Wageningen University, academic year 14/15 Department of CPT

TILTING AT WINDMILLS A discourse analysis and comparison of climate change related communication of the political parties of Sverigedemokraterna and the United Kingdom Independence Party in the European context

Author: Jacob Månsson Registration numner: 880623543020 Supervisor: Margit van Wessel Chair group: Communication Philosophy and Technology (CPT) Course code: CPT-81330

Wageningen University, academic year 14/15 Department of CPT

Summary Europe is experiencing a growth of populist parties operating both in their national contexts and in the context of the European parliament. Although these parties are arguably most well known for their controversial views on immigration policies, they take on other topics too. The aim of this master is to explore if populism can be found within the parties’ respective communication, and if so how populism influences communication on the topic of climate change. It will also briefly discuss how this communication might affect its context. The thesis uses the social constructionist based interpretative approach to conduct a comparative discourse analysis comparing two chosen parties: the Swedish party of Sverigedemokraterna (SD) and the British party the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). The main research question is: Can characteristics of populism be found in the parties’ communication on climate issues? The research question is expanded on using three sub-research questions. The thesis uses a set of discourse analysis tools to analyse sets of quotes chosen from material sources including official party documents and media sources. All analysis results are discussed through the scope of an author-compiled definition of populism. Main research findings include communicative similarities in the parties’ view regarding the European Union’s influence on climate change related politics in Europe and differences in the parties’ communication regarding energy politics and its relation to climate change.

Wageningen University, academic year 14/15 Department of CPT

Table of contents

SUMMARY ...... 2

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION, THESIS AIM, RESEARCH QUESTIONS, POPULIST DEFINITION, PARTY INTRODUCTIONS ...... 1 INTRODUCTION ...... 1 THESIS AIM ...... 2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS ...... 2

POPULIST DEFINITION ...... 2 THE PARTIES, AN OVERVIEW ...... 3

CHAPTER 2: THEORY INTRODUCTION, ANALYTICAL TOOLS INTRODUCTION, METHOD AND VALIDITY SECTIONS ...... 8 WHAT IS A DISCOURSE ANALYSIS? ...... 8 INTRODUCING THE THESIS ANALYTICAL TOOLS ...... 11 METHODS SECTION ...... 13 DATA SELECTION ...... 14 VALIDITY, RELIABILITY, LIMITATIONS AND GENERALIZATION ...... 17

CHAPTER 3: ANALYSIS SECTION 1 & 2: DISCOURSE TOOL APPLICATION ANALYSIS & COMMUNICATIVE THEMES COMPARISON ANALYSIS ...... 19 ANALYSIS OUTLINE ...... 19 ANALYSIS SECTION 1: DISCOURSE ANALYSIS TOOLS APPLICATION ...... 20 DISCOURSE ANALYSIS TOOL APPLICATION, SVERIGEDEMOKRATERNA SUB-QUESTION 1 ...... 20 DISCOURSE ANALYSIS TOOL APPLICATION, SVERIGEDEMOKRATERNA SUB-QUESTION 1 SUMMARY ...... 23 DISCOURSE ANALYSIS TOOL APPLICATION, SVERIGEDEMOKRATERNA SUB-QUESTION 2 ...... 23 DISCOURSE ANALYSIS TOOL APPLICATION, SVERIGEDEMOKRATERNA SUB-QUESTION 2 SUMMARY ...... 26 DISCOURSE ANALYSIS TOOL APPLICATION, SVERIGEDEMOKRATERNA SUB-QUESTION 3 ...... 26 DISCOURSE ANALYSIS TOOL APPLICATION, SVERIGEDEMOKRATERNA SUB-QUESTION 3 SUMMARY ...... 29 ANALYSIS SECTION 1 UNITED KINGDOM INDEPENDENCE PARTY ...... 30 UKIP DISCOURSE ANALYSIS TOOL APPLICATION, SUB-QUESTION 1 ...... 30 DISCOURSE ANALYSIS TOOL APPLICATION, UKIP SUB QUESTION 1 SUMMARY ...... 34 DISCOURSE ANALYSIS TOOL APPLICATION, UKIP SUB-QUESTION 2 ...... 34 DISCOURSE ANALYSIS TOOL APPLICATION, UKIP SUB QUESTION 2 SUMMARY ...... 36 DISCOURSE ANALYSIS TOOL APPLICATION, UKIP SUB-QUESTION 3 ...... 37 DISCOURSE ANALYSIS TOOL APPLICATION, UKIP SUB-QUESTION 3 SUMMARY ...... 40

ANALYSIS SECTION 2 - COMMUNICATIVE THEMES COMPARISON ...... 40 COMMUNICATIVE THEMES COMPARISON - SUB-QUESTION 1 RESULTS ...... 41 COMMUNICATIVE THEMES COMPARISON - SUB-QUESTION 2 RESULTS ...... 43 COMMUNICATIVE THEMES COMPARISON SUB-QUESTION 3 RESULTS ...... 47

CHAPTER 4 CONCLUSION AND PERSONAL REFLECTIONS ...... 50 CONCLUSION ...... 50 PERSONAL REFLECTIONS ...... 52

REFERENCES ...... 53

Wageningen University, academic year 14/15 Department of CPT

Wageningen University, academic year 14/15 Department of CPT

Chapter 1: Introduction, thesis aim, research questions, populist definition, party introductions Introduction These are turbulent times in Europe. Many of European countries struggle with issues in key political areas including financial, immigration and employment. Due to the existence of the European Union, member states find themselves in a situation where they have to interact with each other to and with the union to find solutions to their issues. It is a scenario in which tensions flourish. In the past decades, voices have risen in many member states expressing scepticism toward how the own states and the union handles these issues. Populist, and in some cases nationalist, parties are growing in Europe. Thriving on discontent toward mainstream politics, European populist parties have in the past decades moved from political periphery to wielding considerable political power. In Sweden, the party of Sverigedemokraterna (Sweden Democrats, SD) became the country’s third largest party the election of 2014 (riksdagen.se, 2015). In the United Kingdom the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) hold two Seats in the House of Commons and three Seats in the House of Lords. As a result of their political success, both parties now hold seats in the European parliament, UKIP 23 seats and SD 2 seats.

Many studies have been done to determine why parties such as SD and UKIP now experience a surge as political forces and entities. This thesis does not intend to further investigate why parties such as the two examples are growing. Instead the intention is to gain knowledge on what happens when they take on one of the major political issues of today: climate change. The parties’ used as examples in this thesis are meant to represent the growing power of European populist parties. Issues of climate change remain a major pressing political discussion in Europe as well as worldwide. Most leading researchers and politicians agree global warming and other environmental issues are now part of our reality. But the growth of populist parties shows this is not always accepted as a fact. As will be demonstrated throughout the thesis, there are powerful voices in European politics actively dismissing the existence of a climate change threat.

What is more one can discern a tendency to reject the system the communication takes place in. Political institutions of the EU are questioned on claims of an authoritarianism disconnected from the union’s citizens. Simplification of political processes is a matter of the heart. What evokes fear is a scenario where political decisions making processes are streamlined to a point where the solutions become too simple. What is more, simplification in the communication of the parties’ often means an advocating for concentration of power. In a dark future scenario this creates a political context of a more anti-democratic character.

Understanding more about these parties’ communication on climate change issues is useful. What happens when parties that go to elections on often anti-democratic premises engage in debates on how a union of 28 countries are to handle climate change? This research is relevant not only because the two chosen parties express scepticism toward climate change issues. Although it is alarming it can certainly not be said that all the other political parties in the union share a single opinion on how to address climate change issues. It is the potential negative effects of the parties’ communication that attracts attention. With a will to simplify and in some cases ridicule the climate change debate the parties seed their political context with disbelief. Climate change, an extremely complicated issue is treated with an off hand approach. Scientific results pointing to the dangers of climate change are either dismissed or

1 Wageningen University, academic year 14/15 Department of CPT modified to support sceptic claims. Should this type of communication on climate change issues increase the risk increases for it to influence more voters. And then by extension the climate change policies of the future. Understanding more on how European populist communication on climate change issues is therefore relevant. Thesis aim This thesis’s aim is to explore if populism can be found within the parties’ respective communication, and if so how populism influences communication on climate change. Finally it will also discuss how this communication might affect its context. The main research question is designed to initiate a discussion on if and how populism can be found in the two parties’ communication on climate change. From this discussion the sub questions are meant to expand into particular areas of interest. Each sub question corresponds to what is perceived as populism’s most prominent characteristics, an antagonistic relationship to an elite and acting as the voice of an oppressed people. Research questions

Main research question:

Can characteristics of populism be found in the parties’ communication on climate issues?

Sub research questions:

1. If yes, how does this show in the parties’ communication toward the scientific community and research on climate issues? 2. If yes, how does this show in the parties’ communication toward other political actors and the average citizen? 3. If yes, how does this show in the parties’ communication toward the climate issue related policies of the European Union?

Populist definition The following definition, contrived by he author, of populism is the basis for this thesis. All analysis work will be connected back to it. In the literature, the concept of populism appears to be notoriously hard to pin down. This could likely derive from an on going discussion of what constitutes populism. The concept appears to function as a building scale to which political actors modify and attach values to. Thus populism in itself does not belong in a right or left tradition. Mudde defines populism in the following way:

“A thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated onto two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale of the people” (Mudde, 2013, 270).

Elites e.g. politicians, intellectuals and generally people with power and influence are viewed as selfish and out of touch with reality. With the latter meaning the reality of “ordinary” people (Rooduijn et al 2014, 564). Lynda Lee Kaid and Christina Holtz-Bacha’s Encyclopaedia of Political Communication vol 2 (2008, 625) emphasises populist parties anti- intellectual approach to communication, technical jargon often viewed with suspicion. Political issues are communicated using a personal style at the cost of substantial content. Using simple communication is thought to attract more peripheral (often less urbanized) citizens.

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A part of populist politics viewed as crucial is the leader. She or he acts a beacon to rally around, an embodiment of the parties ambitions. (Kaid Holtz Bacha 2008, 625) At the heart of the populism concept then is the populist parties’ perceived antagonistic relationship between the people and the elite. Other aspects are more debated, Rooduijn et al discusses whether or not populism includes hostility against other groups. That is, other than the perceived elite (Rooduijn et al 2014, 564). These discussions probably stems from a tendency to connect populism with a racist and/or xenophobic element. This thesis will not focus on these aspects of the chosen parties politics on immigration. However, it presumes the parties’ arguably controversial profiles will influence their climate politics and perhaps even more they manner in which other parties respond to them. It should also be mentioned: populism is not a concept exclusively connected to far-right wing politics. Although it appears to be heavily associated with it and admittedly this thesis analyses parties are usually associated with far right political beliefs.

Pie Knigge illuminates this discussing how populism in the European context is traditionally linked to right-wing extremism (Knigge 1998, 249). In her view the western European populism mainly manifests alongside extreme right wing politics. As a result the populism and extreme right-wing politics as appear to have become somewhat interchangeable in terms of meaning. Knigge divides populism in Europe into an old a new version (Knigge 1998, 253. )The former category is characterized by a traditional fascist view on politics. The latter and more recent category is characterized by a more subtle approach. Although they still advocate anti-pluralist and often xenophobic policies, the new right wing populist parties tend to embed their views in less aggressive communication (Knigge 1998, 257. One can of course reflect on if this tendency to streamline communication facilitated the parties’ entrance into mainstream politics. Another prominent aspect of populism is anti-systemic tendencies: an outcome of a suspicious attitude toward the self-serving elite rulers. It often results in distrust toward how political processes are run. Often arguing they are elite ways of keeping political power out of the hands of the people, populist parties apply their desire to simplify to political institutions as well. Chantal Mouffe warns the growth of these tendencies contains a threat toward political institutions and functioning democratic processes: strong and differentiating political views create tension between political actors. But even though this in itself can create much distress, it does feed the democratic processes. But parties who take on differentiating political views and remain adamant to a point where a functioning debates become problematic, because the processes are obstructed. Such parties pose threat as they view other parties not as adversaries struggling to get shape their respective viewpoints into politics. Instead they view other parties as antagonists, enemies, and disapprove of their right to participate in the political processes at all (Mouffe 2002, 15).

Subsequently, populist parties often express dislike for state checks and balances. Arguing for a centralizing of power, populist politics are seen as a challenge of contemporary democratic decision-making processes. The stronger centralized state is seen as a vigorous and desirable strategy to speed up processes (Kaid Holtz Bacha 2008, 625).

The parties, an overview Below follows a short general introduction of the two parties’ meant to provide the reader with background knowledge and build a first understanding of the origins their beliefs, values and general view on climate change:

Sverigedemokraterna: Safety and Tradition “Swedish democracy is a little weird right now, we have taken it for granted… Media is more interested in celebrities than what the people in power are doing. Both our school and work politics have been treated as a

3 Wageningen University, academic year 14/15 Department of CPT playground for our self-proclaimed societal elite. The results are disastrous… We want to strike against an elite whose politics have undermined our society for years: they are the ones responsible for what has happened. (SD, en längre film om oss / a longer movie about us, 2015)“.

The quote is taken from the party of Sverigedemokraterna’s (SD) video presentation of themselves. In their own words, SD calls itself a pragmatic social conservative party openly distancing itself from contemporary mainstream Swedish politics, which is roughly divided into two so called blocks of centre right and left parties (SD website, 2015). Founded in 1988 SD united a cluster of political interest organisations with a common patriotic profile and a sceptical tone toward immigration. SD has had a relatively stormy history since it’s founding. Medial critics claim the united clusters originated from racist and Nazi interest groups. Amongst the prominent original groups were allegedly nationalistic movements Bevara Sverige Svenskt (Keep Sweden Swedish) and Sverigepartiet (The Swedish Party) (DN Stiernstedt, 2011). In its early 1990’s form the party mainly worked on a grassroots level, focusing on activism and demonstrations. In 1994 the party forbid its supporters to wear clothes associated with Nazism and racism, such as bomber jackets. Overall the party made significant efforts to improve its public ethos. Subsequently it established itself in non- parliamentary political instances, such as church and municipality elections (DN Arnstad, 2011). Efforts to design a more consistent party communication have continued. Media critiques have called the zero-tolerance an illusion masking the party’s controversial opinions regarding immigration and integration (SVD 2012, Poohl and Ekman). In it’s own words SD represents a new Swedish party type, capable of making the tough decisions other parties cannot. Among their main propositions SD advocate tougher crime policies and significantly improved care of the elderly (SD manifest 2014, 7). SD’s most well known policies revolve around immigration and integration. The party argues for significant restrictions of Sweden’s accepted quota for refugees. Furthermore immigrants who do receive a residence permit would receive much less governmental funding (SD manifest 2014, 14). In 2005 the party elected its current, and so far most popular leader, Jimmie Åkesson. Åkesson a 36 years old SD long-standing member gained a large following after taking on the role as the party leader. Under his leadership SD succeeded in entering the Swedish Parliament in the election of 2010, winning 20 out of 349 mandates in the Swedish parliament (5,7 % of the votes). In 2014 the party more than doubled its votes winning 49 mandates in the Swedish parliament, 12,8 % of the votes. The party also received 2 seats in the European parliament (riksdagen.se, 2015). Much of SD’s politics and thus communication derives from their concept of “kulturpolitik” (in English: cultural politics), a document explaining the party’s fundamental view on what constitutes the Swedish culture and identity. The party argues the Swedish people need a coherent and solid identity based on the country’s established history tradition. It also states all cultures are not equal, some are better than others, thus the Swedish culture must be preserved and although external cultures may influence it, these processes must be carefully monitored1.

Sverigedemokraterna’s climate profile, an overview Historically SD’s communication is characterised by a high level interest in climate policy. For example, the slogan of 1999’s party manifest reads “a nationalistic middle party with an ecological ethos (SD Manifest 1989, 2)”. True to the slogan significant parts of the proposed policies are based on these two themes. In terms of the nationalistic outlook, Sweden is viewed as a country in decline. Argued to have started in the 1960’s (the starting point of longstanding social democratic rule) this decline was allegedly caused by a wave of socialistic international solidarity. The effects were said to be disastrous. Rampant criminality, in

1 Sd.se/varpolitik

4 Wageningen University, academic year 14/15 Department of CPT particular organized crime attracted by soft laws was one prominent addressed issue. Overly complicated bureaucratic systems and inefficient handling of tax income another. When it came to environmental policies the party established an interesting standpoint. In short the party combined a fascination for deeply rooted national identities with global concern for human treatment of the planet. Native swedes were argued to have lost their pride in their forefathers struggle to survive in the cold northern climate. SD proclaimed a sense for affinity was essential to turn the trend. Climate awareness was to be actively taught in schools. Humans, Swedes, are part of our environment thus SD advocated nature preserving policies with the objective to preserve the country’s unique geography (SD party manifest 1996, 2). Countering the social democratically caused societal decline and re-establishing a perceived lost national pride was seen as essential to realise environmental policies. Supporters and potential voters had to remember such actions demanded political courage as powerful economic and economic interests could go against them (SD party manifest 1989, 15). Concerning the international level the 1999 party manifest openly stated Sweden should leave the European Union. The Swedish EU membership is considered a serious threat to Swedish sovereignty, UN related political presence however would be prioritised. Sweden was to deploy large scaled democratic negotiations for a less bureaucratic UN organization. Acting as a sovereign state Sweden could then contribute significantly to the UN's global environmental work (SD party manifest 1996, 21). In SD’s 2014 party manifesto the environmental profile remains strong, but is not as elaborately communicated. The manifest’s environmental section is predominantly concerned with energy politics. Six standpoints on climate/energy politics are presented: Addressing the ecological situation of the Baltic sea; granting resources to research on energy efficiency; aiding developing countries with their climate work; protecting Swedish flora and fauna and finally a no to Swedish wind power and a yes to funding increased nuclear power (SD 2014, 15). Euro scepticism remains an ongoing theme. Today SD retains its standpoint that EU restricts Swedish sovereignty to an unacceptable degree. It states the Sweden’s future EU membership should be voted for.

United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP): Policies for the people “UKIP is a patriotic party that promotes independence: from the EU, and from government interference. We believe in free trade, lower taxes, personal freedom and responsibility. UKIP believes in Britain becoming a democratic, self-governing country once again. This can only be achieved by getting our nation out of the European Union and reasserting the sovereignty of Parliament. As a party we are unashamedly patriotic: we believe there is so much to be proud about Britain and the contribution it has made to the world. We believe that Britain is good enough to be an independent nation, trading and building harmonious relations with the rest of the world. (UKIP, 2015)”

The quote is taken from UKIP’s official website. Members of the London School of Economics’ anti-federalist league, which was founded to oppose the Maastricht treaty, formed what became UKIP in 1993. The party went to elections on one key policy, leaving the European Union. Originally the party remained in the outskirts of British politics, mostly due to internal conflicts (Telegraph, Lain, 2014). Today it has expanded its politics and grown into a 40 000 member strong party with more representatives in the European parliament than any other British party (BBC, 21/11/2014). However, its key policies still revolves around an independent self-governed United Kingdom, starting with the UK leaving the European Union.

Similar to SD UKIP also faces scepticism due to its history. In 2006, British Prime Minister David Cameron called in a radio interview UKIP a bunch of… fruitcakes and loonies and closet racists. A statement partially based on UKIP’s tendency to attract former members of the British National Party. Similar to SD, UKIP have created controversy due to proposed

5 Wageningen University, academic year 14/15 Department of CPT restrictive immigration policies. Claiming to see the benefits of limiting and controlling immigration UKIP would enforce strict immigration rules to “take back control over our borders (UKIP Policies for the people)”. Work permits in the UK would only be granted if the person could contribute to the British workforce. Subsequently citizen benefits will also only be granted to employed, English speaking and accommodated citizens (UKIP Policies for the people). In the party’s own words, UKIP is a return to a type of British rhetoric and politics that used to be common. In his book, The Rise of UKIP, party member and MEP Bill Etheridge tells the party’s story from its own words. Etheridge recalls his childhood UK, where he claims it was common to controversial communicative symbols, including racial stereotypes. Now he claims this mentality is gone, along with British national pride. British politics have instead grown into an overly sensitive and judgemental institution (Etheridge 2014, 230). Thus the party sees itself as a new old party whose representatives are not afraid of letting their voices be heard. Something UKIP claims mainstream politicians does not dare, rendering them to “all look the same (Etheridge, 2014, 213)”. Much of the credit for the party’s growth is given to the party’s current leader Nigel Farage (UKIP website 2015). Farage calls himself an oddity in British politics due to a non-career minded approach to politics. To enforce this, Farage cultivates an image of himself as the atypical, non- bureaucratic, British man (BBC, 21/11/2014). After surviving a near fatal plan crash Farage returned to his leadership role. A role described by Etheridge as characterized by charisma, honesty and personal charm even in the face of hostility (Etheridge 2014, 171).

UKIP Climate profile, an overview In terms of environmental policy UKIP gives many promises including: supporting a diverse energy market including, nuclear, geo-thermal, solar and conventional oil and gas sources. With this promise comes a no to subsidies for wind farms and solar arrays (UKIP website: Policies for people 2015). UKIP through Farage appear to have taken a particular disliking to wind farming, an opinion voiced by party representatives on many occasions. Furthermore the party advocates reduced fuel taxes and a re-development of British oil and power plants. In the party’s 2010 manifest (recently deleted from the official website) UKIP forcefully rejects future funding of the IPCC. It also connects immigration to environmental issues by highlighting how a growing population equals demand for new accommodation. Further more, environmental bureaucracy is to be brought to a minimum (UKIP Manifest 2010, 11). In its local manifesto of 2014, it pledges to protect green areas and coastlines. This is to be done by opposing alleged futile policies such as wind power. Also green areas are to be protected by opposing particular treatments to travellers. Finally new housing and businesses are to be directed to brown rather than green areas (UKIP Local manifesto 2014, 9). Ongoing environmental themes include scepticism towards the international scientific opinion on the human role in global warming. Furthermore a strong will to preserve the British landscape and green areas is present. Also pervading is an increased funding to British local energy politics, in particular nuclear power, while opposing renewable energy resources (UKIP Local manifesto 2014, 8).

Classifying the parties’ “Chairman, thank you, and can I extend a huge thanks to all those who have welcomed me back to this institution so warmly. Though, I do detect in some of the smiles and laughter that has been directed at me, a slight hint of nervousness. And so there jolly well should be, because there is going to be a British referendum on whether we stay in or whether we leave this European Union. For the first time in many decades, there will be a fundamental debate on the existence of this union and the need for it in the modern world. And I have to say, this debate, this referendum, would not have happened without UKIP and its people's army of millions of supporters.” (Farage EU parliament 20/5/2015)

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Jimmie Åkesson in Agenda’s Swedish Election debate on the issue of EU’s free migration and the effect of beggers (usually from Romania) begging in the streets: It is a social catastrophy and it shows how different the member states actually are and that the EU is not a coherent entity. But that there are various social situations. We think it (the begging) has changed the street view and that people might experience it as an intrusive change. (Agenda 2014 4/5/2014, 16:00)

It is important to demonstrate why SD and UKIP can be considered as populist parties: a point which of will of course be elaborated in the analysis. This section will serve as a general justification to why these parties’ have been chosen. Both parties’ use communication show traits of the populist disbelief in mainstream politics and parties. For UKIP this viewpoint is commonly manifested in its harsh critique toward the EU as en institution. SD, while also expressing Euro scepticism, seems to direct more critique toward immigration issues. The first quote comes from UKIP leader Nigel Farage. Farage enjoys immense support among party supporters but is also controversial both within the party and especially among competing politicians, even within the own party. Etheridge often returns to Farage’s optimistic but stern leader style, which he states is both a blessing and a curse as it has resulted in political success but also causes internal party distress (Etherigde, 2014, 24). Farage functions as a suitable example of Kaid Holtz Bacha’s populist affection for the party leader. Often appearing to consciously apply a simpler, non-technical, style of communication as well as sarcasm Farage, as shown above, regularly speaks as the voice of a disgruntled voice of the British people, referred to here as a “people's army of millions of supporters”. Much of the UKIP and SD’s standpoints on climate issues contains arguments pointing toward an unwanted top-down rule from the EU, often portrayed as a costly bureaucratic gargantuan. While it is not the focus of this thesis, the parties’ also use communication that is harsh toward immigrants and immigration politics. The Jimmie Åkesson quote serves an example of this, with communication showing traces of the anti-plural tendencies often associated with populism. In fact the issue of immigration seems to overshadow most other subjects that other actors want to address the party about. This can be connected to Knigge’s discussion on the anti-pluralist aspect of populism and its heavy influence on how the party’s are perceived by its audiences.

Both parties thus put considerable trust in their leaders. UKIP official communication often emphasises Nigel Farage’s leader role. It cultivates a persona for Farage as a lovable everyman cutting across bureaucratic gibberish and protector of British cultural features is often put to use, especially in terms of cultural political pledges (Etheridge 2014, 45 & UKIP Manifesto 2015, 61). SD communication revolving around Jimmie Åkesson as a leader demonstrates similar traits, although using a somewhat softer approach. Portrayed, as humble and reliable Åkesson appears to embody a newer balanced SD free from the party’s more chaotic roots. However since the Swedish election of 2014, Åkesson has been on sick leave, making a slow return during the late spring of 2015. According to Swedish media this has resulted in a time of leadership turmoil for SD. If any traces of this surfaces during the analysis it will be discussed.

• ”…Since the end of the 60’s the responsibility for our nation lies in the hands of politicians that does not aim toward the best for the Swedish people and does not put the people’s needs first. Those who run Sweden have through their politics contributed to the dissolving of guiding ethic and moral principles. The results have shown themselves through an increase in crime rate, divorces, abortions and a lowered Swedish nativity… (SD Manifesto 1996, 3)”

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“UKIP will bring back power to the people with common sense, local policies which will make people’s lives easier. UKIP councillors know who is boss: we only answer to you and we are known for rolling up our sleeves and getting the job done! CLLR PETER REEVE Local Government Spokesman” (UKIP 2015 Manifesto, 58)

Arguably in tone with Rooduijn et al’s view on populism viewing the elite as out of touch with the needs of the people, UKIP states “we only answer to you” thus distancing itself from other parties’ allegedly having other interests in mind. This is evokes and identity of UKIP representatives being one of the ordinary people who are not afraid of “rolling up our sleeves”. Although considerably older the SD quote demonstrates a similar trait from SD. But it communicates a sense of worry for an erosion of Swedish standards in general rather than boosting the own party’s capacity. This has become a recurring theme for SD and provides an interesting example of the two party’s different communication styles: with UKIP being more aggressive while SD uses a softer approach. As will be demonstrated further both parties’ use the populist communication’s disdain for technical jargon, likely perceived another tool of the elite. When it comes to thesis topic of climate change for example, both parties often favour simplistic examples to deconstruct and question scientific input in the debate. To conclude the two parties have been chosen for analysis because they provide good examples of contemporary European populism. Furthermore both parties’ seem to have a relatively large interest in climate politics, especially in terms of energy politics.

Chapter 2: Theory introduction, analytical tools introduction, method and validity sections What is a discourse analysis? A discourse analysis can in short be understood as the study of language in use (Wetherell et al 2001, 2). In the traditional model of defining language is a vehicle of meaning transmitted from a sender to a receiver. Using language a receiver can decode what the sender conveys. However this model has become somewhat surpassed. It is problematic because it its static. Language is not static: it is not a neutral entity. A language does not develop separately from its context; it is constitutive. Constitutive in this case refers to how language function as a place where meanings are created and changed. Instead language is a tool situated in an interaction process, used for doing things. When a person do something using language her language activities are simultaneously affected by and affecting a situation (Wetherell et al 2001, 6). Four broad approaches to discourse analysis is listed by Wetherell et al. Three are relevant to this thesis.

1. Analysing the language itself: Here the researcher attempts to distinguish patterns in language. Linguistic patterns such as specific vocabularies and structures are highlighted to exchanges between the use of language and social situations. The researcher’s main task is to find regularities in an imperfect system. 2. The constraints of language: Here the researcher attempts to point out how language users linguistic patterns are dependent on previous interactions and contributions. Whatever meanings come out of an interaction is shaped by its context’s history and rules. 3. Language creates what it refers to: Contrary to the second approach, the third approach understands language as situated within social and cultural contexts rather than interactions. Discourses come and go and so does meanings. For

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example online discussions as viral videos etc. generate certain phrases and expressions. This approach states that the structure of communication regarding both objects and living beings enables and constraints how people express themselves as well as how they are viewed by others. How people talk about and refer to something, or someone, assigns the objects or persons certain values. Thus language can create and reinforce roles and values. An example of this would be how stereotypes are discussed in society. A person using language is therefore not viewed as separated from her surroundings but is instead immersed into its rules and regulations. Ultimately, language structures dictates how well a person struggling to make her voice heard succeed in her attempts (Wetherell et al 2001, 11).

This thesis will mainly fall under the third approach. It is usually applied on a larger scale and in a public context: with the objective is investigating how the discourse practices operate on a larger scale. The researcher then attempts to distinguish what identities they allow but also what constraints they carry (Wetherell et al, 2001, 9. However, these three approaches are obviously too broad to guide the thesis work on their own. In order to answer the research and sub questions we must narrow the scope.

To facilitate the analysis it is necessary to include a theoretical perspective for understanding the complicated social patterns and meanings that represents the parties’ communication. In Frank Fischer’s Reframing Public Policy: Discursive Politics and Deliberative Practices the author presents an alternative perspective to analysing communication. Here we must first discuss how traditional empiric and causal approaches can be problematic when conducting a discourse analysis. A political event and policy is a complicated matter. Although it can be viewed simply as a factor X causing Y, such as one party representatives critique of another party’s intentions sparking a debate, this is a simplification. Communication includes an ongoing process of interpretation of social meanings. Social meanings are clusters of motives, intentions, goals, purposes and values that influence how a person communicates. Instead of conducting a communicative analysis using an empirical reductionist approach one can use an interpretative approach. An interpretative approach is interested in the meanings of the social actor it analyses rather than what processes distinguished by the observing researcher. Viewing the researcher’s work not as a process of creating a valid explanation of the observed actors actions. Instead it focuses on concept building in order to interpret social phenomena (Fischer 2001, 52). Social meanings derive from interactions between people. Thus one’s social meanings are logically built on a combination of input from people significant in our lives as well as personal inner reflection. On a larger scale, political social meanings often revolve around moral and ideological positions (Fischer, 56). Consequently political debates contain clashes between different social meanings where statements either reinforce or challenge already established meanings.

Also included in the creation of social meanings are symbols. Every material and social world contains symbols carrying meanings, which are not necessarily consistent. When a symbol emerges it becomes infused with experiences, such as fears and hopes. Social meanings and symbols are activated by language, objects and actions connected to them. Knowledge on what constitutes the social meanings of different groups provides a building stone for both constructing and understanding political communication. Analysing its structure provides an insight into the speaker’s reality, while analysing the reception can do the same for the audience (Fischer 57). Because language is the medium of symbols, it can be viewed as the true experience of political events. It is not what is actually about to happen that matters, it is

9 Wageningen University, academic year 14/15 Department of CPT the language used to talk about it that captures the audience’s attention. Political actors themselves also develop certain perspectives on which what constitutes desirable values, normative symbols of what are right and wrong good and bad. These perspectives, for example a liberal positive attitude toward a free market, influence how the actor constructs their communication as a major theme distinguishable in much of the actor’s communication (Fischer 62). Contrary to the logic of empiric and causal research, the observable or measurable aspects of reality does not shape audience perceptions and political actions. Instead it is the result of political language and whatever ideas and beliefs it can bring out of its audience (Fischer 58). What is demonstrated above is how it can be problematic to analyse communication as something strictly causal. Behind every statement lie not only a structure of words but also a body of social meanings, symbols and the experiences that constitutes them. Not assessing the interaction between actors as the intricate system it is can result in inadequate understandings and results.

The interpretative approach In order to get a more comprising understanding in the analysis Fischer proposes the constructivist approach. It is concerned with the above-mentioned clashes between social meanings occurring in political debates. Arguing people carry mental structures or worldviews constructivism analyses how these structures influence how objects are viewed. Fischer elaborates the support for investigation through constructivism by presenting two variations of how the approach. First the investigation can focus on the expected outcomes of policy decision-making processes. In this approach the goal is to determine if actor A taking on a certain position leads to actor B taking on an alternative meaning. And if this is true, does the following conflict of meanings become more intensive with more juxtaposition of meanings? The second approach is to focus on how policy makers construct their policy target groups. For example by broadly dividing societal groups into advantaged and disadvantaged, with the former including fore example pensioners and scientists while the second criminals and perceived non-providing members of society. These groups can be both broad and specific, depending on the policy design. What is important is the advantaged and disadvantaged are assigned positive values, and are viewed as and taught view themselves as valuable. The opposite is true for the disadvantaged, which results in vast power differences between the two groups. Assigned values are based on many factors including culture, socialization, history, media portrayal etc. Identifying the origins of these constructed identities can help defining underlying sources of conflict (Fischer 2001, 68). Fischer states constructivism is well suited for policy analysis. First because it shows particular interest in how scientific facts, beliefs, experiences and events are constructed then become acknowledged as valid or true. Second it incorporates analysis tools designed to investigate how the design of a political campaign or statement constructs the existence of political issues. This means a social issue, such as the ozone levels in an area, is not necessarily an alarming problem until a political actor succeeds in conveying a mental structure viewing it as such. Naturally issues can still exist and pose a threat without any mental structures surrounding them, but without some sort of recognition in the form of structures no actions will be taken. Basically the perceived social problem would not exist (Fischer 2001, 54). Best, summarized by Fischer, states social problems are constructed based on three primary points: the claims, the claim-makers and the process of claim making. When defining an environmental issue Hannigan’s add the influence of philosophy, ideology, scientific influence and policy initiatives. According to Hannigan, via Fischer, six factors work together constructing environmental issues: scientific validity and claims, someone who makes connections between scientific results and the environmentalist interests, media framing the problem to appear important, well designed visual and symbolic presentation of the problem,

10 Wageningen University, academic year 14/15 Department of CPT institutional sponsorship to legitimate the issue and make sure it stays relevant (Fischer, 2001, 55). Introducing the thesis analytical tools

The discourse analysis toolkit The framework of the first analysis section is provided by James Paul Gee’s How to do a Discourse Analysis, a toolkit (2011). Using practical, hands on approach, Gee presents 27 tools to carry out a discourse analysis. Using the 27 tools, which Gee stresses does not have to be applied in order; the researcher can gain a deeper understanding. The tools come in the form of questions posed to the material. Some are based on theories while others require the researcher to draw for her/his own experiences. Useful as they are: all of Gee’s tools cannot be applied in this thesis. Therefore specific tools have been selected in order to carry out the analysis.

Chosen discourse analysis tool nr 1: the figured worlds tool The first chosen tool is the 26th, the figured worlds tool (Gee 2011, 170) and is designed to provide an overview of the material. A figured world is a compressed version of what is seen as normal within a context. Figured worlds are socially constructed thus it varies from culture to culture. Although mentally constructed, figured media and interactions between people also reinforce worlds: for example how to raise a child (Gee 2011, 170). The researcher asks how the figured worlds a communicator invites the audience to assume are constructed and why. Gee defines the figured worlds tool as follows:

“For any communication ask what typical stories or figured worlds the words and phrases of the communication are assuming and inviting listeners to assume. What participants, activities, ways of interacting, forms of language, people, objects, environments and institutions, as well as values are in these figured worlds” (Gee 2011, 200)

Chosen discourse analysis tool nr 2: the situated meaning tool The second chosen tool is number 23: the situated meaning tool. Based on cognitive psychology this theoretical tool investigates how meanings function. Meanings can in a simplified form be translated into definitions and the expectations people carry toward the defined word. For example, when defining the word bird people will have combine what information and images we have to put together an understanding of the word. Thus we could define the word bird by connecting it with the ability to fly and laying eggs, a definition known as a general meaning (Gee 2011 152). A situated meaning is the specific meaning attached to a word within a certain context, such as the word climate in a political context. Usually people can put together a situated meaning based on previous experiences to complete a shared definition for the situation. However this does not mean the definition is generally accepted or static. Meanings change and people must actively make up new meanings to maintain their understanding of the situation. Also although there can be a situated meaning on what a word or phrase refer to, this not automatically result in all participants agree to it (Gee 2011, 153). The tool is used to ask what social meanings the parties’ assign to key words and phrases connected to climate change in their communication. This would be a way to tap into how their shared definition the context in which the communication takes place differs from that of other actors. In doing so we can attempt to connect the answers to Fischer’s structuralism to discuss the parties’ structures manifest in their communication. Gee defines the tool as follows:

11 Wageningen University, academic year 14/15 Department of CPT

“For any communication, ask of words and phrases what situated meanings they have. That is, what specific meanings do listeners attribute to these words and phrases given the context and how the context is construed” (Gee 2011, 200)”

Chosen discourse analysis tool 3: the politics building tool (modified) By modifying Gee’s tools results can become more coherent with the research questions and chosen theories. As an example we can modify Gee’s tool of politics building. Politics in this particular example refer not to policy making. Rather it refers to how people act in situations were social goods are at stake. A social good can be defined as something a social group or society deems as a good worth having (Gee 2011, 90). For example, addressing a person or referring to an object or phenomena using respectful wording is a social good. Doing the opposite is a bad one. Naturally what is considered respectful varies between groups in society. Social goods are thus built through the use of language. Social goods become part of communicative systems in the sense that people choose how to talk about and toward people, objects and phenomena. By choosing to add or withhold social goods, an easy example being adding or withholding the world please in a sentence, we can change our communicative approach creating different outcomes. This is the meaning of Gee’s use of the word “politics”: it signifies conscious decisions how to distribute social goods. In political situations, a major part of the communications is made up of negotiations over social goods and the distribution of them (Gee 2011, 120). Subsequently when applying Gee’s politics building tool we ask how words and grammatical devices are used to build social goods: reviewing what is treated as valuable social goods as well as how they are distributed. One should also ask how words and grammatical devices are used to build viewpoints on what constitutes social goods are or should be distributed in society (Gee 2011, 121). When modifying the tools I will include the thesis populist section as well as the discourse analysis theories. Thus the modified politics- building tool the question will be as follows:

How are the parties’ communicative efforts attempting to build or destroy social goods related to the populist definition constructed in this thesis?

With this question the idea is to achieve two objectives: distinguishing what the parties’ use in their communication to demonstrate what they view as good or bad in the environmental policy debates. It is important in terms of the thesis theoretical base to tap into how the parties’ relate to other actors. As mentioned in the discussion on populism: the concept it contains a perceived struggle against a corrupted elite. Therefore it is important to know how this struggle manifests itself in the analysed communication.

Chosen discourse analysis tool 4: the identities building tool (modified) The fourth tool is a modified version of the identities building tool. In its original form the tool is designed to ask what identities the speaker tries to build for herself as well as conveying to the audience. It also asks how the speaker’s treat the identities of others. And how he or she uses her language to assign identities to others, also in relation their own identities. Furthermore it asks how the speaker positions others and what identities he or she invites the audience to take up (Gee 2011, 110). For example what kind of identities are the parties’ inviting their audience to assume in their communication on climate policies of the EU? Although the identities building tool is useful in its original form, it will be modified. The modification is based on the worries voiced in the introduction. It seems the wave of right wing populism the parties’ represent contain anti-democratic and/or anti-systemic characteristics. Such characteristics represent a threat of undermined political processes. One can argue a political context is heavily influenced by identities.

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What socially recognizable identities or identity are the party representatives trying to enact or get the others to recognize in their communication? How do these identities relate to the political system the communication takes place in?

Discourse analytical tool kit summary

1. The Figured Worlds Tool: “For any communication ask what typical stories or figured worlds the words and phrases of the communication are assuming and inviting listeners to assume. What participants, activities, ways of interacting, forms of language, people, objects, environments and institutions, as well as values are in these figured worlds. (Gee 2011, 200)” 2. “The Situated Meaning Tool: For any communication, ask of words and phrases what situated meanings they have. That is, what specific meanings do listeners attribute to these words and phrases given the context and how the context is construed (Gee 2011, 200)” 3. The Politics Building Tool (Modified): How are the parties’ communicative efforts attempting to build or destroy social goods related to the populist definition constructed in this thesis? 4. The Identities Building Tool (Modified): What socially recognizable identities or identity are the party representatives trying to enact or get the others to recognize in their communication? How do these identities relate to the political system the communication takes place in?

Linder’s rhetorical element framework Linder’s framework will be used in the second analysis section. It provides a framework of categories for identifying rhetorical elements involved in the social construction of a policy problem. It is divided into four categories each with an embedded policy-analytic element: The treatment of scientific claims and the policy objective; the argumentative appeals and warrants and the type intervention; image of the public underlying the rhetoric and the policy instrument and finally the image of the problem and objectionable errors. The framework is applied in the second analysis section.

Category 4: Image of Category 1: Nature of Category 2: Treatment Category 3: Rhetoric environmental issue argumentative appeals of scientific claims in image of the public (e.g. the existence of or and warrants (e.g. controversy (e.g. (e.g. as victims or magnitude of man moralist or decisive evidence or activists) made climate change paternalistic) partisan advocacy) issues)

Embedded policy analytic element 2: Embedded policy Embedded policy Embedded policy Type of policy analytic element 3: analytic element 1: analytic element 4: intervention (e.g. Policy instrument Policy objective Objectionable increasing energy (e.g. limits on (e.g. protection of errors (eg. false resource exposure or a people, exposing negatives or false extraction or pulblic information lies) positives) protecting campaign) landscape)

Methods section This thesis is a discourse analysis of two right wing parties in the European context communicates regarding climate related issues. The thesis will analyse written and recorded material from the parties by applying the chosen theories. The time frame for the material is set from to 1989-2015. The two parties are chosen because of the following reasons. The

13 Wageningen University, academic year 14/15 Department of CPT material available on the parties provides enough data to perform the thesis, in languages I master. Conducting a comparison will hopefully deepen the understanding. Each party also operates within their specific national context but also in the European parliamentary context. With their large number of representatives in the European parliament, UKIP serves as suitable example of populist politics on the international level. SD on their part has fewer representatives in the European Parliament. However the party’s recent success has put in a position where it has considerable effects on the Swedish political landscape. Therefore it provides a suitable example for the national level of communication. Still, both parties’ will be analysed on both levels.

From an analytic point of view analysing two cases naturally grants more space for elaboration. Their communication styles appear very different. For example, where UKIP can be viewed as characterized by large gestures and an aggressive tone SD often seems to struggle with downplaying such tendencies. Also SD operates within the context of the author’s home country, this gives possibilities to tap deeper into the linguistic aspects of the discourse analysis. Finally the two parties are also officially interacting with each other. This is because both are members of the Eurosceptic Alliance for Direct Democracy in Europe.2 It would be of interests to investigate if and how this shared context and platform for exchange of ideas and inspiration for communication affects the parties. Data selection This section features a presentation of the sources for material. Furthermore it features an explanation of the method for selecting the data used in the thesis while motivating why it was chosen to conduct the analysis.

One possible basis for selection of data units is a plausible assumption that language used by the data units reflects the knowledge or skills shared by the members of a culture. The different discursive analysis approaches vary in what they derive from this assumption. A discursive psychological approach can assume a culture’s shared knowledge also contains a particular understanding and construction of how the body and mind interacts. A conversation analysis approach can assume members of a culture enact a conversational set of rules. Subsequently they can recognize when their communication does not receive the expected response. By analysing the data the researcher can distinguish communicative patterns. These patterns can be shown as indications of knowledge typical to the analysed culture (Wetherell et al 2001, 23). In the thesis the data collection have derived with both assumptions in mind.

Communication occurs in all types of contexts, each with its unique characteristics influencing it. In a discourse analyse is it is important to consider what aspects of this background information is relevant. For example, when analysing recorded party communication it will be relevant to consider the context. One can for instance assume there will be differences in how the parties’ communicate in their own countries and parliaments compared to how they communicate in the European parliament. An important aspect which must be considered when analysing the data is to see things that appear familiar and taken for granted as if they were brand new. Thus if certain patterns emerge through the analysis: it is important they include not only what is being said but also is left unsaid because the speakers make assumptions regarding what their audience already know (Gee 2010,). This could especially apply to data derived from the Swedish context as it more familiar to me than the British and Euro Parliamentary contexts.

2 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meps/en/hemicycle.html

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Method for data collection Since this thesis is of qualitative design, the objective is to find typical material, which provides enough data to reach a deeper understanding. Following this logic the data is specifically chosen for its connection with the two parties. The communication of the parties patterns found in it when applying the chosen theories, is the objective. In practice this means that unless it is unavoidable, communication of other actors that is included in the material will be ignored. An example of this kind of exception would be a direct response to a question from a SD or UKIP representative.

UKIP data sources

Video data UKIP The majority of the UKIP video material derives from the party’s official Youtube channel: UKIPMEPS 3 The channel’s available material, consisting of 1261 clips in total, features UKIP’s pledges, speeches, and questions etc. of UKIPMEPS active in the European parliament. This channel is useful because it provides a large selection of potential data with continuous updates. Also, while it is the party who provides the material, the comment sections can potentially provide insight into party supporter communication on the climate change issue. Naturally the UKIP material is controlled and monitored by the party. One can distinguish some of the channel’s material has been manipulated so representatives appear successful in getting their points across. However, this is not necessarily a disadvantage. Since the objective is to analyse party communication, it would possibly be more of an issue if non-UKIP actors, in a manner that ruined the coherence or quality, manipulated the material. In total 17 clips, clocking in on 56 minutes, have been analysed.

In addition three other video clips have been chosen because of their connection to the 2015 British election. They are interviews conducted by BBC before the election. They feature party leader Nigel Farage and the current leader of UKIP Wales, Nathan Gill. These clips are selected because they allow prominent figures in UKIP to elaborate on their, and the party’s, view on the climate change issue. Furthermore, it is the most up do date of UKIP’s communication, which can be compared earlier. And the election is such a major event, not analysing communication connected to it could be argued to lessen the analysis results relevance. The last clip also features UKIP leader Nigel Farage. It is a handpicked Sky News pre-election leader’s debate of 2015. Chosen in an attempt to cover the party’s communication on climate related issues in a British debate context. The last two clips are meant to show UKIP communicating with the British people as their intended audience, rather than other political actors.

Sampling strategy UKIP video data When obtaining data from the UKIPMEPS Youtube channel the sampling strategy was conducted as follows: To find relevant video material the inbuilt search engine with keywords relevant for the thesis subject. The keywords were: Climate, Climate Change, Environment, Global Warming, and European Union. Out of the results, the clips presented by the search engine as most relevant to the key words have been chosen for analysis. However, clips have also been selected to provide at least one relevant clip from all the years available (the years being 2009-2014), through one search for every year. This is to ensure the analysis can include possible changes over time in the communication. Thus the first video material

3 https://www.youtube.com/user/UKIPmeps.

15 Wageningen University, academic year 14/15 Department of CPT analysis contains a controlled element since the search words are pre-set and a random element as it cannot determine which clips would be rendered most relevant by the engine. It should be mentioned that the channel’s search engine provides no advanced settings for searches. Keywords cannot be combined and results simply appear after their relevance in an unstated manner. It is important to take into consideration this simple method contains a risk for potential data getting lost because the wrong key words were used. The keywords where chosen by the author due to relevance. They do however of course limit the analysis the yield and so the potential understanding, a flaw that is taken into consideration.

Written data UKIP The written material of UKIP was chosen based on convenience and relevance. It consists of all available of the party’s election manifestos from 2009 and 2015 and a local manifesto from 2010 and a EU election manifesto from 2013. Additionally it includes an appendix document named Keeping the Lights on (2015) which explain UKIP’s energy political and environmental politics in detail. All the official UKIP documents were obtained from the party’s official website UKIP.org. Also included is a kindle book named Rise of UKIP, a party official document on the party’s history (Etheridge 2014). It is vital to include the manifestos and other documents, as it is one of the party’s main communication channels toward their supporters and potential supporters. The kindle book was bought at amazon.com.

Audio data UKIP Also included in the analysis of UKIP is a small selection of podcast material. Conducted by BBC the podcast series Sunday Supplement interviews political actors, including UKIP Wales’s leader Nathan Gill (Sunday Supplement 2015). Chosen strategically because it feature UKIP representatives the podcast material serve the same purpose as the BBC Meet the Leaders interview series, as a medium allowing UKIP representatives to elaborate their views. Also, podcasts as a medium have a tendency to allow participants to express themselves in highly personal way. The podcast material clocks in on 10 minutes.

Newspaper data UKIP When obtaining newspaper coverage data the same keywords, also including of course the party name itself, that were used in the official Youtube channel were applied in the Google news database. The search was limited to British newspapers from the years 1995-2015. To ensure a more reliable coverage, the same search was also conducted in the online archives of two major British broadsheet newspapers: The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph. They were chosen for two reasons: their circulation size and differing value bases: The Guardian being centre-left and social liberal and The Telegraph conservative right4. The reason for using both Google news and the newspapers own search engines are the latters unreliable design: which for example gave different yields with the same key words. To counter this: the BBC news site, offering a better search engine, is also included and subjected to the same. Articles have been picked based on search engine relevance. In total 10 UKIP related articles have been analysed. This should provide enough coverage to reach an acceptable level of understanding and distinguishing communicative patterns. Due to the falling relevance all articles does not focus solely on UKIP, instead the party is in some cases briefly featured.

Sverigedemokraterna data sources

Video data Sverigedemokraterna

4 Telegraph.co.uk/aboutus; Theguardian.com/info/guardian-editorial-code

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The video based data for SD has been derived from the Swedish government’s, the Riksdag’s, online database. 5 It features all debates, pledges speeches etc. made in the Swedish parliament. Contrary to the UKIP video data, the Swedish videos are published in their entirety. Meaning every debate spans between two and three hours, but with the possibility to single out specific parties’. This gives makes it easier to put SD communication in context, but also more time consuming as the UKIP channel only provides UKIP related material. However the time element is compensated by the validity of the official governmental website. In total 12 SD appearances in the Riksdag, clocking in on 102 minutes, have been chosen from Riksdagen.se based on search engine relevance. Furthermore a pre-election debate from Swedish state television prior to the 2014 Swedish election is featured on the same grounds as its British equivalent.

Sampling strategy video material Sverigedemokraterna The strategy and the same keywords that were used in the UKIPMep Youtube channel were once again applied. The Riksdag’s search engine is more advanced than the Youtube channels, allowing for combinations of the keywords as well. This was applied to hopefully ensure the most relevant clips have been found. The debate however was handpicked for its relevance. Again, to make sure there was some yearly spread the clips, the search was based on years. However the yield was uneven with more data from 2011-14.

Written data Sverigedemokraterna In total 5 official SD-documents will be analysed. Two of them is the party’s election manifesto from 2010 and 2014, the others are early versions before SD gained seats in the Swedish parliament, and these two are the party’s first manifesto from 1989 and its second from 1996. The 2010 and 2014 manifesto were obtained from the party’s official website. The 2010 and 2014 manifestos were obtained from the SD’s official website while the other two documents were obtained from a site dedicated to preserving SD material6. Also included is the party’s rules of conduct principle: a document of 2011 called Principprogrammet. All official documents were handpicked for the same reasons as the official UKIP material. It is important to note not all of SD’s election manifestos could be obtained, which is an issue since it will make it harder to fully analyse the communication.

7.4 Newspaper data The newspaper data was mainly derived from Sweden’s largest newspapers Svenska Dagbladet and Dagens Nyheter. Like their British equivalents the two are chosen due to their size and differing value bases. The same keywords have been used. Also, due to its relevance (being referred to on numerous occasions in the other media) a debate article from an SD representative has been handpicked. In total, 10 articles have been chosen. Validity, reliability, limitations and generalization

Validity To reach validity in a discourse analysis Gee argues for guidelines should be strived towards. First there should be convergence, the results should be compatible with the 27 tools/questions. This first guideline hopefully poses a relatively small problem. Gee’s tools come in such a general design the material easily falls within its range. Also two tools will be modified to fit their purpose better. Second there should be agreement, meaning the results

5 www.riksdagen.se/debatter 6 www.sd-arkivet.se

17 Wageningen University, academic year 14/15 Department of CPT correspond in some way with other research results. Gee stresses that support from other research fields is extra desirable. This thesis revolves around an analysis of populist elements of communication. It would not exist without already established definitions of and discussions about what constitutes populism. As a result the thesis findings will arguably correspond with existing research. Gee’s third guideline for validity states there should be coverage; the tools should be applied to a sufficient amount of data. Finally the linguistic details should be taken into account (Gee 2010, 184). The last guideline can pose a challenge throughout the analysis because it includes linguistic aspects plus intonation and pauses. Since the author is not a native English speaker, there is a risk for misinterpretation of for example figures of speech or missing linguistic aspects such as exactly what Gee lists as potential pitfalls. However, being a Swedish native, the SD related material could be scrutinized and compared to the author’s own knowledge and Swedish identity.

A starting point when conducting a discourse analysis is deciding what view is take on language. This means a researcher can either use language to study something else or study the language itself (Wetherell et al 2001, 14). In this research both approaches can be distinguished. The former because the analysis results will be scrutinized to find connections to the chosen discussion on populism: the latter since the results will derive from analysis of language. It is essential that the analysis be conducted within these boundaries. Discourse analysis researchers must refrain from reading in intentions of the material’s speakers and writers. Self-awareness is a virtue in discourse analysis. Thus it must be taken in consideration how the author’s own values, beliefs and interests can clash with those expressed in the thesis material. A researcher might perceive certain patterns in what is communicated in the material. Without an obvious connection to theory however, those patterns are unsupported claims, which is not desirable. Sometimes a researcher’s professional identity can also influence her or his ability to conduct a certain project. For example if a researchers gender or socio-economic status creates a tension toward the units analysis and or material (Wetherell et al 2001, 15). In this case, the author is not a professional, but does have bachelor in political science, which provides some extra knowledgeto the analysis of the obviously political material. Still, potential issues for a clouded judgement when conducting the analysis will most likely derive from clashes between personal standpoints and those of the parties. The subject of climate change is an extremely diverse yet sensitive subject the political context on all levels, from the individual to global level. It is also connected to an immense and often clashing set of values. And the two chosen parties’ arguably use a communicative style, which often provokes a lot of people, including the author. This risk of a biased analysis must be taken into consideration.

Reliability This thesis will use the approaches to discourse analysis provided by Wetherell et Al without modification from the author. Thus it is arguably reliable. Although the quotes presented in the analysis section contain what the author labels as recurring themes in the parties’ communication, this selection process is not visible to the reader. Still, the selection of material is partially randomized, with no control of the search engine results. Two of Gee’s tools of discourse analysis come in their original design. This arguably makes them reliable, the two modified tool are designed in relation to the populist definition and to expand on the worries for the parties’ political context described in the introduction. For the first modified tool the reliability is intertwined with the populist definition, while the second modified tool arguably can be judged due to the results it yields. The author constructs the framework for comparison of results between the parties: which can affect the reliability: hopefully the

18 Wageningen University, academic year 14/15 Department of CPT simplistic design of the framework can counter this. In the end, it is the interpretations in the analysis in relation to the author’s ethos that is the potentially largest issue of reliability.

Limitations For this thesis it is important to balance the ambitions with the available time. Obviously climate change related communication is a vast subject. It is highly cross-disciplinary touching upon subjects such as energy politics, economics and scientific debates. Also the subject surfaces in all kinds of channels. Subsequently there is a risk data collection taking up too much time leaving little or no time for analysis work. There is also a risk for incoherent results unless the analysis scope is kept narrow. As interesting as it is, it will be difficult to include more communication from other actors present in the parties’ contexts. It can be done to an extent, such writing out short questions to explain the quote’s context. But it would arguably influence the analysis coherency in a negative way. For example since they cannot be subjected to the discourse analysis tools and populist definition.

Generalization In terms of generalization to other research qualitative this thesis does face issues. The interpretative approach is not based on testing causal hypothesises. It relies on logical reasoning to show how circumstances certify opinions and worldviews. Thus interpretative conclusions stand and fall with well-reasoned interpretation instead of a relationship between dependent and independent variables. To quote Fischer: “The relationship of a belief or action is not external and contingent (like causes) but internal and logical (Fischer 2001, 53)”. Knowledge derived from qualitative data is often viewed as situated: too embedded into its context to be applied anywhere else. Generalization possibilities are therefore narrow. However should the results prove to be situated they are not without importance. Found features of interest from the data can be argued not to be recurring but significant and persistent (Wetherell et al 2001, 13). Generalization of results on a broad scale will obviously be problematic. Hopefully the composition of analytical tools applied in the thesis could provide help other works, adding some transferability to the thesis design. The main objective however is to deepen the understanding on populist communication on the subject of climate change issues. It is possible discussed mental structures of the parties can be found in similar parties and contexts. Ultimately however, reaching deepened qualitative knowledge is what the thesis is designed for.

Chapter 3: Analysis section 1 & 2: discourse tool application analysis & communicative themes comparison analysis Analysis outline The analysis will be divided into two sections. The first section, which will apply will be divided into segments after the sub-questions. Each section will analyse the data from both parties separately. The objective is to apply the selected tools of discourse analysis as well as Fischer’s constructivist approach to search for patterns in the data i.e. the various channels of parties’ communication. For each sub-question at least two of Gee’s analysis tool will applied. Each section will have a small summary in which both parties’ communication will be discussed alone and in relation to each other. Finally the analysis has a section summary discussing the sub-question analysis results and emerging larger themes.

The first analysis section will be divided into segments after the sub-questions. Each section will analyse the data from both parties separately. The objective is to apply the selected tools

19 Wageningen University, academic year 14/15 Department of CPT of discourse analysis to the quotes taken from the selected channels of party communication in order to investigate if their communication on climate change contains populist characteristics. In this section only the discourse analysis tools will be applied. The parties’ communication will be analysed separately.

In the second analysis section, the results from applying the discourse analysis tools will be categorized using Linder’s rhetorical framework for the construction of a social problem, then compared. The objective is to highlight emerging communicative themes from both parties and compare them and discuss them using Fischer’s interpretative approach. Analysis section 1: Discourse analysis tools application

To structure the analysis section and avoid messy results the material has been sorted according to their relevance the sub-questions: That is communication specifically connected to the sub-questions, such as a party representative addressing the scientific consensus on climate change in the parliament. Another example would be party representatives expressing an opinion on the climate policies of the EU in a newspaper article. The results will be discussed in separate sections. In the sections the parties will also be analysed separately. Every section will contain comments for every source of material and a small summary. The analysis will be carried out as follows: three or more quotes from each party will be chosen to illustrate and discuss communicative patterns. The patterns will be found by applying suitable discourse analysis tools. Each party’s quotes will be discussed on their own then compared in the section summary. In this section, results will be obtained using the chosen discourse analysis tools. The quotes chosen for the discourse analysis are chosen because the author argues they make good examples of recurring themes distinguished in the initial reading of the material. This means every quote incorporates a subject or a communicative approach that is also present elsewhere in the material, and of course relevant to their specific category. An example is UKIP’s recurring communication structure on the European energy politics. Each quote comes with a short explanation to why it was chosen and which of the discourse analysis will be applied and why. In the following section the discourse analysis tools from the section above will be applied. The results will be divided among the categories described above. Each category’s selection of quotes will in itself be divided after the sources of material they are taken from. Discourse analysis tool application, Sverigedemokraterna sub-question 1

Official party communication – SD sub-question 1

1. “A realistic and sustainable environment and energy politics The Swedish Democrats work for a Sweden where we take care of our amazing and unique environment while taking the responsibility for the global climate issues while taking other important values into account and realizing Sweden alone cannot solve the world’s climate issues. A Sweden where climate politics derive from love for the home county: A Sweden free from oil dependency with a stable energy supply reasonable prices giving both companies, the welfare and the citizens’ private economy an advantage.

a. A broad energy agreement containing research and a renewed investment in nuclear power, abolished the power tax while continuing to make our country non-reliant on oil.

b. A stronger investment in approaching the environmental issues of the Baltic Sea. A stronger investment in energy efficiency and research. (SD Manifesto 2014, 40)

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2. “Energy politics are meant to ensure our energy supply. SD wants to invest in a fast transition to environmental alternatives. It is important that we learn how to economise thus decreasing our energy use. The problems of nuclear motivates that nuclear power should be settled within the time limit for the nuclear reactors’ natural run time. Fifteen years of sloppy handling since the public vote has put the nation in a situation where our dependency on nuclear power is too great”.(SD Manifesto 1996, 11)

Official party communication analysis – SD sub-question 1 Quote number 1 is taken from SD’s 2014 manifesto’s climate section, it is chosen because it comprehensibly explains the party’s most recent view on environmental politics and its pledges for future policies. In quote number 1, the figured world tool has been applied to distinguish SD’s view of Sweden. Staying true to its communicated ecological viewpoint, SD incorporates a touch of romantic wording expressing love toward the Swedish landscape in their election of 2014’s climate section. The figured world seems to rely heavily on a pastoral view of Swedish nature. This is not a coincidence as the love for the outdoors is often viewed as fundamentally Swedish. The quote shows populist characteristics in terms of the desire to set Sweden aside from other, pluralistic, outside influences.

Quote number 2 is chosen because it signifies a change in the party’s communication on energy politics. The quote will be subjected to the politics-building tool to build an understanding of how SD values energy sources and their relationship to the climate: For an unexplained (that will be discussed in a later stage) reason there is a shift in how the party destroys then rebuilds the social bad and good of nuclear power. In the 1996 manifesto nuclear power is labelled as having too much problems, and is therefore non-environmental and to be phased out. However in the 2014 version, investments in nuclear power research is built as a highly desirable social good. This quote also shows clear populist characteristics in terms of displeasure towards how established parties have handled the issue, labelling it as “sloppy”.

Newspapers – SD sub-question 1

1. ”Climate politics in Sweden has gone too far and is not anything but scientific. I have the utmost respect for all researchers and scientists who are doing all their can to understand our climate. but when everything is summed up and packaged for politicians and journalists a lot is lost. People want simple explanations, but there are none when it comes to the climate issue. ” (Fransson Nyheter 24)

2. ”… - It shows all these apocalyptic claims might be exaggerated. That is what I wanted to say during the debate, Josef Fransson stated. The SD-representative’s conclusion regarding moments of hope in the latest climate reports and claim that this is not mentioned by people making “a lucrative career” from warning about the climate threat made other parties’ representatives see red. – Distressing, said Irene Oskarsson of Kristdemokraterna (the Christian Democrats). Matilda Ernkrans of Socialdemokraterna (the Social Democrats) who’s party in association with the debate came with new propositions lies close to those of Miljöpartiet (the Environmental party) stated: “- He’s placing himself on the far far right…” (DN Larsson, 2013/01/29)

Newspapers analysis – SD sub-question 1 Quote number 1 is taken from a debate article in which SD climate spokesman Josef Fransson posted an article on climate politics. The quote is included because it shows an insight into SD’s view on the scientific community, and provoked reactions from other actors that are present in the rest of the material. For quote number 1, the identity-building tool has been applied. SD climate spokesman Josef Fransson seems to build an identity for the scientific community as hard working yet under pressure from “politicians and journalists”. Seen through the lens of the populist definition, the quote is unconventional. It does not present the people as simply victims. Instead he does appear to build them and identity with some

21 Wageningen University, academic year 14/15 Department of CPT responsibility for the climate policies going to far as they desire the “simple explanations”. Another possibility is the remark communicates how the people are deceived, fed custom made explanations by the elite. This arguably corresponds with Mudde’s definition of populism’s core.

Quote number 2 features Fransson commenting on hostile reactions from competing party representatives following a statement where Fransson questioned the scientific consensus on climate change. It is chosen because it provides an example of how SD’s view on the scientific community affects the parliamentary context. For quote nr 2, the identity building tools will be applied. Contrary to the previous quote, Fransson now shows another view of the scientific community. Obviously he does not claim all research on climate change is illegitimate. However the “apocalyptic claims” does seem to be received as hyperbolic and satiric. And the “lucrative careers” does of course assign an untrustworthy identity to climate scientist community, not only as it hints members have received money to present specific results. Fransson also hints the community keeps the truth hidden for unspecified reasons, which corresponds with the populist tendency to view policies as elite tool for control. The quote’s second half is kept in order to show how reactions of the other parliamentary parties quickly assigned SD the identity of a “far far right” party.

Video material – SD sub-question 1

1. ”…After all we have not seen any significant increase of the global temperature the past 15-18 years. Is there then any scientific legitimacy to such a claim? Same goes for the spreading of deserts… We know the increase of carbon dioxide is pretty beneficial for plant life so to speak. Also the increased sea levels. Is there a curve showing that the increase of sea levels that has been going on for 150 years is accelerating? How about proof that climate change is causing poverty, when the world that is after all just getting richer? (Fransson, 11/11/2014)

2. I’m saying the only tools Sweden has to do any kind of difference (in contributing to lowering of EU emission rates) is about how well our scientists and companies succeed in developing the next generation of energy able to push out fossil fuels on a market basis. And by this I am not referring to ethanol, solar power and wind power and other vain dead ends.” (Fransson, 21/06/2013)

Video material analysis -SD sub-question 1 Quote number 1 is taken from a general parliamentary debate themed the climate and the environment in which Josef Fransson participated. It is chosen because it features an interesting reference to the scientific community and global warming. For this quote the situated meaning tool has been applied to As he lists the climate related issues, all addressed by other parties representatives, Fransson shows SD does not share the general meaning of considering them as being man made or induced: Instead the response is to ask for “scientific legitimacy”. Furthermore climate change, the phenomena, is partially assigned characteristics of a social good as Fransson rather off-handily concludes carbon dioxide is beneficial for plant life.

Quote number 2 comes from a parliamentary debate on energy policies. It is chosen because it provides a good example of SD’s perspective on the relationship between research on sustainable energy resources and energy policies. For this quote the situated meaning tool will be applied: The quote shows Fransson and SD standing firm on the 2014 manifesto’s pledge to invest in nuclear power. The quote also shows SD does put a certain amount of trust in the scientific community. What they seem to disagree with here is where its efforts are made.

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Discourse analysis tool application, Sverigedemokraterna sub-question 1 Summary Ambivalence seems to fitting to describe SD’s communication related to research on the scientific community climate change issues. Mudde’s antagonistic relationship between the pure people and corrupt elite is not entirely there. Rather, the scientific community appears to be prone to bending to the will of the elite politicians and to some extent the media. Thus SD often conforms the constructivist notion that a problem is not a problem unless it is recognized as such. The social good of scientific authority is obviously challenged. When Fransson reflects on the people’s desire for simple explanations, also highlights issues with the popularizing of the issue. It seems SD communicates worries it has gone to far, turning into the apocalyptic, fear inducing, scenarios Fransson’s highlights. Discourse analysis tool application, Sverigedemokraterna sub-question 2

Official party documentation – SD sub-question 2

1. “The Swedish Democrats view most of today’s climate issues as a consequence of society not taking the conservative principle of careful progress into consideration. The principle of careful progress is hence central for SD’s climate politics when it comes to preventing new climate issues and when it comes to choosing methods to counter the already existing issues.” (Principprogram 2001, 40).

2. “Climate political decisions are among the most important as they influence our entire habitat both in the now and the future. It is therefore important a long-term perspective characterizes our environmental politics… It takes political courage to manage the climate issues since powerful economic or political interests can work against vital climate efforts…. “ (SD Manifesto, 1989, 10)

Official party documentation analysis – SD sub-question 2 Quote number 1 is taken from SD’s code of conduct: chosen because it shows what SD representatives consistently refer to as a fundament for the party’s policy design. The quote will be subjected to the politics-building tool. As will be seen in other quotes, much of SD’s critique toward climate policies of other parties seem to manifest in attempts of destroying their social good value by labelling them as hasty. Thus it makes sense to counter this by communicating the party’s own dedication to the conservative principle, building an identity as a party proceeding with sensibility

Quote number 2 is chosen as an extension of the analysis commenced in quote number 1. It will be analysed with the politics-building tool in order to distinguish how the party has communicated its self-proclaimed conservative policy design since its earliest form: This identity is also reinforced by the remark on courage against powerful interests can be argued to correspond with Kaid Holtz and Bacha’s argument regarding populist distrust toward political institutions as well as Mudde’s more fundamental populist perception of the corrupt elite.

Newspapers – SD sub-question 2

1. Swedish Democrats’ Josef Fransson said he saw points of hope in the latest climate reports and claims: this is not mentioned by the people making “a lucrative career” from warning about the climate threat. He also pointed out Sweden is worsening its competitive conditions by preceding others when it comes to decreasing its emissions…. (SVD 29/1/2013)

2. “SVD reporter: What do you say to the car owners who have invested in an ethanol driven car and are now forced to pay expensive repairs out of their own pockets? …It is deeply regrettable one has not taken these issues into consideration when the reform was launched. In our view all these problems

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where known in advance but in the current hysteria for finding fast climate friendly solutions, politicians have lost all rational thinking. Doing something has become more important than what one is doing…” (SVD Sundkvist 2/05/2014)

Newspapers analysis – SD sub-question 2 Quote number 1 features SD representative Josef Fransson on the Swedish current climate profile: as an inspirational forerunner. It is chosen since it represents one of SD’s main arguments against the current climate policies. To analyse it the figured world tool will be applied to distinguish how the figured world can be affected by a perception affected by a populist viewpoint: As in the previous section we can distinguish the type of formula of the relation between research and policies. In this figured world the elite, the mainstream parties’ politicians, have misguided themselves. Also criticised are the Swedish avant-garde climate policies, which in short assumes Sweden setting a standard for climate policies, while maintaining influence and growth, other states will follow. To Fransson this governmentally enacted Swedish identity appears to be viewed as harmful as Sweden is “worsening its market competiveness”.

Quote number 2 also features SD representative Josef Fransson on the subject of decreasing sales of ethanol for car and possible subsidies to counter this. Chosen for the same reason as the quote above and instead analysed using the identities building tool to discuss how the perception discussed above affects the identities the party assigns to their political competitors: From the elite politicians own creation of “the current hysteria” come irrational policies en masse. With the rhetorical punch line “doing something has become more important than what one is doing” other political parties are assigned an identity of being duped by the hysteria into designing inefficient climate policies.

Video material – SD sub-question 2

1. “We won’t save Earth’s climate or environment by penalty taxing the Swedish people and shutting down Swedish nuclear power and replacing it with wind power … We save the Earth’s climate and environment by for distributing the resources where they achieve the most, for example increasing the climate aid or by for example investing in climate friendly energy and electricity production such as nuclear energy… Sweden accounts for circa 0.1 % of the world’s emissions, we have a more or less climate neutral electricity production… (Åkesson, 2014/04/05)

2. Mr President, the biological diversity is another area highlighted by SD, it is about the preservation and manage a heritage. This is not something one can put a price tag on, we simply want to preserve the species we have in Sweden for the future. It's a responsible environmental policy. One can easily see that our suggestions focus on our immediate area, where we can make a visible difference… Because money should be used where it makes the biggest effect, and this is not the case with the current climate policies, or the energy politics. The government wants to work against nuclear power by with one hand carry out an expensive climate policy, where we in practice will make ourselves dependent on fossil fuels either from Sweden or from other countries. At the same time, with the other hand they want to carry out expensive and inefficient climate efforts. This is a large-scale waste of tax money and it is not something we will stand behind. (Kinnunen, 18/12/2014)

3. “… In our Riksdag there are parties’ longing for long standing changes that my party thinks could endanger our economy and market competitiveness. It is desirable to want the best and work toward it, but also to be realistic and a bit partial toward the own country. Deterioration and a lowered living standard could make the level of acceptance for environmental politics decrease.” (Hagwall 2013, 2014/03/13)”

4. (”… Renewable energy needs large subventions, so sadly I don’t think it’s the solution to all problems. Naturally my party is also for a transition to renewable energy more that of course goes for increased energy efficiency as well. But right now we are not in a position were we can give up nuclear power

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plants and pass over to solely renewables, the costs for the Swedish people would be too great…” (Hagwall, 2014/03/13)”

Video material analysis – SD sub-question 2 Quote number 1 features party leader Jimmie Åkesson. It was chosen as an example of SD’s party leader communicating on the subject of climate politics, a communicative subject that is usually taken on by other SD representatives. In the figured world built by Åkesson in the debate quote, the populist perception of the vulnerable people can be distinguished. Current climate policies unnecessarily punish the people through taxing. This arguably corresponds with the populist perceived struggle against a corrupted elite. Taking into account the party’s generally Sweden focused worldview: one can interpret the quote from Åkesson as an attempt to induce pride over the country’s climate efforts.

Quote number 2 features SD representative Martin Kinnunen participating in a Riksdag debate on the Swedish government’s climate related expenditure in 2014. It applies the identities building tool in order to distinguish the basis for the evoked identity for his party. First, Kinnunen establishes a connection the party’s self-proclaimed nature friendly profile, stating preservation of the Swedish landscape is nothing to ” put a price tag on”. As a contrast Kinnunen subsequently labels the government’s climate political efforts as a “large-scale waste“ SD’s communication seems to build an identity corresponding with the populist definition’s of the party being a voice against an established elite.

Quote 1 and 2 from Åkesson and Kinnunen can viewed together be interpreted as an example of SD working up the 1989 manifesto’s desirable “political courage “ to against the misguided elite. In this figured world, both in the TV studio and parliamentary context, SD is arguably attempting to enact and identity of sensibility and know-how when it comes to distributing climate resources correctly. To their competitors’ and their climate policies. Åkesson and Kinnunen assigns an identity that harms the Swedish citizens: By opposing nuclear expansion and investing in wind power they affect the landscape while increasing taxes. In doing so, the Swedish government pursues strategies that seem to collide with two of SD’s core values: (energy) independency from outside influences and preservation of the Swedish landscape.

Quote number 3 and 4 features SD representative Anna Hagwall in the Riksdag communicating on the Swedish on framework for climate and energy politics for 2020-2030. They were chosen as an example of the recurring SD theme of a negative correlation between Swedish climate policies and the country’s market competiveness. The quotes will be analysed using the situated meaning tool to increase the understanding for SD’s view on renewable energy source. We see Hagwall making a communicative challenge to the situated meaning of renewable energy sources, wind power in particular. It seems Hagwall perceives the situated meaning of renewable energy sources as idealistic. It is worth noting Hagwall does not challenge the situated meaning of renewable energy sources being desirable. Rather the costs they carry in terms of economic means but also in the form of their affect on the Swedish citizen’s attitude toward them. This is noteworthy as it is arguably convenient to perceive the party’s communicated resistance toward renewable energy resources as definitive. Instead, it is the economic, market, costs negative impact on the Swedish citizens that seems to be the root of Hagwall’s communicated problem.

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Discourse analysis tool application, Sverigedemokraterna sub-question 2 Summary

In this section, the distinguished populist influences to SD’s communication are characterized by a worry for the effects of misguided and costly decisions. Applying the figured world tool we can attempt summarize what constitutes this worry: As a result of what Josef Fransson labels as the hysteria on climate change, the government have begun to pursue misguided climate policies. To counter this, SD communicates a role as a voice of reason, urging the government their competitors to reconsider the policies. Instead of constructing issues of climate change a social problem; SD seemingly reconstructs the problem the social and economical costs of pursuing policies meant to counter the issues of climate change: A reconstruction that primarily highlights increase of taxes and the country’s market competitiveness.

It is worth noting this section’s quotes do not portray the perceived elite actions corrupt actions born out of pure greed. Apart from Fransson’s remark on those making lucrative careers warning for climate change, SD’s version of Mudde’s antagonistic corrupted elite is in this case not capitalizing on the people. Rather the corruption manifest as corruption through fear. Perhaps pressured by fear of public discontent or actual fear of climate change, the elite pursues ambitious yet unrealistic climate and energy policies. Hence for example Åkesson and Kinnunen’s remarks on unrealistic disposition of resources. It is arguably a version of Rooduijn et al’s populist characteristic of issue with an elite out of touch with reality. Ultimately, according to SD, those who will suffer are the average citizens. This interpretation: that the efforts of SD to reconstruct climate change as a social problem, is because the party seems to foresee significant backlashes from the current climate policies. Therefore the party appears to position itself outside of the perceived hysteria and trying to communicate a warning to its competitors. This corresponds with the party’s self-proclaimed politically courageous identity of being ready to make decisions other actors are not capable of taking.

Discourse analysis tool application, Sverigedemokraterna sub-question 3

Official party communication – SD sub-question 3

” Realistic and sustainable climate politics The Sweden Democrats work for a Sweden where we care for our own fantastic and unique natural environment and take part in the responsibility for the global environmental issues while also weighting in other important values when making decisions realising Sweden alone cannot solve the world’s climate issues. A Sweden: where environmental politics derive from the love and care for the homeland. A Sweden free from oil dependency with a stable electric production and fair energy prices to gain for both companies, welfare and the citizens’ private economy. We will work for the following changes: • An increased in support to the poorest developing countries work with decreasing their emissions of environmentally hazardous substances and green house gases.

• A no to a continued large-scale building of highly subsidized and inefficient wind power that has a negative affect on nature and cultural environments.

• A broad energy deal containing research and a renewed effort on nuclear power, cancellation of the effect tax and continued steps toward making our country oil independent.” (SD Manifesto 2014, 15)

Official party communication analysis, SD sub-question 3

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The quote has been chosen to discuss SD’s view on climate policies in relatio to outside influences. This provides an interesting insight to the party’s view on climate politics, making a clear distinction between Sweden and the rest of the world. To expand on this, the identities building tool and the politics-building tool have been applied. As been mentioned, SD maintains a EU sceptic profile. In its 2014 manifesto the party states it work against any supranational influence over Sweden as well a new Swedish referendum regarding the Swedish EU membership (SD Manifesto 2014, 20). Furthermore the 1996 manifesto states the union’s existence inevitably drives itself toward “a supranational elite leadership” (SD Manifesto 1996, 15). However, there is no written communication regarding any relationship between the EU and Swedish climate policies. One interpretation this is a subtler version of the elsewhere communicated aversion against supranational influences. In short, the Swedish government should only handle the Swedish climate policies. Another interpretation is that the identity being built is that of how SD envisions Sweden: as an entirely sovereign state expressing a will to aid other states in their climate efforts, while maintaining a distance. This can be distinguished in the will to create an independent Swedish energy supply should as well as the expressed love for the Swedish landscape and nature. The first of the three pledges can be viewed as an attempt to build a social good climate aid. Climate aid is however, which will be shown later, a concept that SD’s communication becomes rather complicated on. In the last two pledges, we also see more examples of SD reinforcing their views by destroying the social good of wind power while building social goods for nuclear power.

Newspapers - SD sub-question 3

1. “Prime Stefan Lövfen (Social Democrats) will on Thursday’s EU meeting have to defend his the opposing Alliance’s line in the union’s climate goals for 2030 are to be set. – Its not good for Sweden, not good for the EU, not good for the climate, the prime minister said after SD chose to support the burgess political line… After some confusion and a EU board meeting taking too much time it was finally clear the government’s line of argument before the EU negotiations had fallen. The Swedish Democrats, having maintained their own standpoint, chose to join the Alliance (a coalition of the Swedish liberal, centre, and centre-right parties’) lower target levels which they viewed as “the least harmful”: - “We want a balanced climate politics, the Alliance’s propositions were not good but the Social Democrat’s were even more farsighted, one has balance it somehow, said SD’s representative Johnny Skalin.” (Stiernstedt SVD 22/10/2014)

2. “The climate is an issue the EU-Parliament is has to come to terms on within the coming five years. The battle is about EU should have one or more goals for decreasing carbon dioxide emissions. But SD does not want any goal at all, instead every country should decide for their own emissions.- How are we to then going to stop emission that remain do not obey human borders? Sweden accounts for 0,1 percent of the world’s emission and the EU 10. We must work more globally with countries like China and India with these issues.” (Larsson DN 23/5/2014)

Newspapers analysis – SD sub-question 3 Quote number 1 comes from an article discussing the outcome of SD’s role as a political deal- breaker in the Swedish parliament prior to a EU parliamentary climate meeting. It has been chosen to discuss how the party affects its context and the party’s own communicative response to this. The quote will be analysed using the identities building tool. The quote not only reflects SD’s ongoing building of a EU-sceptic identity, for example through the passages noted in the previous section. Is also reflects the impact of what SD chooses to communicate. Due to the party’s role as deal-breaker in the Swedish parliament it can apparently affect the party’s political context to this extent. Furthermore it provides an insight to the party’s complicated relationship to its perspective on time. Although the party in its

27 Wageningen University, academic year 14/15 Department of CPT earlier incarnations advocated long-term solutions, its more recent form does the opposite. It is unclear, but noteworthy, to reflect on as to why the party now prefers short-term climate policies. Perhaps it simply derives from the potential negative economic effects from a long - term approach to climate change policies perceived by SD.

Quote number 2 is taken from a pre-election interview with aspiring (now appointed) SD MEP Kristina Wihberg. It is chosen as a suitable insight into the communication approach SD pledges to when it functions in the European parliamentary context. The quote will be analysed using the politics-building tool. As has been mentioned, an ongoing communicative theme is the distancing of Sweden from outside influence, including of course Euro scepticism. Here the theme surfaces in relation to the climate issue. The social good of collaborative climate efforts within the union are targeted, seemingly labelled as futile since the differences are to vast. At the same time, the union receives a mix of good and bad policies assigned as it is argued to account for a small part of global emission rates, but also seems to be portrayed as outweighed by more powerful actors accountable for vastly greater emissions.

Video material – SD sub-question 3

1. “… The Swedish politicians decided to ask the people if they wanted to join the European Union when it was about to be formed… But in 1994 nobody spoke about the pillars, power structures, the supranational and EU’s possibilities to decide for Sweden… One spoke about collaboration… Still today, in 2014, politicians stand here talking about collaboration within the European Union. But I argue it is not about collaboration. It is a about a supranational deciding for the Swedish people instead of the people of Sweden deciding together with the people of Europe how to form the European progress forward…” (Skalin, 11/05/2013)

2. “The Swedish avant-garde policies are expensive and fairly insignificant in a larger perspective… The world outside of EU increases its emission rates with a whole EU every fifth year… Often the rhetoric of the climate debate talks about a changing climate primarily affecting the poor. This then motivates reckless spending on more or less futile projects. But what would the poor themselves choose: a decrease in temperature of 0,000001 degrees in 85 years or different forms of decease- and poverty control to a worth of 4 billion kronor…” (Fransson, 11/10/2014)

3. Competitiveness and for the Swedish and European industry alike cannot deter, to the extent of production being moved to countries with less ambitious climate politics. There is a need for a deeper consequence analysis of the effects of a the progress of a one sided ambitious climate politics in a limited part of the world, where we belong. After all, the EU stands for only 11 % of the world’s emissions…” (Hagwall, 13/3/2013)

4. …Us taxing ourselves extensively will not affect the U.S. or China who might stand for nearly half of the world’s emission of carbon dioxide… Research shows binding goals for EU renewables can cause significant increase of costs without reducing the emissions. Sweden and Europe has to focus on energy source research aiming towards finding new sources cheap enough to outcompete fossil fuels. Todays renewables are not good enough to meet economical, technical and environmental goals for sustainability. As long as this continues fossil fuels will remain the dominant energy source especially in developing countries… (Kinnunen 20/5/2015)

Video material analysis – SD sub-question 3 Quote number 1 features SD representative Johnny Skalin in a state of the union debate in the Swedish parliament. It is chosen since it functions an example of SD’s general view on the union, in this case without an obvious connection climate issues. The quote will be analysed using the figured world tool. Clearly Skalin, and his party, are experiencing discomfort toward the EU’s influence over Swedish politics. In itself the opinion does not have to correspond to the populist definition. But the references to an ignored people’s will and

28 Wageningen University, academic year 14/15 Department of CPT mistrust toward a perceived elite rule does correspond with Mudde’s populist definition as Skalin argues the union’s influence to be a gross intrusion to the Swedish people´s volonté general.

Quote number 2 features SD representative Josef Fransson’s on the effects of climate aid and Swedish climate politics in relation to climate politics of the EU and globally. It is chosen as example of how SD relates to the Swedish governmental self-proclaimed strategy of being a climate political forerunner. The quote will be analysed using the situated meaning tool to tap into SD’s perception of the relationship between Sweden and the EU in terms of climate policies. Fransson’s statement challenges any positive situated meanings of these avant-garde politics as well as EU’s climate aid policies. This is done by attempting to put perceived benefits of both Sweden’s and the EU’s climate policies in perspective to the outside world. Like his colleague Kristina Wihberg in the newspaper quote, Fransson downplays the Swedish and the EU’s capacity to influence climate related issues. However, Fransson also includes Knigge’s element of populist suspicion toward political processes. Arguably born out of a climate sceptic mind-set, Fransson views pursuing expensive climate on a long term provides little or no actual aid to those suffering in the moment. Thus, Fransson seems to view investing in the future in favour of the now as an action of a disconnected, or ignorant, elite.

Quote number 3 features SD representative Anna Hagwall debating a European climate framework. The quote is chosen to provide insight in SD’s reactions to the climate related aspirations of the EU, It will be analysed using the politics-building tool to. Hagwall expands the theme of Wihberg and Fransson even more. Hagwall here assigns a negative value to “ambitious” climate policies, since she states they are “one sided” they do EU a disservice by restricting the union while other parts of the world continue relentlessly. SD is here inviting their audience to assume the situated meaning of EU’s climate policy as self-harming.

Quote number 4 features SD representative Martin Kinnunen in a governmental debate on European energy politics. This appears to be echoed in the last quote from Kinnunen where the situated meaning of renewables energy sources are challenged as Kinnunen argues the existing alternatives are not good enough. Discourse analysis tool application, Sverigedemokraterna sub-question 3 Summary In the figured world of SD’s relationship toward climate issue related policies of the EU, the union’s all encompassing approach is dismissed. There seems to be little traces in the party’s communication of any clashes between the populist will to speak for the people and a the preference for power centralization. Instead the EU is viewed as incapable of seeing the best for the Swedish, and the union’s other inhabitants. In terms of climate policies the diversity, arguably viewed as showing traces of the anti-pluralistic tendency of populism, is seen as an issue. The member states’ prerequisites, in terms of for example energy infrastructure, obstruct a coherent climate policy. Perhaps unsurprisingly the populist negative attitude toward bureaucracy can be distinguished in the continuous argumentation against the EU designed collaborative efforts against climate issues. It manifests as the disbelief not in the union’s capacity to implement its large-scale policies. Rather as disbelief on the union’s capacity to maintain their function. Seen in the summary of the previous sub-question analysis, the elite corrupted by evil intentions but by failing ideas and thus incompetence. As the idea of a union is not possible due to differences between member states being to vast is continuously rejected, SD arguably reinforces their views, that incidentally conforms with the populist definition’s discussion on the concept’s the anti-plural element.

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This results in what the SD argues to be Sweden paying an unjust price. Again the strategy of putting Sweden’s capacities in perspective with other member states argument return. From SD’s perspective it seems the EU can restrict Sweden and its other member states as much as it wants, the real climate perpetrators will not stop what they are doing. Therefore the union’s climate policies affects its own inhabitants, and the Swedish people more than most, in a negative way. Any real differences would require monumental research efforts. In the meantime, the current policies are hurting the union’s market competiveness. It shows however SD does not seem to work toward a Sweden shutting itself of from the outside world. Climate aid is a still a recurring subject, as long as the states themselves decide how and where it goes. Thus the populist perception of a corrupted elite can be distinguished as well as suspicion toward bureaucracy. An interpretation of the origins of this particular version, that of SD’s populist characteristics in their communication toward the EU’s climate politics, links back to the party’s ecological viewpoint: If the EU parliamentary members, and the union in general, is viewed to have no relationship to Sweden it cannot know what is best for the country. Thus they are seen as unworthy. Since there is no link built over time the EU’s influence over Swedish climate policies violates the party’s deeply held value of the Swedish uniqueness. Communicated for instance in the party’s cultural politics and numerous party formulations pledging to preserve the Swedish landscape. A value that seems to influence the party’s view on Sweden’s current climate policies: portraying the country as the admirable forerunner in climate politics. Thus the Swedes (and SD), having built and earned their right to manage the country’s climate: and unworthy and uninitiated influence from the EU disrupts an already initiated, though not perfected, line of climate related politics.

Analysis section 1 United Kingdom Independence Party

The following section compiles the results of applying the discourse analysis tools for UKIP. It follows the analysis outline listed above. UKIP Discourse analysis tool application, sub-question 1

Official party communication – UKIP sub-question 1 1. “UKIP accepts that the world’s climate changes, but we are the first party to take a sceptical stance on man-made global warming claims. We called for a rational, balanced approach to the climate debate in 2008, before the extensive manipulation of scientific data first became clear.

a. (Example of 2010 pledge) ”Ban schools from using global warming propaganda such as Al Gore’s film ‘An Inconvenient Truth” (UKIP Manifesto 2010, 11)

2. “Climate Change” is so last-century. Professor Phil Jones of the Climate Research Unit at the University of East Anglia recognises that there has been no statistically significant warming for fifteen years. In fact over the last century the temperature has increased by only about 0.7° C. Even green guru James Lovelock, inventor of the “Gaia” hypothesis and godfather of environmentalists, has conceded that climate alarmism has been hopelessly over- hyped. He says “Twenty years ago we knew what the climate was doing. Now we don’t”… The slight warming in the last hundred years is entirely consistent with well-established, long- term natural climate cycles — the Roman Optimum, the Dark Ages, the Medieval Warm Period, the Little Ice Age. And now we seem to be moving into a new, natural 21st century optimum. There is simply no need to appeal to CO2 as an explanation for natural variation.” (UKIP keeping the lights on 2015, 3)

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Official party communication analysis – UKIP sub-question 1 Quote number 1 is taken from UKIP’s 2010 election manifesto. It is chosen as typical example of UKIP’s communicative style and as introduction to the party’s approach to subject of climate change related research. It will be analysed using the situated meaning tool to. The 2010 manifesto quote UKIP starts out with challenging the situated meaning of climate change being induced by human involvement. This is shown by the opening line, in combination with the remark on “extensive manipulation”. It should be noted the particular quote contains no answer to whom stands behind the manipulation and why. The “extensive manipulation” and “green propaganda” of “people like Al Gore” remarks arguably conforms with Rooduijn et al’s discussion on populist suspicious attitude toward certain societal groups: although without an anti-plural element. Rather it the general meaning of an autonomous scientific community is challenged, implying it is corrupted by influential outside influences.

Quote number 2 is from UKIP’s in-depth energy and climate policy document keeping the lights on from 2015. It is chosen as an extensive example of UKIP’s view on issues of global warming. It will be analysed using the politics-building tool to discuss how UKIP builds legitimacy research to support its own claims.

Keeping the lights on significantly expands the questioning seen in quote number 1 by citing scientists who seem to express climate change scepticism. Notably James Lovelock, who UKIP address in what could be argued as ambivalent wording: “green guru” and “climate alarmism”. Through this, the document creates the ambivalence by destroying the social good of environmentalism, labelling it as exaggerated hype. At the same time, it builds the social goods of global warming as it is stated to be part of a “well established, long term natural climate cycles”. Furthermore the populist negative attitude toward technical jargon can be distinguished. Instead of destroying social goods of the scientific community by stating it is an elite lap dog: the quote attacks the social good of the existence of man-made climate change. It seems citing professor Jones and Lovelock is meant to build the social good of a perspective stating the legitimacy the threat of man-made climate change is in decline. Thus it seemingly implies the scientific research is morphing a propaganda tool of the elite.

Newspapers – UKIP sub-question 1 ¨ “The climate bugaboo, the strangest intellectual aberration of our age, rampages because in the me and now we have cast aside three once-universal forms of learning that gave us perspective: a Classical education, to remind us that in reason and logic there is a difference between true and false; a scientific education, to show us which is which; and a religious education, to teach us why the distinction matters… One of the two ancient principles of natural justice long recognised in British law is audiatur et altera pars. Hear the other side too. It’s certainly cheaper, and it’s probably right.” (Monckton Telegraph, 2010/12/17) ”

Newspapers analysis, UKIP sub-question 1 This quote features former UKIP representative viscount Christopher Monckton’s debate article on the alleged climate bugaboo. It provides an insight into what is arguably an example highly convinced climate scepticism. To facilitate this insight the figured world tools is applied in order to take on the perspective of Monckton and UKIP.

Monckton builds a figured world in which man made climate change worries clouds the sensibility of its followers, effectively out-competing the “once-universal forms of learning”. In terms of populism, the quote corresponds partially with Mouffe’s worries on populist political actors rejects their competitors right to participate in processes, and in this example the worry is pictured from UKIP’s perspective. That is Monckton does not view those who

31 Wageningen University, academic year 14/15 Department of CPT believe in the idea man made climate change to speak from a legitimate point of view, but rejects their view as delusional.

Video material – UKIP sub-question 1

1 ”We've argued from the start that the science wasn't settled, and we've argued very strongly that the measures we're taking to combat what may or may not be a problem are damaging our citizens… It is time to stop this stupidity and to help you [holds up colour pictures] there is the NASA photograph last August of the northern icecaps. And there are the NASA photographs this year of the icecaps. They increased by 60% in one year. Leading American scientists are now saying we are going into a period of between 15-30 years of global cooling. We may have made one of the biggest stupidest collective mistakes in history by getting so worried about global warming. You can reverse this in the next seven or eight months. You can bring down peoples' taxes. If you don't, they will vote on it in the European elections of next year.” (Farage, 11/9/2013)

2 “Scientists will say whatever they paid to say… Nick you are a child of the 1970’s you remember when we where at school we where told we were heading into an ice age. And scientists they flip flop than any politician ever has… We go the wonderful resources of the Internet…Use your own common sense. Get out there, do your own research and think for yourself. Don’t take anyone’s word for it… Go out there find your own answers… Don’t let people like Al Gore tell you well the debate has been settled. No more discussion on this subject has been settled, I’m right and you’re wrong. This is seriously how I see the situation I certainly know for a fact that covering Wales in wind farms will not stop global warming. “ (Gill, 14/04/2015)

3 “I’m one of the few not to foam at the mouth and howl at the moon when we talk about so called man- made global warming. If we take the globe around the past 100 00 years what we see is massive changes and indeed a global cooling trend. Considering the evidence… Don’t you think we’re a tad bit presumptuous and even egotistical to think that man can alter the climate? “ (Nutalli 13/1/2013)

Video material analysis – UKIP sub-question 1 Quote number 1 feature Nigel Farage in an example of his characteristically flamboyant communication style in a state of the union speech. Farage’s speech is addressed to former head of EU Commission José Manuel Barrosso. The quote is chosen as an example of the UKIP party leader’s communication on the subject. It will be analysed using the situated meaning tool to distinguish UKIP’s view on the general consensus on man made climate change, specifically global warming.

In short, Farage challenges the situated meaning of the magnitude of a global warming issue. Using the NASA photographs as prop for proof for support, he shows his and UKIP’s expectations on global warming differ from the commissions’. Arguing the consensus on man made climate is breaking Farage challenges the situated meaning of the scientific community’s trustworthiness. However in terms of the Mudde’s populist perception of working against a corrupted elite, not because it is controlled by non-scientific elite interests, but because Farage argues the community is simply not consistent enough it its communication regarding the existence of climate change. If the community is not sure on man made climate change, it should not be allowed influence political processes to this extent, since it possibly induces “one of the biggest stupidest collective mistakes in history”.

Quote number 2 comes from BBC’s program Meet the leaders and consists of an interview with UKIP Wales leader Nathan Gill. The quote is chosen as example of how UKIP uses the perspective of changes of over time as in their communication on climate issues. It will be analysed using the identities building tool to discuss how UKIP views the scientific community’s legitimacy. It will also be analysed using the situated meaning tool to discuss a

32 Wageningen University, academic year 14/15 Department of CPT recurring argument regarding research on climate change that uses the perspective of time to its advantage.

The audience is invited to assume an interesting identity. Stating scientists “will say whatever they paid to say and flip flop more than any politician ever has”, is arguably a an attempt to destroy the social good of the scientific community by portraying it as simply a tool steered by those have enough resources. Furthermore Gill’s comment to show Nick Servini “you remember when we where at school we where told we were heading into an ice age.” should be noted. It shows a figured world in which climate change as a social issue does not necessarily have to been an issue unless socially recognized and communicated as such. Thus when Nathan Gill invites the audience an identity, it is an identity of critical people it could be interpreted as people using the Internet gaining the ability to cut through biased communication regarding climate change. Furthermore Gill challenges the situated meaning of the consensus on climate change, in particular global warming, by putting its existence in an imagined timeline. Referring to the time before warnings of global warming existed, the legitimacy is questioned.

Quote number 3 features UKIP MEP Paul Nutalli questioning commissioners designate Janez Potočnik regarding the existence of climate change. The quote is chosen because it is a voiced example obviously based from the Keeping the lights on document. It will be analysed using the identities building tool to distinguish further how UKIP relates to the idea of man-made climate change.

Nutalli’s comment on recognizing climate change as man-made or at least influenced by man being “a tad bit presumptuous and even egotistical” could be interpreted as assigning an identity to climate change supporters. An identity over-estimating the influence humanity has on the climate. It seems possible distinguishing another version of the populist suspicion toward technical jargon: here manifested in a similar manner as the argument of the time perspective described above. This time humanity is put in perspective against the forces of nature: argued to be too great for humans to influence, a statement which also contains a techno-hostile element.

Audio material – UKIP sub-question 1

“Head of UKIP Wales Nathan Gill: We don’t agree that man is responsible for climate change, we think its hubris. We also think that its you know. Governments have realized that this is a great way of taxing people and people will just say thank your for taxing us because you’re going to save the world.

Interviewer: You say its hubris. Hubris how, hubris by scientists?

Hubris to think that we’re changing the climate at all. A volcano eruption will produce more c02 than man has ever been able too” (Gill, BBC Sunday Supplement, 12/4/2015)

Audio material analysis – UKIP sub-question 1 The quote is taken from radio interview with UKIP Wales’ leader Nathan Gill. It is chosen since it is directly connected to the previous meet the leaders debate quote also featuring Gill. It will be analysed using the identities-building tool to interpret the mental structures behind this line of reason. Gill continues his reasoning in a manner similar to that of Nutalli. Stating it is hubris of humanity to assigning itself the identity of a force powerful enough to influence the climate. It also shows characteristics of Knigge’s discussion on anti-systemic tendencies: Where elite politicians seize the opportunity to earn money from a duped people through climate change related tax.

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Discourse analysis tool application, UKIP sub question 1 summary

Because UKIP openly states it rejects the idea of man-made climate change, a complicated relationship to the scientific community and research on climate issues seems inevitable. However, UKIP can obviously not refrain to simply denying, but is forced to elaborate its views. Therefore the party seems to take on an identity of a sensible alternative questioning the authority of the scientific community. A plausible interpretation of can be derived from the populist preference to centralize power and the sceptic attitude toward technical jargon: In some examples above, such as the Nathan Gill interview, the scientific community is assigned an autonomous elite status. In others it is viewed as a tool of other influential actors. Thus when the scientific community communicates on the risks of climate change, UKIP reacts by portraying it as a corrupted elite. When UKIP calls for a rational approach to climate policies it can be interpreted as taking a stand. The party shows it does not trust the scientific community and does not approve of its influence on political decision-making processes: even more its influences the people. The sceptic attitude toward scientific communication manifests in the various communicative ways in which UKIP creates a distance between humanity and nature. By portraying man as fickle against the natural cycles, the party’s representatives communicate that humanity should leave nature be, as it is simply to large to comprehend much less influenced. Farage, Gill and Nutalli all echo this and seem to combine three main arguments: Climate change is real, but it is a natural process continuing regardless of and unaffected by human activity. Secondly the scientific community claiming the opposite is because it is paid or ordered to do so, by influential actors. Finally, the resulting hysteria, and policies based on the science hurts the people as preventive actions hurt them the most.

Discourse analysis tool application, UKIP sub-question 2

Official party communication – UKIP sub-question 2

1. ” In 2009 over 4 million households in England were classified as being in fuel poverty: that is, spending over 10% of their disposable income on fuel… As a result of “green” policies, DECC’s24 own predictions show that by 2020 households on the lowest incomes can expect to see their energy bills increase further, pushing even more people into fuel poverty.” (Keeping the lights on 2015, 8)

2. (Climate pledge example from UKIP manifesto of 2010) Repeal the UK’s Climate Change Act and return to a Department of Energy ”(UKIP Manifesto 2010, 11).

Official party communication analysis – UKIP sub-question 2 Quote number 1 is taken from the Keeping the lights on document. It is chosen because it describes a recurring concept in UKIP’s communication: Fuel poverty. The quote will be analysed using the situated meaning tool to tap further into how UKIP communicates their climate political intentions. Using the sarcastic tone, often seen in UKIP communication, for example the sentence “As a result of “green” policies…” arguably shows a challenge of the situated meaning of the benefits of green policies of the British government and other parties, as they are argued to put unreachable demands on the people. The quote arguably shows UKIP positioning itself on the British people’s side facing an elite that implements politics ending up hurting the oppressed people.

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Quote number 2 is taken from UKIP’s 2010 manifest. This is the first time this pledge surfaces and it remains in the latter manifestos as well. The quote will be analysed using the situated meaning tool to discuss the origins of this pledge. Continuously argued by the party to be the single most costly climate related policy of the British government (in collaboration with the EU) the UK Climate Change Act appears to be a prime target for when UKIP challenges what they perceive as the situated meaning of climate change. The act consistently receives criticism for being the extremely costly, while of course being implemented to counter a threat UKIP does not acknowledge. It seems to have become a symbol of political institutional failure for UKIP, and can be viewed as an example of the populist preference for streamlining political processes.

Newspapers – UKIP sub-question 2

1. (UKIP Climate change spokesman in pre-election of 2010 interview) ” Viscount Monckton of Brenchley, the UKIP climate change spokesman, said his party was the only opportunity to vote against the climate change consensus. At the moment all the major parties have decided to sign up to the eco- fascist agenda and therefore anyone who does not believe in eco-fascist agenda has no where else to go," he said.” (Gray, Telegraph, 2010).

2. The Conservatives failed here because traditional Tory voters look at Cameron and ask themselves: is he a Conservative? He is talking about gay marriage, wind turbines, unlimited immigration from India, he wants Turkey to join the EU." And they conclude, no, he is not. This was not the first time that Farage has cited support for wind power among the major criticisms of Cameron. On Radio 4's Any Questions last October, the UKIP leader attacked Cameron for "this loopy idea that we can cover Britain in ugly disgusting ghastly windmills and that somehow our future energy needs will come from that" (Ward, Guardian, 4/3/2013)

Newspapers analysis – UKIP sub-question 2 Quote number 1 features former UKIP climate spokesman viscount Christopher Monckton giving a statement in the Daily Telegraph. It is featured to discuss UKIP’s view of itself and its competitors in relation to climate change politics. It will be analysed using the figured world tool. In this figured world of UKIP: viscount Monckton, former UKIP climate change spokesman portrays competing major parties as a suppressing power. Supporting the climate change consensus is portrayed not as voluntary but coercion. Populist disdain for elite actors, with special regard to politicians can be distinguished. Thus UKIP views itself as the alternative standing outside of the establishment, arguably conforms with Mudde’s populist view of being the voice of the oppressed.

Quote number 2 comes from a Guardian article on UKIP’s view of its British mainstream party competitors. It will be analysed using the situated meaning tool to pinpoint an example UKIP’s main points of criticism against them. It appears Farage invites his audience to view Cameron and his party advocating policies that are no longer in line with the conservative party’s values. Judging by the material represented by this quote, wind turbines holds a particularly unpopular place in UKIP’s communication. They seem to have become a symbol for much of what the identity the party built is opposed to. And here Farage’s comment shows this by opposing any general meaning of wind power as a desirable energy source. What is noteworthy is the delivery and placement in the quote. When Farage lists Cameron’s actions moving away him from traditional conservative values: wind power represents a violation as severe as free immigration and gay marriage, both opposed by UKIP.

Video material – UKIP sub-question 2

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“(Nigel Farage in pre-election Ask the Leaders debate where audience members ask questions to party leaders) Audience member: You’re going to pay for care of the elderly by creating a sovereign wealth fund from shale gas extraction, despite the fact that it is unsafe. Would you like to clarify?

Farage: What we’re trying to do is find a solution to the problem. Look lets celebrate the fact that we live longer all right? Let’s not talk about it as being a horrible burden. Lets find a way of dealing with it and paying for it. When the Norwegians started an exploration in the late 1960’s there were many that said don’t do it it can cause an environmental disaster. We at the same time did it too but the difference is that what the Norwegians did was to take a little bit of tax from those oil revenues and put them into a sovereign wealth fund from which now they fund elderly care. We’re putting together something similiar…” (BBC Ask the leaders 2015)

Video material analysis – UKIP sub-question 2 The quote is taken from an episode of BBC’s Ask the Leader and features Nigel Farage who received this only question connected to climate issues, it is featured in its complete form. The quote is chosen as an example of UKIP communication with civilians and quick responses. It will be analysed using the politics-building tool to investigate how Farage defended UKIP’s pledged policies.

The question likely draws inspiration from UKIP’s 2015 Manifesto in which the party, inspired by the Norwegian model, pledges to engage in shale gas fracking on British soil tax the revenues and create a sovereign wealth fund to spend on policies such as care for the elderly (UKIP Manifesto 2015 39). Farage, who found himself in a relatively hostile context, responded to the comment by seemingly attempting to build up the social good of shale gas fracking. Showing its potential benefits, pointing toward the Norwegian example, in the form of tax revenues Farage sums up by referring to a vulnerable group of society: the elderly. One could as a tendency to downplay climate risks of shale gas fracking as well as fossil fuel dependency. Finally by instead highlighting the benefits for the people, we see can distinguish a populist tendency to tie policies back to a disregarded people. Farage’s response could be viewed as an attempt to evoke an identity as a party with enterprising strategies for the people: while demonstrating the utility of shale gas extraction i.e. a fossil fuel.

Audio material – UKIP sub-question 2

...I think that it is pure stupidity to think that by sticking a bunch of wind turbines all over Wales that we’re somehow going to stop the wind from blowing… (Gill, BBC Sunday Supplement, 12/4/2015)

Audio material analysis – UKIP sub-question 2 The quote features UKIP Wales leader Nathan Gill discussing the existence of global warming and UKIP’s climate policies. It is chosen as another example of the party’s harsh communication regarding the use of wind turbines. It will be analysed using the situated meaning tool. We also see how UKIP challenges the situated meaning, Gill’s comment created much of man-made global warming by continuing to communicate it is a natural phenomenon. Discourse analysis tool application, UKIP sub question 2 Summary

It is fairly logical UKIP’s view on the scientific community in relation to climate issues would influence its view on policies influenced by said community. UKIP’s British mainstream party competitors, the adversarial elite, is therefore portrayed as: greedy, acting irrationally through fear not pursing policies that could solve their issues or simply incompetent. The greed aspect is shown by remarks on how British political elites capitalize on the people’s fear by increasing taxes. By believing in and attempting to counter act climate

36 Wageningen University, academic year 14/15 Department of CPT change, the British government pursues irrational policies, i.e. wind turbines, which hurts the people by creating fuel poverty. This leads to UKIP perceiving their competitors as incompetent. It is important noticing UKIP argues the government is forcing belief in climate change (particularly global warming) on the people, almost subjecting them to a dogma. It seems the party is convince the people’s voice would disagree with the government’s view on climate issues should the be given the opportunity. The corrupted elite, the British government and other mainstream parties, has created a situation where it prevents itself from solving the situation: which would partially be done through the use of fossil fuels. It could be interpreted the continuous advocating for fossil fuels derives from the fuels being a key to UKIP’s implementation of its own policies, for example the shale gas tax revenue fund. Discourse analysis tool application, UKIP sub-question 3

Official party communication – UKIP sub-question 3

”End wasteful EU and UK subsidies to ‘renewable energy scams’, windsuch asturbines and solar farms” (UKIP Manifesto 2010, 11)

”UKIP will abolish green taxes and levies and withdraw from the EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme, reducing fuel bills and enhancing industrial competitiveness at a stroke.” (UKIP Manifesto 2015, 40)

”At the same time we’re sleep-walking into an energy supply crisis as Brussels forces us to close perfectly good coal-fired power stations. We have set ridiculous targets for renewable capacity, which can’t be met, and we’re failing to provide the necessary back up — so when the wind drops, the lights will go out. Meantime families and pensioners suffer as energy prices rise relentlessly. It’s time for a re-think — on energy, and on the EU. This energy crisis offers the clearest possible confirmation that we’d be Better Off Out.” (UKIP Keeping the lights on 2015, 16)

…The problem, as usual, is the EU. We cannot restore the UK coal industry as long as we are bound hand-and- foot by the climate alarmists and green zealots in Brussels.” (UKIP Keeping the lights on 2015, 14)

Official party communication analysis – UKIP sub-question 3 Quote number 1 comes from UKIP’s 2010 manifesto. It is chosen as an example of the party’s view of the EU’s climate policies. The quote will be analysed using the politics - building tool to distinguish more on how UKIP addresses said policies. Here UKIP arguably seeks to destroy the social good of renewable energy sources: wind and solar power. Subsidising them is labelled as wasteful it is implied they demand more than they give.

Quote number 2 comes from UKIP’s 2015 manifesto. The quote is chosen as a continuation of quote-number 1’s argument. The quote will be analysed using the politics-building tool for the same reason as quote number 1. In this quote the social good of “EU’s emissions trading scheme“ is attacked as it is argued to obstruct industrial growth. Together the quotes arguably show characteristics of the populist preference for a centralized state, as leaving the EU would enhance the British market competiveness.

Quote number 3 comes from UKIP’s Keeping the Lights on energy policy document of 2015. The quote is chosen since it provides insight into UKIP’s perspective on EU’s influence over the UK. It will be analysed using the identities building tool and situated meaning tool in combination to discuss UKIP perspective on the effects of the EU’s climate policies.

In the quote, the British people are assigned a somewhat unsuspecting and obedient identity when UKIP states, “we are sleep-walking” into an energy crisis. Furthermore the Keeping the lights on document concludes unreachable targets has been set for the England’s renewable

37 Wageningen University, academic year 14/15 Department of CPT energy capacity. This reasoning regarding EU climate policies creating an energy crisis represents a significant theme of critique in UKIP’s communication: a challenge the situated meaning of renewable energy as climate friendly energy sources. Two non desirable social goods recurrently are communicated shown to support this conclusion: they are not able to maintain a reliable supply since wind and solar is argued to be unreliable energy sources, here shown as “we’re failing to provide the necessary back-up — so when the wind drops, the lights will go out.“ Furthermore this unreliability will cause distress for the British people, portrayed here as “families and pensioners”. Furthermore the party assigns the EU an identity of “climate alarmists and green zealots”. Again one distinguishes the wish for a centralization of power, in this case by returning it to the British government by leaving the EU. Furthermore the ongoing victimisation of the people conforms with the populist view of itself as a voice of an oppressed people.

Video material – UKIP sub-question 3

1 ”Yesterday in this Chamber I had a sharp exchange with our colleague Mr Claude Turmes. He believes that the recent flood tragedy in Sardinia was caused by climate change, and therefore that those of us who argue against man-made global warming are somehow responsible. I told him the disaster was caused by the weather, it turns out we were both wrong…. He (the Sardinian mayor) blames the EU's Stability & Growth Pact, which has denied Sardinia the funding it needs to manage its watercourses. The flood in Sardinia was caused not by Global Warming, but by a failure to dredge the river… Mr President: The House, and Mr Turmes, may like to note that natural disasters can have much more mundane and down-to-earth causes than Global Warming.” (Helmer, 21/10/2013)

2 (UKIP Nigel Farage talking to former president of the European commission José Manuel Barroso during a State of the Union debate in European Parliament)” But it's the green agenda that I find really more interesting. You keep telling us that climate change is an absolute top priority, and you've been greeted with almost hysteria in this place over the last ten years. Well, those of us who have been sceptical about this have been mocked, derided, called 'deniers'. We've argued from the start that the science wasn't settled, and we've argued very strongly that the measures we're taking to combat what may or may not be a problem are damaging our citizens. And we've been proved to be right. Tens of millions forced into fuel poverty, manufacturing industry being driven away because of course our competitors in China and in America are going for cheap fossil alternatives and of course wind turbines blighting the landscapes and seascapes of Europe” (Farage 11/9/2013)

3 “The climate refuses to cooperate with forecasts. The figures show that since 1995 global warming has not been happening… The parliament and national governments should concentrate on the practical measures which in periods of austerity are causing events like the Greek revolt” (Reid, 1/28/2015)

Video material analysis – UKIP sub-question 3 Quote number 1 features the party’s energy and climate spokesman Roger Helmer discussing EU’s Programme for environment and climate action, LIFE. The quote is chosen as a sutiable example of UKIP explicitly using its climate change scepticism as an argument in an EU political context. The quote will be analysed using the situated meaning tool and the figured world to analyse how this manifests in the communication. Helmer criticises the idea of man- made climate change through a line of reasoning, which also incorporates critique of the EU bureaucracy. He also seems to challenge the situated meaning of climate change by stating the flood, unfortunate as it is, was caused by “the weather”, a phrasing which appears leave any human involvement out of the equation. Helmer concludes: “natural disasters can have much more mundane and down-to-earth causes than Global Warming”. This provides a rather drastic insight into a figured world in which climate change is viewed as a natural process. Therefore Helmer turns the perspective from the flood disaster into a populist influenced criticism of the EU’s bureaucratic processes.

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Quote, number 2 is taken from a speech in the European parliament in which UKIP leader Nigel Farage forcefully confronts José Barrosso, former president of the European commission on the subject. It is chosen because the clip is the most popular of UKIP’s climate related clips. The quote will be analysed using the situated meaning tool to distinguish how two political leaders engage on climate change. As mentioned, a situated meaning is a specific meaning in a certain context. When Farage states: “those of us who have been sceptical about this have been mocked, derided, called 'deniers'”, it can be interpreted as a recap of what happens to those who challenges the context of the EU parliament’s situated meaning of climate change. The “And we've been proved to be right” remark can furthermore be interpreted an attempt of Farage to evoke a vindictive identity to UKIP. In the scope of the populist definition this can also be viewed as way to the build social good of a perceived struggle against a controlling elite. When Farage states: “the measures we're taking to combat what may or may not be a problem are damaging our citizens. “, this can be interpreted as the actual result of the parliaments belief in this situated meaning. It is a variant of the populist idea of an elite causing damage to its people by restricting itself belief in climate change. In short: this figured world shows a European parliament pursuing unnecessarily strict climate policies that causes fuel poverty while lowering EU market competitions as heavy industries move out the union.

Quote number 3 features UKIP MEP Julia Reid on a roadmap in the face of an upcoming climate meeting in Paris. It is chosen because it is the most recent (since the thesis material was collected) UKIP clip on the climate. The quote will be analysed using the situated meaning tool and the politics-building tool in combination to gain more understanding of the party’s 2015 climate communication. Reid continues the argument regarding anti climate change policies being a source of resource waste. Reid seems to destroy the social good of the EU’ pursuing its climate policies. Similar with Farage’s statement, Reid seems to question the situated meaning of climate change. Thus, EU’s resources spent on climate change policies could be better spend, as Reid argues: “periods of austerity are causing events like the Greek revolt”. Here we can arguably perceive an populist view of an elite corrupted by its own incompetence, diverting its attention from actual issues such as the Greek crisis.

Audio material – UKIP sub-question 3

”We do not want Brussels making 75% of our laws and the people of Britain agree with that… We want to stop this massive (green) subsidy culture that is basically making landowners wealthy... Lets make it so that our businesses in Europe has to pay extra 40% for the cost of energy when that’s the major cost of manufacturing in Europe putting us out of the competition with the rest of the world… We know that the prime minister’s father is getting I think believe its about 180000 a year from having some wind turbines… from of our most vulnerable dying because of the weather ” (Gill, Sunday Supplement, 12/4/2015)

Audio material analysis – UKIP- sub-question 3 The quote features UKIP wales leader Nathan Gill talking in the BBC podcast Sunday Supplement. It is chosen as an example of UKIP discussing the outcome of EU’s climate policies. It will be analysed using the figured world tool to discuss what Gill and UKIP actually thinks motivates these policies. Gill argues EU influence over British laws results in a failing energy supply. As show by an earlier quote from this podcast episode, Gill already stated it is hubris of man to believe in humans affecting the climate. In a matter of fact tone Gill shows a figured world in which EU’s inclination to support and subsidize green energy sources. This allegedly hurts the people, the “most vulnerable” while making the “landowners” rich.

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Discourse analysis tool application, UKIP sub-question 3 Summary Due to the core of UKIP’s core value as a Eurosceptic party, this section provides significant amounts of material. As shown in previous sections, UKIP representatives frequently question the existence of man-made climate change. Simply put the EU implements policies to counter a phenomenon UKIP does not believe in. To a party built on rejection of the supranational influence of the EU, this naturally reinforces tension. Thus the populist perceived adversarial relationship toward the elite is arguably established. When not criticising the union’s very existence, UKIP seems to view it as too preoccupied with countering the mirage of climate change, it ends up hurting its own citizens. Of course the hardships of the British people is the usual example of this, with the recurring worries of fuel poverty as an example. But as Reid and Helmer’s comments shows the party seems to spot EU violations toward its people in many places. This interpretation can again be tied back to the corrupt elite versus the pure people from Mudde’s definition of populism. By pursuing its anti climate change policies the EU is argued to be creating an unreliable and costly energy grid which lowers the union’s (and the UK’s) market competitiveness as companies move their business elsewhere. Meanwhile elite representatives, as argued by Gill, gain resources through green policies for example by receiving subsidy money and taxes.

An interpretation of the official party communication is that UKIP perceives green “zealots” design the EU’s climate policies. Zealots who Farage claims, in his speech against Barrosso, responds aggressively to those who question their views. Objections against the EU’s climate policies, commonly referred to by UKIP representatives as “the green agenda” seems to viewed a political standpoint forbidden by the EU: meaning UKIP views itself as under attack. At the same time, a great challenge to the communication between the two derives from UKIP’s core policy, leaving the union. This because one can interpret the party’s communication as characterized by Mouffe’s discussion on antagonists and adversaries. The EU is not acknowledged by UKIP, its influence rather viewed as a grave intrusion of national sovereignty. Therefore the party arguably perceive the union’s climate policies not only as harmful to the people, but also as illegitimate. In terms of Mudde’s relationship between the pure people and the corrupted elite, the tensions in this section are thus extremely high.

Analysis section 2 - Communicative themes comparison

This section will compare the results from applying Gee’s discourse analysis tools. The section’s purpose is to discuss prominent communicative patterns and similarities and differences between them using Fischer’s interpretative approach and connect the discussion to the thesis populist definition. It is relevant to highlight the extent to with the populist characteristics seems to influence the parties’ communication in order to provide more substance in answering the research questions. To facilitate the comparison the section uses Linder’s framework to categorize and highlight elements of the parties’ communication. Each comparison of discourse analysis results will be designed as follows: Prominent arguments, communicative themes, distinguished in the discourse tool analysis section will be categorized using the framework, and summarized in the figures using keywords. The comparison follows the same outline as the discourse tool analysis meaning the results from each sub-question will be analysed to its equivalent i.e. UKIP results from sub question 1 will be compared to SD’s results from sub-question 1.

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Communicative themes comparison - Sub-question 1 results

Sub Question Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Category 4 1 Ambigios to man Rational, Exaggarated, Benighted SD made, definetley questioning sometimes false sometimes docile exaggerated

Preserving Research on E.G. Provide unbiased SD EMBEDDED landscape, clean renewables and Carbondioxide is info energy supply nuclear power not dangerous

Propaganda, Rejects man Rational, Duped, many UKIP controlled and made, entierly confronitative suffering exaggareted natural Expand fossil fuel E.G. Global Trying to expose Provide unbiased extraction, warming is UKIP EMBEDDED green agenda, info Encourage ensure energy consistent with green zealots etc criticicism supply natural cycles

Sub-question 1 Category 1 – Nature of argumentative appeals

Communicative similarities In the interplay of the two parties and their perceived struggle against elite, the scientific community has a complicated role. A role that appears not be set but contested both within the party’s communication, and so their worldviews, and in what they attempt to communicate to their audiences. In some cases the community is assigned autonomous interests, although rarely interests with the average citizens best in mind. In others it is viewed as a tool of control of the elite. An interpretation of this would be scientists can capitalize on the people’s fear by providing the political apparatus with custom-made research results, see for example UKIP’s pledge to stop Al Gore’s green propaganda Overall both parties, although each coming from their own perspective, communicate a larger theme regarding how climate change is framing as an issue. In the parties’ perspective it becomes a burden to the people. Thus it becomes a clash of interpretations. A clash where SD and UKIP recognizes an issue in the manner their adversaries recognize climate change as a problem.

A prominent similarity between the parties in their communication toward the scientific community and research on climate related issues are their calls for rationality against in a perceived hysteria. Both parties, albeit to different degrees, believe scientific claims regarding the threats of climate change are exaggerated. SD questions scientific communication’s apocalyptic characteristics, which can be interpreted, as the party implying there is some legitimacy presented in an unnecessarily dark manner. UKIP on their part confronts what they believe to be consciously exaggerated threats, designed to secure implicit interests such as increased green taxes. This is can arguably conform to the populist disdain for complicated technical jargon. Because the climate issue is so complicated, the scientific communication becomes complicated as well, and so the skills needed to interpret it becomes a skill monopolised by the elite.

Communicative differences

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A prominent difference is the parties’ explicit stance on the existence of man-made climate change. SD maintains an ambiguous non-defined stance, meaning the party does not openly state it does not exist. This is important since it arguably affects the resulting communication. It could be the stance originates from the party’s self-proclaimed profile as ecological. Meaning that although SD does not subscribe to the scientific community’s opinion on the magnitude of climate change, it cannot reject it entirely because the will to protect and preserve the Swedish landscape remains a fundamental value. Thus opposing for example scientific warnings on excessive fossil fuels would be a hard blow to the party’s credibility. Therefore, while it is arguably highly sceptic and insinuating SD’s communication leaves the ultimate decision on whether man-made climate change exists or not to its audience.

This differentiates from UKIP’s solid view of the scientific community as a propaganda machine. To UKIP there is a direct correlation between the scientific community and research on climate change’s influence on environmental politics and a suffering British (and to some extent European) people. Most prominently then, the community is an obstacle to energy safety.

Sub-question 1 Category 2 - Treatment of scientific claims

Communicative similarities As mentioned both parties’ host doubts toward the scientific claims on climate change. Doubts that is arguably a strong example of the populist dislike for technical language. In what seems to be a perceived as a continuous loop of exceedingly outrageous claims, the parties states the actual facts and the resulting fear of these scenarios has become indistinguishable from each other. In short, the parties believe the claims are not genuine, in the sense that the harmful climate scenarios they present are not obtained using objective research processes.

Communicative differences UKIP’s communication openly treats the scientific claims as propaganda. Using terms as eco- fascism and green agenda the party seems to view the claims only as political tools of the elite, obstacles to their embedded desire to extract fossil fuels. The scientific claims on climate change contributing to the green agenda. Differentiating from UKIP’s solid view of the scientific community as an obstacle to energy safety: SD’s earlier mentioned ambiguous stance is most likely influenced by the fact that SD also puts considerable amounts of trust to the scientific community. SD needs the community’s skills in a way UKIP does not. It is the key to SD’s vision of a oil-dependency free Sweden, made possible by extensive research on improved nuclear power, and to some extent hydro power.

Sub-question 1 Category 3 - Rhetoric image of the people

Communicative similarities In the case of this sub-question and category, neither party’s communication contains many direct references to their respective countries citizens. In one quote SD surprisingly refers to the people as benighted and at the mercy of whoever provides and interprets the scientific community’s information for them, possibly another example of the party’s wariness toward scientific communication as an example of elite control.

Communicative differences

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Like SD UKIP have few direct references to the British people in this sub-question and category. The most prominent one differs from SD’s remark by instead encouraging the British people to do their own research, essentially standing up against the elite propaganda.

Sub-question 1 Category 4 - Image of environmental issue

Communicative similarities Both parties’ has an image of the magnitude of climate change being exaggerated to be used as a political tool by the elite. And also as a socially constructed problem of the elite: Although some climate effects can be perceived, the image of the magnitude is controlled and maintained by the elite, consisting of either the political elite in collusion with the scientific community, by the former controlling the latter or vice versa. An interpretation is that the populist traits distinguished in the previous section create an inherent doubt toward agreeing with dominant social meanings. This could in turn restrict the parties to grant the generally established credibility assigned to the scientific consensus on man made climate change. In other words, agreeing with what the research consensus existence of man made climate change their competing parties, and the EU, believe means agreeing with the elite. Naturally SD cannot fully control the context they operate in, and this would be an example of how they might have restricted themselves and subsequently their communication. This interpretation would correspond Fischer’s discussion regarding the potential conflict conflicts derived from juxtapositions created when an actor reacts to another actors positioning in an issue.

Communicative differences UKIP openly rejects of man-made climate change, arguing human activities are simply too futile to influence the climate in any way. If climate change is real it is part of natural cycles. Non-man made climate change however is accepted, but consistently put in a time frame where it is argued to be part of natural cycles. The party’s representatives often use communication in which they show pride of their sceptic standpoint. SD is highly sceptic but does not openly reject man-made climate change, but do maintain a highly sceptic stance toward the magnitude of the issues for the reasons stated above.

Communicative themes comparison - Sub-question 2 results

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Sub Category Category Category Category Question 1 2 3 4 2 Following Nuclear power Victims of Too big for good SD current climate Sweden to conservative renewables principle policies make such desirable sacrificies Informing in Restore market Stop avant- media, Avant-garde SD EMBEDDED competitivenes garde policies government etc policies do not protect nature work Victims of Aggressive current climate Overwhelming Less of a threat UKIP perplexed policies and exagarrated than current bantering climate policies Informing in Stop current media, Rejecting UKIP climate policies, Increase fossil governent consensus on EMBEDDED end fuel fuels extraction election etc climate change poverty and leave union

Sub-question 2 Category 1 – Nature of argumentative appeals

Communicative similarities Both parties perceive their respective country’s current climate policies are doing more harm than good. Especially in terms of two fields: Market competitiveness and energy supply. Both parties also states their respective climate policies are reducing job opportunities. Arguing the Swedish government has fallen victim to an irrational fear for climate change, SD’s argumentative style is characterised by the conservative principle, which can be interpreted as a counter reaction to a hasty elite. UKIP states the British climate policies are doing the same to its country. Only on a more severe level, as current British energy policies are driving people into fuel poverty. Therefore UKIP’s argumentative style is much more aggressive. Because the party seems to express perplexity on how the British government managed to create the current situation, it consistently constructs argument from an underdog perspective, confronting the elite on their wrongdoings. Viewing their competitors as victims of a frenzy they themselves have contributed to whipping up, SD and UKIP seem to react to the issues of man-made climate change with a to them perceived rationality. Interpreted this way, the parties’ viewing their political adversaries as disconnected from reality, by hysteria or greed profiting from public hysteria, their communicated doubt is more understandable. The parties’ harbours the opinion man-made climate change is not a fact. This arguably conforms to a populist view of politics. Because the scientific community’s legitimacy is already questioned: policies designed on the basis of their truths, can also be viewed as either tools of or mistakes of elite adversaries.

Communicative differences To SD the preservation of the Swedish landscape and biodiversity is vital. It seems the party perceives it to be a part of the people’ s soul. And current governmental policies are threatening the landscape, for example by implementing wind turbines. It seems the objective is to minimize physical changes of the Swedish landscape while ensuring a clean energy supply. Which arguably results in the continuous argumentation for nuclear energy, as it is perceived as the alternative with the least aesthetical impact and maximum energy yield.

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UKIP’s political objective has a more utilitarian character, to stop fuel poverty. Thus its communication seems to lack affectionate references to the landscape. Instead, fossil fuels are heavily communicated as the best alternative, possibly viewed as the most realistic with the largest yield. More than a threatened landscape, UKIP sees a threatened people as a result of unrealistic elite policies. Obviously what places and meanings the parties’ are aspiring to change is affected by their respective contexts. SD communication that includes the Swedish nature seems to be heavily associated with two themes: first, pride over the landscape is a birth right for the Swedish people. In the author’s experience, nature, being in the outdoors and enjoying legally stated free roam of the countryside is deeply embedded in the Swedish cultural identity. This appears to be picked up and incorporated in SD’s communication. Second, the Swedish culture, and with it the right to roam the land is perceived to be under distress from foreign interests.

In order to maintain and preserve its unique character the country must react. And SD attempts to communicate it is the only party to actually recognize and try to counter this. In short, the party’s culture politics recognize the importance of embedding the Swedish natural landscapes, flora and fauna whenever the country’s identity the communicative focus. Perhaps it cannot even separate itself from it, in any case variations of the theme: pride over the Swedish nature arguably remains a recurring theme part of SD’s communication. UKIP seem to lack this salient need to incorporate pastoral descriptions and references to the British landscape in its communication. Instead, communication revolving around British landscapes seems to be more concerned with a perceived waste of opportunities in extraction of fossil energy sources such as shale gas. Opportunities lost due to decisions made by decision makers in a context external to people of the UK. Speculating freely UKIP’s perception of the UK’s landscape bears some traits of the Industrial Revolution. A less romanticized approach to the landscape, and in particular the energy sources it provides, in favour of a more pragmatic could therefore be logical. Perhaps this is again simply a result of the two parties’ contexts. UKIP focuses more on enlightening its audience on the risks of an external influence, the EU.

Sub-question 2 Category 2 -Treatment of scientific claims

Communicative similarities Both parties argue their respective governments designing failing climate policies is heavily influenced by the scientific research it is based on. SD’s main issue is the Swedish avant- garde climate policies and its investments in renewable energy sources. The party argues they are futile and must be dismantled and puts heavy tax strains on the Swedish people. An interesting change part of SD’s manifestos is the change in valuation of Nuclear Power: from referred to as unreliable in 1989 to referred to as the only realistic alternative in the post-1996 manifestos. Perhaps this value conforms with SD’s strive to become oil independency. Nuclear power would effectively restrict outside influence over Swedish energy politics. At the same time, the communicated worry for an erosion of Swedish moral standards, a Swedish identity, communicated in the manifestos and cultural politics has allegedly made their non- supporters pursue inefficient climate policies. This because they spend resources on for example wind power.UKIP criticises the British equivalent investments in renewable energy sources, wind power in particular, also because of the economic costs for the British people. Reinforced numerous by the representatives from both parties this notion has become a recurring larger theme. From the scope of the populist definition, the section of their communication does become more understandable. A distinguishable factor is the dramatization factor. Significant parts of the parties’ communication is concerned with this.

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The parties show doubt toward the communicated potential issues of climate change. The magnitude of the effects is exaggerated, or non-existent, but they provide a pretext to other policies. This means the nature of communicated policy objective is questioned: they are intrinsically used to gain control through rather than assessing a problem.

Communicative differences SD opposes investments in renewable energy sources because the party argues Sweden is already doing so well. It accounts for a small account of the global emissions and no states are following which results in increased taxes to finance futile renewable energy policies. In a sense, Kaid and Holtz Bacha’s populist perception of the detached political elite can be distinguished. UKIP also opposes investments in renewable energy sources but completely ignores emission rates. Instead the party advocates increased extraction of fossil fuels to counter the elite politicians preference for renewables from hurting the people. It is important to notice neither UKIP nor SD wants to eradicate renewable energy sources; they simply view them as unreliable. Although the language and values assigned to renewable energy sources in the party’s communication is negative, it does support a mixed network. UKIP’s fear for fuel poverty and disbelief in man-made climate change combined with their fundamental wish for UK independence therefore motivates a high valuation of fossil fuels. It is in a sense a utilitarian approach motivated by care for the average citizen. What emerges for UKIP is a communication which one of Fisher’s ideological positions. Based around a fierce liberal desire for independence from supranational influences over the British energy industry mixed with populist characteristics it eventually revolves around protecting the British people from irrational climate policies. Another, simpler interpretation could be that UKIP’s worldview simply does not include man-made climate change, making their preference for fossil fuel logical as it is simply designed with maximized energy supply in mind.

Sub-question 2 Category 3 - Rhetoric image of the people

Communicative similarities Possibly deriving from their populist characteristics, viewing themselves as guardians of for and of the people both parties arrive very similar conclusions when it comes to the portrayal of the people. Both parties portray the people as victims of the an incompetent elite’s exaggerated climate policies. To counter this both parties’ use communicative channels, including those analysed in this thesis, to provide what they view as unbiased, or perhaps untainted (by elite interests) information.

Communicative differences However, the paths to the conclusions differ. What characterizes the respective portrayals of the people is the, to some extent perceived, magnitude of the people’s suffering. To SD the people’s issues are prominent, but the party mainly communicates future worst scenarios. For example, the party views the Swedish government’s energy politics as an unnecessary increase of costs for the people: but the focus remain on communicating SD’s vision of the future energy supply, to avoid an steady increase of suffering/increased costs for the people. To UKIP the worst scenario is already happening in the form of fuel poverty inflicting severe damage to the British people. And thus party communicates a will to act in the now to hasten the impact of a disaster that has already happened.

Sub-question 2 Category 4- Image of environmental issue

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Communicative similarities Both parties’ communication essentially downplays threats posed by climate change. Their efforts seem set on shifting focus to on resulting side effect social issues created by their respective government’s climate change policies, viewed as over done as the threat is not as severe. The two main fields of side effect issues are the negative effects on market competitiveness and energy supplies.

Communicative differences SD’s mainly focus on invalidating any benefits of Swedish climate policies, arguing it does not inspire other political actors but simply strains Swedish resources, ruins the landscape and increasing the costs for the people. As UKIP openly rejects the consensus on man-made climate change the party also argues for side-effects inflicting harm on the British people, but of policies designed to counter a falsified threat. Communicative themes comparison Sub-question 3 results

Sub Category Category Category Category Question 1 2 3 4 3 EU Climate Victims, EU Sweden focused Less of a threat policies too climate policies SD , generally EU than external influenced by moves jobs out sceptic of the union effects of EU deciving sciene climate policies Argues for no Reduce EU Reduce science avant garde Sceptic toward influence over influence on SD EMBEDDED policies for Swe consensus on Swedish climate EU/Swedish and EU climate change. policies climate policy Victims EU EU sceptic Propaganda climate policies Aggresive, Less of a threat used for moves jobs out UKIP defiant and than external capitalizing on of union dissapointed effects of EU citizens' fear Pledge to leave climate policies Erradicate its EU restore & Rejecting UKIP Leave the EU as influence on British fracking. consensus on EMBEDDED soon as possible British climate Abolish green climate change policy tax & subsidies and leave union

Sub-question 3 Category 1 Nature of argumentative appeals and warrants

Communicative similarities Both SD and UKIP maintain a EU-sceptic character to their communication and argumentative styles. To UKIP the EU’s climate policies embody the populist perceived corrupt elite. The party’s communication often resorts to three major themes: portraying the union and the EU parliament as corrupted elite acting solely for its own benefit, disregarding its people. This means the union has consciously constructed the social problem of climate change as a man-made extremely dangerous threat. In the other theme, the EU parliament is viewed as illegitimate and incompetent corrupted by fear. However due to it’s established power position the EU parliament still reaps benefits of the people. Finally, as a result of the first two: UKIP argues Britain should leave the EU. SD ‘s share the perception of the EU an elite incapable of designing functioning climate policies due to fear and to, a lesser extent, the

47 Wageningen University, academic year 14/15 Department of CPT view of it as an elite benefitting from the policies. Furthermore the party does communicate Sweden should leave the EU, but not as ferociously as UKIP. Possibly deriving from the aversion toward a ruling elite, a continuous theme in SD’s climate communication is an effort to establish a them and us perspective. This includes an acceptance of climate change, but the primary objective seems to be using differences between member states as an explanation to why climate change policies cannot be designed on a supranational level. In terms of mental structures, this clearly resonates with the party’s culture politics. If the obviously reinforced attitude against cultural differences is extended to include developing climate policies: the party’s arguments against collaborative climate policies but for foreign climate aid become more understandable. It resonates with both cultural politics and the populist definition.

Communicative differences SD’s frequently utilises perspectives and comparisons in its argumentative style. Portraying the EU’s climate policies as malfunctioning because their approach is too broad. I.e. an elite disconnected from reality implements policies that do not take into account variations between its member states capacity to take care of their own climate policies. To SD Sweden is already a forerunner and its government alone posses the local knowledge to design functioning climate policies. Thus SD argues Sweden must repel EU’ influence to stop it from damaging a relatively well-functioning climate policy system. UKIP also believes its own government alone should design it but unlike SD do not highlight differences between member states as an argument against the success of EU climate policies. Instead UKIP declare the union’s policies illegitimate from the start, rendering all EU climate policies to a violation of the member states sovereignty.

Sub-question 3 Category 2 - Treatment of scientific claims

Communicative similarities Both parties object against the scientific influence over the EU’s climate policies. Because of the reasons elaborated in the sub-question 1 section, the claims are viewed as amplifiers of fear resulting in exaggerated and misguided policies. Which ultimately inflict damage on the people, and especially in SD’s view on the landscape. Furthermore, both parties’ describe their own roles as controversial for speaking up against the scientific influence.

Communicative differences Once again the main difference lies in the level of doubt. SD mainly sees a EU that has been carried away by overly agitated scientific claims. UKIP sees the same but also argues the union has a self-interest in maintaining the level of fear as it can seize an opportunity to increase taxes.

Sub-question 3 Category 3 - Rhetoric image of the public

Communicative similarities Both parties assign the people of their countries, and the EU in general, as victims. Victims of unnecessarily harsh climate policies which in the end affect the average citizen negatively. According to the parties, the EU parliament’s determination on countering the threats of climate change spawns policies which does not take into account the social costs, efficient they may be the people’s payment is simply to steep. Apart from increased green taxes, people of the EU will also suffer lowered market competiveness and fewer jobs when companies leave the union and unstable energy supply as unreliable renewables such as wind power increases.

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Communicative differences Although both parties view leaving the EU as the ultimate solution to the end the people’s suffering, UKIP obviously communicates this more frequently being the party’s core policy. Having left the union and ended its influence on British climate (and energy) policy, the party would commence fracking shale gas and increase the use of coal power in order to counter the fuel poverty. SD, most likely deriving from their perception on how Swedish climate policies can and should be uninfluenced by outside interests, are less definitive. Instead the party appears to focus on reducing the union’s influence for the moment, in order to lower green taxes on what it views as useless energy alternatives, mainly solar and wind power. Then implement its political process to increase Swedish nuclear power.

Sub-question 3 Category 4 - Image of environmental issue

Communicative similarities In this sub-question and category the parties again arrive to very similar conclusions. Although they highlight different aspects of it, some unique to their respective contexts i.e. UKIP’s and Britain’s fuel poverty. Both parties communicate a standpoint stating the threats of climate change, whether viewed as entirely man-made or not, are not more of an issue than the political and social effects the EU’s current climate policies are causing.

Communicative differences In this section there are essentially few differences. As been shown in earlier sections, the differences mainly show in the parties’ policy objectives. One difference lies in the differentiating perspective regarding the EU parliament’s ability to tackle potential threats of climate change. Here UKIP, deriving from its core valuation of the union as illegitimate view the parliaments efforts as unnecessarily zealous or as deceptive means to reach ends that are not truly environmentally connected, such as increasing green subsidies thus extracting more tax money from the people. SD on their part maintains the sceptical view on collaborative climate change efforts in the union, emphasising the benefits of keeping Swedish climate politics within Sweden: as it would create the fairest and best situation for the country.

Comparison Summary In this second analysis section the results from the first section is compared in order to distinguish communicative similarities and differences between the parties. Although they are not the result of any application of the discourse analytical tools: The interpretations of this section are not conjured without support; but derives from the more mechanically results of the first analysis section and provide interpretations to what motivates the parties’ to communicate them. In sum the second analysis section’s function is to increase the understanding of the parties’ communication through the comparison. Furthermore it is to provide analytical space to further apply the interpretative approach.

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Chapter 4 Conclusion and personal reflections Conclusion Born out of interest and concern with the growth of populist parties’ decision making power and influence in Europe: This thesis is a discourse analysis of the climate change related communication of two European populist parties, Swedish Sverigedemokraterna (SD) and the British United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). The main research question of this thesis is:

Can characteristics of populism be found in the parties’ communication on climate issues?

It is designed to discuss on the introductory discussion, what happens when the two chosen parties’ engage in communication regarding one of our times greatest issues: climate change? By applying James Gee’s discourse analysis tools in the first analysis section then comparing and further discussing the results in the second using Linder’s rhetorical framework and Frank Fischer’s interpretative approach: we have arguably found that yes, characteristics of populism can be found the parties’ communication on climate change. The three sub- questions are based on the populist definition created shown in chapter 1. They are used to expand into areas of interest surfacing in the interplay between searching for populist characteristics, the topic of climate change and the direction of the parties’ communicative efforts.

1. If yes, how does this show in the parties’ communication toward the scientific community and research on climate issues? 2. If yes, how does this show in the parties’ communication toward other political actors and the average citizen? 3. If yes, how does this show in the parties’ communication toward the climate issue related policies of the European Union?

In the first analysis section, Gee’s discourse analytical tools are applied to sampled quotes from the two parties in that are categorized after their relation to the three sub-questions. In short, results of the applying the tools to the first sub-question shows the parties’ communication share an element of suspicion toward the scientific community and its research on climate change. Communication directed toward or talking about the community recurrently portrays it as either an elite actor in itself, capitalizing on the average person’s fear of climate change exaggerating the potential dangers of climate change; or as a controlled actor producing the same results for the elite political actors striving to maintain control over the people. In terms of believing in the existence of climate change: SD uses an ambiguous line of arguing while UKIP aggressively denounces any human involvement in it.

Results of the second sub-question shows both parties communication shows characteristics of populism, most prominently on of its fundamental elements: a perceived struggle between a pure people and a corrupted elite. Climate change related policies of other actors are often depicted as misguided, based on false scientific claims, or more outright strategies to

50 Wageningen University, academic year 14/15 Department of CPT exploiting the people through for example tax increase. Both parties, claims they aim for a rational approach to climate change related policies as their political competitors are seen as acting irrationally to tackle exaggerated or non-existent issues climate change.

Results of the third sub-question show the parties’ on the EU’s climate change policies sees them as an elite intrusion. In UKIP’s case leaving the union this is the party’s core policy: and thus it views the union’s climate policies as undesirable and falsified: generally as strategies to increase the union’s political influence over Britain with the result of a suffering British people. SD on their part views EU’s vision of collaborative anti climate change actions in the union as unrealistic. The variations in prerequisites and infrastructure results in a situation where Sweden, already seen as a forerunner in the matter, loses more than it gains on allowing the EU to influence its climate policies: and thus the party shows a desire to decrease the union’s influence over the Swedish climate policies.

In the second analysis section: the results above are discussed more in detail. Using Linder’s framework for comparison communicative similarities and differences in the parties’ discussion are distinguished, and then reflected upon how they came to be. An example of interpretation is the differences in how the parties incorporate their respective country’s landscape in their communication: While much of SD’s communication revolves around the importance of preserving the Swedish landscape and arguably shapes the party’s view on energy politics to emphasising nuclear power as a the best alternative, because of the small visible changes in the Swedish landscape. UKIP on their part sees a suffering British people due to elite mistakes that has resulted in a concept called fuel poverty. To counter this UKIP seemingly renounces the need to preserve the British landscape and emphasises the need to increase fossil fuel extraction in order to counter the more pressing issue of fuel poverty.

Limitations A significant limitation of this thesis is it does not include communicative reactions from other actors than the parties’ themselves. The reason is it the thesis is not designed as such, as it aims to gain a deeper understanding if the parties’ communication contains characteristics of populism. Nevertheless, an analysis of for example debates between the parties’ or similar actors, and other non-populist actors would surely provide much understanding as well. Another limitation derives from the analysis design: it makes for little distinction between the different types of sources. In particular, little has been said regarding the party representatives body language and intonation. This is mainly due to time limitations, finding and including suitable theories would this was not possible within the time frame, but would been an interesting add to the thesis results. Originally it was the author’s intention to conduct interviews with party representatives, but time limitations resulted put an end to it. Although the sources of material provided interesting results, it would arguably add much credibility to the thesis if party representatives could expand on the subject of climate change in person.

Recommendations for future research Derived from the discussion above comes the following three suggestions for future research:

1. Conducting a conversational analysis of interactions and debates between populist and non-populist parties or political actors. In order to understand more on if and how populism manifests when for example parties are subjected to communication that openly rejects their views or even labels them as populist. 2. Conducting a discourse analysis to distinguish chronological changes in the parties communication in relation to the concept of populism. This has been briefly touched

51 Wageningen University, academic year 14/15 Department of CPT

upon in this thesis by referring to Knigge’s discussion on the new and old right wing populism in Europe. However it would arguably be very interesting to expand on what caused changes some standpoints or reinforced others of the parties or similar parties. 3. Conduct interviews with populist party representatives regarding climate change related issues. This to receive a more unofficial, most likely less polished, insight into the worldviews of the growing populist parties in Europe and preferably in other contexts as well.

Personal reflections

Writing this thesis has been a process much longer than I excepted. Despite some years of studying I can still find myself completely lost in the academic process. To build and maintain the structure for a thesis is a challenge. Especially balancing the wild ideas and hopes of uncovering something new and exciting with the vital systematic tools that shape true research. Writing academically is so different from any other type of writing. Still today I find my brain questioning why I cannot just write what I think. Evidently being patient and learning not to give in to the temptation of short cuts is also part of academic writing. That and learning how to write really, really, long sentences. At the same time it is important not to take too long. The writing process has to move on in a steady pace. As my poor eminent supervisor must have noticed, I tend to do the opposite and produce large chunks of text in short periods of time.

But, it is also extremely rewarding. I have learned a lot. Although there are of course rules for how the process and end result should be: that first spark of inspiration of creativity is the author’s very own. As are the decisions, good and bad, made throughout the writing. It took time for me. I really wish I would have understood earlier on that the rules are there to help. The more one knows and accepts the rules of academic writing, the faster the process. Because at least for me, the main issues not been coming up with what to write but how to write it correctly and comprehensibly. It was an early decision this thesis would be concerned with politics. Since the issues of climate change are one of the largest across the board political challenges of our time, it was natural to connect to them. I am of the worrying kind. Many things in life scare me. And because I am convinced humanity is inducing climate change, our actions worries me a lot. Therefore it became increasingly more interesting to investigate those who do not worry about man made climate change. Who openly states it is not even real. People who do express worries about climate change. Instead they are worried of the opposite: that those who believe in climate change will end up hurting people. Some of these people are members of and represent the two parties’ whose communication I have analysed in this thesis.

The two party’s analysed in this thesis harbours political views that makes me very angry. Not only in terms of their beliefs but also due to their communicative styles. Ranging from aggressive bullies to smug instigators these representatives question, contradict and outright deny what I view as blatantly dangerous threats. While much of the political world leaders and a crushing majority of the scientific community agrees on the existence of man made climate change exists, there are those who seem to capitalize on stating the opposite. Perhaps it comes as no surprise my biggest challenge throughout the analysis is this anger. Because the topic is emotional, there has been a latent risk of these emotions affecting the analysis. Although I have used an interpretative approach, it does not allow the researcher to find what

52 Wageningen University, academic year 14/15 Department of CPT she or he wants to find. Plus, I learned the ultimate failure a researcher can do while conducting discourse analysis, is making it seem as if she or he can deduce what the analysed people are thinking. Although I have many times over been extremely frustrated with what I perceive in the material. It has often felt as if I have seen the party representatives true selves and intentions. But even if this was true, I cannot prove it systematically. The biggest threat to this thesis credibility then would be me unintentionally doing this in spite of myself. Another threat is using too many theories, frameworks etc. I have found my writing style to be much like a glacier: huge blocks of text slowly moving forward. Very inflexible. Thus a problem occurs because the topic is so eclectic. Reading the parties’ communication takes through political theory, (pseudo)-environmental science, macroeconomics all in one quote. There is an inherent risk the results could have been taken damage because I did not understand a reference or managed to connect the dots. Not to mention the differences in context. An aspect I fear I should have done much more with. Furthermore, the field of discourse analysis itself has proven to be extremely varied. It quickly becomes complicated to keep the varying approaches apart, especially since so many of them seem so helpful in providing answers. All of this combined has at times made my work overly stressful. During my first master year I took a learning style test, which told me I am an extreme diverger. A diverger is good a coming up with angles for analysis, making connections etc. But divergers have issues with coherence, as her or his mind only lays the first bricks of the fundament before something else comes to mind. This thesis proved that test to be right.

Still. With a lot of help from my highly skilled supervisor, a patient family, endless discussions with my gifted girlfriend and finally a handful of dogs available for long anguish filled walks, this became something. And while I might have some doubts on the thesis structure, I have no doubts in the subject’s relevance. Today in august 2015, SD is now up on 20% of the votes in the latest polls. UKIP is locked in an internal struggle for leadership but is still highly relevant. I hate to say it looks as if they are here to stay. And so is their influence on how people think and talk about climate change. With so much fear of other things out there, I am convinced these parties gain enormously from presenting all their false correlations (for example, both parties states EU’s free immigration is harmful to the climate as illegal immigrants pollute and require housing) as truths. They are like sirens singing a single note. In any case, It would be very interesting to analyse how their communication will evolve from now on. How will a party who consistently portrays itself as the bullied underdog who happens to sit on all the answers reorganize when they are no longer underdogs?

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS To my supervisor Margit van Wessel for your patience and invaluable input. To my family for supporting me whatever came up. To Sara. To the people in and around House Beautylaan for being the springboard of so many ideas. To Wageningen, the tiny village with the enormous ideas. Thank you!

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