NO. 15 / SEPTEMBER 2011 AFRICA SECURITY BRIEF A PUBLICATION OF THE AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

Sifting Through the Layers of Insecurity in the Sahel: The Case of BY CÉDRIC JOURDE

◆◆Security threats in the Sahel are characterized by layers of intertwined and crosscutting interests at the local, national, and regional levels.

◆◆International partners’ misunderstanding of these complex dynamics leaves them susceptible to manipula- tion by illegitimate national actors.

◆◆Regional cooperation against transnational illicit trafficking and terrorism is hamstrung by governments that have calculated that their international standing is enhanced by the perpetuation of instability.

HIGHLIGHTS

Until recently, the Sahel (as-Sahil), literally the As the spotlight on the Sahel widens, analytic “shore” of the Saharan “sea,” rarely made headlines. shortcuts are perpetuating a superficial understanding of Nevertheless, the expanding nexus of illicit traffick- the region’s security dynamics. Suboptimal policies are ing and transnational Islamist terrorism—and the the result. Beyond the common perceptions of states, increasingly serious risk this poses to stability in the terrorists, and smugglers engaging one another across a region and to international security—is attracting sparsely populated territory, a more complicated reality growing attention. These concerns will likely mount exists. Rivalries among tribal groups, the state, private as al Qaeda in the Islamic (AQIM) at- interests of government officials, castes, and others lead tempts to use the window of opportunity presented by to constantly shifting local and regional political and the Arab Spring to reestablish itself in North Africa economic arrangements. Understanding these layers of while transitional governments there devote much of influence is vital to addressing the security challenges their energy to rebuilding state institutions. In turn, facing Mauritania and the broader Sahel. an unstable North Africa, especially Libya, could fur- MUSLIM, SPARSELY POPULATED, AND WEAK? ther exacerbate insecurity in the Sahel as unsecured weapons and trained mercenaries filter their way into The lens most often used by analysts to deci- the region. pher Mauritanian politics highlights the expansive

1 territory, largely comprised of uninhabited desert, in Insecurity in the region is also fed by extensive which its 3.2 million citizens live. It is also one of transborder smuggling—directly via weapons traf- the poorest countries in the world. Its government ficked and combatants hired, and because terrorist agencies are underfinanced, lack adequate capacity, groups or their partners reap huge profits from it, and, as a consequence, are incapable of monitoring which they reinvest in violent activities. its vast territory. Combined with cultural factors (for These usual suspects of insecurity in the Sahel— example, the prevalence of ), Mauritania, like Islam, vast uninhabited land, weak states—do indeed most of its regional neighbors, is an easy target and play a significant role in regional instability, but they haven for traffickers and armed groups, including fall short of explaining all the dynamics of insecu- transnational Islamist terrorist movements. rity.2 At times, the state is the instigator of armed A number of recent events substantiate this as- violence, such as the 1989–1990 killing of hundreds sessment. Deadly attacks on remote Mauritanian of Haalpulaaren, Sooninko, and Wolof—ethnic mi- military garrisons by terrorist groups have occurred norities known as “Black Africans”—at the hands of multiple times since 2005. Foreign embassies have -speaking officers of the Mauritanian security been targeted by gunmen and suicide bombers. West- forces. This was accompanied by the violent depor- ern tourists and humanitarian assistance workers have tation of about 80,000 others. An amnesty law that been regularly assassinated or kidnapped for ransom by protects security personnel from any form of judicial Islamist extremists since December 2007. In 2010, a prosecution for past abuses perpetuates these griev- group of alleged suicide bombers was intercepted and ances and reinforces suspicions of the state and its neutralized in Nouakchott before it could attack its security forces. targets. During the past 2 years, Mauritanian security Not only is insecurity in the Sahel more complex forces have periodically clashed with armed groups than it appears, but so are the political actors involved, across the border in (once, in 2010, with support the reasons they engage one another, and the intersec- from French troops). In other Sahelian countries such tions of local, national, and regional dynamics. as Niger, the situation is also problematic. Five em- THE OVERLAY OF MICROPOLITICS AND ployees of the French nuclear company AREVA were REGIONAL RIVALRIES kidnapped and are still held hostage to this day, while two young Frenchmen were kidnapped in the center Security analysts of the Sahel often first adopt a of Niger’s capital and killed when their abductors and global perspective and then zoom in on the domes- French Special Forces clashed a few hours later. tic politics of a given country. But they rarely zoom These acts of violence have been perpetrated by in enough. This is necessary, however, to get past battalions (katiba) and small brigades (saraya) affili- conventional myths that frame analyses of security ated with the region’s most active Islamist terrorist in the region. organization, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. How- Take the case of illicit trafficking across the Sa- ever, as the October 2010 trial and death sentences of hel, which involves goods ranging from cigarettes three Mauritanians for terrorist ties indicate, local ex- and stolen cars to drugs, weapons, and persons. tremist groups such as Ansar al-Islam (the Partisans of This has evolved into a broad and interconnected Islam) and Ansar Allah al-Murabitun fi Bilad al-Shinqit “economy of insecurity.” At stake are the business (the Murabitun Partisans of God in the Country of interests, alliances, and rivalries of state officials, Shinqit)1 have played a role too. tribes, or factions of tribes. Many tribes have his- torically occupied vast areas that straddle interna- tional boundaries, such as the Rgueybat, who inhabit Dr. Cédric Jourde is an Associate Professor at the School parts of Mauritania, , and the Western Sa- of Political Studies, University of Ottawa, Canada. His re- hara. Some groups, such as the Ideybussat and the search focuses on the politics of identities in Sahelian coun- , have been so successful that they have tries and on dynamics of regime change and regime survival. expanded beyond the region to the Persian Gulf,

2 where they do business in the region’s commercial Another common but problematic perspective hubs, such as Dubai and Abu Dhabi.3 is the Sahel as a no-man’s-land. Though the desert Competition and influence over this transbor- is vast, the actual areas used by humans are much der trade are decades old, and to some degree they more limited. All human activity—whether it is tour- explain how tribes and clans have engaged in vari- ism, nomadism, trafficking, or terrorism—relies on ous conflicts. In northern Mali, smuggling “remains the region’s key land routes and converges at water a long-cherished symbol of autonomy and control points and fuel stops. That local communities, armed and an important part of both social practices and Islamists, smugglers, and other groups involved in il- shifting political alliances.”4 Further complicating legal activities sometimes interact at these nodes, matters, such transborder traffic is shaped not only then, is no surprise. by intergroup politics but also by specific individuals. Similarly, many AQIM leaders are Algerian Because of tribal structures and traditions, individual and would find it difficult to navigate the complex personalities sometimes “make” the tribe more than terrain of the Sahel without support from some lo- the reverse.5 Swings in influence and authority, then, cal communities. Accordingly, AQIM leadership’s are sometimes reduced to the strength of individuals strategy of marrying into these communities is prag- with distinct and complex interests. matic. Local community support is itself a combina- Local politics can also seriously blur the differ- tion of grievances with the national government ences between state and nonstate actors. It is no se- (“the enemy of my enemy is my friend”), practical cret that some state officials from Mauritanian border regions (in the military, in the customs administra- “allegiances to one’s ethnic group, tion, and elsewhere) have used their positions and tribe, clan, or personal network can resources to further their private or clan’s business be stronger than those to the state” interests. Similarly, “many agents of the state on the Malian and Algerian sides of the border consider business interests, and ideological motivations. At their position in the state apparatus as a means to the least, communities notice the presence of these feed their tribal solidarity with state money.”6 In the groups. In addition, some state officials originate zones inhabited by Malian Tuaregs, “customs officials from these peripheral communities, while others and the smugglers often belong to the same clan.”7 are stationed nearby and have relationships within The argument that the state cannot control them. Yet, again it is the micropolitics that super- these illegal economic transactions, therefore, mis- sede the interests of the state. identifies the problem. In fact, some high-ranking ISLAMISM AND LOCAL POWER STRUGGLES military officers, as well as members of their families and tribes, play key roles in this illicit economy and Local groups interpret, interact with, reject, or are involved in numerous local power struggles. The adopt Islamism and the ideology of Islamist move- result is a seemingly irreconcilable tension: the state ments in unique ways. Accordingly, although the as an abstract entity is threatened by this illicit busi- entire population in Mauritania and most of the Sa- ness, yet simultaneously many state agents are deeply hel is Muslim, this religious identity is filtered and involved in these activities. The suggestion, then, informed by other identities. that the Mauritanian state needs more technology, Castes. Most ethnic groups of the Sahel are surveillance materials, vehicles, and capacity-build- internally organized by hierarchies of castes that ing is true, but it misses the point. That state officials define social status. These are not rigid but change may follow private, social, and political incentives over time and are geographically idiosyncratic. not congruent with the interests of the state indicates However, they still affect how people live their lives, that the problem is less technical than political. Alle- and therefore how they interact with Islamism. For giances to one’s ethnic group, tribe, clan, or personal instance, many Mauritanian leaders in AQIM come network can be stronger than those to the state. from Moorish society’s top-tiered “free” Zwaya tribes

3 of the southwest region. The Zwaya have histori- postcolonial period also factors into the pull of Is- cally specialized in religious scholarship, providing lamism. Having been deprived of development re- most of the region’s religious scholars (ulama, qadi, sources and access to ruling political coalitions for Imam, and others) who oversee traditional religious decades, some northern Tuareg communities are simi- schools (called mahadra in Mauritania). By contrast, larly suspicious of their governments’ calls to fight the the vast majority of Haratin, lower tiered “freed cap- “Islamist enemy.” tives” of Moorish society, are extremely poor and can hardly move up the socioeconomic ladder. “violent groups such as Given that context, many Haratin have been at- AQIM use an egalitarian tracted by the egalitarian discourse (“all equal be- antiestablishment discourse” fore God”) of Islamist movements such as Tabligh wa Da’awa. Founded in India in the 1920s, this or- Meanwhile, in and Morocco, the unre- thodox but nonviolent group has become the largest solved issue of the “Sahrawi problem” in Western Sa- transnational Islamist order in the world. It seeks hara creates broader challenges. Prospects for youth a re-Islamization of Muslim societies from below stuck for years in Sahrawi refugee camps are gloomy. and therefore rejects the caste hierarchy and any Understandably, some may be tempted by more ad- other form of ethnic or racial distinctions. While venturous business-related or ideological alternatives. attracting far fewer followers, violent groups such Clans. Interclan rivalries also matter. For in- as AQIM also use an egalitarian antiestablishment stance, the arrival of the Tabligh wa Da’awa move- discourse that rejects ethnic, national, or racial dif- ment in Mali’s northern region of Kidal at the end ferences. This could explain why Mauritania’s only of the 1990s added a new layer to longstanding clan two homegrown suicide bombers were Haratin. interactions. As one clan adopted new Tabligh doc- Ethnicity. Islamism in Mauritania cannot be un- trine, others would immediately reject it, mostly be- derstood without an appreciation of its history of eth- cause of historical rivalries.8 nic power struggles. For example, counterintuitively, In short, the transborder illicit economy, Is- few members of Mauritanian Islamist groups come lamism, and other phenomena are all constantly from the Haalpulaar, Sooninko, and Wolof ethnic shifting and are frequently reappropriated or rejected minorities of the River Valley, though they by local actors who interpret and perceive these ex- are all Muslim, have often been targeted by state se- ternal influences through local lenses. curity forces, and comprise roughly 30 percent of the INCUMBENTS WAVE THE FLAG OF population. This is largely because power struggles NATIONAL “SECURITY” fought in the name of ethnoracial identities have his- torically marginalized Black Africans. Islamist move- Local and national power struggles also often in- ments are often unable to bridge such differences, tersect. The Mauritanian regime, like its counterparts preventing them from reaching individuals outside in Chad, North Africa, and to some extent Niger, the Moorish community. In fact, in the villages of the struggles with a legitimacy deficit. As authoritarian Senegal River Valley and neighborhoods of Nouak- systems, they all face domestic discontent and resort chott where Black African ethnic minorities have to a mixture of repression and co-optation to check settled, many conceive of Islamism as a reincarnation internal opponents. In such contexts, “insecurity” is of an older “Arab nationalist” ideology that favors used by incumbents, or at least rival factions within the “Arabness” of Mauritania to the detriment of its these regimes, to command greater authority. non-Arab communities. Deciphering the sources of insecurity in regimes In Mali and Niger, where the governments are where the military is a dominant political actor re- predominantly controlled by ethnic “Southerners” quires paying close attention to the dynamics of fac- (or Africans), the economic and political margin- tionalism within the security forces.9 For instance, alization of Tuareg communities during most of the Mauritanians remember the clashes between two of

4 former President Ould Taya’s cousins between 2003 tionally precisely because it abruptly interrupted a and 2005 as well as the more recent tensions between democratic transition many had applauded. How- current President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz and ever, “insecurity” and “instability” were soon mobi- his cousin and predecessor. More generally, the only lized to justify support for the new military strongman engine of leadership change since 1978 has been in Nouakchott, General Ould Abdel Aziz. Several the coup d’état. In each instance, military officers analysts have raised the possibility that leading up have ousted military officers. The sole exception was to the coup “a number of [violent] acts were ordered President Ould Shaykh Abdellahi’s election in 2007, to destabilize the presidency of Ould Abdellahi and though he was subsequently deposed and replaced undermine his credibility in the eyes of his foreign after 17 months by his military chief of staff, General partners, especially France.”11 Shortly after the coup, Ould Abdel Aziz, confirming the rule. Indeed, every General Ould Abdel Aziz publicly claimed that the recent coup d’état has been fomented by close col- previous president was too soft on Islamists and that laborators of the ousted leader. Given this unpredict- only he could provide security. France quickly ex- able environment, the recent arrests of high-ranking tended its support. The United States, though the Mauritanian officers for drug trafficking does not nec- leading nation among those that strongly condemned essarily mean that the government is cracking down the coup, eventually resumed its support after the on this trade. Rather, identifying which officials have general organized and won presidential elections in not been arrested and who is responsible for the ar- 2009. In short, when governments in the Sahel wave rests is often a more revealing piece of information. the flag of “instability,” it may be concealing more Insecurity in the Sahel may also be conceived complex domestic dynamics. as a political resource for incumbent regimes. Dur- REGIONAL RIVALRIES OVERWHELM ing President Taya’s rule in Mauritania from 1984 MUTUAL INTERESTS to 2005, the regime instrumentalized notions of in- security to impose a wide range of restrictions, often The ongoing dispute in the Western , the in the name of counterterrorism.10 During the last 5 Tuareg rebellions in Mali and Niger (and indirectly years of Taya’s reign, Mauritanian security forces ar- in Mauritania), and the Algerian civil war of the rested dozens of people labeled as “Islamists,” rang- 1990s–2000s all continue to influence insecurity at ing from youngsters suspected of belonging to Is- both the regional and national levels. These conflicts lamist militias to mainstream Imams and opposition have created a “political economy of conflict” featur- politicians such as the current head of the Islamist ing trade in arms and illicit goods, which sponsors Tawassoul party, which has never called for violence the activities of communities and political actors but advocates for financial disclosures of politicians across the Mauritanian borderland and the Sahel and security officials. In addition to silencing influ- more generally. Consequently, local politics adapt to ential local actors, the regime successfully capital- and intertwine with these regional dynamics. Com- ized internationally on the climate of fear to attract mercial routes, for instance, are sometimes reconfig- external support. Western countries, mainly the ured according to the needs of Tuareg and Sahrawi United States and France, and to some extent the groups and how they relate with their enemies of the European Union, provided the Taya regime with moment, whether they are regional governments or financial, material, and diplomatic backing. In simi- rivals within their own communities. As a result, lar ways, the Nigerien and to some extent Malian rebel groups originally organized around some politi- governments have used the theme of “insecurity” cal grievance eventually involve themselves in traf- to clamp down on Tuareg and other communities. ficking activities unrelated to their primary aims, as This strategy has often backfired, simply intensifying illustrated by kidnappings of foreigners by AQIM for animosity towards the government. financial gain. Much can be learned from these experiences. Political rivalries among regional neighbors The 2008 coup was widely condemned interna- also complicate the drivers of insecurity. In most

5 African conflicts, armed groups are enabled by personal competition between military officers, the neighboring governments or factions within gov- political economy of Sahelian communities such as ernments who provide financial and military sup- the Tuareg, and the complex and at times contradic- port or simply tolerate their presence. Since the tory structures of loyalty, including those to the state conflict in in the 1970s, the am- (an employer), a tribe, and personal interest. Devot- biguous status of the Sahrawi communities as well ing more time to acquiring and maintaining a deep as former and active Polisario combatants has been knowledge of the region will improve international a constant source of contention between Algiers policy engagement, better respond to the real needs and Rabat, periodically transforming Mauritania of the region, and lower the risk of analysts being into a proxy battlefield. Similarly, every time there manipulated by local actors who know how to “talk” is a coup d’état in Mauritania, rumors spread about to them. Morocco’s or Algeria’s role. Build stronger loyalties through genuine de- Such regional rivalries permeate analysis of velopment and political outreach to marginalized seemingly unconnected political developments, communities. Some communities in the Sahel thereby frustrating cooperation and feeding suspi- have been denied access to decisionmaking circles cion. Interpretations of the December 2010 arrests and development schemes for decades. Exclusion in Mauritania of alleged Polisario activists who may from state institutions and political processes has have had business relations with AQIM are a case eliminated channels through which their legiti- in point. Some concluded that the Algerians had ei- mate interests can be assessed and incorporated in ther turned a blind eye on their Polisario “protégés,” or, worse, were using them to help AQIM, a group “the choice of either stability whose very existence buttresses Algeria’s image as provided by the military regional counterterrorist champion. To others, the (sometimes in civilian clothes) or allegation of Polisario-AQIM connections was sim- the violence of Islamist terrorists ply a manipulation by the Moroccan government to is artificial” tarnish the reputations of its opponents, the Polisario and Algeria. Again, regional rivalries make it hard to transparent and nonviolent ways. This exacerbates interpret and understand what is really happening, let already opaque insecurity dynamics throughout alone act on this information. the region. Sustainable development programs, as well as inclusive political solutions, are particu- SOME LESSONS larly relevant. For instance, the official recogni- Three broad lessons emerge from the layered tion of Mauritania’s moderate Tawassoul Islamist complexity of insecurity in Mauritania and the Sahel party by the government in 2007 was constructive. more generally. The exclusion of this moderate player for some 17 Avoid dichotomous thinking and shortcuts to years nurtured antigovernment discourses. From knowledge. The frequently presented choice of ei- a socioeconomic point of view, Malian initiatives ther stability provided by the military (sometimes in such as the Investment and Development Fund for civilian clothes) or the violence of Islamist terrorists the Socioeconomic Rehabilitation of the Regions is artificial. So is the binary notion of the state versus of Northern Mali are a good start. So is Maurita- insurgents and traffickers (that is, nonstate actors). nia’s Program for the Prevention of Conflicts and Policymakers and analysts must devote more time the Consolidation of Social Cohesion, which is and resources to considering the complexity of the directed at both Haratin and returning Black Af- region. Among the issues worth studying at length rican refugees. The resources channeled into these are the spectrum of rivalries among tribes specializing programs, however, are unquestionably insufficient. in illicit commerce, the tensions between castes, the Given that Sahelian countries are among the poor- impact of ethnicity on Islamist mobilizations, the est in the world, their international partners can

6 play a significant role in providing support to as- 3 Armelle Choplin, “From the Mosque to Dubai sist these countries’ development programs among Towers,” The Maghreb Review 35, nos. 1–2 (2010), 146–163. marginalized communities. 4 David Gutelius, “Islam in Northern Mali and the War on Meanwhile, outreach should not be equated Terror,” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 25, no. 1 (2007), with the militarization of these areas. If these local 70. communities begin to witness the rising presence 5 Zekeria Ould Ahmed Salem, “Prêcher dans le désert: of their national governments’ security forces—or l’univers du Cheikh Sidi Yahya et l’évolution de l’islamisme mau- those of their international partners—this outreach ritanien,” Islam et sociétés au sud du Sahara 14–15, (2001), 6. would backfire. 6 Judith Scheele, “Tribus, États et fraudes: la région fron- Support legitimate political regimes. Inter- talière algéro-malienne,” Études rurales, no. 184 (July–December national partners should provide strong support to 2009), 91. Emphasis added. democratic regimes and those that are implement- 7 Baz Lecocq and Paul Schrijver, “The War on Terror in a ing democratic changes, while pressuring those that Haze of Dust: Potholes and Pitfalls on the Saharan Front,” Journal opt for authoritarian policies. The unfolding Arab of Contemporary African Studies 25, no. 1 (2007), 159. Spring is demonstrating what some Sahelian and 8 Ibid., 149–150. sub-Saharan countries already knew: legitimate gov- 9 Abdel Wedoud Ould Cheikh, “Une armée de tribus? Les ernments are less subject (though not immune) to militaires et le pouvoir en Mauritanie,” The Maghreb Review 35, the opposition of armed groups and better equipped no. 3 (2010), 339–362. to respond to societal demands. Mali, for example, 10 Cédric Jourde, “The International Relations of Small is much less subject to antigovernment violence Neoauthoritarian States: Islamism, Warlordism, and the Framing than regimes that employ an authoritarian style. of Stability,” International Studies Quarterly 51, no. 2 (June 2007), The greater legitimacy of democracy mutes the 481–503. resonance of calls for jihad and armed rebellion, 11 A. Antil and C. Lessourd, “Non, mon Président! Oui, mon except in specific regions, not coincidentally where général! Retour sur l’expérience et la chute du président Sidi Ould these regimes underperform, as in northern Mali. Cheikh Abdallahi,” L’Année du Maghreb 2009, V (2009), 382. Autocratic Mauritania and Algeria, on the other hand, have been directly targeted, both in words and deeds. International partners of Sahelian coun- tries, as well as regional organizations such as the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States, should strongly and consis- tently condemn authoritarian actors such as mili- tary coup–makers or unconstitutional heads of states (for example, Niger’s former President Tandja) that threaten the development of democratic institutions and practices.

NOTES

1 Shinqit is the ancient name used in the Arab world to refer to most of what is today Mauritania. Murabitun is the name of a local group that eventually invaded Morocco and at the turn of the 11th century. 2 On Western “representations” of Mauritanian politics, see Cédric Jourde, “Constructing Representations of the ‘Global War on Terror’ in the Islamic Republic of Mauritania,” Journal of Con- temporary African Studies 25, no. 1 (2007), 77–100.

7 Africa Center for Strategic Studies

Recent and forthcoming titles Urban Fragility and Security in Africa The Paradoxes of Algerian Stephen Commins Security Policy Africa Security Brief 12, April 2011 Laurence Aïda Ammour Africa Security Brief, forthcoming Africa’s Evolving Infosystems: A Pathway to Security and Stability Security through Legitimacy: Steven Livingston Democratic Oversight of the ACSS Research Paper 2, March 2011 Security Services AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES Mathurin Houngnikpo ’s Growing Terrorist Director: Ambassador William Africa Security Brief, forthcoming M. Bellamy (Ret.) Threat: Confronting AQIM’s National Defense University Sahelian Strategy 300 Fifth Avenue, Building 21 Stress-Testing South Africa: Fort Lesley J. McNair Modibo Goïta Washington, DC 20319-5066 The Tenuous Foundations of Africa Security Brief 11, March 2011 Phone: + 1 202-685-7300 Web site: www.africacenter.org One of Africa’s Stable States Assis Malaquias Investing in Science and Tech- AFRICA CENTER ACSS Research Paper 3, July 2011 REGIONAL OFFICE nology to Meet Africa’s Maritime IN DAKAR Regional Manager: Security Challenges Elisabeth Feleke Nigeria’s Pernicious Drivers of Augustus Vogel Phone: 221 33 869 61 00 Ethno-Religious Conflict Africa Security Brief 10, February 2011 Email: [email protected] Chris Kwaja AFRICA CENTER Africa Security Brief 14, July 2011 Playing Ostrich: Lessons REGIONAL OFFICE IN ADDIS ABABA Learned from South Africa’s Regional Manager: Optimizing Africa’s Security Brad Anderson Response to Terrorism Phone: 251 11 517 4000 Force Structures Hussein Solomon Email: [email protected] Helmoed Heitman Africa Security Brief 9, January 2011 Africa Security Brief 13, May 2011 AFRICA SECURITY BRIEFS Editor: Joseph Siegle, Ph.D. Phone: + 1 202-685-6808 Email: [email protected]

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