LOOKING AHEAD: CHARTING NEW PATHS FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN

REPORT

SCIENTIFIC COORDINATION Valeria Talbot ISPI Stefano M. Torelli ISPI, ECFR

AUTHORS Dlawer Ala’Aldeen MERI, Ziad A. Akl AL-AHRAM CENTER FOR POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC STUDIES, Francesco Bandarin UNESCO, Emna Ben Arab ITES AND UNIVERSITY OF SFAX, Rim Berahab OCP POLICY CENTER, Filippo Biondi BRUEGEL, Center for Civil Society and Democracy, Eugenio Dacrema ISPI, Galip Dalay AL SHARQ FORUM, Maria Demertzis BRUEGEL, Georges Fahmi EUI, Dina Fakoussa DGAP, Maria Fantappie ICG, Filippo Fasulo ISPI AND CESIF, Silvia Gison SAVE THE CHILDREN, Mohanad Hage Ali CARNEGIE MIDDLE EAST CENTER, Omar Kadkoy TEPAV, Andrey Kortunov RIAC, David Mariano SAVE THE CHILDREN, Karim Mezran ATLANTIC COUNCIL, Francesca Paci LA STAMPA, Noemi Pazienti SAVE THE CHILDREN, Giuseppe Provenzano UFM, Ali Rostom IFRI, Dorothée Schmid IFRI, Yousra Semmache SAVE THE CHILDREN, Musa Shteiwi CSS, Claire Spencer CHATHAM HOUSE, Simone Tagliapietra BRUEGEL AND FEEM, Valeria Talbot ISPI, Matia Toaldo ECFR, Stefano M. Torelli ISPI AND ECFR, Arturo Varvelli ISPI, Lorenzo Vidino ISPI AND GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, Mateo Villa ISPI, Maha Yahya CARNEGIE MIDDLE EAST CENTER

EDITORIAL ASSISTANT Chiara Anna Cascino ISPI

GRAPHICS AND LAYOUT Giovanni Collot, Nicolas Lozito, Federico Petroni IMERICA

SCIENTIFIC PARTNERS

Published on the occasion of the third edition of Rome MED - Mediterranean dialogues (30 November - 2 December 2017), promoted by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Afairs and International Cooperation and ISPI

5 PREFACE

ver the last three years, Rome MED – Mediterranean Dialo- gues has served as a hub for high-level initiatives and meetin- gs among policy-makers and experts from both the northern andO southern shores of the Mediterranean. The purpose is to look beyond current turmoil, rivalries and conflicts to draf a positive agenda for the Mediterranean. This new edition of the MED Report is intended as a tool to support debate in the context of Rome MED. In particular, the volume collects insights, analyses and policy recommendations from diferent perspecti- ves and countries, with a view to shedding light on current dynamics and future developments in the Mediterranean region at the political, security and socio-economic level. In this spirit, the first part of the Report highlights opportunities to be seized and provides policy options to build a beter future for the region. The second part of the Report focuses on today’s major regional challen- ges and is structured along the four main pillars of Rome MED: shared security, shared prosperity, migration, and civil society & culture. This volume is the result of the fruitful cooperation among all MED Scientific Partners. It benefited from the renewed partnership of Bruegel, the Royal Institute of International Afairs (Chatham House), the Deut- sche Gesellschaf für Auswärtige Politik (DGAP), the European Council of Foreign Relations (ECFR), the European University Institute (EUI), the In- stitut Français des Relations Internationales (IFRI), and the Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program (TTCSP) of the University of Pennsylvania. In addition, this year the scientific partnership was enlarged to include seven institutes from the southern shore of the Mediterranean: Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies; Al Sharq Forum; Carnegie Mid- dle East Center; Institut Tunisien des Etudes Stratégiques (ITES); Jordan Center for Strategic Studies (CSS); OCP Policy Center; Middle East Rese- arch Institute (MERI). This expanded collaboration has allowed to further enrich the content of the volume and provide new views and ideas. I sincerely wish to thank all the scholars and experts who contributed to this Report. Their constant support and eforts were crucial to make it possible.

Paolo Magri ISPI Executive Vice President and Director TABLE OF CONTENTS PART 1 POSITIVE TRENDS AND OPPORTUNITIES

The shrinking Caliphate 11 The Islamic State’s territorial losses in Iraq 11 Dlawer Ala’Aldeen, MERI Where the Islamic State’s losses in Syria might lead 15 Maha Yahya and Mohanad Hage Ali, Carnegie Middle East Center Political transition in Tunisia despite everything 19 Dina Fakoussa, DGAP The rise of alternative young democratic voices from within religious 23 communities Georges Fahmi, EUI New opportunities for growth: global China reaches the Middle East 27 Filippo Fasulo, ISPI and CeSIF The Mediterranean in the digital era: youth-led technological advance 33 Claire Spencer, Chatham House Going green: prospects for renewable energy in the MENA region 37 Rim Berahab, OCP Policy Center

References 42

PART 2 CHALLENGES

SHARED SECURITY

Radicalisation and counter-terrorism in the era of the Islamic State’s 48 metamorphosis Lorenzo Vidino, ISPI and George Washington University Facing new security challenges in the south of the Mediterranean 52 Ziad A. Akl, Al-Ahram Center for Political & Strategic Studies The path towards radicalisation: a Tunisian perspective 55 Emna Ben Arab, ITES and University of Sfax Through the strains: a viable roadmap for Libya? 58 Arturo Varvelli, ISPI The Gulf monarchies: disunited we stand 62 Valeria Talbot, ISPI The Kurdish conundrum 66 Stefano M. Torelli, ISPI and ECFR Afer the referendum: what’s next for the Iraqi Kurdistan? 70 Maria Fantappie, ICG A The Middle East according to Trump 74 Karim Mezran, Atlantic Council Syria: testing Russia’s long-term strategy in the Middle East 78 Andrey Kortunov, RIAC

SHARED PROSPERITY

Promoting intra-regional trade in the southern Mediterranean 84 Filippo Biondi and Maria Demertzis, Bruegel Iran’s economic reintegration: constraints and prospects 88 Dorothée Schmid and Ali Rostom, IFRI A new “vision” for diversification in Saudi Arabia 92 Eugenio Dacrema, ISPI Energy as a bridge in the eastern Mediterranean? 96 Simone Tagliapietra, Bruegel and FEEM The blue economy: a driver of shared prosperity 100 Giuseppe Provenzano, Union for the Mediterranean

MIGRATION

A migration policy for the EU: solidarity through partnerships 106 Mateo Villa, ISPI Managing flows through the central Mediterranean 110 Matia Toaldo, ECFR Syrian refugees between hospitality and integration 114 Maha Yahya, Carnegie Middle East Center From humanitarian assistance to empowerment in Jordan 118 Musa Shteiwi, CSS, University of Jordan Looking into the Turkish experience 121 Galip Dalay, Al Sharq Forum, and Omar Kadkoy, TEPAV

CIVIL SOCIETY, CULTURE AND MEDIA

Preventing a lost generation of young Syrians 126 Silvia Gison, David Mariano, Noemi Pazienti, Yousra Semmache, Save the Children Policies for the educational sector in Syria 130 CCSD Protecting cultural heritage in conflicts areas 132 Francesco Bandarin, UNESCO Channelling change: social media and its political impact 136 Francesca Paci, La Stampa

References 140 PART POSITIVE TRENDS AND OPPORTUNITIES

PHOTO: MEDITERRANEAN CURRENT FLOWS // NASA 1 1

11 The shrinking Caliphate The Islamic State’s 1 territorial losses in Iraq

Dlawer Ala’Aldeen President, MERI

The sudden fall of Mosul to the Islamic fore IS’ emergence, the state-building and State (IS) in June 2014 epitomised the nega- nation-building processes were secondary tive trend since the regime change of 2003. concerns, making the emergence of IS and It symbolised the failure of the ruling elite its occupation of Iraq’s Sunni Arab constit- to capitalise on the unprecedented interna- uency no more than consequences. tional support and ample opportunities to build a functioning, democratic, and pros- A POTENTIAL TURNING POINT perous state. The 2014 elections and government Conversely, the liberation of Mosul in change in Baghdad proved to be a major July 2017 has become the symbol of a new turning point for Iraq. Al-Maliki was re- spirit and positive trend in Iraq, beginning placed by Haidar al-Abadi who formed an in late 2015 when IS was contained through inclusive coalition government. Al-Abadi internal unity and international support. rapidly gained the support of local, region- Surviving the shock of IS, Iraq went on to al, and global actors particularly in the fight liberate most of the occupied territories. IS against IS. He reached out to the Sunni Ar- is now finally on the verge of total military abs, made eforts to mend fences with the defeat. However, sustaining this positive Kurds and promised radical reform in gov- new trend and winning the ultimate war erning and administration. on terror brings major challenges that will However, by 2014 Iraq was already require shared visions and collective eforts too weak for a rapid reversal of fortunes. to overcome. Al-Abadi did not have full backing of his own party or parliamentary faction, and STRUCTURAL WEAKNESSES his government was severely undermined Afer the regime change, the Iraqi state by Shia-Shia rivalries. He failed to imple- lost its monopoly on violence. The Iraqi ment the promised reforms or to reverse army was initially dissolved, then re-built al-Maliki’s policies against the Sunni Ar- de novo in haste and with no clear doc- abs and the Kurds. That said, Aa-Abadi’s trine. Meanwhile, several paramilitary government is now credited, by the Shias groups became operational across Iraq, and the international community, with many taking active roles in the sectarian saving Iraq’s unity by winning the military war of 2005–6 between Shiite and Sunni war against IS and regaining military con- Arabs, and in ongoing insurgencies against trol over the disputed territories which had the state. Furthermore, eight years of sec- come under the control of Kurdistan Re- -80% tarian majority rule of Prime Minister Nou- gional Government (KRG). the territorial losses ri al-Maliki (2006–14) brought Iraq to its Al-Abadi’s success, on the other hand, is of IS in Iraq and knees and expedited the growing inter- and marred by two major blows to Iraq’s state Syria between 2014 intra-community divisions. Thus, even be- integrity. The first was the expansion and and 2017 12 POSITIVE TRENDS

legitimisation of the pro-Iranian Shiite the United Nations, there were over three paramilitaries (Popular Mobilisation Forc- million displaced persons in Iraq before es, PMFs) which became permanent fix- the liberation of Nineveh, the majority of tures of Iraq’s security system. These PMFs which were IS-related and accommodated are fully funded by the state, yet their in Kurdistan. Most of these people are still components act independently and have awaiting the full restoration of their neigh- overwhelming power over the state secu- bourhoods, services, and security before rity. The second blow came afer the Iraqi they return home. Cities like Tikrit, Falluja, Kurds conducted a referendum for inde- Ramadi, and other previously IS occupied pendence on 25 September 2017, securing districts have long been liberated but con- 92.7% support. Although the referendum tinue to lay in ruins with no serious recon- was rejected by al-Abadi’s government, it struction efort in sight. nevertheless raised tensions between Erbil • Reconciliation. Over the past fourteen and Baghdad and led to political deadlock years, many reconciliation projects were and confrontation. launched by Baghdad to deal with the sectarian divide, but all failed without ex- CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES ception. In the absence of a genuine and Until recently, Iraq’s ruling elite was centrally implemented process of justice deeply engaged in self-destructive politics, and reconciliation, reintegration and coex- and the country’s sovereignty and ability istence of the various communities remains to solve its own problems remains severe- extremely difcult. Sunni Arabs’ suspicion ly undermined. However, Iraq is growing and sense of hostility towards the Shi- increasingly confident and has not lost its ite-dominated political system in Baghdad potential to recover. Military successes by and the Iran-backed PMFs, has not gone the Iraqi Army, KRG’s Peshmerga Forces, away. Similarly, the recent PMF atacks (16 and PMFs were critical in creating a stable October, 2017), led by Iranian Revolution- environment for post-IS recovery, and in ary Guard Commanders on Kurdish-ma- creating a unique opportunity for Iraq to jority towns and cities to regain control provide a successful model for post-con- over Kirkuk and other disputed territories, flict recovery. However, numerous chal- further severely undermined relations be- lenges remain. tween the Shiites and the Kurds. Without The IS war brought destruction to the regaining the trust and confidence of the physical infrastructure in the occupied ar- country’s communities, violence may erupt eas, displaced millions of people and deep- at any time when fuelled by acts of revenge, ened the divisions among communities. It disputes, or competition. also highlighted the fundamental structur- • De-radicalisation. Unfortunately, there is al weaknesses of Iraq’s governing system. plenty of ground for IS and other extremists These must be tackled urgently as a mater to remain deeply embedded in society, with of top priority. the potential to re-establish new strong- • Stabilisation and services. In the im- holds in the liberated areas where poverty, mediate term, the newly liberated areas unemployment, and corruption continue to need security, stability, and the provision drive radicalisation. For three long years, IS of public services such as water, sanita- was fully in charge of a vast population and tion, electric power, health, and educa- had opportunity to systematically radical- tion. The authorities have been partially ise generations of vulnerable children and successful in providing some of these young people. Iraq needs to approach this services in areas that were only partial- challenge from a diferent perspective, and 72% ly damaged. Hence, many people have needs to seriously invest in the rule-of-law, Iraqis supporting returned to their homes voluntarily and social justice, and economic reform, as well al-Abadi established communities. According to as revising its education system. 13

IS WITHDRAWS IN IRAQ AND SYRIA IS territorial losses from October 2015 to September 2017

Qamishli Kobane Hasaka Al-Bab Tal Abyad Manbij Mosul Shaddadi Tal Erbil October 2015 Aleppo Raqqa Afar

Kirkuk Deir al-Zour Shirqat Highest territorial Mayadin Hawija expansion of Daesh Homs Baiji Palmyra Bu Kmal Tikrit SYRIA Al-Qaim Haditha IS controlled areas Damascus IRAQ Tanf Fallujah Crossing Ramadi Rutba Baghdad IS area of influence

Qamishli Kobane Hasaka Al-Bab Tal Abyad Manbij Mosul Shaddadi Tal Erbil Aleppo Raqqa Afar

Kirkuk Deir al-Zour Shirqat Mayadin Hawija September 2017 Homs Baiji Palmyra Bu Kmal Tikrit SYRIA Al-Qaim Haditha

Damascus IRAQ IS controlled areas Tanf Fallujah Crossing Ramadi Rutba Baghdad IS area of influence

October 2015 September 2017

246,604 km2 80,867 km2

Data: Le Monde 14 POSITIVE TRENDS

Of course, international assistance is need- THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND ed, but Iraq can learn from internal success CONDITIONAL HELP stories. For example, the Kurdish author- With direct international help, Iraq pulled ities issued a general amnesty in 1991 for through the IS shock. More than three long all collaborators with Saddam’s regime, a years of relentless war were required to de- 3,356 measure that helped re-integrate them into feat IS militarily by Iraq, however it will take terrorist atacks by IS society and saved the region from further much longer to regain peace and stability. in Iraq (2016) bloodshed. In 2015, the Kurdistan Region’s Unfortunately, from 2003 to 2014, despite un- Parliament legislated to protect the cultur- limited international assistance, Iraq’s ruling al and religious identity of ethno-religious elite remained ill-focused and stuck in con- minorities in Kurdistan. It explicitly men- stant political deadlock. Regretably politics tions the Turkmens, Chaldeans, Assyrians, and the leadership did not change regardless Syriacs, Armenians, Christians, Yezidis, Sa- of existential crises and threats. It is time for bean-Mandaeans, Kaka’is, Shabak, Faylie the international community to adopt new (Shiites), Zoroastrians, and “others”. In 2017, approaches to constructively engage Iraq’s school curricula were changed by introduc- leaders and help them focus on good gover- ing religious studies (replacing the narrow- nance and the rule of law. er Islamic studies), where all religions are The international coalition has ofered taught and religious tolerance is promoted. plenty of assistance to Iraq and the Kurdis- • Revising the governing system. As per tan region militarily, economically and po- the Constitution, Iraq is designed to be an litically, with no strings atached. They have asymmetrical federal state, with sufcient lef Iraqi and KRG decision makers of their flexibility to allow for varying degrees of own accord with no pressure. Iraq requires devolution of power. However, with the further assistance to overcome its long-term exception of the Kurdistan Region, the challenges, which should be conditional on country has remained highly centralised leaders investing in inclusiveness and elim- with prominent authoritarian and sectari- inating the root-causes of terrorism. an tendencies. There is hardly any sign of Iraq is a resource-rich country with strate- institutionalisation of resource- and pow- gic geopolitical positions – too important for er-sharing. Leaders of the institutions of Europe and the rest of the world to ignore. democracy, including the parliament, gov- The failure of the state of Iraq would expose ernment, and judiciary, must engage in a the vital interests of Europe, the US, and oth- constructive debate to radically review the ers to serious consequences. Onward migra- Constitution and redefine relations be- tion, terrorism, and reduced trade are among tween the central and local governments the obvious ones. The international commu- across the provinces. Federalisation, devo- nity must engage Iraq’s various communities lution of power and systematic implemen- more constructively in the future. The leaders tation of the constitution can save Iraq, not of Iraq must take responsibility for the stabili- divide it. ty and prosperity of their own country. 15

Where the Islamic State’s losses in Syria might lead

Maha Yahya Director, Carnegie Middle East Center Mohanad Hage Ali Director of communications, Carnegie Middle East Center

As the authority of the Islamic State tion, into a mass graveyard for dissidents withers away in Syria, the fight to defeat and members of minorities, some of whom IS and bring stability to the region is far were tossed into it alive. The corruption from over. The liberation of IS-controlled of IS leadership was also a subject of re- territory presents considerable challenges ports. In one widely circulated interview, and opportunities for both the internation- a former hairdresser in Raqqa detailed the al community and for Syrians in rebuild- opulent life of the leaders’ wives. Despite ing institutions, reconstructing cities, and the IS claim to moral superiority, wasta, or mending fractured social relations. It also the use of connections to achieve desired opens a door to capitalising on the popular ends, prevailed across much of its territo- goodwill generated by the removal of IS. ries. Former residents of Raqqa and Deir Ezzor, in eastern Syria, refer to favouritism AN UNRAVELLING UTOPIA in the Islamic State’s distribution of zakat, The liberation of Raqqa and Deir Ezzor in an Islamic tax collected for the poor, as eastern Syria signalled the end of the uto- members ofen prioritise their relatives and pian claims to a caliphate announced by allied tribes in delivering cash or basic food IS in June 2014. The emergence of IS came items. In Raqqa and Deir Ezzor, the organ- with a significant cost for populations in isation’s hierarchy advantaged those from the areas under the group’s control. Their Iraq or who enjoyed Iraqi ties. To residents, experiences drove many to compare the IS this practice was reminiscent of the Syrian governance style with that of the Baathist regime’s “Qordaha connection” – the per- regime in Syria. In the minds of many, the ceived favouritism for Alawis hailing from secular but authoritarian regime of the As- the hometown of the Assad family in ap- sad family had simply been replaced by pointments to high positions in the Syrian an autocratic theocracy. In many regards state and security apparatus. it was an absolute reign of terror. Entire communities were governed at the whim AFTER IS IS GONE of local IS commanders, who arbitrarily in- This fresh collective memory of the vented laws and conducted summary ex- Islamic State’s crime, and the good will ecutions and beheadings. People’s homes should be met with inclusive governance, were confiscated and looted, while others and a swif reconstruction plan. were destroyed under the most inconse- There are existing and growing demands quential of pretexts. for these two elements in Raqqa, where These atrocities were regularly docu- IS has now been pushed out of its former mented. For example, in a widely-shared self-declared capital. The liberation of the article, a former tourist guide described city by the US-backed Syrian Democratic how IS transformed the Al-Houta Abyss Forces (SDF) has lef many questions un- near Raqqa, previously a tourist destina- answered, especially with regards to the 16 POSITIVE TRENDS

Territory under the control of IS (in km2)

300,000

250,000

200,000

150,000

100,000

50,000

0 2014 2015 2016 2017

Data: Institute for the Study of War

return of divisive politics and the chal- council, which was set up last April and lenges of reconstruction. The liberation includes Arab notables, would run the of Raqqa lef in its wake an empty city city. However, the capacity of the council that had become a wasteland of destroyed to govern has been seriously undermined buildings and unexploded ordnance. More by the gargantuan task of restoring basic than 300,000 of Raqqa’s residents fled to services, including water and electricity, badly-serviced camps for the internally the de-mining of residential areas, and the displaced located in SDF-controlled ter- general reconstruction of a severely dam- ritories. Meanwhile, the predominance aged urban area. The prospects for such re- of Kurdish flags and images of Abdullah construction are complicated by the broad- Ocalan, the imprisoned head of the Kurd- er regional political scene. Turkey views istan Workers’ Party (PKK), in Raqqa’s city the PKK, with which the SDF is closely af- centre has triggered fears of Kurdish dom- filiated, as a threat to its national security. inance over this Arab majority city. These This suggests that Ankara is likely to hin- fears have manifested themselves in local der the rebuilding of Raqqa and the con- demonstrations against Kurdish forces. solidation of SDF authority there through Residents of Raqqa’s al-Mishleb neigh- the local city council. So far, the council’s bourhood protested the delays in allowing meetings and announcements remain re- their return to their homes afer the con- stricted to statements on condemning the flict ended. Rather than resolving the con- Islamic State’s destruction, and highlight- flict peacefully, the Kurdish-led fighters ing the extent of work required. However, shot live rounds at the protestors seriously reports of a Saudi-US initiative to de-mine wounding several civilians. Following the and rebuild the city are encouraging signs regime’s take-over of Deir Ezzor, a bloody of an active international role afer the IS atack lef 75 people dead, while Iran’s cessation of conflict. It also points to a po- al-Quds force leader, Qassem Suleimani, tential opening for the active engagement was photographed among fellow Shiite of countries of the Gulf in funding the re- fighters in the city. These developments building of Syrian cities. highlight the ensuing polarisation in the In the north, where the Turkish-led Eu- 2,500-5,000 city, posing challenges for reconstruction phrates’ Shield operation ended the Islamic number of Yezidis and the return of refugees. State’s control of Jarablus and al-Bab cities, killed by IS The SDF declared that the Raqqa city a diferent political mechanism is taking 17

Where IS sympatisers tweets from* form. The opposition’s interim government is acting as a civilian authority, providing Saudi Arabia some basic services and managing aid. The Turkish government has created a mecha- nism through which the interim government 866 and local councils share revenues from the 469 atacks perpetrated Syria lucrative border crossings (Bab al-Salameh, Jarablus and al-Rai). This setup re-empow- by IS in Syria (2016) ered local governance afer their complete 507 absence under the Islamic State and Salafist Jihadist groups (HTS, Ahrar al-Sham, Jaish Iraq al-Islam). However, a more inclusive ap- proach towards the Kurdish population in 453 the region is required to mend ethnic ten- sions afer the Islamic State’s defeat. USA LOOKING TO THE FUTURE 404 The reservoir of goodwill resulting from the defeat of IS should not detract from the Egypt colossal challenges of rebuilding the state and society in Syria. This includes paying 326 close atention to the urgent needs of civil- ians in liberated areas, as well as the pros- Kuwait pects for radicalisation, particularly among children who came to adulthood in IS-con- trolled schools or camps. 300 It also means ensuring an inclusive gov- Turkey ernance model that addresses the dangers of identity politics in the wake of IS rule. This could include a focus on adminis- 203 trative and financial decentralisation and Palestinian Territories local governance, giving communities a greater say in running their own afairs. In Syria, restoring some sense of normal- 162 ity requires a willingness by the interna- Lebanon tional community to support the rebuilding of cities and societies destroyed by the con- flict and the subsequent campaign to expel 141 IS. If successful and sufciently inclusive, the Euphrates Shield region could provide UK a model for governance, reviving local councils as an alternative to authoritarian 139 central rule. There are already promising signs of the restoration of political and cul- Tunisia tural spaces to their immediate post-revo- #med2017 lution level, as local journalists and activ- a sustained debate is necessary to deprive 125 ists are returning. any future radical As the power of IS disappears, the group Islamic organisations of the means to justify * Built on a sample size of 20,000 tweets leaves behind a trail not only of destruc- their acts by employing Data: Brookings Institution tion and misery, but also of hundreds of religious justifications 18 POSITIVE TRENDS

Number of deaths from terrorist atacks in 2016

Iraq

12,186

Afghanistan

6,106

Syria

2,741

Nigeria

2,164

Somalia

1,558

Data: Global Terrorism Database

thousands of cautionary tales that have again. A sustained debate is necessary to found their way into the region’s collec- deprive any future radical Islamic organ- tive memory. An inclusive transitional isations of the means to justify their hei- justice process, in the form of public trials nous acts by employing mainstream reli- and documentation, could help raise pub- gious justifications. Without this, it is only lic pressure on governments and religious a mater of time before IS rears its ugly leaders to ensure that this will not happen head again. 19 Political transition in Tunisia 2 despite everything

Dina Fakoussa Head of the Middle East and North Africa Program, DGAP

Elite consensus and power sharing during ganisations, which are the Tunisian Union for times of division and polarisation are core Industry, Trade, and Handicrafs (UTICA), the characteristics of the Tunisian democratic Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT), and path that have proved immensely valuable. the Tunisian Union of Agriculture and Fishery For this reason the Tunisian experience is (UTAP). Thereby, opposition parties as well as rightly applauded internationally. Still it would civil society organisations were catapulted to be inaccurate and misleading to measure Tu- the decision-making level. nisia’s success story mainly by the ability of the political elite to generate consensus. Far more THE SHORTCOMINGS OF CONSENSUS important is to evaluate this peculiar model GOVERNMENT of governance in terms of its ability to imple- Had Tunisia’s consensus-based power ment direly needed reforms, particularly in the constellation fulfilled people’s expectations, social and economic realm that continues to the arrangement would seem reasonable. But rank highest on the list of people’s priorities, until today, the public has been gravely dis- and its impact on society’s perception of de- appointed. The pursuit of the interests of a mocracy as the pathway to more individual plethora of actors has complicated and ofen and societal wellbeing and advancement. blocked decision-making. As a result, unem- When the country witnessed serious inter- ployment remains persistent at 15% and in nal conflicts and polarisation reached alarm- the southern and western regions it is even ing heights in 2013, consensus was built to keep believed to be twice as high. Social inequality the transition process on track thus paving the and regional disparities have not decreased way for core milestones such as the 2014 Con- and the neglected regions remain major the- stitution and subsequent elections. In summer atres of social unrest. Consequently, there is 2016, a national unity government headed a waning trust in democracy as a system that by Youssef Chahed was endorsed by Parlia- translates into positive change. The consen- ment, replacing the legitimate government of sus arrangement is also problematic for the Habib Essid. In this case, there was again an country’s democratic evolution from a difer- elite consensus particularly between the two ent viewpoint: it has led to a blurring of the largest parliamentary factions, namely Nidaa political spectrum and the absence of clear Tounes and Ennahda, that only power sharing demarcation lines between political parties. in the form of a new national unity govern- While all decisive political actors are directly ment could prevent destabilising the country. or indirectly involved in government and gov- The Carthage agreement reached in July 2016 ernance, genuine pluralism and opposition was the peak product of these informal nego- are missing. For the development of a healthy 7 tiations between the two central players and it democratic environment that ofers discon- prime ministers have went even further, including other five oppo- tented bases viable alternatives to choose from been appointed since sition parties as well as three civil society or- based on convictions and ideology, this is no the fall of Ben Ali 20 POSITIVE TRENDS

Opinion poll: “What is the biggest economic problem facing Tunisia?” (2017)

Unemployment 44%

Economic and financial crisis 24%

Corruption 12%

Terrorism 5%

Domestic political conflicts and tensions 3%

Security (crime, terrorism and order) 2%

Violence, delinquency and vandalism 2%

Strikes and sit-ins 1%

International conflicts and tensions 1%

Other 6%

Don’t know 2%

Data: International Republican Institute (IRI)

doubt counterproductive. Equally problematic of governance that reflects the ballot box and is the fact that informal, highly personalised that more clearly divides actors into opposi- meetings, like those between Beji Caid Essebsi tion and government forces might be worth and Rachid Ghannouchi, rather than formal testing afer the general elections in 2019. This structures such as parliament and the ballot would require Tunisia’s political actors to es- box, are the basis for decision-making. Thus a pouse a new self-understanding of their polit- trade union such as the UGTT – which is de ical engagement. jure not a political decision-maker – is today First, the grand significance and respon- a de facto ruling partner. These practices are sibility of genuine opposition need to be val- detached from elections that have grown in- ued as much as exercising executive power. creasingly insignificant and annul the power Increasingly, it seems that central actors such of parliament, not to mention the repercus- as Nidaa Tounes, Ennahda, and the UGTT are sions on the legitimacy of those governing in power thirsty for the mere sake of remaining the eyes of citizens. Indeed, polls and voter relevant and bolstering their might. In light turnout in 2014 as well as registration numbers of the country’s nascent democratic process for the municipal elections suggest that many such atitudes are irresponsible. Also, the very Tunisians consider politics devoid of any sub- narrow pursuit of partisan politics needs to be stance and have lost trust in the democratic rethought and weighed against its impact on system itself. Particularly young people have the higher goal of democratic and economic turned their back on politics. Lack of pluralism progress. For example, the UGTT’s vast power also strengthens actors on the far right or lef of through its extensive countrywide reach and the spectrum. The significant rise of jihadism its ability to mobilise large segments of society among the country’s youth could also partly needs to be responsibly devised as to not par- be regarded as a consequence of this context. alyse the entire country and derail economic recovery further. The third postponement A CALL FOR AN ALTERNATIVE DEMOCRATIC of Tunisia’s first-ever municipal elections to 15.3% UNDERSTANDING BY TUNISIA’S POLITICAL Spring 2018 serves as another example of how unemployment rate ELITE the predominant power-driven atitude of in Tunisia In Tunisia, a shif to a more “classic” mode political actors is hindering fundamental de- 21

Unemployment and poverty rates in Tunisia (2015)

North-East Poverty rate Great Tunis North-East 9.1%

Great Tunis 10.3%

North-West North-West 25.7%

Centre-West 32.3% Centre-East Centre-East 8.0% Centre-West South-West 17.9%

South-East 21.5% South-West Unemployment rate

North-East 13.2%

Great Tunis 21.9%

North-West 31.6% South-East Centre-West 35.4%

Centre-East 19.4%

South-West 35.4%

South-East 41.7%

Data: Tunisian National Institute of Statistics velopments. One of the main reasons for post- ation and assembly, and the protection and ponement seems to be the non-Islamist par- advancement of human rights. Despite ongo- #med2017 ties’ fear of Ennahda’s comparative advantage ing deficiencies and partial regression, many an increase in budget support would clearly in outreach and organisation, and a very likely mechanisms through which political actors allow for more gradual victory at the local level. But local elections are and society can push to alter courses, change austerity measures that are socially acceptable indispensable in order for the abandoned and reforms and eventually claim power are al- highly underdeveloped regions with the high- ready in place but they have to be continuously est socio-economic grievances to be equipped developed and overseen to prevent setbacks. with legitimate local authority and financial An essential step to further strengthen and means to address their serious woes. expand the democratic system could be the Second, and conducive to such a renewed establishment of a constitutional court where self-understanding and reassuring for future new laws’ compliance with the principles en- and potential opposition forces, is the further shrined in the constitution are scrutinised. It amelioration and consolidation (and preven- would ofer an institutionalised platform with tion from regression) of the democratic sys- a clear mandate for checks and necessary de- tem. This needs to be prioritised by those in cision-making. power as well as by opposition forces: a system based on the principles of the devolution of THE NEED FOR DIALOGUE AND INCLUSION power, checks and balances, an independent CONTINUES judiciary, the rule of law, freedom of associ- To be clear, the country is going through a 22 POSITIVE TRENDS

historic existential phase where fundamental regime – measures bearing president Essebsi’s pillars and the orientation of society and state hallmark – are worst-practice examples. They are being negotiated, reformed or built anew. carry high potential for conflict and division. For example, issues like transitional justice, the Besides, they show troubling autocratic ten- place of religion in state and society, and the dencies that can only be counterbalanced with nature of Tunisia’s social and economic model a strong unified opposition, calling yet again need to be widely debated in a participatory for an organised, unified opposition camp. fashion. Evidently, inclusion and dialogue with other actors are core. Civil society should THE NEED FOR MORE FUNDS continue to play a significant role here. The One of the major challenges facing Tunisia establishment and continuation of expert and and too ofen constituting a major point of public fora respectively that transcend party division among the political elite that derails afliation and where themes as complicated economic reforms is the introduction of nec- as for example the desired socio-economic essary austerity measures whilst keeping the model are intensely debated are core. These social price of these measures low. The reduc- debates also need to address the feasibility tion of the government’s hefy public wage bill and timeframe for achieving a certain model, serves as an example. Tunisia’s socio-econom- and technical experts need to demonstrate in ic challenges certainly require much more than simple language the linkage between the ev- cash. But for example an increase in budget eryday life of average citizens and potential support would clearly allow for more gradual measures at the macro level. At the same time austerity measures that are socially acceptable, there has to be also an acknowledgment of the and it would enable the government to spend legitimacy of those voted into power and their money on the vital health and education sec- prerogative to take decisions. Political actors in tors as well as on infrastructure. Finally, much the driver’s seat on their part need to strike a more atention needs to be given to the regions delicate balance between politics and avoiding sufering from chronic government neglect. too polarising, antagonising measures, par- Quick social and economic wins are neces- ticularity if widespread opposition to certain sary. More targeted development cooperation measurers is evident, as was the case with that makes a qualitative diference might be transitional justice. The new Administrative one avenue. It is already a fait accompli that Reconciliation Law passed in September 2017, this continued lack of improvement or even which was highly contested and now ofers deterioration in standards of living is under- 31.3% amnesty to ofcials from the Ben Ali regime mining the entire democratisation process. A involved in corruption, as well as the most change in atitudes and commitments by the seats held by women in the Tunisian recent change in government that saw the in- international community as well as Tunisia’s Parliament clusion of two former ministers of the Ben Ali elite is therefore paramount. 23 The rise of alternative young democratic voices from 3 within religious communities

Georges Fahmi Research Fellow, EUI

Parallel to the radicalisation processes ty to build new democratic regimes in which that are under way within the diferent re- all citizens enjoy the same rights regardless ligious communities of the Middle East and of their religious afliation. In Egypt, in 2011, their increasingly confrontational paths, a segment of the Coptic youth established a new democratic views and discourses are movement to defend the political and religious being formulated among these religious com- rights of the Copts, known as the Maspero munities. Religious communities have been Youth Union (named afer the Maspero area of producing in their midst a political discourse Cairo, where Coptic youth organised sit-ins to that contradicts the main trends at play at the protest against religious discrimination). community, national and regional levels. Ex- In Syria, during the first year afer the 2011 amples include the Shia voices denouncing uprising, a group of Christians met regularly the political corruption of their community in Damascus to discuss how Christians could parties in Iraq and rejecting Iran’s interference support the revolution. They rejected the in Iraqi afairs, the Christian youth in Egypt Church leadership’s support for the regime and Syria refusing to support the authoritari- and drafed a leter insisting on freedom and an regimes in power, and the reformist voices dignity for all Syrians. Other Syrian Christians within the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and took part in the peaceful protests in other Syri- Tunisia. If these alternative voices manage to an cities, such as Aleppo and Homs. However, break the isolation in which they live and es- the rise of Islamic religious forces afer the re- tablish channels of outreach, dialogue with le- moval of the old regime in Egypt, and within gitimate voices within their own communities, the revolutionary scene in Syria, has increased and common action with other constituencies Christian concerns over their security. This within their societies, they could increase their has rendered the discourse on democracy and influence and play a positive role in future po- freedom less atractive. Nonetheless, these re- litical developments. formist Christian voices are still struggling to spread their ideas among their communities ALTERNATIVE CHRISTIAN VOICES and most of these Christian voices had to re- IN EGYPT AND SYRIA adapt their discourse to focus on humanitari- Despite the well-spread narrative that an issues rather than political reforms. In Syria, Christian minorities support authoritarian re- many Christians are involved in humanitarian gimes in the Middle East, Christians in Egypt activities for Syrians afected by the armed and Syria have reacted diferently to the wave conflict. Their Christian family names make it of Arab uprisings. While the various Church- easier for them to pass through regime check- es’ leadership perceived it as a threat to the points to deliver aid to areas under siege. Oth- 8 million Copts in Egypt, the powers they had gained through longstand- er Christian activists have lef the country, largest Christian ing relationships with the autocratic regimes, but are still engaged in civil society initiatives community in the other Christian voices saw it as an opportuni- supporting Syrian refugees abroad, for exam- Middle East 24 POSITIVE TRENDS

Timeline of Muslim Brotherhood and Ennahda

Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (MB) Ennahda in Tunisia

1928: founded by Hasan al-Banna 1981: founded with the name of Movement of the Islamic Tendency 1952: the MB backs the overthrow of the monarchy 1989: when Ben Ali comes to power, the movement 1954: first ban on the movement under Nasser is allowed to participate in local elections and chan- ges its name in Ennahda 1966: MB influencing member Sayyid Qutb is executed 1990-1992: Ennahda is banned afer its good results in the municipal elections of 1989. Its members are 2005: the Muslim Brotherhood members gain 88 arrested or exiled seats in the parliamentary elections 2011: afer Ben Ali’s fall, Ennahda is legalized and its 2012: Muhammad Mursi is elected President: the leader Rached Ghannouchi comes back to Tunisia first time in Egyptian history that a president comes from MB 2011: Ennahda gains the majority in the elections for the Constituent Assembly 2013: afer al-Sisi’s coup, MB is heavely cracked down 2014: the party participates in a coalition govern- ment with Nidaa Tounes 2016: historical change: Ennahda removes the reference to “political Islam” in favour of separating religion from politics

ple in Lebanon and Turkey. In Egypt, the Mas- tellectuals, journalists and artists. The protests pero Youth Union focuses on reporting human started by denouncing the poor public services rights violations to atract public atention to before increasing their demands to challenge the discrimination against the Coptic com- the political corruption that led to the defeat of munity. They are also helping with delivering the Iraqi military against the self-proclaimed humanitarian aid, as they did with the Coptic Islamic State in the summer of 2014. This pop- families who lef the city of Al-Arish in north- ular mobilisation was supported by some re- ern Sinai afer receiving threats from the Sinai ligious figures, including the most prominent branch of the Islamic State in February 2017. Shia religious leader Sayyid Ali al-Sistani, who asked the Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Aba- SHIA DISSIDENCE IN IRAQ di to stand against corruption and sectarian- In Iraq, Shia militias have been gaining ism, and to remove incompetent state ofcials growing influence since the ouster of Saddam regardless of their party afliation or sectarian Hussein’s Baathist regime in 2003. However, background.1 While other Iraqis share these the last few years have witnessed the rise of demands, the sectarian environment has alternative Shia voices calling for political re- hindered cooperation with youth activists forms. In the summer of 2015, Iraq witnessed a from the Kurdish and Sunni areas. Moreover, large wave of protests in Shia-dominated areas the involvement of the Shia political leader against the Shia ruling elite. The protests start- Muqtada al-Sadr in the protest movement has ed in the city of Basra, and then spread to oth- reframed its demands to focus on Sadr’s own er southern provinces to reach Tahrir square in political struggle with other Shia political forc- Baghdad a few weeks later. While some polit- es. Nonetheless, the liberation of Mosul in July 15-20% ical figures – including the communist party 2017 opened new opportunities for coopera- Kurds as part of the total population in – joined the protests, the major bulk of pro- tion between reformist voices from both Sunni Iraq testers have been non-partisan, including in- and Shia regions. For example, a group of civil 25

Christians as % of total population 2011, a group of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood youth organised a meeting in which they dis- #med2017 Lebanon cussed their ideas on the future of their move- reformist within religious communities 40% ment. They insisted on the need for a full sep- succeeded in making aration between the political activities of the their voices heard, like Ennahda in Tunisia Egypt party and all other religious and social activi- 10% ties of the movement. However, at that time, the Muslim Brotherhood leadership rejected Syria any atempt to reform the movement. 9% In Tunisia Ennahda succeeded in what the Muslim Brotherhood youth in Egypt wanted Jordan but were unable to achieve, i.e. to reform the 6% movement by drawing a clear diferentiation between its political and religious identities. Israel Afer a few years of debate within both Ennah- 2.5% da’s leadership and between the leadership and its rank-and-file members, the reformist Iraq voices won. In May 2016, Ennahda’s 10th gen- 2.5% eral assembly agreed to implement a division between the political party and the preaching Palestinian Territories activities that would practically prevent the 1.7% political party leaders from also holding se- nior positions in religious associations or even Data: CIA World Factbook from preaching in mosques. The congress fi- nal statement insisted that the party no longer society activists and intellectuals organised an belongs to the category of political Islam, but initiative called “The convoy of freedom” as rather it seeks to establish a larger coalition of a sign of solidarity with the people of Mosul. Muslim democrats that would include non-Is- The initiative included more than 300 people lamist voices as well.2 from all over Iraq who travelled to Mosul to celebrate the liberation of the city. This initia- NEW STRATEGIES FOR tive, and other similar ones, ofers an import- REFORMIST VOICES ant chance for Iraqi activists from diferent It is evident that the current turmoil in the religious and ethnic backgrounds to meet and Middle East has drastic consequences on the share ideas about the future of their country. region and its populations, but it also ofers op- Most of them agree that the sectarian political portunities that could be built on. The reform- regime has had catastrophic consequences on ist voices within religious communities are all of Iraq’s religious and ethnic communities. one such case. Some of these reformist voices They also agree that the best way to change have succeeded in implementing their ideas, this is through building a cross-sectarian alli- for example, Ennahda in Tunisia, while others ance, rather than each community seeking to are still struggling to defend their ideas, as is challenge their own political elites, as has oc- the case with reformist Shia voices in Iraq and curred in protest movements in Kurdish and the Christian democratic voices in Egypt and Shia areas. Syria. Within the current environment of re- ligious and political polarisations – examples ATTEMPTS TO REFORM THE MUSLIM being the Sunni-Shia divide in Iraq and Syria BROTHERHOOD IN TUNISIA AND EGYPT or the Muslim-Christian divide in Syria and 60% The Sunni Islamic movement in Egypt and Egypt – these democratic voices ofen have Shia as part of the Tunisia has also been witnessing the rise of litle influence. These alternative voices face total population in several reformist voices since 2011. In March well-established institutions that are protect- Iraq 26 POSITIVE TRENDS

ed by networks of interests, as is the case, for tani provides to the protesters’ demands in example, with the sectarian political regime Iraq has amplified the impact of these voic- in Iraq. Changing these established rules and es. In addition, these reformist voices need confronting the networks of interests asso- to build cross-sectarian alliances capable of ciated with them will require these reformist bringing together all those who share their voices to review their strategies. ideas regardless of their religious and ethnic The answer to this challenge is twofold: backgrounds. The recent initiative of “The first to seek support from legitimate voices convoy of freedom” to the city of Mosul in within their own religious communities, and July 2017 was a step in this direction. By re- second to establish cross-sectarian alliances. lying on legitimate voices within their own The support of Ennahda’s historical leader communities and building cross-sectarian Rached Ghannouchi has certainly facilitat- alliances, these alternative voices can solid- ed the Islamic movement shif, unlike the ify their space within their communities and case of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. compete to ensure the implementation of Likewise, the support that Sayyid Ali al-Sis- their ideas. 27 New oppportunities for growth: global China 4 reaches the Middle East

Filippo Fasulo Associate Research Fellow, ISPI and Scientific Coordinator, CESIF

When the Chinese President Xi Jinping according to its political needs. gave his famous speech in Davos last Jan- China’s government prescriptions over uary he was not only taking the lead of BRI are described in a document issued by the pro globalisation international public the National Development and Reform Com- opinion in opposition to newly elected US mission, titled “Vision and Actions on Jointly President Donald Trump’s stand for protec- Building the Silk Road Economic Belt and tionism. Indeed, he was presenting the new 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road”. Accord- Chinese way to conduct international rela- ing to it, the Middle East can be referred to tions. The leading theme revolves around the as “the place where the Belt joins the Road”, so-called “win-win cooperation”, an idea that meaning the terrestrial and maritime routes, goes along with other concepts like “shared and is therefore central to China’s strategy. development” and “community of common The so-called China-Central Asia-West Asia destiny”. This way, Xi Jinping is promoting a Economic Corridor runs from China’s Xinji- new model of economic and political relations ang province through Central Asia, reaching based on the narrative of mutual benefit. In- mainly Iran and Turkey, while the maritime terconnections among people and countries, section of the project will go past the east- and the free flow of goods and capital are at ern shores of the Arabian Peninsula before the centre of such a strategy, which has the reaching the Mediterranean Sea. potential to be a real game changer. The Mid- China’s investments channelled through dle East is highly involved within China’s new BRI do not come out of thin air, they are leap outward and the whole region is eager to rooted into deeper political and economic receive a new boost for its growth thanks to relations. On the occasion of a trip to Sau- investment from Beijing, aimed at enhancing di Arabia, Egypt and Iran that President Xi domestic infrastructures and international Jinping undertook in January 2016 – a turn- trade routes along with promoting local in- ing point for Sino-Middle Eastern relations dustrialisation. This new wave of globalisation – China’s government published its Arab with Chinese characteristics is named Belt Policy Paper, outlining its view towards the and Road Initiative (BRI), Xi Jinping’s flagship area. A key theme is to present China as a international policy. partner on a par with Arab countries, and to posit economic relations as the basis for SEIZING BRI OPPORTUNITIES mutual satisfaction according to the consid- Since 2015, China’s outward foreign di- eration that economics precedes politics. The rect investments (FDIs) overcame FDI to the proposed guidelines are based on a “1 + 2 + 3” +26% country, thanks to a stunning rise started model referring to an economic cooperation increase in Chinese trade with the in the early 2000s. As money lef China at platform that is built on energy as its core, southern Mediter- a growing pace, in 2013 Beijing proposed a infrastructure and trade as “two wings” and, ranean from 2016 new initiative to channel those investments finally, new technologies such as nuclear en- to 2017 28 POSITIVE TRENDS

China’s gap in oil production/consumption

15,000 thousands b/d

Consumption 12,000

9,000

6,000

Production 3,000

0 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016

Providers of Chinese oil (% of total Chinese oil imports)

Angola 13%

52% Russia 11% MENA countries Venezuela 4%

Colombia 3% Saudi Arabia 16% Congo 2% Oman 10% Brazil 2% Iraq 10%

Iran 9% South Sudan 2%

UAE 4% Kazakhstan 2%

Kuwait 3% Others 9%

Data: British Petroleum

ergy, aerospace and new energies as “three Corporation (CNPC),1 in 2016 China import- turns.” Therefore, economic relations are not ed about 62% of the oil it consumes; of that, only limited to trade in oil. On the opposite, 52% came from the Middle East. Similar con- their main goal is to achieve a more struc- siderations apply to natural gas as well, since tured economic partnership. its consumption is growing rapidly in China – although still accounting for only about 5% NOT ONLY ENERGY AND INFRASTRUCTURE: of its energy mix – and since about a third DIVERSIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT of the natural gas imported (which in turn New opportunities for growth are built on amounts to almost 30% of its consumption) existing economic relations, mainly trade in comes from Qatar alone. energy and goods. The relevance of energy However, China–Middle East relations are for China-Middle Eastern relations has been not only based on one-way energy trade. In 52% clearly evident since 2014, when China over- 2015, exports to Gulf countries amounted to took the US as the first destination of the €61.2 billion (UAE and Saudi Arabia topped of Chinese consumed oil comes Middle East’s oil exports. According to an the list) while exports to the southern Med- from the Middle East estimate by the China National Petroleum iterranean totalled €51.3 billion euros (with 29

CHINA’S WAY TO THE MEDITERRANEAN Proposed 21st Century Maritime Silk Road

ITALY GREECE CHINA EGYPT INDIA

DJIBUTI SRI LANKA

KENYA

INDONESIA

Chinese commitment in the Mediterranean In 2017 China opened its first overseas naval base in Djibouti 552 million $ Chinese investments in the Greek port of Piraeus China is the largest investor in the development of Egypt’s Suez Canal Corridor 11 billion $ Expected Chinese investments for the new administrative capital of Egypt 1 billion $ Chinese investment in the construction of a new industrial and technological hub near Tangiers, Morocco First 10 countries of the Mediterranean and MENA region for Chinese investments and contracts (billions of $, 2005-2016)

Saudi Arabia 30 Egypt 19

Italy 22.9 Iraq 18.5

Algeria 22.8 UAE 18.4

Iran 20.5 Turkey 13.5

France 19.4 Kuwait 7.6

Data: AEI 30 POSITIVE TRENDS

Turkey and Egypt as main destinations), an Overall trade with the countries increase over the previous year of 19% and of the Mediterranean area (2016) 23% respectively. The importance of trade in goods is highlighted by the fact that China China 186 billion $ has a significant surplus with southern Med- iterranean countries (in 2015 China imported USA 148 goods worth €8.5 billion, and exported goods worth €53.7 billion), while it is balanced with Germany 90 the Gulf countries (imports for €61.4 billion; exports for €61.2 billion euros).2 Italy 76 Against this background, the future of eco- nomic relations looks promising from many points of view. In fact, the goal is to reach a France 66 level of bilateral trade of $600 billion by the mid-2020s, and to increase China’s non-fi- UK 52 nancial investment stock in Arab markets to over $60 billion (up from $10 billion in 2013). Data: Eurostat; UNCTAD Infrastructure development is the most evident opportunity that BRI can bring to Sea and it will be strengthened through in- the Middle East. Those projects are not only vestments in ports in the southern and east- useful to connect China with Europe, but ern Mediterranean, and in the Adriatic Sea. also to boosting local infrastructure levels. The high flows in Chinese investment Projects are afoot, for example, in countries abroad are also giving new hope to other like Oman and Turkey for the creation of countries in the region. Political leaders ex- highways and railways, but also energy-re- pect cooperation with China to be instru- lated infrastructure is on the verge of receiv- mental both for diversifying and promoting ing a significant boost3 thanks to China’s industrial development. The UAE are among investment. This element might also further those who are seeking to find a new role not fuel trade and investment facilitation, by related to mere energy trade. For this rea- using local currencies for trade and creat- son, Dubai is eager to become the second ing new cooperation models. Those kinds country in the region to host a Yuan clearing of investments are very likely to be carried and setlement facility in order to become a out because they are needed to solve existing financial hub for China’s Renminbi interna- structural problems in trade in energy with tionalisation. Diversification might also be Beijing. achieved through industrialisation led by At the same time, a rise in maritime econ- Chinese companies. Saudi Arabia is certainly omy is crucial to creating new growth op- among the interested countries: it is atempt- portunities. Chinese investments in ports ing to link and pair its Vision 2030 to BRI and have a more-than-a-decade-long history, the 65 billion dollar deal, it should be noted, but recently they were stepped up dramati- includes an agreement to manufacture Chi- cally. Indeed, afer COSCO’s – China Ocean na-made drones. Indeed, manufacturing is a Shipping (Group) Company – takeover of further element that might be boosted by a 25% of the Antwerp Container Terminal in globalisation in China’s activities. Beijing is 2004, in 2015 and 2016 China completed at carrying on the promotion of cooperation in least 7 other similar operations. The Greek production capacity and equipment manu- 4 $600 bil port of Piraeus is no doubt the most relevant facturing in order to facilitate the transition lion acquisition, thanks to the purchase of a 67% of its own industry to a higher level in the the Chinese goal for trade exchange with share in the Piraeus Port Authority. Such an global value chain. Besides Saudi Arabian the MENA countries operation contains a pledged commitment drones, China is very much interested in the by 2050 to make it a major hub in the Mediterranean Middle East’s abundant labour force, low la- 31 bor cost and good education programmes, when it comes to political issues. Finally, as especially in countries like Egypt and Iran. Chinese investments increase and China’s #med2017 local presence becomes more evident, it ap- Local industrialisa- tion through industry THREE CONDITIONS FOR FOSTERING pears more and more necessary that M&As capacity cooperation GROWTH and greenfield operations are perceived as and people-to-people connections is crucial China is expanding its presence in the mutually beneficial and that local people world and in the Middle East through a stun- are involved and partake in job creation and ning increase of its investment abroad. How- the distribution of new wealth. This is a cru- ever, in order to ensure that the dream of de- cial aspect in order to realise BRI’s strategic velopment brings about real benefits, three goals. In so doing, the Middle East will end main conditions need to be fulfilled. The first up being part of a new global value chain is that China keeps investing and targeting with Chinese funds and companies play- the Middle East as a significant partner. BRI ing a significant role. Local industrialisation and China’s Arab policy paper should be a through industry capacity cooperation and guarantee that this will happen. Secondly, in people-to-people connection is therefore a order to invest China needs regional stabili- major factor to align China’s need to invest ty in the Middle East. This means that Bei- abroad and southern Mediterranean coun- jing might be ready to have a stronger voice tries’ development prospects.

33 The Mediterranean in the digital era: youth-led 5 technological advance

Claire Spencer Senior Research Fellow, Chatham House

Future growth in the Mediterranean re- report summarised the untapped potential in gion can no longer rely on the expansion of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA re- existing development models and private gion) as follows: “the digital economy is, at 4% of sectors, much less on providing limitless GDP, half of what the US is at (8%) and lagging public sector employment to meet labour behind the EU (6%). Furthermore, seizing the market needs. digital opportunity requires reacting to wider To the south of the Mediterranean, low- transformations that technology is creating in skilled industrial production is already coming the world of work. New skills are clearly needed. under threat from Asian competition and ro- An even more pressing issue is to acknowledge botics. The agricultural potential of the region how work practices are changing globally, how remains hampered by export-oriented policies new work models are emerging, how career and limits to the output for domestic markets. paterns are drifing away from the prototyp- In southern Europe, high public debt ratios ical single employer career path, and how all and austerity measures have created greater these changes are likely to afect the efciency divisions between the beneficiaries and vic- and relevance of existing practices, policies and tims of economic policy since the onset of the institutions in the MENA region.”2 Euro crisis. Unemployment among the un- der-30s across the Mediterranean still exceeds TECHNOLOGY AND A NEW PRIVATE SECTOR 35-40%, down from 60% in Greece and 56% In a region where established private sectors in Spain only four years ago.1 A new regional ofen sufer from an image of accrued advan- paradigm is needed to prepare the economies tage and “crony capitalism”, a change of public of the Mediterranean region for the global im- policy direction is required to facilitate the rise 160 million pacts of rapid technological change, resource of technologically-informed business models. people out of 350 constraints, and climate change. The choice A new type of business sector is needed to million people in the facing North Africa, the Levant and the pe- increase competition and market efciencies MENA region live ripheral regions of southern European states in the existing economy, whilst also creating in the cities is two-fold: either to embrace and invest in a new jobs for workers displaced by technolog- high-skilled “knowledge economy” to build on ical change. The shif from state-dominated the region’s untapped consumer-led growth economies is already underway for budgetary in goods, services and renewable energy, or reasons as much as from changing public ex- to scale-up the currently small number of me- pectations, including in southern Europe. dium and large private sector enterprises to Parallels with previous industrial revolu- create employment opportunities in both new tions may be exaggerated, but the disruptive and older sectors of the economy. efects of technology on multi-speed econ- 4% of GDP: Under each scenario, technology will have omies are already being felt across the wider value of digital a key role to play, as will a re-conceptualised region and into Africa. Since 2012, for exam- economy in the and devolved private sector. A recent INSEAD ple, the mobile phone all-based transportation MENA countries 34 POSITIVE TRENDS

Population under 15 years (% of total) (2016)

Iraq Palestinian Territories Yemen

40.9% 39.9% 39.9%

Syria Jordan Egypt

36.1% 35.3% 33.5%

Libya Algeria Saudi Arabia

29.6% 28.9% 28.3%

Morocco Lebanon Tunisia

27.2% 23.5% 23.5%

Kuwait Bahrain Oman

22.6% 21.4% 21.1%

Qatar UAE

15.6% 14.1%

Data: World Bank

company Careem has expanded from its ori- THE THREE VECTORS FOR CHANGE gins in Dubai to operate in 53 cities across the Youth. Much of the new activity is driv- Middle East, North Africa and South Asia; the en by the generation that has grown up with translation and editing agency Tarjama also new technologies and who by nature are more employs women across several Middle East- globally-integrated and aware than their par- ern states via online platforms in ways that ents’ generation. The under-40s also represent would not have been possible a few years ago.3 well over 75% of the populations to the south There are implications for how the Middle of the Mediterranean. In designing and devel- East has traditionally been seen4 as well as for oping new market opportunities, the majority new forms of economic interaction within and of start-ups still fail, but the success stories of- across the Mediterranean Basin. ten move faster than the ability of policy estab- 35

Youth unemployment (2016)

Oman Libya Palestinian Territories

50.8% 48.1% 41.1%

Iraq Tunisia Jordan

36.1% 35.7% 34.0%

Yemen Egypt Saudi Arabia

33.8% 33.4% 31.2%

Algeria Lebanon Morocco

26.6% 21.3% 20.6%

Kuwait UAE Bahrain

13.3% 11.5% 5.6%

Qatar

0.7%

Data: World Bank lishments to keep track. In the EU, for exam- and platform-based connections means that ple, the advent of the “Internet of Things” and many of the youth of southern Europe and the “gig” or collaborative economy has placed the MENA region have more in common with new regulatory demands on governments, in each other than with traditional economic sectors that a recent European Commission thinking and practice in their own countries, White Paper estimated could add as much as and ofen design solutions to youth-based 572 billion euros to the EU economy in coming needs that inherently cross cultural and geo- years.5 graphical borders. For now, it is mostly the The new business possibilities made avail- externally educated elites of the MENA region able by the rapid regional expansion of mobile that have established the international net- phone technology as well as via Facebook works and understand the potential of new 36 POSITIVE TRENDS

technologies who are best placed to advance These new sectors address the neglected their business models in practice, but ideas youth and consumer-oriented markets of both travel swifly across borders in an increasingly the Middle East and Africa and mesh with in- inter-connected world. formal sectors which to the south of the Med- 40% Strategic connectivity. Small and Medium iterranean already represent over 40% of for- Enterprises (SMEs) are ofen seen as the main mal economies. With regional mobile phone the share of infor- mal sector in the avenue for satisfying the region’s employment usage having increased well above global av- southern needs, but many are still stuck at the ‘small’ erages over the past decade, the emergence of Mediterranean stage of development, and struggle to scale up new online and platform business models will economies to levels at which more jobs may be created require new thinking about fiscal and admin- and sustained. New types of public-private istrative reforms to incentivise their integra- partnerships are required to create the kinds of tion into the formal economy, as well as labour enabling environments that will build future market regulations. business champions that stretch beyond na- Cities. While the challenges faced on both tional borders. New entrants to the workforce sides of the Mediterranean are diferent in na- across the Mediterranean need to be educated ture and scale, the role of cities as the nexus to acquire the skills of critical thinking, self-re- for future economic development is growing liance and flexibility, and will increasingly in importance. The spread of virtual connec- demand the kind of “e-governance” and “big tivity along with new transport links could data” methodologies being adopted interna- revive the age-old synergies for cooperation tionally for streamlined and targeted public across the Mediterranean Basin, above all in policymaking. Investment in infrastructure port cities that double as technological hubs.6 will also need to keep pace with the require- According to Arif Naqvi, CEO of the Abraaj ments of the virtual world alongside logistical Group, six cities alone already represent 40% of connections that favour greater intra-regional the GDP of the MENA region (Casablanca, Tu- and global trade. nis, Cairo, Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Riyadh) and In order to scale up and add value and jobs enjoy growth rates double that of the countries to the best new economic initiatives in the re- in which they are situated; 160 million of the gion, a beter understanding is also needed of MENA’s region’s 350 million people live in how Mediterranean economies are already be- cities.7 The Mediterranean Growth Initiative, ing incrementally restructured through formal which seeks to stimulate greater regional trade and informal economic links within the region and investment, reminds us that the combined and beyond. New investors in technology no markets of the Mediterranean Basin represent longer reflect the “north-side” dynamics of Eu- 500 million people and 10% of world GDP.8 ro-Mediterranean policy since the 1990s: pri- Too ofen, as in southern Europe, the Med- vate venture capitalists are increasing in num- iterranean is viewed as a backwater to the en- ber and scale alongside state-backed investors gines of growth situated in capital and indus- from China, India and the Gulf to make stra- trial cities further north, or to the east in the tegic investments in new markets designed to Gulf for the Arab world. The combination of link Asia and Africa across the Mediterranean. new urban hubs for growth, markets connect- #med2017 Their targets range from e-commerce, “fin- ed through virtual as well as physical means, a change of public tech” and solar energy to more traditional, but and the new mind-sets represented by the policy direction is required to facilitate under-exploited, regional consumer markets region’s youthful pioneers could well reinstate the rise of technologi- for pharmaceuticals, health care and insur- the Mediterranean as a trading and business cally-informed business models ance, inter alia. hub in its own right. 37 Going green: prospects for renewable energy 6 in the MENA region

Rim Berahab Research Assistant, OCP Policy Center

The global energy landscape is witness- countries of the Mediterranean, such as Mo- ing an important growth of renewables. rocco, Egypt, and Iran, and more moderate, yet This transition to less polluting energy sources still interesting in Gulf Cooperation Council holds important socio-economic benefits and (GCC) countries and Iraq. ofers a path of prosperity and sustainability, In 2015, renewable power generation grew in a world that is progressively preoccupied by 8 percent, reaching 45 TWh.3 The largest by climate change.1 Although the Middle East source of renewable generation was hydro- and North Africa (MENA) region is tradition- power. The share of the later amounted to 61 ally linked to conventional forms of energy percent of total renewable energy supply in such as oil and gas, renewable energy is start- selected MENA countries,4 followed by solar ing to emerge as a new transformative oppor- thermal (17 percent) and wind (16 percent).5 In tunity. Accounting for 6 percent of the world addition, renewable electricity capacity dou- total population and expecting an additional bled since 2014 and reached 1.9 GW. 213 million inhabitants by 2040,2 the MENA The most noticeable developments in 2015 region is likely to be subject to an upward came from Morocco in North Africa and pressure on energy demand. Therefore, if this Jordan in the Middle East.6 Morocco is pres- region can turn its renewable energy potential ently one of the leading countries regionally into reality, it would help alleviate this burden. in regard to installed renewable capacity for non-hydroelectricity.7 By the end of 2015, re- RENEWABLE ENERGY POTENTIAL: OVER- newable energy increased by 17%, driven by VIEW AND OUTLOOK nearly 800 MW8 of installed generation capac- +78% Renewable energy can play a key role in ity for total wind and solar power, the largest in expected renewable the Middle East and North Africa region as a the MENA region. The first phase of the Ouar- generation growth in cost-competitive substitute to conventional zazate’s NOOR solar project, launched in early the MENA region fossil fuels. Of all renewable energy carriers, 2016, and phases II and III in progress should solar energy for electricity generation has the add considerably to this capacity reaching 2 greatest potential, with costs among the low- GW by 2020.9 As for Jordan, renewable gen- est in the world and an impressive pipeline of eration tripled in 2015. This progress is driven projects. by the important deployment of onshore wind The MENA region has some of the best solar and solar photovoltaic (PV) projects such as resources in the world – with global horizontal the Tafila wind project, commissioned in 2015 irradiance values ranging from 1,600 kWH/ with a capacity of 117 MW, and the net meter- m²/y in the litoral of the Mediterranean to ing scheme that added 20 MW of distributed 1,600 – 2,600 2,600 kWH/m²/y in the desert –, low rainfall solar PV.10 kWH/m²/y and vast spaces available to install mirrors or A strong outlook is expected for the MENA the global horizontal sensors without having to move populations. region over the medium term, thanks to its irradiance value of The potential for wind is high as well in several fast-growing energy demand, excellent re- the MENA countries 38 POSITIVE TRENDS

source availability and increasing cost-efec- Primary renewable energy supply tiveness of renewables. Renewable generation in the MENA region (2016)* is thus expected to grow to 78 percent by 2021, reaching 80 TWh and the share of total power Hydropower 64.3% generation is expected to reach 5 percent. +8% This growth would be mainly driven by so- growth of renewable lar PV (8.1 GW) and wind (6 GW) particularly in power generation in the United Arab Emirates (1.6 GW), Egypt (2.9 the MENA over the last year GW), Morocco (1.7 GW) and Jordan (400 MW). Hydropower capacity and Concentrated Solar Panels (CSP) would continue to grow but to a lesser extent.11 To capitalize on this potential, massive investments in transport infrastruc- Biogas Wind ture will be required to connect solar instal- 0.3% 16.9% lations, deliver electricity to consumers and Solar Thermal Solar PV 17.5% 1.0% interconnect countries. *except biofuels Data: International Renewable Energy RENEWABLE ENERGY BENEFITS Agency (IRENA) The MENA region is undoubtedly well suited for the expansion of renewable energy gy savings. Renewables can meet the region’s +17% technologies. Their implementation holds sig- energy needs as well as generate additional growth of renewable nificant benefits: beside the security of energy export earnings, thereby increasing their in- power generation in supply, the deployment of renewables would comes. Europe could be a potential customer Morocco have positive impacts on cost competitive- given its proximity. Indeed, “in order to meet ness, energy savings, carbon dioxide emis- 15 percent of the European electricity demand, sions and employment. only less than 0.2 percent of the area suitable Renewables can play a significant role in for CSP installations in the MENA region securing access to energy. They can help al- would be required”.13 leviate the fluctuation of energy generation Renewables can help stabilize or reduce

costs since their production cost is stable, un- the CO2 level in the atmosphere. The use of like fossil fuel prices that tend to fluctuate due energy from fuel combustion, particularly in to external factors. Renewables can also help the electricity and heat generation sectors, is reduce energy import dependency, which in the largest source of greenhouse gas emission turn lowers reliance on external factors that in the atmosphere. In 2014, the MENA region may threaten the availability of supplies. accounted for 6 percent of the total CO2 emis- Renewables can be an economically via- sions and Iran and Saudi Arabia were among

ble source of energy in the long term unlike the top ten CO2 emiting countries in the fossil fuels. Even though non-renewables world.14 Consequently, the increasing use of appear cheaper, many costs, such as the en- fossil fuels will contribute to an upward trend

vironmental costs, are not reflected in their in CO2 emissions. Therefore, if MENA region consumer price, which constitute a burden countries can meet their renewable energy

both economically and socially for MENA re- targets, nearly 84 and 482 Mt of CO2 are likely gion countries in the long term.12 Indeed the to be avoided in 2020 and 2030 respectively.15 negative impact of non-renewable sources on The deployment of renewable energy can the environment requires costly adaptation also greatly contribute to job creation in a and mitigation measures. Moreover, there is a region struggling with high unemployment great potential for technology developments in rates. It could provide employment opportuni- the future that would make renewables more ties for skilled and unskilled labour in research cost-competitive. MENA’s vast potential for and development sectors, manufacturing, as- renewable energy can provide important ener- sembly, construction and maintenance. Solar 39

RENEWABLE ENERGY IN THE MENA REGION Primary renewable energy supplies (TJ), 2015

Total RE except Solar biofuels Hydropower Wind Solar PV Thermal Biogas Electricity Charcoal

Morocco 18,633 6,998 9,476 109 1,929 121 2,699 0

Algeria 2.242 523 69 49 1,601 0 0 0

Tunisia 2.386 248 0 170 1,968 0 -2 0

Egypt 58,167 49,759 5,198 154 3,035 21 -214 -2,623

Jordan 5,381 189 443 150 4,530 69 60 200

UAE 2,931 0 5 237 2,624 65 0 4,186

MENA region* 89,740 57,717 15,191 869 15,687 276 2,543 1,763

Renewable energy capacity in the Middle East and North Africa, excluding Hydro (MW), 2015

300 650 800 260 120 130 0 25 120

Algeria Egypt Morocco Tunisia Iran Jordan Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE

MENA net renewable capacity additions by technology and country (2015-21)

Other Hydropower Solar PV Wind Total GW

Other 1.9 Morocco 5% 1% 16% 36% 18%

Hydropower 4 Algeria 34% 4% 12% 21% 13%

Solar PV 8.1 Tunisia 17% 0 20% 1% 11%

Wind 4 Egypt 10% 0 11% 10% 8%

Jordan 34% 95% 41% 32% 50%

*Data available only for Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan and UAE Data: IRENA, OCP Policy Center, IEA 40 POSITIVE TRENDS

Trends in energy use, compound annual average growth rate

8% Years: 7% 1974-1984 6% 1984-1994 5% 1994-2004 4% 2004-2014 3% 2% 1% 0 -1% -2% East Asia & European Latin Middle East South Asia North Sub-Saharan Pacific Union America & & North America Africa Caribbean Africa

Data: World Development Indicators

PV would account for the largest share of jobs government engagement and allow a trans- with 41 percent by 2030, followed by wind (28 parent market. A progressive phasing out of percent) and CSP (22 percent).16 subsidies to conventional energy sources must be considered to guarantee a more level play- NEED OF REFORM ing field for renewables. This process should Renewables hold significant long-term be carried out gradually and adapted to each economic, environmental and social benefits country’s socio-economic context. An accu- compared to fossil fuels. The development rate assessment of renewable energy infra- of renewable energy technologies in MENA structure needs to be conducted to assure countries would thus ofer a valuable opportu- the adequacy of infrastructure policies with nity to diversify their economies and increase the requirement of renewable technologies energy security. However, the full deployment such as electricity penetration. Access to lower of renewables requires the adoption of appro- cost of finance would help assure a large de- priate policies and reforms at national level. ployment of renewable energy technologies. #med2017 The establishment of a favourable frame- The involvement of international financial solar energy has the greatest potential, with work to renewable energy development is institutions and commercial banks is needed costs among the lowest crucial. Mandatory targets should be set and to provide loans for the construction of new in the world and an impressive pipeline backed with energy roadmaps in order to in- projects, thus ensuring sustainable and long- of projects. form both the population and investors of term development. 41 REFERENCES

PART 1 POSITIVE TRENDS AND OPPORTUNITIES

The rise of alternative young democratic voices from within religious communities 1. Al-Sistani to al-Abadi: rebellion against the corruption and the sectarianism, 7 August 2015, full speech of Sayyid Ahmed al-Safi, the representative of al-Sayyid Ali al-Husaini al-Sistani, from htps://www.sistani.org/arabic/in-news/25147/ 2. Final statement of Ennahda 10th congress, 25 May 2016, htp://congres10.ennahdha.tn/ar/

New opportunities for growth: global China reaches the Middle East 1. Xinhua, China’s dependency on foreign oil Exceeds 60 percent, 26 January 2016, htp://www.china.org.cn/ business/2016-01/26/content_37668744.htm 2. Economic relations between Italy and the Mediterranean - 6th Annual Report, SRM, 2016. 3. Shi Ze and Yang Chenxi, China’s Diplomatic Eforts to Promote Energy and Resources Cooperation Along the “One Belt and One Road”, CIIS Report, n. 5, May 2015. 4. Tristan Kenkerdine and Han Ling, “International Capacity Cooperation—Financing China’s Export of Industrial Overcapacity”, Global Policy, 2017.

The Mediterranean in the digital era: youth-led technological advance 1. Trading Economics, Spain Youth Unemployment rate (1986-2017) htps://tradingeconomics.com/spain/ youth-unemployment-rate ; Greece Youth Unemployment Rate (1986-2017) htps://tradingeconomics.com/ greece/youth-unemployment-rate 2. B. Lanvin, E. Rodriguez-Montemayor, MENA Talent Competitiveness Index 2017, INSEAD, May 2017. 3. See Careem, htps://www.careem.com/dubai/node and htps://www.tarjama.com/ 4. World Economic Forum on the Middle East and North Africa, Embracing Disruption, 21 May 2017. 5. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Council and Social Commitee and the Commitee of the Regions, A European agenda for the collaborative economy, 2 June 2016. 6. Organisations already exploring shared experiences across regional divides include the Med Cities Network and the Rockefeller Foundation’s 100 Resilient Cities initiative. See Med Cities htp://www. medcities.org/en/presentation and Lina Liakou, Urban Lessons for a Diverse Region, 100 Resilient Cities, 10 December 2017. 7. Arif Naqvi intervention in the World Economic Forum on the Middle East and North Africa panel session on Embracing Disruption. 8. Mediterranean Growth Initiative, htps://www.mgi.online/

Going green: prospects for renewable energy in the MENA region 1. A. Z. Amin, Drivers, challenges and opportunities of the global sustainable energy transition – developments in the MENA region and Jordan, IRENA, April 2017. 2. World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision, UNDESA, 2o15. 3. Medium-Term Renewable Energy Market Report 2016, IEA, 2016. 4. Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia and United Arab Emirates. 5. IRENA database, 2017. 6. IEA, 2016. 7. L. El-Katiri, Morocco’s Green Energy Opportunity, Policy Paper 16/14, OCP Policy Center, 2016. 8. A. Z. Amin, 2017. 9. Moroccan Climate Change Policy, Ministry Delegate of the Minister of Energy, Mines, Water and Environment, March 2014. 10. IEA, 2016. 11. The data used in this paragraph is from IEA. 12. D. R. Jalilvan, Renewable energy for the Middle East and North Africa: Policies for a successful transition, Friedrich Ebert Stifung, February 2012. 13. M. O’Sullivan, T. Pregger, C. Schillings and F. Trieb, “Solar Electricity Imports from the Middle East and North Africa to Europe”, in Energy Policy, Vol. 42, 2012. 14. IEA, 2016. 15. E. Menicheti and A. El Gharras, “How can renewable energy help contribute to the development of the MENA countries”, MENARA, No. 6, July 2017. 16. Ibidem. PART CHALLENGES

PHOTO: MEDITERRANEAN CURRENT FLOWS // NASA 2 2

1 SHARED SECURITY 48 SHARED SECURITY Radicalisation and counter- 1.1 terrorism in the era of the Islamic State’s metamorphosis

Lorenzo Vidino Head of the Radicalization and International Terrorism Centre, ISPI and Director of the Program on Extremism, George Washington University

SHARED As the self-declared Islamic State slowly these areas can drastically increase or reduce SECURITY but steadily loses ground in Iraq and Syria, the chances of a regional Daesh resurgence, questions about what lies ahead are of par- and the organisation’s devotion to each region amount importance. Without clairvoyance, in terms of strategy, resources, and ideological it is clear that countless factors will influence investment varies. However, a situation where future developments, which are likely to difer Daesh invests considerable support in its afl- significantly from region to region. In the ter- iate organisations could escalate already sim- ritories previously occupied by the group in mering conflicts in several countries around Iraq and Syria it is likely that Daesh will revert the world and the group’s ability to plan atacks to what it was in its early days, some ten years from there. ago: a lethal insurgent force using tactics rang- Many Daesh operatives might also establish ing from pure terrorism to guerrilla warfare. Its clandestine networks in more politically stable priority will be to regain the territory it has lost countries in the region and engage in terrorist (something it might occasionally be able to do activities with the goal of destabilising them. in some areas) and undermine the Iraqi gov- Tunisia, like several other North African coun- ernment and the various forces it is batling in tries, is particularly vulnerable to this risk be- Syria by exploiting sectarian tensions. cause of the massive Caliphate-bound mobili- sation of its citizens. Gulf countries might also DAESH’S INCREASING DECENTRALISATION experience this blowback. In addition, Russia, Globally it is likely that, with time, Daesh the Caucasus, and various Central Asian coun- will become a more decentralised, amorphous tries are also areas of concern, especially con- organisation operating in a more asymmetric sidering the large number of foreign fighters 51 fashion. Some of its leaders and cadres might they have provided to Daesh and the prom- terrorist atacks in relocate to bordering countries, posing seri- inent role they have played on the batlefield. Europe and in the ous challenges to the security and, in some US, 2014-17 cases, the stability of the local regimes. Daesh THE TREATH TO EUROPE might also rely more on its afliates worldwide. A critical concern for counterterrorism au- The group has established ofcial provinces thorities is that Daesh members fleeing Syria (wilayat) in Libya, Afghanistan, Yemen, the and Iraq, particularly those holding European Sinai Peninsula, the North Caucasus, and East passports, will travel to Europe. While figures Asia and small groups worldwide have pledged vary, the most reliable estimates suggest that allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Many of 6,000 European residents have joined Daesh 6,000 the regions where Daesh afliates operate are in Iraq and Syria. It is clear that a number of ungoverned territories or, at best, rife with the these 6,000 will either die or be captured in Europeans that have joined Daesh in Syria conditions conducive to full-scale insurgen- Syria/Iraq, be captured while trying to leave and Iraq cies. Clearly, varying local factors in each of Syria/Iraq, or be arrested while entering Eu- 49

WHERE MOST FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN IRAQ AND SYRIA COME FROM

Russia 1,700 United Kingdom 700 Germany 700 France 1,550

Tunisia 6,000 Turkey 1,400

Lebanon Morocco 700 900 Jordan 2,000

Saudi Arabia 2,275

GEOGRAPHY OF ATTACKS IN EUROPE AND THE US (2014-2017*)

Europe: North America: North America: Europe: 63% of atacks 37% of atacks 32% of atackers 68% of atackers

Atacks % Atackers %

France 17 33% France 27 42%

United States 16 31% United States 18 28%

Germany 6 12% Germany 7 11%

United Kingdom 4 8% Belgium 5 8%

Belgium 3 6% Canada 3 5%

Canada 3 6% United Kingdom 3 5%

Denmark 1 2% Canada 1 2%

Sweden 1 2% Sweden 1 2%

Data: Homeland Security Commitee *as of August 2017 50 SHARED SECURITY

rope. However, it is also equally clear that not Atackers in Europe all will. Some will come in illegally or posing as refugees, as demonstrated by the path into Europe taken by some of the November 2015 27.3 y 73% Paris atackers. Some will return legally, ofen Average Citizens of the country 65 using their genuine European passports. age of atack atackers in Europe Detecting returning foreign fighters is only and in the US, 2014-17 one of the challenges facing European coun- terterrorism ofcials. An entirely diferent, yet 17% 97% Converts to Islam Males not less daunting challenge, is determining what to do with those identified upon return. European authorities have experienced enor- mous problems in finding appropriate legal 5% 18% tools to deal with returning foreign fighters, Refugees Returning foreign fighters being ofentimes unable to charge them with any ofence (the recent disclosure by the Home Ofce that only 54 of the 400 British foreign fighters who have returned from Syria/Iraq Central, Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (previously have been convicted of an ofence is troubling known as Jabhat al-Nusra) has quietly but but hardly unique).1 Given these difculties, surely carved out a de facto mini-state in parts the need for rehabilitation programs is par- of Syria. Furthermore, al-Qaeda in the Arabi- ticularly urgent. Yet returning foreign fighters an Peninsula (AQAP) has been experiencing are not the only threat to European security ups and downs during the ongoing Yemen linked to Daesh. A recent study by the Italian war, and while it no longer controls a sizeable Institute for International Political Studies region (as it did at some point), it is still a vi- (ISPI) and the George Washington University’s brant branch of the global organisation active- Program on Extremism showed that, of the 65 ly planning atacks against the West. There atackers who carried out the 51 atacks perpe- are also rumours of a revamped leadership trated throughout Europe and North America structure within al-Qaeda Central. While all since June 2014, only 18% were returning for- these dynamics need to be carefully assessed, eign fighters.2 The majority of the perpetrators it would be erroneous to treat al-Qaeda as ob- were individuals who, while possessing only solete. loose or no operational connections to the The counterterrorism community is cur- group, had embraced its ideology. rently debating what the relationship between This dynamic strongly suggests that, even a declining Daesh and a seemingly resurgent in the face of a complete loss of territory, the al-Qaeda is and will be. Over the last few years Daesh brand and the emotional appeal of its the competition between the two groups has declared Caliphate are unlikely to vanish any played out on a global scale. It is not currently time soon. Despite critical challenges, the or- clear whether these dynamics will continue or ganisation’s remarkable digital presence, the whether, as some have argued, the two groups, so-called virtual Caliphate, rekindles commit- having a common history, ideology and aims, ment to its cause among sympathisers world- will reconcile their diferences, work togeth- wide and prompt some to carry out terrorist er, and even merge. It is also likely that these atacks in its name. dynamics might play out in diferent ways in diferent places. Understanding and eventual- TACKLING THE GLOBAL JIHADIST ly exploiting the complex and ever-fluctuating MOVEMENT chasms within the global jihadist movement is It should be noted that various indications crucial. also point towards a resurgent al-Qaeda. De- What is clear though is that what has faced, spite its uneasy relationship with al-Qaeda is facing and will be facing the security of the 51 global community in the future is not a group bureaucratic sluggishness, make informa- or a collection of groups, but rather an ideolog- tion sharing, even among close allies, very #med2017 ical movement, the global jihadist movement. challenging. The problem exists not just at the global community in the future will not This movement is not homogenous, but rather the international level but also within most face a group or a plagued by divisions and rivalries. Ultimately, countries, where similar problems hinder the collection groups, but, rather, an ideological however, it has a clear vision and is guided by efective circulation of relevant information movement, the global a strong doctrine. Daesh is just the latest and among various agencies. jihadist movement arguably most successful incarnation of this • Increase resources for law enforcement movement. Daesh’s vicissitudes are hugely and intelligence agencies. The vast majori- important in shaping the future of this move- ty of terrorist atacks carried out in the West ment. But even its hypothetical demise is un- over the last few years were perpetrated by likely to cause the end of the global jihadist individuals known to authorities. In most movement. cases these individuals had appeared on the It is exactly because of the paramount im- authorities’ radar only peripherally and were portance of the ideological component that not regarded as high priority. One of the main tackling the ideology that motivates Daesh, reasons why ofcials cannot conduct further al-Qaeda, their afliates, and unafliated ji- investigations and surveillance on known hadis worldwide is crucial. Over the last few extremists who have not yet crossed the years the general atitude has been somewhat threshold of criminally relevant behaviour is timid in fighting this admitedly daunting the limited resources they possess in order to batle. There are encouraging signs from the keep tabs on a burgeoning number of jihadist Middle East, where various countries (even sympathisers. An increase in resources will some that had previously not recognized the not constitute a silver bullet but will allow problem or had even contributed to its expan- authorities to expand the number of known sion) have engaged in a full-fledged ideological extremists it can monitor. batle against not just Daesh, but the broader • Implement Countering Violent Extrem- Islamist ideology as well. Likely, these eforts ism (CVE) initiatives. As it is now almost will not bear fruit for a number of years as universally accepted throughout the coun- the jihadist ideology has been sustained for terterrorism community, repressive meth- and solidified by countless socioeconomic, ods alone are unlikely to defeat terrorism. religious, and political factors. And while this Whether they entail counter-messaging complex batle has multiple, overlapping lay- campaigns, grassroots activities or tailored ers, it is noteworthy that most Middle Eastern interventions aimed at de-radicalising specif- countries recognise that religious engagement ic individuals, CVE activities are a necessary is one of its key aspects. complement to traditional counterterrorism At the tactical level, more immediate re- work. They are hardly infallible and indeed sults can be achieved through a combination many need to be perfected (and some, to be of international and local eforts. Of the many, honest, completely scrapped). It is clear that three need to be emphasised. CVE programmes will not always work, and • Improve information sharing among in- realistically, the goal of CVE should be threat telligence and law enforcement agencies. reduction, not threat elimination. However, it Information sharing among counterterror- has also become increasingly clear that CVE ism agencies worldwide about networks and needs to be part of any comprehensive coun- individuals known for or suspected of links terterrorism strategy. to various terrorist groups is crucially import- Albeit ever-morphing, the threat posed by ant. Ideally that exchange would take place in terrorism and extremism is likely to confront a speedy and complete fashion inspired by the international community. Because of its the principle of global cooperation against a nature it requires a nuanced, multi-layered and common threat. However, in reality, count- transnational response that must recognise in- less factors, including political rivalries and ternational cooperation as its cornerstone. 52 SHARED SECURITY

Facing new security challenges in the south of the Mediterranean

Ziad A. Akl Director of the Program for the Mediterranean and North Africa Studies, Al-Ahram Center for Political & Strategic Studies

Recent developments in the region have down to $870 million in 2016.3 For a group for stripped the Islamic State (IS) of a significant whom territorial control was so crucial in plan- part of its presence, influence, and territo- ning out strategy, the loss of territorial control ry. Whether in Syria, Iraq, Libya or Sinai, the is likely to create a change of patern with geographical presence of the Islamic State has which the group operates.4 been shrinking, its territorial control over cities The expected changes in patern will in- and resources significantly reduced. However, clude the coping strategies that the Islamic with the presence of various prevailing condi- State will employ to adjust to the new geo-po- tions in the south of the Mediterranean region, litical reality. With reduced territorial control, Islamic State’s losses in one country do not the group is more likely to aim for micro-tar- necessarily and inevitably mean the group’s gets rather than macro ones. Loss of territorial termination. In fact, it bears more risks of group control, with all the losses in authoritative and re-location and transformation due to the frag- bureaucratic functions it entails, will make ile conditions under which the region presides.1 the group focus on targeting small-scale op- erations rather than aspire for the building of LOSS OF TERRITORIAL CONTROL: EXPECTED an Islamic State. Similarly, to compensate for PATTERN CHANGES the loss of resources, the group will most likely Territorial control for the Islamic State was increase its involvement in trafcking-related not a mere strategic gain, it was rather a tool activities, which in turn signals an alert for an through which the Islamic State managed to Islamic State relocation in Libya as a transit create its image, its strategic agenda and its country within all forms of trafcking activi- international presence. The Islamic State’s ties. Because of the loss of both territorial con- control over parts of Iraq and Syria was used trol and economic resources, the Islamic State in the propaganda manufacturing process will most likely focus on urban terrorism in the that the group relies on in both recruitment coming phase, due to the relative ease of ac- and in difusing its repertoire. However, the cess to vital urban targets and comparatively 2,814 magnitude of territorial control has been sys- less logistic sophistication required in carrying terrorist atacks in tematically reduced over the past two years. In out urban atacks. Egypt (2013-2017) a report issued by the IHS conflict monitor in The Islamic State’s change in patern of op- June 2017, it is believed that the Islamic State eration puts higher risks on countries that en- has lost territorial control over 60% of the ter- joy political stability within the region, whether ritories it occupied in both Iraq and Syria in north or south of the Mediterranean. Unlike January 2015.2 the past few years, conflict zones in the south In addition, loss of territorial control has di- of the Mediterranean like Syria, Iraq, Sinai and rectly influenced the amount of revenue that Libya are expected to focus on exporting threat the Islamic State can secure, whether from to more stable zones rather than atempting to selling oil, kidnapping, taxing or confiscating. magnify domestic sovereignty. Consequently, 1,981 ICSR figures show that the yearly revenue of urban targets in North Africa and Europe are deaths by terrorism the Islamic State was $1,890 million in 2014, likely to be high on the prioritised targets list of in Egypt (2013-2017) down to $1,700 million in 2015, and further the Islamic State at the current moment. 53

Number of atacks in Egypt and Sinai

150 North Sinai Egypt 120

90

60

30

0 2013 2014 2015 2016

Data: Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED)

PUSH AND PULL FACTORS OF nean region. Dismantling the territorial infra- RADICALISATION IN THE REGION structure in Syria and Iraq strongly points to Despite the territorial losses, the Islamic the phenomenon of returning foreign fight- State benefits from the presence of push and ers. Returning foreign fighters are a crucial pull radicalisation factors predominant in the aspect of the Islamic State metamorphosis region. Lack of democratic pluralism and the in the Mediterranean region. Countries like frequent cases of state violence or hostility to- Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan and Morocco have sig- wards political opposition in the south of the nificant numbers of fighters enlisted within Mediterranean still act as a potential breeding the ranks of the Islamic State, a return influx ground for further radicalisation. Parallel to of those fighters will pose a few threats to the that, political instability and lack of efective south of the Mediterranean region, in addition state institutions in areas like Libya, Syria and of course to the threat posed to the north of Iraq expands the sphere of influence that rad- the Mediterranean by returning radicalised ical groups can act within, which in turn con- members of diaspora communities. The re- stitutes a pull factor to radicalisation expressed turn of foreign fighters poses two questions: through the group’s recruits from the region. first, the passive vs. active returning fighters, Therefore, despite the strategic losses the Is- and second, the criminalising vs. reintegration lamic State has sufered, the surrounding envi- dilemma. The presence of local cleavages for ronment allows for the group’s adaptive trans- the Islamic State in areas like Sinai and Libya formations to easily eradicate the possibilities increases the possibilities of an active return of group termination. of foreign fighters back into terrorist activi- ties. Simultaneously, southern Mediterranean MANIFESTATIONS OF NEW THREATHS countries lack efcient strategies of reintegra- The expected transformations in the oper- tion, which in turn makes it more atractive for ative strategies of the Islamic State will pose foreign fighters to re-engage in terrorist activi- several new security threats to the Mediterra- ties. While the Islamic State stands at the verge 54 SHARED SECURITY

Islamic State’s revenues fall down crease. Such operations have greater political impact than operations done in non-urban 2014 periphery locations.

THE WIDER REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS 6,492 All the given facts point to an upcoming jihadists killed by transformation within the operative strategy Security Forces in of the Islamic State. Meanwhile, the ongoing Egypt (2013-2017) 1,890 million $ regional political developments still constitute an atractive environment for further radical- isation. So far, coordination between interna- 2015 tional atempts of countering terrorism and local ones in the region has been minimal. The transformation to non-territorial terror- ism requires an elaborate fusion of concepts of both hard-core security and human security. 1,700 million $ Development of remote areas like the Sinai in Egypt and south-east Libya is a must to face the transforming security threats the south of the Mediterranean faces now. Similarly, 2016 working on facilitating political pluralism in non-conflict countries in the region is of equal importance. Finally, reaching efcient frame- works of political setlement, specifically in 870 millions $ Syria and Libya, will allow for an opportunity to unite eforts aimed at countering terrorism, Data: ICSR whether international or domestic ones. The south of the Mediterranean is witnessing signs of transformation of one of its major se- of re-location options, the Libyan south is put curity threats. However, there are a number forth as a potential hub for this re-location pro- of options that could be used to counter the cess.5 The ongoing east-west conflict in Libya metamorphosis of the group in the region. The has shifed focus away from the Libyan south. anticipated group re-location requires a high- Libya, due to its geopolitical transit nature, has er degree of regional coordination concerning been used as a hub for trafcking, specifical- border security. Regional coordination should ly through the connections the Libyan south also be extended to building a shared database border has with the West African Sahel. With of jihadists. Countering the transformation the absence of sufcient legitimate military of IS will also require more regional pressure 97% power, and the presence of networks connect- on political setlement procedures in zones of of which ing militias to terrorist groups to trafcking conflict, specifically Libya. The international in the Sinai criminal organizations, the Libyan south is in coalition fighting IS will need to focus more grave danger of becoming a new recipient hub on logistic and intelligence support because for a transformed version of the Islamic State. the territorial losses and the phase of trans- Meanwhile, countries in the south of the Med- formation will make large-scale military oper- iterranean are likely to face more politicised ations less efective in countering the group’s violence because of the Islamic State transfor- new tactics. The transformation of the group mations. Targeting churches in Egypt or tourist requires transformation within the countering sites in Tunisia is more likely to witness an in- strategies in the region. 55

The path towards radicalisation: a Tunisian perspective

Emna Ben Arab Non-Resident Fellow, ITES and Professor, University of Sfax

Before the Syrian crisis and the flocking conducted with an overall terror-convict- of an impressive pool of Tunisian men and ed population of 83 (80 men and 3 women) women to Syria and Iraq to fight with the among whom 58 individuals had atempted Islamic State organisation and other terror- to travel, travelled, or expressed their inten- ist groups, radicalisation – as a process that tion to travel to conflict zones, or, while being leads to and includes a violent form of action prevented from travelling, had perpetrated ter- – was a marginal notion in academia as well rorist atacks in Tunisia during the period 2011- as in political debate in Tunisia. 2016. While socio-economic grievances (un- The high-profile atacks and political assas- employment, poverty, bad governance) and sinations imputable to jihadism between 2012 populist pan-Islamism, which for a long time and 2015 and the return of foreign fighters propagated an alarmist discourse emphasising afer the territorial contraction of IS spurred external threats to the Muslim nation, seem to public anxiety and made radicalisation a na- be necessary factors in the radicalisation pro- tional security concern and a key notion for cess of all interviewees, they were never suf- understanding the diferent stages that an cient to explain the phenomenon. individual goes through eventually spiralling The study has shown that an explosive mix into violence and becoming an active terrorist. of injustice, exclusion and stigmatisation was Approached as such, jihadist radicalisation has decisive in the radicalisation process of most been handled within a repressive and intelli- interviewees. A strong feeling of injustice gence-centred strategy. This strategy focuses coupled with a deep-seated feeling of hatred on quick fixes through a series of piecemeal toward the police and security forces was em- security-focused policies (legislation monitor- phasised. Most of them evoked their experi- ing charity associations, surveillance of home- ences of injustice and abuse by authorities 17,000 grown networks and sympathisers, travel ban), which had driven them toward embracing the new NGOs created rather than on solutions based on an integrat- Islamic State as being the land of rights and since 2011 ed approach that places this multi-dimension- justice. In fact, in prioritising their belonging to al threat within a broader perspective. This an entity or group, very few mentioned Tuni- entails providing an immanent explanation sia in the first place or at all. Their frustration for issues of social identity, economic and so- with political authorities mainly during the cial exclusion, new forms of acculturation and Troika period was repeatedly underscored. deprivation of political channels of expression. Most of them mentioned by name political parties and politicians who encouraged them UNDERSTANDING RADICALISATION to travel to Syria, which was portrayed to them Drawing on a study conducted by the Tuni- as an act of inward solidarity that was neither sian Institute for Strategic Studies, titled “As- unethical nor illegal. Most of them claimed sessing the Threat Posed by Tunisian Foreign they were, therefore, unaware that fighting in Fighters” (forthcoming, December 2017), ten- foreign wars or liking/sharing a terror group’s tative explanations of radicalisation in Tunisia Facebook page was a crime. 6,000 and the seemingly sudden and unprecedented Western intervention in the MENA region Tunisians among the ranks of jihadist shif to political violence could be identified. was a primary source of anger and grievance groups in Syria, Iraq The study was based on personal interviews for them. They all deprecated the perceived and Libya 56 SHARED SECURITY

Where Tunisian jihadists recruit

Libya Syria Iraq Afghanistan Algeria Mali Turkey

69.23% 21.98% 3.29% 2.19% 1.09% 1.09% 1.09%

Data: Centre tunisien de la recherche et des études sur le terrorisme

double standards of the Western powers and for the jihadists between mid-2011 and July decried the continued occupation of Palestine 2013 when they were banned. As post-2011 Tu- and the impunity of Israel, which remains a nisia opened up to freedom and democracy, festering wound that makes the Islamic State an unprecedented number of NGOs – up to look like a viable alternative to restore the 17,000 – were created. Of those, 48% did not greatness of the Muslim civilization. abide by their declared scope and objectives Although the personal dimension (person- and 19% operated under the cover of religious al experiences, state of mind) assumes a great and charity organisations, funded by un- importance and helps explain the tendency of known sources, and serving as facilitators for these individuals to become radicalised and arms and fighters smuggling, providing logis- to embrace ideologised violence,1 the unprec- tics for fanatical jihadist preachers to address edented rate of radicalisation in Tunisia seems and brainwash disillusioned young people.2 to be the result of an objective situation that The post-uprising dismantling of the secu- activated pre-existing motivations. rity apparatus led to the erosion of the security environment. One of the very first decisions of THE TUNISIAN SPECIFICITY the post-2011 government was the dissolution There are at least three facilitative caus- of the secret service undermining domestic es, which are specific to Tunisia. Islamist-led intelligence collection and information shar- governments between 2011-2014 provided a ing. Afer the uprising this corps d’elite had favourable political climate for radicalisation become a target and came under atack for by turning a blind eye toward indoctrination having propped up the previous regime for campaigns, which included those in jails and so long, which weakened their morale and mosques, as witnessed for a long time by the afected their performance. The situation was “occupy mosques” campaigns in hundreds aggravated by the new opportunities created of mosques under the influence of extremist for foreign figthers in Libya where an anarchic 200+ jihadist imams. Similarly, the so-called “pros- environment gave rise to greater freedom of deaths caused by elytising tents”, a space for jihadists to hold movement, training and funding combined terrorist atacks in meetings and distribute flyers and booklets, with the ready availability of weapons that Tunisia since 2013 became a major public recruitment channel proliferated in the lawless desert on the Tu- 57 nisian-Libyan border, providing an extraordi- The way to radicalisation nary opportunity for extremists to train new Drivers of radicalisation recruits on their way to Syria.3 The atackers of among Tunisian jihadists the Bardo Museum were returnees from Lib- Influenced by: ya, where they were trained. Finally, it is worth noting that radicalisation as a process is not Textbooks 46.34% reducible to the micro-level of analysis, that is to the actors who partake in it. The macro- and Relatives or friends meso-levels are important as they show that, 37% though preconditions are related to profound grievances, they are triggered by environmen- Internet and social media tal stimuli. Winning the war against radicali- 11.11% sation will require going a step further beyond the denouncement of terrorist activities, secu- Media 3% rity-centred measures and military operations currently underway, to dismantling extremist Other influences ideologies through education and providing 2.55% real alternatives for change and opportunities Data: Centre tunisien de la recherche for the youth. et des études sur le terrorisme 58 SHARED SECURITY Through the strains: 1.2 a viable roadmap for Libya?

Arturo Varvelli Co-Head of the Middle East and North Africa Centre, ISPI

war, which culminated in the signing of the SHARED Six years afer Qaddafi’s death, the Lib- SECURITY yan crisis has not been solved. The country UN-sponsored Political Agreement (LPA) continues to be divided between a parliament in Skhirat, Morocco, in December 2015. The (and executive) in Tobruk and a Presidential LPA formed a Presidency Council (PC) and a Council (headed by Fayez al-Serraj) in Tripoli cabinet, the Government of National Accord that is backed by the United Nations. In actu- (GNA), led by Prime Minister Fayez al-Ser- al fact, neither have real governing capacity raj. Despite major eforts at bolstering the but they are rather “hostages” of the militias PC/GNA, more ofen than not the United that support them and control the territory: Nations and the European Union were un- General Hafar’s in Cyrenaica and the asso- dermined by the double-crossing of some of ciated militias of Misrata and Tripoli to the their members. In fact, while almost all states west, respectively. The militias who fought formally pledged allegiance to the UN-led against Qaddafi developed diverging inter- process, many behaved diferently on the ests and found value in entrenching their ground. control over cities and local villages. This However, over the last two years, the LPA led to a fragmentation of authority, the pro- has failed to take of and the weakness of liferation of militias, criminal organisations, the unity government is a result of the fail- and terrorist groups, which undermined any ure of UN leadership. The new UN Special atempt to bring stability back to the coun- Envoy Ghassan Salamé is trying to restore try. Inevitably, the rivalry among the various the credibility and efectiveness of the UN factions dragged a series of external actors Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), first of into the politics of Libya, which turned the all by amending the LPA. But a positive out- country’s conflict into a proxy war. come is far from certain. The fragmentation of European actors in Libya, combined with REGIONAL INTERESTS AND PROXY WAR the lack of interest expressed by the US ad- The rivalry between domestic factions ministration in engaging in political eforts to and their international supporters reached stabilise Libya, have led to an imbalance in its climax in the summer of 2014, when the favour of Hafar. A series of meetings in Abu country was de facto split into two parts, Dhabi, Paris and Rome have allowed Hafar one in Tobruk in the east under the control to be formally equal to al-Serraj. Hafar has of General Khalifa Hafar and the newly been able to gain a political role and the legit- elected House of Representatives (HoR), and imacy it requires by presenting himself as the one in the west led by Islamist/revolutionary leader in the fight against Islamic terrorism leaning militia leaders and those in the city and the emergence of radical groups in Lib- of Misrata. While in most cases the factional ya. Hafar gathered around himself various #med2017 over the last two years, rivalries in Libya have local roots, they have groups concerned by the rise of radicals in the LPA has failed been exacerbated by the interests of foreign the country. His narrative leveraged the fight to take of and the weakness of the unity actors. The United Nations and the Europe- against “Islamists” in his atempt to join the government is a result an Union as collective organisations sought international campaign against IS and rad- of the failure of UN leadership to reach a negotiated solution to the civil icals in the region. Hafar appeared capable 59

THE DIVIDED LIBYA

Bouri

Jurf Areas of influence of the Gover- nment of National Accord Sabratha Misurata Misrata Derna Zintan Benghazi Tobruk Beni Walid Sirte Sirte Areas of influence of Zintan Zueitina Ajedabia forces Ghadamis Ras Lanuf Basin Militias linked to the National Salvation Government

Sarir Basin Sirte Areas of influence of Libyan Basin National Army forces

Murquz basin Areas of influence of Tebu forces

Production fields Pipelines

LIBYAN INSTABILITY REFLECTS ON OIL PRODUCTION Oil production in Libya (2010-2017)

Million b/d 1,6

1,4

1,2

1,0

0,8

0,6

0,4

0,2

0 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Data: Bloomberg, ISPI 60 SHARED SECURITY

of coagulating around himself the consen- First 10 corrupted countries in the world sus of the population, fearful of an extremist trend, especially in the city of Benghazi, and Corruption Perceptions Index: 0 most corrupted - 100 least corrupted of countering the proselytism of the most radical groups. On the other hand, this ati- North Korea 8 tude fostered a tactical convergence between Somalia 10 radical militias and various political Islamist forces which, despite lacking ideological af- South Sudan 11 finities, felt openly threatened. Syria 13 THE LIBYAN CHESSBOARD However, it would be incorrect to reduce Libya 14 the country’s problems to the confrontation Sudan 14 between Hafar and al-Serraj, as a number of other factors are currently afecting the Yemen 14 Libyan scenario. In a context of evolving and transforming alliances between the various Afghanistan 15 factions, it is unlikely that a single faction could militarily prevail over the others and Guinea-Bissau 16 unify the country under its control. Similarly, Iraq 17 despite the system of alliances that allowed Fayez al-Serraj to become President, the PC Venezuela 17 does not seem to be in a position to fully con- Data: Transparency International, 2016 trol even the Tripolitania region in which it is based. A number of militias in Tripolitania appear more and more to be acting inde- pervasive at the same time. Upon closer in- pendently from the PC, even though they are spection of these dynamics, it would appear formally part of it. Other important forces in that only coordinated action by the interna- Libya hold diferent and at times unpredict- tional community to insulate the country able positions. In the south, political and eth- from competing regional interests in Libya’s nic fragmentation dominates. The historical internal afairs would provide a chance to tribal order was overturned and the Qadhafa successfully reestablish order. tribe, which led the region under Qaddafi’s Internally international actors should regime, suddenly lef the door open to oth- promote and facilitate local dialogue. Dis- er groups. The disruption of the political and cussions should concern the political rec- tribal order has generated repeated waves of ognition and inclusion of the leaderships of conflict among Tebu, Awlad Sulaiman, War- certain armed groups, trying to make them falla, and Tuareg tribes, all vying to control aware of their responsibilities, as well as illicit trafcking. Tripoli authorities have those of the tribal communities they belong sought to provide assistance, most signifi- to, especially those with a history of mar- cantly using Misrata’s militias as a pacifying ginalization. Mediation could be intensified element but they have not succeeded, and on the levels of civil society, local represen- the Fezzan region today is characterised by tatives, and economic elites; nevertheless increasing fragmentation. new negotiations involving especially key #med2017 only coordinated action security actors are crucial. Internation- by the international RELAUNCHING THE PROCESS OF INTER- al community should collaborate with the community to insulate Libya from competing NATIONAL POLITICAL MEDIATION local militias that are willing to support a regional interests would It has now become clear that the interests new government produced by a revised provide a chance to successfully reestablish and operations of regional and international LPA, and ultimately be incorporated into a order actors in Libya have become complex and professional, nascent armed Libyan force. 61

Presidential Council should be encouraged to the population of Libya, could allow the PC/ adopt a policy to selectively allocate funding GNA to initiate a series of economic projects #med2017 to the militias, in an atempt to establish a to repair Tripoli’s infrastructure – such as the stabilisation of the whole of Libya should closer connection between financial support restoring roads, rebuilding schools and hos- start from the local level and the internal reintegration of the new na- pitals that have been badly damaged by war and move from the botom-up tional powers. The international community and neglect, and repairing the power grid and can also engage in training the Presiden- electrical infrastructure – and restart eco- tial Guard and other security forces on the nomic activity in the city. Success in these ground. These eforts should be undertaken endeavours could slowly and progressively, within a theoretical framework for a decen- but consistently, be expanded throughout tralization process that shifs functions and the entire country. Success in Tripoli could duties of the state from the centre to the be replicated in every city and village in Lib- periphery. For the purpose of gaining great- ya, where local militias would join municipal er influence and legitimacy, local represen- security forces under the supervision of the tatives could facilitate seeking solutions in central government and the support of the exchange for an increase in income deriving reconstituted national armed forces. from renewed oil production. The success of this plan means the seting In parallel, the international community of a deterrent against Hafar’s and others’ should strengthen the Presidential Council’s ambitions to weaken the PC/GNA and pur- (and new unity government) capacity to ad- sue a military victory. It also entails rebuild- dress the economic issues on the table (e.g. ing support among western militias, includ- the banking liquidity, electricity and health ing those from Misrata, for the PC/GNA. In care). The stabilization of the whole of Libya order to avoid further escalation, these mili- should start from the local level and move tias would need to be convinced that a nego- from the botom-up. The establishment of a tiated setlement, even one that would bring minimum level of security in the city of Trip- Hafar into the fold would not threaten their oli, which by itself comprises almost a third of interests. 62 SHARED SECURITY The Gulf monarchies: 1.3 disunited we stand

Valeria Talbot Co-Head of the Middle East and North Africa Centre, ISPI

hosting Islamist and opposition figures have SHARED At the beginning of June, Saudi Arabia, SECURITY the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bah- been firmly criticised by its Arab Gulf neigh- rain, along with Egypt, severed diplomatic bours. In 2014 Saudi Arabia, along with UAE relations with Qatar. Additionally, strict eco- and Bahrain, had already withdrawn their nomic and logistical restrictions have been ambassadors from Doha to put pressure on imposed, including the blockade of land, air, the tiny emirate. On that occasion, ties were and sea access to Qatar. Qatari ofcials and reinstated afer nine months, when Qatar ac- residents were expelled from the three Gulf cepted to expel senior Muslim Brotherhood states and Qatar was ejected by the Saudi-led leaders. But many questions remained un- military coalition in Yemen. solved and disagreements were simmering Saudi Arabia and its allies accused Qatar beneath the surface. of financing terrorism and supporting Isla- So, the recent crisis erupted against a back- mist groups, including the Muslim Brother- drop of long-standing irritation with Qatar. hood and Hamas, in addition to Iran. A list of Saudi Arabia, which has always played a 13 conditions1 has been imposed to Doha in leading role within the GCC, has frequently order to end the crisis and resume ties. For its complained about Doha’s independent for- part, Qatar has vehemently denied all charges eign policy and its refusal to adhere to Ri- and refused to comply with those requests. In yadh’s line. Disagreements between Saudi spite of a months-long embargo, Saudi Arabia, Arabia and Qatar have been occurring for UAE, Bahrain and Egypt proved unable to more than 20 years – since the current Qa- isolate Qatar. So far, atempts to mediate have tari Emir’s father Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani not yet produced concrete results, and the risk took power in 1995 afer a coup d’état – but of an escalation remains high. The crisis has it has now reached an unprecedented high. raised serious concerns about the impact this Another bone of contention is Qatar’s Al Ja- will have not only on regional security and zeera TV station, which has represented both stability, but also on global energy markets as a crucial source of sof power for Doha and a well as on Gulf states’ eforts to diversify their critical voice vis-à-vis Arab autocrats since its economies. establishment in 1996.2 Criticism against the al-Saud royal family during an Al Jazeera TV DECADES-LONG TENSIONS debate was at the origin of the diplomatic rup- Diferent and ofen divergent interests and ture between Saudi Arabia and Qatar in 2002. political agendas among Gulf Cooperation On that occasion, ties were not restored until Council (GCC) member states have emerged 2007. over the years, in spite of the fact that the Iran is a further source of discord among organisation is commonly perceived as a re- GCC monarchies. For a country that bases its gional homogenous block. Qatar’s indepen- economic wealth on hydrocarbon revenues 0.5% dent policy, along with its growing regional – Qatar is the world’s largest exporter of liq- GCC countries’ assertiveness, particularly afer the 2011 Arab uefied natural gas and the forth gas producer projected GDP uprisings, its support to Islamist movements, – cordial relations with Teheran are crucial. growth for 2017 its close relations with Iran, and the practice of Indeed, the two countries share the largest 63

THE GULF AT A GLANCE Major demographic, socio-economic and political indicators in the GCC countries

Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE

Population (million) 1.4 4 4.4 2.6 32.2 9.2

Urban population 88.8% 98.4% 78.1% 99.3% 83.3% 85.8%

Demographic growth 3.8% 2.9% 5.2% 3.5% 2.3% 1.3%

Population under 21.4% 22.6% 21.1% 15.6% 28.3% 14.1% 15 years Migration rate 21.7 133.0 269.7 162.6 26.9 44.2 (every 1,000 people)

GDP (billion $) 34 127 71 174 707 407

GDP growth 2.3% 0.0% 0.4% 3.4% 0.4% 1.5%

GDP per capita 52 71 46 129 55 68 (thousands $) Women employed (% on total women 38.9% 48.1% 30.1% 53.3% 20.1% 41.8% in working age)

Youth unemployment 5.6% 13.3% 50.8% 0.7% 31.2% 11.5%

Foreign reserves 4 34 20 32 547 85 (million $)

Debt (% on GDP) 88.6% 19.8% 38.5% 50.2% 15.6% 19.1%

Trade balance 3 15 0.4 26 42 41 (billion $) Health expenditure 5.0% 3.0% 3.6% 2.2% 4.7% 3.6% (% on GDP) Energy production 22 170 76 224 614 202 (Ktep) Energy consumption 14 35 24 40 192 70 (Ktep) Arms import 273 497 737 502 5,207 10,517 (million $) Military expenditure 4.6% 4.8% 13.7% 1.5% 9.9% 5.7% (% on GDP) Data: World Bank 64 SHARED SECURITY

Oil and gas reserves of the Gulf countries (world ranking)

Oil Gas Billion barrels Trillion cubic meters Saudi Arabia 266.5 (2°) Qatar 24.3 (3°)

Kuwait 101.5 (6°) Saudi Arabia 8.4 (5°)

UAE 97.8 (7°) UAE 6.1 (7°)

Qatar 25.2 (14°) Kuwait 1.8 (20°)

Oman 5.4 (22°) Oman 0.7 (28°)

Data: British Petroleum

natural gas field in the world – the North prompt support ofered by Turkey and Iran Dome field that extends into Iranian waters, that allowed Qatar to overcome the blockade. where it is called South Pars – that represents The Saudi supposition that Qatar was highly Qatar’s most important economic resource. dependent on its GCC larger neighbour for However, Doha’s pragmatic approach to- trade and air transport proved to be incorrect. 40% wards Teheran clashes with the Saudi policy Moreover, contrary to Saudi expectations, of the world’s oil to contrast Iran’s influence in the Middle East. the economic embargo produced a formal reserves are in the Over the last years, Iranian-Saudi hegemonic rapprochement between Doha and Teheran. GCC countries competition has highly escalated, afecting re- In August, Qatar announced the decision to gional dynamics. strengthen bilateral relations with the Islamic In this context, afer President Trump’s vis- Republic in all fields and to send its ambassa- it to Riyadh last May and its overt support to dor back to Teheran. the Saudi monarchy in fighting terrorism and This move is likely to open unexpected countering Iran’s influence, Saudi Arabia felt geopolitical scenarios in the Middle East. Qa- emboldened by this endorsement and pro- tar’s deeper relations with the Islamic Repub- ceeded to reassert its leadership role and to lic might bring it closer to Iranian positions on force Qatar to be more cooperative. thorny regional issues, especially on the Syri- an front, where Doha might downgrade its in- TOWARDS A GEOPOLITICAL RESHUFFLE IN volvement and reduce its support to anti-As- THE MIDDLE EAST sad forces. Furthermore, a new alignment, Although this time Riyadh and its allies including Qatar, Iran, Turkey, along with Rus- seem determined to secure significant conces- sia, is not so unlikely. However, it remains to sions, tougher demands and escalating ten- be seen whether it would be a geopolitical axis sions have made a diplomatic solution much or a tactical alignment, and what the implica- more difcult to reach. While from a Qatari tions on the regional context would be. There- perspective Saudi requests are unacceptable, fore, this crisis might turn into another failure 23% atempts to isolate Qatar through sanctions of Saudi foreign policy afer the intervention of world proven na- have failed so far. Indeed, the tiny emirate has in Yemen. On other regional fronts, from Leb- tural gas reserves are proved to be able to find alternative sources anon to Syria, Saudi Arabia is losing influence in the GCC countries of supply and transport routes, thanks to the as well. 65

Against this backdrop, what is proving to be but also in the other GCC countries, because more and more evident is that the old geopolit- of the deep economic integration among them #med2017 ical lines may no longer explain today’s Middle and the great exposure of Saudi Arabia and it is likely that an 8 escalation would have East. UAE banking and business sectors to Qatar. even more disrupting Furthermore, the prolonged uncertainty has efects not only on GCC countries, but also on ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS a negative impact on the GCC business envi- the entire region At the economic and financial level, the cri- ronment and foreign direct investment atrac- and beyond sis is already producing negative efects and tion, thus puting in question ongoing reforms prospects would be gloomy, if tensions persist. towards economic diversification, a process In its Regional Economic Outlook released that GCC oil monarchies have sped up afer in October 2017, the International Monetary the fall in the oil price in mid-2014. Fund (IMF) projected GCC economic growth at just 0.5 percent in 2017, saying that a pro- OVERCOMING THE STANDOFF longed rupture between Qatar and the other Undoubtedly, the Gulf crisis adds one more Gulf monarchies could further reduce growth factor of instability to a highly volatile and prospects not only for Qatar but also for oth- troubled Middle Eastern region. It is likely er GCC countries and across the region.3 Al- that an escalation would have even more dis- though the growth slowdown is the result of rupting efects not only on GCC countries, but fiscal measures and reforms adopted to foster also on the entire region and beyond. Stability economic diversification of these oil export- and security in the GCC monarchies – which ers, IMF warned that a protracted rif will control 40% of the world’s known oil reserves “slow progress toward greater GCC integration and 23% of proven natural gas reserves – are and cause a broader erosion of confidence, re- crucial for both regional countries and inter- ducing investment and growth, and increas- national players. Mediation atempts have ing funding costs in Qatar and possibly the being carried out to end the months-long dis- rest of the GCC.”4 pute. Although initially President Trump took As a mater of fact, while Qatar was litle the Saudi side, the United States, together afected by trade sanctions,5 the crisis has with Kuwait that has maintained neutrality, produced financial pressures on the emirate has engaged significantly to heal the rif be- because of the downgrading of its sovereign tween its Gulf allies. The tiny emirate holds credit rating and outlook, raising interbank in- great strategic importance for Washington, as terest rates and leading to a decline in private Qatar hosts the largest regional US military sector deposits.6 At first, the Qatari central base, Al Udeid, which serves as a key strate- bank injected liquidity to mitigate the impact gic hub for military operations in the Middle on banks and public sectors deposits were in- East, not least against the Islamic State. As a creased. Qatar used $38.5 billion (equivalent to long-standing guarantor of Gulf security, the 23 percent of its GDP) to support its economy.7 US has a crucial interest in overcoming the However, the longer the crisis persists, the standof. But the interests at stake are numer- more the cost of funding will increase. Accord- ous not only for the US. However, eforts to ing to Moody’s investors service estimations, bring the parties to engage in dialogue have around $30 billion were withdrawn from Qa- proved unsuccessful so far. Of course, the lack tar’s banking system in the first two months of trust between the parties and their diver- of sanctions. However, this situation is dam- gent political agendas pose a further obstacle aging business confidence not only in Qatar to mediation atempts. 66 SHARED SECURITY The Kurdish 1.4 conundrum

Stefano M. Torelli Associate Research Fellow, ISPI and Visiting Fellow, ECFR

SHARED Kurdistan is back as one of the most dif- creating expectations. In Iraq, these expecta- SECURITY ficult issues to solve in the Middle East and, tions have translated into an ofcial request at the same time, as one of the most import- for independence of the territories under the ant theatres of events in the whole area. control of the Kurdish Regional Government To be sure, it is not even possible to talk (KRG) from Baghdad through the referen- about just one Kurdistan and it is highly mis- dum held on 25th September. In Syria there is leading to treat all the Kurds as if they were a growing perception that the conquered ter- one. Therefore, the main challenge when ritories in the north of the country, in which facing the so-called “Kurdish factor” is to dif- the Kurds have inaugurated the experiment ferentiate the various Kurdish communities. of a de facto semi-independent quasi-state In order to do so, it is crucial to understand under the name of Rojava (“west” in Kurdish their ofen diverging interests, which in turn language), could soon become a new example determine diferent and conflicting systems of Kurdish autonomy. Finally, in Turkey the of alliances all over the region. Kurdish factor has vehemently re-emerged as one of the most important national secu- THE KURDS IN THE SPOTLIGHT AGAIN rity, political and social issues, characterised The main factor that contributed to push- by a high level of violence that caused more ing once again the Kurds in the spotlight has than 3,000 deaths since the summer of 2015. been the emergence and the expansion of the Islamic State (IS) between Iraq and Syria. ACROSS ALLIANCES, RIVALRIES AND The international community and the same MISCALCULATIONS regional actors have delegated to the Kurd- How, then, to beter understand and ad- ish militias (namely the Peshmerga in Iraq dress the Kurdish issue? The first unknown is and the militias of the YPG, People’s Protec- related to the outcomes of the referendum in tion Unit, in Syria) the role of vanguard on Iraqi Kurdistan. Here, Barzani’s gamble could the field against Daesh. It was thanks to the turn into a boomerang. According to the in- Kurdish fighters that, in Iraq as well as in Syr- ternal oppositions, Barzani and his party, the ia, IS has been partially defeated and forced KDP (Kurdish Democratic Party), called for to abandon important cities like Mosul and the referendum more for internal political Raqqa. It was the Peshmerga that secured the calculations than for ideological and nation- oil-rich areas near Kirkuk in Iraq. Also, when alistic reasons. public opinion all around the world celebrat- Afer the referendum, the evolution of the ed the end of the siege of Kobane at the Syr- situation on the ground in Kirkuk – with the ian-Turkish border in 2015, it was essentially Iraqi army intended to take control of the area thanks to the Kurdish eforts that this became and the PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) possible. At the same time, it became more afliated Kurds partially leting even external 30-35 million and more clear that these eforts would come actors like the Iranians interfere – is just one with a price to be paid by the international of the examples of the instability that could the estimated num- ber of Kurds living in community and the regional actors. Inciting, be expected, as well of the divisions among the Middle East arming and sustaining the Kurds also meant the Kurds themselves. At the western borders 67

The distribution of the Kurds in the Middle East

Kurdish inhabited areas Kurdish regional government in Iraq

Ankara TURKEY

Kobane

Mosul Tehran Kirkuk SYRIA IRAN Damascus Baghdad

IRAQ

Turkey

15-20 million 20%

Syria

2.5 million 10%

Iraq

5 million 15-20% number of Kurds in the country in Kurds of number

Iran the country of population total % of

6-8 million 8%

Data: Institut Kurde de Paris of Iraq, the condition – and the future evolu- key, the US and the EU consider a terrorist tion – of the Syrian and Turkish Kurds seem organisation –, Ankara has become increas- to be closely connected. Once again, part of ingly worried by their territorial and political the problem is to be found in the miscalcu- gains. In short, what is happening at the Syr- lations of the external actors that over the ian-Turkish border is one of the worst night- last three years have continued to sustain the mares Turkey could ever have fathomed: Kurdish forces. Too distracted by the neces- the establishment of a semi-autonomous sity to break down the Islamic State, most of Kurdish entity. Moreover, this happened also them have fomented the Kurds as the only thanks to the PKK, which in turn took advan- reliable partner in the direct fight against IS, tage of this new situation and of the Syrian regardless of the fact that this could alter the conflict itself to pursue its strategy aimed at regional balances. creating a new safe haven where to organise In particular, given the proximity of the its moves against Turkey while, at the same Syrian Kurds with the PKK – which Tur- time, expanding its influence and its idea of 68 SHARED SECURITY

Territory under the control of Syrian Kurdish forces (in km2)

45,000

42,532

30,000

15,000 14,568

0 2014 2015 2016 2017

Data: Institute for the Study of War

a “Kurdish democratic confederation” be- the HDP and the Kurds. For its part, the PKK yond the Turkish border. The combination took advantage of the new scenario in Tur- of a confining proto-Kurdish State and the key, as most of its current and influential revitalisation of PKK activities, mixed with leaders are against the policy of compromise. $300 million the internal difculties that the AKP experi- enced in the afermath of the June 2015 elec- MOVING FORWARD: LOOKING FOR A US contract signed in tions (when it failed to gain a parliamentary SINGLE VOICE April 2017 providing weapons, vehicles, majority to the advantage of the pro-Kurdish What can be expected in the coming and supplies to HDP, People’s Democratic Party), led Ankara months is a period of redefinition of new Kurdish units in to react. balances, with some actors trying to change Syria and Iraq The Turkish response to this change of the status quo and others trying to resist. the status quo has been multilevel. It implied Among the former are surely the majority of political moves and military actions against Kurdish actors (even if with diferent strate- the Kurds and it involved the external as gies for diferent purposes), while among the well as the internal context. Actually, Turkey later are the most important regional state undermined the eforts of the internation- actors. Turkey cannot aford the creation al coalition against the IS, since hiting the of a Kurdish autonomous entity in Syria as PKK-linked Syrian Kurds meant weakening it could influence the Turkish Kurds and it the West against the jihadists. This embar- would bring about a strategic advantage for rassed the US and the EU and risked to cre- the PKK. Iraq has demonstrated to be ready ate an unprecedented crisis within NATO, of to deploy military forces against its Kurdish which Turkey represents the second largest communities, as happened in the area of army. Ultimately, Ankara had to accept the Kirkuk in the afermath of the referendum. situation on the ground and the Iraqi and Iran has a too-big interest in maintaining Syrian Kurds managed to defeat – if only the status quo in Iraq, continuing to influ- 10.75% militarily – IS. At the same time, however, ence Baghdad and, within the KRG, main- votes gained by the President Erdogan played his cards against taining good relations with the PUK in order HDP in the last to counterbalance the influence of Turkey, Turkish parliamen- the Kurds at home and his electoral cam- tary elections paign in late 2015 focused on discrediting which in turn has built a solid partnership 69

Territorial expansion of Syrian Kurdish forces (2015-July 2017)

Kobane Jarabulus Al-Qamishli

‘Afrin Tall Byad Azaz Manbig

Al Shaddadah Aleppo Idlib Raqqa

Territorial expansion: January 2015

January 2016

August 2016

July 2017

Data: Institute for the Study of War with the KDP. For the Kurds, one of the main over the decades by external actors. The US, problems is represented by their internal di- Russia, European powers, Iran, Turkey – all visions. Not even the possibility to achieve of them relied on diferent Kurdish actors the dream of the creation of an independent in order to pursue their particular interests Kurdistan contributed to overcoming the and, once the goal had been achieved, they rivalry between the KDP and the PUK in abandoned them again to their destiny. As Iraq. And from an enlarged perspective, the long as the Kurds fail to achieve an internal goals of the Syrian Kurds are diferent from consensus and to propose a single long-term the ones of the Iraqi Kurds, which in turn di- political project for their status in the region, verge from the project of the PKK in Turkey. their exploitation by external actors is likely This internal weakness has been exploited to continue. 70 SHARED SECURITY

Afer the referendum: what’s next for the Iraqi Kurdistan?

Maria Fantappie Senior Analyst, International Crisis Group (ICG)

On 25 September 2017, the Kurdistan Re- that form the Popular Mobilisation Units gion of Iraq held a referendum on indepen- (PMU) would allow Kurdish leaders to kill two dence which cast Erbil and Baghdad into an birds with one stone: consolidating the leader- impossible deadlock. By making indepen- ship of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) dence the ultimate condition for negotiations over the region as the primary defender of the with Baghdad, the leaders of Iraqi Kurdistan Kurdish national cause while also consolidat- have shunned the possibility of a negotiated ing US support as a bufer against a blatant deal, leaving military confrontation as the only show of Iran’s influence in Iraq. way forward and rendering the Kurdistan re- Three weeks afer the vote, tensions peaked gion efectively more dependent on its neigh- in the oil-rich city of Kirkuk, which has long bours. In its formulation, which asked voters been disputed with Baghdad. On 16 October, whether they wanted the Kurdish region and Iraqi forces massed on Kirkuk’s outskirts and the areas under its control outside its admin- seized control of Kirkuk’s oil installations and istration to become an independent state, the many of the disputed territories outside the referendum efectively closed all doors for Kurdistan region. Atempts by the Kurdistan negotiation and set Iraqi Kurdistan and the Democratic Party (KDP) to consolidate its central government in Baghdad on a collision dominance have directly encouraged mem- course. The vote’s overwhelmingly positive re- bers of its rival, the Patriotic Union of Kurd- sults implied that any post-referendum talks istan (PUK), to consider an arrangement with should include the prospect of independence. Baghdad that could provide the PUK leaders Baghdad has rejected this prospect, making a assurances of political and economic survival return to talks conditional upon an annulment in their rivalry with the KDP in return for with- of the vote, which it considered a violation of drawing and allowing Iraqi forces to deploy in the principle of territorial integrity enshrined Kirkuk and other disputed territories. in the Iraqi constitution. PMU factions afliated with Iran have also deployed in the operation, but alongside other THE IMPACT OF THE KURDISH Iraqi security forces (such as the US-trained REFERENDUM Counter Terrorism Forces and army and Rather than resolving Kurdish leaders’ in- police divisions) and only with prior orders ternal rivalries and enhancing prospects for from Haider al-Abadi, Iraq’s Prime Minister. statehood, the vote deepened divisions and Al-Abadi’s order has efectively legalised the now risks jeopardising Iraqi Kurdistan’s au- operation as an Iraqi-led operation, in spite tonomy and international support. The refer- of the fact that Teheran and Ankara had been endum proponents may have calculated the aware of it all along – and possibly even helped risks but they miscalculated to what extent the to engineer it. International silence over the move could backfire. They may have counted advancement of Iraqi forces was an implicit on an escalation that would shif US and in- acknowledgment that the US and the interna- ternational backing in their favour and ofer tional community would side with Baghdad 5.3 million a jumping board for a unilateral declaration as long as it helped pressure Kurdish leaders people living in the of independence. For instance, an aggressive into making concessions and preventing the Iraqi Kurdistan response from the Shiite-dominated factions breakup of Iraq. 71

Results of the referendum held in the Iraqi access an independent revenue stream. KDP’s Kurdistan on 25 September 2017 economic partnership with Turkey risks weak- ening now that Iraq’s oil ministry announced plans to re-open the pipeline to Turkey by- passing the one operated by Kurdistan. Iran is meanwhile aggressively entrenched in Kurdis- 4,581,255 Registered voters tan’s eastern territories, consolidating the part- nership between the PUK and Iraqi Shiite po- litical factions. The prospect of losing exclusive control over Iraq’s border points with Turkey and Iran may catastrophically roll back Kurd- 3,335,925 (72.8%) ish autonomy to the scenario that predated the Turnout 1991 Gulf War. The KDP-promoted independence refer- endum and the PUK forces’ withdrawal in the face of Iraqi forces’ advance in Kirkuk 2,861,471 (92.7%) 224.464 (7.3%) have more in common than it appears at first YES NO glance: leaders of both parties have chosen to In favour of independence Against independence secure their own survival while leaving Iraqi Kurdistan vulnerable. Iraqi Kurdistan’s parlia- mentary and presidential elections, scheduled If, by voting in the referendum, Iraqi Kurds for early November, have been postponed. have genuinely expressed their aspiration for This risks further delaying a necessary re- statehood, post-referendum developments newal of Kurdish politics that has been the may deliver a region which is less indepen- root cause of the unfolding crisis and deepens dent and less democratic than before. Inter- Kurds’ disenchantment towards the entire po- necine rivalries consume the leadership at the litical process. It risks further reducing Kurd- top while Iraqi Kurds’ distrust of their leaders ish parties to family aggregations controlling is more widespread than ever. Leaders who fiefdoms dependent on powerful neighbours. supported the referendum blame others as The PUK, dominated by members of Jalal Tal- traitors, while the later label the referendum’s abani’s family, may opt for deepening political proponents as irresponsible. and economic ties with Baghdad and Teheran to secure power in the eastern provinces of KIRKUK AS A TURNING POINT Suleymania and Kirkuk. A KDP dominated by The loss of Kirkuk unleashed a domino Massoud Barzani and his son Masrour – afer efect, which now threatens Iraqi Kurdistan’s the lost referendum bid – may become even decades-long gains in carving out an auton- more dependent on Turkey to at least secure omous region in Iraq tolerated by Turkey and its power in the western provinces of Dohuk Iran. Erbil has lost much of its bargaining pow- and Erbil. The retreat of political parties to their er against Baghdad. Peshmerga have with- family and tribal territorial strongholds will ac- drawn from most of the territories that fell un- celerate the erosion of the Kurdistan Regional der Kurdish control afer Iraqi security forces Government’s institutions, which, afer 2003, collapsed in 2014, which provided Iraqi Kurd- constituted an important platform for gover- istan with a bargaining chip in any negotia- nance and intra-party cooperation. tions with the central government. As things The debacle should be a wake-up call for the stand now, even if negotiations start, the sit- political leaders who have led the region to the uation on the ground has changed and Iraqi brink of collapse. They are the main obstacle 450,000 Kurds are now on the weaker side. As a heav- to overcoming the crisis they themselves have oil barrels per day ily oil-dependent economy, without Kirkuk’s created, which can now only be resolved by al- pumped from the oil installations the region has lost its ability to lowing for a transition to new leadership. Both area of Kirkuk 72 SHARED SECURITY

Areas controlled by Kurds in Iraq

Irbil Mosul Area controlled Kirkuk by Iraqi Kurds

Retaken by Iraqi forces since 16 October

Data: Institute for the Study of War

the KDP and PUK count within their ranks mechanism in the disputed territories, and figures who, despite their family and party commit to delivering 17 percent of its budget afliations, are commited to KRG institu- to Kurdistan while finalising agreements on tions and could start talks with Baghdad on oil revenues and funding to Peshmerga forc- unresolved issues without conditioning them es that can build on shared interests between on negotiations regarding the referendum’s the two sides. results. Post-IS Iraq is likely to witness a tortuous process of transitioning away from the dy- WHAT BAGHDAD CAN DO namics that regulated post-2003 Iraq. The Baghdad should use its leverage to empow- referendum and its afermath mark a first er a new Kurdish leadership which can stand spectacular turn in Erbil-Baghdad relations as a solid party to the negotiations. Opting for — a major unresolved node of post-invasion continued escalation and a divide-and-rule Iraq’s politics. The lost referendum bid can policy would do just the opposite, leaving the still be transformed into a win for both cap- Kurds fragmented and weak in these talks. itals if the crisis is taken as an opportunity The Iraqi central government, if commited to bring about a change of power in Kurdish 17% to implementing the Iraqi constitution as it parties’ top leadership, a change now nec- claims to be, should negotiate a deal which essary to secure Iraqi Kurdistan’s pre-ref- the amount of national oil rents allows Kurdistan to secure control over its of- erendum gains and turn the page of its de- destined to the KRG ficial borders and agree on a shared security cade-long conflicted relations with Baghdad. 73 74 SHARED SECURITY The Middle East 1.5 according to Trump

Karim Mezran Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council

have largely been successful, as IS has lost SHARED Global leaders, analysts, and the public SECURITY have a lot of trouble discerning US poli- about 80 percent of its territory and approx- cy toward the Middle East, whether due to imately 2.1 million displaced Iraqis have re- inconsistent messaging from the diferent turned. branches of government, an auto-pilot con- The Trump administration inherits a more tinuation of Obama-era policy, or the lack complicated framework in Syria. Obama’s of a policy at all. President Donald Trump’s apprehension over intervention created the rhetoric does litle to help clarify his vision or space for Russia and Iran to overtly support strategy for the future of the MENA region. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Most no- This at a time when the United States needs a tably in Syria, the US fired several missiles at clear, comprehensive approach to stabilise the the Shayrat airbase in April 2017 in Homs, a raging and complex conflicts that have a direct stark contrast to the Obama policy of avoid- impact on US interests. ing direct engagement. These deviations from Obama focused on minimal US interven- Obama-era positions, however, appear either tion and reduced tensions with Iran, but the cosmetic or reactionary with no real impact on legacy of US entanglements in the MENA the overall dynamics of the conflict or on US region and the rise of the Islamic State forced strategy in Syria. him into the paradoxical position of respond- The United States continues to utilize Tur- ing to the region’s crises while trying to reduce key’s Incirlik air base as a tool in aerial recon- the US footprint. His approach opened the naissance campaigns against IS. A major point door for a Trump policy that looks to return of contention with Turkey, however, involves the Iran genie to its botle, “get tough” on ter- US collaboration with the predominantly rorism, and re-establish the traditional Arab Kurdish SDF, led by the Kurdish People’s Pro- order. tection Units (YPG). The Trump administra- tion authorised to arm and equip the YPG in IRAQ AND SYRIA: STABILISATION NOT RE- its atempt to seize Raqqa, but Turkey fears CONSTRUCTION that US support would only embolden Kurd- Trump has largely followed Obama’s lead ish separatism on Turkish territory. in the fight against IS in Iraq and Syria with The administration’s role in the anti-IS co- the Combined Joint Task Force–Operation In- alition, led by Special Envoy Bret McGurk, herent Resolve (OIR, or the anti-IS coalition). has strategically excluded institution-building The coalition conducted more than 13,000 initiatives, leaving the fate of Iraq in Prime strikes in Iraq as of 9 August 2017, with ex- Minister al-Abadi’s and Syria in Assad’s penditures of over $14.3 billion since 8 August hands. As such, the US State Department and 2014. In Iraq, Trump’s Pentagon continues to USAID still operate under an Obama-era pol- rely on Kurdish Peshmerga forces. It has also icy: stabilisation not reconstruction. As part 13,000 continued coordinated eforts with Iraq’s Shia of stabilisation eforts, the State Department airstrikes conducted Al-Hashd Al-Shaabi (or Popular Mobilisation has reiterated US support in infrastructure vs by the US in Syria Units) in joint-operations in the Western An- institution-building and repatriation eforts for and Iraq since 2015 bar province and Mosul. These operations displaced civilians. 75

US ENGAGEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST

14.3 billion $ — Expenditure for the war on IS in Syria and Iraq (2014-17) 100,000 — Security forces trained in Iraq 300 million $ — Contracts for providing weapons, vehicles, and supplies to Kurdish units 110 billion $ — Deal with Saudi Arabia for providing cybersecurity technology, tanks, artillery, ships, helicopters and radar missile-defense systems

13,000 — Aistrikes against IS (2014-17)

US naval and air bases

Naval bases: Naval Support Activity Muharraq Airfield Masirah 1 Bahrain 2 Bahrain 3 Oman

Camp Patriot Fujairah naval base Umm Qasr 4 Kuwait 5 Kuwait 6 Iraq

Air bases: Sheik Isa Air Base Al Udeid Air Base 1 Bahrain 2 Qatar

Ali Al Salem Ahmed Al Jaber 3 Kuwait 4 Kuwait 6 Al Dhafra King Khalid City KUWAIT 4 5 UAE 6 Saudi Arabia 12 3 4 Riyadh Air Base Eskan Village 7 Saudi Arabia 8 Saudi Arabia

1 2 BAHRAIN 3 SAUDI ARABIA 1 QATAR 2 5 8 5 6 14 7 UAE Air bases: OMAN 9 Taif Air Base 10 9 Saudi Arabia 11 10 Jeddah Air Base Saudi Arabia 13 11 Masirah Island Oman 15 12 Tabuk Air Base Saudi Arabia

13 Ali Musnanah Oman

14 Seeb Air Base Oman 15 Thumait Air Base Oman

Data: US Department of State 76 SHARED SECURITY

EGYPT: A BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP Number of US drone atacks against THROUGH MILITARY PARTNERSHIP terrorist targets in Yemen The US-Egypt relationship has had its share 2011 16 of turmoil over the past few years as the Obama administration tried to balance its strategic 2012 55 $7.5 billion interests with support for democratic norms. US foreign aid to When Trump took ofce, the Egyptian Pres- 2013 22 Middle East countries in 2016 ident al-Sisi was among the first to congratu- 2014 19 late him and Trump invited him to the White House, ending the characteristic diplomatic 2015 22 cold shoulder of the Obama years. Neverthe- less, the US State Department withheld $195 2016 37 million in military aid and cut $96 million, os- 2017 103 tensibly for Egypt’s human rights record. New drone strikes revelations, however, suggest that the move Data: The Bureau of Investigative Journalism had less to do with Egypt’s domestic policy and more to do with a perceived slight by the Trump administration. Trump condemned the Qatari government for Egypt has also maintained a largely un- alleged support of terrorist organizations. De- der-the-table relationship with North Korea spite Trump’s initial support of Qatar’s block- at a time when the Trump administration has ade, however, his administration has been vowed to increase North Korea’s economic and critical of the coordinated assault on Qatar, diplomatic isolation. A recent UN sanctions reflecting its concerns that the rif could de- commitee report also implicated Egypt in the velop into a larger security crisis. US Secretary purchasing of small arms from the pariah na- of State Rex Tillerson has questioned the three tion. US ofcials confirmed that this, among Gulf states behaviour and designated Kuwait as other incidents, contributed to the decision to a neutral source of mediation, hosting negoti- withhold a portion of the foreign assistance. ations between parties over the course of four Despite the tension, the Trump adminis- days in July. tration agreed to resume the Bright Star joint To balance the Gulf states’ anxiety over the military exercise with Egypt. Since 2013, when US-led Iran nuclear agreement, Obama had of- Obama suspended the exercise, Egypt has fered a considerable amount of military support struggled with an active terrorist presence, and even close cooperation with the Saudi-led particularly in the Sinai Peninsula. The mili- coalition’s leadership in its war in Yemen. De- tary partnership remains a cornerstone of the spite its criticalities, the value of Saudi Arabia bilateral relationship and the United States has as a partner supersedes its human rights record continued to provide military assistance and and its newfound assertiveness on the regional border surveillance equipment for Egyptian stage. Unlike Obama’s time, however, growing forces. Trump’s atitude toward Egypt will focus impatience with the Gulf allies has led to diver- on those same interests it has always held dear: gent opinions in the Trump administration that priority access through the Suez Canal, Israeli has started to chip away at the historically priv- security and a close military relationship. ileged relationship.

THE ARAB GULF STATES: TACKLING THE RIFT YEMEN: FOCUSING ON AQAP In Saudi Arabia, Trump signed the largest Nine days afer his inauguration, Trump arms agreement in history with the monarchy ordered a Navy SEAL raid in Yemen targeting $12.3 million in May 2017. The visit also birthed a new coun- an al-Qaeda cell. The raid embodied a contin- average daily cost terterrorism initiative, the Joint Strategic Vision uation of the Obama-era policy that authorised of US operations in Syria and Iraq since Declaration. In the diplomatic row between the use of force against al-Qaeda in the Arab 2014 the Gulf states over the months that followed, Peninsula (AQAP), but against the backdrop 77

US foreign assistance Yet the increasing human cost, mounting inter- in the Middle East (2016) national and domestic criticism, and potential #med2017 damage to international standing may force With US interests rela- Israel 3,100 tively narrowly defined the Trump administration to strictly limit its in- Egypt 1,381 by both administra- volvement in Yemen to anti-AQAP operations. tions in the region, Jordan 1,000 in the region, policy continuity is more likely Iraq 347 NORTH AFRICA: COUNTERTERRORISM IS THE than abrupt ruptures West Bank & Gaza 281 KEY Syria 191 Trump’s main order of business in Lib- Lebanon 103 ya remains focused on counterterrorism. In Tunisia 54 September, Trump ordered the first airstrikes Yemen 35 against IS forces in Libya, but it is not the first time the United States has struck IS there. As Libya 31 with Obama’s airstrikes, the Trump adminis- million of dollars tration carried them out in coordination with Data: US Department of State the UN-backed Government of National Ac- cord (GNA) and Prime Minister Fayez al-Serraj. of the concurrent Saudi-led war against the The Trump administration has also taken Houthi rebels, the public increasingly began to a stronger stance in supporting Special Rep- view US involvement as problematic. Trump resentative of the Secretary General Ghassan also loosened the strict Obama-era rules of en- Salame’s UN-led mediation between the GNA gagement, giving military commanders greater and General Khalifa Hafar. Whether this will leeway in conducting their operations – but evolve into an invested US efort in the Libyan with the side efect of greater civilian casualties. theatre remains to be seen but early signs look The Obama administration had provided encouraging. Meanwhile in Tunisia, the ad- logistical support, targeting, and mid-air refu- ministration decided to reduce funding as se- elling to the Saudi-led coalition, but became curity threats are no longer a primary concern. increasingly wary of implicating the United Budget cuts in Tunisia underscore the admin- States in suspected war crimes. It suspended istration’s priorities in focusing on counterter- some of its military cooperation to the Sau- rorism and security as opposed to an agenda di-led coalition in Yemen, but still gave Saudi directly focused on institution-building. Arabia the room to outmanoeuvre calls for ac- countability at the UN Human Rights Council. LARGELY UNCHANGED The rising civilian toll and potential for US Ten months into Donald Trump’s presiden- culpability in war crimes has prompted US law- cy ofers few data points from which to derive makers to call for a review of the 2001 Authori- his strategic vision for the MENA region. While sation for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) his atitude toward liberal internationalism and multiple atempts to stop weapons sales to and traditional foreign policy norms difer Saudi Arabia. Public pressure helped convince greatly from Obama’s, the resulting policy ap- Obama to stop the transfer of some arms to pears remarkably the same. What deviations Saudi Arabia toward the end of his tenure, but have emerged appear either superficial (as in the bulk of the military relationship remained the case of the Syria strike) or driven by uncon- intact. Under Trump, growing support in the trollable externalities (as in the case of grow- US Congress to hold Saudi to account has led to ing discontent with Arab Gulf actions). Both more atempts to block weapons sales, though presidents share a security-driven view of the none of these eforts have yet been successful. Middle East and a desire for a lighter footprint. Trump’s counterterrorism focus, pro-Arab With US interests relatively narrowly defined Gulf stance, and anti-Iran calculations clearly by both administrations in the region, in the rely on military force that made Yemen a con- region, policy continuity is more likely than venient batleground to demonstrate all three. abrupt ruptures. 78 SHARED SECURITY Syria: testing Russia’s 1.6 long-term strategy in the Middle East

Andrey Kortunov Director General, Russian International Afairs Council (RIAC)

SHARED The profound crisis of the Middle East studies is arguably among the oldest and the SECURITY region has many layers. The most visible most accomplished. This knowledge of the one is the spread of religious fundamen- region and experience on the ground im- talism, political extremism and interna- plies that in Moscow there should be no illu- tional terrorism. Another, more funda- sions about Russia’s ability to dominate the mental though less visible layer of the crisis Middle East or to replace the United States is the decay of the regional state system, a as the main security provider for the region. spectacular weakness of basic state institu- The Russian capacities may be significant, tions and secular political regimes. Finally, but they are clearly not limitless. Besides, the third layer is the failure of economic and Russia has many higher priority interests in social modernisation models that have been other parts of the world including Europe, tested in the Arab world for the last fify or East Asia and the territory of the former So- sixty years. viet Union. It would be fair to say that the modern So, why did Russia intervene in Syria? The Middle East is too important to leave it to prime reason was not to rescue the regime in Middle Easterners alone. The paradox of the Damascus. Bashar al-Assad had never been situation, however, is that while many det- a client of the Kremlin or a close friend of rimental repercussions of negative devel- Vladimir Putin, and Syria has too litle to opments in the Middle East become more ofer Russia as an economic partner. True, and more significant for the outside world, it might provide a convenient access to the the outside world has less and less leverage Mediterranean, but Damascus is in no way to influence unforeseen and unpredictable unique in this sense. Neither was the Krem- tectonic changes in the region. The outside lin deliberately trying to create additional involvement in various forms – from size- problems for the United States by com- able technical assistance programs to direct plicating maters in Syria. If this were the military interventions – has in most cases case, it would be more logical to encourage a turned out to be inefcient, and in some in- large-scale US intervention in Syria, turning stances totally counterproductive. One can this country into yet another headache for diagnose a growing scepticism about any Americans similar to Iraq or Afghanistan. positive impact that an external involve- Even less plausible is the assumption that ment can have on the Middle East region Moscow was and still is commited to sup- under the current circumstances. porting Shias against Sunnis. Russian Mus- lims are predominantly Sunni, and some of 4,000 CHALLENGING THE WESTERN APPROACH the best Russian friends in the Arab world Russian military IN THE MIDDLE EAST (e.g. Egypt) happen to be Sunni, not Shia. personnel stationed in Syria since Russia has a long history in dealing with Initially the Russian intervention was pri- September 2015 the Arab world; the Russian school of Arab marily a pedagogical action. Afer the West 79

Russian arms sales to the MENA region (2000-2016)

Russia’s share of country’s arm imports:

<40% 40-60% 60-80% 80-100% 0% N.A. Morocco Libya Iran Algeria Tunisia Palestine Egypt Oman Syria Israel territories Jordan Lebanon Iraq Saudi Arabia Kuwait Qatar UAE Bahrain Yemen Data: SIPRI

(mostly the US, of course) had demonstrated crisis was short-lived. The failure of this its spectacular inability to “fix” places like strategy became apparent in the fall of 2016, Iraq, Libya and Afghanistan, Moscow could when the painfully negotiated Kerry-Lavrov ofer a diferent, more practical and more ef- peace plan collapsed only a couple of weeks ficient approach to the region. This was par- afer signing. It would seems that this expe- ticularly important afer the Ukrainian crisis rience led to a serious reassessment of the 41 cast a dark shadow over Russia’s relations Russian approach to Syria and to the region casualties among Russian military with its Western partners. The Kremlin had at large. Afer that, the Kremlin focused its personnel between to demonstrate that it could be a part of the energy and diplomatic skills on building a October 2015 and solution, not a part of a problem. The idea coalition of regional players through the As- October 2017 was not to replace the West in the Middle tana de-escalation process. Bringing Turkey East, but to change the Western approach and Iran to the negotiating table was an un- to the region, and most importantly to con- questionable diplomatic victory for Vladimir vince Western leaders that their enthusi- Putin and the Kremlin was working hard to astic support for the Arab spring had been get major Arab countries interested in this an irresponsible, short-sighted, and very new arrangement. The invitation was also dangerous approach. This idea apparent- extended to the United States, but the US ly reflects the overall mental framework of participation was no longer considered crit- contemporary Russian leaders, who believe ical for the success of Russia’s Syrian strat- that the real borderline in global politics to- egy. day divides not democracy from authoritar- ianism, but order from chaos. BEYOND SYRIA: A LONG-TERM PLAN? However, this hope to use Syria as an The ongoing Russian atempts to forge opportunity to limit the damage in Rus- a broad coalition of “responsible” regional sia-West relations caused by the Ukrainian players in the Middle East seem to go be- 80 SHARED SECURITY

Areas of influence in Syria and Russian presence

Pro-Assad: Hezbollah Aleppo Raqqa Iran

Russia Deir al-Zour

Tartus Anti-Assad: Homs Palmyra Jordan

United States

Damascus Turkey

Saudi Arabia

Qatar

• The Tartus Naval Base, used to provide regime with arms and ammunition 1,700 strong staf 2 repair and supply vessels

• The Bassel al-Assad Airbase, used for military and intelligence operations 2,000 strong staf 16 helicopters 32 planes 9 tanks 2 land-to-air missile defense systems

Data: Anadolu Agency, Institute for the Study of War

yond Syria, indicating the likely direction of under a common hegemonic umbrella are longer-term Kremlin’s plans for the region becoming more and more remote. For Rus- at large. Russia cannot endorse a Middle sia, the “regional uni-polarity” would mean East security system based on a regional the need to break its relations with Iran, a hegemonic power taking responsibility for step Moscow is not ready to take. 74 stability in its “natural” sphere of influence. Another traditional regional security Russian private In the Middle East case, the role of the re- model is based on the leading role of an out- military contractors gional hegemon could be claimed jointly of-area hegemon, which acts as an external dead between by Saudi Arabia and UAE, with Saudis pro- security provider and an honest broker in October 2015 and October 2017 viding most of the “hard” power, with the regional disputes. The United States appears Emirates contributing their political ideolo- to be the perfect candidate to play this role. gy and strategic vision. Both the Yemen and In fact, the concept of a “Greater Middle Qatar crises question the mere feasibility of East” popular with the George W. Bush ad- a “regional uni-polarity”: neither Saudi Ara- ministration in the beginning of the centu- bia nor UAE seem capable of successfully ry envisaged building various military and “managing” arguably much less powerful political alliances in the Middle East and regional players. On the contrary, political North Africa under a US security protector- divisions in the region are geting deeper ate. Moscow consistently opposed this idea. and prospects for a regional reconciliation At the end of the day, the “Greater Middle 81

East” turned out to be stillborn. First, it was WHAT SECURITY MODEL FOR THE MIDDLE incepted by DC-based analysts and bureau- EAST? #med2017 crats with questionable knowledge of the re- Where should Moscow look for alter- the idea of a collective security system in the gion. Second, it implied the idea of division; natives to these deficient models? For the Middle East appears the intention was to mobilise the Arab world Russian leadership, the only plausible al- to be very distant from the current regional for a joint struggle against US opponents ternative is a collective security model ap- realities and foes in the region. plied to the Middle East. This model might It is too early to make any final judgments look too radical, naïve or detached from about the Trump administration strategy the current regional political realities. Nev- in the Middle Eastern region, but for the ertheless, the desperate situation in Yemen Kremlin there are grounds to suspect that and the stalemate around Qatar suggest that the United States might get back to its past any half-way, tactical solutions are not good stance. The concept of an “Arab NATO” enough to handle basic security problems of backed by the US and targeted against the region. Iran seems to gain momentum in Wash- One of the fundamental principles of any ington. The odds are that this concept will international collective security system is be no more successful than the concept of its inclusive nature. Leading Arab nations – a “Greater Middle East”: the Arab world is Egypt, Saudi Arabia, UAE and others – have very complex and highly diverse, interests to play a decisive role in building such a and priorities of various Arab states are in system. However, from the Moscow’s view- no way identical. An atempt to create a de- point, no one should ignore the non-Arab fence alliance similar to NATO in the region states of the region – such as Iran, Turkey does not look realistic. and Israel. These states are no less interest- Nevertheless, one could imagine that ed in a stable, predictable, prosperous and such a military bloc could indeed emerge vibrant Middle East than their Arab neigh- in the Middle East. What security problems bours are. It would be not only unfair, but would it be in a position to resolve? In the also highly short-sighted to remove any of best-case scenario, this arrangement would these states from the regional arrangement. freeze the current conflicts in the region in To exclude just a single major player would the form of a regional Cold War. As we know make the whole system extremely fragile from European history in the second half and unreliable. of the 20th century, this scenario has many Of course, the idea of a collective security negative strings atached, including mutual system in the Middle East appears to be very mistrust and suspicions, continuous arms distant from the current regional realities, race and political tensions and, most im- but Moscow regards its successful endgame portantly, an inherent risk that the Cold War in Syria as the first step towards this remote, might turn into a real “hot” war. but atainable goal.

2 SHARED PROSPERITY 84 SHARED PROSPERITY Promoting intra-regional trade 2.1 in the southern Mediterranean

Maria Demertzis Deputy Director, Bruegel Filippo Biondi Former Research Assistant, Bruegel

SHARED Despite the recent narrative of trade pro- duced their high dependence on EU products PROSPERITY tectionism, free and open trade is accepted (around 50%), Libya and Egypt significantly as the right means to promote growth and increased imports from European countries. prosperity. And regional trade integration is Simultaneously, the economic rise of Chi- the first step towards opening markets and na and India has been a mixed blessing for benefiting in terms of welfare. Trade inte- the countries in North Africa. On the one gration in the south of the Mediterranean hand, higher demand from these countries (MED) is still very low and incomplete. There has partially ofset the reduced European are important economies of scale and diver- demand in the afermath of the crisis. On sification opportunities that remain largely the other, domestic producers and exporters untapped. At the same time, while several have seen an increase in competition from trade agreements are in place – too many, ac- China and India, especially in the textile and cording to some – they have not succeeded electronics industries. in creating the necessary conditions for trade But a striking feature of the southern Med- to ultimately develop. However, none of the iterranean countries is the uncharacteristi- existing economies of scale or necessary con- cally low level of intra-regional integration. ditions for trade can be created before peace, Intra-regional trade represents only 5.5% of political stability and economic security are total exports and even less (3.9%) of total im- re-established. There is a clear role for Europe ports. According to the African Development to play here. European countries have been Bank, it has been the lowest of any region in 5.5% actively involved in the region, but the next the world and well below that achieved by step in promoting the region’s development other regional communities in Africa, such as southern Mediterranean will rely on (more) coordinated action. This the Southern African Development Commu- intra-regional exports will be necessary to promote intra-regional nity (SADC) or the Common Market for East- on total exports trade. ern and Southern Africa (COMESA).1 A number of factors underpin this lack of TRADE INTEGRATION IN THE REGION: LOW regional trade. First, the region’s modest in- AND INCOMPLETE come and size compared to neighbouring The EU is by far the most significant trad- Europe makes it gravitate towards the later. ing partner of MED countries. The EU at- Close links with Europe mask the need to de- tracts more than half of Algerian, Libyan, velop stronger regional links. Moroccan and Tunisian exports, and also Second, it reflects the lack of complemen- accounts for a large share of Egypt’s exports. tarity in production structures of countries 3.9% Energy trade is arguably the most important in the region. However, as Chaponnière and southern economic link between the two regions. Im- Lautier point out, the success of the Associ- Mediterranean in- tra-regional imports ports are slightly less concentrated. In the last ation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on total imports years, while Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia re- model is based on intra-industry rather than 85

A REGION STILL LITTLE INTEGRATED Share of intra-regional trade in merchandise, % of total

60% 23% 20% 13% 10%

EU28 ASEAN SADC LAIA GAFTA

8% 4% 4% 2%

ECOWAS Northern African COMESA Agadir countries

REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN EUROPE, AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

EUROMED Albania Bosnia and Herz. European Union Monaco Turkey Montenegro Israel UMA GAFTA

Libya AGADIR Bahrain Iraq Lebanon Kuwait Algeria Morocco Tunisia Egypt Jordan Oman Palestine Qatar Saudi Arabia Syria Mauritania UAE Sudan Yemen

Eritrea Kenya COMESA Eastern and Southern African Countries

Data: author’s calculation on COMTRADE data 86 SHARED PROSPERITY

inter-industry regional trade.2 Ben Ali also TRADE AGREEMENTS: AN OBSTACLE TO agrees that the region can benefit from de- TRADE INTEGRATION? veloping intra-industry trade and upgrading The low level of integration contrasts with their respective export quality.3 the numerous regional trade agreements that Beyond these structural constraints, there are found in the region. The figure on page 83 278% are various infrastructure-related and pol- provides a representation of North African of production value: icy-induced impediments to intra-regional countries’ membership in various Regional trade costs between the Maghreb countries trade. Shepherd reports the perverse efect of Economic Communities and how they over- North African countries having lower costs lap. Analysts agree that the proliferation of when they trade with Europe than when they (ofen overlapping) trade arrangements has trade between them.4 Trade costs between actually had negative efects due to an accu- Maghreb ranged from 335% of production mulation of rules that are largely inconsistent value in 1995 to 278% in 2014, about twice as in terms of application and scope.9 In partic- high as trade costs with European states. This ular, the diverse rule of origin systems is con- is due to the relatively few active transport sidered a major impediment to the creation of corridors across the region and the existence integrated supply chains in the region. of fragmented logistics services markets. The Initiatives aimed at regional integration World Bank reports that improving logistic such as GAFTA (Greater Arab Free Trade performance would reduce average bilateral Area) and AMU (Arab Maghreb Union) have trade costs by a factor of ten compared to an fallen below expectations mainly due to a equivalent percentage reduction in average lack of implementation and the persistence tarifs.5 of non-tarif measures. Nevertheless, the EU Third, non-tarif measures, like compli- regarded the Agadir Agreement as the most cated customs clearance and overburdened promising way of enhancing south-south in- administrative processes, still represent a rel- tegration. Despite the rather limited efect of evant hurdle, as reported by the International the process, the EU has supported the seting Trade Centre.6 Another impeding factor to up of the Agadir Technical Unit. According intra-regional trade relates to restrictive rules to Behr, part of the EU’s enthusiasm for the of origin (ROOs). According to the OCP Poli- Agadir Process over GAFTA stems from the cy Center, diagonal accumulation only exists fact that Agadir links closely the southern across a subset of countries and generally dif- Mediterranean countries to the EU.10 Thus, fers across some Euro-Med countries (e.g. the the Agadir countries adhere to the Pan-Euro ROOs for Egypt are not the same as those for Med Rules of Origins and apply the so-called Tunisia and Morocco), which further restricts Euro Med certificates to their exports. In light efective market access to the EU.7 of this, a few positive developments are worth Lastly, political instability throughout mentioning: last year Palestine and Lebanon North Africa and more generally across the joined the Agadir Agreement and recently region, has not helped the cause of economic Egypt ofcially declared its intention to re- growth and integration. Firstly, Algeria and vive the agreement, in light of the tension be- Libya have very unpredictable environments tween Egypt and some Gulf states. Contrary for foreign operators, a clear disincentive to the intention of a free trade agreement to to mutual trade and investment. Secondly, harmonise standards and increase coopera- there is latent hostility between Algeria and tion, agreements in the region have failed to Morocco around the issue of Western Sa- produce the desired efect. Improving that re- hara, which led to the closure of the Algeri- quires expanding the scope of existing agree- an-Moroccan border in 1997. In practice, this ments to include more countries. has severely restricted the flow of goods and people between the two nations and probably A ROLE FOR THE EU? represents the largest barrier to economic in- In line with the G20 agenda, the role of the tegration in the region.8 EU in the region is both crucial to its own in- 87 terests and pivotal for the MED region itself. der to prevent this from happening, the EU But the issues and EU involvement are noth- would need to encourage interregional talks #med2017 ing new. Development banks are already (EU-MED) rather than engaging directly with Intra-regional trade integration present in the region and European coun- individual countries. This by itself can help is a crucial and tries themselves have their own established centralise cooperation and rethink the num- unexploited factor for future development. ways of contributing. The EU’s role could be ber and focus of current trade agreements. strengthened in the following ways: Third, the EU should continue to help First, coordinating eforts from the Eu- regional organisations to function more ropean side would maximise the breadth efectively within the limited margin and depth of help provided. This may re- set by the political process, and with that quire centralising at least part of the national demonstrate its commitment to south-south eforts made, in order to ensure consistency integration. However, funds currently ear- and to target priority objectives. marked for regional cooperation schemes Second, the issue of coordination needs probably fall far short of what would poten- to happen also in terms who Europe en- tially be needed. gages with. Studies show that when the EU The sustainable development of south- engages bilaterally with the countries of the ern Mediterranean countries is a strategic region, it runs the risk of reinforcing non-co- long-term investment for the EU in terms operative behaviour.11 This means that each of economic relations and with a view to MED partner prefers to conduct its own ne- containing migratory waves from the rest of gotiations to extract preferential treatment in Africa, that will continue to increase in the direct competition with its own neighbours. future.12 Intra-regional trade integration is a This is an important limitation to the “hub- crucial and unexploited factor for future de- and-spoke” relationship with the EU. In or- velopment. 88 SHARED PROSPERITY Iran’s economic 2.2 reintegration: constraints and prospects

Dorothée Schmid Head of Turkey / Middle East Program, IFRI Ali Rostom Research Assistant, IFRI

SHARED Iran’s economy has been isolated from agreement was meant to bring about change PROSPERITY the global system since 2006 afer reports in their country by integrating their econo- dating back to 2003 suggested that the coun- my into the global market.3 The deal was also try was developing a clandestine nuclear espoused by the Iranian political elite who programme in spite of its ratification of the seemed on board with Rouhani. As secondary Non-proliferation Treaty in 1970. Given Te- sanctions – aiming at severing any ties be- heran’s reluctance to cooperate with the IAEA, tween non-American firms and Iran – were the Security Council enacted sanctions against lifed, many pundits believed that business Iran followed by American and European uni- openings would arise in the financial, banking, lateral measures.1 Afer a decade of unfruitful energy, petrochemical, shipping, shipbuilding, negotiations, the parties eventually reached a and automotive sectors.4 Iranian ofcials were setlement in July 2015, one month afer Has- bent on finding foreign investments especially san Rouhani’s election, sparking a huge wave in the mining, energy, automotive steel, and of enthusiasm amongst European countries. technology sectors.5 Iran is indeed a massive Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action market with a highly educated population and (JCPOA), the five Security Council members, countless natural resources.6 Substantial in- Germany2 and the European Union undertook vestments were nonetheless necessary in or- to relieve nuclear-related sanctions imposed der to revitalise such a britle sector hindered on Iran. Multinational corporations scrambled by decades of sanctions. This also holds true to restore trade with Iran. Yet many issues re- for the relatively developed – although frail – mained unresolved and pitfalls were looming banking sector. European ofcials from Ger- large. Trump’s election put the deal in limbo many, Italy and France endeavoured to capi- as he immediately imposed new sanctions on talise on the opportunity by sending high-level Iranian companies. The US President evinced ofcials to Iran. Italy and France were also the his reluctance to any further rapprochement first countries visited by Rouhani on a presi- with Iran by refusing to recertify the nuclear dential trip afer Implementation Day in Jan- deal. His decision is likely to take its toll on the uary 2016. Various Chambers of Commerce viability of the JCPOA. European leaders have and Industry representing small- and medi- nevertheless maintained a unified voice and um-sized European enterprises dispatched reafrmed their commitment to the deal. business representatives in order to see how the land lies. In fact, US companies were still A LONG WAY UP TO MEET EXPECTATIONS held back by the feters of non-nuclear related $13.7 billion The JCPOA was perceived as a massive vic- sanctions which ofered a comparative advan- value of EU-Iran tory for the moderate camp led by President tage to European companies.7 trade in 2016 Rouhani. Iranians thought at first that this A wide spectrum of business deals and 89

The terms of the Iran deal

Uranium enrichment First-generation centrifuges installed Advanced centrifuges installed

from 19,138 to 6,104 from 1,034 to zero

Uranium stockpile Low-enriched (< 3.67%) Medium-enriched (20%)

from 19,211 lbs to 660 lbs from 430 lbs to zero lbs

“Breakout time”

from 1-2 months to 1 year

Iran will grant access to inspectors and permit continuous surveillance

Data: IAEA; Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action memorandums of understanding were signed as Iranians were mostly optimistic about the between Iranian and global European com- future. His electoral platform favouring inter- panies (Total, Siemens, Airbus). It is worth national engagement and domestic reforms mentioning that Europe – now playing second ensured him the necessary support from the fiddle to China – was Iran’s biggest trade part- reformist and moderate camps. The release of ner before 2006 and European businesses still frozen assets could help the country import enjoy a good reputation in the country. In the industrial equipment, raw materials and con- 2017 presidential elections, Hassan Rouhani sumer goods.8 managed to secure a second term with around However, many issues are yet to be solved. 57% of the votes cast in the first round. His Besides the sanctions, Iran’s structural eco- $41.1 billion positive economic record and the implemen- nomic weakness could put a damper on for- value of oil exports of tation of the nuclear deal played in his favour eign companies’ will to invest in the short Iran in 2016 90 SHARED PROSPERITY

Stock of foreign direct investments in Iran (billion of dollars)

50

40

30

20

10

0 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Data: World Bank

term. Onerous regulations – making Iran’s against a backdrop of popular discontent de- shambolic bureaucracy one of the most infa- spite Rouhani’s election. Iran still cleaves to mous models in the world – ofen dissuade the “Resistance Economy’’ model as the Su- foreign investors. Moreover, inflation and un- preme Leader – Ali Khameini – declared in employment rates remain high despite some March 2017 that his country should focus on improvement.9 In order to reap the rewards of safeguarding its economy from any foreign in- the JCPOA, Iran is indeed in desperate need of terference. Moreover, Trump withheld his con- economic reforms. European investors have a sent to certify the deal in October 2017, a deci- long way to go before they can fully penetrate sion that may prove to be the straw that breaks the Iranian market: they still have “to conduct the camel’s back. Trump’s scathing stance accurate due diligence to avoid the remaining against Iran is anathema to most European US sanctions, to find partners they are com- leaders who fear that such blistering rhetoric fortable with and to get the green light from might scutle the agreement and bring Europe their banks’’.10 and Iran’s economic relations to a crossroads. In fact, companies willing to cooperate with THE MAZE OF US SANCTIONS Iran were already constrained by non-nuclear The path towards full economic integration related sanctions and still had to scrupulously with the West is indeed fraught with thorns. heed these hindrances.13 Now that the Unit- As time went by, Iranian hardliners grew sus- ed States is apparently backpedalling on the picious about US intentions. Donald Trump’s agreement, Europe would have to devise new election added fuel to fire. Ever since his in- strategies in order to bypass this obstacle. vestiture as the US President, he set the tone American legislators now have until De- with Teheran by contending that “the Iran deal cember to decide whether they will either made by the previous Administration is one impose new sanctions or keep the status-quo. of the worst deals [he has] ever witnessed’’.11 The EU three (France, Germany and UK) seem The US President constantly nagged Iran and at odds with the US and appear to be facing a imposed new sanctions in February 2017. In mammoth conundrum. Should Congress re- $4.8 billion his visit to Riyadh in May 2017, he excoriated instate nuclear sanctions, European leaders value of the deal Khamenei for allegedly supporting terrorism willing to uphold the deal should prepare new signed by Iran with 12 France’s Total in July and called to isolate Iran. As a result, many gambits allowing them to outwit the US. Ex- 2017 to develop the high-ranked clerics, including the Supreme tensive collaboration with Russia and China South Pars gas field Leader, distanced themselves from the deal should be the overriding priority. A clear po- 91 litical discourse is also needed in order to re- Iran by allowing it to become a “responsible 16 assure Iran and European companies as well. actor” in the area. The current standof with #med2017 New mechanisms might be designed to pro- the US and the lack of incentives might spur With few options lef, Iran is likely to turn tect European firms from American extrater- Iran to pursue its regional policy agenda with towards Asia, especially ritorial sanctions. However, Washington has litle heed to Europe’s interests. China, to maintain its economic momentum. a head start over Europe due to the fact that European banks are greatly interwoven with ALTERNATIVE HORIZONS FOR IRAN the US market.14 In the meantime, Europe, With few options lef, Iran is likely to turn Russia and China can use their leverage to try towards Asia, especially China – and to a less- to mollify the Iranian regime while trying to er extent Japan and Korea – to maintain its persuade the US to abide by the agreement. economic momentum. Indeed, China is prac- Even though the Iranian Foreign Minister tically sheltered from American sanctions and Javad Zarif declared that his country would Iran has a central place in Beijing’s One Belt remain in the deal even without the US, many One Road Initiative. This ambitious initiative American and European ofcials believe that that revolves around infrastructure projects further sanctions might prod Iran to resume and Eurasian integration might serve Iran’s its nuclear agenda.15 Due to its geographic interests. China is already investing massive proximity to the Middle East, Europe is ex- sums in Iran’s transport and energy sectors. posed to higher risks in relation to the current Teheran has now the opportunity to thrust situation in the region. The EU believed that into its immediate neighbourhood, providing greater economic cooperation might placate a new alternative fuelled by China’s impetus. 92 SHARED PROSPERITY A new “vision” 2.3 for diversification in Saudi Arabia

Eugenio Dacrema Associate Research Fellow, ISPI

SHARED The objectives envisioned by the Saudi undertake new businesses and enterprises. PROSPERITY government’s long-term economic transfor- Unlike previous generations, young Saudis en- mation plan “Vision 2030” represent noth- tering the labour market would cease looking ing less than a top-down revolution of the for low-productive jobs in the public adminis- economic and social structures of the king- tration and find employment in a competitive dom. The plan was launched in April 2016 by and well-remunerated private sector. Accord- the current Crown Prince Mohammad Bin ing to the plan, by 2030 Saudi Arabia would Salman and constitutes the most ambitious become a solid, diversified economy, indepen- diversification plan ever launched by a Gulf dent from oil-revenues, and characterised by a monarchy. It is meant to transform Saudi Ara- young and dynamic private sector. bia from a state-led, oil-dependent economy The radical and profound transformations to a diversified and private-sector driven one. entailed by Saudi Vision 2030 provide at the Such a transformation would include a deep same time great opportunities and significant rebalance of the labour market, today charac- risks for the future of the kingdom. The young terised by a relatively small private sector pop- and ambitious Crown Prince has bet much of ulated almost exclusively by foreign workers, his credibility on the success of the plan; in the and a public sector that employs more than medium and long term, a failure to achieve its 90% of Saudi national workers. Through a goals may result in economic and political in- vast plan of privatisation of state enterprises stability. and properties, the Saudi government aims to collect the resources necessary to establish the MOVING THE ECONOMY AWAY FROM OIL biggest sovereign fund of the world. The fund Vision 2030 does not constitute the first would then be employed to support a dramatic atempt to diversify the Saudi economy. Di- expansion of the private non-oil sector whose versification has been pursued by the coun- value is planned to increase from the current try’s government for decades, although so far $43 billion to over $250 billion. This expansion litle has been accomplished. One of the main would also lead to a significant diversification reasons for these failures is to be found in the of the country’s exports: the non-oil export trends of oil prices. Periods like the one com- share is planned to increase from the current prised between 2009 and 2014 – 5 years when 16% to 50%. Such a deep and structural trans- prices remained steadily over 100 dollars per formation would be accompanied by the con- barrel – have rendered the eforts for diversi- tinuation of the “Saudisation” of the private fication mostly futile. In fact, the constant and labour sector, started under the rule of King abundant stream of revenues dramatically re- $250 billion Abdallah, and further pushed forward by King duced the incentives for moving the economy the expected value Salman. In fact, most of the private sector’s ex- away from oil-dependence. This is probably of non-oil sector in Saudi Arabia pansion would occur through the employment one of the main reasons that led King Salman, by 2030 of young Saudis, who would be encouraged to who acceded the Saudi throne in 2014, to in- 93

THE AIMS OF SAUDI VISION 2030

From 8m to 30m 7% 5.7% of GDP The planned increase Unemployment rate, The planned contribution in annual Umrah down from of foreign direct investment. visitors 11.6% today Today it stands at 3.8%

65% of GDP 5 universities 30% Private sector contribution, In the top 200 Women expected to be in the up from 40% global ranking for education workforce, up from today institutions 22% today

SAR 7 trillion 50% 16% to 50% Expected in Public Localised military The expected increase Investment Fund assets, spending, in non-oil up from SAR 600bn today up from 2% today GDP exports

SAR 1 trillion 40% 80 years in non-oil government Of individuals exercising The average life revenue, up from at least once a week, expectancy, from SAR 163bn today up from 13% today 74 years old today

Data: Vision 2030 94 SHARED PROSPERITY

crease dramatically the country’s oil produc- Crude oil exports (thousands barrel/day) tion at the end of that year. The objective of this move was twofold: first, by leting the oil Saudi Arabia 7,517 price dramatically fall below 100 dollars (some- times reaching record-low levels at 30-35 dol- Russia 5,487 5% lars), the kingdom aimed to conquer as many of the national oil market quotas as possible in order to assure company ARAMCO West Africa 4,335 will be sold to private its long-term leading position in the energy stakeholders market and, at the same time, to eliminate or Others significantly curb the production of alterna- Middle East 4,069 tive extra-OPEC sources such as shale gas and in-depth extractions. Second, by keeping Iraq 3,554 the price steadily below the current breakev- en price of the Saudi budget, the leadership South and 3,554 created the incentives to quickly implement Central America the economic reforms aimed at moving the national economy away from oil dependence. Canada 3,293 The second key move planned for the im- plementation of Saudi Vision 2030 is the pri- UAE 2,468 vatisation of national companies and proper- ties. The kick-start moment will be the sale of Kuwait 2,069 5% of the Saudi national oil company ARAM- CO. This bold move, planned for the beginning Mexico 1,217 of 2018, is meant to earn the State Treasury around $100 billion. This money is planned North to be allocated to a new sovereign fund which Africa 1,165 will be utilised for programmes aimed at sup- Data: British Petroleum (2016) porting new private businesses and the dra- matic expansion of the non-oil sector envi- sioned by Vision 2030. the other OPEC members. The reversal of the oil-price trends caused by this move is consid- THE RISKS AHEAD ered potentially dangerous for the implemen- Since the launch of the plan, the Saudi lead- tation of the most severe measures entailed by ership – especially King Salman and his son Vision 2030, which include cuts in subsidies, (and current Crown Prince) Mohammad bin public salaries, and the introduction of a VAT Salman – has demonstrated a strong commit- tax. In April 2017, following the first significant ment toward its implementation. However, increase in oil prices, the Saudi government afer some initial swif steps ahead, significant reversed the cuts of public sector salaries and obstacles started to emerge. bonuses that it had introduced few months First, the fall of oil prices was more dra- earlier afer some protests from the employees. matic than forecasted. While the Saudi lead- A decision that many observers saw as a step ership had envisioned a stabilisation around backward in the reform programme. $50-60 per barrel, in 2015 and 2016 prices fell A second set of obstacles are emerging re- significantly below this threshold, leading the garding the sale of the 5% share of Saudi AR- Saudi government to employ its financial re- AMCO. A first obstacle is represented by the serves to balance the budget at a faster pace difculties in assessing the market value of $100 billion than forecasted, and causing major economic the company. In fact, numerous experts have problems for other oil-producing countries. raised doubts regarding the real amount of re- the expected earning from the sale of This situation pushed the Saudi government serves available to the company and its future ARAMCO quotas to negotiate a production cut with Russia and independence from the Saudi government 95 which, despite the public sale, will maintain crown prince as a move made from a position possession of 95% of its shares. If the Saudi of strength to further consolidate his power, #med2017 leadership is not able to provide satisfactory others see it as a move dictated by sudden Saudi Vision 2030 represents one of the answers on this point, the sale may not gen- fears over the delicate health of the king, to boldest reform pro- erate the expected earning and thus imperil curb opposition from within the royal family. grammes ever proposed in the MENA region the capacity of the planned sovereign fund Even if apparently silenced by the nomination to stimulate the expansion of the private sec- of Bin Salman as Crown Price, this internal op- tor. Furthermore, selling ARAMCO’s shares position may still have a say in the future of the through an Initial Public Ofering (IPO) may country, especially if the bold plans of Salman legally impair the Saudi government to open- and his son reach a dead-end. ly exert influence on oil prices through its de facto leadership of OPEC, since this would A LONG-TERM VISION amount to indirect price-control exercised by In sum, Saudi Vision 2030 represents one a publicly listed company through the Saudi of the boldest reform programmes ever pro- government, its major shareholder. To over- posed in the MENA region. If implemented, come these obstacles, the Saudi leadership is it promises to reshape from the botom the considering the option of selling ARAMCO’s economic and social structure of the country shares privately, to big investors and sovereign and to set a new, more sustainable course for funds. In particular, the Chinese government the economy away from oil-dependence. The is rumoured to be interested in the private pur- current Saudi leadership has demonstrated to chase of a significant stake. be fully commited to its realisation and some Finally, risks may emerge from the inter- first important steps have already been taken. nal stability of the monarchy. Last June, King However, the road ahead for its implemen- Salman deposed his former Crown Prince, his tation is still long and some serious obstacles nephew Mohammad bin Nayef, and appoint- have already emerged. Oil price trends, dif- ed to the position his young son, the 32-year- culties to successfully sell the 5% percent stake old Mohammad bin Salman. Until that mo- in ARAMCO, and opposition from within the ment, the later had been the vice Crown royal family may represent major risks for the Prince, while the 58-year-old bin Nayef had economic and political stability of the country been nominated Crown Prince in a move in the medium- and long-term. apparently aimed at appeasing the rest of the It is precisely the IPO of Saudi ARAMCO royal family. In fact, several princes were ru- in 2018 that may be key to determining the moured to be concerned about an excessive future success of Saudi Vision 2030. Much of concentration of power in the hands of Salman the credibility of the current Saudi leadership and his line of succession. However, since the depends on its successful outcome. A failure to coronation of his father, Mohammad bin Sal- achieve the forecasted targets may result in a man has been given de facto absolute powers chain reaction that in the medium-term may on nearly every branch of the state, including undermine the legitimacy of the current lead- the economy, the army, and the security forc- ership and, along with it, the entire realisation es. While some see his ofcial nomination as of Vision 2030. 96 SHARED PROSPERITY Energy as a bridge in the 2.4 eastern Mediterranean?

Simone Tagliapietra Research Fellow, Bruegel and Senior Researcher, Fondazione Eni Enrico Matei (FEEM)

SHARED In the last few years, there has been a se- sidering its size, this discovery has reshaped PROSPERITY ries of ofshore gas discoveries in the wa- the regional gas outlook, and also renewed the ters of Israel, Cyprus and Egypt. These have prospects of new regional cooperation. raised hopes about the potential role the east- Zohr will primarily serve the Egyptian do- ern Mediterranean region could play as a new mestic market. As a result of rapid decline in energy supplier. The discoveries also raise the domestic gas production, Egypt has struggled issue of the potential for cooperation on en- over the last few years to meet its domestic ergy to solve long-lasting regional geopolitical demand. It even began importing LNG in tensions, such as over the divided island of 2015, while Egypt’s LNG exports dropped to Cyprus. zero in 2014, leaving the country’s two LNG Though availability of gas resources does plants, Idku and Damieta, completely idle. not automatically imply deliverability, region- Zohr thus represents a major relief for Egypt’s al companies and governments have started constrained gas market. to work on various export plans aimed at Furthermore, Zohr could be the first of a supplying eastern Mediterranean gas to the new string of gas discoveries of the Egyptian neighbouring markets of Europe and Turkey. coast. International oil and gas companies Pipelines (e.g. the East-Med pipeline project have already started to increase operations in and the Israel-Turkey pipeline project) and the area, and if Zohr and other ofshore fields liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects (e.g. the reach their full potential by the mid-2020s, Vassilikos LNG project and Israel’s onshore Egypt might again become an LNG exporter. and ofshore LNG projects) were promptly Zohr’s impact could be felt well beyond proposed. Egypt’s boundaries. Zohr is located only 90 However, the initial high hopes have been km from the Aphrodite gas field in ofshore dampened as geological and regulatory obsta- Cyprus, which in turn is only 7 km from the cles have arisen. In Cyprus, where the discov- Leviathan gas field in ofshore Israel. This ery of gas was welcomed as a gif to relieve the proximity could allow the coordinated devel- country of its financial troubles, there have opment of the fields and thus the economies been successive downward revisions of the of scale needed to put in place a competitive estimated resources. In Israel, a long-lasting regional gas export infrastructure. internal political debate on the management With the LNG plants at Idku and Damieta of the gas resources created a climate of un- currently inactive, Egypt could start to export certainty that has delayed key investment the gas not needed for the domestic market. decisions. Even taking into account the growing domes- tic demand in Egypt, it is fair to assume that NEW PROSPECTS AFTER THE DISCOVERY some export capacity would be lef for Israeli 155.5% OF ZOHR GAS FIELD and Cypriot gas – if it could be brought to the Hopes revived in 2015 when Egypt’s large Egyptian terminals. As both LNG plants can the loss of Egyptian surplus of natural ofshore Zohr gas field was discovered – the be expanded, Israeli and Cypriot developers gas, 2009-17 largest ever found in the Mediterranean. Con- would have a flexible outlet. 97

THE WEALTH UNDER THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN New discoveries of natural gas basins

CYPRUS

Leviathan LEBANON Aphrodite 620 bcm 140 bcm

Zohr 850 bcm

Tamar ISRAEL 280 bcm EGYPT

Proved natural gas reserves and new discoveries

bcm: 2,700 1,081 140 850 Zohr

280 Tamar 620 Leviathan 1,850 Proved reserves 181 Proved reserves before discoveries before discoveries 140 Aphrodite Egypt Israel Cyprus

A POTENTIAL GAS HUB Pipeline and export projects in the eastern Mediterranean

TAP TANAP

Poseidon to Turkey/Italy EASTMED to Italy

to Asia/EU To Egypt

Data: ENI 98 SHARED PROSPERITY

Natural gas production and consumption in Egypt (Mtep)

60

Consumption 50

Production 40

30

20 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 Data: British Petroleum

For Israel and Cyprus, cooperating with first opportunity to test cooperation on gas be- other players in the region is crucial. Build- tween Egypt, Israel and Cyprus. Cooperation ing the export infrastructure and develop- could be scaled-up during the 2020s, should ing the fields is a circular problem: if there is new gas resources be found in the region and a political or commercial risk that no export should gas demand in export markets justify infrastructure will be in place when produc- the construction of additional infrastructure, tion starts, a lot of money will be lost. If the such as an Israel-Cyprus-Greece pipeline. field underperforms compared to expecta- tions, expensive export infrastructure will ASSESSING THE BENEFITS FOR EU sit idle. Consequently, bringing together an AND EGYPT underused and scalable export infrastructure For the European Union, the emergence of and several promising fields could be the key an eastern Mediterranean gas hub would be to unlocking untapped regional potential. beneficial for both energy policy and foreign Utilising the existing Egyptian LNG infra- policy reasons. In terms of energy policy, the structure for the export of eastern Mediter- joint exploitation of eastern Mediterranean ranean gas would also have another major gas resources could, already in the short-term, benefit: geopolitical flexibility. In the eastern contribute to the EU’s long-standing gas sup- Mediterranean region, multiple conflicts ply diversification strategy. In terms of foreign persist: the Cyprus issue; the changing rela- policy, even if eastern Mediterranean gas co- tionships between Turkey, Israel and Egypt; operation is not sufcient by itself to function Israel’s relations with neighbours; the Turk- as a catalyst for overall regional stability, it ish-Greek disputes over the Aegean. In such would be one of the few areas over which sen- a geopolitically-complex region, commiting sible regional dialogue could be established. to new costly and long-term energy infra- On this basis, the EU should become more structure might prove to be difcult for inter- engaged in energy developments in the east- national energy companies. But connecting ern Mediterranean, for instance by estab- #med2017 connecting ofshore ofshore gas fields to the existing LNG infra- lishing an “Eastern Mediterranean Energy fields to existing structure in Egypt might represent an efcient Diplomacy Task Force” that would facilitate LNG infrastructure in Egypt is an and viable solution for the monetisation of re- regional dialogue about the establishment of efcient, viable gional resources. an eastern Mediterranean gas hub based on solution for the monetisation A joint regional export scheme through Egypt’s existing LNG infrastructure. This ini- of regional resources Egypt’s LNG facilities could also provide a tiative should not only focus on natural gas, 99 but also on renewable energy. In fact, natural for both Egypt (i.e. both in terms of revenues gas and renewable energy sources such as and sustainability) and Europe (i.e. in terms of #med2017 wind and solar should well be considered as additional gas imports from the region). gas cooperation represents one of the the two sides of the same (eastern Mediterra- Considering the importance of this ‘nat- few areas where nean energy) coin. ural gas – renewable energy nexus’, it would sensible regional dialogue could be Between 2000 and 2016, Egypt’s primary be important to engage in a newly established established energy demand has doubled and electricity “Eastern Mediterranean Energy Diplomacy demand has even tripled. Egypt has mainly Task Force” not only the private and public satisfied this booming demand by increasing players involved in regional natural gas de- the utilisation of natural gas in domestic elec- velopments, but also the ones involved in tricity generation. In fact, while being rich- regional renewable energy developments. In ly endowed of renewable energy resources, particular, institutions like the European In- Egypt still produces only less than 2 percent of vestment Bank (EIB), the European Bank for its electricity via wind and solar. Promoting a Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), greater utilisation of wind and solar could thus the Association of Mediterranean Energy be highly beneficial for Egypt and its energy Regulators (Med-Reg) and the Association of requirements. In this way, Egypt could also Mediterranean Transmission System Opera- free up additional volumes of natural gas, oth- tors (Med-TSO) should all be included in the erwise used in the domestic electricity genera- new initiative. On this basis, a new “Eastern tion sector. Gas exports would generate imme- Mediterranean Energy Diplomacy Task Force” diate economic returns for the country, that would not only function as a facilitating plat- could also be invested in supporting the fur- form for regional gas cooperation, but also as ther deployment of renewable energy. Such a a powerhouse of overall regional energy sus- virtuous circle would be thus greatly beneficial tainability. 100 SHARED PROSPERITY The blue economy: 2.5 a driver of shared prosperity

Giuseppe Provenzano Expert, Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)

SHARED Exploitation of marine resources has tra- ties while ensuring a sustainable exploitation PROSPERITY ditionally been a field where international of the most visible shared resource in the rules and cooperation were strongly needed. Mediterranean: the sea itself. Promoting re- The international dimension of marine issues gional solutions is a way of reversing danger- has led to an early development of the law ous environmental trends while reinforcing of the sea, based on both customary law and a development agenda for the most embat- multilateral treaties. A turning point was the tled coastal communities, providing decent 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law jobs, and fighting the deep roots of migration. of the Sea (UNCLOS), considered by some the As a concept, the blue economy was struc- “Constitution of the sea”. Marine resources tured during the “Rio +20” United Nations are assets for the region, and crucially so in a Conference on Sustainable Development semi-enclosed basin such as the Mediterra- (UNCSD) held in Rio de Janeiro on 20-22 June nean: migratory fish stocks, maritime cultural 2012, where a green economy roadmap was heritage, and sea currents straddle across po- launched. The blue economy was designed litical boundaries. Sea-borne shipping, mov- in line with the concept and principles of the ing 80 percent of trade volumes,1 would not green economy, adapting them to the needs generate prosperity with hard borders. Sim- of small-island states and coastal countries. ilarly, the same commonality can be seen in A synthetic definition is ofered by the Union threats such as waste circulation, acidification for the Mediterranean (UfM) Ministerial of the oceans and sea-level rises. The nature Declaration on Blue Economy (17 November 93% of the challenges highlighted in the Sustain- 2015, Brussels), where it is hinted that it may able Development Goals (especially the 14th: include “the set of human activities depending of the assessed “Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas on the sea and/or underpinned by land-sea fish stocks is overexploited and marine resources for sustainable develop- interactions in the context of sustainable de- ment”) and at the 2015 Paris Climate Confer- velopment, and notably including industrial ence further underscore the fact that marine and service sectors such as aquaculture, fish- issues are interconnected and relevant to ev- eries, blue biotechnologies, coastal and mar- erybody. Ignoring the degradation of common itime tourism, shipping, ship-building/repair, resources can have dire consequences: recent ports, ocean energy and marine renewable analyses have shown that 93% of the assessed energy, including ofshore wind”. 3 fish stocks are overexploited, and a number of Despite these many possible maritime them are on the verge of depletion. Further- sectors where economic growth is feasible, more, the Mediterranean Sea has lost 41% of the European Commission has recently iden- 34% its marine mammals and 34% of the total fish tified some specific ones based on their po- population over the past 50 years.2 tential: blue energy, aquaculture, coastal and of the total fish population of the maritime tourism, blue biotechnology and Mediterranean has DEFINING THE BLUE ECONOMY sea-bed mining. Innovation and research in been lost over the The blue economy gives a holistic answer particular make the blue economy an un- past 50 years binding together sea-based economic activi- missable opportunity for the region. Even 101 if the maritime economy already accounts authorities ofers a botom-up approach to for over five million jobs generating almost the blue economy, by strengthening the role €500 billion a year in the EU alone4 (accord- of local coastal administrations in the context ing to Federazione del Mare, €33 billion di- of European initiatives in the Mediterranean, rectly generated in Italy),5 the rapid growth while a supporting mechanism is provided of ofshore renewable energy has generated by the Conference of Peripheral Maritime 150,000 150,000 jobs in the last five years. Regions, which brings together some 160 re- jobs created by gions from 25 states outside and inside the maritime economy in the EU over SOME AXES FOR ACTION European Union. the last five years The Mediterranean Sea has in fact many Diferent policy tools are being developed regional actors and initiatives already work- in the EU and in the Mediterranean, such as ing towards maritime economic sustainabil- Maritime Spatial Planning and Integrated ity and marine environmental integrity. For Coastal Zone Management. These allow for instance: multi-stakeholder pre-planning of economic • Concerning fishery management, the activities by mapping and marking marine General Fisheries Commission for the Med- areas for diferent uses, incentivising new iterranean (GFCM) has long been acting in economic activities and preventing unsus- the common interest as one of the oldest re- tainable practices (by ensuring cumulative gional fisheries management organisations environmental sustainability). with a mandate to ensure the conservation and the sustainable use of living marine re- THE UFM ROLE sources and the sustainable development of Being fully aware that clean and healthy aquaculture. seas are drivers for regional growth, the • Research initiatives such as the Part- Union for the Mediterranean has strong- nership for Research and Innovation in ly promoted the implementation of a blue the Mediterranean Area (PRIMA) and economy vision. As an organisation bringing BLUEMED have been expanding research together the 43 countries of the Euro-Med- cooperation between the two shores of the iterranean region based on co-ownership Mediterranean. between the two rims of the basin, it is in a • As for the safeguard of the sea, both the unique position for ensuring coherence of Barcelona Convention for the Protection of eforts and synergies in the implementation the Marine Environment and the Coastal of the blue economy in Mediterranean. Region of the Mediterranean and the Med- Recognising the value and the experience iterranean Action Plan of the United Na- ofered by many institutions for achieving tions Environment Programme aim at the this goal, the UfM approach has been to good environmental status of the sea with connect existing positive initiatives already ambitious goals such as the depollution of operating in the field, fostering synergies the Mediterranean. among them, promoting responsible produc- The role of local authorities can hardly be tion and consumption, addressing growing overstated, as they are best placed for under- coastal urbanisation and connectivity, in- standing the challenges of peripheral coastal creasing maritime security, decent jobs and communities and for turning them into op- training, and improving knowledge and data portunities. A vibrant example is ofered by sharing. the Fisheries and Blue Growth District of According to the UfM Deputy Secretary Mazara del Vallo, Italy, a cluster whose vision General for Water and Environment Miguel is to chart a new route for the Sicilian fish- Garcia-Herraiz, “it is at the core of the UfM ery sector through the principles of the blue to treat the Mediterranean as a common her- economy. itage to be preserved, at the same time, it is As a way of strengthening local ownership, an instrument for development which must the Bologna Charter signed by many local be promoted.” 102 SHARED PROSPERITY

MEDITERRANEAN TRAFFIC (2016) Container port trafc

<1,000 1,000-5,000 5,000-10,000 >10,000 thousands of TEU

Spain 14,710

Italy 11,312

Egypt 8,810

Turkey 7,622

France 6,645

Greece 3,939

Morocco 3,070

Malta 3,003

Portugal 2,857

Israel 2,446

Tunisia 600

Libya 456

Algeria 360

Data: World Bank 103

Building on the above-mentioned UfM from 2010’s 1.5 trillion dollars to 3 trillion dol- 6 Ministerial Declarations on the blue econ- lars in 2030. Many positive outcomes could #med2017 omy, the UfM is developing a regional be foreseen by exploiting this potential. The the blue economy ofers a way to embrace maritime governance initiative focusing creation of jobs in local communities con- growth potential on the western Mediterranean sub-region, nected to sustainable fishery and tourism and spread it to communities ofen hard WestMed, in line with the similar experience would ofset a trend associated to reduced hit by traditional and of the EU Strategy for the Adriatic and Io- employment in the maritime sector. Sea- new challenges nian Region (EUSAIR). This initiative will based renewable energy production would allow 10 western Mediterranean countries increase electricity supply to deprived areas, to work together to increase maritime safe- allowing local sustainable economic growth. ty and security, promote sustainable blue By ofering a prosperous future to youth liv- growth and jobs, and preserve ecosystems ing in coastal communities, there would be and biodiversity. a positive efect against the so-called deep A key milestone was the UfM Regional roots of migration forcing youths to aban- Stakeholder Conference on Blue Economy don their coastal areas in order to look for held in Naples on November 2017, where beter opportunities elsewhere. hundreds of experts, local and international In a region beset by youth unemploy- authorities, as well as policymakers gath- ment, the cooperation opportunities ofered ered to discuss practical ways to promote a by “blue” technology transfer, co-research, sustainable blue economy in the Mediterra- sharing of best practices, training and ex- nean region. changes of students and researchers create avenues for spreading common positive OPPORTUNITIES FOR GROWTH solutions for human and sustainable devel- AND DEVELOPMENT opment between the two rims of the Medi- These eforts towards sustainability and terranean. development link the Mediterranean Basin The blue economy ofers a way to embrace to wider global eforts towards international this growth potential and spread it to com- ocean governance, an initiative about man- munities ofen hard hit by traditional and aging and using the world’s oceans and their new challenges, such as youth unemploy- resources in ways that keep oceans healthy, ment and climate change, in a way that does productive, safe, secure and resilient. not threaten their long-term sustainability. According to the Organisation for Eco- It is up to the Mediterranean as a whole nomic Co-operation and Development to embrace this opportunity and make it a (OECD), the ocean economy might double building block of shared prosperity.

3 MIGRATION 106 MIGRATION A migration policy for the EU: 3.1 solidarity through partnerships

Mateo Villa Research Fellow, ISPI

Migration to Europe is today’s bogeyman. increase in forced migrants, persons compelled MIGRATION Over the centuries, high and persistent mi- to flee their homes due to conflict and political gratory pressures at a nation’s borders have instability rather than in search for jobs or for ofen elicited strong reactions by long-time family-related reasons. As the Cold War ended, citizens. This is why, afer more than five years the number of refugees and asylees dropped of high migratory flows to Europe through the from 20 million in 1990 to 13 million in 2005. southern and eastern Mediterranean, the cur- Bucking this trend, between 2013 and 2016 the rent political environment seems unconducive global refugees population grew by 50%, from to finding a solution to the common challenge 15 to 22.5 million, climbing back to and over- of managing migration together. If anything, taking its 1990 peak. A tripling in international the situation today appears to have further de- migrants in half a century is impressive, as is teriorated. Two years ago, many EU countries the recent surge in forced migration. But one sided in favour of an unprecedented deroga- should also note that since 1960 the world pop- tion to Dublin rules by adopting an emergen- ulation has grown by 2.5 times, from 3 to 7.6 cy relocation mechanism. While a number billion. In relative terms, then, the internation- of eastern European countries had been at al migrant population has grown only slightly, the forefront of an anti-solidarity pushback from 2.5% in 1960 to 3.3% today. Meanwhile, against such measures, they appeared to be in- regional trends can vary, being mostly influ- ternationally isolated. Today, on the contrary, enced by geographic proximity, the diferential many governments in western Europe seem in income per capita, and socio-cultural links to be leaning in the same direction, as shown between origin and destination countries. This by recent elections in the Netherlands, Germa- shows why Europe is a key destination. Future ny, and Austria that have bolstered parties in demographic and economic trends, together favour of restrictive policy responses to migra- with geopolitical crises that might facilitate tion. The question, then, is whether the current irregular border flows, are crucial to gauge ex- preference for finding solutions that are both pectations on the propensity of people from national (instead of European) and repressive other regions to migrate to Europe. In spite of (instead of accommodating) can be viable and its high relevance, the geopolitical side of the sustainable over the long run. If the answer is equation is the least predictable one. Demo- no, there should be a search for reasonable and graphics and economics, on the other hand, feasible solutions. In order to do so there is a are fairly easier to anticipate. As the population huge need to put all the pieces together. of the EU is almost unchanged at 500 million since 1990, Sub-Saharan Africa’s inhabitants MIGRATION IS HERE TO STAY have doubled from 500 million to 1 billion over At the end of 2016, almost 250 million world the last quarter century, and are poised to dou- 250 million inhabitants were international migrants. They ble again to 2 billion by 2050. If the rate of in- world inhabitants only amounted to 77 million in 1960, meaning ternational migration by Africans remains the are international that they tripled in half a century. This almost same, we can expect that demographic pres- migrants linear increase masks a diferent one: a drastic sures by 2050 will generate 30 million new in- 107

The failure of intra-European solidarity Relocation of asylum seekers from Italy and Greece to other EU countries as of October 2017 countries total and relocated relocated total % Malta 168 131 >100% Finland 1,979 2,078 95% Luxembourg 430 557 77% Sweden 2,550 3,766 68% Latvia 321 481 67% Lithuania 382 671 57% Portugal 1,532 2,951 52% Cyprus 143 320 45% Estonia 141 329 43% Netherlands 2,487 5,947 42% Slovenia 217 567 38% Germany 8,722 27,536 32% Belgium 1,026 3,812 27% France 4,468 19,714 23% Romania 728 4,180 17% Spain 1,286 9,323 14% Croatia 78 968 8% Bulgaria 50 1,302 4% Slovakia 16 902 2% Austria 15 1,953 1% Czech Republic 12 2,691 0% Hungary 0 1,294 0% Poland 0 6,182 0% Data: European Commission ternational migrants, 10 million of which may continent are not likely to abate any time soon atempt to reach Europe. On the economic – in fact, they are poised to increase. side, a crucial variable is the income gap. Many Sub-Saharan African countries experienced THE FAILURE OF INTRA-EU SOLIDARITY substantial GDP growth over the last 15 years. Despite the reality of high present and fu- Despite this, GDP per capita has grown only ture migratory pressures, the EU migration and marginally: the current average GDP per cap- asylum governance system is still a patchwork ita in Sub-Saharan Africa is stuck at $1,650, or of national and EU-wide rules. Each member about twenty times lower than an average EU state decides autonomously whether and at citizen ($34,900). All this leads to one conclu- what conditions to allow non-EU migrants to sion: migration is here to stay. Structural mi- enter the country. Irregular migration to the gratory pressures to Europe from the African EU is therefore difcult to monitor or regulate 108 MIGRATION

GDP per capita (1950-2016) 40,000

35,000 EU28

30,000

25,000

20,000

15,000

10,000 MENA 5,000 Sub-Saharan Africa 0 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 Data: World Bank

at supranational level, being also a function stuck at 30% compared to initial commitments, of how strict national policies are. Meanwhile amounting to just 2% of irregular arrivals to It- EU-wide norms – the so-called Dublin rules aly and Greece over the same period. This sit- – establish which country is responsible to ex- uation is compounded by the fact that, in late amine an application for international protec- 2015, a number of western European countries tion. Most ofen, these rules result in the first (including Germany, Sweden, and Austria) +50% country of arrival in the EU being ultimately partially suspended the Schengen agreement, the growth of global reintroducing checks at internal borders. This refugee population responsible. While awaiting for a response, between 2013 asylum seekers must remain in the country forced an even larger number of migrants to and 2016 responsible for their application. And even af- remain stuck in Italy and Greece, instead of ter receiving protection, non-EU nationals can atempting to circumvent Dublin rules by move to another EU country for short periods, crossing irregularly into a second EU coun- but cannot live or work there before becoming try. According to the Schengen Borders Code, EU citizens. This way, norms born to avoid countries may reintroduce border controls for multiple applications by the same asylum four consecutive periods of six months each. seekers (“asylum shopping”) end up having Suspensions should have therefore ended on 11 perverse efects when flows are systematically November 2017. Despite this, many countries directed towards some first countries of arriv- suspending Schengen announced a further al rather than others. This is what happened six-month prorogation, and do not appear to during the most recent refugee crisis, as almost be willing to back down on their plans until the every irregular migrant since 2011 entered risk of secondary movements within Europe Europe by sea, landing on Greek, Italian or abates significantly. Spanish shores. Pressured by the asymmetry of the current system, Italy and Greece heav- MIGRATION PARTNERSHIPS AND LEGAL ily lobbied for an overhaul. Eventually, in 2015 PATHWAYS TO EUROPE EU member states decided to adopt an emer- The political impasse within Europe makes gency mechanism that temporarily derogated the already fragile Dublin rules less and less to the Dublin rules, allowing for the relocation sustainable. Acknowledging the drawbacks of of about 100,000 asylum seekers from Italy the current system, the European Commis- 2 billion and Greece to other Dublin countries. In Sep- sion has proposed a substantial overhaul of Sub-Saharan Africa tember 2017, however, the programme came the Dublin rules that would make the emer- population by 2050 to an underwhelming end, with relocations gency relocation mechanism permanent. In 109

Past, actual and projected population in selected world regions (1950-2050, in millions) 2,500

Sub-Saharan Africa 2,000

1,500 China

1,000

500 EU28 Nigeria

0 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 2050 Data: UN Population Division

October 2017, a commitee of the European destination countries to undertake background Parliament proposed an even more radical checks and select the persons allowed to enter #med2017 solution, turning relocations into the default Europe. It would be possible to increase re- The Migration Part- nership Framework is option. While the logic of these proposals is gional ownership by puting origin and transit the best option to push sound, their political feasibility in the current countries in charge of receiving and managing forward viable changes in EU migration policies climate decreases as the proposals become requests for legal entry in the EU. This would while also leveraging more ambitious. This sombre assessment does also bolster the need for regional coordina- cooperation between the northern and not imply that nothing can be done. In fact, the tion, opening up the possibility for Northern southern shores of the EU-Turkey agreement in March 2016 and the African countries that ofen have higher ad- Mediterranean current cooperation to stymie irregular flows ministrative and technical capacities, to sup- from Libya show that European countries are port the eforts of origin and transit countries willing to discuss policies that “externalise” upstream. Finally, a sensible return policy may migration management to third countries. The also be atached to these schemes, but always Migration Partnership Framework adopted in in exchange for an increase in legal quotas. In 2016 goes precisely in this direction. And it is sum, the absence of efective, substantial legal probably the best option to push forward via- pathways to reach Europe is the main elephant ble changes in EU migration policies while also in the room in the debate around EU policies leveraging cooperation between the northern to tackle irregular flows. Encouraging national and southern shores of the Mediterranean. As EU governments to link the success of Migra- they stand, Migration Partnerships have many tion Partnerships to a substantial increase in problems. They tend to tie development assis- regular migration quotas may be the way out of tance in African origin or transit countries to the impasse. The challenge posed by irregular their cooperation in deterring migration flows. migration has no easy long-term solution. But This kind of negative conditionality has litle to it is a challenge that needs to be faced none- make it palatable and sustainable over the long theless, as migration to Europe is here to stay. term. This is why the partnerships could be en- Migration Partnerships ofer a way to bring hanced by linking actual declines in irregular the two shores of the Mediterranean closer migratory movements to Europe to an increase together in managing migratory flows. This is in legal migration quotas. The benefits of doing why, even in a divisive political climate, a pos- so would be numerous. By ofering new legal itive dialogue between northern and southern pathways to Europe, the plan would proactive- Mediterranean countries is much needed in ly discourage illegal practices. It would allow order to achieve lasting results. 110 MIGRATION Managing flows through the 3.2 central Mediterranean

Matia Toaldo Senior Policy Fellow, ECFR

Afer the closure of the Balkan route in to resist in the long term. Rival smugglers not MIGRATION March 2016, irregular migration to Europe included in the agreement with Italy could has taken place mostly through the cen- challenge the deal while the militias that have tral Mediterranean route, which runs from so far upheld the agreement – and that ofen Sub-Saharan Africa, through Libya and happen to have a formal ofcial afliation eventually ends in Italy. In 2016 and in 2017, with the UN-backed Government of National most of the irregular arrivals by sea to Europe Accord – are highly unstable and unpredict- happened through this route, stressing the able. A more positive, long-term agenda has to Italian reception and asylum systems and be pursued if migration flows between sub-Sa- creating strains in its relations with the rest of haran Africa and Europe are to be managed the EU. Until July 2017 there seemed to be no and it should guarantee mutual protection: of ready-made policy capable of stemming the African people on the move and of European flows from the central Mediterranean, which citizens who want to protect their borders. is ultimately Europe’s main goal. The EU, with Change in Libya is unlikely to come easi- a strong Italian and Maltese leadership on the ly. People smuggling is a key component of issue, had put in place a number of measures: the growing informal sector which is both training of the Libyan Coast Guard; operation the only source of revenue for some border Sophia to fight smugglers in the high seas; re- communities and the main activity of armed vamping the EU Border Assistance Mission groups which ofen live a double life: formal- (EUBAM) for Libya; a wider programme of ly part of the government, in fact complicit support for Africa through the EU Trust Fund when not protagonists of illicit activities. The and other development aid; a specific cooper- government and central institutions are at the ation with Niger aimed at closing the route up- nascent stage and ultimately uncontrolled mi- 50,000 stream. While the International Organisation gration flows are the result of the lack of rule for Migration (IOM) reported a drop in flows of law, which allows armed groups to prosper number of people to resetle under from Niger into Libya, litle of this seemed to and hinders the afrmation of an efective the supervision of afect the immediate trend of migration from and accountable state security sector while UNHCR according Libya into Italy, where arrivals could be count- condoning the systematic abuse of migrants, to the proposal of the ed in the thousands per night. and which is ultimately a consistent driver of EU Commission migrations towards Europe. The EU Border THE LIBYAN CONUNDRUM Assistance Mission is already working on im- Things have started to change in the mid- proving the rule of law but the Libyans will dle of last summer when flows dropped dra- have to do most of the leg work and much matically as a result of the EU-Libyan-Italian will depend on whether the country eventu- cooperation in strengthening the Libyan Coast ally gets a reunified government and military Guard, which intercepted most migrants institutions through the ongoing political 15,000 bringing them back to Libya, and the decision process. migrants died in the Cooperation between Libya’s neighbours Mediterranean over of some smugglers to stop their business in ir- the last 4 years regular migration. But this solution is unlikely is essential. While Libya is unable to control 111

BEHIND THE MED CORRIDOR Main migration routes from Sub-Saharan Africa towards Libya

Tripoli Benghazi Oragla Contested Sebha route Tamanrasset Arlit Séguédine Gao Agadez Coopted Bamako Niamey route Legal route

Migration dynamics and actors in Niger

President + governing party EU pushing for cooption anti-smuggling measures

Tuareg tribe Agadez administration ofers capacity in power building competition administers Tummo border crossing Tebu tribe Security forces controls arrest smugglers

Migration dynamics and actors in Libya

EU

provides capacity buildings arrests or are bribed by Militias Smugglers Coast Guards

run sell migrants to send migrants to administers

Detention centres Government/GNA administers

Data: Cliengedael 112 MIGRATION

its southern borders, much could be done by People arriving in Europe through the countries like Niger and Chad. Algeria, Tuni- central Mediterranean corridor (% of total) sia and Egypt have a big role to play in ensur- ing that Libyan subsidized goods do not end Nigeria 13.8% up in their markets, fuelling the illicit sector Syria 9.7% of which people smuggling is just one facet. Most importantly, Libya’s neighbours can do Guinea 8.5% a lot to encourage reconciliation and the po- Ivory Coast 7.9% litical process among Libyans, thus providing Bangladesh a crucial contribution to the establishment of 7.3% the rule of law in the country. Gambia 5.2% While working on change with Libya, Mali 5.0% Europe and Libya’s neighbours will have to manage migration flows making sure that as Eritrea 4.6% few people on the move as possible end up Senegal 4.6% in Libya where they are almost certain to fall into the hands of smugglers. Morocco 4.5%

MANY PROPOSALS, PARTIAL SOLUTIONS Data: UNHCR (as of October 2017) Most European countries are keen to draw a distinction between refugees with a right UNHCR-led resetlement mechanism which to come to Europe and “economic migrants” the EU has already successfully tested with who have no such right. The idea is that only 23,000 Syrians. According to the propos- a small fraction of those who move along the al presented by the EU Commission in late central Mediterranean route would actual- September, the EU could now make available ly qualify for asylum in Europe, though the 50,000 places for refugees mostly from Afri- UNHCR estimates that around 40% of those ca. They will likely be selected by UNHCR in processed in Italy do qualify for some form of reception centres, one of which could open protection. Within this framework, diferent soon in Libya. Unlike hotspots and detention proposals have emerged in order to process facilities, UNHCR reception centres would asylum applications ofshore, as close to the give migrants freedom of movement while countries of origin and as far from Europe providing registration and support. as possible. During the summer, the French Yet, resetlement for refugees and people in President Macron proposed the creation of need of protection is just one part of the solu- “hotspots” in Libya where asylum applica- tion. A second part would need to address the tions could be processed. This raises several economic drivers of migration, including cli- security questions for the European person- mate change. Since the Euro-African summit nel which would serve there and also for the in Valleta in November 2015, the EU has im- protection of migrants who would efectively plemented a series of programmes to support be moved from the existing Libyan detention African development while strengthening centres to new detention facilities supposedly border control capacities of transit countries managed by the EU. along the central Mediterranean route. These The Paris summit on migrations that countries have received ofers for “Partnership brought together key European and African frameworks” which include a comprehensive countries in late August focused instead mix of capacity building for border control; on the creation of “protection missions” in trade facilitation; and development aid. The -82% countries of transit i.e. outside of Libya. This goal is to negotiate readmission agreements the drop of arrivals is a more realistic option, particularly be- as part of these packages, though none so from Libya to Italy in August 2017 compa- cause France and other European countries far has been signed between the EU and the red to August 2016 are now focusing on enhancing the existing countries of origin. Readmission agreements 113

Managing the flows: arrivals through the Mediterranean (2015-2017)

250,000

200,000

150,000 JULY 2017 Italy-Libya memorandum 100,000 MARCH 2016 of understanding EU-Turkey deal 50,000

0 2015 2016 2017 Data: UNHCR could prove elusive if the incentive package agement in Africa, Europe should not for- for African countries is not atractive enough get its political priorities. There needs to be #med2017 while most European countries have few real a careful balancing act between migration There needs to be a careful balancing act “sticks” to put on the table. management, security, and political risks. between migration Irregular migration is ofen an important management, security, and political risks. THE NEED FOR A LONG-TERM SOLUTION source of revenue for border communities. In the longer term, the focus on migration A crackdown that does not ofer concrete in Euro-African relations could produce two alternatives risks fuelling radicalisation. Sim- types of distortions. The first is to build an un- ilarly, returns of irregular migrants without healthy conditionality between development adequate guarantees and cooperation with aid and immediate drops in migratory flows. countries of origin risk expanding the pool in Helping Africa grow is in Europe’s interest well which radical groups flourish. beyond migration control. A more prosperous There is no magic wand to manage migra- Africa is a beter trade and security partner. In tion from Africa to Europe, but a key factor designing comprehensive packages for coun- is strategic patience, something that politi- tries of origin the emphasis should always be cians who have to stand for elections while on sustainable growth (with a special focus being under pressure from seemingly uncon- on containing the efects of climate change) trolled migratory flows can hardly aford. A rather than on stemming migration flows, but mix between short- and long-term policies the self-defeating idea that countries that do is needed, carefully combining the closure of not cooperate on migration should be denied irregular routes with eforts to build a more European aid is hard to eradicate. prosperous Africa. Secondly, in approaching migration man- 114 MIGRATION Syrian refugees 3.3 between hospitality and integration

Maha Yahya Director, Carnegie Middle East Center

Recent political statements seem to sug- Absorbing the needs of so many refugees MIGRATION gest that an end to the Syrian conflict is in has presented a profound challenge to both sight. The establishment of de-escalation countries, with which they continue to strug- zones in the country through the Astana ne- gle. Neither Lebanon nor Jordan have any sig- gotiating process is bringing various territories nificant resources to commit. Both countries back under government control. To neigh- sufer from longstanding problems, including bouring host countries Lebanon and Jordan, deteriorating public infrastructure and poor this signals the prospective return home of public-sector health and educational systems the close to 2 million Syrian refugees in their among others. Yet as frontline countries they midst. However, the absence of a broader and have borne the brunt of addressing the reper- more sustainable peace process means that cussions of the refugee crisis. The World Bank both may need to contend with the fact that estimates that the crisis has cost Lebanon $7.5 these refugees will continue to remain unable billion in foregone output and widened the to go home for some time to come. fiscal deficit by $2.6 billion through 2014. In Jordan, the cost is around $2.5 billion a year, LEBANON AND JORDAN: or about a quarter of the government’s annual GUESTS NOT REFUGEES revenues. The tansformation of the Syrian uprising since 2011 into a ferocious conflict has gen- BEYOND HOSPITALITY erated the largest refugee crisis of this centu- The challenges generated by the crisis can- ry. For Lebanon and Jordan, this has meant not be calculated in dollars alone. The impact +37% a sudden increase in resident populations by on education illustrates just as well the seis- growth of Lebanese 37 percent for Lebanon and at least 8 percent mic shock that has hit both Lebanon and population as efect for Jordan within the first three years of the Jordan. Approximately 50 percent of refugee of the Syrian refugees inflow conflict. Today more than 1 million Syrian populations in both Lebanon and Jordan are refugees reside in Lebanon, amounting to an school-age children. The reorganisation of estimated 25 percent of the country’s popu- public schools to conduct double shifs to al- lation, while another 655,000 are ofcially low for the education of 149,000 refugee chil- registered in Jordan, a country of 9.5 mil- dren in Lebanon and another 145,000 in Jor- lion. Unofcial estimates in both countries dan quickly overwhelmed already struggling suggest the total number of refugees may be educational systems. Student-to-teacher ra- much higher. Neither Lebanon nor Jordan is tios increased while the quality of education $7.5 billion a signatory to the International Convention sharply declined for refugees and locals alike. on Refugees. This means that fleeing popula- However, opening new schools is insuf- the cost of the Syrian refugee tions are not accorded refugee status and the cient. War refugees are distinct from other ref- crisis for Lebanon protection that this ofers. ugees in that they sufer from the additional 115

SYRIAN REFUGEES IN THE REGION Distribution of Syrian refugees in the region

Turkey 3,222,000

Lebanon 1,001,051

Jordan 654,582

Iraq 244,235

Egypt 124,534

North Africa 30,104

IDP’s (in Syria) 6,500,000

Syrian refugee crisis in numbers First origin countries of refugees (2016)

Syria 5,276,000

Afghanistan 2,501,000 5,276,506 1,5 million Number of Syrian Children among refugees abroad refugees South Sudan 1,436,000

Somalia 1,012,000 800,000 half of them Refugees hosted only do not have access to Sudan in the Za’atari camp formal education 650,000 (Jordan) Congo Dem. Rep. 537,000

$4.63 billion Centrafrican Rep. 490,000 Funding requirements Myanmar 490,000 $1.76 billion Received (38%) Eritrea 459,000 $2,87 billion Gap (62%) Burundi 408,000

Data: UNHCR 116 MIGRATION

Number of Syrian refugees registered by UNHCR (in million)

6

5

4

3

2

1

0 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Data: UNHCR

trauma of violence. Providing psychosocial 2000 deportations in the first five months of support and revising curricula to include the year, Lebanon has also seen a dramatic some elements of the refugees’ culture of uptick in anti-refugee sentiment, which has which they can be proud are fundamental become quite widespread. Meanwhile, the to the wellbeing of these children. Improving recent return of refugees to Syria as part of the prospects for life afer school, including negotiated peace deals in north-eastern Leb- potential employment opportunities, is also anon drove vulnerable populations back into central. This includes revisiting existing ac- a war zone, specifically the Idlib province. creditation programs as well as considering More critically, the military involvement of alternative informal education mechanisms. Hezbollah, the Lebanese militia and political party, in support of the Syrian regime, has REFUGEE DILEMMAS BETWEEN INTEGRA- politicised the refugee question even further. TION AND RETURN Currently Hezbollah is using the refugee is- The future of Syrian refugees in Lebanon sue as leverage to put pressure on the Leba- and Jordan remains ciritical. The full integra- nese government to normalise relations with tion of refugees into national life represents the Syrian regime. an existential challenge in both countries In this context, calls for the forced repatri- and is for the most part rejected at both the ation of refugees are gaining traction as are political and popular levels. Beyond the de- anti-refugee actions by local host commu- terioration in the quality of services, the nities. These communities are claiming that sheer number of refugees has triggered deep the creation of de-escalation zones in Syria anxieties that their presence could upend means that the refugees can go back home. the current demographic balance and undo However, recent reports have indicated that the fundamental governance principles and increased bombings across much of Syria sense of identity that underpin the Lebanese during the month of September resulted in and Jordanian nation-states. In Lebanon, the highest monthly death toll this year. this question has taken on a sectarian di- From the perspective of refugees, going mension, while in Jordan it revolves around back home is simply not an option today. $2.5 billion national origin of resident populations. Most have no confidence in the parties to the cost of the Consequently, while the number of doc- the conflict, whether Syrian or foreign, and Syrian refugee umented forced repatriations in Jordan now do not believe that any of them can guar- crisis for Jordan averages around 300 per month or around antee their safety. To many refugees, the re- 117

Lebanon: the weight of refugees

1 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon

400,000 Palestinian refugees Lebanon population 74% in Lebanon Syrian refugees 19% Palestianian refugees 7%

Data: UNHCR placement of the more comprehensive Unit- mechanisms to ensure accountability and ed Nations peace process in Geneva with a measure of justice. Engaging with these #med2017 the piecemeal approach of Astana is simply challenges requires a refugee-focused polit- a refugee-focused political setlement for guaranteeing the survival of the Assad re- ical setlement for Syria that addresses the Syria addressing the gime and consolidating the partition of Syr- conditions necessary to guarantee the safe, conditions necessary to guarantee the safe, ia. In this context, the prospects of returning voluntary, and dignified return of refugees. It voluntary, and digni- to their home country, under a regime that also necessitates concerted atention to im- fied return of refugee is necessary has repeatedly said it considers them trai- prove the lives of refugees in host countries tors for fleeing, remain very low. Central to in ways that protect their fundamental hu- this sentiment is the absence of any discus- man rights and their future prospects within sion on the release of detainees, let alone on and outside these countries. 118 MIGRATION

From humanitarian assistance to empowerment in Jordan

Musa Shteiwi Director, CSS, University of Jordan

When the Syrian crisis erupted, Syrians sures in order to respond to the massive were allowed to enter Jordan without any amount of Syrian refugees within the frame- restrictions, except for security consider- work of the larger, more comprehensive ap- ations. Syrians now represent the largest proach of the international community in group of refugees in Jordan with 654,582 facing the emergency. The Sixth Regional ofcially registered (September 2017)1 out Response Plan (RRP6) was the project pro- of 1.4 million refugees in total, in a country moted by the United Nations High Com- of around 10 million citizens and 3 mil- missioner for Refugees and considered a lion foreigners.2 The Jordanian reception Jordan-focused response plan alongside model, which started out as an initial sub- plans for Lebanon, Egypt, Turkey, and Iraq. sistence-based approach characterised by The National Resilience Plan (NRP) was the temporary hospitality, is now turning into Jordanian Government’s own response to a long-term response focused on economic the Syrian refugee crisis aimed at minimis- and social empowerment potentially lead- ing the spillover efects of the Syrian refugee ing to refugee integration. crisis on Jordanian host communities and When the first waves of Syrian refugees preserving Jordan’s economy and human started to access the Hashemite Kingdom, development. It emphasised assistance for the type of intervention that Jordan imple- Jordanian host communities in order to har- mented was mainly humanitarian-orient- monise the Syrian refugee response with ed. By the end of 2011, approximately 2,600 Jordan’s domestic development goals. In Syrian asylum seekers had arrived in Jordan general, RRP6 was meant to provide short- and the figure gradually increased as more term emergency aid focused on Syrian refu- than 11,000 refugees fled Syria in a single gees in Jordan. The NRP, on the other hand, day. By the end of 2013, nearly 10% of Jor- was meant to strengthen medium- and dan’s population was made up of Syrian long-term coping systems that target infra- 14% refugees, with an increase from 119,400 UN- structure and services in host communi- HCR-registered refugees to 585,300 within ties in order to prevent the deterioration of the Syrian population in Jordan compared the year, of whom 53% were younger than services for Jordanians as well as to beter to the total Jordanian 18. This trend appears to be continuing since adjust the health and educational services population the largest amount of cohorts of Syrian ref- ofered to Syrians. ugees currently setled in Jordan consists of In 2015, Jordan adopted a resilience-based individuals aged 5-14.3 Consequently, edu- approach to respond to and mitigate the ef- cation and more recently higher education fects of the Syrian crisis on host communi- have come to represent urgent issues to be ties in Jordan. The main aim was firstly to taken into account in Jordan’s political agen- ensure the protection of the Syrian refu- das especially in the light of the prolonged gees and the vulnerable parts of Jordanian conflict in Syria. society. The Jordan Response Plan (JRP) of 22.1% 2015 implemented a series of policies in co- unemployment rate REFUGEE POLICY SHIFT ordination with international agencies and in Jordan. Before Between 2013 and 2014, Jordan started to other governments. It included provisions 2011, it was 14.5% implement medium- and long-term mea- to strengthen the capacities of the main ser- 119

First 10 countries in the world for refugees hosted on total population (2016)

Refugees per 1,000 population

Lebanon 173 South Sudan 21

Jordan 89 Sweden 19

Nauru 50 Djibouti 19

Turkey 35 Malta 18

Chad 27 Mauritania 16

Data: UNHCR vices in fields such as health, education, and This change of policy amounted to a para- water and sanitation especially at the mu- digm shif in government policy and in the #med2017 nicipal level since services and infrastruc- international community context. the main challenge the Government of Jordan ture were degraded as a result of growing faces today in regard pressure on water, housing, environment, EMPOWERMENT OF SYRIAN REFUGEES to Syrian refugees is to balance its economic energy and transport. It is in this context that a debate emerged policies that encourage As the flows started to represent a con- within the political agenda on the possi- the employment of Syrian refugees while stant phenomenon within the Jordanian bility to ofcially open up the labour mar- tackling unemployment socio-economic environment, a more com- ket to Syrians without negatively afecting among Jordanians prehensive plan was deemed urgent. In this Jordan’s economy. This is also due to the sense, in February 2016 the Jordan Compact fact that potential social conflict between – an agreement between Jordan and the in- the hosted and hosting communities could ternational community in general and the occur in case internal regulations are not EU in particular – was released. Its approach complied with – a possibility that should is based on three actions: turning the Syrian be carefully considered by decision-makers refugee crisis in Jordan into a development especially when it comes to implementing opportunity; investing in Jordan’s commu- long-term integration policies. nities (with a focus on the resilience of host The more recent socio-economic chal- communities); supplying Jordan with grants lenges have now turned from subsistence adequate to meeting the financial needs and to socio-economic integration and should sustaining the economy over the next three be addressed mainly by looking at further years. The Jordan Compact has drawn a several social and economic indicators. As path forward toward long-term sustainabil- the crisis continues, more Syrians possess- ity and integration between the Syrian and ing diferent skills come to Jordan and en- Jordanian communities. ter sectors that were normally occupied by Moreover, it should be highlighted that Jordanians, thus pushing Jordanians out of the youngest cohorts of Syrian refugees are the labour market. A growth of the informal gradually entering the Jordanian public ed- sector has been registered, since the major- ucation system, since 76% regularly atend ity of Syrian refugees employed in Jordan public schools4 for free as guaranteed by occupy low-skilled positions that used to be the Government alongside several donors’ filled by Jordanians. This negative impact is initiatives aimed to support Syrian refugees represented by the growing unemployment in order to avoid withdrawals from school. rate, which has increased from 14.5% in 2011 120 MIGRATION

Evolution of asylum requests by Syrians in the EU (in million)

1

0,8

0,6

0,4

0,2

0 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Data: UNHCR

to 22.1% in 2014.5 The new policy aims at pro- BALANCING INTERVENTION POLICIES moting and facilitating the entry of Syrian Empirical studies about the relationship refugees into the Jordanian labour market. between Jordanians and Syrian refugees re- Currently, most of the Syrian refugees veal that there is no group tension between who are registered with UNHCR receive fi- the two communities. On the contrary, nancial help. If this kind of assistance were there is growing evidence that the Syrians to stop, most Syrian refugees would enter are gradually being integrated into Jorda- the labour market, causing its saturation. nian society through intermarriage, mixed Moreover, Syrian refugees would need to neighbourhoods, employment in the infor- stay and gradually setle down in Jordan. It mal and formal sectors. In fact, with regard should also be noted that the large amount to employment, the Government of Jordan of refugees represent a potentially active la- has taken several steps to facilitate the em- bour supply. It is only in 2016 that Syrian ref- ployment of Syrians and has commited to ugees ofcially entered the Jordanian labour supporting the employment of 200,000 Syr- market by becoming legally eligible for em- ians in the future. Those very developments ployment within the Hashemite Kingdom. are also causing concern among Jordanians In this way progress was made as this paved as they see their economic situation deterio- the way for wider economic integration. rating and unemployment increasing in the As regards future plans concerning Syr- country. Furthermore, people also express ian refugees, the preliminary results of the concern about the future of Syrian refugees CSS survey released last month with the in Jordan as the military crisis winds down hope that these would encourage refugees in Syria. In fact, unofcial reports indicate to return to Syria indicate that a truce be- that there are about 3,000 Syrians who re- tween conflicting parties (40%) and a politi- turn to Syria monthly. The main challenge cal solution in Syria (32%) are the most pop- the Government of Jordan faces today with ular options, while some indicated a victory regard to Syrian refugees is to balance its of the opposition and others stated that they economic policies that encourage the em- would not go back. It is evident that while ployment of Syrian refugees while tackling 3,000 the majority might return to Syria (although unemployment among Jordanians, and hav- Syrians return to that will also depend on work opportunities ing a refugee policy in post-conflict Syria Syria every month in Syria), a significant number of refugees which might require coordination with the would most likely remain in Jordan. Syrian government. 121

Looking into the Turkish experience

Galip Dalay Research Director, Al Sharq Forum Omar Kadkoy Research Associate, TEPAV

“While a nation — especially one that is While Ankara’s legal stance is interim, Syr- our kin and relative — is being tormented, ians are weaving themselves into the labour we have absolutely no intention to turn a market and setling in for the future. Ankara blind eye, to turn our backs against Syria, opened the doors to formal employment for with which we share a 910-kilometer-long Syrians as late as 2016. The strict conditions border.” Said Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the of employing Syrians under the law combined Prime Minister at the time, when he ad- with Syrians’ poor Turkish language profi- dressed the AK Party on November 22, 2011.1 ciency, unrecognized professional skills, and This was six years ago, when the number of absence of diploma equivalencies allowed Syrians who sought refuge in Turkey was only 13,298 Syrians under Temporary Protec- 8,000.2 The moral commitment to the on- tion to obtain work permits over the course going tragedy in Syria led Turkey to receive of 2016.3 In this regard, some 8,652 Syrians 3.25 million Syrians who today makeup 4 acquired permits according to 2017 mid-year percent of the country’s population. Turkey’s figures.4 This means the majority of Syrians open door policy ended in early 2016 and the who are filling the lower ranks of the labour government is shifing toward sustainable in- market in Turkey do so informally and sufer tegration policies. While doing so, structural from exploitation: below the minimum wage, challenges are emerging and slowing down long shifs and dire working conditions. the progress. COPING WITH THE LEGAL AMBIGUOUS “GUESTS” WITH FEW BENEFITS STATUS: SELF-INTEGRATION AND BUSINESS Although Turkey is a signatory to the 1951 Syrians, on the other hand, are present on Geneva Refugee Convention, the succeeding the supply side of the labour force in Turkey governments in Ankara since 2011 have re- as entrepreneurs. The Union of Chambers ferred to Syrians as “guests” and this reference and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB) is due to a geographical limitation to the afore- figures show that the number of companies mentioned Convention. This means Turkey established by Syrians or with Syrian part- is legally obliged to grant refugee status only ners increased from 77 in 2011 to 6,551 in Oc- to European citizens seeking asylum “due to tober 2017. Istanbul, the megacity and by far events occurring in Europe.” The more Syrians Turkey’s biggest economic area, is a hub for arrived in Turkey, the greater the need for a le- 3,208 of these companies – but the rising en- gal umbrella to ensure their rights and define trepreneurial activity is more important in the their obligations. To this end, Ankara took a southeast region where one-third of Syrians step forward and introduced the Law on For- reside. eigners and International Protection (LFIP). In Take Gaziantep, for example. In 2011, there force since October 2014, this law looks at Syr- were 14 Syrian companies registered with 4% ians as Foreigners under Temporary Protec- the Gaziantep Chamber of Commerce. The of Turkey’s popula- tion and entitles them to access the free public number of Syrian companies today stands tion is represented provision of education and of health. at 1,200, of which 17 percent operate in agro- by Syrians 122 MIGRATION

EU countries with most asylum requests Gaziantep and Mersin: by Syrians Exports to Syria (in million $)

Gaziantep Mersin

69 2011 15

53 2012 17

276 2013 76

Germany 360 2014 142 and Sweden 64% Hungary, Austria, Netherlands, 406 2015 121 Denmark, Bulgaria 21% All 426 2016 138 others 15% Data: UNHCR Data: Turkish Statistical Institute

food and 14 percent in foreign trade.5 Mersin, Turkey, it is unlikely that Syrians in Turkey a portal city on the Mediterranean, is home to will go back to Syria anytime soon, if ever. In 831 Syrian companies. The Syrian entrepre- this regard, Turkey’s treatment of the issue as neurship phenomenon in both cities reflects a transitional one is not realistic. To the con- the rising export volumes to Syria. There is trary, Syrians are likely to become a part of no clear link between the number of Syrian Turkey’s socio-political and socio-economic companies and volume exports to Syria, but scene. This calls for developing a new mind- evidence from the region suggests that the set to beter integrate the Syrians into the two could be connected. mainstream of Turkish society. While ofcials still call Syrians “guests” and To achieve this, Turkey needs to rethink the legal status governing them is ambiguous, its idea of identity, citizenship, and Turkish- Syrians are integrating into the fabric of the ness. To be more explicit, in addition to the 3,208 Turkish economy through self-interaction by Kurdish issue, the presence of more than 3 taking undesired labour jobs and seting up million Syrians in Turkey requires the Turk- Syrian companies established in businesses that are balancing the provincial ish state to craf a new notion of identity that Istanbul wealth. Now there is the need to design an in- is more multicultural and accommodative of tegration policy based on multi-stakeholders diferent identities and needs. This should be dialogue to adequately and sustainably de- followed by building the capacity of Turkey’s fine an inclusive outlook for both locals and institutions, from the educational system to Syrians. the labour market, to beter meet the needs of the Syrians in Turkey. The motive behind RETHINKING TURKISH IDENTITY FOR MORE crafing the new notion of identity and re- SUSTAINABLE POLICIES designing Turkey’s public institutions comes This requires Turkey to upgrade its policies from the fact that Syrians should not remain 1,200 towards the Syrians. Given the persistence at the periphery of Turkish society with- Syrian companies in Gaziantep. 17% of of the Syrian crisis, the level of destruction out sustainable prospects. Instead, the state them operate in the that Syria has experienced, and the new life needs to regard the Syrians in Turkey as po- agro-food sector that the Syrians have built for themselves in tential citizens. 123

Number of Syrians and Syrian companies in Turkey

Number of Syrian companies – right axis

Number of Syrians under temporary protection – lef axis

3,500,000 7,000

3,000,000 6,000

2,500,000 5,000

2,000,000 4,000

1,500,000 3,000

1,000,000 2,000

500,000 1,000

0 0 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Data: TOBB and Directorate General for Migration Management, TEPAV calculations

MAINTAINING THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN Statement on irregular migration. It entails, EU AND TURKEY first, inclusive humanitarian schemes to as- #med2017 In this sense, engagement with the Euro- sist the vulnerable population. Second, ca- the presence of more than 3 million Syrians pean Union is essential and beneficial. Turkey pacity building programmes are transferring in Turkey requires the is a middle-income country, fairly globalised, the know-how to Turkey’s public institutions. Turkish state to craf a new notion of identity and closer to the European identity than any Finally, the bloc’s eastern shores are safer now that is more other Middle Eastern country. Moreover, the from unpredicted irregular migration waves. multicultural and accommodating of EU has a long standing experience in multi- Additionally, the Statement is a dialogue diferent identities culturalism and integrating migrants. There channel in the current rif between Ankara may be some political fuss between the two and Brussels. Therefore, it is in all the parties’ sides, but technically speaking there has also interest to maintain this dialogue open to el- been progress in the form of the EU-Turkey evate the standards for everyone concerned.

4 CIVIL SOCIETY, CULTURE AND MEDIA 126 CIVIL SOCIETY, CULTURE AND MEDIA Preventing a lost generation 4.1 of young Syrians

Silvia Gison, David Mariano, Noemi Pazienti, Yousra Semmache Save the Children

CIVIL With the Syrian crisis in its seventh year, from indiscriminate and sometimes targeted SOCIETY there are 8.3 million children in need of as- atacks.8 There have been more than 4,000 sistance due to the conflict,1 bombed and atacks on schools in Syria – almost two a day starved in an unimaginable depth of vio- since 2011.9 In northwest Syria,10 schools have lence, sufering, destruction and disregard witnessed more than 200 incidents since 2014, for human life. Despite ceasefire deals agreed which have resulted in the temporary closure in some areas in 2017, widespread violence of schools, total destruction of facilities, and against civilians continues and September the deaths of students, teachers, and staf. was the deadliest month so far this year. The Close to 1.75 million children are out of UN Secretary General’s Report on Children school, and the formal education system has and Armed conflict documented close to 750 lost 150,00011 – more than a third – of its ed- grave violations against children in the first six ucation personnel, including teachers. More- months of 2016 alone,2 and child recruitment over, teachers that remain are usually not doubled last year compared with 2015.3 At least trained to work with children who are psycho- 3 million Syrian children under the age of six logically afected by the conflict, and many are know nothing but war;4 there are around 1.5 psychologically impacted themselves. million children in hard-to-reach locations, Since the beginning of the conflict, increases and over 200,000 in besieged areas encircled in child marriage – particularly afecting girls by military actors.5 Over half of the popula- as young as 11 – have been widely reported.12 tion has been forced from their homes and 5 Parents ofen feel that a married girl is likely million civilians from Syria live as refugees to be safer and beter protected from sexual in neighbouring countries, including 2.5 mil- violence and harassment.13 Furthermore, in lion children whose future remains uncertain. northern Syria in June 2017, child marriage 851 These children are the next generation who continues to be utilised as a negative coping cases of child recru- will have to rebuild their country. mechanism “to decrease the number of family itment atributed to 14 ten armed groups members requiring food.” Moreover, boys – verified by the UN INSIDE SYRIA as young as 7 – are at particular risks of being Since the start of the conflict, hundreds of recruited by armed groups.15 Although it is a thousands of people, including women and violation of international human rights law16 children, are reported to have been killed.6 In and one of the six grave violations against 2016 alone, UNICEF reported more than 652 children in armed conflict,17 the UN cited 851 children were killed including 255 who died verified cases of child recruitment atributed in or nearby a school.7 The situation remains to at least ten armed groups.18 dire for millions of children at risk of violence, Children exposed to multiple sources of vio- restriction of aid, exploitation associated with lence may become desensitised and emotion- 2 forced displacements and disintegration of ally numb, which increases the possibility that atacks a day on average occurred social support structures: few places are safe they start imitating the aggressive behaviour against schools in for them while their schools, homes, and play- they witness and consider such violence as Syria since 2011 grounds continue to be damaged or destroyed normal. As well as traditional learning, schools 127

THE LOST GENERATION IN NUMBERS

8.4 million 3 million 300,000 million of children are afected by children are under the age children live in besieged areas conflict in Syria of 6 and have always lived in a war context

353,000 2.5 million 652 children live encircled children are refugees in 2016, at least 652 children by militay actors in or outside Syria have been killed

4,000 1.75 million 150,000 since 2011, 4,000 atacks of Syrian children personnel in the education on schools have been registered are out of school sector have been lost since 2011

Syrian children refugees out of school in the host countries (2015)

Children in education Children out of school

Turkey 293,404 452,598

Lebanon 190,676 180,419

Jordan 189,068 31,842

Iraq 38,968 25,257

Egypt 36,243 4,104

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Data: Save the Children, UNICEF 128 CIVIL SOCIETY, CULTURE AND MEDIA

Primary school enrollment in the MENA region (2016)

Tunisia 98.6% Kuwait 92.9%

Morocco 98.4% Iraq 92.3%

Egypt 98.0% Qatar 92.1%

Saudi Arabia Palestinian 97.6% Territories 90.2%

Algeria 97.1% Jordan 89.2%

Bahrain 96.4% Yemen 84.8%

Oman 94.5% Lebanon 81.8%

UAE 93.4% Syria 66.7%

Data: World Bank

provide children with a vital source of safety, parental supervision, children are particular- stability and routine and are crucial for normal ly vulnerable to exploitation and to psycho- childhood development.19 logical, physical and sexual abuse...22 As they have neither the time, nor the energy to atend IN NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES school, children who are working are more As of October 2017, more than 5.3 million likely to drop out of school and their chances people, including 2.5 million children, have of re-enrolling diminish.23 fled Syria in search of safety and aid, mainly in Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and Egypt.20 THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY RE- The dramatic increase in population size has SPONSE put strains on public services and exacerbated Afer more than six years of brutal conflict, the vulnerabilities of host communities. the outrage at what is occurring in Syria must Refugee children face a number of barriers remain unchanged. It is more important than to their access to education. Access to educa- ever for the various parties to come together tion varies greatly in camps – formal or infor- and find a political solution to the conflict in mal – and urban contexts. The most margin- Syria.24 Numerous initiatives have been put in alised refugee children such as girls who get place since the beginning of the war to allevi- married early, children who work and adoles- ate the sufering of the civilian population and cents who have been out of school for several help children and vulnerable people afected years, are particularly hard to reach. The lon- by the Syrian crisis. ger children are out of school the more they The No Lost Generation Initiative, launched lose skills and knowledge they have already in 2013, ensures that child protection and ed- acquired and the smaller the likelihood that ucation are at the centre of the humanitarian they will go back.21 Due to limited access to the response to the Syria crisis and aims to pre- labour market for refugee caregivers and lack vent a lost generation. More recently, it has of education opportunities, children are at risk broadened its scope to address issues afecting of child labour and, in some cases, become the adolescents and young people as well. The aim 255 main breadwinners in refugee families. Since is to amplify the voices of children, adoles- children dead in or they have more opportunities in the informal cents and youth; provide a platform for com- near a school sector, ofen far away from home and without mon advocacy; and try to address issues like 129 child labour and child marriage by mobilising principle of responsibility sharing by increas- 25 resources. ing global refugee resetlement quota, leaving #med2017 Since 2014, the international communi- the burden mainly on neighbouring countries. the international community has to ty’s approach has changed significantly with Participants also fell short of geting more work on ensuring that the launch of the first multi-year Regional multi-year funding pledged, preventing the the current political negotiations lead to an Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP). The 3RP humanitarian community from efective- efective nationwide consists of two main components: protection ly planning and implementing projects in a cessation of hostilities and humanitarian assistance to refugees; re- long-term context. silience and stabilisation of host communities and ownership of national governments. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A COMMON AC- Over 2016 and 2017, the international com- TION munity has developed a comprehensive new We need to act now to reverse the impact approach to address this protracted crisis. Two that the Syrian crisis has inflicted on a genera- main conferences have been held: the “Sup- tion of children. The international community porting Syria and the Region” Conference that has to work on ensuring that the current po- took place in February 2016 in London and litical negotiations lead to an efective nation- a follow-up conference in Brussels in April wide cessation of hostilities as a first step to- 2017. Donors and host countries commited wards a lasting agreement to end the violence to policies and funding to improve access to and a political setlement to the conflict. quality education and increase jobs and live- NGO partners, including Save the Children, lihood opportunities across the region – both have called for donors to invest in multi-year for Syrians and host communities. In particu- and predictable funding to support broad- lar, at the London Conference participants set er and longer-term approaches and scale up two ambitious targets: creating 1.1 million new quality education, child protection, and men- jobs in the region by 2018 and ensuring that, tal health support activities inside Syria and by the end of the 2016/17 school year, 1.7 mil- in refugee hosting countries. lion children – including all refugee children Host countries and donors must fulfil the and vulnerable children in host communities commitments made at the London and Brus- – will be in quality education, with equal ac- sels conferences, in particular by implement- cess for girls and boys.26 At the Brussels Con- ing the “No Lost Generation” goal on educa- ference, participants pledged further funding tion, by strengthening education systems in and commited to achieve the goals already host countries and implementing measures set in London. However, the international that address jointly education, livelihoods and community has so far failed to honour the protection to reach every last child. 130 CIVIL SOCIETY, CULTURE AND MEDIA

Policies for the educational sector in Syria

Center for Civil Society and Democracy (CCSD)

The ongoing conflict in Syria has brought fit their religious mindset. Under these condi- to the fore many problems and crises at all tions many families chose to homeschool their levels of society and in all parts of the coun- children or hire teachers to teach their children try. One of the most urgent of these is not only at home. The impact on students of the lack the rehabilitation of the education sector, but of education on the one hand, and extremist also its reform. If the process of reform is ap- education on the other, in post-IS areas is an proached in the right way, it can complement urgent issue at the moment. It is crucial to ex- rehabilitation, and lead to building social co- amine this in detail, in order to address these hesion, preventing violent extremism and negative impacts in the most efective way. empowering women and girls, among other things. It is crucial to think of the reform of RECOMMENDED POLICIES AND ACTIONS Syria’s education sector as part of an inclu- If the crisis in Syria’s education sector is not sive and sustainable peace process which will urgently addressed, it is very likely that Syria guarantee a credible transition. Only this can will enter a stage of total collapse in regard to allow real, efective and sustainable reform for education, which would have major repercus- the education sector to take place. While the sions into the future, with the country becom- devastation is extensive, there are opportuni- ing a centre of illiteracy, underdevelopment ties to implement positive changes that will and extremism. At the same time, if the pro- build a beter foundation for the future of this cess of reform is approached in the right way, crucial sector in Syria. it can complement rehabilitation, and lead to building social cohesion, preventing violent FRAMING THE SYRIAN CONTEXT extremism and empowering women and girls. The challenges and opportunities facing the It is crucial to think of the reform of Syria’s ed- education sector vary throughout the country, ucation sector as part of an inclusive and sus- and in large part are determined by local au- tainable peace process which will guarantee thorities. These diferent authorities, including a credible transition. Only this can allow real, the Assad government, have all imposed their efective and sustainable reform for the edu- own ideologies on students through curric- cation sector to take place. ula. This threatens the concept of the Syrian Based on the above, we have formulated the national identity, and also undermines social following recommendations, which we urge stability in the coming post-war era. In or- all stakeholders to act on immediately: der to design efective solutions, it is crucial Create a safe environment for children to go to analyse the distinct challenges facing the to school. education sector in each part of Syria. For ex- • Pressure the parties to the conflict to con- ample, in IS-held areas, the education sector sider school buildings as neutral from the is completely paralysed and there is no real conflict; they must not be atacked, seized or education except according to IS’ ideology. IS used as military facilities. imposed restrictions on schools and teachers, • Establish a working group comprised of in- eventually closing down schools complete- ternational organisations and bodies to exert ly and restricting education to take place in pressure on the various local, national and mosques with educational curricula that only international parties to the conflict to main- 131

tain the education sector and its institutions ing peace education material (in cooperation as neutral from the conflict. with international expert organisations), #med2017 • Support independent Syrian civil society training teachers in conflict resolution skills we can be optimi- stic because of the groups to play a positive role in this regard, and building the capacities of local gover- eagerness of Syrians to through their campaigns and initiative to nance institutions to support and facilitate learn despite the great challenges they face, support and protect students. For example, the rebuilding of schools and curricula. as well as the presence some civil society groups have been involved • Mechanisms to accredit curricula must be of many Syrian civil society groups that can in initiatives to mediate with armed groups established and supported in areas where it support the rehabili- to ensure that students have safe passage to is difcult to secure schools or educational tation of the education sector atend their exams. centres. Special accredited curricula such as • Train teachers in conflict sensitivity and con- the free education and the e-learning curric- flict resolution skills. ulum as well as the UNICEF’s self-learning Ensure the transparency of rehabilitated ed- curriculum could be adopted. ucation systems. • Undertake studies on the educational situa- • Decentralise the administration of education tion in post-IS areas with the aim of prepar- in opposition-held areas (not to be extended ing special curricula. Any curriculum imple- to curricula and textbooks) so that education mented in these areas must contribute to the is supervised by bodies afliated to local psychosocial reintegration of the children councils, and remains centrally linked to an in those areas and prevent them from being educational department that coordinates the drawn to extremism in the future. educational process at the national level. • Ensure that there are opportunities for the • Support independent Syrian civil society many children and young people who have groups to play a role in ensuring the trans- been deprived of their studies for long periods. parency of the education system, by holding This will mean a focus on programmes that decision-makers accountable, building pub- help them catch up at every educational level: lic awareness and convening diferent com- primary, secondary, and higher education. munity stakeholders such as parents and teachers for discussion. PROMOTING CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION Support the development of new curricula, Throughout all of these eforts, it is crucial and ensure that systems are structured to that the participation of Syrian women and include all students. civil society groups in decision making, de- • Ensure that there are schools established in sign and implementation is ensured. Their IDP camps, and support the eforts of Syri- participation will ensure that solutions reflect ans who have established or wish to establish community needs and are supported by com- schools in hard-to-reach and besieged areas. munities, thus creating the conditions for sus- • There is not only an urgent need to rebuild tainability. It is also crucial that any work on and protect school buildings, but also to rehabilitation or reform of the education sec- adjust curricula and include topics such as tor ensures that there are positive incentives to peace, psycho-social support and human move Syria towards sustainable peace. rights. This “peace education” helps children In conclusion, despite the gloomy picture of to deal with the efects of war and build so- the status of education in Syria, there is a path cial skills for dialogue and conflict resolution. forward. In particular, we can be optimistic be- Peace education in schools is crucial for so- cause of the eagerness of Syrians to learn de- cieties to overcome war and re-build social spite the great challenges they face, as well as resilience and cohesion. the presence of many independent Syrian civil • Build the capacity of local government society groups that can support the rehabilita- structures to facilitate the implementation tion and reform of the education sector. It is a of new curricula and support the role of in- moral duty of all capable parties to contribute dependent local civil society groups. These positively to securing the basic right of educa- groups can play an important role in design- tion for Syrian children. 132 CIVIL SOCIETY, CULTURE AND MEDIA Protecting cultural heritage 4.2 in conflicts areas

Francesco Bandarin Assistant Director-General for Culture, UNESCO

CIVIL Cultural heritage and pluralism have in- sion-making. Armed non-state actors are in- SOCIETY creasingly become the direct targets of sys- creasingly challenging domestic governance tematic and deliberate atacks in numer- and ofen do not consider themselves bound ous conflicts around the world. More and by decisions taken at the international lev- more, UNESCO and its partners are called el. These conflicts increasingly afect culture upon to respond. Culture is particularly vul- and challenge the way in which organisa- nerable to collateral damage, looting and in- tions like UNESCO, whose programmes tentional destruction, which is ofen paired are built around international conventions with the persecution of individuals based on signed by states, can respond. their cultural, ethnic or religious afliation Moreover, conflicts no longer have clear and the denial of other communities’ identi- endings, they create complex humanitarian ties resulting in “cultural cleansing”. Out of 81 emergencies of a protracted nature. Even World Heritage Properties in the Arab states when peace agreements are signed, pow- region, 21 are listed as in danger, 17 of which er struggles continue that challenge fragile due to conflict. agreements leaving large parts of the popu- In countries such as Iraq, Mali and Syria, lation displaced and dependent on human- extremist groups are applying a deliberate itarian aid. The absence of clearly distin- strategy aimed at eradicating cultural diver- guishable post-conflict phases and the high sity. This involves the persecution of peoples number of protracted conflicts that can es- and groups on the basis of their cultural and calate at any given time require a prolonged religious identity, including by intentionally engagement on the part of the international targeting their material cultural references - community with regards to both the delivery such as shrines, monuments, sites, museums of basic humanitarian assistance and pro- and their artefacts, libraries and archives, but tection responsibilities, including the safe- also schools and other places of knowledge, guarding of cultural rights. 81 and even teachers, intellectuals and religious Culture and heritage, as expressions of World Heritage Pro- leaders. It also includes preventing people peoples’ identity, repositories of memory perties in the Arab from practicing their intangible cultural her- and traditional knowledge, are essential states region itage, including religious rituals, and from components of a community’s resilience exercising their cultural rights. Such strate- and social capital. Promoting respect for cul- gy has been termed “cultural cleansing” by tural diversity is fundamental to preventing former UNESCO’s Director-General Irina violent extremism, generating positive di- Bokova. alogue and inclusion, and fostering lasting peace. DIFFERENT WARS, NEW THREATS The significance of culture in the lives of 21 The evolving nature of contemporary communities and individuals makes its con- World Heritage conflicts, from inter to intra-state, poses a tinuity a powerful tool for building resilience, Properties in the significant challenge to the current world or- serving as a basis for sustainable recovery. MENA region listed as in danger der built on international treaties and deci- Likewise, the rehabilitation of heritage can 133

WORLD HERITAGE AT RISK

IRAQ • 2 out of 4 World Heritage sites sufered from destruction (Hatra,7 March 2015, and Ashur, 29 May 2015); • 2 sites on World Heritage Tentative list severely afected: Nimrud by destruction (bul- ldozers and explosives) on 11 April 2015; sculptures and 2 gates destroyed at Ancient City of Nineveh; • Around 100 sites are afected by the conflict, including Mosul Museum, vandalized with heavy destruction of artifacts (mainly sculptures from Hatra, Khorshabad and Balawat); the Tomb and Mosque of Prophet Jonah (Nebi Yunus) blown up; • Numerous sites in Mosul, Telafar, Sinjar, Tikrit, and Samarra are reported as de- stroyed or severely damaged, and include archaeological sites, shrines and religious places.

SYRIA • All 6 World Heritage sites directly afected by fighting; • 4 World Heritage sites severely damaged, including Palmyra and the Old Cities of Aleppo and Damascus; • 8 sites on the World Heritage Tentative list damaged, destroyed or severely afected by looting and illegal excavations; • At least 6 museums damaged and/or looted; • At least 12 other sites damaged or destroyed.

YEMEN • 2 World Heritage sites (Old City of Sana’a; Historic Town of Zabid) repeatedly dama- ged in airstrikes; • 2 sites on World Heritage Tentative list damaged and destroyed, respectively (Old City of Sa’adah, March 2015; Marib Dam, 31 May and 18 August 2015); • At least 7 other sites damaged or destroyed, including the archaeological city of Baraqish, the Al Qahirah citadel in Taiz, the Dhamar Museum, the Al Salam Bridge in Shabwa, as well as ancient tombs in Hadramout.

Capacity-building in Syria by UNESCO

• 120 international experts rallied international community to safeguard Syrian cultu- ral heritage; • 3 first aid support meetings dedicated to Crac des Chevaliers, Aleppo Museums and the Ancient City of Damascus; • Meeting on creation and updating of Syrian police database of looted artifacts; 120 • 2 meetings on improving inventories of built, movable and intangible Syrian cultural international heritage; experts • Training to combat looting and illicit trafcking addressed to police and customs ofcers from Syria and neighboring countries (Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey); • Training to protect movable heritage during and post-conflict, and museums from looting; • 2 trainings on first aid to built cultural heritage in Syria; • Training on the 2003 Convention for the safeguarding of intangible cultural heritage; • Workshop on the fight against illicit trafcking and restitution of cultural property; 1 Syrian police database • 2 trainings on 3D digital documentation (data collection and analysis); of looted artifacts • First Aid Support Meeting on Syrian Traditional Musics; • 2 workshops on building documentation and damage assessment; • IT workshop on storage and data management; • Training on the safeguarding and digitization of historic documents and archives; • Technical workshop for WH sites of Crac des Chevaliers, Palmyra and Ancient City of Damascus; • Technical meeting on WH site of Old City of Aleppo; 2 • First Aid Support Meeting for Traditional Building Techniques; trainings on first aid to • First aid support meeting on community-based safeguarding of museums and built cultural heritage mosaics. Data: UNESCO 134 CIVIL SOCIETY, CULTURE AND MEDIA

contribute towards healing the scars of war ENLARGING COOPERATION AND by allowing communities to recover a sense TECHNOLOGY of hope, dignity and empowerment. As a vis- The Strategy also provides a focus for the ible expression of common ground between mobilisation of the Global Coalition “Unite communities, culture can be a powerful tool for Heritage”. Launched in June 2015 by the for reconciliation and a building block for so- former Director-General of UNESCO, Ms cial cohesion. Irina Bokova, it aims to bring together a wide Artists and cultural institutions play an range of actors from diferent professional essential role in ensuring freedom of expres- fields to strengthen eforts in the protection sion, promoting cultural diversity and fos- of cultural heritage. tering inclusive dialogue. Such cultural ex- This involves strengthening our coopera- pressions also ofer appropriate ways to deal tion with traditional partners and establishing with psycho-social distress and so reconcile new forms of cooperation with actors beyond communities. the field of culture such as the humanitari- an and security sectors. In this context, over UNESCO’S ROLE IN SAFEGUARDING the past years, the international community CULTURAL HERITAGE has demonstrated a growing awareness for By protecting cultural heritage and pro- the importance of integrating culture in the moting cultural pluralism in emergency sit- framework of humanitarian, security, peace- uations, UNESCO contributes towards pro- keeping and human rights policies and oper- tecting human rights, preventing conflicts ations. Since 2015, the UN Security Council and building peace, upholding international has adopted several landmark resolutions humanitarian law and enhancing resilience that considered cultural heritage. While res- among communities. olutions 2199 (2015), adopted under Chapter UNESCO has a long record of intervention VII of the UN Charter, and 2253 (2015) rec- to protect or rehabilitate cultural heritage af- ognised the illicit trafcking of cultural ob- fected by conflicts or natural disasters, as it jects as a source of financing of terrorism and leads international eforts and campaigns banned the trade in cultural artefacts from around the world. The unprecedented atacks Iraq and Syria, resolution 2347 (2017) is the against culture and heritage, notably in the first dedicated exclusively to cultural heri- Middle East, together with the increased oc- tage, condemning its unlawful destruction, currence of natural disasters have called for and making concrete recommendations for new and more efective approaches to meet action to UN member states. these challenges. In cooperation with UNITAR-UNOSAT At its 38th General Conference in Novem- and other partners, UNESCO monitors dam- ber 2015, UNESCO adopted a Strategy for the age to cultural heritage via satellite imagery, reinforcement of the organisation’s actions for allowing remote access to otherwise inac- the protection of culture and the promotion of cessible areas. This helps to clarify the situ- cultural pluralism in the event of armed con- ation on the ground, to deploy cultural first flict. It builds on the six culture conventions aid wherever it is most needed and to plan administered by UNESCO by strengthening for future recovery, all of which are based on their synergy and operational capacity to a comprehensive record of historic features achieve the dual objectives: and the involvement of local communities • to strengthen member states’ ability to and their understanding of the consequences prevent, mitigate and recover the loss of of destruction. A Memorandum of Under- cultural heritage and diversity as a result of standing was also signed with the Interna- 17 conflict; tional Commitee of the Red Cross (ICRC) World Heritage on 29 February 2016 to promote the respect Properties in the • to incorporate the protection of culture MENA region in into humanitarian action, security strate- of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), danger due to conflict gies and peace-building processes. including through the ratification of the 1954 135

Hague Convention for the Protection of Cul- cultural heritage as a tool of intercultural di- tural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict alogue, UNESCO led international eforts to #med2017 and its two Protocols (1954 and 1999). It is reconstruct the Old Bridge in Mostar in 2004. UNESCO is active in Iraq, Libya, Syria also in the context of IHL that UNESCO wel- Today, the World Heritage site of the Old and Yemen to protect comed the prosecution and condemnation Bridge Area of the Old City of Mostar stands these countries’ cultural heritage from the by the International Criminal Court (ICC) of as a symbol of reconciliation, international devastating efects of a suspect for the war crime of intentionally cooperation and the coexistence of diverse the conflicts directing atacks against historic monuments cultural, ethnic and religious communities. and buildings dedicated to religion, namely In Timbuktu, Mali, UNESCO collaborated of the shrines and mausoleums in Timbuk- with local masonry associations to complete tu, Mali, during the occupation by extremist the reconstruction of 14 of the 16 mausole- groups in 2012 of the city listed as a World ums inscribed on the World Heritage List Heritage property. On the operational side, which were deliberately destroyed by violent and under the coordination of the Italian extremist groups in 2012. A consecration cer- Ministry of Culture and Tourism, a national emony was held in February 2016 to celebrate “Task Force” of cultural heritage experts has the revival of the city’s invaluable heritage. been established. At the request of UNESCO, The rehabilitation of Timbuktu’s destroyed its members, including Carabinieri special- heritage served to ensure the continuity of ised in the fight against illicit trafcking, are the city’s ancient cultural traditions as well ready to deploy and assist in safeguarding as to commemorate and overcome, as a com- cultural heritage at risk, both for preventive munity, the traumatic experience of its loss. purposes as well as in emergency situations At present, UNESCO is active in Iraq, Lib- resulting from armed conflict and natural di- ya, Syria and Yemen to protect these coun- sasters. tries’ cultural heritage from the devastating efects of the conflicts there. This involves the BUILDING ON THE RUINS provision of technical assistance and capaci- All of these activities build on UNESCO’s ty-building, documentation as well as emer- 70 years of experience in the field of cultural gency rehabilitation measures, also financed heritage protection. Following the conflict in through the newly created and flexible UNE- Bosnia and Herzegovina, and with the ded- SCO Heritage Emergency Fund for the pro- ication of local authorities to promote their tection of heritage in emergency situations. 136 CIVIL SOCIETY, CULTURE AND MEDIA Channelling change: social 4.3 media and its political impact

Francesca Paci Journalist, La Stampa

CIVIL Six years afer the Arab Spring, it is in- media platform (62%), followed by Facebook SOCIETY teresting to reflect on what remains in the (55%) and YouTube (33%).2 MENA region of the events that spread the hope of a rapid democratic social and VIRTUAL REALITY IN SAUDI ARABIA: political evolution. At the time the western FRIEND OR FOE? media referred to those events as “the in- Another interesting indicator comes from ternet revolution” because of the young age Saudi women’s fight for their right to drive. In of those involved – Egyptians, Tunisians, the past weeks the debate around the royal de- Libyans, Syrians, Yemenis, Bahrainis – and cree allowing women to drive has flooded Sau- because not a single day passed without the di social media with critical hashtags whereby appearance of new blogs, online bulletins and “the people reject women driving”,3 but many independent web-TVs that were further am- more are in fact the supporters of this decision plified by the social networks. Six years later, and hundreds of women are celebrating. This that political window has closed, the author- should come as no surprise. Women in Saudi ities have relegated those hopes into utopia, Arabia have been fighting for their rights for and the activists have been confined to their 30 years, but afer the 2011 events social media homes by the reborn regimes. Nevertheless, has played a central role in the campaigners’ if Tahrir Square is physically back to the past, eforts to push reform ahead in the Gulf King- the virtual square is still alive. Like the Egyp- dom. Many activists have paid with jail time tians, the Arab web generation is anything the batle they carried out through their com- but buried. Navigating daily from Facebook puter even before than in the street. Loujain to Twiter to Instagram or Snapchat gives the al-Hathloul was detained for 73 days afer be- impression that social networks in the Mid- ing arrested for atempting to drive across the dle East and North Africa are if possible more border from the United Arab Emirates in 2014 important today than ever before. Internet and she documented her experiences on Twit- 58 million penetration in MENA reaches 60% with us- ter. Manal al-Sharif was arrested in 2011 afer Facebook users ers growing by 15% since January 2016, active filming herself driving and posting the video in the MENA region social media by 38% and mobile subscriptions on YouTube and Facebook. Maysaa at Amoudi by 127%.1 sufered the same fate in 2015 afer turning to Those figures are enlightening in under- the Internet to share the details of her ordeal. standing how social media and the Internet The Saudi kingdom appears to take the cy- have changed the way Arab youth are ac- ber world quite seriously, both as a threat and cessing their news. In 2011, in the midst of po- as a potential means to build consensus. In litical turmoil, 62% of Arabs aged 18-24 said particular, the Crown Prince Mohammed bin that they read newspapers on a daily basis, Salman, who is believed to hold much of the while today that number has dropped to 7%, power behind the throne, has promised an im- 6.5 million 32% afrm that they get the daily news on- portant package of political and social reforms Twiter users in the line (mostly via Facebook) and 29% watch TV as part of his Vision 2030 plan for which he MENA region news. WhatsApp is the most popular social needs the support of the younger generations, 137

Annual growth in the Middle East

Internet users Active social media users

+15% since January 2016 +47% since January 2016 +19 million +30 million

Mobile subscriptions Active mobile social users

+5% since January 2016 +44% since January 2016 +15 million +25 million

Data: We Are Social

The Middle East and Internet (2016)

3.7%

of the total worldwide Internet users are from the Middle East

40.2%

of total Middle East population has Internet access

88.0%

of the Middle East’s online population uses social networking sites daily

Data: We Are Social both because 70% of the population is under GOING SOCIAL: THE EGYPTIAN WAY TO DIS- 30 and because they use the Internet much SENT more than their parents do. Data indicate that Another interesting example is Egypt, a among Saudi youth the Internet penetration country where according to the latest Freedom rate is around 93% (with a rapidly growing use House report “serious political opposition is of Facebook, YouTube, Twiter and Snapchat) virtually non-existent, as both liberal and Is- while, according to a report from Northwest- lamist activists face criminal prosecution and ern University in Qatar, daily TV viewing has imprisonment”5 and where, according to Hu- dropped by 16%.4 man Rights Watch, most recently the authori- 138 CIVIL SOCIETY, CULTURE AND MEDIA

Internet penetration rate in the Middle East

60

50

40

30

20

10

0 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Data: Internet World Stats

ties have arrested at least 50 peaceful political CNN, successful applicants would receive a activists and blocked more than 400 web- login connected to their national ID while un- sites on claims of “supporting terrorism” and authorized users could risk prison sentences “publishing false information”.6 Although the and heavy fines.8 political horizon opened up with Mubarak’s An annual survey titled “Media Use in the 25% removal, it started to shrink again and even- Middle East” and focused on regional me- of all Facebook users in the MENA region tually disappear in the summer of 2013. How- dia trends and atitudes towards free speech are in Egypt ever, Egypt channels its repressed vitality into over the past five years found Egypt to be in the web opting for forms of aggregation that very bad shape: while in 2013 almost half of all have litle to do with politics and translate in- Egyptians (48%) believed that “it is okay for in- stead into start-ups, i.e. initiatives that bring dividuals to express their ideas on the internet together small groups of households for eco- even if they are unpopular”, only 29% percent nomic purposes and online cultural circles. agreed in 2017.9 Yet, despite the social anxiety The clearest evidence of this is the regime’s and the atempts by the state to monitor the activism in shuting down blogs and websites social networks also through government-run that soon reappear in diferent forms and the electronic systems, youthful energies still regularity with which diferent Members of manage to express themselves by ignoring Parliament call for stricter regulation on social politics and focusing on social activities, cul- media to protect national security. It would ap- ture, and small business online (e-commerce pear that the Egyptian government is fighting has a penetration of 16% and is constantly in- against the Internet the same war that it fought creasing). Examples include Tyro, a start-up a couple of years ago against international that aims to help youth to get beter access to 0 NGOs (nowadays almost inactive),7 consider- high-quality education, Tawseela, which seeks countries of the ing new radical proposals to restrict its citizens’ to tackle trafc congestion by geting cars of MENA region listed access to social media almost every week. One the streets by ofering membership-based bus- as ‘free’ in the Free- dom House scores of of the most recent examples is a draf bill pro- es, and bkam.com, a price comparison website Freedom on the net. posed by MP Reyad Abdel Satar of the liberal featuring over one million products. Only 5 (Lebanon, Li- Free Egyptian Party and presented six months A report by We Are Social and Hootsuite bya, Jordan, Morocco ago in the Egyptian press, a measure that called “Digital in 2017” confirms that Egypt is and Tunisia) are listed as “partly free”. All the would require Internet users to register with moving forward on all digital fronts. Even if others are listed as the government to access various websites the country has 37% Internet penetration (al- “not free” including Twiter and Facebook. According to most 30 million users, one-third of the pop- 139 ulation) compared to 99% in the United Arab politics on the Internet (the highest rate afer 11 Emirates, Egyptians spend on average 4 hours Lebanon). There are a number of reasons #med2017 online every day on laptops/desktops and why Tunisia was able to create coalitions and the connection between the social needs of the around 3 hours on their mobiles. Social media witness a bloodless power transfer six years MENA countries and penetration in Egypt is also around 37% but ago and one of the most important is probably their communication through the social users grow year-on-year by 25% (almost 50% of the country’s high literacy rate, which during networks did not come Facebook users are active daily) and in terms the revolution allowed a direct connection be- to an end with the th regression of the Arab of mobile penetration Egypt ranks 24 inter- tween the virtual reality of social media used Spring nationally with a 103% rate.10 by activists and society as a whole. However, in Tunisia, as in Egypt, widespread unem- WHAT PROSPECTS? ployment and extremism are perceived to be Clearly, something is changing in Saudi the greatest obstacles to social and political Arabia and Egypt but the same holds true for progress. The situation is not, however, very almost all countries in the MENA region, from comforting. The case of Lebanon — where, Iraq to Algeria, and in particular for the pro- compared to other countries, critics of the tagonists of 2011. Developments in post-revo- establishment are rather outspoken and tol- lution Tunisia show that positive change has erance for criticism against government pol- happened in the country since the removal of icies ofine is high (66% compared to 48% in former leader Ben Ali. Though far from per- Tunisia)12 — is quite unique. What is certain fect, Tunisia’s new constitution, signed afer is that the connection between the social the 2011 revolution, was hailed as the most needs of the MENA countries and their com- progressive in the region, providing more free- munication through the social networks did dom to criticise government and state institu- not come to an end with the regression of the tions. Almost 50% of Tunisians believe that it Arab Spring. That road remains open in all is safe to express one’s ideas and opinions on possible directions. REFERENCES

PART 2 CHALLENGES

SHARED SECURITY

Radicalisation and counter-terrorism in the era of the Islamic State’s metamorphosis 1. R. Mendick and R. Verkaik, “Only one in eight jihadists returning to UK is caught and convicted,” Telegraph, 21 May 2016. 2. L. Vidino, F. Marone, E. Entenmann, Fear Thy Neighbor. Radicalization and Jihadist Atacks in the West, ISPI, 2017.

Facing new security challenges in the south of the Mediterranean 1. See the BBC report Islamic State and the crisis in Iraq and Syria in Maps, 11 October 2017, htp://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27838034 2. Regional Conflict. Global Impact, International Handling Services (IHS) Markit Report, June 2017. 3. S. Heißner, P.K. Neumann, J. Holland-McCowan and R. Basra, Caliphate in Decline: An Estimate of Islamic State’s Financial Fortunes, International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR), 2017. 4. I. Bremmer, “The top 5 countries where ISIS gets its foreign recruits”, Time Magazine, 14 April 2017. 5. F. Wehrey, Insecurity and governance challenges in Southern Libya, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 30 March 2017.

The path towards radicalisation: a Tunisian perspective 1. M. Wieviorka, Sociétés et terrorisme, Fayard, Paris, 1988. 2. 2015 Report of National Observatory, ILEF. 3. “Tunisia’s Security Problem”, Fanack Chronicle, 9 April 2015.

The Gulf monarchies: disunited we stand 1. Among the 13 demands issued to Qatar there are: curb diplomatic ties with Iran; sever all ties to “terrorist organisations”; shut down Al Jazeera; terminate Turkish military presence in Qatar; end interference in sovereign countries’ internal afairs; align itself with the other Gulf and Arab countries. 2. “Troubled waters: GCC internal schisms in the spotlight again”, MEES, 9 June 2017. 3. Regional Economic Outlook. Middle East and Central Asia, International Monetary Fund, October 2017. 4. Ibidem. 5. According to MEES figures, Qatar’s export revenues totaled $16.5 billion in Q3, the highest quarterly figure since Q4 2015, and full-year 2017 revenues are estimated around $65 billion, up 13 percent on 2016. “Kuwait urges Gulf unity as Qatar exports rise despite embargo”, MEES, 27 October 2017. 6. “IMF tells Gulf states to speed up switch from oil”, Middle East Eyes, 31 October 2017. 7. Ibidem. 8. Saudi banking sector’s exposure to Qatar is estimated to be around $30 billion. SHARED PROSPERITY

Promoting intra-regional trade in the southern Mediterranean 1. E. Santi, S. Ben Romdhane, and W. Shaw (eds.), Unlocking North Africa’s Potential through Regional Integration: Challenges and Opportunities, African Development Bank, 2012. 2. J.R. Chaponnière and M. Lautier, “By chance or by virtue? The regional economic integration process in Southeast Asia”, in B. Jetin, M. Mikic (eds), ASEAN Economic Community, Palgrave Macmillan US, 2016, pp. 33-57. 3. M. S. Ben Ali (ed.), Economic development in the Middle East and North Africa: Challenges and prospects, Springer, Berlin, 2016. 4. B. Shepherd, Trade Costs in the Maghreb 2000-2009, Working Paper DTC-2011-9, New York, Developing Trade Consultants, 2011. 5. Trade Costs in the Developing World: 1995–2010, Policy Research Working Paper 6309, World Bank, 2013. 6. Making regional integration work: Company perspectives on non-tarif measures in Arab States, International Trade Centre, Geneva, 2015. 7. K. El Aynaoui, K. El Mokri, U. Dadush and R. Berahab, “The Unmet Challenge of Interdependence in the EU-MENA Space: A View from the South”, in Seven Years afer the Crisis: Intersecting Perspectives, Bruegel and OCP Policy Center, 2016, p.35-82. 8. C. Jolly, Regional integration in the Mediterranean, impact and limits of Community and bilateral policies, European Parliament’s Commitee on Foreign Afairs, 2014. 9. B. Hoekman, Intra-Regional Trade: Potential Catalyst for Growth in the Middle East, Policy Paper No.1, Middle East Institute, 2016. N. Wolf, F. Mihram, and M. Frische, Perspectives on Economic Integration between the EU and North Africa: Investments, Reforms, Partnership, Humboldt University of Berlin, Institute of Economic History, 2017. 10. T. Behr, Regional integration in the Mediterranean moving out of the deadlock?, Notre Europe, Paris, 2010. 11. Jolly, 2014. 12. U. Dadush, M. Demertzis, and G. Wolf, Europe’s role in North Africa: development, investment and migration, Policy Contribution No. 10, Bruegel, April 2017.

Iran afer the sanctions: back in business? 1. P. Magri, A. Perteghella, Iran Afer the Deal: the Road Ahead, ISPI, 2015, p. 16. 2. Also known as P5+1: France, the UK, China, Russia and the US (all 5 members of the UNSC), + Germany. 3. A. Tabatabai, Preserving the Iran Nuclear Deal. Perils and Prospects, Policy Analysis No. 818, CATO Institute, August 2017, p. 5. 4. R. D. Hormats, Post-Sanctions Economic Opportunities and Risks in Iran, Issue Brief, Atlantic Council, 2016, p. 3. 5. Ibidem, p. 5. 6. Iran has the world’s largest natural gas reserves and is expected to be the third-largest oil supplier in the world by 2025. 7. S. Blockmans, A. Ehteshami and G. Bahgat (eds), EU-Iran Relations afer the Nuclear Deal, CEPS, 2016, p. 35. 8. Magri, Perteghella (eds.), 2015, p. 38. 9. Ibidem, p. 29-30. 10. S. Blockmans, A. Ehteshami and G. Bahgat, 2016, p. 24. 11. htp://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1704/05/wolf.02.html 12. Tabatabai, 2017. 13. S. Blockmans, A. Ehteshami and G. Bahgat, 2016, p. 38. 14. E. Geranmayeh, What if Trump decertifies the Iran deal?, ECFR, 6 October 2017. 15. U. Friedman, “Trump Isn’t Certifying the Iran Deal—What Happens Next?”, The Atlantic, 12 October 2017. 16. S. Blockmans, A. Ehteshami and G. Bahgat, 2016, p. 35.

The blue economy: a driver of shared prosperity in the Mediterranean 1. The Potential of blue economy. Increasing long-term benefits of the sustainable use of marine resources for small island developing states and coastal least developed countries, World Bank and United Nations Department of Economic and Social Afairs, 2017, p. 1. 2. Saving our heritage, our future: The worrying state of Mediterranean fish stocks, Joint Research Centre, EU Science Hub, 3 April 2017. 3. UfM, UfM Declaration, November 2015, htp://ufmsecretariat.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/2015- 11-17-declaration-on-blue-economy_en.pdf 4. Report on the Blue Growth Strategy. Towards more sustainable growth and jobs in the blue economy, Commission Staf Working Document, Brussels, European Commission, 2017, p. 3. 5. V Rapporto sull’economia del mare. Cluster maritimo e sviluppo in Italia, Federazione del mare, 2015, p. 11. 6. The ocean economy in 2030, OECD, 2016.

MIGRATION

From humanitarian assistance to empowerment in Jordan 1. htp://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=107 2. CENSUS, 2015, htp://www.dos.gov.jo/dos_home_a/main/population/census2015/Refugees/ Refugees_7.1.pdf 3. P. Verme, et al., The Welfare of Syrian Refugees. Evidence from Jordan And Lebanon, World Bank Group and UNHCR, 2016. 4. Jordan National Child Labour Survey 2016, Report, CSS and ILO, 2017. 5. S. E. Stave, S. Hillesund, Impact of Syrian refugees on the Jordanian labour market, ILO and FAFE, 2015.

Looking into the Turkish experience 1. S. Arsu, “Turkish Premier Urges Assad to Quit in Syria”, The New York Times, 22 November 2011. 2. htp://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=224 3. Anadolu Ajansı, “2016’da 13 bin Suriyeli çalışma izni aldı”, NTV, 18 January 2017. 4. “Türkiye’ 46 bin yabancıya iş kapısı oldu”, CNN Turk, 7 August 2017. 5. “Suriyeli İş Adamlarına İş Kurma Prosedürleri Eğitimi”, Milliyet, 4 October 2017.

CIVIL SOCIETY, CULTURE AND MEDIA

Preventing a lost generation of young Syrians 1. Humanitarian Needs Overview 2017 – Syrian Arab Republic, OCHA, 2017. 2. Ibidem. 3. UN Secretary General Report on Children and Armed Conflict, October 2017. 4. Invisible Wounds. The impact of six years of war on the mental health of Syria’s children, Save the Children, 2017. 5. OCHA, 2017. 6. With estimates as high as 470.000. Confronting Fragmentation, Syrian Centre for Policy Research, 2016. 7. Hiting rock botom: Children’s sufering in Syria at its worst, Press release, UNICEF, 13 March 2017. 8. Syria: “September was the deadliest month of 2017 for civilians”, Regional Humanitarian Coordinator Syria, OCHA, 5 October 2017. 9. Children in war-torn Syria risk their lives to go to school, UNICEF, 21 October 2016. 10. Save the Children’s own supported schools. 11. Education Bulletin, No. 4, Syria Education Sector Working Group, 2017. 12. No Place for Children. The impact of five years of war on Syria’s children and their childhoods, UNICEF, 2016. 13. Save the Children, 2017. 14. According to Save the Children’s own assessment. 15. No Place for Children, UNICEF, 2016. There were also some reports of girls recruited to cook and clean for fighters, however the vast majority felt that boys are at greatest risk. 16. Child Recruitment and use, Ofce of the Special Representative of Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, 2016. 17. The “six grave violations” were identified by the UN Security Council Resolution 1612 in order to “advance the goal of protecting children during armed conflict and ending the impunity of perpetrators”. The Six Grave Violations Against Children During Armed Conflict, Working Paper No. 1, Ofce of the Special Representative of Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, 2009 – update 2013. 18. Annual Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict (A/72/361), General Assembly Security Council, 2017. 19. Save the Children, 2017. 20. Syria Regional Refugee Response, UNHCR htp://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php. Turkey is hosting the largest number of Syrian refugees (2.8 million) followed by Lebanon (1 million) and Jordan (660,000). 21. Save the Children, 2017. 22. Small Hands, Heavy Burden, UNICEF and Save the Children, 2015. 23. K. Watkins, S. A. Zyck, Living on hope, hoping for education: the failed response to the Syrian refugee crisis, Report, ODI, 2014. 24. htp://www.unocha.org/syrian-arab-republic/syria-country-profile/about-crisis htp://nolostgeneration.org/about 25. Stand and Deliver, Danish Refugee Council, Oxfam and Save the Children, 2017.

ISBN 978-88-90949982