Acknowledgements The Georgian security sector is not a well-documented area. Authoritarian systems are not known for the free flow of qualified information, nor for fostering the type of analysis that lends itself to media where information must be in a concentrated form. The editors would like to express their deep gratitude to all those who contributed by writing articles and/or translating and/or shaping some of these articles into publishable entities. They regret that not all articles sent in could be accommodated in this publication, and remain convinced that reforms will eventually make the task of reporting on security sector reform and security sector governance a more joyful and less cumbersome undertaking. The Editors Introduction Georgian Security Sector Governance after the Rose Revolution Philipp H. Fluri and Shorena Lortkipanidze Georgia has been on many an observer’s mind ever since President Eduard Shevardnadze’s regime collapsed. Grave economic and social problems, the “political disillusionment” of the people, grave and ever-increasing systemic corruption and the falsification of the 2003 parliamentary elections eventually led to the “the Rose Revolution” in Georgia – in part by the protégées of Shevardnadze himself. The new Georgian leadership seems to understand the challenges to be addressed in the near future: conducting free, fair and transparent elections (presidential and parliamentary); fighting corruption and organized crime; revamping government institutions and the civil service, which collapsed or withered under Shevardnadze; attracting honest, competent and educated people to the government; delivering pensions, salaries and other social security payments on time; setting the conditions for economic growth and foreign investment to overcome the deep economic crisis (or rather the fact that macro-economic activity in the free market sense hardly exists); managing a difficult relationship with Russia; attempting territorial reintegration while Russian passports are given to inhabitants of the separatist regions. All these tasks need to be addressed on the short term, but will hardly lead to immediate success. The new leadership made some first steps, such structural changes as the modification of the Georgian constitution within a few weeks of the revolution. The government also began reforms in the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Interior, and across entire fiscal administration system. Reforms in education and the decentralization of power are in the progress now. The change of power alone will not resolve Georgia’s systemic problems. The corruption, economic stagnation, energy shortage, uncontrolled borders and relinquished significant territories to separatists movements supported by Russia in Abkhazia and South Ossetia represent great obstacles for the development of the country. Nor are Georgian and international commentators agreed on their interpretation of the “Rose Revolution” Remarks such as those that suggest the “Georgian revolution may be the model for dissolving dictatorship in other former Soviet republics…Democrats in countries such as Belarus and Turkmenistan may be learning the lessons of Georgia, just as Saakashvili and his friends learned their lessons from the Serbian revolutionaries,” are circulating on the international scene. But there are also critical assessments of the revolution and its post-revolution implications. It will be difficult for Georgia to both overcome and retain some revolutionary spirit. The focus of our interest is security sector and the governance after revolution. In many ways the general security situation of Georgia can be said to have improved after the revolution. But the main issue for Georgian Security Policy and Security Sector Governance is to assess threats and challenges to its security and to design forces and services capable of dealing with these threats and challenges. The situation remains fragile and the requirements to modernize the security sector remains of major importance to the stability of Georgia. Currently the defence planning system remains limited as a National Security Concept has not yet been worked out and decided about. The new system as is implied in the IPAP (Individual Partnership Action Plan with NATO) is being elaborated The NATO-Georgia relationship is a very important point to be addressed. NATO membership has public support in Georgia. The Parliament of Georgia has already confirmed that membership in NATO is a high priority of Georgian security and foreign policy. On September 13, 2002, the “Resolution on the Beginning of the Process of Accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)” was passed. The “Interagency Governmental Commission After Shevardnadze: Georgian Security Sector Governance of Euro-Atlantic Integration”, established by presidential decree, elaborated a “State Program of Euro-Atlantic Integration.” In December 2002 the National Security Council of Georgia approved this programme. The political will to membership in the Euro-Atlantic Structures grew in strength after the Rose Revolution. But again, only political will is not enough for the democratic and economically effective transformation of a country. In this book we will seek to give a concrete picture of how the security sector in Georgia looks after the “Rose Revolution”. Georgian and international experts will address the issue of post-authoritarian internal security (David Darchiashvili), power elites in Georgia (Zurab Chiaberashvili and Gigi Tevzadze), the legal provisions for the deployment of foreign forces in Georgia: (Mindia Vashakmadze) , the role of regional and international organisations in Georgia (Heidemaria Gürer), successes and failures of International Observer Missions (Axel Wohlgemuth), the legal framework of Security Sector Governance in Georgia and its effectiveness (Mindia Vashakmadze), the place of civilians in national security structures and Civil-Military Relations in Georgia (Tamara Pataraia), military justice and the military service appeals system (Irakli Sesiashvili) and the role of domestic and international NGOs (Duncan Hiscock). The analytical chapters will be joined by Conclusions and Recommendations by Dov Lynch and Antje Fritz Reform as a Process – Status and Prospects What, then, have been the major reforms in the security sector since the Rose Revolution, and what can we expect from the Saakashvili government in the future? The strong political will to implement legal and systemic reforms and to transform the whole political system can play a very important role in the creation of a new security environment in Georgia. On the other hand, for the newly independent state having no democratic tradition, the major goal was and is to establish reliable and effective security structures, to find funding for and to coordinate their activities and to democratically watch and control them. The “Rose Revolution”, which was followed by constitutional changes and fast reform of the so-called “power ministries”, much stressed the need to adapt the laws overseeing and regulating the security sector. The Law “On the Structure and Activity of Executive Bodies” identifies the list of ministries and departments belonging to the security sector: 1. The Ministry of Defence 2. The Ministry of the Interior 3. The Ministry of State Security 4. The State Department of the Border Guard Service 5. The Intelligence Department 6. The Special Service for State Protection This law, though still in power today, does not address services which still exist in reality. They have been reformed without the legal basis having been created: the State Department of Border Guard was integrated into the Ministry of Interior, the Intelligence Department was incorporated into the Ministry of State Security. In the constitution of Georgia the division of labour between parliament and executive branch are defined as following: • The Parliament of Georgia determines the main directions of the country's domestic and foreign policy via standing parliamentary committees, carries out legislative work, adopts state budget, and ensures control over implementation of current tasks. • The Government of Georgia, as the executive authority, bears responsibility for the activities of state agencies operating in the field of security and defence. It is liable to After Shevardnadze: Georgian Security Sector Governance provide these agencies with all necessary material resources and funds in accordance with the decisions of the parliament or the decrees of the President within the limits of its constitutional power. The democratic control of the security sector first of all means parliamentary oversight of the MoD budgets, legislative actions regarding soldiers’ rights, and the program of civil education in security related matters. Generally, the exercise of democratic control through parliamentary oversight has improved, with the strongest emphasis on the Ministry of Defence. However, much of the enthusiasm for genuinely parliamentary committee work seems to have vanished since the revolution. For a better understanding of the current trends in the security sector it will help to review each service within the security sector.. Reforms in the Defence Services After the revolution the first step towards reforms in the Ministry of Defence was the appointment of a civilian minister of defence. This had for years been one of the main recommendations made by the ISAB (International Security Advisory Board) to the Georgian government. A Defence