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Ph 327P: the Philosophy of Wittgenstein Fall 2009

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Ph 327P: the Philosophy of Wittgenstein Fall 2009 PH 327P: THE PHILOSOPHY OF WITTGENSTEIN FALL 2009 Class Meetings: Wed., Fri., 12:20-2:10, Ladd 106 Instructor: Professor Matthew Ostrow, Department of Philosophy Office: 214 Ladd Hall Email address: [email protected] Phone: 580-5403 Home phone: 583-3726 Office Hours: T: 3:30-4:30; W: 2:45-3:45; TH: 12:30-1:30; and by appointment Texts: Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus Notebooks 1914-1916 Philosophical Remarks Philosophical Occasions Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, and Religious Belief Philosophical Investigations Packet of Readings Aims of the Course: Ludwig Wittgenstein is often described as the greatest philosopher of the twentieth century; he is almost certainly the most widely referenced. While his work is associated with questions about the nature of language, his concerns extend to logic and mathematics, the mind, ethics, aesthetics, and religion. Above all, however, Wittgenstein’s aim is to explore the nature of philosophy itself. He is indeed quite radical in this regard, insisting on the illusory nature of philosophical problems. Thus in the Philosophical Investigations he famously describes philosophy as “a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language (PI 109).” In the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus he claims that philosophical problems result from a “misunderstanding of the logic of our language” (TLP, p. 27). Although these remarks might seem to suggest that Wittgenstein’s thought is to be understood in connection with the scientism of the Logical Positivists, he explicitly distanced himself from this whole approach. Moreover, we also find in Wittgenstein’s writings a very un-Positivistic concern with ethics and the inexpressible: “The solution of the riddle of life in space and time lies outside space and time” (TLP 6.4312). Given the apparent incompatibility of such claims, as well as the terse, aphoristic style of Wittgenstein’s writing, it is no wonder that his work has been subject to a remarkably wide variety of interpretations. In this course, we will focus primarily on Wittgenstein’s first work, the Tractatus, and on the Philosophical Investigations, the paradigmatic expression of his later philosophy, but we will also touch on writings from his middle period. Throughout, we will be engaged in very close, careful readings of the texts, as it is only in this way that one can hope to understand the thought of this most profound and enigmatic of philosophers. Requirements: Regular attendance is required. Unless there is a genuine issue, you will lose one grade increment for each absence (e.g., with one absence a final grade of “A” will become an “A-”, with two it will become a B+). In addition, there will be two moderately long papers and an ongoing philosophical journal; you may be asked to do a presentation as well. Participation in class discussion is strongly encouraged. SCHEDULE September 9 Introduction, 11 Packet reading 1: Frege, Preface to Begriffsschrift, pp. 5-8; Reading 2: Frege’s “On Concept and Object,” pp. 182-188 16 “On Concept and Object,” pp. 188-194; Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus (TLP) Preface; Notebooks 39 (23/1/15); Notebooks 53 (1/16/15): Packet Reading 3: Carnap’s “Elimination of Metaphysics” 18 TLP Preface; 4-4.0031, 4.1-4.122, 6.53-7; Philosophical Remarks 2; Handout: Diamond’s “Throwing Away the Ladder” 23 TLP 1-2.063; 4.1272 25 TLP 1-2.063; 3.24, Notebooks 59-71 30 TLP 2.06-2.18, Notebooks, pp. 5-30 October 2 TLP 2.1-3; 4.01-4.03; Philosophical Remarks 10-46; Packet Reading 5: Frege’s “On Sense and Meaning” 7 TLP 3-3.3; 4-4.0031; Packet reading 4: “On Denoting”; Notebooks pp. 59-71 9 Tractatus 3.31-3.5; 5.473-5.4733; Reading 6: Russell’s “Mathematical Logic” 14 TLP 4.12-4.1251; 5.55-5.5571; Notebooks, pp. 108-113; Philosophical Occasions, pp. 29-35 (“Some Remarks on Logical Form”) 16 TLP 2.2-2.225; 3.4-3.42; 4.02-4.0641; 5.51-5.5151; 4.46-4.4661; Notebooks 23-29 21 TLP 4.3-5; 6.1-6.2 23 NO CLASS (Study Day) 28 TLP 5.5; 5.54-5.641; Packet Reading 7: Russell’s “On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood”; First Paper Due 30 TLP 6.36311-7; Philosophical Occasions, pp. 37-44 (“Lecture on Ethics”); Notebooks, pp. 72-91 November 4 Lectures and Conversations, pp. 1-11, 53-72; Philosophical Occasions, pp. 161-63; 173-79; 189-95 6 Philosophical Investigations (PI) 109-33; Preface and remarks 1- 24; Handout: Goldfarb’s “I Want You To Bring Me a Slab” 11 PI 25-45 13 PI 46-64 18 PI 65-108 November 25 NO CLASS (Thanksgiving Break) 27 NO CLASS (Thanksgiving Break) December 2 PI 134-156 4 PI 179-219 9 PI 220-257 11 PI 258-309 Final Paper Due: May 16 WORKS BY WITTGENSTEIN Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, C.K. Ogden, trans., Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., London. English translation reprinted with corrections, 1933. Philosophical Investigations, G.E.M. Anscombe and R. Rhees (eds.), G.E.M. Anscombe (trans.), third ed. Macmillan, 1958. The Blue and Brown Books: Preliminary Studies for PI. Harper & Row, 1960. Notebooks 1914-16, G.H. von Wright and G.E.M. Anscombe (eds.), G.E.M. Anscombe (trans.). Blackwell, Oxford, 1961. Geheime Tagebücher 1914-1916, Wilhelm Baum.Vienna (ed.). Berlin: Turia und Kant, 1991. Philosophical Occasions 1912-1951, James Klagge and Alfred Nordmann (eds.). Hackett, Indianapolis, 1993. Ludwig Wittgenstein: Cambridge Letters, Brian McGuinness and G.H. von Wright (eds.). Blackwell, Cambridge, 1995. Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle, shorthand notes recorded by F. Waismann, B. McGuinness (ed.), J. Schulte and B. McGuiness (trans.). Blackwell, Oxford, 1973. Philosophical Remarks, Rush Rhees (ed.), Hargreaves and White (trans.). Blackwell, 1975. Philosophical Grammar, R. Rhees (ed.), A.J.P. Kenny (trans.). Blackwell, Oxford, 1974. Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, G.E.M. Anscombe, R. Rhees, G.H. von Wright (eds.), G.E.M. Anscombe (trans.). MIT, 2nd, 1978. Cambridge Lectures 1930-32, D. Lee (ed.). Blackwell, 1980. Cambridge Lectures: 1932-1935, from the Notes of Alice Ambrose and Margaret Macdonald, Alice Ambrose (ed.). Rowman and Littlefield, Totowa, N.J., reprinted by the University of Chicago Press, 1979. Wittgenstein's 1939 Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, C. Diamond (ed.). Chicago 1989. Culture and Value, G.H. von Wright and H. Nyman (eds.), Peter Winch (trans.). University of Chicago Press, 1980. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Briefe: Briefwechsel mit B. Russell, G.E. Moore, J.M. Keynes, F.P. Ramsey, W. Eccles, P. Engelmann und L. von Ficker, B.F. McGuinness and G.H. von Wright (eds.). Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1980. Zettel, Anscombe and von Wright (eds.). Blackwell, 1967. Remarks on Color, Anscombe (ed.). California, 1977. On Certainty, G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wrights (eds.). Harper, 1972. Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, vol. I. Chicago, 1980. Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, vol. II. Chicago, 1980. Lectures on Philosophical Psychology 1946-1947, Chicago 1988. Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. I. Von Wright, Heikki Nyman (eds.), C.G. Luckhardt, Maximilian A. E. Aue (trans.). Chicago, 1982. Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 2, The Inner and the Outer. Blackwell, 1992. Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief, Cyril Barrett (ed.). California. BIOGRAPHICAL READINGS: D. Edmonds’ and J. Eidinow’s Wittgenstein’s Poker. HarperCollins, 2001. N. Malcolm's Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir. Oxford University Press, 1984. B. McGuiness' Wittgenstein: A Life. University of California Press, 1988. R. Monk's Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius. Free Press/Maxwell-Macmillan, 1990. R. Rhees, ed., Ludwig Wittgenstein: Personal Recollections. Oxford, 1984. SELECTED SECONDARY WORKS: Anscombe, G. E., 1959, An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. Harper & Row, 1959. Black, Max, A Companion to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. Cornell, 1964. Burnyeat, Miles, “Wittgenstein and Augustine’s ‘The Teacher’”, Arist. Soc. Supp. LXI Conant, James, “The Method of the Tractatus,” in E. Reck (ed.), From Frege to Wittgenstein. Oxford, 2002 Cavell, The Claim of Reason. Oxford University Press, 1979. Diamond, The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy and the Mind. M.I.T. 1991. Diamond, "Ethics, Imagination and the Method of Wittgenstein's Tractatus", in eds. Crary and Read, The New Wittgenstein. Routledge, 2000. Dreben and Floyd, "Tautology: How Not to Use A Word", Synthese 87,1, 1991: 23-50. Floyd, "The Uncaptive Eye: Solipsism in the Tractatus" in L. Rouner, ed., Loneliness. Notre Dame. Goldfarb, "I Want You To Bring Me A Slab", Synthese 56: 265-282. Goldfarb, "Wittgenstein on Understanding", in P.A. French, T.E. Uehling, Jr., H.K. Wettstein, T The Wittgenstein Legacy. Midwest Studies in Philosopy Volume XVII. Janik and Toulmin, Wittgenstein’s Vienna. Weidenfeld &Nicolson, 1973. Malcolm, Nothing is Hidden: Wittgenstein's Criticism of his Early Thought. Blackwells, 1986.. Minar, "Feeling at Home in Language (What Makes Reading Philosophical Investigations Possible?)”, Synthese 102, 1995: 413-452. Mounce, Wittgenstein's Tractatus: An Introduction. University of Chicago Press, 1981. Ostrow, Wittgenstein’s Tractatus: A Dialectical Interpretation. Cambridge, 2002. Pears, The False Prison: A Study of the Development of Wittgenstein's Philosophy. 2 vols, Oxford University, 1987. Phillips, Wittgenstein on Religion. St. Martin's, 1993. Rhees, “Wittgenstein’s Builders”, in his Discussions of Wittgenstein. Schocken, 1970. Sluga and Stern, eds., The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein. Cambridge, 1996. Stern, Wittgenstein on Mind and Language, Oxford University Press, 1995. Stroud, B., “Wittgenstein’s ‘Treatment’ of the Quest for ‘A language which describes my inner experiences and which only I myself can understand”, in Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. Hölder Pichler Tempsky, 1983. .
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