A Hundred Think Tanks Bloom in China

ANALYSIS CHINA

A HUNDRED THINK TANKS

BLOOM IN CHINA

Introduction

ABOUT by François Godement

The Chinese have long been obsessed A red thread runs through the history of Chinese thought, with strategic culture, power balances and dividing “state intellectuals”, as the noted scholar Merle geopolitical shifts. Academic institutions, Goldman called them, from more independent thinkers think-tanks, journals and web-based debates – whether they subscribed to the Taoist invocation of the are growing in number and quality, giving China’s foreign policy breadth and depth. individual being, or to the compelling obligations of the Legalist school, which bound the supreme ruler as much as China Analysis introduces European his subjects. Throughout Chinese history, the state – and, audiences to these debates inside China’s today, the Party – has taken varying approaches to these expert and think-tank world and helps the three types of thinkers, approaches again well described European policy community understand how 1 China’s leadership thinks about domestic by Merle Goldman as phases of “freeze” and “thaw”. and foreign policy issues. While freedom This divide helps to understand the topic explored in of expression and information remain this issue of China Analysis, and sheds some light on the restricted in China’s media, these published apparent contradiction at its core: China, which is right sources and debates provide an important now repressing lawyers and activists and promulgating way of understanding emerging trends within China. a harsh law on NGOs, is at the same time pursuing the development of think tanks, including nominally non- Each issue of China Analysis focuses on a governmental institutions, and is even having a debate specific theme and draws mainly on Chinese about their role. mainland sources. However, it also monitors content in Chinese-language publications from Hong Kong and Taiwan, which At the root of the Party’s current approach is a recognition occasionally include news and analysis that that think tanks – or state intellectuals – perform a dual is not published in the mainland and reflects function in China. In a state without a public court of the diversity of Chinese thinking. opinion, think tanks provide rulers with views that are meant to be informed and rational, or in other words, moderate: the function of the “prince’s adviser” (conseiller du prince), as the French thinker Raymond Aron called

1 Merle Goldman, Sowing the Seeds of Democracy in China: Political Reform in the Deng

August 2016 Xiaoping Era (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994). 2 ECFR/184 August 2016 www.ecfr.eu CHINA ANALYSIS: A HUNDRED THINK TANK BLOOM IN CHINA china/2016-08/08/content_26379949.htm ring up trouble”,China 2016, Daily, 8 August available at by stir not breaklaw Kai andWuYan,“Lawyersshould inGuo 2 ZhengYongniancited this area, too, along-termcompetitionisunderway. there areinanyothercountrysavetheUnitedStates.In thanChina in centres other and Beijing in tankers think leaders totheled. Itisasafebettosaythattherearemore providers influencingtheviewsofeveryone –fromthe It understandstherolethatthinktanksfulfilasservice all developments,anditisreadytopayachievethis. and internationalopinion.Itwantstobekeptabreastof the spacebetweenpowerandpopulace,China Nonetheless, theChineseParty-stateisseriousaboutfilling Belt, OneRoadInitiativeareacaseinpoint. The numerouscentresandconferencesrelatedtotheOne bandwagon.latest the on jump simply to seem often they less likelytocomeupwithindependentthinking; rather, Unhappily, onegetsthesensethatneweroutfitsaremuch studies onthestructureofChinesestateeconomy. published, forexample, someofthemostinteresting existed before2012: theUniruleInstituteofEconomics tanks. Astrikingexampleofthiskindthinktankalready encouraging thedevelopment ofprivatelyfundedthink regard, itisworthnotingthatXiJinping’sChinaalso likely toproduceideasacceptablethestate. Inthis aretanks think state-funded that means which the tune, callto tends piper the pays who He China. to unique not course,– dilemmais, of practical very and – moral The activism.” social their statusbystirringup lost have (who) same thinktankerhasjustpubliclydenounced“lawyers critical thinkingormorepoliticalparticipation: thevery However, thisshouldnotbemistakenforacallmore complains thattherearenotenoughindependentthinkers. think tankers. Awell-knownthinktankerbasedoverseas state power, awishisexpressedforfewer, butbetter, think tanks. Fromthethinktanklocatedatheartof criticise thelackofindependentthinkingamongChinese second. Onthe“prince’sadviser”function, severalauthors the firstfunction,andasurfeitofthosereadytofulfil there isperhapsashortageofthosecapableperforming Our explorationseemstoindicatethatatthemoment, Chinese viewsoftheworld. “soft power”asChineseofficialdomseesit, istobroadcast it. Theotherfunction,whichcoincidesmorebroadlywith . http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/ 2 - The Opinion notes the important role that policy research Independence and influence: The plays in the government’s decision-making process, and future of Chinese think tanks recognises the shortage of institutionalised arrangements for consulting leading personalities and talents in Silvia Menegazzi policymaking. Moreover, the Opinion acknowledges that think tanks play “an irreplaceable role in international A Chinese government plan to construct think tanks with relations”, pointing out that they are very important to “Chinese characteristics” has sparked intense debate among China’s soft power.6 the country’s academics. The plan suggests that the political elites intend to gain greater control of this key sector of A Chinese theory of China policymaking, which could mean that think tanks become more inclined to serve the interests of the Party in the The publication of the Opinion feeds into an ongoing debate coming years.3 about the influence of public intellectuals, academics, and policy experts on China’s decision-making process. In October 2014, speaking in front of a group tasked with In response, many academics have spoken out about the developing guidelines for policy reform, President Xi current state of the Chinese intelligentsia. Zheng Yongnian, Jinping said that China’s think tanks had developed rapidly for example, who heads the East Asia Institute at the in recent decades, and that they now played a leading role University of Singapore and who is particularly active in the in shaping the country’s social development and economic Chinese intellectual debate, believes that the major problem reform programme.4 However, the president noted that of Chinese think tanks is not that they are backward Chinese think tanks still lack a substantial “international compared to those in the United States or Europe, but a reputation” (国际知名 broader issue: the Chinese intelligentsia does not have a 度, guoji zhimingdu) or systematic critical viewpoint on the country’s political and “Zheng believes the 7 significant “influence” Chinese intelligentsia economic development. Intellectuals and academics tend (影响力, yingxiangli). does not have a systematic to rely excessively on Western ideas, which prevents them Xi said that critical viewpoint on the from developing long-term solutions appropriate for the Chinese context. “constructing think country’s development” tanks with Chinese characteristics is a Despite China’s improved economic performance over major task in order to develop scientific decision-making, the last 30 years, Zheng argues that advice on policy democratic decision-making, China’s national governance, implementation from experts and academics in China and modernisation, as well as to strengthen China’s soft remains extremely limited. For instance, he says that Chinese power”.5 After this meeting, a plan to institutionalise and economists have failed to provide systematic solutions to develop the think tank sector in China was drafted. China’s economic difficulties. Zheng believes that experts in China have made only superficial contributions to Xi On 1 January 2015, the Communist Party (CCP) General Jinping’s recent “supply-side” economic restructuring (供 Office and the State Council General Office released a 给侧改革, gongji ce gaige), as they did in the 2000s with document setting out the guiding ideology, basic principles, the theory of the “Three Represents” (三个代表, sange and general objectives for the development of a new kind daibiao).8 Zheng argues that reform can only succeed if of Chinese think tank – the “Opinion on strengthening experts begin to recognise the need for China to establish the construction of new types of think tanks with Chinese its own supply-side economics, free from the influence of characteristics” (hereafter, the Opinion). According to Western theories.9 the document, think tanks should be oriented towards long-term research projects, information gathering, and Interestingly, his critics say that Zheng Yongnian himself consultancy services. Their staff should possess a high has been too influenced by Western ideas, and that he has level of expertise and they should build up influence. They become today what Zhen Peng calls an “invisible nationalist” should have a well-developed organisational structure and (隐形民族主义者, yinxing minzuzhuyizhe).10 Zhen says the capacity to generate sustainable funding. They should be able to develop multi-level academic exchanges at home 6 “Opinion”, State Council General Office. 7 Zheng Yongnian, “China has entered an era of intellectual shortage” (中国已经进入一 as well as internationally. 个知识的短缺的时代, Zhongguo yijing jinru yige zhishi duanque de shidai), Lianhe Zao- bao, 29 January 2016, available at http://www.21ccom.net/html/2016/gqmq_0126/1183_2.html (hereafter, Zheng, “China has entered an era of intellectual shortage”). Zheng Yongnian is the director of the East Asia Institute at the University of Singapore. 3 “Opinion on strengthening the construction of new types of think tanks with Chinese 8 The “Three Represents” was a theory put forward by President Jiang Zemin in 2000: Jiang characteristics” (关于加强中国特色新型智库建设的意见, Guanyu jiaqiang Zhongguo tese said the CPC was to represent “the development trend of China’s advanced productive forces, xinxing zhiku jianshe de yijian), State Council General Office, 1 January 2015 (hereafter, the orientation of China’s advanced culture, and the fundamental interests of the overwhelm- “Opinion”, State Council General Office). ing majority of the Chinese people.” See “Three Represents”, News of the Communist Party of 4 Xi was speaking at the Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Re- China, 23 June 2006, available at http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/66739/4521344.html. forms, which was established in December 2013. 9 Zheng, “China has entered an era of intellectual shortage”. 5 “Why did Xi Jinping emphasise the idea of building think tanks with Chinese char- 10 Zhen Peng, “Criticising the false rationalism of Zheng Yongnian”, (批评郑永年的伪理性 acteristics?’ (习近平为何特别强调新型智库建设?, Xi Jinping weihe tebie qiangdiao xinx- 主义, piping Zheng Yongnian de wei lixingzhuyi), Gongshiwang, 11 March 2016, available ing zhiku jianshe ?), People’s Daily, 29 October 2014, available at http://theory.people.com. at http://www.21ccom.net/html/2016/gqmq_0311/2363.html (hereafter, Zhen, “Criticising the false cn/n/2014/1029/c148980-25928251.html. rationalism of Zheng Yongnian”). Zhen Peng is a researcher at Chinese Shandong University. 3 4 ECFR/184 August 2016 www.ecfr.eu CHINA ANALYSIS: A HUNDRED THINK TANK BLOOM IN CHINA gqmq_0129/1317.html aoteng matter” ( things doneisanother 14 NieHuihua,“Mr.ZhengYongnian, to talkbutgetting it’s easy html/2016/ggqz_0129/1332_2.html ku hen beiguan 我对中国所谓的智库很悲观年： think tanks”( Chinese so-called about Yongnian: Iamverypessimistic 13 “Zheng March 2016,availableat 要什么样的供给侧改革 ( by entrepreneurs” reforms needed 12 Zheng Yongnian, See “The supply-side 11 Zhen,“CriticisingthefalserationalismofZhengYongnian”. government isafundamental the relationship with a good that having recognise same time,they process. Butatthe decision-making actors inthe more powerful and become think tankstodevelop help will international experience that scholars believe international level. Chinese at the and active think tanksmorevisible make these as reforms important isincreasingly party-state with the relationship ofthinktanksandtheir “Chinese-ness” The questionofthe for theirimplementation. holding back, new ideas without and hasproposed policies and criticisedthese plan. It hasdiscussed the supply-side as theOneBelt,Roadinfrastructureinitiative, and such policies, recent mark on numerous its (CASS) hasleft Academy ofSocialSciences in China,topics theChinese sensitive it isnoteasytocandidlydiscuss example, although only aboutminor ones” ( talking major transformationswhile about silent “remained is changing,andNiecomplainsthatZhengYongnianhas implementation. However,this policymaking andpolicy ( cake” on the “icing are the decision-making; rather, they Chinese in a vitalrole have circles intellectual think that to wrong inZheng’s asmistakes think tanks.saysthatZhengis Nie of Chinese judgement sees he what identified Huihua not.Nie or are independent they whether influential, are in China and experts intellectuals public that argue Others that aremoreimportantthaninfluence. universal standards( are and independence Zheng, impartiality providing advice.For and formulating policy cannot beobjectivein this meansthatthey groundsthat on the gonggong zhishifenzi ( general in intellectuals public think tanksinparticularandChinese government of the from lack ofindependence the Zheng Yongniancriticises Independence andinfluence that left-wingforcesinChinashould“raisetheirheads”. government. Chinese the of those with in line not are often ideas his why ( “trumpeter” a simple that, livingoverseas,ZhengYongnian has become ), 郑永年先生站着说话不腰疼 Gongshiwang 锦上添花的功能公共知识分子 ), Gongshiwang 11 吹鼓手 . NieHuihuaisaneconomistatRenminUniversity ofChina. Zhen argues that times are changing,and that times Zhen argues , , 29 January 2016, available at Qiye jiashuyao shenmeyang de gongjice gaige http://news.ifeng.com/a/20160302/47655767_0.shtml , chuigushou 普适性的标准 . , 29January 2016, available at , , Zheng Zhongguo Yongnian: Wo dui suoyou de zhi ), , , jinshangtianhua de gongneng Zheng Yongnian Xiansheng zhenzheshuohuabuy 14 "Intellectuals tend to tend "Intellectuals 避重就轻 Western ideas, Western ideas, which rely excessively on rely excessively prevents them from them prevents Chinese context appropriate forthe developing solutions developing ) (fromabroad), and thisis , pushixingde biaozhun , bizhongjiuqing http://www.21ccom.net/html/2016/ 13 http://www.21ccom.net/ " . ), Ifeng.com ). For 企业家需 ) in ) 12 郑永 , 2 ) - - opportunities producedbytheirinternationalexperiences. new the with government to proximity their balance they on how extent a large to depend will to China’sleaders advice long-termresearchandpolicy to providesystematic, to whichthink tanks willbeable The extent complicated. more Opinion allthe the This willmakeimplementing abroad. power and soft governance in China’sdomestic tools central can become control ofthinktanks, so they political and international exposure balance between delicate this their activities. continue to allowed be think tanksareto if precondition wei andFuYongarebothresearchersatthe Shanghai AcademyofSocialScience. jianshi yuguojijingyan jiejian ( International Experience” Learning from Think Tanksby of Type New Yong, “ToBuild and Fu Renwei 15 Huang 15 The Opinion is premised on maintaining TheOpinionispremised 中国新型智库建设与国际经验借鉴 ), Guoji Guanxi Yanjiu Guoji , No. 6, 2015, pp. 3-11. Huang Ren , Zhongguo xinxing zhiku - work to obtain leaders’ endorsements (批示, pishi) and China’s new think tank diplomacy explain policies […] but the real value of think tanks is to provide diverse options for how to respond to serious and Pascal Abb complicated international issues”.18 This points to the basic contradiction faced by state-dependent institutions in an authoritarian state: on the one hand, they are expected to Foreign policy has long been an important research area for improve policy outcomes, but on the other, they are often China’s think tank sector, and the Central Committee’s 2015 restricted to legitimising and interpreting decisions that plan to build “think tanks with Chinese characteristics” have already been made. further stresses the national importance of Chinese foreign policy think tanks (FPTTs).16 According to the directive, the Others put forward a more conservative vision. Lin Limin emergence of “unprecedentedly complex and difficult global argues that, because of its size, China has too many experts, issues” means that the government needs better foreign which means that high-level decision makers are flooded by policy advice, and FPTTs are described as “important competing policy suggestions.19 In his view, the solution is to carriers of national soft power” that are expected to focus on quality over quantity, by fostering an “elite of the conduct public diplomacy and other exchanges in order to elite”, who would presumably be given privileged access to “strengthen China’s international influence and the power decision makers. Zhao Minghao also identifies a mismatch of its discourse”. within China’s “marketplace of ideas”, but sees the main problem as being on the supply side: think tanks should As a result, Chinese FPTTs are quickly expanding their develop a better “policy feeling” and greater sensitivity portfolio of activities, their international networks, and their towards political demands by public profiles. This article will examine the ways in which "For Zhu Feng, “analysing leaders’ speeches Chinese think tankers and other experts have taken on these 'too many think and other key materials to new roles, their ideas about how to perform these roles, and tanks only work find out what is troubling their opinions on the overall progress of China’s FPTTs. to obtain leaders’ policymakers, and focus their Although the current think tank boom has been met with endorsements'" research accordingly”.20 widespread enthusiasm, it is important to note that think tank development is still shaped by China’s authoritarian This exchange can be seen as a snapshot of a much broader political environment. In order to avoid frustration later, debate on China’s future: whether the country should their international partners should maintain a realistic view persist with a top-down, state-centric approach, or whether of the opportunities and constraints faced by Chinese FPTTs. it should open up greater space for civil society. Quality versus quantity Internationalisation and “telling the China story” In Chinese debates about the future of the country’s FPTT Even without fundamental political and social liberalisation, sector, commentators agree that China’s rapid emergence however, Chinese FPTTs have already taken on many new as a pivotal global actor has placed much greater demands roles and activities, especially in terms of international on these institutes. In the past, Chinese diplomats have outreach. In the coming years, these will be showcased as often had to hash out positions and conduct negotiations China embarks on its first project of truly global scope: on issues like climate change without much intellectual the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) infrastructure initiative, support – think tanks should now become a kind of “early intended to upgrade transport links across Eurasia. warning system” and provide more timely advice to officials. Think tanks are closely involved in this project. They are However, as shown in a recent debate in a prominent expected to provide know-how for its realisation and to Chinese international relations journal, think tankers are carry out strategic coordination with international partners. split on how best to achieve this. Some, like Zhu Feng, call According to Shi Yulong, the issues surrounding OBOR are for FPTTs to have greater independence and more control “far more complicated and difficult than drawing up national over their own research agendas so as to boost creativity development strategies and policies, which opens a vast and avoid groupthink.17 According to the author, “Chinese space for think tanks to display their unique capabilities”.21 FPTTs must position themselves as an independent ‘social force’ (社会性的力量, shehuixing de liliang) in order to be 18 A “pishi” is basically an official’s endorsement of an internal policy suggestion, which is considered a great distinction and mark of influence for the author. able to provide different options and different voices on 19 Lin Limin, “Building Chinese think tanks: How to avoid overcrowding?” (中国智库 international issues”, and this would ultimately benefit 建设：如何避免‘千智万库’挤独木桥，Zhongguo zhiku jianshe: ruhe bimian ‘qian zhi wan ku’ jidu muqiao?), Xiandai Guoji Guanxi, April 2016. Lin Limin is a research profes- the government. At present, “too many think tanks only sor at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR). 20 Zhao Minghao, “The building of FPTTs must turn towards the key point” (国际问题智 16 “Opinion on strengthening the construction of new types of think tanks with Chinese 库建设需扭住关键环节, guoji wenti zhiku jianshe xu niuzhu guanjian huanjie), Xiandai characteristics” (关于加强中国特色新型智库建设的意见, Guanyu jiaqiang Zhongguo tese Guoji Guanxi, April 2016. Zhao Minghao is a researcher at the Contemporary World Stud- xinxing zhiku jianshe de yijian), State Council General Office, 1 January 2015. ies Center of the International Department of the Central Committee. 17 Zhu Feng, “Problems to be pondered and tackled in the development of Foreign Policy 21 Shi Yulong, “Using think tanks to support and promote the building of ‘One Belt, One Think Tanks” (国际问题研究智库发展中需要思考和解决的问题, Guoji wenti yanjiu zhiku Road’” (以智库为支撑推进’一带一路’建设, yi zhiku wei zhicheng tuijin ‘yi dai yi lu’ fazhan zhong xuyao sikao he jiejue de wenti), Xiandai Guoji Guanxi, April 2016. Zhu jianshe), China Development Observation, January 2016 (hereafter, Shi, “Using think Feng is a professor of International Relations at Nanjing University. tanks to support and promote the building of ‘One Belt, One Road’”). Shi Yulong is direc- 5 6 ECFR/184 August 2016 www.ecfr.eu CHINA ANALYSIS: A HUNDRED THINK TANK BLOOM IN CHINA Academy ofMacroeconomicResearch. of theNDRC’s and regionaleconomicresearch institute tor oftheterritorialdevelopment on sensitive new ideas,“especially todevelop be encouraged should institutes think tanks: Chinese between II exchanges Track programme of a morecomprehensive Wang suggests that actasopinionleadersandagendasetters. institutes without won cannot be of ideas” “battle global and the system”, diplomacy public entire the backbone of and informational intellectual problem: thinktanksare“the that thisisamajor Western counterparts.Wang believes their to compared influence global little have organisations China hasalargenumberofthinktanks, and althoughthese resources, of itsintellectual development the has outpaced interactions. state-to-state traditional beyond international ties creating role ofFPTTs the idealfuture in public diplomacy,outlines on experts China’s leading of Wang Lili,one by essay A recent with WestEuropeancounterparts. prominently inconsultations initiatives willlikelyfeature question ofhowtocoordinateOBOR with EuropeanUnion and the think tankmeetings, a mechanismforregular includes countries, already and EasternEuropean Central of Chinaand15 up “16+1” group,made involved: the be also will institutes European enterprises. Chinese to andprovideconsultation international exchanges facilitate International)( and Development 23 Wang Lili, think Chinese ( tanks “Building and expandingpublic diplomacy” Road’”. of ‘OneBelt,One building the and promote think tanks tosupport 22 Shi,“Using in the initiative, which the government can then use to make in theinitiative, whichthegovernmentcanthenusetomake studies aboutthesituationincountriesthatmaybeinvolved out regularexchangeswiththem, andconductingjoint by engagingforeignpartnersinpublicdiplomacy, carrying the project” also “buildastrongsocialfoundationfor should tanks think government, the to findings research providing in thenormsandrulesunderlyingglobalisation. Apartfrom about developments informed government the Chinese keep provide advice and risk assessments on specific projects, and strategic coordinationwithothermajorinvestment initiatives, who wouldliketoemulateit. Theyareexpectedtofacilitate explain theChinesedevelopmentmodeltoforeignaudiences internationally. To fulfil this task, think tanks are expected to Jinping hassetaspartoftheprojecttobuildingChina’s image ( They couldusethisopportunityto“tellagoodChinastory” at RenminUniversityofChina. and Strategy of Development National Academy the of director deputy Wang Liliisthe Quarterly Diplomacy 库建设与公共外交拓展， pingtai zhiku guoji zhiku hezuo lianmeng ( alliance” cooperation “OBOR thinktank joined networkslikethe have already them and manyof project, this to are naturallysuited FPTTs in area studies, With theirstrongcapabilities OBOR-related tasksandplaytheirroleontheworldstage. to becomemoreinternationalisediftheyarecarryouttheir have since they will tanks, think for top priority be a should funding decisions. Shibelieves thatinternationalisation 讲好中国故事 23 According to Wang, China’s economic rise AccordingtoWang, China’seconomic , jiang hao zhongguo gushi), a task that Xi , jianghaozhongguogushi), ataskthatXi , March 2013 (hereafter, Wang, “Building Chinese think tanks”). Chinese Wang, “Building , March2013 (hereafter, zhongguo zhiku jianshe yugonggong tuozhan waijiao ). These initiatives are designed to are designed initiatives ). These ) and the RDI platform (Research ) andthe 一带一路智库合作联盟蓝迪国际智库平台 , yidaiyilu , ), landi 中国智 Public 22 cannot achieve”. diplomacy that interstate results yield China willoften out of understanding a better giving them views, and their finding audiences, public foreign towards diplomacy communication, strengthening network intensifying with civil society to itsfounder,HanFangming, “in aglobalised diplomacy think tank. most prominentpublic According China’s as emerged organisation, has a non-governmental ( Charhar Society 2009, the arealreadybeingputintopractice.Since ideas Some ofthese intense internationalcooperationandexchanges. more through increased be should institutes Chinese of “brand awareness” global and the governmental institutes, of non- thedevelopment give taxincentivestoencourage government should up, thatthe be set think tanks”should diplomacy public general. Shesaysthatmore“specialised proposed toimprove thethink tank number ofsuggestions in sphere officially are they author makesa Finally, the authorities. Chinese the to before acceptability” and for “feasibility them testing counterparts, foreign their to directly them pitch to able be and should issues”, security Consultative Conference. November 2011. Political Han and memberofthePeople’s Fangming isabusinessman zhanlüe gonggong zhikuzuoyong ying zhongshi waijiao minjian non-governmental think tanks”( of role the to importance attach must strategy diplomacy Han Fangming,“China’spublic 25 24 Wang,“BuildingChinesethinktanks”. has risensharplyunderXi Jinping, on intellectuals pressure ideological notably,the Most in public. acknowledged – althoughthispointisrarely China’s system political from ultimately others arestructuralandstem sector, but the develop to a scheme overcome through and canbe are transient Some challenges. substantial faces still sector FPTT its out, pointing of never tire experts Chinese as China iscurrentlyin the throesof“thinktank fever”, but, Political controlanddomesticfunctionofFPTTs institutes. at traditional employed and relyingonapoolof“fellows” staffadministrative small a only keeping institute, mortar It is alsomoreofaplatformthanbricks-and- businesses. andfrom itsfounder from mostly donations, by financed are since itsoperations sector, state the activities beyond for thinktank a model may become Charhar Society The tothelocalcustomsofforeignpartners. and moreattuned rules, official by constrained less are they because possible that thegovernmentcouldnot. According toHan, this isonly actors to reachcivilsociety able have been networks, they of their Bymaking use heard andaccepted. their messages in getting time an easier have had Charhar Society the "think tanks are model to foreign model Chinese development Chinese like toemulateit audiences who would audiences expected to explainthe expected 25

" 中国公共外交战略应重视民间智库作用，察哈尔学会 found it hardtocarry found think tankshave Likewise, governmental private initiativeslike exchanges”, whereas and emotional dialogues out “heart-to-heart , chaha'er xuehui ), Southern Weekly 24

Zhongguo , 16 ), and repeated warnings not to spread “Western values” or “improperly discuss central government policies” have had How viable are private Chinese a chilling effect on policy discourse in China.26 think tanks?

Moreover, although FPTTs have now established a much Angela Stanzel and Abigael Vasselier larger presence in the media, their role in public discourse is often restricted. Because of the need to provide so- Since 2013, China’s President Xi Jinping has been calling called “public opinion guidance” (舆论引导, yulun for the establishment of new think tanks with Chinese yindao), especially on sensitive foreign policy issues, FPTT characteristics (中国特色新型智库，zhongguo tese xinxing statements are often propagandistic in nature and focused zhiku). The overall goal of this initiative is to improve the on endorsing or interpreting government policies, rather consulting mechanisms available to decision makers and than delivering new ideas or making genuinely critical to increase China’s soft power. To help achieve this, the assessments. Since the push to build “new-type think Central Committee published its “Opinion on strengthening tanks” will be overseen by the National Planning Office for the construction of new types of think tanks with Chinese Philosophy and Social Sciences (NPOPSS), a division of the characteristics” in January 2015. The document’s main Propaganda Department, this is unlikely to change. focus is on large state-run think tanks: it proposed a plan to set up 50 to 100 more of these.27 But as well as Finally, the recent expansion of the government’s anti- governmental and university think tanks, it calls for the corruption campaign has also had an impact on the development of “civilian think tanks” (民间智库，minjian work of Chinese scholars: new budgetary restrictions, zhiku), in particular linked to big private companies red tape, and shrinking “grey areas” have complicated and media groups. The expression “civilian think tanks” international exchange activities. In 2016, a new internal obscures major differences between these organisations, regulation limited overseas travel for Chinese academics both in terms of their relationship to the government, and to a maximum length of five days per country. This puts ultimately their capacity to influence policymaking.28 internationalisation under threat, and makes serious field research practically impossible. So many new Chinese think tanks are emerging so quickly that it seems impossible to keep track, to distinguish Western scholars and policymakers must be aware of these governmental from non-governmental organisations, or constraints and the reasons behind them when engaging to distinguish research from consultancy institutions. The with Chinese FPTTs. However, despite the difficult political new top-down approach to transforming think tanks, as environment, exchanges should be kept up – should the well as the proliferation of institutions, brings various winds shift again, China’s think tanks may be able to challenges for Chinese think tanks, (both old and new). realise their new roles much more fully, and investments in These challenges range from finding sufficient funding to partnerships now could bear even greater fruit in the future. establishing expertise and remaining independent from the state. As the following debate shows, these issues are a particular concern for non-governmental think tanks – and for some are even a matter of survival.

The emergence of media think tanks

Wang Yan says that the Chinese leadership and official media’s focus on the development of think tanks has caused a “Think Tank Spring” (智库春天, zhikun chuntian). She quotes an expert who says that the number of Chinese think tanks could double within a year. She describes the enthusiasm as that of a crowd following the latest fashion trend (赶时髦, ganshimao), scrambling to be first 争先 ( 恐后, zhengxiankonghou), and thoroughly confused (一哄而上, yi hong er shang). As a result, some scholars are concerned that this “Spring” will develop into a(nother) “Great Leap Forward” (大跃进, da yuejin): a movement with no clear direction or organisation.29

27 “Opinion on strengthening the construction of new types of think tanks with Chinese characteristics” (关于加强中国特色新型智库建设的意见, Guanyu jiaqiang Zhongguo tese xinxing zhiku jianshe de yijian), State Council General Office, 1 January 2015. 大陆新兴智库热潮 26 Nectar Gan, “China’s President Xi Jinping warns Communist Party schools against 28 Wang Yan, “Mainland China’s new think tank boom” ( , Dalu xinxing zhiku rechao), Phoenix Weekly, 7 June 2015 (hereafter, Wang, “Mainland China’s ‘Western capitalist’ values”, South China Morning Post, 1 May 2016, available at http:// new think tank boom”). Wang Yan is a journalist at Phoenix Weekly. www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1940396/chinas-president-xi-jinping-warns- communist-party. 29 Wang, “Mainland China’s new think tank boom”. 7 8 ECFR/184 August 2016 www.ecfr.eu CHINA ANALYSIS: A HUNDRED THINK TANK BLOOM IN CHINA 34 Wang,“MainlandChina’snewthinktank boom”. 33 Gao,“Whyarenewmediabecomingthink tanks?” 32 Gao,“Whyarenewmediabecomingthink tanks?” are newmediabecomingthinktanks?”).Gao Yangisajournalistat weishenme douzuozhiku? meiti Xin think tanks?” ( becoming media 31 GaoYang,“Whyarenew 30 Wang,“MainlandChina’snewthinktank boom”. are largelyignoredbythegovernment. they and feel lack funds they governmental system,because the of among thinktanksoutside dissatisfaction wider and tocarry out meaningfulresearch. establish to think tanks, many well-established among the themselves financially, survive to think struggle new media which tanks, facing difficulties the discusses article profitable, His or only barely,forthefoundingmediaoutlets. not are tanks think media most that says Gao report ontheinfluentialChinesethinktank”. the top15ofShanghaiAcademySocialSciences’ “2015 instance, Gaonotesthatnomediathinktankswereamong For counterparts. longer-established their as influential as in theirinfancy, andhavesomewaytogobeforetheyare to thegovernmentforyears. Still, theseorganisationsare agency hasbeenprovidingadvice andconsultancyservices within thesystem, since–totakeoneexampleXinhuanews outlets to develop their own influence. Often, they are already the existingnetworksandbrandsoftheirassociatedmedia their creationin2015.Theyhavesucceededbuildingon Gao stresseshowactivetheseorganisationshavebeensince online branchofPeople’sDaily. 分析室 ( Monitoring Unit Opinion Public Daily People’s zhiku Liao WangInstitution ( as the such outlets, media major public the by created mainly been think tanks. mainstream Chinese the became non-university thinktanks, which eventually of number a of creation the triggered crisis financial 2008 of the“Opinion”inJanuary 2015 publication – justasthe the after think tanksappeared of new generation this in writes Yang or so.Gao year past the in scene arrived onthe media thinktankshaveonly Most in marketresearchoncompaniesChinasince1992. Group, whichhasspecialised Horizon Research Consultancy the as such model, US the on firms consulting actually are Wang thatan increasing numberofthink also notes tanks globalisation. in relationto China’s development studying on scholars trainedabroad,andfocuses in 2008 by founded 与全球化智库 for ChinaandGlobalization( Centre tanks suchasthe think policy to public outlets, major publicly-owned by the media sector,generally by the from organisationsestablished think tanksranges non-governmental of landscape diverse Council). The State the of Centre Research Development the Party School,and Central the Social Sciences, of Academy Chinese (such asthe party-state by the supervised directly organisations to governmental thinktanks,asopposed Wang growing cohortisnon- Yan says thatthefastest ), which was founded by Xinhua news agency, andthe news by Xinhua ), whichwasfounded , renmin wang yuqing fen xishi , zhongguo yu quanqiu hua zhiku ), Time Weekly 31 , February2016 Gao, “Why (hereafter, Media think tankshave Media 34 瞭望智库 ), affiliated with the with affiliated ), 新媒体为什么都在做智库？ Time Weekly Time 33 Wang reports 32 Time Weekly , 人民网舆情 ). This was liaowang . 30 that 中国

, 古 ( Pangu tank think the of director Peng, Yi tanks. think highlights thecontradictionsinherentinnewcivilian nalists atthe are jour An, andLiuJieFei Yu Ziyi, Ye Era, TwoThinkTanks”). Meng and Liu, “One Ye, yige shidai, liangge zhiku Era, TwoThink Tanks” ( An, LiuJieFei,“One Yu Ziyi, Ye 36 Meng 35 Wang,“MainlandChina’snewthinktank boom”. to OBOR were availableon related issues. Some50pieces concentration oncertain since itcanleadtoexcessive this, about careful be to have they that says founder its but government, the to interest current of on topics in focusing effective particularly be to seems Pangu economy. regional lu One Belt,Road( on the focused research on urbanisation.In 2015, their 30 pieces some issues. In2014, Pangu published fashionable for example, and topical on content provide to think tanksis for challenge ( good advicetothegovernment” to suggest “responsibility it isa such asacademiccommittees.Yisayshebelieves channels communication unofficial the through in government influence some have even might Pangu webpage. Yi Peng’scommentaryonurbanisation ontheir published Daily People’s media. Forinstance,on18April2014, the Chinese the influence to managed has that entity private of a story–anexample as asuccess itself Pangu presents other areas. and internet, the urbanisation, finance, economics, in topics Pangu’s launch,ithadalreadypublishednine,dealingwith has producedlargenumbersofreports: twomonthsafter environment favourable created forthinktanksafterthe18thPartyCongress. It the from benefited and 2014, in was established Pangu in September2015. Financial Times the with interview an in tank think own his of influence and Wang describes civilian think tanks as being both “open both civilianthinktanksasbeing Wang describes opaque. highly remains policy influence to ability their and government the with of thinktanks’relationship question think tankpolicy.The new and directionofthe content appears tobeconfusionaboutthe – there Security State toChina’s Ministry of International Relations,attached Contemporary of China Institute the cites government –she policy independent the to linked institutions among the that research. Wangsays and objective, scientific, produce to resources nor the expertise the have neither institutions new the number of them, alarge funds availableto lack of the and established were which they with haste of the Because The trade-offbetweeninfluenceandautonomy 经世致用 , OBOR) infrastructure initiative anditsimpactonthe , OBOR)infrastructure , " A large number of the number of " Alarge nor the resources to nor the resources expertise the neither have institutions new policy research objective, produce and independent Pangu Financial TimesChina , ), expressed optimism about the development development the about optimism expressed ), jingshi zhiyong 36 ), Financial TimesChina . " ). He thinks the mostimportant , 23 September 2015 , (hereafter, Meng, 23 September Financial Times China Financial TimesChina in article Liu JieFei’s Ziyi, YeYuAn,and assessment, Meng with Wang’s In line er yinmidequnti 隐秘的群体 ( and secretive” 一带一路一个时代，两个智库 , , yi dai gongkai 公开而 ). 35 盘

- , Pangu’s website between January and September 2015.37 As with the numerous articles produced on the topic by Politburo Study Sessions: A chance most Chinese think tanks, there are questions about the to influence Chinese leaders? originality of this research. Kata Julianna Szabó In contrast to Pangu’s steady growth, the Financial Times’ authors discuss another think tank, the Unirule Institute of Expertise is a much sought-after commodity in Chinese Economics (天测经济院所, tianzi jingji yuan suo), which decision-making circles. The Politburo is constantly in has encountered more difficulties since its foundation in need of new information to help it to meet the domestic 1993. One of Unirule’s biggest challenges is simple financial and international challenges of the day, while the survival. It depends on public funding and consultancy Chinese Communist Party (CCP) values the tradition services to maintain its operations, and researchers have of learning from history.40 In order to satisfy these even had to contribute their own funds to keep it afloat. strategic and traditional requirements, a unique system Unirule evolved from an independent non-government adapted to Chinese particularities was invented by the organisation to being affiliated to a commercial consulting party: the Politburo’s “collective study” mechanism (集 firm. Since then, it has launched several fundraising 体学习, jiti xuexi). Using this system, external expertise campaigns, with some success: from 2010 to 2014, can be channelled into the Party in a manner that is enterprises and private companies (such as Lenovo) showed institutionalised and controlled – and therefore risk-free increased interest in providing it with funds. However, its for the party-state. situation remains precarious – it has relocated eight times in the past 20 years, moving from Beijing city centre to the outskirts of the capital.38 Intra-party study mechanisms have existed since the 1950s, but analysts usually date the establishment of the Unirule’s research focuses on macroeconomics, including Politburo’s collective study mechanism to 26 December public policy, reforms, business, law, and the constitutional 2002, when President Hu Jintao announced that party system. Unirule also aims to research more neglected officials should strengthen their study skills.41 Officials issues, such as inequality within Chinese society, which have done this by attending lectures on topical issues and relates to human rights. One of the challenges that come discussing their relevance for policy. These study sessions with dependence on public funds is the struggle to stay are primarily seen as a platform for the dissemination of independent, especially on such contentious issues. In information, where experts from outside the CCP have 2009, Shen Hong (a founding member and executive the opportunity to share their ideas with the core of the director of Unirule) mentioned the principle of neutrality Chinese leadership. But Chinese political analysts agree (中立原则，zhongli yuanze) in an interview with China that the mechanism increasingly provides an opportunity News Service, explaining that the organisation’s assessment for experts to set the policymaking agenda.42 of the implications of policies for the public interest should be neutral and not subject to any kind of influence.39 While Evolution under Xi Jinping Pangu and Unirule at first seemed to have a similar status, Unirule’s choice of topics seems to have cost it a lot. Still, Unirule’s originality should not be overstated: its output The structure of the study sessions has changed little remains close to the official line. since the time of Hu Jintao; the main difference is where they are held.43 In the past, study sessions were organised The Chinese government’s creation of a favourable exclusively at Zhongnanhai, the headquarters of the CCP environment for think tanks has led to the flourishing of non- and the central government. However, under Xi Jinping, governmental think tanks. These new organisations face the a new trend has emerged: sessions are now sometimes same challenges and opportunities as think tanks anywhere else in the world: in terms of funding, independence, impact, 40 Liu Shaohua, “CPC Politburo holds 30 study sessions in 3 years” (中央政治局3年30次集体学习, Zhongyang zhengzhiju 3 nian 30 ci jiti xuexi), Renminwang, 4 February 2016, and visibility. However, the constraints and limits upon available at http://www.chinaelections.org/article/851/240812.html (hereafter, Liu, “CPC Po- litburo holds 30 study sessions in 3 years”). Renminwang is the website of People’s Daily. them, especially the need to obtain government support, Liu Shaohua is a journalist for the People’s Daily. might make this new generation of think tanks short-lived. 41 Wang Lixin, “The structure of national learning abilities: from collective study sessions of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee to individual research” (国家学习能力的建构 — — 以中共中央政治局集体学习制度为个案的研究, Guojia xuexi nengli de jiangou – yi zhonggong zhongying zhengzhiju jiti xuexi zhidu wei gean de yanjiu), Fudan Political Science Review (Fudan Zhengzhixue Pinlun), 2015, Vol. 1, available at http://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTotal-FDZZ201500005.htm (hereafter, Wang, “The structure of national learning abilities”). Wang Lixin is a researcher at the Department of Law and Political Science of the Shanghai Normal University. 42 Liu, “CPC Politburo holds 30 study sessions in 3 years”. 43 The study sessions, which last around two hours and take place every 40 days on aver- age, are thoroughly prepared. The lecturers are carefully selected. They are experienced professionals, mostly professors or researchers, who have domestic and international credentials in the selected topic. A topic or policy area is deemed relevant if it covers 37 Meng, Ye, and Liu, “One Era, Two Think Tanks”. an issue that is traditionally important to the CPC, such as Marxist ideology or peaceful development, or if the issue is of pressing global or domestic importance, such as the 38 Meng, Ye, and Liu, “One Era, Two Think Tanks”. rule of law, fighting corruption, or the economic crisis (Wang, “The structure of national 39 Meng, Ye, and Liu, “One Era, Two Think Tanks”. learning abilities”). 9 10 ECFR/184 August 2016 www.ecfr.eu CHINA ANALYSIS: A HUNDRED THINK TANK BLOOM IN CHINA 48 Wang,“Thestructureofnationallearning abilities”. scenes ofthe92CCPPolitburostudysessions”, at able Zhongyang jiemi muhou xuexi zhengzhiju 92 cijiti ( sessions” study 92 CCPPolitburo the of scenes the in 3 years”; “Behind sessions 30 study Politburo holds Liu, “CPC also on 9 March 2014. expression See this Jinping coined Xi oneself.” takings andconducting inplanning matters,startingunder Be steady anddiscipliningoneself. of power abuse yaoshi yaoshi, chuangye xiushen, yanyiyongquan,youmoushi yanyi lvji, yaoshi, zuoren phrase Chinese from anabbreviationofthe comes Stricts andThreeSteadies” The“Three 47 46 Liu,“CPCPolitburoholds30studysessionsin3years”. is anewspaperissuedbytheBeijingPropagandaDepartmentofCPC. Mechanism”, Study Politburo’s Collective of the litical “Secrets” 2016, at available 学习的“政治密码 ( Mechanism” Study Politburo’s Collective of the 45 “ThePolitical“Secrets” 44 Liu,“CPCPolitburoholds30studysessionsin3years”. and moreopen. clearersessions the of output the make to wants Wang study material, includingdiscussiontopics. greater publicitywasgiventosessionreportsandother recommendations basedontheadviceoflecturers, andif policy drafted officials if effective more made be could improvement. Hethinksthatthestudymechanism However, hestressesthatthereisstillroomfor technological, andsocietaldevelopments inChina. of renewingitselfandadaptingtothelatesteconomic, Wang arguesthattheCPChasproveditiscapable to whichXiwantsPartymembersconform. Steadies” ( China, andtheissueof“ThreeStrictsThree anti-corruption efforts and their implications for modern In particular,thesessionshave dealtwiththehistoryof in thestudysessionsheldfor16thand17thPolitburo. and Party affairs are also more important than they were the economy,andhousingindustry. Marxistideology of transformation the system, financial the of reform the been particularlyfocusedoneconomicissues, including broad topics, the18thPolitburo’s studysessionshave reform” ( 展革开放 by the18thPolitburohavebeen“reformandopening”( heldsessions the in discussion of topics important most the governanceofpartyandcountry. Thethree and strategy, defence affairs, international and domestic three andahalfyears, includingdevelopment reform, lastthe over topics of range wide a covered have Sessions information intothegovernment. better networkingopportunities, notjustchannelling providing and studying from benefits practical achieving at in thefunctionofstudysessions: theyarenowaimed strategies. Science Parktodiscussinnovation-driven development Politburo helditsninthstudysessionattheZhongguancun current the when 2013, September 30 on place took first conducted on-siteatfactoriesorinnovationparks. This , heping fazhanheping ), which translates as “Be strict in cultivating one’s moralcharacter,preventing in cultivating strict as “Be translates ), which http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2014/0603/c64387-25093927.html 严以修身、严以用权、严以律己，又谋事要实、创业要实、做人要实 , gaige kaifang 司法体制改革 44 三严三实 http://www.chinaelections.com/article/851/240780.html ”, The change in setting corresponds to a change Thechangeinsettingcorrespondstoa Zhengzhiju xuexide“zhengzhijiti mima“ ), and comprehensive “judicial system“judicial comprehensive and ), , sanyan, sanshi ), “peacefuldevelopment” ( , 中共中央政治局92次集体学习幕后揭秘 sifa tizhi gaige Jinghua Shibao 45 ),

Jinghua Shibao ) –asetofprinciples ). ), ). 46 Xinjingbao (hereafter,“Behindthe Xinjingbao Beyondthese (hereafter, “The Po (hereafter, , 3June2014, avail 48 47 Overall, ). , , 1 February Zhonggong Xinjingbao 和平发政治局集体 ( yanyi 改 - - -

54 Mo,“ForeignResearchers”. Magazine Li isajournalistat Researchers”). Mo March 2016Mo, “Foreign (hereafter, cong Fu Shan he Zheng Yongnian kan ziyou xueshu renge duli ──從福山和鄭永年看獨立自由學術人格 ( Research” Academic of and Independence Freedom the about 53 MoLi, “Foreign Researchers EnteringZhongnanhai: Fukuyama andZhengYongnian 52 Wang,“Thestructureofnationallearning abilities”. 51 “Behindthescenesof92CCPPolitburostudysessions”,JinghuaShibao. 26 March2015,availableat 习都请哪些“老师” ( sessions?” study Politburo for the ‘professors’ invited nance. “Whoarethe ous anti-corruptioncampaigns. Bu Xianqun also spokeon the evolutionofChinesegover previ academicians BuXianqunandFangNing, who discussed were 50 Thetwolecturers 49 “ThePolitical“Secrets”ofthePolitburo’sCollectiveStudyMechanism”, The intellectuals with access to the top leadership Wang is in favour of this change, and suggests making the Wang isinfavourofthischange,andsuggestsmakingthe no lecturers were invited, andthere (CASS) were Sciences of Social Academy Chinese from the researchers only two term, Xi’s of years two first the during instance, for down; – hasgone sessions for the lecturers main sourceof the previously – institutions government-linked academic of Baidu, Robin Li, lecturers. was oneofthe visit toZhongguancun, the CEOofinternetcompany more importantrole: for instance,duringthePolitburo’s a areplaying too, people, Business officials. government including, centralandlocal invited togivelectures, been Jinping, have Xi a morediverserangeofspeakers under but background – on scholarsfromanacademic relied mostly sources, Chinese to Politburo, according The 16thand17th to easilyunderstandeachother. since thegapbetweentheirphilosophiesistoowideforthem Chinese leadersisoftenasortof“chickenandducktalk”, Mo statesthatdialoguebetweennon-Chinesescholarsand more influence than those of Chinese scholars. Nevertheless, Mo showsthatforeign-basedscholarsoftenseemtohave were recentlyinvitedtoBeijingmeetXiJinping inperson, Yongnian andUSpoliticalscientistFrancisFukuyama, who examples oftheSingapore-basedChinesescholarZheng as wellforeignscholarswithoutChineseroots?Usingthe countries, other in based scholars Chinese specifically, more could studysessionsalsoincludeforeign-basedscholars–or formation. policy influence to ability official party lineinordertoprotecttheircareers, whichlimitstheir the to stick must China in intellectuals that argues decision-making process. ButMoLi, aHongKongauthor, mostly considerthatexternallecturersaddvaluetothe of intellectualsfromoutsidetheCCP.Mainlandanalysts and importance role the on disagree counterparts Kong Hong lecturers stillfurther. study mechanismmoreopenbybroadeningtheselectionof "Mo showsthat Chinese scholars foreign-based influence than influence seem to have more to seem scholars often . , Zhengzhiju jiti xuexi dou qingnaxie‘laoshi’ xuexi Zhengzhiju jiti http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2015-03/26/c_127621872.htm 52 However, mainland experts and their However, mainlandexpertsandtheir " , Dang waibin xuezhe Zhongnanhai Dang waibin jinguo – organisation. any other than sessions to the more lecturers sent institutions two these period. Council inthis State the of Centre Research Development from the 54

53 50 Following this idea, idea, Following this UnderHuJintao, ), 49 51 Zhengming Magazine ), 當外賓學者進過中南海 Thenumber

Beijing Youth Daily Beijing Youth 政治局集体学 Xinjingbao Zhengming . . - - , , Since 2002, the collective study mechanism has evolved About the authors from an opportunity for theoretical discussions into a platform for policymaking and networking. The most François Godement is director of the China & Asia programme remarkable change is the broader the recruitment of and a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign speakers. While their level of impact remains unclear, Relations. He is also a non-resident senior associate of the intellectuals from diverse backgrounds are now able to Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, speak to the core of China’s leadership. D.C., and an outside consultant for the Policy Planning Staff of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He can be reached at [email protected].

Silvia Menegazzi is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at LUISS Guido Carli University in Rome. She can be reached at [email protected].

Pascal Abb is a research fellow at the GIGA Institute of Asian Studies. He can be reached at pascal.abb@giga- hamburg.de.

Angela Stanzel is a Policy Fellow for the ECFR's Asia and China Programme. She can be reached at angela.stanzel@ ecfr.eu.

Abigaël Vasselier is the Programme Coordinator for the ECFR's Asia and China Programme. She can be reached at [email protected].

Kata Julianna Szabó is a Research Assistant at the D-GESS Departement, ETH Zürich. She can be reached at kata. [email protected].

Jérôme Doyon is the editor-in-chief of China Analysis, and an associate policy fellow for the ECFR's Asia & China Programme. He can be reached at [email protected].

ECFR would like to thank Justine Doody for her help in preparing the text for publication.

This paper does not represent the collective views of ECFR, but only the view of its authors.

Copyright of this publication is held by the European Council on Foreign Relations. You may not copy, reproduce, republish or circulate in any way the content from this publication except for your own personal and non- commercial use. Any other use requires prior written permission.

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