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Wednesday 18, June 1:30-4:30Pm Wednesday 18, June 1:30-4:30pm: Parallel Session I Symposium: The Seventeenth Century Origins of Absolute Space and Time Like many metaphysical doctrines of the seventeenth century, the concepts of absolute space and time served both an important scientific function and also fostered vigorous and productive philosophical exchange. The preeminent instances of these dual roles are, respectively, Newton's Principia and the Clarke-Leibniz Correspondence. Consequently these texts have been the main focus for early modern scholars of space and time. The papers in this symposium, while recognizing the centrality of these texts, aim in a number of specific ways to broaden and enrich our understanding of 'the absolutes' in seventeenth century natural philosophy of space and time. First, several of the papers (Dunlop, Gorham, Slowik) investigate anticipations of the Newtonian absolutes in authors known to Newton, especially Gassendi, Barrow, and the Cambridge Platonists, and explore crucial but lesser known Newtonian texts such as the unpublished tract, De Gravitatione. The concern in these papers is not only with the influence on Newton, but also with the intrinsic nature and justification of the particular forms of absolute space and time proposed in the work of these influential authors. A second major theme of the papers (Dunlop, Futch, Gorham) is the epistemic or methodological status of absolute space and time. A major issue for Newton, and for his contemporary and subsequent critics, was the relation between the absolutes and their 'sensible measures' (bodies and motions). This symposium will show how this epistemic concern was at work in the philosophical precursors of Newton, as well as in the development of Leibniz's alternative to absolute space and time. Third, several of the papers (Dunlop, Futch, Gorham) examine the symmetry, or similarity, between absolute space and absolute time, which was a common preoccupation in seventeenth century treatments. While many -- such as Locke -- saw deep analogies between space and time, others -- such as Descartes -- conceived of them as importantly different. The symposium explores the complex role played by considerations of symmetry in arguments both for and against the existence of absolute space and time. Fourth, all of the papers aim to shed new light on the perennial relationalist-substantivalist debate. Slowik and Futch concentrate, respectively, on the original champions in the debate, Newton and Leibniz. But rather than enjoin the debate itself, each paper presents a novel reading of the metaphysical presuppositions of the opposing positions, which clarifies what is ultimately at stake. Dunlop and Gorham offer distinctive explanations for notable asymmetries in Newton's treatment of absolute space vs. absolute time. Dunlop illuminates Newton's approach to the ontology and measurement of space and time by contrasting his conception of geometrical practice with that of his teacher, Isaac Barrow, while Gorham argues that early modern conceptions of absolute space (but not absolute time) have their origin in updated versions of traditional thought experiments involving God's absolute power of annihilation. Analogical Reasoning in Precursors of Absolute Time: Gassendi and Barrow Geoffrey Gorham (St. Olaf College and Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science) In a recent overview of early modern metaphysics, Nicholas Jolley observes in passing that “philosophical theories that seem primarily tailored to space are often said to apply mutatis mutandis to the case of time”.[1] I examine this tendency to argue by analogy from space to time in two likely influences on Newton: Pierre Gassendi and Isaac Barrow. In the Aristotelian tradition, space implies body and time implies motion. However this symmetry is broken by the end of the sixteenth century: void space is widely entertained but time remains wedded to motion or change. There are many reasons for this asymmetry; but here I emphasize a factor that has been little discussed. Practically every early modern natural philosopher who treats space and time invokes – even if only to refute – traditional metaphysical arguments for endowing space with intrinsic dimensionality apart from body. For example, it is argued that God could annihilate a certain part of the world leaving a vacated space with the same dimensions as the part destroyed. However, as Leibniz recognized, such arguments simply do not extend to time: "If there were a vacuum in space one could establish its size. But if there were a vacuum in time, i.e. duration without change, it would be impossible to establish its length. ....It follows from this that we cannot refute someone who says that two successive worlds are contiguous in time. with no possible interval between them.[2] The relative paucity of empirical investigations of changeless time, as compared with local spatial vacua, is unsurprising given the inherent conceptual barrier to gauging such duration. It is in this precisely this context that analogical arguments from space to time come to the fore. Drawing on recent philosophical discussions of analogical reasoning in science, I show how time is endowed with an intrinsic dimensionality and measure isomorphic to an already articulated absolute space. This kind of reasoning is pervasive in the seventeenth century but Gassendi and Barrow are especially influential and instructive instances. The former develops an elaborate version of the traditional thought experiment for absolute space, but his case for changeless time rests primarily on the otherwise strong analogy between time and his geometrical space: both are extended, continuous, neither substance nor accident, and composed of parts. Given these similarities, Gassendi concludes, time is simply the successive counterpart of absolute space: "there exist two diffusions, extensions, or quantities, one permanent, namely place or space, and one successive, namely time or duration".[3] Similarly, in Barrow absolute time emerges parasitic on absolute space and inherits spatial features: the 'space of motion' (spatium motas), as he refers to time, is conceived as successive existence stretched out along a single spatial dimension.[4] Finally, I will argue that the Gassendi-Barrow methodology is assimilated by Newton in his early accounts of absolute space and time (e.g. De Gravitatione). From this point of view, I suggest, we can make better sense of certain otherwise puzzling features of Newton’s famous Scholium, especially his comparatively limp defense of absolute time vs. absolute space and motion. [1] 'Metaphyiscs', Cambridge Companion to Early Modern Philosophy, 128-9. [2] New Essays, II, xv. [3] Syntagma, I, ii. [4] Geometrical Lectures, I. Cambridge Platonism and Newton's Ontology of Absolute Space Edward Slowik (Winona State University and Pittsburgh Center for Philosophy of Science) This presentation will investigate the influence of Cambridge neo-Platonic concepts and arguments on Newton’s natural philosophy of space, matter, and motion, with special emphasis placed on the manner by which both Henry More and Walter Charleton may have prompted or informed Newton’s ontology of space. A number of important questions, much discussed in the recent literature on Newton, will be addressed. (1) Did Newton accept a form of “substantivalism”, which (among other things) regards space as a form of substance or entity? (2) Did Newton ground the existence of space upon an incorporeal being (i.e., God or World Spirit), as did his neo-Platonic predecessors and contemporaries? (3) What is the status of the parts or points of space in Newton’s scheme, and does his pronouncement on the identity of the points of space (in his tract, De Gravitatione) undermine his alleged substantivalism? As regards (1), A number of important reappraisals by Howard Stein and Robert DiSalle have concluded that the content and function of Newton’s concept of “absolute” space should be kept separate from the question of Newton’s commitment to substantivalism. In Stein’s contribution to The Cambridge Companion to Newton, he further contends, more controversially, that Newton does not sanction substantivalism, a view that may also be evident in various early articles by J. E. McGuire. Concerning (2), Stein rejects any significant neo- Platonic content, as did McGuire’s early work. Finally, the problem of the points of space, raised by an enigmatic discussion in the De Gravitatione, has brought about several recent reappraisals by Nerlich and Huggett concerning the viability of Newton’s espoused substantivalism. This presentation will examine the ontology of Newton’s spatial theory in order to determine the adequacy of these interpretations and arguments. As will be demonstrated, Newton’s spatial theory is not only deeply imbued in neo-Platonic speculation, contra (2), but these neo-Platonic elements likewise compromise any strong non-substantivalist interpretation, contrary to (1). Throughout our investigation, however, the specific details and subtleties of Newton’s particular brand of neo-Platonism will be contrasted with the ontologies of his contemporaries and predecessors, especially More and Charleton, and by this means a more adequate grasp of the innovations and foreword-looking aspects of his theory of space can be obtained. In short, the spatial theory that Newton advances, especially in De Gravitatione, bears much in common with a property view of space, such that space is correlated and coextensive with the existence of an immaterial
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