Africa Security Brief a Publication of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies
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NO. 15 / SEPTEMBER 2011 AFRICA SECURITY BRIEF A PUBLICATION OF THE AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES Sifting Through the Layers of Insecurity in the Sahel: The Case of Mauritania BY CÉDRIC JOURDE ◆ Security threats in the Sahel are characterized by layers of intertwined and crosscutting interests at the local, national, and regional levels. ◆ International partners’ misunderstanding of these complex dynamics leaves them susceptible to manipula- tion by illegitimate national actors. ◆ Regional cooperation against transnational illicit trafficking and terrorism is hamstrung by governments that have calculated that their international standing is enhanced by the perpetuation of instability. HIGHLIGHTS Until recently, the Sahel (as-Sahil), literally the As the spotlight on the Sahel widens, analytic “shore” of the Saharan “sea,” rarely made headlines. shortcuts are perpetuating a superficial understanding of Nevertheless, the expanding nexus of illicit traffick- the region’s security dynamics. Suboptimal policies are ing and transnational Islamist terrorism—and the the result. Beyond the common perceptions of states, increasingly serious risk this poses to stability in the terrorists, and smugglers engaging one another across a region and to international security—is attracting sparsely populated territory, a more complicated reality growing attention. These concerns will likely mount exists. Rivalries among tribal groups, the state, private as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) at- interests of government officials, castes, and others lead tempts to use the window of opportunity presented by to constantly shifting local and regional political and the Arab Spring to reestablish itself in North Africa economic arrangements. Understanding these layers of while transitional governments there devote much of influence is vital to addressing the security challenges their energy to rebuilding state institutions. In turn, facing Mauritania and the broader Sahel. an unstable North Africa, especially Libya, could fur- MUSLIM, SPARSELY POPULATED, AND WEAK? ther exacerbate insecurity in the Sahel as unsecured weapons and trained mercenaries filter their way into The lens most often used by analysts to deci- the region. pher Mauritanian politics highlights the expansive 1 territory, largely comprised of uninhabited desert, in Insecurity in the region is also fed by extensive which its 3.2 million citizens live. It is also one of transborder smuggling—directly via weapons traf- the poorest countries in the world. Its government ficked and combatants hired, and because terrorist agencies are underfinanced, lack adequate capacity, groups or their partners reap huge profits from it, and, as a consequence, are incapable of monitoring which they reinvest in violent activities. its vast territory. Combined with cultural factors (for These usual suspects of insecurity in the Sahel— example, the prevalence of Islam), Mauritania, like Islam, vast uninhabited land, weak states—do indeed most of its regional neighbors, is an easy target and play a significant role in regional instability, but they haven for traffickers and armed groups, including fall short of explaining all the dynamics of insecu- transnational Islamist terrorist movements. rity.2 At times, the state is the instigator of armed A number of recent events substantiate this as- violence, such as the 1989–1990 killing of hundreds sessment. Deadly attacks on remote Mauritanian of Haalpulaaren, Sooninko, and Wolof—ethnic mi- military garrisons by terrorist groups have occurred norities known as “Black Africans”—at the hands of multiple times since 2005. Foreign embassies have Arabic-speaking officers of the Mauritanian security been targeted by gunmen and suicide bombers. West- forces. This was accompanied by the violent depor- ern tourists and humanitarian assistance workers have tation of about 80,000 others. An amnesty law that been regularly assassinated or kidnapped for ransom by protects security personnel from any form of judicial Islamist extremists since December 2007. In 2010, a prosecution for past abuses perpetuates these griev- group of alleged suicide bombers was intercepted and ances and reinforces suspicions of the state and its neutralized in Nouakchott before it could attack its security forces. targets. During the past 2 years, Mauritanian security Not only is insecurity in the Sahel more complex forces have periodically clashed with armed groups than it appears, but so are the political actors involved, across the border in Mali (once, in 2010, with support the reasons they engage one another, and the intersec- from French troops). In other Sahelian countries such tions of local, national, and regional dynamics. as Niger, the situation is also problematic. Five em- THE OVERLAY OF MICROPOLITICS AND ployees of the French nuclear company AREVA were REGIONAL RIVALRIES kidnapped and are still held hostage to this day, while two young Frenchmen were kidnapped in the center Security analysts of the Sahel often first adopt a of Niger’s capital and killed when their abductors and global perspective and then zoom in on the domes- French Special Forces clashed a few hours later. tic politics of a given country. But they rarely zoom These acts of violence have been perpetrated by in enough. This is necessary, however, to get past battalions (katiba) and small brigades (saraya) affili- conventional myths that frame analyses of security ated with the region’s most active Islamist terrorist in the region. organization, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. How- Take the case of illicit trafficking across the Sa- ever, as the October 2010 trial and death sentences of hel, which involves goods ranging from cigarettes three Mauritanians for terrorist ties indicate, local ex- and stolen cars to drugs, weapons, and persons. tremist groups such as Ansar al-Islam (the Partisans of This has evolved into a broad and interconnected Islam) and Ansar Allah al-Murabitun fi Bilad al-Shinqit “economy of insecurity.” At stake are the business (the Murabitun Partisans of God in the Country of interests, alliances, and rivalries of state officials, Shinqit)1 have played a role too. tribes, or factions of tribes. Many tribes have his- torically occupied vast areas that straddle interna- tional boundaries, such as the Rgueybat, who inhabit Dr. Cédric Jourde is an Associate Professor at the School parts of Mauritania, Morocco, and the Western Sa- of Political Studies, University of Ottawa, Canada. His re- hara. Some groups, such as the Ideybussat and the search focuses on the politics of identities in Sahelian coun- Tajakant, have been so successful that they have tries and on dynamics of regime change and regime survival. expanded beyond the region to the Persian Gulf, 2 where they do business in the region’s commercial Another common but problematic perspective hubs, such as Dubai and Abu Dhabi.3 is the Sahel as a no-man’s-land. Though the desert Competition and influence over this transbor- is vast, the actual areas used by humans are much der trade are decades old, and to some degree they more limited. All human activity—whether it is tour- explain how tribes and clans have engaged in vari- ism, nomadism, trafficking, or terrorism—relies on ous conflicts. In northern Mali, smuggling “remains the region’s key land routes and converges at water a long-cherished symbol of autonomy and control points and fuel stops. That local communities, armed and an important part of both social practices and Islamists, smugglers, and other groups involved in il- shifting political alliances.”4 Further complicating legal activities sometimes interact at these nodes, matters, such transborder traffic is shaped not only then, is no surprise. by intergroup politics but also by specific individuals. Similarly, many AQIM leaders are Algerian Because of tribal structures and traditions, individual and would find it difficult to navigate the complex personalities sometimes “make” the tribe more than terrain of the Sahel without support from some lo- the reverse.5 Swings in influence and authority, then, cal communities. Accordingly, AQIM leadership’s are sometimes reduced to the strength of individuals strategy of marrying into these communities is prag- with distinct and complex interests. matic. Local community support is itself a combina- Local politics can also seriously blur the differ- tion of grievances with the national government ences between state and nonstate actors. It is no se- (“the enemy of my enemy is my friend”), practical cret that some state officials from Mauritanian border regions (in the military, in the customs administra- “allegiances to one’s ethnic group, tion, and elsewhere) have used their positions and tribe, clan, or personal network can resources to further their private or clan’s business be stronger than those to the state” interests. Similarly, “many agents of the state on the Malian and Algerian sides of the border consider business interests, and ideological motivations. At their position in the state apparatus as a means to the least, communities notice the presence of these feed their tribal solidarity with state money.”6 In the groups. In addition, some state officials originate zones inhabited by Malian Tuaregs, “customs officials from these peripheral communities, while others and the smugglers often belong to the same clan.”7 are stationed nearby and have relationships within The argument that the state cannot control them. Yet, again it is the micropolitics that super- these illegal