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HEGEL’S LOGIC OF ABSOLUTE IDEALISM AND HIS POLITICAL ARGUMENT: THE CONCEPTUALITY OF ACTUALITY A Dissertation Submitted to the Temple University Graduate Board in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY by Matthew J. Smetona May, 2010 Examining Committee Members: Aryeh Botwinick, Advisory Chair, Political Science Joseph M. Schwartz, Political Science Carol C. Gould, Philosophy and Political Science Joseph Margolis, External Member, Philosophy i © by Matthew J. Smetona 2010 All Rights Reserved ii ABSTRACT Title: Hegel’s Logic of Absolute Idealism and his Political Argument: The Conceptuality of Actuality Candidate’s Name: Matthew J. Smetona Degree: Doctor of Philosophy Temple University, 2010 Doctoral Advisory Committee Chair: Aryeh Botwinick This dissertation is about the theoretical foundation of Hegel’s political argument. Its goal is to comprehend the basic structure of that argument by articulating the conceptual framework Hegel employs when he asserts that the particular set of political institutions he is arguing for is rational. Its argument is that the criterion Hegel employs in his conception of rationality is that an object is rational if and only if it is comprehended by thought in and through the holistic inferential system of concepts he refers to as the Concept ( der Begriff ). Hegel’s final argument in the Science of Logic is that there can be no actual object that is not “rational,” i.e., that is not constituted, in all of its determinations, by the unified activity of thinking that is the Concept. Consequently, it is argued that the rationality, and therewith the actuality, of Hegel’s rational state depicted in the Philosophy of Right derives from the fact that it is comprehended by thought in and through the totality as thought that is the Concept. Further, because the Science of Logic demonstrates the totality of actuality to be the constituted reflection of the Concept itself to itself, and because the Philosophy of Right depicts the objective- mental form of actuality in particular, it is argued that the Philosophy of Right is nothing more than the determinate reflection of the Science of Logic , the repetition of the movement of the pure logical Concept depicted therein at its highest level of determinateness. The comprehension by thought of the object of right in and through the Concept in the Philosophy of Right is therefore the Concept’s comprehension of itself, iii and this rational comprehension is indicated by Hegel through his presentation of the Philosophy of Right as the determinate reflection of the Science of Logic . This unified logical interpretation of Hegel’s political philosophy is opposed not only to recent “practical” interpretations which dispense entirely with Hegel’s theoretical philosophy, but also to recent transcendental interpretations which incorrectly attribute to Hegel the position that the determining activity of thought is limited to the form of the object of its cognition. iv DEDICATION To my wife, Susan Smetona, who not only tolerates the time I spend with German philosophical texts when there is so much else to do with one’s life, but also provides me with loving support and encouragement. v TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... iii DEDICATION .....................................................................................................................v ABBREVIATIONS .......................................................................................................... vii LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................. xi CHAPTER 1. HEGEL’S CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL: PRELIMINARIES ...................................................................................................1 2. THE PROBLEM OF SUBJECTIVITY IN THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND .............................................................83 3. THE DOCTRINE OF THE CONCEPT IN THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC ............................................................................115 4. THE IDENTITY OF RATIONALITY AND ACTUALITY .............................................................................................163 5. ABSTRACT RIGHT AND MORALITY ............................................................201 6. THE FAMILY AND CIVIL SOCIETY ..............................................................265 7. HEGEL’S CONCEPT OF THE RATIONAL STATE ........................................325 BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................383 vi ABBREVIATIONS The original German will be cited along with the standard English translations, with German pagination followed by English pagination, separated by a slash (/). In works cited by section (§), remarks ( Anmerkungen ) are indicated by “A” and additions ( Zusätze ) by “Z.” Translations of previously untranslated writings are my own. Writings of G. W. F. Hegel (1770-1831) BA Rede zum Antritt des philosophischen Lehramtes an der Universität Berlin (1818). In GW XVIII, pp. 9-31. “Inaugural Address, Delivered at the University of Berlin (22 October 1818).” In Hegel: Political Writings , pp. 181-185. Translated by H. B. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. EG Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften III (1817, rev. 1827, 1830). TW X. Cited by section (§) number. Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind . Translated by William Wallace and A. V. Miller. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971. EL Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften I (1817, rev. 1827, 1830). TW VIII. Cited by section (§) number. Hegel’s Logic . Translated by William Wallace. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975. EN Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften II (1817, rev. 1827, 1830). TW IX. Cited by section (§) number. Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature . Translated by A. V. Miller. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970. ER Über die englische Reformbill (1831). In GW XVI, pp. 323-404. “On the English Reform Bill.” In Hegel: Political Writings , pp. 234-270. GW Gesammelte Werke . Edited by the Nordrhein-Westfälischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1968-. Cited by volume and page number. PG1 Jenaer Systementwürfe I: Philosophie des Geistes (1803-1804). In GW VI, pp. 265-326. PG2 Jenaer Systementwürfe III: Philosophie des Geistes (1805-1806). In GW VIII, pp. 185-288. PhG Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807). GW IX. Cited by page number. Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit . Translated by A. V. Miller. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977. Cited by paragraph (¶) number. vii PR Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (1821). TW VII. Cited by (§) number. Preface cited by page number. Hegel: Elements of the Philosophy of Right . Translated by H. B. Nisbet. Edited by Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. TW Werke Theorie Werkausgabe . Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970. Cited by volume and page number. VA Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik . 3 vols. TW XIII-XV. Cited by volume and page number. Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art . Translated by T. M. Knox. 2 vols. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975. VGP Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie . 3 vols. TW XVIII-XX. Cited by volume and page number. Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy . 3 vols. Translated by Elizabeth Haldane. New York: Humanities Press, 1968. VPG Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte . TW XII. The Philosophy of History . Translated by J. Sibree. New York: Dover, 1956. VPR1 Vorlesungen über Rechtsphilosophie (1818-1831). vol. 1: Der objektive Geist aus der Heidelberger Enzyklopädie 1817 mit Hegels Vorlesungsnotizen 1818-1819. Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft nach der Vorlesungsnachschrift von C. G. Homeyer 1818/19. Zeitgenössische Rezensionen der Rechtsphilosophie . Edited by K.-H. Ilting. Stuttgart: Frommann Verlag, 1973. VPR2 Vorlesungen über Rechtsphilosophie (1818-1831). vol. 2: Die Rechtsphilosophie von 1820 mit Hegels Vorlesungsnotizen 1821-1825 . Edited by K.-H. Ilting. Stuttgart: Frommann Verlag, 1973. VPR3 Vorlesungen über Rechtsphilosophie (1818-1831). vol. 3: Philosophie des Rechts nach der Vorlesungsnachschrift von H. G. Hotho 1822/23 . Edited by K.-H. Ilting. Stuttgart: Frommann Verlag, 1973. VPR4 Vorlesungen über Rechtsphilosophie (1818-1831). vol. 4: Philosophie des Rechts nach der Enzyklopädie zweite und dritte Auflage (1827 und 1830). Philosophie des Rechts nach der Vorlesungsnachschrift von D. F. Strauss 1831 mit Hegels Vorlesungsnotizen (Greisheim Nachschrift). Edited by K.-H. Ilting. Stuttgart: Frommann Verlag, 1973. VPW Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte . Edited by J. Hoffmeister. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1955. Lectures on the Philosophy of World History . “Introduction.” Translated by H. B. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975. viii WBN Über die wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts, seine Stelle in der praktischen Philosophie und sein Verhältnis zu den positiven Rechtswissenschaften (1802-1803). In GW IV, pp. 417-485. “On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law, on its Place in Practical Philosophy and its Relation to the Positive Sciences of Right.” In Hegel: Political Writings , pp. 102-180. WL Wissenschaft der Logik (1812-1816, bk. 1 rev. 1831). 3 bks. GW XXI (erster Band, die objektive Logik: erstes Buch, die Lehre vom Sein ), GW XI ( erster Band, die objektive Logik:
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