Rising Democracies, Burden-Sharing, and the International Liberal Order Ted Piccone

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Rising Democracies, Burden-Sharing, and the International Liberal Order Ted Piccone POLICY BRIEF Rising democracies, burden-sharing, and the international liberal order Ted Piccone Amid an erosion of leadership among established democracies, rising democratic powers—though saddled with their own problems at home—should be ready to step up on the international stage. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY A close look at the evolution of these six middle power democracies reveals a turning away from The international liberal order based on collectively more ambitious goals of regional and global securing peace, promoting development, and influence. In Brazil and South Africa, the traditional protecting human rights is facing a major stress test. political order has nearly collapsed under the With the decline of U.S. leadership, a weakening weight of revelations of deep structural corruption Europe, and the rise of authoritarian China and Russia, and economic downturns. Mexico’s foreign policy is the future of the liberal order depends on newer returning to its traditional noninterventionism as it democratic powers picking up the slack. Leading struggles to maintain equilibrium in the face of direct players such as India, Brazil, South Africa, the Republic challenges to its trade and migration relationship of Korea, Indonesia, and Mexico are capable of playing with the United States and escalating violence and a more active role to sustain a global cooperation corruption. South Korea, after weathering a major agenda favoring open democratic societies. Many constitutional crisis that led to the jailing of former of these countries, however, face significant political President Park Geun-hye, is consumed by the threat and economic challenges of their own. If geopolitical of war on the Korean Peninsula. Indonesia is coping competition intensifies, they may choose to sit on with a more muscular version of political Islam the fence or accept lowest common denominator and a retrenchment in its regional ambitions. Only outcomes for the sake of avoiding outright economic India, which also has chosen a more nationalist and or military conflict. Liberal democracy and human populist approach to governing at home, is raising rights, in this scenario, will erode further. 1 DEMOCRACY & DISORDER RISING DEMOCRACIES, BURDEN-SHARING, AND THE INTERNATIONAL LIBERAL ORDER its foreign policy game, for example by contesting among the world’s great powers have on these China in the Indo-Pacific. rising democracies’ interest in sharing the burden of defending the international liberal order? Middle power democracies, like the six reviewed in this essay, have a potentially positive role After an earlier period of more ambitious to play if they can revive their once promising expectations of regional if not global leadership, paths to sustainable democratic development. leaders of these six middle power democracies in As they have mostly benefited from the upside of the last five years have mostly steered away from a economic globalization and democratization, they more activist role internationally. In Brazil and South should also become more responsible stewards Africa, the traditional political order has nearly and shapers of our interdependent system. They collapsed under the weight of revelations of deep now need to step up and share the burden of structural corruption and economic downturns. managing a more multipolar world that aligns Mexico, under its new populist president, is tackling with their own democratic values and interests. its massive domestic challenges in ways that They can do so by contributing more resources reinforce nationalist and strongman tendencies. to international institutions that uphold universal South Korea, having survived a major constitutional values and protect the global commons, support crisis that led to the jailing of former President implementation of the Sustainable Development Park Geun-hye, is distracted by the threat of war Goals, defend civil society and independent media on the Korean Peninsula. Indonesia enters an from growing attacks on their work, build cross- important year that will test its ability to cope with a regional coalitions to block the growing trend more muscular version of political Islam and amid toward zero-sum nationalism, and proactively share retrenchment in its regional ambitions. Only Prime the burden of good global governance. Minister Narendra Modi’s India, which also has chosen a more nationalist and populist approach INTRODUCTION to governing at home, is stretching its ambitions, for example by contesting China in the Indo-Pacific. With the decline of U.S. leadership, a weakening Europe, and the rise of authoritarian China and This policy brief will take an updated look2 at how Russia, the international liberal order is facing a these middle power democracies are performing serious stress test. Middle power democracies in the context of an emerging great-power contest such as India, Brazil, South Africa, the Republic for global leadership. It will consider how their of Korea, Indonesia, and Mexico, which together democratic governance challenges and economic represent 27 percent of the world’s population,1 are interests shape their respective foreign policies and capable of playing a more active role in shoring up activism on liberal order issues. It will then provide the liberal order’s shaky pillars. A more concerted recommendations on how best they could engage effort by these countries, along with more as partners for sharing the burden of sustaining the established middle powers in Europe, Canada, international liberal order. Australia, and Japan, could provide the backbone necessary to sustain the international agenda HOW ARE MIDDLE POWER DEMOCRACIES on human rights, sustainable development, and DOING? cooperative security. But are they willing to play that role given their own internal political and economic Domestic performance challenges posed by their populations’ demands After two decades of impressive progress on both for improved governance and standards of living? the political and economic fronts, six middle power And what effect will the intensifying competition democracies from around the world—India, Brazil, 2 DEMOCRACY & DISORDER RISING DEMOCRACIES, BURDEN-SHARING, AND THE INTERNATIONAL LIBERAL ORDER South Africa, the Republic of Korea, Indonesia, and Widodo, or “Jokowi,” Indonesia has faced rising Mexico—raised expectations in the established Islamist radicalization and underperformed on West that they could become constructive players its once-promising leadership role in Southeast in the emerging multipolar world system. More Asia and the Islamic world as the world’s fourth- recently, however, their performance as liberalizing largest democracy. Only South Korea has continued exemplars has fallen short of those expectations. the course of strengthening liberal democracy, Turkey, for example, has fallen so far from the including weathering a presidential impeachment democratic fold that it can no longer fairly be included and criminal trial, while simultaneously pursuing a in this grouping. The timing of their backsliding negotiated peace with its nuclear-armed neighbor behavior couldn’t be worse: The United States to the north. under Donald Trump and a worrisome number of European societies are facing their own crises of On the economic and sustainable development liberal democratic governance. Moreover, populist fronts, these six present a mixed picture. India and nationalist leaders are unabashedly contesting stands out with the best economic performance of fundamental assumptions of international peace the group in terms of both gross domestic product and security founded on shared democratic (GDP) and year-over-year growth, while South interests and values that have facilitated relative Africa presents a slow growth rate and the lowest 6 peace since World War II. GDP of the six countries. Brazil’s economy, after impressive growth rates in the 2000s, is mainly According to a number of indices, the quality of stagnant after suffering a major recession between democratic governance, respect for human rights, 2014 and 2017. In terms of tackling inequality, and the rule of law have declined over the last two South Korea is the highest performing country in years in all six middle power democracies except for the group with a Gini Index score of 31.6 out of 100. South Korea.3 Brazil’s ongoing struggle to overcome The most unequal country is South Africa with a decades of entrenched corruption, combined score of 63, followed by Brazil with 51.3 and Mexico with economic malaise, high rates of crime, with 43.4.7 Together, they are heavily invested in the and worsening poverty, have led to historically international trading regime, particularly with China. low rates of approval of current political leaders and parties4 and opened the door to populist A preliminary analysis of each country’s progress nationalism and calls for a return to military rule. in achieving the United Nations Sustainable A similar phenomenon in Mexico has resulted in Development Goals (SDGs) shows that South the first election of a left-wing populist in Mexico’s Korea and Brazil have made the greatest advances. democratic history and a likely return to economic All but South Africa score highly with regard to nationalism. Both countries, among the 20 most fighting poverty, for example, but performance is murderous in the world, are struggling to deliver uneven. Mexico is losing ground in the fight against public security to their citizens.5 South Africa’s crisis inequality and Brazil
Recommended publications
  • ACT of RECOMMITMENT to the WARSAW DECLARATION July 2-4, 2010
    ACT OF RECOMMITMENT TO THE WARSAW DECLARATION July 2-4, 2010 We, the Participants, from: the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the Republic of Albania, the Argentine Republic, Australia, the Republic of Austria, the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, the Kingdom of Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Bulgaria, Canada, the Republic of Chile, the Republic of Colombia, the Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Czech Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Republic of Ecuador, the Republic of El Salvador, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Finland, the French Republic, Georgia, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Guatemala, the Republic of Haiti, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Iceland, the Republic of India, the Republic of Indonesia, the Republic of Iraq, Ireland, the State of Israel, the Italian Republic, Japan, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Republic of Kenya, the Republic of Korea, the State of Kuwait, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lebanon, the Kingdom of Lesotho, the Principality of Liechtenstein, the Republic of Lithuania, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Malaysia, the Republic of Mali, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, the Kingdom of Morocco, the Republic of Namibia, the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the Kingdom of Norway, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan,
    [Show full text]
  • U.S.-Japan Approaches to Democracy Promotion
    U.S. JAPAN APPROACHES TO DEMOCRACY PROMOTION U.S. JAPAN Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA 1819 L St NW #300 Washington, DC 20036 [email protected] U.S.-JAPAN APPROACHES TO DEMOCRACY SASAKAWA USA SASAKAWA PROMOTION Edited by Michael R. Auslin and Daniel E. Bob ISBN 9780996656764 51000 > 9 780996 656764 U.S.-JAPAN APPROACHES TO DEMOCRACY PROMOTION Edited by Michael R. Auslin Daniel E. Bob Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA is an independent, American non-profit and non- partisan institution devoted to research, analysis and better understanding of the U.S.-Japan relationship. Sasakawa USA accomplishes its mission through programs that benefit both nations and the broader Asia Pacific region. Our research programs focus on security, diplomacy, economics, trade and technology, and our education programs facilitate people-to-people exchange and discussion among American and Japanese policymakers, influential citizens and the broader public in both countries. ISBN: 978-0-9966567-6-4 Printed in the United States of America. © 2017 by Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA LCCN Number applied for Sasakawa USA does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views expressed herein are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect the views of Sasakawa USA, its staff or its board. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by and means without permission in writing from Sasakawa USA. Please direct inquiries to: Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA Research Department 1819 L Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20036 P: +1 202-296-6694 This publication can be downloaded at no cost at http://spfusa.org/ Cover photo: © EPA/Barbara Walton Contents Preface .............................................................................................................................v Dennis Blair and Yasushi Akashi INTRODUCTION U.S.-Japan Approaches to Democracy Promotion ............................................
    [Show full text]
  • FROM the G7 to a D-10: Strengthening Democratic Cooperation for Today’S Challenges
    FROM THE G7 TO THE D-10 : STRENGTHENING DEMOCRATIC COOPERATION FOR TODAY’S CHALLENGES FROM THE G7 TO A D-10: Strengthening Democratic Cooperation for Today’s Challenges Ash Jain and Matthew Kroenig (United States) With Tobias Bunde (Germany), Sophia Gaston (United Kingdom), and Yuichi Hosoya (Japan) ATLANTIC COUNCIL A Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world. The Center honors General Brent Scowcroft’s legacy of service and embodies his ethos of nonpartisan commitment to the cause of security, support for US leadership in cooperation with allies and partners, and dedication to the mentorship of the next generation of leaders. Democratic Order Initiative This report is a product of the Scowcroft Center’s Democratic Order Initiative, which is aimed at reenergizing American global leadership and strengthening cooperation among the world’s democracies in support of a rules-based democratic order. The authors would like to acknowledge Joel Kesselbrenner, Jeffrey Cimmino, Audrey Oien, and Paul Cormarie for their efforts and contributions to this report. This report is written and published in accordance with the Atlantic Council Policy on Intellectual Independence. The authors are solely responsible for its analysis and recommendations. The Atlantic Council and its donors do not determine, nor do they necessarily endorse or advocate for, any of this report’s conclusions. © 2021 The Atlantic Council of the United States. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the Atlantic Council, except in the case of brief quotations in news articles, critical articles, or reviews.
    [Show full text]
  • Japan's Democracy Diplomacy
    JAPAN’S DEMOCRACY DIPLOMACY Daniel M. Kliman Daniel Twining JULY 2014 © July 11, 2014 The German Marshall Fund of the United States. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF). Please direct inquiries to: The German Marshall Fund of the United States 1744 R Street, NW Washington, DC 20009 T 1 202 683 2650 F 1 202 265 1662 E [email protected] This publication can be downloaded for free at www.gmfus.org/publications. GMF is grateful to the U.S.-Japan Commission on the Future of the Alliance, the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, and the Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA for supporting this project. GMF Paper Series The GMF Paper Series presents research on a variety of transatlantic topics by staff, fellows, and partners of the German Marshall Fund of the United States. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of GMF. Comments from readers are welcome; reply to the mailing address above or by e-mail to [email protected]. About GMF The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) strengthens transatlantic cooperation on regional, national, and global challenges and opportunities in the spirit of the Marshall Plan. GMF does this by supporting individuals and institu- tions working in the transatlantic sphere, by convening leaders and members of the policy and business communities, by contributing research and analysis on transatlantic topics, and by providing exchange opportunities to foster renewed commitment to the transatlantic relationship.
    [Show full text]
  • Taking Stock of Regional Democratic Trends in Europe Before and During the COVID-19 Pandemic the Global State of Democracy Special Brief, January 2021 in FOCUS
    Taking Stock of Regional Democratic Trends in Europe Before and During the COVID-19 Pandemic The Global State of Democracy Special Brief, January 2021 IN FOCUS The Global State of Democracy Special Brief, January 2021 Taking Stock of Regional Democratic Trends in Europe Before and During the COVID-19 Pandemic Key facts and findings • The COVID-19 pandemic arrived in a largely the pandemic that are concerning from a democracy democratic Europe. Only 4 countries in the region standpoint. (10 per cent) are not democracies, while many of the democracies are high performing. • The main democratic challenges caused by the pandemic in Europe pertain to the disruption of • Democracy in Europe, however, has in recent years electoral cycles, curtailment of civil liberties, the experienced erosion and backsliding. More than use of contact tracing apps, the increase in gender half of European democracies have eroded in the inequality and domestic violence, risks to vulnerable last 5 years. In particular, 3 countries—Hungary, groups, executive aggrandizement, protest waves, Poland and Serbia—have registered a more severe corruption cases and challenges in the relationship form of erosion, called democratic backsliding, with between local and national governance. Hungary regressing on its democratic standards for the past 14 years. • Europe’s democracies have mostly showed resilience, and opportunities for furthering the • The pandemic has intensified these pre-existing integrity of elections, for digitalization and for concerns. The 3 backsliding countries in Europe innovative social protests have arisen. have implemented a number of measures to curb 1 Taking Stock of Regional Democratic Trends in Europe Before and During the COVID-19 Pandemic The Global State of Democracy Special Brief, January 2021 IN FOCUS 1.
    [Show full text]
  • The Polish Case
    COMMUNITY of DEMOCRACIES THE POLISH CASE Permanent Secretariat of the Community of Democracies THE POLISH CASE Permanent Secretariat of the Community of Democracies Warsaw 2010 Published by the Permanent Secretariat of the Community of Democracies (PSCD) Al. Ujazdowskie 41, 00-540 Warsaw, POLAND www.community-democracies.org © PSCD, Warsaw 2010 All rights reserved. The contents of this publication may be freely used and copied for educational and other non-commercial purposes, provided that any such reproduction be accompanied by an acknowledgment of the PSCD as the source. FOREWARD by Prof. Bronislaw Misztal Executive Director Permanent Secretariat of the Community of Democracies Retrospectively, the Polish case of democratic transformation, or the experience of a complex, co- temporal and multi-axial reconstruction of a social system is still a mystery and a miracle of history. It ran against political and military interests that cumulated on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Poland as the Western flank of the Communist territory was an important prong of this system. The transformative processes in Poland involved a number of changes in the areas of social and political life that were so solidly welded with the global political order of its era, and with the historical heritage of the region, that each of those changes alone seemed to be impossible, not to speak about any of them occurring concurrently. For those who lived through these changes (and there are still large segments of the Polish society that were coming of age in the late 1970s), who worked in Poland, posted there by news and media institutions, who observed the events working as diplomats, journalists, scholars or experts, the exhilaration of the 1980s sometimes overshadowed the complexity of this historical experience.
    [Show full text]
  • Enhancing U.S
    Enhancing U.S. Leadership at the United Nations Report of an Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and Freedom House David Dreier and Lee H. Hamilton, Co-Chairs Lee Feinstein and Adrian Karatnycky, Project Co-Directors 2 The Council on Foreign Relations is dedicated to increasing Americas understanding of the world and contributing ideas to U.S. foreign policy. The Council accomplishes this mainly by promoting constructive debates and discussions, clarifying world issues, and publishing Foreign Affairs, the leading journal on global issues. The Council is host to the widest possible range of views, but an advocate of none, though its research fellows and Independent Task Forces do take policy positions. Please visit our website at www.cfr.org. THE COUNCIL TAKES NO INSTITUTIONAL POSITION ON POLICY ISSUES AND HAS NO AFFILIATION WITH THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. ALL STATEMENTS OF FACT AND EXPRESSIONS OF OPINION CONTAINED IN ALL ITS PUBLICATIONS ARE THE SOLE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE AUTHOR OR AUTHORS. The Council will sponsor an Independent Task Force when (1) an issue of current and critical importance to U.S. foreign policy arises, and (2) it seems that a group diverse in backgrounds and perspectives may, nonetheless, be able to reach a meaningful consensus on a policy through private and nonpartisan deliberations. Typically, a Task Force meets between two and five times over a brief period to ensure the relevance of its work. Upon reaching a conclusion, a Task Force issues a report, and the Council publishes its text
    [Show full text]
  • FROM the G7 to a D-10: Strengthening Democratic Cooperation for Today’S Challenges
    FROM THE G7 TO THE D-10 : STRENGTHENING DEMOCRATIC COOPERATION FOR TODAY’S CHALLENGES FROM THE G7 TO A D-10: Strengthening Democratic Cooperation for Today’s Challenges Ash Jain and Matthew Kroenig (United States) With Tobias Bunde (Germany), Sophia Gaston (United Kingdom), and Yuichi Hosoya (Japan) ATLANTIC COUNCIL A Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world. The Center honors General Brent Scowcroft’s legacy of service and embodies his ethos of nonpartisan commitment to the cause of security, support for US leadership in cooperation with allies and partners, and dedication to the mentorship of the next generation of leaders. Democratic Order Initiative This report is a product of the Scowcroft Center’s Democratic Order Initiative, which is aimed at reenergizing American global leadership and strengthening cooperation among the world’s democracies in support of a rules-based democratic order. The authors would like to acknowledge Joel Kesselbrenner, Jeffrey Cimmino, Audrey Oien, and Paul Cormarie for their efforts and contributions to this report. This report is written and published in accordance with the Atlantic Council Policy on Intellectual Independence. The authors are solely responsible for its analysis and recommendations. The Atlantic Council and its donors do not determine, nor do they necessarily endorse or advocate for, any of this report’s conclusions. © 2021 The Atlantic Council of the United States. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the Atlantic Council, except in the case of brief quotations in news articles, critical articles, or reviews.
    [Show full text]
  • Washington's Flirtation with a League of Democracies
    Relevance and Realities: Washington’s Flirtation with a League of Democracies JEFFREY LAURENTI n the fall of 2003, six months after the United States broke with the United Nations Security Council and launched its invasion of Iraq, un I Secretary-General Kofi Annan gloomily warned the world’s leaders gath- ered before him that they had »come to a fork in the road.« An interna- tional order built on »rules to govern international behavior« and »a net- work of institutions, with the United Nations at its center« had been shaken to its foundations. Some saw an »Abyssinia moment,« recalling the »rigor mortis« of the League of Nations in the face of Axis ambitions in the 1930s. Five years later, the sense of crisis has somewhat eased. George Bush’s »Abyssinia« – the effort to convert Iraq into a us ally or client – has, even at home, discredited the project for a new American century that his na- tional security team had worked so feverishly to realize. The Security Council machinery was cranked up to deliver patchwork responses to crises in Sudan, Lebanon, and Iran that America’s reigning conservatives had to acknowledge they could not control or resolve with just an ally or two. The international order conceived in a rather different world by Franklin D. Roosevelt’s generation has demonstrated its continuing rel- evance, to the dismay of its detractors. But this represents a reprieve for the United Nations system, not a re- commitment to it. Multiplying stresses between the Anglo-Americans and the Russians – on whose comity the un security system still depends – are narrowing the range of crises on which Security Council members can agree on a common global interest and course of action.
    [Show full text]
  • General Assembly Distr.: General 10 July 2015
    United Nations A/70/142* General Assembly Distr.: General 10 July 2015 Original: English Seventieth session Request for the inclusion of an item in the provisional agenda of the seventieth session Observer status for the Community of Democracies in the General Assembly Letter dated 10 July 2015 from the Permanent Representative of El Salvador to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General In accordance with rule 13 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, I have the honour to request the inclusion of an item entitled “Observer status for the Community of Democracies in the General Assembly” in the provisional agenda of the seventieth session of the General Assembly. In accordance with rule 20 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, an explanatory memorandum (see annex I) and a draft resolution (see annex II) are transmitted herewith. I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annexes circulated as a document of the General Assembly. (Signed) R. I. Zamora Rivas Permanent Representative of El Salvador to the United Nations * Reissued for technical reasons on 10 September 2015. 15-12223* (E) 100915 *1512223* A/70/142 Annex I Explanatory memorandum The Community of Democracies is a global organization of States Members of the United Nations singularly dedicated to a common goal: to support democratic rule and strengthen democratic norms and institutions around the world. The activities of this intergovernmental Community are oriented towards enhanced collaboration between the States on democracy-related issues in existing international and regional institutions by forming coalitions of States and caucuses to support resolutions and other international activities aimed at the promotion of democratic governance, taking due account of cultural diversity, gender equality and protection of human rights at the global and regional levels.
    [Show full text]
  • The Secretary-General Message to the Community
    THE SECRETARY-GENERAL MESSAGE TO THE COMMUNITY OF DEMOCRACIES SEMINAR "THE ROLE OF REGIONAL AND MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE DEFENSE AND PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY" Washington. D.C.. 20-21 February 2001 I am pleased to convey my best wishes to the participants in this seminar on a subject of great importance to the work of the United Nations. The United Nations' efforts in promoting democracy are based on a set of key principles drawn from the lessons of past decades, and seek to provide a universal basis for the success of democratic rule. First, democracy and the rule of law are inseparably connected. Democracy strengthens respect for the rule of law by making the people the ultimate source of legal authority. And democracy depends on the rule of law, because widiout respect for the rule of law it is not possible to hold free and fair elections. A strong, independent judiciary is essential as well. The UN's governance programmes have given support to countries in need of assistance in this field. Second, democracy implies majority rule. However, this does not mean that minorities can or should be excluded from the exercise of power. The minority must always be free to state its case, and to have its case considered freely and openly. Third, democracy needs a free and vigorous mass media. For an election to be truly fair, different parties and candidates should have equal access to the media, and should be equally open to its scrutiny. Neither state power nor the power of money should determine that one party gets a hearing while another is denied it.
    [Show full text]
  • 2019 Annual Report of the Community of Democracies
    2019 Annual Report of the Community of Democracies February 2020 2019 Annual Report of the Community of Democracies February 2020 2 Annual Report Community of Democracies Community of Democracies Annual Report 3 Table of contents Overview by the Secretary General Thomas E. Garrett ....................................................................7 Intergovernmental Cooperation ............................................................................................................10 Presidency of the Community of Democracies ................................................................10 Executive Committee of the Community of Democracies ............................................11 Governing Council of the Community of Democracies ..................................................13 Renewal Process in the Membership in the Governing Council .................................22 Expansion of the Governing Council ...................................................................................23 Working Groups.........................................................................................................................24 Community of Democracies and Civil Society ...................................................................................28 Events and Activities ..................................................................................................................................30 Strategic Objectives ..................................................................................................................30
    [Show full text]