positive attitudes. D-3 and D-4-, however, reflect a fairly uncertain, neutral attitude. The most revealing data from this experiment were obtained in the importance by discrepancy by groups inter­ action. Only the first root was significant (jg <,020). The univariate tests and discriminate function coeffi­ cients indicated that the linear component of the inter­ action was the most important (F= 3*66; df 180; £ <.00?). While these were the only significant effects, they were also the most critical. In Table 3 the importance by groups interaction is shown separately for each discrepancy Certain Absent Uncertain Present levelin order toshow theprogressive effects of increasing discrepancy oncognitive-affective structure, D-2 D-l i-O, High Beliefcertainty asfunctiona of belief favorability and degreeof discrepancy aoaiiyLow Favorability Figure3

133 and how value Importance operated in this progression. Table 3 Belief certainty as a function of belief favorability, value importance, and degree of discrepancy D-0 High Belief Favorability Low 1 2 3 lp $ 6 Important 8 .6? 7.73 5.25 3.38 2.10 1.35 Unimportant 7.77 6.87 5.33 4.13 2.75 1.81 D-l High Belief Favorability Low Important 7^95 8?12 5?77 4^20 1?90 1*70 Unimportant 7•30 7-^3 5.67 4.40 2.63 2.27 D-2 High Belief Favorability Low 1 2 3^56 Important 6.15 5.83 6.81 6.37 4.20 2.75 Unimportant 7.47 6.47 6.30 5.35 3.01 2.65

D-3 High Belief Favorability Low 1 2 3 4 5 6 Important 7.08 6.27 4.10 5.38 4.45 3.90 Unimportant 5*55 4.78 3.27 4.87 6.22 4.95 D-4 High Belief Favorability Low 1 2 3 4 5 6 Important 5*65 6.88 H-.55 4.68 4.88 4.77 Unimportant 5.01 6.55 4.07 5.50 5.17 6.45 At D-0, Ss in the I value condition were more certain that Person X had favorable traits and did not 13^ have unfavorable traits than were Ss in the UI value condition. It should be noted that certainty was greater in favorability group 1 than in group 2. Since the initial information about Person X was, on the average, most evaluatively similar to group 2, it might be concluded that Ss in the D-0 were more favorable after receiving the new information than they were initially.

This attitudinal enhancement or "set-size effect" stems from receiving two sets of information of the same favorability. Ostrom et al. (1970) obtained clear evidence for this effect, but with the present data such an interpretation is tenuous at best.

The difference in importance conditions at D-l was slight, but most pronounced at the extremes of the favorability scale. The pattern indicates the beginning of a shift away from favorability in the UI condition.

At D-2 the interaction table indicates a more favorable attitude in the UI condition. Both conditions appear moderately positive, but UI Ss show a more systematic relationship between belief favorability and certainty. I Ss are most certain that Person X has neutral traits and does not have extremely negative ones. At this moderate discrepancy level the bonding of important values is having its greatest effects on beliefs that are evaluatively dissimilar to the initial 135 set. The difference due to importance across favorability groups is most apparent at D-3. Here I Ss are fairly certain about the presence of favorable traits and absence of extremely unfavorable ones, but they report uncertainty about neutral traits. The UI condition reflects a general uncertainty with a tendency toward a negative attitude. They are uncertain about favorable traits, and fairly certain that Person X does not have neutral qualities and does have some moderately negative ones • At D-4 the effects of extreme discrepancy seem to have partly eliminated the differences due to importance on the favorable side of the belief scale. On the unfavorable side the importance conditions diverge. Ss in the I condition show uniform uncertainty with a trend toward disbelief in negative traits. However, Ss in the UI condition find extremely negative traits fairly acceptable. The conclusions based on these tables embody those that followed from the single score data. Both sets of findings, of course, are derived from the same instrument. They show that the effects of value iraportance-related- ness are not constant across discrepancy levels. Table 3 provides some insights regarding how these differences 136

are represented In cognitive structure* The effect of

value importance on the pattern of belief favorability

was not the same in all discrepancy conditions. At discrepancy levels 0, 1, and 3> the difference between

the I and UI conditions was approximately the same on both sides of the belief favorability scale. At D-**,

however, differences occurred mainly on the negative

side, i. e., among beliefs that were most evaluatively dissimilar from those of the initial set.

Other data exist which can be used to check the reliability of this interesting interaction. The previously mentioned unpublished article by the present author compared I and UI conditions under moderate and extreme discrepancy conditions using the affective- cognitive structure measure. In that study, the impor­ tance by discrepancy by favorability groups interaction was not significant. Inspection of the belief certainty profiles showed that the greatest difference between I and UI conditions occurred among beliefs most dissimilar from the initial set for both discrepancy levels.

However, the I-UI difference in the high discrepancy condition tended to be larger among beliefs most eval­ uatively distant from those in the initial information set. This tendency corresponds to the present finding. In another experiment (Edwards & Ostrom, 19^9) employing only moderate discrepancy, the I and UI 13? conditions were different on both sides of the favorability scale, but again the separation was greatest among the most dissimilar beliefs. In the experiment reported in Chapter 2 the non-significant differences due to importance were observed only among beliefs most evaluatively similar to the initial traits. In the experiment reported in Chapter 3, the non-sig­ nificant differences between importance conditions were not systematic across favorability groups. In the 8 value condition of that experiment, the I-UI difference was greatest among beliefs most similar to those of the Initial set. In summary, these findings imply that value importance effects are likely to be manifested at any or all locations in affective-cognitive structure. When these effects are significant, there is a tendency toward greater separation of I and UI conditions in the area of affective-cognitive structure that is evaluatively similar to the traits comprising the discrepant information. This tendency is particularly apparent when initial attitudes are exposed to new information that is extremely discrepant. Other analyses. Immediately after completing the value bonding task, Ss rated how strongly Person X would favor or oppose each value. These ratings pro- 138 vide a numerical summary of the direction and degree of the attitude value relationships that Ss described in their bonding paragraphs. Analysis of these ratings summed over values yielded only one significant effect. Important values were more positively attributed than unimportant values (F= 253*0^; df 1, 180; p <.001). This finding confirmed the effectiveness of the impor­ tance- relatedness manipulation and again demonstrated that important values are more likely to be attributed to a likeable person than unimportant values. At the end of the experiment, Ss completed several de-briefing questions. One item asked how personally important the ideas were which they related to Person X. Responses were made by circling one of four phrases ranging from very important to very unimportant. There were no significant sources of variance in these data. The mean for all conditions was 3.1, indicating that all values, regardless of normative importance, were regarded as "fairly important" at that point. Another question asked Ss how well the initial and discrepant information sets went together. The written responses were coded by two independent judges. Responses were assigned to one of four categories ranging from "the sets did not go together at all" (1 ) to "the sets went together very well" (4). initial inter- judge agreement was over 90%• Judges then conferred until both agreed on the categorization of each response. Analysis of these data yielded two significant effects. As would be expected, the perceived consistency of the two sets of information declined with increasing discrepancy (P= 25.2 6 ; df 180; jd <.001). Across discrepancy levels Ss in the I condition reported greater consistency than Ss in the UI condition (F= 5.^7; df 1, 180; £ <.020). The experiment reported in Chapter 3 found no difference in perceived discrepancy due to importance. However, in that study, importance was not significantly related to final attitude. It might be expected that resistance to change due to value importance could be mediated by a higher level of perceived inconsistency between the discrepant information and the value bonded initial attitude. The present findings are contrary to that expectation. Ss were also asked to state which of the two sets of information counted more in their feelings about Person X. It was expected that Ss in the I condition would place more emphasis on the initial information than on the discrepant, and that this would not be true of Ss in the UI condition. Ss' responses were reviewed by two independent judges and were assigned 140 one of three ratings; initial set counted more (1), both counted about equally (0), and discrepant set counted more (-1). Initial inter-judge agreement was nearly perfect. Analysis of these ratings yielded only an importance by discrepancy interaction (P= 2,81; df 1, 180; £ <,027), The cell means for this effect are shown in Table 4, Table 4 Relative contribution of initial and discrepant information as a function of value importance and discrepancy level Discrepancy Level 0 1 2 3 4 Important -,050 .100 -.150 .350 .250 Unimportant .200 .050 .200 -.200 -.250 The main feature of these data is that the relative contribution to final attitude of the two trait sets did not differ in the I and UI conditions at low dis­ crepancy levels. At the two highest levels, however, Ss in the I condition reported that the initial set counted more, while Ss in the UI condition reported that the discrepant set counted more. The difference between importance conditions were individually compared at each discrepancy level. For the first two discrepancy levels, none of the differences were significant. At D-2, Ss in the UI condition favored 141 the initial set, while Ss in the I condition favored the discrepant set. This difference, while not sig­ nificant (F= 1.96; df 1, 38; £ <.170), is similar to the finding in Chapter 3» Ih both cases, Ss encountering moderate discrepancy were more likely to cling to the initial information if it was bonded to unimportant values than if bonded to important ones. The difference between importance levels at D-3 was significant (F=5«82; df 1, 38; jo <.021); and fell just short of significance at D-4 (F= 4.04; df 1, 38; £ <.052). The outcome of this "counts more" analysis directly paralleled the final attitude data. Those conditions in which the initial favorable information counted more, were those in which final attitudes were most favorable. In Chapter 3 it was reported that Ss in the UI condition tended to write more than Ss in the I condition. This difference offered a possible expla­ nation for the unusually moderate effects of importance in that study* By writing more, Ss in the UI groups could have established greater relatedness between Person X and the values, thereby offsetting the lesser resistance conferring qualities of UI values. The present study, which found significant effects of importance, provided a further test of this notion. The number of words in the bonding essays were counted 142 and analyzed. Only the main effect of importance was significant (P= 16.57; df 1, 180; jo <.001), Ss in the UI condition again wrote more (x=8l.l) than Ss in the I condition

The history of human conflict has proven that the use of armed force as a means of producing social change and gaining control over large numbers of people is ineffective in the long run. Only rarely have ter­ ritorial invasions succeeded or unpopular regimes prevailed. World War I was thought to be the "war to end all wars," but that hopeful view was quickly dissipated. After witnessing in horror the destruction and desolation of World War II, many people accepted the inevitably of conflict,but concluded that the next war would be the "struggle to control men's minds." This struggle would involve not the force of arms, but the force of politics, propaganda and persuasion. If the times are indeed changing, then any person, group, or nation must have in its arsenal of weapons a knowledge of how to persuade others and how to resist persuasion themselves. Recognizing this need, people have turned to social philosophers and scientists. Psychologists have responded by providing a massive body of experimental research on attitude change and 146 1^7 resistance to attitude change* Although much of this work has been tied to theories of change, the study of resistance has not generally followed from any unified set of predictions. The several exceptions have been either narrow in scope or dependent on individual differences• This paper has reported on the most recent inves­ tigations of a theoretical model of attitude change resistance that is is potentially applicable to all issues for all people. The basic postulates of the model are very straightforward. They are summarized in the statement that resistance to persuasion is directly determined by the importance, relatedness, and number of personal values to which an attitude is attached. Values are regarded as superordinate guides for thinking and acting, and ultimately desired end states. People with the same apparent attitude but with different attitude-value connections will be differen­ tially susceptible to persuasion. Resistance to persuasion, therefore, can be aroused by establishing bonds between attitudes and values. The method used to test the model has been strictly experimental. Initial attitudes, attitide-value bonds, and attitude change inducing communications have all been created in the laboratory. This method, while 1^8 possibly sacrificing some relevance and generality, has the advantage of isolating the critical value properties for unconfounded investigation. Chapter 2 reported on past research and a new experiment which tested the prediction that the greater the personal importance of the values to the subject, and the greater the relatedness of the values to the object, then the greater will be the subject's resistance to changing his value bonded attitude. These studies have not successfully separated the effects of importance and relatedness, but in com­ bination these factors have produced significant resistance in support of the model. The partial confounding of these variables has not interferred with the interpretation of research findings since the model predicts that they combine multiplicatively. Further studies should be conducted to more clearly separate the effects of importance and relatedness. This work will have to begin by establishing even more discriminable value sets than those employed before. The manipulation of value bonding motivation reported in Chapter 2 suggested some boundary conditions in which high and low levels of the critical properties will have their differential effects. This finding should stimulate investigation of other possible interacting variables. 149 Chapter 3 noted the apparent lack of difference in resistance due to the number of values to which an attitude is bonded. However, the early evidence contrary to the bonding model predictions was weak and inferential. The experiment in that chapter tested the interaction of number and value importance. Some support for » the model was obtained, and some suggestions were offered for why the effect was not stronger. The manipulation of number is rather difficult since it can be so easily confounded with other variables and psycho­ logical processes. Several findings indicated that the degree of consideration given each value goes down in proportion to the number of values considered. More carefully designed experiments should be conducted to further study number effects. In Chapter 4 the consequences of value bonding for attitude change were compared at different degrees of discrepancy and using different sets of stimulus materials. It was found that value importance became more critical as discrepancy increased. This implies that resistance due to bonding is relatively greater at high discrepancy levels. No support was found for the contention that attitude change will decrease with increasing discrepancy beyond a certain level. The term "resistance" implies that discrepant information is simply not accepted and that Initial attitudes remain the same. However, in all of the research reported, attitudes have indeed changed. The most tenable conclusion, therefore, is that high levels of critical value properties only reduce change relative to the effects of low levels of these properties. One experiment (Edwards, In press) employed a no-value- bonding control group. The results of that study showed that unimportant-unrelated values conferred no more resistance than no bonding. Future research should make more use of such controls to better assess the level of resistance that is accomplished by the bonding procedures. Another type of control data could be obtained by using within subjects designs. By instilling two attitudes and differentially bonding them to values, the properties of values could be investigated using each subject as his own control. The experiments completed so far by this author have all involved interpersonal attitudes using the same general paradigm. The impression formation situation was chosen and used repeatedly because of its qualities of rigor and flexibility. The use of adjectival traits to describe an attitude object permits greater control over stimulus characteristics than is possible with other more substantive issues. 151 Furthermore, this approach has permitted the comparison of findings across different experiments which is advantageous in the early stages of theory testing. At this point, all of the basic predictions of the value bonding model have been examined in a single attitudinal domain. This does not mean that the end of research has been reached. Rather, we have arrived at the end of the beginning. The bonding model should be explored in other attitude areas to determine its generality. A particular type of value bond was found to be appropriate for interpersonal attitudes. This type is not likely to apply to all attitudinal issues. Type of value bond may prove to be an additional important aspect of resistance to change that should be incorporated in the model. This consideration suggests an experiment featuring a manipulation of the qualitative nature of the value bonds. Furthermore, the value relating processes dealt with in the present studies should be explored in terms of models of attribution (Kelley, 1967) especially as they apply to person perception (Jones & Davis, 1965)* Attention must also be given to the interaction of the imporance-relatedness of the bonded cognitions and the direction (positive or negative) of the bonds. In the present studies, bond direction has been determined by Ss in their bonding paragraphs. This procedure permitted the direction of bonds to vary with the nature of the values. Values which are more related to the attitude object are more likely to be positively bonded, while less related values are more likely to be neg­ atively bonded. Controlling the direction of bonds would help clarify the role of value properties independently of the direction of the' bonds. It would be worthwhile to compare the effects of positively bonded important values with negatively bonded unimpor­ tant values in producing resistance to change. A manipulation of this type would parallel the supportive vs. refutational defense procedures used in the study of innoculation theory (e*g., McGuire & Fapageorgis, 1961). The value bonding model could also be examined using a correlational approach. Naturally occuring attitudes and their existing value bonds could be measured prior to a counter-attitudinal message. Ss whose attitudes were known to be linked to many important values should be least affected by discrepant information. A variation of this approach would require Ss to record their cognitive responses (Greenwald, 1968) while listening to a counter-attitudinal communication. The responses would be analyzed for value content. Ss 153 expressing more highly important values when counter- arguing should be less influenced by the message than Ss expressing unimportant or no values. Hesistanooto attitude change is not the only audience variable of Interest. Another prevalent reaction to discrepant information is derogation. An experiment in which value importance and credibility of the communicator are manipulated and derogation is the dependent variable would extend our knowledge of value bonding effects to variables not directly examined in the present research. Although the Ostrom-Brock model makes explicit what effects value bonding will have, it does not offer an explanation of how these effects were mediated cognitively in the present research. As originally formulated, the model implies that the prospect of changing a value bonded attitude is ego-threatening since valuer in part, comprise the self. While 'fego-involvement11 may be aroused for certain issues by certain types of bonds, this process does not seem appropriate for interpersonal attitudes featuring attributional bonds. There are no indications in the present data that the observed resistance was due to differences in perceptual distortion of the stimulus materials or 15^ effort on behalf of the attitude object. Other possible resistance sources such as individual difference variables and pre-experience with the object can be ruled out because of the type of design and experimental materials used. One plausible interpretation of these data can be derived from a generalized notion of cognitive consistency. In all three studies reported here, Person X was described initially in fairly favorable terms. Ss then attributed values to this person in a fashion commensurate with the attitude instilled by the initial traits. That is, Ss felt that Person X would favor important values and would be indifferent or moderately opposed to unimportant values. Given the freedom to establish the direction and degree of attribution, Ss tended to form an internally consistent attitude toward Person X. Ss in the important value conditions had, in effect, two sets of initial favorable information, i. e., Person X possessed likeable traits and was in favor of important values. Ss in the unimpor­ tant value conditions also had two sets of initial favorable information, but of a decidedly differ­ ent nature, ©•* Person X had likeable traits and was indifferent to unimportant values. Except for the experiment reported in Chapter these two 155 different arrangements of initial attitude do not result in significantly different degrees of initial favor- ability toward Person X. In Chapter b the former arrangement did produce an initially more favorable attitude as might be expected. In general, however, the affirmation of important values and denial of unimportant values appear to be equivalent in the attitude formation stage (Edwards & Ostrom, 1970), In terms of Heider's (1958) consistency model, both initial attitudes were "balanced." m the important condition; likeable Person X favors values which the S thinks are important (+++); while in the unimportant condition, likeable Person X does not favor ideas which the S thinks are unimportant (+--)• Recent extensions of balance theory (Rosenberg, 1968) have been concerned with various modes of resolving different patterns of unbalanced cognitions. The present data suggest another extention involving different qualities of consistent patterns. The +++ arrangement seems to be more resistant to change than the arrangement. Rosenberg (1968) argued that certain unbalanced structures i. e., those which lead to a state of gain are less susceptable to cognitive reorganization than others. It may also be the case that balanced structures vary in their hedonistic 156 character. It could be argued that +++ is generally more satisfying than 4— and therefore less vulnerable to new information. Also, attitude change by way of consistency attainment would occur to the extent that Ss attributed unimportant values to Person X in a positive direction. These possibilities certainly warrant further investigation. In addition, as noted in an earlier chapter, experiments need to be conducted whose designs allow investigations of situations where the consistency and value bonding approaches lead to opposing predictions. Another possible interpretation of the present findings was suggested by the analysis of value similarity data derived from the attribution and importance ratings, Ss who saw themselves as most similar to Person X in terms of their feelings about the values were least affected by the negative informa­ tion about X. This may reflect an extended form of ego-involvement, i, e., negative information about a person similar to oneself in important ways is resisted because it threatens the self-concept. These briefly outlined suggestions do not exhaust the research possibilities implied by the cognitive bonding model. They do indicate how much can be learned by exploring a single idea in detail. At the beginning of this work it was observed that, outside the laboratory, attitude change is difficult to accomplish. The continuing program of studies deriving from the cognitive-bonding model will contribute to our knowledge of the origins of persuasion resistance, how it can be overcome, and how it can be maintained. APPENDIX A Experimental materials referred to in Chapter 2

158 159

NAME_____ CUSS RANK AGE______SEX______

PLEASE DO NOT OPEN THIS BOOKLET UNTIL INSTRUCTED TO DO SO. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT EVERYONE EEGIN AT THE SALE TIME. 160

INTRODUCTION

This experiment deals with the way in which people put together and integrate information about other persons. Whether through personal contact or indirectly, we are con­ stantly gaining knowledge about the characteristics of specific individuals. For example, a friend may inform us that a mutual acquaintance is "artistic," or a political advertisement might claim that a particular candidate has "integrity." One purpose of this experiment is to study this process of impression formation. In addition to forming impressions on the basis of sometimes limited information, we are often required to make judgments about how other people might feel regarding a given event or idea. For example, someone may ask us how we think another person feels about capital punishment or about a change in this country's foreign policy. On the basis of our knowledge of a person's characteristics, we are indeed able to make such judgments. Another purpose of this experiment is to investigate this ability to make predictions about other people's feelings and actions. In this experiment you will receive some information describing an individual in terms of several personality characteristics. On the basis of this information, you will be able to form an impression of what this person is like and to discuss this impression in writing. Then you will read a list of ideas and describe in writing your expectations of how the person feels and acts with regard to each idea. To illustrate the method, an example taken from a previous experiment is provided on the next page. 161

In this case, a person was described as having these traits: strict lonely solemn materialistic On the basis of this information, the following paragraph was composed: "This person is probably materially successful, but at the cost of being a social outcast. He or she is an efficient worker, but would be hard to get along with. This person may be a Scrooge type with a tough exterior but a soft heart," This paragraph illustrates one of your tasks in this experiment. The second task is to relate ah impression to some general ideas. An example <*f this is given below: The ideas that were to be related to the person described above were: 1, Public acknowledgement of one's errors. 2, Listening to classical music, 3, Pursuing sensual pleasure. Being in good health. An example of the kind of relationship drawn between the person and the ideas: "I don't think this is the type of person that would acknowledge errors publically, but would keep them bottled up. Idea is particularly appropriate to the person because classical music often sets a solemn mood and is a good way for lonely people to pass the time. This person would definitely not seek sensual pleasure as this would go against strict moral codes and would not produce material benefits. This person would no doubt be in pretty good health by living on a frugal but well-balanced diet," 162

This concludes the orientation section of the experiment. Please clear your mind of any thoughts of the example person and ideas as these are irrelevant to what follows. On the next page you will receive information about a particular individual. i?or convenience, this person will be designated Person X. Please turn the page. 16^

Personality description- Person X is: friendly open-minded interesting inexperienced warm-hearted

On the basis of these traits, form an overall impression of Person X, and then write a brief paragraph in the spaoe below describing this impression. 164

Wext you will read a list of ideas which you are to relate to Person X. To be able to predict another person's feelings about various ideas requires sen­ sitivity and understanding, and indicates a capacity for experiencing meaningful relations with others, host college students have these qualities. Since Person X's feelings about each idea are known, we will be able to compare your responses with Person X's actual feelings and determine your accuracy. How well you do on this task depends entirely on your willingness to devote careful thought to the way in which Person X might be related to each idea. Since a person might be related in several ways to each idea, list as many good- ways as you can think of. Host people are able to do this very well if they are conscientious while thinking and writing. In the past, however, a few people have looked upon this as a useloea assignment and did not do well at all. Yet, later, when they realized the full importance of the task to themselves and to this research, they were then able to do as well as everyone else. What we are asking is your cooperation in helping this experiment and finding out for yourself the upper limits of your own thoroughness. It is important that we obtah your maximum performance on this task. If you do not work to the best of your ability, the experiment and your participation in it will be worthless. On the other hand, if you do your best in searching for sources of relatedness between Person X and the ideas, you will be helping this project and spending your time on something really worthwhile. 165

Next you will read a list of ideas which you are to relate to Person. X. Past research both here at Ohio State and elsewhere has shown that most people can do an adequate job on this task mainly through guesswork. To be able to predict another person's feelings and actions with regard to various ideas is very common and does not require any special sensitivity and understanding or ability to experience meaningful relationships with others. Since Person X's feelings about these ideas have not been measured, we will not be able to determine the accuracy of your responses. In addition, it should be made clear that what you write will not tell us anything about your own personality or intelligence, but only how people in general respond. What we are asking is your cooperation in reading through the ideas and noting down the first thing that comes to mind. The point we are trying to make is that it is necessary for our purposes that you not go into any great detail in describing the relationship between Person X and the ideas. Try to say something about each idea, but to make a detailed listing of your thoughts would not be appropriate or worthwhile. 166

The general ideas to which you are to relate your impression of Person X are: 1. Keeping promises 2. Being neat and clean 4 3. Having many good friends A* World peace 5. All human beings having equal rights Below write a brief paragraph describing the relationship you perceive between your impression of Person X and each*of these ideas. 16?

Using the scales next to the ideas, indicate how strongly Person X would favor or oppose each idea. Circle one number in each line. oppose favor strongly strongly

Keeping promises -3 -2 0 1 2 3 Being neat and clean -3 -2 0 1 2 3 Having many good friends -3 -2 0 1 2 3 World peace -3 -2 0 1 2 3 All human beings having -3 -2 o 1 2 3 equal rights

Indicate on the scales below how important or unimportant each idea is to you personally. very very unimportant important Keeping promises -3 -2 o 1 2 3 Being neat and clean -3 -2 0 1 2 3 Having many good friends -3 -2 0 1 2 3 World peace -3 -2 0 1 2 3 All human beings having -3 -2 0 1 2 3 equal rights 168

The general ideas to which you are to relate your impression of person X are: 1. Personal responsibility for decisions 2. Doing the kind of work you want to do regardless of the rewards 3* Change and variety; having new kinds of experience« Protecting personal property 5. Racial and ethnic tolerance Below write a brief paragraph describing the relationship you perceive between your impression of Person X and each of these ideas. 169

Using the scales next to the ideas, indicate how strongly Person X would favor or oppose each idea. Circle one number in each line. oppose favor strongly strongly Personal responsibility for -3 -2 -1 0 2 3 decisions

Doing the kind of work you want -3 -2 -1 0 2 3 to do regardless of the rewards

Change and variety; having new -3 -2 -1 0 2 3 kinds of experience

Protecting personal property -3 -2 -1 0 2 3 Racial and ebhnic tolerance -3 -2 -1 0 2 3

Indicate on the scales below how important or unimportant each idea is to you personally.

very very unimportant important Persoial responsibility for -3 -2 0 2 3 decisions

Doing the kind of work you want -3 -2 0 2 3 to do regardless of the rewards

Change and variety; having new -3 —2 0 2 3 kinds of experience

Protecting personal property -3 -2 0 2 3 Racial and ethnic tolerance -3 -2 0 2 3 170

The general ideas to which you are to relate your impression of Person X are:

1 , Adherence to church doctrine

2, Having childlike wonder and respect

3, Involvement in the personal affairs of others

Being like others in general; having the same interests

5. Doing everything in moderation

Below write a brief paragraph describing the relationship you perceive between your impression of Person X and each of these ideas. 171

Using the scales next to the ideas, indicate how strongly

Person X would favor or oppose each idea. Circle one number in each line. oppose favor strongly strongly Adherence to church doctrine -3 -2 0 1 2 3 Having childlike wonder and -3 -2 0 1 2 3 respect

Involvement in the personal -3 -2 0 2 3 affairs of others

Being like others in general; -3 -2 0 2 3 having the same interests

Doing everything in moderation -3 -2 0 2 3

Indicate on the scales below how important or unimportant each idea is to you personally.

very very unimportant important Adherence to church doctrine -3 -2 -1 0 2 3 Having childlike wonder and -3 -2 -1 0 2 3 respect

Involvement in the personal -3 -2 -1 0 2 3 affairs of others

Deing like others in general; -3 -2 -1 0 2 3 having the same interests

Doing everything in moderation -3 -2 -1 0 2 3 172

The general ideas to which you are to relate your

impression of Person X are:

1. having power and authori y over people

2. Explaining outer space

3* Living for oneself

Having information that very few other people have

5. Keeping one's last will and testament up-to-date

Below write a brief paragraph describing the relationship you perceive between your impression of Person X and each of these ideas. 173

Using the scales next to the ideas, indicate how strongly Person X would favor or oppose each idea. Circle one number in each line. oppose favor strongly strongly -3 -2 —1 0 2 3 people

Explaining outer space -3 -2 -1 0 2 3 Living for oneself -3 -2 -1 0 2 3 Having information that very -3 -2 -1 0 2 3 few other people have

Keeping one's last will and -3 -2 0 2 3 testament up-to-date

Indicate on the scales below how important or unimportant each idea is to you personally.

very very unimportant important Having power and authority over -3 -2 people

Explaining outer space -3 -2 0 2 3 Living for oneself -3 —2 0 2 3 Having information that very -3 -2 0 2 3 few other people have Keeping one's last will and -3 -2 testament up-to-date 174

Summarize your feelings toward Person X by placing a checkmark next to one of the labels given below:

Generally speaking, my feelings toward Person X are:

HIGHLY UNFAVORABLE

CONSIDERABLY UNFAVORABLE

MODERATELY UNFAVORABLE

SLIGHTLY UNFAVORABLE

SLIGHTLY FAVORABLE

MODERATELY FAVORABLE

CONSIDERABLY FAVORABLE

HIGHLY FAVORABLE 175

So far you have been dealing with a fairly limited set of information. We are able to provide you with additional information about Person X. The traits which you read earlier are only part of Person X's known characteristics. The remaining traits are given on the next page. After reading these traits and thinking about them in terms of the earlier information, write a paragraph giving your impressions based on all of the information. 176

Additional traits of Person X- Person X is: showy careless inattentive untrustworthy conforming

Write descriptive paragraph below: 177

Indicate how certain you are that Person X has or does not have each of the traits listed below. Make your response by circling one of the numbers, 0 - 10, on the scale to the right of each trait. If you are very certain that Person X does not have the trait, mark near the left end of the scale; if you are uncertain, mark near the center; if you are certain that X has the trait, mark near the right end of the scale.

very certain very certain trait absent uncertain trait present

✓ methodical 0 1 2 3 4 5 O 7 8 9 10 withdrawing 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 iO phony 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 3 9 10 dependable 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 unobservant 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 naive 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 truthful 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 compulsive 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 shy 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 subtle 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 greedy 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 productive 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 malicious 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 convincing 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 humorous 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 foolish 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 skillful 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 irresponsible© 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 178

Please answer the following questions* Where appropriate, respond by placing a checkmark between the slashes, e.g., / / A 1. At one point in this experiment you were asked to describe some relationships between your impression of Person X and some general ideas. Frankly, how important to you personally was it for you to try to do your best on this task?

/ / / / / /_____L____ / of no of great importance importance 2. Krw much time and effort did you actually spend in relating Person X to the ideas? I— L L L L L / very very little much 3. Hbw much effort do you think was expected of you on the paragraph relating Person X to the ideas? //////// very very little much In general, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with what you wrote in that paragraph? / / / /____ L____ L____ L___ ! very very dissatisfied satisfied 5. What effect did relating the ideas to Person X have on your impression of this person? iiiiiii/ no effect considerable at all effect 6. What do you think was the purpose of relating Person X to the ideas? 179

7. You received two sets of information about Person X, In general, how likeable or dislikeable was the first set of traits? L., . /___L___L_____ L____L____L—J very very dislikeable likeable 8. How likeable or dislikeable was the second set? /- / / /_____L____/.. /____/ very very dislikeable likeable 9. What do you think was the purpose of presenting Perots. X's traits in two sets?

10. Please list below any and all other thoughts that occurred to you during the course of your participa­ tion today. Positive, negative, and even irrelevant comments are welcome. Your complete and frank answers will greatly contribute to the success of your participation in this experiment. APPENDIX B Experimental materials referred to in Chapter 3

180 181

NAME______CLASS RANK AGE______SEX______

PLEASE DO NOT OPEN THIS BOOKLET

UNTIL INSTRUCTED TO DO SO 182

INTRODUCTION

This experiment deals with the way in which people put together and integrate information about other persons. Whether through personal contact or indirectly, we are con­ stantly gaining knowledge about the characteristics of various individuals, for example, a friend may inform us that a mutual acquaintance is "artistic,* or a political advertisement might claim that a particular candidate has "integrity." One purpose of this experiment is to study this process of impression formation. In addition to forming impressions on the basis of sometimes limited information, we are often required to make judgments about how other people might feel regarding a given idea or event. For example, someone may ask us how we think another person feels about capital punishment or about a change in this country's foreign policy. On the basis of our knowledge of a person's characteristics, we are indeed able to make such judgments. Another purpose of this experiment is to investigate this ability to make predictions about other people's feelings and actions. In this experiment you will receive some information describing an individual in terms of several personality characteristics. The traits are not self-descriptions, but are descriptions given by people who know the person well. On the basis of this information, we expect that you will be able to form an impression of what this person is like and to discuss this impression in writing. In addition, you will be given a list of ideas and we expect that you will be able to discuss in writing your predictions about how the person feels and acts with regard to each idea. To illustrate the method, an example taken from a previous experiment is provided on the next page. 183 In this case, a person was described as having these traits: strict lonely solemn materialistic On the basis of this information, the following paragraph was composed: "This person is probably materially successful, but at the cost of being a social outcast. He or she is an efficient worker, but would be hard to get along with. The person may be a Scrooge type with a tough exterior but a soft heart after all," This sample paragraph illustrates one of your taBks in this experiment. Of course, you may or may not agree with the example, but it shows the type of paragraph that could be written. Your second task is to relate an impression to some general ideas. An example of this task is given below. The ideas that were to be related to the person described above were: 1, Public acknowledgment of one's errors. 2, Listening to classical music. 3* Pursuing sensual pleasure. Being in good health. The following paragraph was written describing the relation­ ship between the person and these ideas: "I don't think this is the type of person that would acknowledge errors publically, but would keep them bottled up. Idea #2 is particularly appropriate to the person because classical music often sets a solemn mood and is a good way for lonely people to pass the time. This person would definitely not seek sensual pleasure as this would go against strict moral codes and would not produce material benefits. This person would no doubt be in pretty good health by living on a frugal but well- balanced diet." Again, you may or may not agree with this example, but it does serve to illustrate your second task. Please go on to the next page. 184

This concludes the introduction and orientation section of the experiment. At this point try to clear your mind of any thoughts of the example person and ideas as these details are irrelevant to what follows. On the next page you will receive information about a specific individual. For convenience, this person will be called Person X. Please turn the page. 185

Personality description- Person X is: friendly open-minded interesting inexperienced warm-hearted On the basis of these traits, form an impression of Person X, and then write a brief paragraph in the space below describing this impression. The general Ideas to which you are to relate your impression of Person X are: 1. Keeping promises* 2. All human beings having equal rights. Below write a brief paragraph describing the relation­ ship you perceive between your impression of Person X and each of these ideas. 187

Using the scales next to the ideas, indicate how strongly Person X would favor or oppose each idea* Circle one number in each line.

oppose favor strongly strongly Keeping promises -3-2-10123

All human beings having equal -3-2-10123 rights

Indicate on the Beales below how important or unimportant each idea is to you personally.

very very unimportant important Keeping promises -3-2-10123

All human beings having equal -3-2-10123 rights 188

The general ideas to which you are to relate your impression of Person X are:

1. Doing the kind of work you want to do regardless of the rewards,

2, Getting along with different kinds of people.

Below write a brief paragraph describing the relation­ ship you perceive between your impression of Person X and each of these ideas. 189

Using the scales next to the ideas, indicate how strongly Person X would favor or oppose each idea. Circle one number in each line.

oppose favor strongly strong-1 y Doing the kind of work you want -3 -2 -1 to do regardless of the rewards

Getting along with different -3 -2 -1 kinds of people

Indicate on the scales below how important or unimportant each idea is to you personally.

very very unimportant important Doing the kind of work you want -3-2-1012 3 to do regardless of the rewards

Getting along with different -3 -2 -1 kinds of people 190

The general ideas to which you are to relate your impression of Person X are:

1. Having a good family life,

2. Education,

Below write a brief paragraph describing the relation­ ship you perceive between your impression of Person X and each of these ideas. 191

Using the scales next to the ideas, indicate how strongly Person X would favor or oppose each idea. Circle one number in each line. oppose favor strongly strongly Having a good family life -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3

Education -3 -2 -1

Indicate on the scales below how important or unimportant each idea is to you personally. very very unimportant important Having a good family life -3-2-10123

Education -3-2-10123 192

The general ideas to which you are to relate your impression of Person X are: 1, World peace. 2* Having many good friends. Eelow write a brief paragraph describing the relation­ ship you perceive between your impression of Person X and each of these ideas. 193

Using the scales next to the ideas, indicate how strongly Person X would favor or oppose each idea. Circle one number in each line,

oppose favor strongly strongly

World peace -3 -2 - 1 0 1 2 3

Having many good friends -3 -2 - 1 0 1 2 3

Indicate on the scales below how important or unimportant each idea is to you personally.

very very unimportant important

World peace -3-2-10123

Having many good friends -3-2-10123 194

The general ideas to which you are to relate your impression of Person X are: 1. Keeping promises 2. All human beings having equal rights. 3. Doing the kind of work you want to do regardless of the rewards. 4. Getting along with different kinds of people. Below write a brief paragraph describing the relation­ ship you perceive between your impression of Person X and each of these ideas. 195

Using the scales next to the ideas, indicate how strongly Person X would favor or oppose each idea. Circle one number in each line,

oppose fever strongly strongly Keeping promises -3-2-10123 All human beings having -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 equal rights Doing the kind of work you want -3-2-1012 3 to do regardless of the rewards Getting along with different -3-2-10123 kinds of people

Indicate on the scales below how Important or unimportant each idea is to you personally,

very very unimportant important Keeping promises _3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 All human beings having -3-2-10123 equal rights Doing the kind of work you want -3-2-10123 to do regardless of the rewards Getting along with different -3-2-10123 kinds of people 196

The general ideas to which you are to relate your impression of Person X are: 1. Having a good family life. 2. Education. 3* World peace. Having many good friends. Below write a brief paragraph describing the relation­ ship you perceive between your impression of Person X and each of these ideas. 197

Using the scales next to the ideas, indicate how strongly Person X would favor or oppose each idea. Circle one number in each line.

oppose favor strongly strongly

Having a good family life -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 Education -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 World peace -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 Having many good friends -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3

Indicate on the scales below how important or unimportant each idea is to you personally.

very very unimportant important

Having a good family life - 3 - 2-1012 3

Education - 3 - 2-1012 3

World peace - 3 - 2-1012 3 Having many good friends -3-2-1012 3 198

The general ideas to which you are to relate your impression of Person X are: 1. Keeping promises, 2. All human beings having equal rights. 3. Doing the kind of work you want to do regardless of the rewards. Getting along with different kinds of people. 5. Having a good family life. 6. Education. 7. World peace. 8* Having many good friends. Below write a brief paragraph describing the relation­ ship you perceive between your impression of Person X and each of these ideas. 199 Using the scales next to the ideas, indicate ^ow strongly Person X would favor or oppose each idea. Circle one number in each line.

oppose favor strongly strongly

Keeping promises -3 -2 n 1 0 2 3 All human beingshaving -3 -2 -1 0 2 3 equal rights

Doing the kind of work you want -3 -2 -1 0 2 3 to do regardless of the rewards

Getting along with different -3 -2 -1 0 2 3 kinds of people

Having a good family life -3 -2 -1 0 2 3 Education -3 -2 -1 0 2 3 World peace -3 -2 -1 0 2 3 Having many good friends -3 -2 -1 0 2 3

Indicate on the scales below how important or unimportant each idea is to you personally.

very very unimportant important

Keeping promises -3 -2 -1 0 2 3 All human beings having -3 -2 —1 0 2 3 equal rights

Doing the kind of work you want -3 -2 -1 0 2 3 to do'regardless of the'rewards

Getting along with different -3 -2 -1 0 2 3 kinds of people

Having a good family life -3 -2 1 0 2 3 Education -3 -2 -1 0 2 3 World peace -3 -2 -1 0 2 3 Having many good friends -3 -2 —1 0 2 3 200

The general ideas to which you are to relate your impression of Person X are: 1. Keeping one's last will and testament up-to-date. 2. Responsibility of the society for individual behavior. Below write a brief paragraph describing the relation­ ship you perceive between your impression of Person X and each of these ideas. 201

Using the scales next to the ideas, indicate how strongly Person X would favor or oppose each idea. Circle one number in each line.

oppose favor strongly strongly Keeping one's last will and -3 -2 -1 testament up-to-date

Responsibility of the society -3 -2 -1 for individual behavior

Indicate on the scales below how important or unimportant each idea is to you personally.

very very unimportant important Keeping one's last will and -3 -2 -1 testament up-to-date

Responsibility of the society - 3 - 2-10123 for individual behavior 202

The general ideas to which you are to relate your impression of Person X are: 1* Having information that very few other people have, 2, The whole world being one family. Below write a brief paragraph describing the relation­ ship you perceive between your impression of Person X and each of these ideas. 203

Using the scales next to the ideas, indicate how strongly Person X would favor or oppose each idea. Circle one number in each line. oppose favor strongly strongly Having information that very “3 “2 -1 few other people have

The whole world being one -3 -2 -1 family

Indicate on the scales below how important or unimportant each idea is to you personally.

very very unimportant important Having information that very -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 few other people have

The whole world being one - 3 - 2-10123 family 204

The general ideas to which you are to relate your impression of Person X are: 1, People in other nations accepting our principles and standards. 2. People honoring their ancestors. Below write a brief paragraph describing the relation­ ship you perceive between your impression of Person X and each of these ideas. 205

Using the scales next to the ideas, indicate how strongly Person X would favor or oppose each idea. Circle one number in each line. oppose favor strongly strongly People in other nations accept- -3 -2 -10 12 3 ing our principles and standards

People honoring their ancestors -3 -2 - 1 0 1 2 3

Indicate on the scales below how important or unimportant each idea is to you personally. very very unimportant important People in other nations accept- -3-2-10123 ing our principles and standards

People honoring their ancestors -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 206 The general ideas to which you are to relate your impression of Person X are: 1. A place for everything and everything in its place. 2* Living for oneself. Below write a brief paragraph describing the relation­ ship you perceive between your impression of Person X and each of these ideas. 207

Using the scales next to the ideas, indicate how strongly Person X would favor or oppose each idea. Circle one number in each line. oppose favor strongly strongly A .place for everything and -3 -2 -1 everything in its place

Living for oneself -3 -2 -1

Indicate on the scales below how important or unimportant each idea is to you personally.

very very unimportant important A place for everything and -3-2-10123 everything in its place

Living for oneself -3 -2 -1 The general ideas to which you are to relate your impression of Person X are: 1. Keeping one's last will and testament up-to-date# 2# Responsibility of the society for individual behavior. 3# Having information that very few other people have. The whole world being one family. Eelow write a brief paragraph describing the relation­ ship you perceive between your impression of Person X and each of these ideas. 209 Using the scales next to the ideas, indicate how strongly Person X would favor or oppose each idea. Circle one number in each line. oppose favor strongly strongly Keeping one's last will and -3-2-10123 testament up-to-date Hesponsibility of the society -3-2-10123 for individual behavior Having information that very -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 few other people have The whole world being one -3 -2-10123 family

Indicate on the scales below how important or unimportant each idea is to you personally, very very unimportant important Keeping one's last will and -3-2-10123 testament up-to-date Responsibility of the society -3-2-10123 for individual behavior Having information that very -3-2-10123 few other people have The whole world being one -3-2-10123 family 210

The general ideas to which you are to relate your impression of Person X are:

1* People in other countries accepting our principles and standards•

2. People honoring their ancestors, 3. A place for everything and everything in its place. A. Living for oneself. Lelow write a brief paragraph describing the relation­ ship you perceive between your impression of Person X and each of these ideas. Using the scales next to the ideas, indicate how strongly Person X would favor or oppose each idea. Circle one number in each line.

oppose favor •strongly strongly

People in other nations accept- -3-2-10123 ing our principles and standards People honoring their ancestors -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3

A place for everything and -3-2-10123 everything in its place

Living for oneself -3-2-10123

Indicate on the scales below how important or unimportant each idea is to you personally.

very very unimportant important People in other nations accept- -3-2-10123 ing our principles and standards People honoring their ancestors -3-2-10123 A place for everything and -3-2-10123 everything in its place Living for oneself -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 212

The general ideas to which you are to relate your impression of Person X are: 1. Keeping one’s last will and testament up-to-date. 2. Kesponsibility of the society for individual behavior. 3. Having information that very few other people have. 4. The whole world being one family. 5. People in other nations accepting our principles and standards. 6. People honoring their ancestors. 7. A place for everything and everything in its place. G, Living for oneself. Eelow write a brief paragraph describing the relation­ ship you perceive between your impression of Person X and each of these ideas. 213 Using the scales next to the ideas, indicate how strongly Person X would favor or oppose each idea. Circle one number in each line.

oppose favor strongly strongly

Keeping one's last will and -3 -2 2 3 testament up-to-date

Eesponsibility of the society -3 -2 2 3 for individual behavior

Having information that very -3 -2 2 3 few other peopio have

The whole world being one -3 -2 2 3 family

People in other nations accept- -3 -2 2 3 ing our principles and standards

People honoring their ancestors -3 -2 0 2 3 A place for everything and -3 -2 0 2 3 everything in its place Living for oneself -3 -2 -

Indicate on the scales below how important or unimportant each idea is to you personally.

very very unimportant important Keeping one's last will and -3 -2 0 2 3 testament up-to-date

Eesponsibility of the society -3 -2 0 2 3 for individual behavior

Having information that very -3 -2 0 2 3 few other people have

The whole world being one -3 -2 0 2 3 family

People in other nations accept- -3 -2 0 2 3 ing our principles and standards

People honoring their ancestors -3 -2 0 2 3 A place for everything and -3 -2 0 2 3 everything in its place Living for oneself -3 -2 214

Summarize your feelings toward Person X by placing a checkmark next to one of the labels given below:

In gneral, my feelings toward Person X are:

HIGHLY UNFAVORABLE

CONSIDERABLY UNFAVORABLE

MODERATELY UNFAVORABLE

SLIGHTLY UNFAVORABLE

SLIGHTLY FAVORABLE

MODERATELY FAVORABLE

CONSIDERABLY FAVORABLE

HIGHLY FAVORABLE 215

So far you have been dealing with a fairly limited set of information. We are able to provide you with additional information about Person X. The traits which you read earlier are only part of Person X's known characteristics. The remaining traits are given on the next page. After reading these traits and thinking about them in terms of the earlier information, write a paragraph giving your impressions based on all of the information. Additional traits of Person X,

Person X is: unpoised nervous incompetent passive untidy

Write paragraph below. 217

Indicate how certain you are that Person X has or does not have each of the traits listed below, hake your response by circling one the numbers, 0-10, on the scale to the right of each trait. If you are very certain that Person X does not have the trait, mark near the left end of the scale; if you are uncertain, mark near the center; if you are very certain that X does have the trait, mark near the right end.

very certain very certain trait absent uncertain trait present

methodical 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 withdrawing 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 dishonest 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 dependable 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 unobservant 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 naive 0 1 2 3 Ur 5 6 7 8 9 10 truthful 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 compulsive 0 1 2 3 Ur 5 6 7 8 9 10 ordinary 0 1 2 3 Ur 5 6 7 8 9 10 subtle 0 1 2 3 U 5 6 7 8 9 10 conceited 0 1 2 3 u 5 6 7 8 9 10 productive 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 malicious 0 1 2 3 Ur 5 6 7 8 9 10 convincing 0 1 2 3 Ur 5 6 7 8 9 10 humorous 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 foolish 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 skillful 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 irresponsible 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Please review your responses to make sure you have circled one and only one number in each line. 218 Please answer all of the following questions. Where appropritate, respond by placing a checkmark between the slashes, e . g . , / J / .

1. At one point in this experiment you were asked to describe some relationships between your impression of Person X and some general ideas. How much time and effort did you actually spend in relating Person X to the ideas?

/ J /_____/ / ■/ / / very very little much 2. What effect did relating the ideas have on your feelings about Person X? L_____L_____L_____L_____L____/ ...... / , - / made me made me like X less no effect like X more 3. What do you think was the purpose of relating Person X to the ideas?

4. You received two sets of information about Person X. In general, how likeable or dislikeable was the first set of traits? L_____L____/ / / / / -/ very very dislikeable likeable 5. How likeable or dislikeable was the second set? I _____L____/_____/- / / / / very very dislikeable likeable 6. How well do you think the two sets went together? Were they consistent or inconsistent? L_____L____/ ... . /____/ / / V very very inconsistent consistent 7. Which of the two sets of information counts more in your present feelings about person X, or do they count about equally? / /- / / / L— L— J first set about second set counts more equal counts more 219 Please list below any and all other thoughts that occurred to you during the course of your participation today. Positive, negative, and even irrelevant comments are welcome. Your complete and frank answers will greatly contribute to the success of your participation in this experiment. Thank you. APPENDIX C Experimental materials referred to in Chapter 4

220 221

NAME______

CLASS BANK

AGE______

SEX______

PLEASE DO NOT OPEN THIS BOOKLET UNTIL INSTRUCTED TO

DO SO. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT EVERYONE BEGIN AT THE

SAME TIME. INTRODUCTION 222

This is a study on how people go about forming attitudes toward other people that they know very little about. One purpose of this study is to establish a new way of describing a total personality accurately and concisely. The method is as follows: Several people who are familiar with the person to be described select personality traits which they think are descriptive of the person. As a set these descriptive traits represent a simple but comprehensive summary of the individual's personality. In this study you will receive information about a person and then you will outline in a few words your impressions of that person. Another purpose of this study is to examine how people relate their attitudes toward other individuals to different kinds of general ideas. After outlining your impression of the described person, you will read a list of such ideas. Then you will write a brief paragraph relating your impression of the person to each idea. In order to acquaint you with the procedures, you will be given some practice starting on the next page. Be very thoughtful in making your evaluation of the person and in relating the impression to the ideas.

In this experiment follow these steps: 1) Head the traits carefully. 2) Form a general impression of what the person is like and describe this impression in a brief paragraph. 3) Read the ideas and think carefully how each may be related to the person and then describe these relationships in a paragraph. 223

Practice Person This person is: honorable clean sympathetic On the basis of these traits, form an overall impression of this person, and write a brief paragraph describing this impression. To give you an idea of the kind of paragraph that would be appropriate, a sample is provided. "This is the type of person with whom you would like to have a close association. This person would be desirable as a companion; fellow worker and neighbor. You could go to this person and get comforting and helpful advice." Now, in the space below, describe your own impression of this person.

Below are presented four general ideas. Keeping in mind your impression of the person described above, indicate how this impression is related to each idea. 1. Having one's family approve of one's views. 2. Woman being submissive to man. 3. Working with people rather than things. 4. Adherence to church doctrine. To give you a notion of how impressions of other people can be related to these kinds of ideas, a sample is provided. "I would say that this person would be sensitive to the feelings of others and would want his family and friends to approve of his views. As for -,/2, I do not think that the person would favor women being submissive to men as this is not very honor­ able. This person probably does prefer working with people rather that things. Finally, I feel that this person would adhere to church doctrine, but not to an extreme degree.* Now, in the space below, describe the relationships you see between this person and each idea. 2 Zk Practice Person This person is: underhanded vulgar belligerant On the basis of these traits* forin an overall impression of this person, and write a brief paragraph describing this impression* To give you an idea of the kind of paragraph that would be appropriate, a sample is provided* "This person would be highly undesirable to do business with* This is the aggressive and coercive type of person who would do anything to get his own way regardless of the feelings of others, I definitely would not like this person." Now, in the space below, describe your own impression of this person.

Below are presented four general ideas. Keeping in mind your impression of the person described above, indicate how this impression is related to each idea. 1. having one's family approve of one's views. 2. Woman being submissive to man. 3. Working with people rather than things. A. Adherence to church doctrine. To give you a notion of how impressions of other people can be related to these kinds of ideas, a sample is provided. "This person does not care one way or the other about how his family feels about him. A person with these traits would favor woman being submissive to man unless the person was a woman and she would feel just the opposite. The person enjoys working with people so he can push them around. The person would not adhere to church doctrine except in a hypocritical way.11 Now, in the space below, describe the relationships you see between this person and each idea. 225

This concludes the practice section. Next you will receive information about another person.

This new individual will be called Person X. 226

Personality description: Person X is: honest interesting mature conforming reliable On the basis of these five traits, form an overall impression of Person X, and then write a brief para­ graph in the space below describing this impression* 227

Personality description: Person X is: friendly open-minded intelligent inexperienced warm-hearted On the basis of these five traits, form an overall impression of Person X, and then write a brief para­ graph in the space below describing this impression. 228

The general ideas to which you are to relate your impression of Person X are: 1. Being neat and clean. 2. Keeping promises. 3. Having a good family life. Explaining oneself clearly. Below write a brief paragraph describing the relationship you perceive between your impression of X and each of these ideas. 229

Using the scales next to the ideas, indicate how strongly Person X would favor or oppose each idea. Circle one number in each line. oppose favor s trongly s trongly

1. Being neat and clean. -3- -2 -1 0 1 2 3 2. Keeping promises. -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3

3. Having a good family life. -3 —2 -1 0 1 2 3 k. Explaining oneself clearly. -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 230

The general ideas to which you are to relate your impression of Person X are:

1. Keeping up with child rearing trends,

2, The whole world being one family, 3. Explaining outer space,

4, Possession of wealth.

Below write a brief paragraph describing the relationship you perceive between your impression of X and each of these ideas. 231

Using the scales next to the ideas, indicate how strongly

Person X would favor or oppose each idea. Circle one number in each line. favor strongly strongly 1. Keeping up with child -3-2-10123 rearing trends.

2. The whole world being -3-2-10123 one family,

3# Explaining outer space. -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 k* Possession of wealth. -3-2-10123 232

Summarize your feelings toward Person X by placing a checkmark next to one of the labels given below:

Generally speaking, my feelings toward Person X are:

HIGHLY UNFAVORABLE

CONSIDERABLY UNFAVORABLE

MODERATELY UNFAVORABLE

SLIGHTLY UNFAVORABLE

SLIGHTLY FAVORABLE

MODERATELY FAVORABLE

CONSIDERABLY FAVORABLE

HIGHLY FAVORAELE 233

We are able to provide you with additional information about Person X. The traits which you read earlier are only part of Person X fs known characteristics. The remaining traits are given on the next page. After reading these traits and thinking about them in terms of the earlier information, write a paragraph giving your impressions based on all of the traits. Additional traits of Person X: friendly open-minded inexperienced warm-hearted good-humored

Write descriptive paragraph below- Additional traits of ;»erson X: frank idealistic scientific meditative inoffensive Write descriptive paragraph fcelow- 236

Additional traits of Person X: meticulous unsophisticated hesitant lonely restless Write descriptive paragraph below- Additional traits of Person X: hard-headed suspicious wasteful inattentive reckless Write descriptive paragraph below- 238

Additional traits of Person X: narrow-minded conceited untrustworthy- loud-mouthed discourteous

Write descriptive paragraph below- 239

Additional traits of Person X: honest mature conforming thoughtful good-natured Write descriptive paragraph below- 240

Additional traits of Person X: obedient candid philosophical reserved proud

Write descriptive paragraph below 24l

Additional traits of Person X: mathematical superstitious passive lonesome mediocre Write descriptive paragraph below- Additional traits of Person X: showy incompetent unagreeable unpoised careless Write descriptive paragraph below- 243

Additional traits of Person X: ill-tempered insincere obnoxious bragging deceitful Write descriptive paragraph below- 244

Indicate how certain you are that Person X has or does not have each of the traits listed below. Make your response by circling one of the numbers* 0-10, on the scale to the right of each trait. If you are very certain that Person X does not have the trait, mark near the left end of the scale; if you are uncertain, mark near the center; if you are certain that X has the trait, mark near the right end of the scale.

very certain very certain trait absent uncertain trait present methodical 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 3 9 10 withdrawing 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 3 9 iO phony 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 3 9 10 dependable 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 unobservant 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 naive 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 truthful 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 compulsive 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 shy 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 subtle 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 greedy 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 productive 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 malicious 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 convincing 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 humorous 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 foolish 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 skillful 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 irresponslbleO 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 2k5

Please answer these questions as concisely as possible. Both positive and negative comments are welcome.

1. What do you think was the general purpose of this study?

2. What effect did the practice persons have on your evaluation of Person X? Did the practice help or hinder your thinking about Person X?

3. In general, how important to you personally were the ideas which you related to Person X? (circle one): very important, fairly important, fairly unimportant, very unimportant, ahat effect, if any, did relating the ideas have on your impression of Person X?

You received two sets of information about Person X. How well did these two sets go together? Explain.

5. Which of the two sets counts more in your present feelings about Person X, or do they count about equally?

6, Please list any and all other thoughts that occurred to you during the course of your participation today. Your complete and frank answers will greatly contribute to the success of your participation in this study. APPENDIX D

Analysis summaries and tables of means

referred to in the text

246 247

Table 1 a. Mean initial attitude as a function of value importance (I) and relatedness (R), and task motivation- Chapter 2* High Motivation Low Motivation Important Unimportant Important Unimportant Related 7.2 6*4 6.6 6.6 Unrelated 6*8 7*2 6,3 6,8 *Note:- Range of possible scores was 1 (highly favorable) to 8 (highly unfavorable)• N * 10 in all cells.

b. Analysis summary of initial attitude scores as a function of value importance (I) and related­ ness (R), and task motivation (M)

Source df MS F E< I 1 .013 .012 .913 R 1 .113 .107 .745 M 1 2.112 2.009 .161 IR 1 3.612 3.436 .068

IM 1 1,012 .963 .330 RM 1 .313 .297 .587 IRM 1 .612 .582 .448

error 72 1.051 Table 2 Analysis of variance summary of post-discrepancy attitude as a function of value importance (I) and relatedness (B), and task motivation (M)-Chapter 2 Source df MS F I 1 .030 .281 .598

B .081 .764 .385 M 1 1.044 9.887 .002

IB 1 .253 2.397 .126 IM 1 .021 .200 .656

BM 1 .017 .165 .686 -=}■ CO 0 IBM 1 .325 3.079 • error 72 .106 249 Table 3 a. Analysis of variance summary of post-discrepancy attitude as a function of value importance (I) and relatedness (R), in the low motivation condition-Chapter 2

Source df MS F £< I 1 .050 .474 .496

R 1 .087 .813 .373 IR 1 .576 5.413 .026 error 36 .105 b. Reanalysis covarying out initial attitude

Source df MSF E< I 1 .074 .707 .408 co c^- R 1 .081 .768 .

IR 1 .495 4.711 .037 error 35 .105 c. Adjusted cell means for post-discrepancy attitude with initial attitude covaried out. Important Unimportant Related 3*85 3*54 Unrelated 3*53 3*6? 250

Table 4 Multivariate analysis of variance summary of belief certainty as a function of favorability groups (0), value importance (I) and relatedness (R) and task motivation (M)-Chapter 2

Source df MS P E< Between Subjects I 1 10.512 1.918 .170

R 1 .035 .00 6 .937 M 1 2.939 .536 .466 IR 1 1,013 .185 .669 IM 1 6.422 1.172 .283

RM 1 3.472 .633 .429 IRM 1 8.450 1.543 .218 error 72 5.481 Within Subjects G Multivariate test (P = 20.433; d£ 5,68; £ <.001) df ijs P SDF linear 1 743.150 13.317 .001 ,011 quadratic 1 292.494 22.553 .001 .393 cubic 1 56.248 1.850 .178 -.177 quartic 1 1424.011 59.777 .001 -.622 quintic 1 736.002 38.145 .001 -.558 IG Multivariate test {F *s .436; d£ 5,68; 2. < .822)

linear 1 31.500 .564 .455 .549 quadratic 1 2.143 .165 .686 -.501

cubic 1 11.674 .384 .538 -.323 quartic 1 8.257 .347 .558 -.338 quintic 1 17.976 .932 .338 -.523 Table 4 (continued) EG Multivariate test (£ * .824; df 5*68; £ < .537) df MS F £< SDFC linear 1 21.131 .379 .540 .608 quadratic 1 18.859 1.454 .232 -.953 cubic 1 6.847 .225 .637 .420 quartic 1 2.857 .120 .730 .072 quintic 1 5.272 .273 .603 .416 MG Multivariate test (F = 3.406; df 5 ,6 8 ; £ < .008) linear 1 684.598 12,267 .001 .960 quadratic 1 1.101 .085 .772 -.415 cubic 1 .321 .011 .918 .183 quartic 1 110.716 4.648 .034 -.451 quintic 1 16.003 .829 .3 66 -.013

IRG Multivariate test (F =3.043; df 51,68; £<.015) linear 1 128.411 2.301 .134 .761 quadratic 1 61.334 4.729 .033 -.792 cubic 1 71.121 2.339 .131 -.221 quartic 1 70.715 2.969 .089 .384 quintic 1 6.717 .348 .557 .235

IMG Multivariate test (P=.3^3J &£ 5*68; J? <•885) linear 1 9.447 .169 .682 .032 quadratic 1 15.238 1.175 .282 .712 cubic 1 .007 .000 .988 -.005 quartic 1 7.778 .327 .570 -.360 quintic 1 9.172 .475 .493 .519 Table 4 (continued) HMG Multivariate test (P= 1.223; df 5,68; p<.308) df M'S F p<~ SDFC linear 1 2.151 .339 .845 .057 quadratic 1 21.488 1.657 .202 .422 cubic 1 21.007 .691 .409 .345 quartic 1 .179 .007 .931 .020 quintic 1 83.057 4.305 .042 .820 IRMG Multivariate test (_F= 2.411; df 5 ,6 8 ; p <.045> linear 1 158.457 2.839 .096 .673 quadratic 1 31.763 2.449 .122 -.676 cubic 1 17.921 .589 .445 -.110 quartic 1 .088 .004 .952 .054 quintic 1 106.895 5.540 .021 -.549 error** linear 72 55.828 quadratic 72 12.978 cubic 72 30.402 quartic 72 23.808 quintic 72 19.291 ■^Standardized discriminant function coefficients ** MS error differed slightly for each effeot. These numbers are averages over the five effects. Table 5 a. Analysis of variance summary of post-discrepancy attitude as a function of value importance (I) and number (N) - Chapter 3

Source df MS F £< I 1 .022 .139 .710 N (linear) 1 .392 2.517 .115 N (quadratic) 1 .040 .254 .615 IN(linear) 1 .404 2.596 .110

IN(quadratic) 1 .045 .288 .592 error 114 .157 b. BeanaDysis covarying out initial attitude

Source df MS F £< I 1 .015 .116 .73^ N (linear) 1 .861 6.606 .011

N (quadratic) 1 .046 .357 .551 IN(linear) 1 .353 2.706 .103 IN(quadratic) 1 .002 .012 .913 error 113 .130 c. Adjusted cell means for post-discrepancy attitude with initial attitude covaried out Number of Values 2 4 8 Important 4.03 4.10 4.36 Unimportant 4.13 4.10 4.19 254 Table 6 Multivariate analysis of variance summary of belief certainty as a function of favorability groups (G), value importance (I) and number (N) - Chapter 3 Source df MS F p< Between Subjects

I 1 2.089 .522 .472 N‘ 2 .278 .069 .933

IN 2 .973 .243 .785 error 114 4.005 ;hin Subjects G Multivariate test (F = 46.575; df 5.110; £ <.001) df MS I £< SDFC# linear 1 2977.349 47.178 .001 .683 quadratic 1 322.507 17.072 .001 .027 cubic 1 4374.859 139.300 .001 .908 quartic 1 58.407 3.285 .073 -.038 quintic 1 22,073 .908 .343 -.053 IG Multivariate test {£ ^.398; &f 5»H0; £ <.849) df m. F £< SDFC linear 1 4OIO .000 .990 .127 quadratic 1 17.919 .949 .332 -.777 cubic 1 .794 .025 .874 .159 quartic 1 2.800 - .157 .692 .132 quintic 1 18.850 .775 .380 -.739 Table 6 (continued) NG Multivariate test Root 1 - 2 (F = .815; df 10,220; £ <.615) Root 2 - 2 (F = ,82**; df **,110; £ <.513)

df MS F £< SDFC linear 2 85.227 1.350 .263 .567 quadratic 2 6,008 .318 .728 .192 cubic 2 27.2**0 .867 .423 -.506

quartic 2 8.933 .502 • 606 -.**62 quintic 2 36.7^9 1.511 .225 .347 ING Multivariate test Root 1 - 2 (F = 1.315 ; df 10,220 £ <. 223) Root 2 - 2 (I * 1.307 ; df 5,110 ; £ <•272)

df MS P £<, SDFC linear 2 87 1.386 .254 .*>57 quadratic 2 27.212 l.****l • 2**1 -.403

cubic 2 23.514 .7**9 .475 .218 quartic 2 29.265 1.646 .197 .501 quintic 2 26.332 1.083 .342 -.527 ERROR** df MS

linear 11** 63.115 quadratic 114 18.886

cubic 11** 31.583 quartic 11** 17.80? quintic 11** 2**. 315 Standardized discriminant function coefficients for Root 1 - 2 MS error differed slightly for each effect* These numbers are averages over the five effects. 256 Table 7 a. Initial attitude as a function of value importance, degree of discrepancy, and stimulus replications-Chapter 4* Replication 1

Degree of Discrepancy 0 1 2 3 4 Important 7,1 6,2 6,1 7,0 6,8 Unimportant 6.5 5.2 6.9 7.0 6.1 Replication 2 Number of Values 0 1 2 3 4 Important 7.2 7*4 7.4 7.1 7*2 Unimportant 5*6 7*1 6.7 6.8 7.2 *Note:- A high score indicates a more favorable attitude. Range was 1-8, all n's » 20. b. Analysis summary of initial attitude scores as a function of stimulus replications (R), value importance (I), and degree of discrepancy (D)

irce df MS I £<

R 1 11.520 6.681 . 0 1 1

I 1 9.680 5.613 .019

D 4 1.530 .887 .473 -a- 'A CM

HI 1 .980 .568 .

RD 4 5.695 3.302 .012 ID 4 2.030 1.177 .322 RID 4 2.455 1.424 .228 error 180 1.724 Table 8 a. Analysis summary of post-discrepancy attitude as a function of stimulus replications (B), value importance (I), and degree of discrepancy (D). Orthogonal comparisons - Chapter 4,

Source df MS F E< H 1 .870 5.986 .015

I 1 .951 6.543 .011 D (linear) 1 19.29^ 132.768 .001 D (quadratic) 1 .005 .036 .850 D (cubic) 1 .511 3.518 .062 D (quartic) 1 .026 .180 .672 RI 1 .008 ' .054 .817 ED (linear) 1 .474 3.262 .073 ED (quadratic) 1 .053 .362 .548 ED (cubic) 1 .195 1.344 .248 ED (quartic) 1 .015 .103 .749 ID (linear) 1 .067 .460 .499 ID(quadratic) 1 .462 3.181 .076

ID (cubic) 1 .142 .987 .324 ID (quartic) 1 1.225 8.424 .004

BID (linear) 1 .021 .146 .703 BID(quadratic) 1 ,024 .164 .686

BID (cubic) 1 .329 2.267 .134 BID (quartic) 1 .102 .702 .403 Error 180 .145 258 Table 8 (continued) b, Reanalysis covarying out initial attitude

Source df MS P E< R 1 1.392 10.289 .002

I 1 .515 3.808 .053 D (linear) 1 20.401 150.824 .001

D (quadratic) 1 .009 .063 .802 D (cubic) 1 .696 5.148 .024

D (quartic) 1 .032 .235 .629 RI 1 .000 .001 .978

RD (linear) 1 .553 4.085 .045 RD (quadratic) 1 .126 .932 .336 RD (cubic) 1 .009 •066 .797 RD (quartic) 1 .037 .273 .602 ID (linear) 1 .172 1.268 .262

ID (quadratic) 1 .281 2.075 .151 ID (cubic) 1 .157 1.164 .282 ID (quartic) 1 1.091 8 .O63 .005 RID (linear) 1 .003 .019 .891 RID(quadratic) 1 .049 .361 .549 RID (cubic) 1 .181 1.337 .249 RID (quartic) 1 .230 1.698 .194

Error 179 .135 c* Adjusted cell means for post-discrepancy with initial attitude covaried out. 0 1 2 3 4 Important 4.81 4.71 4.20 4.21 4.04 Unimportant 4.70 4.61 4.42 3.87 3.83 259 Table 9 Multivariate analysis of variance summary of belief certainty as a function of favorability groups (G), stimulus replications (R), value importance (I), and degree of discrepancy (D) - Chapter 4

Source df MS F £< Between Subjects R 1 5.500 1.466 .227 I 1 .233 .062 .803 D 4 20.900 5.571 .001 HI 1 .257 .068 .794 RD 4 9.^69 2.524 .043 ID 4 2.950 .786 .535 RID 4 2.112 .563 .690 Error 180 3.752 lin Subjects G Multivariate test (P = 65.449; df 5,176; £ <,001) df MS P E< SDFC* linear 1 18952.055 299.825 .001 .973 quadratic 1 1.393 .070 .792 -.004 cubic 1 139.506 5.540 .020 .104 quartic 1 102.871 5.654 .018 .153 quintic 1 491.474- 25.643 .001 .262 EG Multivariate test (P = 7.163; df 5,176; jg <.001) df MS I £< SDFC linear 1 255.958 4.049 .046 .349 quadratic 1 378.299 19.037 .001 -.710 cubic 1 144.019 5.719 .018 -.225 quartic 1 175.371 9.640 .002 .363 quintic 1 38.611 2.015 .157 -.413 260 Table 9 (continued) IG Multivariate test (F = 2.010; df 5» 176; £ <.079) df MS F £< SDFC linear 1 560.397 8.866 .003 .888 quadratic 1 30.771 1.458 .215 .380 cubic 1 14.762 .586 .445 -.087 quartic 1 .330 .018 .893 .166 quintic 1 .580 .030 .862 .005 DG Multivariate tests Root 1 - 4 (F = 11.760; df 20,585; £ <.001) Root 2 - 4 (F = 7.377; df 12,488; £ <.001) Root 3 - 4 (F = 5.954; df 6,354; £ <.001) Root 4 - 4 (F = .413; df 2 ,178; £ <.662) df MS F p< SDFC SDFC SDFC linear “5 2285-510 36.157 .001 7B73 7445 7172 quadratic 4 248.452 12.503 .001 .143 -.717 - cubic 4 248.597 9.872 .001 -.058 .113 quartic 4 207.547 11.408 .001 -.276 .478 - quintic 4 65.237 3.404 .010 -.222 -.061 - RIG Multivariate test (F =.663; df 5» 176; £ <.652) df MS F £< SDFC linear 1 8.016 .127 .722 .154 quadratic i 3.067 .154 .695 .119 cubic 1 6.806 .270 .604 -.224 quartic 1 32.254 1.773 .185 .721 quintic 1 27.580 1.439 .232 .631 RDG Multivariate tests Root 1 - 4 (F = 1.567; df 2 0 ,585; £ <.055) Root 2 - 4 (F =s 1.570; df 12,488; £ <.097) Root 3 - 4 (F *= 1.658; df 6,354; £ <.130) Root 4 - 4 (F - .835; df 2,178; £ <.436) Table 9 (continued) df MS F SDFC SDFC SDFC linear “4 148.715 2.353 .056 .437 .908 .022 quadratic 4 24.908 1.253 .290 -.392 .175 .798 cubic 4 11.254 .447 .775 -.164 .257 -.328 quartic 4 32.265 1.774 .136 .382 -.285 .781

quintic 4 30.652 1.599 .176 -.747 .204 .298 IDG Multivariate tests Root 1 - 4 (F'*= 1.773; df 20,585; £ <.020) Root 2 - 4 (F = 1.082; df 12,488; £ <.373) Root 3 - 4 (F = .470; df 6,354; £ <.831) Root 4- 4 (F « .007; df 2 ,178; £ <.993)

df MS F £< SDFC linear 4 231.312 3.659 .007 .766 quadratic 4 47.203 2.375 .054 -.616 cubic 4 24.832 .986 .417 -.132 quartic 4 17.604 .968 .427 -.207 quintic 4 30.939 1.614 .173 .078 RIDG Multivariate tests Root 1 - 4 (F = 1.154; df 20,585; £ <.290) Root 2 - 4 (F = .760; df 12,488; £ <.692) Root 3 - 4 (F - .512; df 6,354; £ <•799) Root. 4 - 4 (F = •312; df 2,178; £ <.932) df MS F SDFC linear ”4 39.558 .326 Ms • 166 quadratic 4 7.287 .367 .832 .016 cubic ~4 36.949 1.467 .214 -.228 quartic 4 46.132 2.536 .042 .838 quintic 4 17.112 .893 .469 - .508 Error df MS linear l!5o 63.212 quadraticl80 17.885 cubic 180 25.182 quartic 180 18.193 quintic 180 19.164 ■^Standardized discriminant function coefficients for the first and other significant roots. BEFERENCES

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